1NC

Off Case
 Off
T Subs

Substantial refers to a totality of circumstances

US First Circuit Court of Appeals ’98 In Re Richard Lamanna, Debtor.first Usa, et al., Appellees, v.
Richard Lamanna, AppellantUnited States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. - 153 F.3d 1Heard July 27,
1998.Decided Aug. 25, 1998 http://www.swlearning.com/blaw/cases/court_uses.html

Decision Affirmed. The court joins other circuits in adopting the "totality of the circumstances" test as the
measure of substantial abuse under the Bankruptcy Code. This is a flexible standard adopted by Congress to allow
bankruptcy courts to consider the factors involved in each case and to prevent abuse of Chapter 7 filings. When there is evidence that the
consumer can pay their debts, there is likely to be found substantial abuse.

Violation---the aff only limits part of the defense pact

Voting issue---explodes limits to infinite potential subsets and undermines neg ground
 Off
T Flexible Response

“Defense pacts” obligate aid, which is more than military force

Morrow 00 – James D. Morrow, Political Science Professor at the University of Michigan (starting in
2000). [Alliances: Why Write Them Down? Annual Review of Political Science, 3(1), Annual Reviews]
Two or more states form an alliance when they conclude a treaty that obliges them both to take certain actions in the event of war.
Commonly, the study of alliances focuses on defense pacts—mutual commitments by states to come to
one another's aid if one is attacked—over lesser degrees of commitment, such as ententes. Nevertheless, all
formal military agreements share a similar logic with different degrees of expected action in the event of war, and this chapter explores that
logic.

“Activation” refers to actions that trigger the defense pact

Pitlo 19 -- Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation,
Lecturer at the School of Social Sciences at Ateneo de Manila University. [Ambiguity and Changing Times
Compel Review of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, 2-8-19, https://amti.csis.org/ambiguity-
changing-times-compel-review-mutual-defense-treaty/]

There are four salient issues that will crop up in the review of the MDT. These are the treaty’s scope, the activation
process (i.e., what actions would trigger the treaty), capacity to respond to actions below the threshold of armed attack,
and whether a more comprehensive system of regional security should replace this arrangement.

Violation---the plan changes US response rather than the defense pact’s activation

Vote neg for limits---their interpretation adds 100s of affs tinkering US response
 Off
Biden’s immigration reform bill will pass now---PC is key
Shear 1/19/21 (Michael D. - White House correspondent for The New York Times, “Biden to Announce
Broad Plan to Reverse Trump Immigration Policies,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/biden-immigration-policies.html)
In Tuesday’s interview, Mr. Miller, who more than anyone else was responsible for Mr. Trump’s anti-immigrant sentiment and policies, said
many of the changes they put in place would withstand Mr. Biden’s efforts to reverse them. But Mr. Biden
is betting on his
longstanding relationships in the Senate and a backlash against some of Mr. Trump’s more extreme
immigration measures, including separating migrant families at the border and forcing asylum seekers to
wait in slumlike facilities in Mexico while their applications for entry are processed. The president-elect
is also counting on support from religious and business groups who have long backed a more robust
system of immigration. Catholic organizations argue that the country is morally obliged to be more generous to those seeking refuge,
while groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce say the country needs immigrants to remain competitive. “I’m very optimistic President
Biden has an opportunity to facilitate passage of an immigration bill that would provide the stability
and predictability the business community has been yearning for, ” said Tom Collamore, a former top official at the
chamber. “This is key to stimulating investment of capital that has been sitting on the sidelines, and which
would lead to new jobs and economic growth.” Todd Schulte, the president of FWD.us, an immigrant rights group created by
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg and others with ties to Silicon Valley, said he too was “deeply encouraged” to see Mr. Biden make a
pathway to citizenship a “clear priority on Day 1.” Polls, he said, show that 75 percent of Americans support that goal. But
he warned that winning passage of the legislation would be difficult because this was the same country “where a faction of
the Republican Party explicitly embraced overturning an election and we saw a deadly insurrection, fueled by racism and xenophobia.” Besides a
comprehensive immigration overhaul, the new administration may try to pursue other legislative efforts, including a stand-alone Dream Act to
protect DACA recipients and legislation that gives essential health care workers a path to citizenship as part of Covid relief efforts.

Plan costs PC---congressional backlash

Rapp-Hooper 17 [Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper is a Senior Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program and
the Center for a New American Security, TIES THAT BIND: WHY ASIAN ALLIANCES WILL
SURVIVE TRUMP, January 12, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/ties-that-bind-why-asian-alliances-
will-survive-trump/]
When allies fear abandonment, however, these “veto points” can be good things. Renegotiation of a commitment or a burden-sharing
arrangement could take years for allies to complete. And, it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to keep this
secret. During the process, other branches of government and opposition parties would have time to intervene and to
oppose changes. Recall that President Jimmy Carter’s furtive attempts to slash U.S. troop levels in South Korea were
made public, prompted a fiery backlash, and were derailed. President Richard Nixon promised Beijing that he would
end the U.S. alliance with Taiwan and moved his plans forward in secret to evade the “China Lobby.” But when Carter moved to
recognize China and abrogate the U.S. defense pact with Taipei several years later, Democrats and Republicans in Congress were so
enraged that they passed the Taiwan Relations Act — not quite a mutual defense commitment but not far
off. Treaties, by definition, engage Congressional interests, and U.S alliances are so longstanding that many
partners have robust ties to legislators, the military, the civil service, and interest groups. If the new
administration decides to modestly revise some agreements, these forces may not stand in the way, but allies who fear radical,
precipitous change will have no greater friends than thorny bureaucracy and domestic infighting.

Immigration reform proposal is key to sustained food production and ag sector stability
Abbott 1/21/21 (Chuck - journalist for the Food & Environment Reporting Network, “BIDEN
PROPOSES LEGAL STATUS, PATH TO CITIZENSHIP FOR UNDOCUMENTED
FARMWORKERS,” https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/biden-proposes-legal-status-path-to-
citizenship-for-undocumented-farmworkers)
The estimated 1.25
million undocumented farmworkers in the United States would immediately gain legal
status under the immigration reform bill unveiled by President Joe Biden on Wednesday, his first day in office. If
passed, the bill would make the farmworkers eligible for green cards and, after three years, open a
pathway for becoming U.S. citizens. Congress has struggled for years over immigration reform, whether as comprehensive
legislation or one-piece-at-a-time bills, and Biden’s plan was quickly criticized by some Republican senators as unmerited amnesty. Democrats
have slender majorities in the House and Senate, so there is little leeway for legislation without bipartisan backing. The House passed a bipartisan
farm labor bill on a strong 260-165 vote in December 2019, but it died in the Senate without a vote at the end of 2020. The House bill offered
temporary legal status for undocumented immigrants who continued to work in agriculture as well as modernization of the H-2A visa for
guestworkers, including permission for year-round agricultural employment. “We are looking to work with Congress again in order to solve these
longstanding problems for American agriculture,” said Chuck Conner, head of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, which supported the
2019 bill. Ata time when the farm sector wants a legal and reliable workforce, half of farmworkers are
believed to be undocumented. Ag employers say that the H-2A system needs to be streamlined so that it is
easier to use and so that guestworkers, now limited to seasonal work, are available for year-round work,
such as on dairies. “Under the Biden bill, farmworkers with work histories would immediately get legal
status, along with Dreamers and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients,” said Teresa Romero, president of the United Farm Workers
union. “This bill is fundamentally different than what any other president has ever done in emancipating farmworkers so they can escape
pervasive fear and behave like free women and men. … Now we must turn this vision into reality.” To qualify for legal status, farmworkers
would have to pass criminal background checks and show they had worked in agriculture for at least 100 days in four of the preceding five years,
said the UFW. A Biden fact sheet says immigrant farmworkers, so-called Dreamers, and TPS recipients “who meet specific requirements are
eligible for green cards immediately under the legislation. After three years, all green card holders who pass additional background checks and
demonstrate knowledge of English and U.S. civics can apply to become citizens.” Republican Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas said on social media
that the immigration bill was “mass amnesty” for foreigners when “we should focus on helping Americans.” Other Republican senators, such as
Marco Rubio of Florida and Chuck Grassley of Iowa, also were critical. The Center for Immigration Studies, which favors low immigration, said
that “popular support for legalizing millions of illegal immigrants … may not be that strong.” But two Democratic leaders on the House Judiciary
Committee said the bill would “return America to its roots and restore its reputation as an inclusive and welcoming nation.” Dave Puglia, chief
executive of the Western Growers Association, which represents fruit and vegetable growers in California, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico,
said theBiden bill sent “a clear statement about his commitment to resolving one of the most pressing
issues facing the agriculture industry,” reported the Palm Springs Desert Sun. The U.S. food system would falter
without the labor of immigrants, said the National Farmers Union. “Through the pandemic, these essential workers have continued
to show up to feed their fellow Americans — despite the immense risk to their own lives,” said NFU president Rob Larew. “To repay them for
their bravery and selflessness, the very least we can do is to offer them a clear path to citizenship.”

