1. ALFREDO TANO vs. HON. GOV. SALVADOR P.

SOCRATES

G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to
January 1, 1998.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33,
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period five (5) years in and coming
from Palawan waters.

Petitioners contend that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances are valid exercise of police power

RULING: YES. Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the
provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority
to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.

Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing
resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the
ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end
that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the
generations to come.

The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong
to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
"exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State." 

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the
duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran, this Court
declared:

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. . . .

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly
mentions this right:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
 essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the
LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community."

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and
impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of
explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods
of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to
enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall
include, inter alia, ordinances that "protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing
. . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes, or of ecological imbalance."

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the
Constitution. Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that
"any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in
case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned." Devolution refers to the act by which the
National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities.

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters.

In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers
granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under
Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the
exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to
establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of
five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in
municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The
devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April
1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC
and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.

2. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. CITY OF CEBU

G.R. No. 159110               December 10, 2013

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize
the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions
and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality and validity of the ordinance on the ground that the
ordinance constituted a contravention of the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by
authorizing the immobilization of offending vehicles through the clamping of tires. 

Issue: 1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the
City of Cebu; and

2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality,
particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.

RULING: YES. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e.,involving inherent merit, like the conformity of
the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of
Cebu?

Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only
such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to
enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also
generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law.
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part
of the Government.

If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the
protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable
requirement, due process is likewise violated.

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with that kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when
it takes a particular action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is sufficient justification for the government’s action. Case law in the United
States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of
scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary
to achieve a compelling government purpose.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad
enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and
sidewalks, which were precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in a vowedly aiming to ensure "a
smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times" (Section 1).

Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population
and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the
public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in
order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic
congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.

Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose
vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel
enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an
administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest
directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and
Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña–officials named in the
ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of
the stipulated fine. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance
was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for
illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to
move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping
would happen only to prevent the transgress or from using the vehicle itself to escape the due
sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary
impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of
the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle
would not be deprived of his property.

In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
elements of fairness and reasonableness.

Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many
instances under our laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not
necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the
passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive suspension of a civil
servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the
padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.

The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of
others similarly situated) was of the same character as the aforecited established exceptions
dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by
clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of
apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the
lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process,
forgiving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could
equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not
indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce
the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply
driving away.

3. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.

G.R. No. 156052             March 7, 2007

FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8027. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist
from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option."

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97 and declared that the MOU
was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30,
2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that
Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.

ISSUE: 1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8027.

RULING: 1) YES. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.

When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a
direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor,
to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance
No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It
is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.

2) We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing
that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
 4. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.

G.R. No. 156052             February 13, 2008

FACTS: Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon, in an original petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to
compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies.

On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)8 with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down
of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.9 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared
that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. 10 Thereafter, on
January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 1311 extending the validity of Resolution
No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the
oil companies.12

This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7, 2007
decision. We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code
(LGC) to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city," 13 including
Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered
into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by
the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the resolutions which ratified the
MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.

After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene
and filed motions for reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007
respectively. On April 11, 2007, we conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners,
respondent and movants-intervenors oil companies and DOE.

During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Court’s power to rule on the constitutionality
and validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of consolidated cases involving this issue
in the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid

RULING:

Mandamus Lies To Compel Respondent Mayor To Enforce Ordinance No. 8027

The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the
separation of powers of the executive and judiciary. Indeed, the Courts will not interfere
by mandamus proceedings with the legislative [or executive departments] of the government in the
legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be
performed by some officer thereof.

This is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the power to compel "the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station."

They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel respondent to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was to seek relief from the President of the Philippines through
the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the President’s
power of supervision over local government units. Again, we disagree. A party need not go first to
the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be
unreasonably long, tedious and consequently injurious to the interests of the local government unit
(LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. Besides, petitioners’ resort to an
original action for mandamus before this Court is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027

Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its
police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the
welfare of the people is the supreme law). While police power rests primarily with the national
legislature, such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare
clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.

LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this
case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the city.

This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to "reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city."

The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of Police Power

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled
to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the
area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.

The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such
a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove
these terminals to dissipate the threat.

Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the
public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Clearly,
the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And
to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or
welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified
the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as
a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a
given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. As a
result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present
location will no longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit
of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust

We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which Amounts To Taking
Without Compensation

The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have invested
billions of pesos in the depot. Its forced closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous
costs in constructing new facilities.

In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote
public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the
state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and
applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the
other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a
taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount
rights of the public.

In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence
there is no compensable taking. In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other
businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can
be applied to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory

The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and
residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation
Code.

An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and
substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. Here, there is a reasonable
classification. We reiterate that what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation
that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-
value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be
nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there
is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which provides for the cessation of the
operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose
of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was
enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and
industries in the area it delineated.

Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent With RA 7638 And RA 8479

The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it
contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) 145 and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation
Law of 1998).

Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress. However, a brief
survey of decisions where the police power measure of the LGU clashed with national laws shows
that the common dominator of all of these cases is that the national laws were clearly and expressly
in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there
was no room for doubt. This is not the case here.

The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to "establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage
of energy resources" and "to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public
interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of
petroleum products." These powers can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers
granted them. When these ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU
to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not
difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan
Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Manila.

The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution.

An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of
local governments as mandated by the Constitution.

There is no showing how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of
Manila of its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land
uses within its jurisdiction.

The DOE Cannot Exercise The Power Of Control Over LGUs

Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the
Constitution confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision.

Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over
them.

The President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of
local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE
cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of
Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law.

Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Invalid For Failure To Comply With RA 7924 And EO 72

The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with
its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review process, it is invalid.

RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities
and municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72.
EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is
admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which
reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible
terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the "Manila [CLUP] and
Zoning Ordinance of 2006." CLUPs are the ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for
integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that
they conform with national guidelines and policies.

Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil
companies did not present any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance
with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed.
Conclusion

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to
lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious:
life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a
few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.

5. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS vs. ALFREDO S. LIM

G.R. No. 187836               November 25, 2014

FACTS: On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo Lim, who succeeded
Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187, amending Ordinance
No. 8027 and Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119. Thus, where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance
No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone (I-1), the new Ordinance No. 8187 created a
new Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I-3), where petroleum refineries and
oil depots are now among those expressly allowed.

Petitioners seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which allegedly contains provisions contrary
to those embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right
to a healthful and balanced environment are also included.

During the pendency of the petition, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which composition had already
substantially changed, enacted Ordinance No. 8283, which amended the assailed Ordinance No.
8187 by reclassifying the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from Heavy
Industrial (1-3) to High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD). In effect, Ordinance No.
8283 excluded the area where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial
Zone. The oil companies, whose oil depots are located in the newly classified High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given until the end of January 2016 within which to
relocate their terminals.

Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor, vetoed Ordinance No. 8283.

 
Issue: Whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187 allowing the continued stay of the oil
companies in the depots is invalid and unconstitutional.

RULING: YES

Ordinance No. 8027 remains a valid exercise of police power, and Ordinance No. 8187 is
struck down

(a) Pandacan Terminal as a likely target of terrorist attacks

In G. R. No. 156052, based on the assessment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and
Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the
Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so convinced.
As found by the Committee, the depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to
dissipate the threat.

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to
persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at
risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187, in relation  to the continued
stay of the oil depots in the Pandacan Terminals, is invalid and unconstitutional.

The steps taken by the oil companies remain insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers
posed by the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already been completely
removed. It is the removal of the danger to life, not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe that
made the Court favor Ordinance No. 8027 in G.R. No. 156052. That reason, unaffected by
Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.

Moreover, the very nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly
volatile products, regardless of whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no place
in a densely populated area.
 

(b) Right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property

The objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the constituents’ general welfare
in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the
people.

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to
lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property . The reason is obvious:
life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a
few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.

Sangguniang Panlungsod's failure to uphold the duty to promote the general welfare of the
City of Manila

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is

vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city” subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance.

In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary, hence, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027. In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already
changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again
when some of the previous members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding
the same seat, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots until the end of January 2016
within which to transfer to another site.

It appears that, notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots
existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this day, the
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its
determination of the “general welfare” of the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the
people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to which particular sector among its constituents
it wishes to favor.