Food shortages cause nuclear war

FDI 12 (Future Directions International - a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s
global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery - PhD in Agricultural Science and former Professor at the
University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment, “Food and Water Insecurity: International
Conflict Triggers & Potential Conflict Points,” 5/25/12,
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-
points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity/)
There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts
in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of
resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts
induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired , at
least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent
workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather,
urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers
Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and
why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), “…if
people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is
not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds
anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world
run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to
follow.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation
of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says:
“The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy
mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody
competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over
resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over
resources, not because people are going hungry. A
study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that
where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the
Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK
Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US C S I S and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine
enter for trategic and nternational tudies

as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

 Off
The aff causes Japanese prolif which collapses the NPT and ensures a global wave of
prolif
Stangarone 16 [Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the
Korea Economic Institute of America, "Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go
Nuclear?," Korea Economic Institute of America, 2016, http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-
and-japan-should-go-nuclear, DS]

Is it inevitable that South Korea and Japan will develop nuclear weapons ? As Mark Fitzpatrick of the Institute for International
Security Studies points out, the United States’ nuclear umbrella and policy of extended deterrence have provided

reassurances to Seoul and Tokyo about their security posture. Both countries would likely pursue a
nuclear option if they believed that the security assurances of the United States were in doubt. At the same
time, both South Korea and Japan have refrained from developing nuclear weapons despite North Korea’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. If the possession of nuclear
weapons by a neighboring state were an indicator of a country’s likelihood of developing nuclear weapons, one would have expected South Korea and Japan to already have done so.

Ultimately, a Trump administration policy of weakening U.S. security commitments to Seoul and Tokyo
would likely do more to encourage them to develop a nuclear weapons program than anything North Korea has done to date. If the
U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence can reassure U.S. allies and therefore also help to constrain nuclear proliferation, is Trump right to suggest that it is a burden that the United
States can no longer afford? As Robert Samuelson at the Washington Post points out, the United States is wealthy enough to pay for domestic needs and a robust presence abroad. Since 1950,
U.S. GDP has risen from $2.2 trillion to $16.3 trillion last year in inflation adjusted terms. At the same time, Japan’s per capita GDP is only 69 percent of the United States’ and South Korea’s
less so. While a debate over the best usage of resources in any society is legitimate, the United States is clearly wealthy enough to meet its commitments abroad should society at large deem
them to be beneficial. More to Trump’s point about burden sharing, South Korea already contributes a great deal to the alliance in contrast to what he has suggested. Seoul provides 55
percent of the non-personnel costs for stationing U.S. troops in South Korea, including annual increases. It spends more on defense, 2.6 percent of GDP, than any other ally in Europe and Asia,
and fields an active military of 630,000 troops through conscription. South Korea has also historically contributed troops to assist the U.S. in past wars and peace keeping missions than any ally
other than the United Kingdom and a few others. This brings us to the last of Trump’s arguments, that the United States does not benefit enough from its commitments abroad. Is this the

case? As previously noted, U.S. commitments to our allies have helped constrain nuclear proliferation , but the United States
benefits in other ways as well.U.S. commitments abroad provide necessary stability around the world to maintain the
peace and order that helps to enable the international commerce necessary for U.S. prosperity. U.S. bases abroad also provide forward positioning to allow the United States to
deal with military threats abroad before they endanger the homeland. At the same time, the idea of allowing South Korea and Japan to

develop nuclear weapons to lessen the burden on the United States would face a series of constraints
and concerns. As we have noted on previous occasions, there are real economic and foreign policy constraints on South Korea developing a nuclear weapon. Many of these would
apply to Japan as well. Seoul and Tokyo would need to either violate their commitments to or withdraw from the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If they, along with Saudi Arabia and other countries, did so as a
result of Trump’s policy, it would likely be the end of the NPT and increase nuclear proliferation
worldwide. This has significant security implications for the United States, especially as it relates to terrorism. As more states develop nuclear programs there will increasingly be
more states with access to fissile material that a bad actor could utilize to threaten peace and stability.

Extinction and turns case---causes global conflict

Tanter ’17 [Richard; Senior Research Associate at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability and
Director of the Nautilus Institute at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology; “Donald Trump’s
Japanese and South Korean Nuclear Threat to China: A tipping point in East Asia?,”
https://apjjf.org/2017/07/Tanter.html]

A nuclear-armed Japan may come about through reluctant U.S. acceptance of a nationalist Japanese government
mimicking De Gaulle’s removal of France from NATO in the 1960s, while still remaining generally aligned with ‘the West’. Or it may be the
result, as Tillerson seems to envisage, of Japan being encouraged by the United States to become, as Richard Armitage advocated, ‘the Great
Britain of East Asia’ – presumably in part thinking of Britain as a hyper-loyal client nuclear state, dependent on the U.S. for its missiles. This
would envisage Japan as a loyal and still subordinate partner, a second tier, or at least third tier nuclear- armed state – presumably with a high
level of ‘conventional weapons militarization’. This
is not a thought much welcomed in Seoul, and Japanese and South
Korean nuclearization will be separated only by an historical nanosecond, with Taiwan equally facing a future-
defining choice about nuclear weapons development. In this fantasy of U.S. East Asian nuclear hegemony reborn, all this would be accompanied
by a U.S.-led East Asian version of NATO, linked in the south to Australia, and in the wilder shores of late imperial dreaming of an ‘alliance of
democracies’, to a U.S.-aligned India. What could possibly go wrong? But in the longer run, apart from the direct risks of such an event for the
U.S. itself, its East Asian alliance network, now in its seventh decade, founded on Japanese and Korean acceptance of U.S. nuclear primacy and a
U.S. nuclear umbrella, would change dramatically, bringing with it, for better or worse, the end of U.S. hegemony in East and Southeast Asia.
Whether occurring on a Gaullist or British model, the foundations of Korean and Japanese relations with the United States would be irrevocably
altered. Even
leaving aside the obvious questions about the DPRK, in the event of a nuclearized Japan and South
Korea, clearly the mathematical risks of nuclear war initiated in East Asia would be very much greater
than even the current risks of India-Pakistan nuclear conflict. Regional nuclear security planning would be woven with
multiple valences of possible perceived nuclear threats. The calculus of China-U.S. nuclear relations immediately becomes much more complex,
with China facing two new potential threats, nominally at least coordinating with the U.S., in addition to the older concerns about India and
Russia. For the United States, a
nuclear-armed, fully ‘normalized’ Japan would never be the undoubted loyal
lapdog of by then likely post-United Kingdom Little England. And the calculations of a nuclear-armed South
Korea and Japan about each other would start and finish in historically-conditioned suspicion. At a global
level, the U.S. opening the door to Japanese and Korean nuclear weapons could not fail to encourage a
cascade of regional races to nuclear weapons, not only in the Western Pacific but in the Middle East, in Latin
America, and quite possibly in Africa. The risks of regional nuclear war with all its now thoroughly documented
catastrophic environmental and climate consequences would be both manifold and far higher than at present.
 Off
Article V PIC

The United States federal government should limit its responses to efforts to
undermine Japanese administration of the Senkaku Islands short of force to an array
of proportionate graduated measures.
 Off
TEXT: The United States federal courts should rule that military responses to non-
violent attacks on Senkaku’s is an unconstitutional violation of Congressional war
powers and adopt flexible respons measures

Judicial review solves alliance suits and causes follow-on---sets a broader precedent
for Congressional war powers
Farrier 16 [Jasmine Farrier is an associate professor of political science at the University of Louisville,
“The Contemporary Presidency: Judicial Restraint and the New War Powers,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 46, no. 2 (June), https://louisville.edu/politicalscience/files/the-contemporary-presidency-
judicial-restraint-and-the-new-war-powers, y2k]
From the founding to 1950, war usually proceeded in constitutional order: congressional authorization followed by executive enforcement. Over that century and a half, federal judges

Today, presidents of
adjudicated dozens of war-related disputes raised by private litigants that hinged on executive branch adherence to Congress’s prior legislative direction.

both partiesorder new offensive military actions abroad without explicit congressional consent before or even
during the conflict. Although House and Senate majorities eventually support these actions one way or another (bills
and/or appropriations), on 10 occasions, members of Congress (up to 110 at a time) challenged presidential wars in federal

court. These unsuccessful lawsuits deserve new attention because they reflect a quiet, but steady, three-branch constitutional revolution on war that has taken place in the United States,
under both parties’ watch and under a variety of foreign policy contexts. If all three branches now interpret congressional silence as consent,

constitutional war processes have flipped, and the War Powers Resolution is a dead letter.

there is no
This article offers three arguments about these developments, using case law, institutional archives, and interviews with members of Congress and their attorneys.1 First,

constitutional reason for federal courts to demur on war powers suits filed by members of Congress,
outside of decades of judge-made precedent. Federal judges and scholars are divided on whether courts
should take these cases, not whether they can. Second, federal courts hold member–plaintiffs to a different standard than private interest litigants. Members of
Congress must show supermajority disapproval of the president’s unilateral actions whereas private war litigation once hinged on prior simple majority authorization of the action. Third, the
legal postures of all three branches reflect deeply ingrained institutional habits, not partisan differences. Unlike other public policy areas, presidential war is not ideologically divisive.

Reflecting this new normal, the United States has been engaged in a military campaign against the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) since August 2014, with no Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF). According to the Department of Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve has cost an average of $11 million per day for 450 days of operations, which destroyed or
damaged over 16,000 targets.2 While calling for new AUMF in the State of the Union Address in January 2015, and sending a proposal to Congress earlier that year, President Barack Obama
and his administration maintained that the necessary authorization is already in place through the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs (against al-Qaeda and Iraq, respectively; Weed 2015b). While ISIS-
related terrorist attacks in France have fueled some bipartisan criticism of administration strategy, a new AUMF is unlikely (Carney 2015).

Despite repeated cries of “lawlessness” against the president on domestic policy actions, members of Congress have not pursued a lawsuit on the ISIS actions. Even if members did band
together to file a suit that challenged the current ISIS campaign, it is unlikely to jump the formidable hurdles to member suits that federal courts have built over four decades. However, a
House-sanctioned lawsuit against the Obama administration on enforcement of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was recently granted standing to proceed on the merits regarding whether the
administration spent money on ACA implementation that was not appropriated by Congress (see United States House of Representatives v. Burwell 2015). Regardless of the ultimate outcome,

Divided government, partisan

members can use this case to push the argument that federal courts are a legitimate alternate arena for interbranch disputes.

gridlock, and a dysfunctional political culture may prevent Congress from using normal legislative
processes to challenge presidential actions, but does that mean any president can operate unilaterally
until disapproved?
Scholars have taken up different facets of this question since 9/11, with fresh assessments of the policy, partisan, and institutional contours of a new “imperial presidency” (Rudalevige 2006).
We are also reminded that congressional war powers are enumerated in the Constitution and the framers’ intentions for prior congressional authorization are clear, except in cases of
emergency defensive actions (Edelson and Starr-Deeken 2015; Fisher 2013). Yet, the Bush and Obama presidencies defend versions of a “unitary executive theory” of war that largely rejects
outside institutional meddling (Posner and Vermeule 2011; Yoo 2010), provoking repeated criticism (Edelson 2013b; Kassop 2003; Pfiffner 2008; Pious 2006). The contemporary House and
Senate are also getting renewed attention, with some studies highlighting their formal and informal influence prior to presidential war decisions (Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Kriner 2014) and
afterward in the oversight process (Kriner 2010). But these studies do not extinguish long-held accusations of congressional abdication (Fisher 2000b). Congress also shows bursts of short-lived
ambition as it pivots from delegation of power to regret and criticism of the use of delegated power (and then delegates again) in domestic and foreign policy (Farrier 2004, 2010).

combination of aggressive presidents, ambivalent congresses, and disinterested

Federal courts are not a panacea to this state of affairs, but a

justices have clearly upended the Madisonian constitutional system. Unlike civil rights, civil liberties, and economic federalism, federal courts are
 there was once a vibrant debate within the law and
inconsistent in their interest and more ideologically mixed in separation of powers cases. However,

courts literature regarding whether or not the federal courts (and especially the Supreme Court) should apply their vast
constitutional authority to foreign policy conflicts. Advocates of judicial restraint argued that federal courts should preserve legitimacy and institutional capital by
eschewing certain types of cases (Bickel 1986). Avoiding separation of powers (and many federalism claims) would allow the courts to concentrate on protecting individual liberties and small
group rights because they are structured in part to attend to these claims (Choper 1980, 2005). On legislative processes, however, courts are ill equipped to police interbranch balance,

federal courts could provide a deterrent to

especially when Congress chooses not to defend itself (Devins and Fisher 2015). Other scholars argue that

unilateral presidential war and/or put pressure on Congress to act. While it is not ideal to “settle” war powers conflicts in court,
there is no reason for presidential actions to be off the table automatically (Glennon 1990; Keynes 1982; Redish 1985). Far
from deciding to go to war, Ely argued courts “have every business insisting that the officials the Constitution
entrusts with that decision be the ones who make it” (1993, 54).

that federal courts can jumpstart or reframe constitutional dialogues

Rather than advocating for judicial supremacy, this article argues

on war, just by accepting a member lawsuit on the merits and focusing on the origins of presidential
authority for the action rather than legislative disapproval after it is already in progress. Rather than being the “final word,” federal
courts inspire broader conversations and direct legislative responses (Burgess 1992; Devins and Fisher 2015; Tushnet 1999). For
example, a federal court can declare a nonemergency, offensive war action unconstitutional pending legislative

authorization. While a formal withdrawal order would be unlikely from the court, and unwelcome by many, Congress could be granted a “reasonable time to consider the issue” (Ely
1993, 54). Presidents would then risk a legal and political rebuke when assuming prior authorization is optional,
not required. Congress would be forced to make a decision one way or another, and their deliberations would be on the record. While this idea seems fanciful, Supreme Court scrutiny of
presidential war powers was once fairly routine.

Three Branch Constitutional Flip from the Quasi War to Vietnam

A systemic shift on constitutional war processes took place across all three branches in the second half of the twentieth century. Before that time, presidents did not advocate unilateral war outside of defensive and emergency situations (Edelson 2013a). Congress was also protective of its war prerogatives, and federal courts scrutinized presidential military orders for evidence of prior authorization, when cases arose from private interest injury claims (Fisher 2005; Silverstein 1997). The sea change in constitutional processes reflects institutional landmarks stretching over
two decades. President Truman’s initiation of the Korean War under UN authority in 1950, Congress’s passage of the broad delegation of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, and the Supreme Court’s handling of Vietnam-era member lawsuits.

Early Judicial Interest in War

From the plain language of the Constitution’s text, war is a three-branch power. Congress receives the power to declare war in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11. In Article II, Section 2, the “President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States” (emphasis added). Article III, Section 2 says “judicial power shall extend to all cases ... arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”
These clauses were interpreted early on by government officials present at the ratification. The Supreme Court decided the first of three “Quasi War” case in 1800, predating Marbury v. Madison by three years (and never overturned, see Adler 2000, 159). From these cases through the rest of the nineteenth century, the Court not only ruled for legislative primacy in war, as noted in the first chapter epigraph, but also for the Court’s power to review presidential action.

In the Quasi cases, all filed by private litigants, the Supreme Court had to decide whether France was an “enemy” of the United States and, in effect, whether the country was at war. The ambiguities stemmed from the fact that Congress had passed laws authorizing limited military activity by the executive branch, but did not declare war against France formally. Justice Salmon Chase explained that “perfect” (declared by Congress) and “imperfect” (authorized by Congress) military actions were still wars for the purposes of the private compensation at issue in the case (Bas
v. Tingy 1800, 37, 40-41).

Another Quasi War case decision, written by Chief Justice John Marshall, said even more explicitly that to understand the state of affairs with another nation, one has to look at legislative actions. “The whole powers of war being by the Constitution of the United States vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry” (Talbot v. Seeman 1801, 28). In the final Quasi case, Chief Justice Marshall ruled against the president’s orders during, not after, the military action, saying his “instructions cannot change the nature of the
transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass” (Little v. Barreme 1804, 170, 179).

Through the rest of the century, including the War of 1812, Mexican–American War, Civil War, and the Spanish American War, additional Supreme Court rulings addressed the authorization for individual actions against foreign governments, habeas corpus petitions, property disputes; and much more. In these cases, federal court decisions repeatedly endorsed a Congress-centered foreign policy by focusing on laws (or lack thereof) to determine the outcome. Landmark twentieth-century war-related cases still hinged on tracing some congressional authorization of the
action, even if the president’s actions were sustained (Korematsu v. United States 1944; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Company 1936). Also through judicial scrutiny of Congress’s wishes, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) denied President Truman the right to order his commerce secretary to seize domestic steel mills to avert labor strife that he argued would undermine U.S. war efforts during the Korean conflict. The often-cited concurring opinion by Justice Robert Jackson said the president has greatest power when he is given explicit authority to act
(Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., v. Sawyer, 1952, 637, Jackson, J., concurring).

Beginning around this time, however, three additional events shifted constitutional assumptions away from Justice Jackson’s statement. First, the Korean War was launched in 1950. It was the first truly presidential war because President Truman executed a UN resolution to delegitimize and repel Communist forces in the Korean peninsula without explicit congressional authorization (see Fisher 1995; Keynes 1982). A decade later, the Supreme Court issued the landmark case on the “political question doctrine” (Baker v. Carr 1962), which said the court should avoid certain
kinds of cases because they are committed by the Constitution, or better suited to, the other branches. (As noted in the epigraph, foreign policy was not yet cordoned off as a political question.) Then, in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson received broad authorization to escalate U.S. commitments in Vietnam. President Richard Nixon’s expansion of the inherited conflict brought the first member lawsuits and a judicial pivot toward restraint.

Judicial Division and Rebuff on First Member War Cases

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed unanimously in the House of Representatives, and only two senators voted against it. It said “Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression.”3 Johnson’s escalation of the war through this broad guideline prompted a national popular antiwar movement and congressional backlash, leading to his decision not to seek the Democratic nomination in 1968.
Richard Nixon inherited the 1964 authority when he took office in 1969 and within a year expanded U.S. military action into Cambodia and Laos. Congress passed the “Fulbright Proviso” in 1970, saying any action in these countries must be limited to assisting the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1971. The two branches tangled over the contours of the Cambodia operations in particular for the next three years, with Nixon’s arguing that his administration could not be micromanaged by Congress.

Nixon’s actions also inspired 70 federal lawsuits, filed by novel types of litigants including soldiers, their families, citizens, taxpayers, and even a state (Massachusetts). The named defendants in these suits were executive branch department heads or Nixon himself. At all three levels (district, appeals, and Supreme), federal judges seemed to wrestle openly with how and whether to take these unconventional kinds of cases. In the member suits, federal courts were divided, but ultimately opted to burden Congress, not the president. The House and Senate had not exhausted
all modes of disapproval of Nixon’s expansion of the war through other constitutional weapons, including overturning presidential vetoes and even impeachment.

Mitchell v. Laird (1973). This case was the first Congress-member lawsuit in U.S. history. It was filed by Representative Parren Mitchell (D-MD) and 12 other members of the House in 1971 against the president, secretaries of state, defense, and the three branches of the military. The plaintiffs alleged that the United States had been engaged in new expansions of the war for seven years (since the 1964 Resolution) without obtaining “either a declaration of war or an explicit, intentional and discrete authorization of war,” which had the effect of “unlawfully impair[ing] and
defeat[ing] plaintiffs’ Constitutional right, as members of the Congress of the United States, to decide whether the United States should fight a war.” The first demand of the lawsuit was a judicial order to stop the executive branch from prosecuting the current military campaigns unless, within 60 days, Congress “explicitly, intentionally and discretely authorized a continuation of the war.” The second demand was for “a declaratory judgment that defendants are carrying on a war in violation of Article I, section 8, clause 11 of the United States Constitution.” A district court
dismissed the case on standing (Mitchell v. Laird 1973, 613).

The court of appeals examined several issues, some not raised in the first round, then agreed to dismiss the case. In the opinion, Judge Charles Wyzanski and David Bazelon (appointed by Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, respectively) acknowledged that the three-judge panel came to the dismissal through different jurisprudential paths. The case was ripe, not moot, and standing was approved. The political question doctrine was the fundamental barrier. In 1973, the Vietnam and Laos parts of the conflict were winding down or ended, but the Cambodia involvement
was still ongoing. The panel conceded that the Vietnam War was a war in the Article 1 sense and that Congress had not authorized all the president’s actions. Therefore, President Nixon’s only duty was to end the military operations. The nonjusticiable political question was the factual determination of how and whether he was winding it down, or not.

If not, the judges cited a variety of other paths afforded to plaintiffs, including legislation, veto overrides, and pursuit of impeachment and conviction. The judges acknowledged that prior authorization was lacking (noted in the third epigraph), and that appropriations and even conscription bills were incomplete expressions of congressional policy preferences. “This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to appropriate money or to draft men a congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically
the appropriation or draft act refers to that war” (Mitchell v. Laird 1973, 616). The logic of this argument is that while congressional majorities had not explicitly authorized the Cambodia campaign, nor had they used all the supermajority powers at their disposal to stop it. According to an attorney involved in the case, while the judges appeared sincerely torn by the war’s questionable authorization and outcome, there was no interest in taking any responsibility for the next steps of policy or directly challenging President Nixon.4

Holtzman v. Richardson/Schlesinger (1973). The continued impasse on Cambodia directly inspired two related lawsuits filed by House member Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) and nine Air Force personnel against both of Nixon’s secretaries of defense in 1973 (Schlesinger replaced Richardson when the latter was appointed attorney general that same year). At the time of the first filing in April, a cease-fire was in effect in Vietnam, and all American prisoners of war had been returned; still, no explicit congressional authorization existed for the ongoing bombing of Cambodia. In
response to the lawsuit, according to a statement of facts in the first [Richardson] case, “the Executive has informed Congress that it is prepared to continue its military activities whether or not the Congress appropriates funds for the Cambodian combat operations” (Holtzman v. Richardson 1973, 547). Congress nevertheless tried to stop the bombings via an appropriations bill rider, President Nixon vetoed the bill, and the House did not have enough votes to override.5 Nixon signed a compromise bill that mandated the bombings stop August 15.

As this legislative conflict played out, district Judge Orrin Judd (nominated by President Johnson) broke with the Mitchell ruling and confirmed that Holtzman “has raised a serious constitutional question dealing with the war-making power of Congress enumerated in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution ... The power to wage war is a controversy arising under the Constitution and therefore within the jurisdiction of this court.” Rejecting the political question doctrine and other justiciability objections by the government, Judge Judd said the constitutional question was not
hypothetical or abstract in this suit and that Holtzman had standing (Holtzman v. Richardson 1973, 549). In July, after the case’s name had been switched to Schlesinger (new secretary of defense), Judd ruled again for Holtzman, providing both declaratory and injunctive relief. The judgment declared that “there is no existing Congressional authority to order military forces into combat in Cambodia or to release bombs over Cambodia, and that military activities in Cambodia by American armed forces are unauthorized and unlawful” and restrained defendants and their staff
from “participating in any way in military activities in or over Cambodia or releasing any bombs which may fall [there]” (Holtzman v. Schlesinger 1973, 553).

The order was stayed until the end of July as the legislative conflicts continued. However, Judge Judd acknowledged that the barrier to congressional control of the war was its

lack of two-thirds to override Nixon’s veto. Simple majorities were already on the record. It cannot be the rule that the President needs a vote of only one-third plus one of either House in order to conduct a war, but this would be the consequence of holding that Congress must override a Presidential veto in order to terminate hostilities which it has not authorized ... In order to avoid a constitutional crisis that would have resulted in a temporary shutdown of vital federal activities...Congress agreed to hold off any action affirmatively cutting off funds for military purposes
until August 15, 1973. (Holtzman v. Schlesinger 1973, 565)

Between the district and appeals court rulings, the Supreme Court became involved through applications to vacate the stay issued by Judge Judd. In the first round, Justice Thurgood Marshall (in his circuit justice capacity) denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate. Although he strongly hinted at his policy agreement with Congresswoman Holtzman, Marshall said he needed to reflect the votes of the rest of the court when acting in his circuit capacity. He said, “if the decision were mine alone, I might well conclude on the merits that continued American military operations in
Cambodia are unconstitutional.... When the final history of the Cambodian war is written, it is unlikely to make pleasant reading. The decision to send American troops [to Southeast Asia] ... may ultimately be adjudged to have been not only unwise, but also unlawful” (Holtzman v. Schlesinger 1973, 1312-13). Justice Douglas filed a dissent on the procedural issue regarding vacating the stay and disagreed with Marshall’s premise that the court had no place in weighing in on what Douglas viewed as an equivalent of a capital punishment case. “It has become popular to think
the President has that power to declare war. But there is not a word in the Constitution that grants that power to him. It runs only to Congress ... But even if the ‘war’ in Vietnam were assumed to be a constitutional one, the Cambodian bombing is quite a different affair” (Holtzman v. Schlesinger 1973, 1319-20).

The appellate court heard the case on August 8. Judge Judd’s district court opinion was overturned 2-1 by the DC Circuit (all three were Nixon appointees). The majority cited the August 15 cutoff date as an indication that all actions up to that point were authorized and invoked the political question doctrine. The dissent said military capacity and authority are separate (Holtzman v. Schlesinger 1973, 1308-10). The case had two long-term legacies. First, the political question doctrine was applied to war in two back-to-back cases, building a powerful set of precedents against
future lawsuits. Second, the case litigants connected undeliberated war expansion with failed policy that destabilized Cambodia for decades.6

Member Litigation after the War Powers Resolution

At the same time as the Mitchell and Holtzman cases went through the federal system, Congress debated and passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973. Its intention was to force interbranch collaboration before and during new military operations abroad. Yet almost every president since its passage has explicitly denied, or implicitly tested, the WPR’s constitutionality, beginning with President Nixon’s veto.7 Presidents have since reported 160 actions as “consistent” with the WPR requirements (Weed 2015a). Eight lawsuits filed by members of Congress accused
presidents of not complying with the WPR and other legal and constitutional requirements for offensive actions, including Ronald Reagan (interventions in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada, and IranIraq war), George H. W. Bush (first Persian Gulf War), Bill Clinton (Kosovo), George W. Bush (Iraq), and Barack Obama (Libya) (Garcia 2012).

While its purpose is clear in its preamble, rebalancing congressional–presidential power over war decisions, the WPR included loopholes and internal contradictions that did little to help restrain presidents or embolden Congresses.8 Section 2(c) appears to provide clear, limited parameters for new military action, saying the president, as commander in chief, can introduce U.S. armed forces into situations of hostilities or imminent hostilities “only pursuant to—(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon
the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”9

But these presidential restrictions are undermined by sections 3 and 4. In section 3, presidents are required to consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before introducing U.S. forces (of any military branch) into “hostilities or ... situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” In section 4 (a)(1), regardless of the extent of consultation, the president must report to Congress within 48 hours of the start of a military action if a declaration of war or other legislative authorization had not been passed by both chambers. In
section 5(b), if Congress did not vote to approve the action, before or after forces were committed, they would be withdrawn by the president within 60 days, which could be extended to 90 days for special military circumstances. However, section 5(c) says Congress can also vote to remove forces by concurrent resolution at any time, which would not be subject to a presidential veto. Sections 6 and 7 lay out the expedited legislative procedures to prioritize congressional authorization related to the reported conflict, or a withdrawal resolution. Section 8 says that
authorization for military force cannot be construed from appropriations bills or treaties, unless accompanied by a separate authorization. Hinting at future litigation, a “separability” clause in section 9 says if any part “is held invalid” then the rest still stands.10

Influencing later WPR cases, two separate member lawsuits challenged President Jimmy Carter’s unilateral changes to the Panama Canal and Taiwan treaties. In the Taiwan case, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and others said the Senate must consent to the action of undoing a treaty, just as the Constitution requires two-thirds of the body to ratify it. Writing for a divided court, the majority contrasted the case with Youngstown, saying in that case “private litigants brought a suit contesting the President’s authority under his war powers to seize the Nation’s steel industry,
an action of profound and demonstrable domestic impact. Here, by contrast, we are asked to settle a dispute between coequal branches of our Government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests, resources not available to private litigants outside the judicial forum” (Goldwater v. Carter 1979, 1004, Rehnquist, J. concurring). Both treaty cases placed the burdens on the House and Senate to demonstrate a genuine interbranch impasse, which can only occur if Congress passes formal legislation (Fisher 2014, 284-88).

Member Litigation against Presidents Reagan and Bush I

All post-WPR litigation built on the Mitchell and Holtzman precedents. First, the cases are dismissed on a variety of justiciability grounds; judges did not rule directly on the legitimacy and application of the WPR. Second, unlike private litigation prior to Vietnam, most judges do not trace presidential action to prior congressional authorization, nor compel reporting under the WPR, but rather reverse the burden to inquire whether there is supermajority disapproval of action in progress. Third, while there is ample evidence of partisanship in the lineup of member–plaintiffs
against opposition party presidents, there is no ideological distinction in the constitutional claims made by Democrats and Republicans in either branch. Congress members of both parties assert the same constitutional points, as do presidents of both parties. Judges appointed presidents of both parties are largely dismissive of the cases. Crockett v. Reagan (1982-83). During a brewing civil war that was destabilizing El Salvador, President Jimmy Carter tried to shore up support for its military government through various forms of assistance beginning in 1979. Although called
“non-lethal” aid, the United States sent equipment such as “tear gas grenades, grenade launchers, night vision instruments, image intensifiers, and other riot control and counterinsurgency equipment” (Harris and Espinosa 1981, 297). An attack on American nuns by a death squad linked to the rightist faction of the junta in December 1980 led Carter to suspend some of the aid pending an investigation. Then, in February and March 1981, newly elected President Ronald Reagan sent 35 military advisors to assist the Salvadoran government, in addition to maintaining the 19
dispatched by President Carter. President Reagan’s interest in expanding U.S. influence in El Salvador reflected a hemispheric cold war strategy. The new decretary of dtate, Alexander Haig, argued that U.S. interests required supporting the right-wing junta to head off a new Latin America “domino” effect of Communist influence emanating from Cuba (LeoGrande 1981).

While the legislative–executive wrangling went on for three more years over El Salvador, Crockett v. Reagan was filed early on by opponents in Congress. The lawsuit was the first one to allege violations of the WPR when it was filed in 1981 by 29 House members (all Democrats) who protested the lack of a formal WPR report, among other claims. In a one-of-a-kind response by the president’s supporters in Congress, the lawsuit prompted the same number of Republicans (13 senators and 16 Congress memebers including one southern conservative Democrat) to file an
amicus curiae brief against their colleagues, claiming the original group was going to court too hastily. The allegations by Representative George W. Crockett (D-MI) et al. against the administration included violations of the Constitution, the WPR, and a legislative ban on foreign aid and military assistance to any regime alleged to have engaged in extensive human rights abuses. The defendants (President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig) argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and assistance had been authorized by
an act of Congress in 1981. While not conceding the constitutionality of the WPR, the administration said there were no “hostilities.”

Federal District Judge Joyce Hens Green (nominated by President Carter) dismissed the case, saying federal courts were not institutionally equipped or situated to define the nature of the El Salvador operation. In an interview, a House coplaintiff who had also voted in favor of the WPR in 1973 vehemently disagreed with Judge Green’s claim that fact finding on war was not possible for a judge. The member had visited El Salvador during the early 1980s and said “it looked like a war to us.” The member added that judges routinely engage in other types of fact finding.11
Judge Green instead dismissed the lawsuit on political question grounds. First, citing Baker v. Carr, Mitchell v. Laird, and Holtzman v. Schlesinger, she said the courts could not assess the facts of the case on which the two sides disagreed: were there “hostilities” in El Salvador or not? Second, Judge Green cited Goldwater v. Carter in her argument that a “constitutional impasse appropriate for judicial resolution would be presented” only if the president ignored a resolution requiring a report per WPR section 5(b) or withdrawal of the advisers. “[T]he nature of the fact finding
in these circumstances precludes judicial inquiry,” but she allowed that the WPR was still open for future justiciability (Crockett v. Reagan 1982, 897-98). An appeals court affirmed, saying members lack standing without a clear “nullification or diminution of a congressman’s vote” shown by bill passage (Crockett v. Reagan 1983, 1357, Bork, J. concurring). Defendants prevailed with another pro-presidential precedent.
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan (1983-85). In 1979, the Sandinistas, a left-wing guerrilla group, overthrew the Somoza family dictatorship that had ruled Nicaragua since the 1930s. In President Reagan’s first term, he issued national security findings and directives to create the “Contras,” a counterrevolutionary force. After Congress appropriated money to support the Contras in 1981, the first “Boland Amendment” passed in 1982 (named for Representative Edward P. Boland, D-MA), banning the executive branch from spending any money “for the purpose of overthrowing the
government of Nicaragua.”12 Leaked classified memos proved the Reagan administration was not adhering to Boland. In 1983, the House voted to cut off all Contra aid, but a Senate-based compromise allowed $24 million, a fraction of the administration’s request. Ultimately, two more restrictive amendments passed the House and Senate in the first term. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan was filed in 1983 and focused on adherence to the first Boland. Twelve members of the House of Representatives (all Democrats) joined over a dozen private citizens of Nicaragua (who
alleged damages due to actions of the U.S.- supported Contra rebels) and Florida (who alleged damages due to paramilitary training operations). The suit was filed to protest U.S. paramilitary operations that the plaintiffs alleged violated various neutrality laws, the National Security Act of 1947, the Boland Amendment, WPR, and the Constitution (Michaels 1987). The plaintiffs said that the judiciary is needed to control executive abuses of power in this case “because Congress has done all it can, namely, pass legislation.” District court judge Howard Corcoran (nominated by
President Lyndon Johnson) dismissed the case as a political question. He said “a court must take special care, when confronted with a challenge to the validity of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, to give appropriate deference to the decisions of the political branches, who are constitutionally empowered to conduct foreign relations” (Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan 1983, 599-600). Judge Corcoran cited Baker v. Carr, the Vietnam-era cases, as well as the recent Crockett precedent. He also echoed Judge Green, saying the case required fact finding that is beyond the court’s
competence.

Were this Court to decide ... that President Reagan either is mistaken, or is shielding the truth, one or both of the coordinate branches would be justifiably offended ... and there is a real danger of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question ... Such an occurrence would, undoubtedly, rattle the delicate diplomatic balance that is required in the foreign affairs arena ... It is, therefore, prudent for us to decline to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims at this time. (Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan 1983, 599) The appeals court affirmed Judge
Corcoran’s decision unanimously. Future Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (a Reagan appointee) delivered the opinion, citing mootness because the appropriations rider at issue in this lawsuit (Boland I) expired in 1983.

The congressional appellants also allege that assistance to the Contras is tantamount to waging war, so that they ‘have been deprived of their right to participate in the decision to declare war’ in violation of the war powers clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ... Dismissal of this claim is required by our decision in Crockett v. Reagan, which upheld dismissal of a similar claim by twenty-nine members of Congress relating to alleged military activity in El Salvador on the ground that the war powers issue presented a nonjusticiable political question. (Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan 1985, 210) Another future justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg (a Carter appointee), filed a concurrence on ripeness grounds, blaming Congress for ambiguities on U.S. support for the Contras. Ginsburg also cited Goldwater v. Carter, saying Congress had not thrown down the “gauntlet” by using its own tools, which are more powerful than the federal court (Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan 1985, 211).

Conyers v. Reagan (1984). October 1983 was an active month for U.S. military engagement. On October 12, 1983, President Reagan signed a congressional resolution that spelled out an 18-month continuation of U.S. troop presence in Lebanon, ending an interbranch dispute about Congress’s role in the deployment. Upon signing, Reagan said it “was not to be used as any acknowledgement that the President’s constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute” (Rubner 1985, 629). The next day, Maurice Bishop, the left-leaning prime minister of Grenada
who had seized power in 1979, was arrested by members of his own militia. Bishop was temporarily freed by supporters on October 18 but was assassinated later that day. Bishop was replaced by what Reagan described as a more staunchly pro-Cuban junta. President Reagan decided to invade Grenada on October 24 and then announced it the next day, citing the presence of around 1,000 U.S. medical students on the island.

Reagan sent a written report of the invasion to the speaker of the House, Thomas P. O’Neill (D-MA), and the president pro tempore of the Senate, Strom Thurmond (R-SC), on October 25. The president said the letter was “consistent with” the WPR. He did not mention that troops were going into “hostilities,” which would trigger the WPR clock. The House and Senate moved swiftly to approve resolutions to hold the Grenada operations to a 60-day timetable.13 Around the same time, Representative John Conyers (DMI) was the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit filed against the
president that challenged his authority to invade Grenada in the first place without congressional authorization. Ten other House Democrats signed onto the suit, most of whom had joined in previous suits, including Parren Mitchell (D-MD).

District judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed the suit, citing the member war suit precedents (two before and two after the WPR), including her own Crockett decision. She also utilized the novel equitable discretion doctrine theory that said courts should be leery of accepting cases from plaintiffs (especially members of Congress) who have other methods of resolving their disputes (see McGowan 1981).

If plaintiffs are successful in persuading their colleagues about the wrongfulness of the President’s actions, they will be provided the remedy they presently seek from this Court. If plaintiffs are unsuccessful in their efforts, it would be unwise for this Court to scrutinize that determination and interfere with the operations of the Congress ... the Court must withhold jurisdiction of this matter and exercise judicial restraint. (Conyers v. Reagan 1984, 327)

By the time the case reached the Appeals Court in 1985, the final noncombat troops were slated to leave Granada. The appeal was dismissed for mootness unanimously by the three judges, Tamm, Wald, and Bork (nominated by Presidents Johnson, Carter, and Reagan, respectively). The issue of whether the WPR clock was triggered by “hostilities” was not resolved. In the mission, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and 116 were wounded, 24 Cuban soldiers were killed and 59 wounded, and Grenadian casualties included 45 killed and 337 wounded (Rubner 1985, 628). The final
suit against President Reagan pivoted away from Central American to the Persian Gulf.

Lowry v. Reagan (1987). Beginning in 1986, during the Iran–Iraq War, Iranian military vessels around the Persian Gulf threatened Kuwaiti oil tankers. Kuwait reached out to both the Soviet Union and the United States for protection. Upon hearing that Kuwaitis requested that the United States reflag six vessels and the Soviet Union five, the Reagan administration offered to reflag all eleven tankers (Ciarrocchi 1987, 7). In 1987, 37 U.S. sailors were killed by a missile attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf by Iraq. In response, the administration augmented a single aircraft
carrier with 11 warships, six minesweepers, and over a dozen small patrol boats. Secretary of State George P. Shultz submitted a letter on the buildup to Speaker of the House Jim Wright (D-TX) but did not mention the WPR or clock. The administration did not file formal reports after two U.S. ships struck mines in summer 1987, nor when a U.S. fighter plane shot missiles at an Iranian aircraft the U.S. crew perceived as threatening.14 During this time, military personnel were also receiving “danger pay,” reflecting potential “hostilities” (Grimmett 2012, 16-17).

Alleging the presence of “hostilities” and “imminent hostilities,” 110 Democratic House plaintiffs filed a federal suit to demand a formal WPR report. In the district court’s dismissal of the case, Lowry v. Reagan, the judge said a “profusion of relevant congressional activity” in response to the president’s actions in the Persian Gulf was evidence that this was a matter for the two branches to work out among themselves. The litigants had in fact worried that legislative activity would shift the judicial spotlight from Reagan’s actions to Congress.15 Judge George H. Revercomb
(nominated to the federal bench by Ronald Reagan) delivered the opinion, citing the equitable discretion and political question doctrines in this particular case.

This Court declines to ... impose a consensus on Congress. Congress is free to adopt a variety of positions on the War Powers Resolution, depending on its ability to achieve a political consensus. If the Court were to intervene in this political process, it would be acting ‘beyond the limits inherent in the constitutional scheme ...’ Judicial review of the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution is not, however, precluded by this decision. A true confrontation between the Executive and a unified Congress, as evidenced by its passage of legislation to enforce the Resolution,
would pose a question ripe for judicial review. (Lowry v. Reagan 1987, 337-339, 341)

On an expedited appeal, the panel affirmed as a political question (Lowry v. Reagan 1988).16 Yet, in an encouraging turn for member–litigants, this standard was rejected two years later.

Dellums v. Bush (1990). On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within a week, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and, on August 25, the UN Security Council authorized “such measures as may be necessary” to cease and regulate cargo shipping to Iraq. On August 8, Bush announced the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia in a live televised speech, saying he “shared [meaning communicated] the decision” with Congress. On August 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt sent a letter to Congress (not mentioning the WPR)
saying “[i]t is not our intention or expectation that the use of force will be required to carry out these operations. However, if other means of enforcement fail, necessary and proportionate force will be employed to deny passage to ships that are in violation of... sanctions” (Grimmett 2012, 21). On November 8, 150,000 additional troops were sent to the Gulf. Bush sent a second report to Congress over a week later describing the continuing and increasing deployment of forces to the region but said hostilities were not imminent, in part due to the massive buildup. In this
phase, called Operation Desert Shield, around 350,000 U.S. troops were eventually deployed.17

In response, 53 members of the House and one senator (all Democrats) filed an injunctive suit against the president to prevent his going to war against Iraq without explicit congressional consent. Dellums v. Bush was rejected for ripeness by district judge Harold Greene (a Carter appointee). Judge Greene said it is up to the other branches to parse the diplomatic and military meaning of “war,” but at a certain scale, the label clearly applies. Judge Greene explored the history of member litigation on war and concluded that political question, standing, and equitable
discretion precedents did not apply here. The hurdle for the members was simply ripeness. Rejecting the administration’s argument, Greene implies that there is a door to future litigation if a president’s claim of unilateral authority is clearly out of line with the Constitution.

If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such an ‘interpretation’ would evade the plain language of the Constitution, and it cannot stand ... here the forces involved are of such magnitude and significance as to present no serious claim that a war would not ensue if they became engaged in combat, and it is therefore clear that
congressional approval is required if Congress desires to become involved. (Dellums v. Bush 1990, 1145)

The ripeness challenge came from the fact that U.S. troops had not yet engaged Iraq. Only around 10% of Congress’s membership signed onto the suit, implying that a majority-sanctioned suit might have a better chance at being heard on the merits (Dellums v. Bush 1990, 1151).18

Within a month of the federal opinion, on January 8, 1991, President Bush sent a request to the congressional leadership to pass legislation that supported military enforcement of UN Resolution 678, which called for member nations to use force to expel Iraq from Kuwait if it did not do so by January 15, 1991. The AUMF passed with party-line votes in the House (250-183) and Senate (52-47) and said explicitly that the legislation was complying with section 2 of the WPR. President Bush’s signing statement on January 14 said none of the debates, and even the resolution,
was interpreted as threatening to his “constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or [acknowledging] the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.”19 Days later, Bush reported the beginning of combat operations “consistent with” the WPR (Grimmett 2012, 24).

Member Litigation after Raines v. Byrd

The landmark case on Congress members’ standing in court came in 1997. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) sued to prevent the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 from taking effect. Although the district court sided with Byrd on both justiciability and substance, the Supreme Court reversed on the former, saying members cannot claim an institutional injury stemming from a loss of political power (Raines v. Byrd 1997). The majority opinion, like the war powers precedents, emphasized that Congress has legislative options to recover power. However, the Court found the act
unconstitutional the following year on presentment grounds once private interests claimed injury (Clinton v. City of New York, 1998; see also Farrier 2004, 2011).

Campbell v. Clinton (1999-2000). The Republican Congress granted President Clinton item veto power but did not explicitly authorize military action in Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia,
and Haiti in his first term (Adler 2000). In Clinton’s second term , however, his military orders related to Kosovo inspired a congressional lawsuit in the final year of the

administration. In 1998-99, a move for independence by ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo brought

a new wave of conflict and, in 1999, a joint U.S./NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military response. The story
of U.S. action in Kosovo is similar to previous cases discussed here, despite a partisan switch in both branches.
Judge Greene implied in Dellums that member–plaintiffs would have standing if they voted against a specific engagement abroad that proceeded anyway. That theory was tested in the spring
of 1999. On March 24, the NATO air campaign began against targets in Serbia. Clinton announced the action in a national address and submitted a report two days later to Congress, saying it
was “pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive” and the report was “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution.” On April 7, Clinton updated congressional leaders, saying “it is not possible to predict how long [the] operations will continue.” Defense Secretary William Cohen told the Senate
Armed Services Committee: “We’re certainly engaged in hostilities, we’re engaged in combat.”20 During the fifth week of strikes, on April 28, 1999, the House voted on multiple resolutions the
same day, which ultimately neither declared war, authorized the campaign, nor withdrew forces. The Senate, however, did pass an AUMF. Then, on May 21, 1999, the president signed an
emergency supplemental appropriations act that funded the operation.21

Campbell (R-CA) and over 20 fellow members, almost all Republicans, filed a complaint on May 19, seeking a declaratory
Representative Tom

judgment that President Clinton violated the WPR and the Constitution. The suit also demanded “that no later than
May 25, 1999, the President must terminate the involvement of the United States Armed Forces in such hostilities

unless Congress declares war, or enacts other explicit authorization, or has extended the sixty day period” (Campbell v. Clinton 2000, 33). The suit
was dismissed by district court judge Paul Friedman (appointed by Clinton) who reviewed the congressional actions and concluded “plaintiffs have failed to establish a sufficiently genuine
impasse between the legislative and executive branches to give them standing. The most that can be said is that Congress is divided about its position on the President’s actions in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and that [Clinton] has continued ... in the face of that divide” (Campbell v. Clinton 1999, 44).

The appeals court upheld the district court but was divided on reasoning. The panel offered four opinions among the three judges (an opinion for the court and three concurrences). The panel’s opinion was written by Judge Laurence Silberman (nominated to the appellate court by Ronald Reagan), who said the congressional votes were not sufficiently “nullified” by the president’s actions for an injury. The three judges then went in different directions. In his separate concurrence, Judge Silberman said the appellants’ claim of “hostilities” in Yugoslavia does not lend itself to
resolution, even if it appears to be true: “[a]ppellants cannot point to any constitutional test for what is war.” Judge Raymond Randolph (nominated by George H. W. Bush) emphasized the principles of standing and mootness. He looked at the totality of the House votes on April 28, saying they were “not for naught” because Clinton did not introduce ground troops, which he might have if the full war declaration had passed. Judge David S. Tatel (appointed by President Clinton), offered the most sympathetic reading of the member–plaintiffs complaint. Although he agreed
with the majority that the standing problems were too severe, overall he said war is justiciable. “Since the earliest years of the nation, courts have not hesitated to determine when military action constitutes ‘war’” (Campbell v. Clinton 2000, 16-37).

In interviews, a member and staffer involved in Campbell expressed frustration. They said the lawsuit was designed to bring public attention to Congress’s “lack of will” to confront President Clinton on war. “Republicans pride themselves as constitutionalists. Democrats pride themselves as learning lessons from Vietnam.” Yet “war brings ... institutional disinterest.”22

Doe v. Bush (2003). Despite campaigning against Bill Clinton’s “nation building,” and promising a “humble foreign policy” in 2000,23 President George W. Bush’s presidency was built on post-9/11 foreign interventions. However, the second Iraq war suit is unlike the previous ones because the Congress debated and passed a resolution authorizing President George W. Bush to decide when/if to invade. A dozen Democratic House members focused on the latter in a lawsuit saying that it is unconstitutional for Congress to delegate away the war powers that are enumerated in
Article I. Because the nub of their argument focused on a passed law, and President Bush waited until the AUMF was in place to invade, this case had less promise for the plaintiffs than the others discussed here.24

Just weeks before the invasion began, the House members, joined by 20 private plaintiffs (active military and their families) tried to prevent the AUMF’s execution.

They made two somewhat contradictory constitutional claims: Congress delegated too much war power and what they granted to President Bush was not a green light for invasion. Judge Joseph Tauro (nominated by Richard Nixon) agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case as a political question, saying there was no clear conflict between the political branches. Tauro said, “there is a day to day fluidity in the situation that does not amount to resolute conflict between the branches – but that does argue against an uninformed judicial intervention” (Doe v. Bush
2003, 440). Circuit judges Sandra Lynch (nominated by Clinton), Conrad Cyr (nominated by Reagan and Bush I) and Norman Stahl (nominated by Bush I) dismissed the case on ripeness rather than the “murky” political questions (Doe v. Bush 2003, 138). The previous year, however, the Bush administration got a separate member suit dismissed on political question precedent.25

Kucinich v. Obama (2011). Like President Bush’s flip from candidate to president, Barack Obama’s war powers interpretations changed dramatically from 2007 to 2011 (see Edelson-Deelen 2015). During the “Arab Spring” revolts from 2010 to 2011, street protests in Benghazi, Libya, began to turn toward regime change and the ouster of longtime dictator Colonel Muammar Qadhafi. The UN Security Council passed two resolutions that together condemned violence against civilians, encouraged member nations to place asset freezes and travel bans on the Libyan leadership,
endorsed the travel bans already being put into place by the Arab League and other regional organizations, introduced a no-fly zone and authorized member states through regional organizations to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. Operation Odyssey Dawn was a multinational coalition led by the United Stsates in response to the second UN resolution; Operation Unified Protector was the NATO operation that “responded to the UN call” by enforcing an arms embargo as well as the no-fly zone. On March 31, NATO assumed command for all international
operations in Libya.26

The constitutional question through these months was whether President Barack Obama needed explicit authorization from Congress to engage in this offensive military action abroad. The president and his administration argued that he possessed unilateral authority, bolstered by treaty obligations.27 Echoing the Kosovo situation, Congress neither authorized nor banned action. The mission began on March 19; the president reported to Congress two days later that he “directed U.S military forces to commence operations to assist an international effort authorized by the
United Nations.” The strikes will be “limited in their nature, duration, and scope ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I appreciate the support of the Congress in this action.”28 Without any supportive action in Congress, President Obama asserted that the United Nations can “authorize” members’ military campaigns (which the WPR specifically denies in section 8), and said “it is U.S. policy that Qaddafi needs to go” (Fisher 2013, 240). The administration took the position that the
mission was not “war” in a constitutional sense that required congressional authorization. Nor did President Obama acknowledge explicitly that he was bound to a withdrawal clock under the WPR.29 However, when the 60-day clock expired on May 20, the president wrote to leaders to express support for a resolution passed in the Senate that would authorize the mission. The House did not pass it. A few days before the 90-day clock expired on June 19, the White House said there were no “hostilities” without US casualties (for more information on legal position and
debates within the administration on this issue, see Edelson and Starr-Deelen 2015; Savage 2011; and Savage and Lander 2011).

Meanwhile in Congress, several House actions indicated interest in holding the president to the WPR. First, House Concurrent Resolution 51 was introduced by Dennis Kucinich (D-OH, who would soon be the lead plaintiff in the member lawsuit) and said “[p]ursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution ...Congress directs the President to remove the United States Armed Forces from Libya by not later than the date that is 15 days after the date of the adoption of this concurrent resolution.” The resolution failed on the floor 148-265, with bipartisan groups on both
sides of the question; the “yea” votes had 87 Republicans and 61 Democrats and the “nay” votes had 144 Republicans and 121 Democrats. Second, on June 3, Speaker John Boehner himself sponsored House Resolution 292, which banned ground troops and passed on a party line vote.

Third, on June 15, Boehner wrote to warn the president he was about to violate the WPR. The fourth major House action of the month came when Representative Alcee Hastings (D-FL) sponsored a resolution to authorize the mission, which failed 123-295, with only eight Republicans voting “aye.” Finally, Representative Tom Rooney (R-FL) sponsored a resolution to de-fund the NATO mission, which also failed 180-238.30 These last two (seemingly contradictory) votes took place on the same day.

In the middle of this active month, 10 members of the House of Representatives (two Democrats and eight Republicans) filed suit against President Obama on June 15, 2011. The complaint noted that “the Obama Administration had yet to ask Congress for specific funding [for military action in Libya]” nor sought “a declaration of war from Congress or even congressional approval for [the military action].” Information from the Department of Defense estimated spending around $550 million in the first 10 days of the military engagement, paid for with reallocations (Bennett
2011). Nevertheless, U.S. District Judge Reggie Walton (a G. W. Bush appointee) agreed with the defendants, and the case was dismissed in mid-October. Judge Walton rejected the members’ standing to sue as legislators and taxpayers. Citing several previous member lawsuits, he said that the alleged injuries to these 10 plaintiffs are not separate from those that may have been suffered by the other 425 members of the House (Kucinich v. Obama 2011, 113). Therefore, what Kucinich et al. claim is an “institutional injury,” which had been dismissed as a standing category in
Raines v. Byrd (1997, discussed above). If an institutional injury characterizes the situation, then it should be endorsed by the body, which was precisely what Judge Rosemary Collyer noted in the current suit on enforcement of the ACA, House v. Burwell. The next issue was whether a legitimate conflict arose from the president’s actions in light of congressional votes. Specifically, did President Obama “nullify” any particular congressional action, including the defeat of the authorization bill on June 24? Judge Walton endorsed the Obama administration’s view, saying “[t]he
President’s actions, being based on authority totally independent of the June 24, 2011 vote, cannot be construed as actions that nullify a specific Congressional prohibition” (Kucinich v. Obama 2011, 113). The decision came on October 20, 2011. The NATO campaign ended on October 31. Kucinich did not file an appeal. The tenth member war suit failed to disrupt the new order.

Conclusion
While federal courts are accused of activism on many policy fronts, war questions meet restraint. Whatever the motivations of federal judges who have formed
these multilayered barriers around war powers, the consistency of the judicial position defies ideological polarization on other issues, and transcends change on the
bench, majority control of the House and Senate, the occupant of the White House, and even the foreign policy zeitgeist. All this is not to say there is an ideal, rigid
model of war powers that is appropriate to all contemporary situations, nor that courts can and should “save” the country, and Congress, from the president. It is
not federal court’s burden to uphold the Constitution or WPR alone. But federal courts can take up a future suit and declare a
presidential action unconstitutional pending congressional approval within a certain period of time ,
possibly prompting a national policy debate that will put House and Senate members on the record . It is also

possible that federal courts could accept a case and rule for the president on the merits, possibly even declaring the WPR unconstitutional. In the

meantime, presidential assertiveness is supported by default through congressional ambivalence and judicial
discomfort or disinterest (Keynes 1982; Koh 1990).
All three branches and both parties have contributed to our nation’s flipped understanding of constitutional war. After-the-fact public criticism, oversight hearings
and investigations, and party changes in the White House and Congress have not changed this dynamic. Today, in addition to bombing ISIS targets since August
2014, President Obama has sent 3,500 troops and special operations advisors to the field by October 2015 with one commando death thus far (Baker, Cooper, and
Sanger 2015). The president has chided Congress repeatedly for not sending a new AUMF, but neither branch has said the lack of explicit authorization matters.
These postures support modern constitutional interpretations that have received remarkably little outcry or debate. Unlike
marriage, health care,
campaign finance, privacy, and many other high-profile legal conflicts that ricochet through the
branches, public discourse, and elections for years (and even decades at a time), Congress’s war powers are
actually enumerated in the Constitution .

Solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Fuchs 18 [Michael H Fuchs is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and a former deputy
assistant secretary of state for east Asian and Pacific affairs, “When it comes to foreign policy, Congress
must rein Trump in,” 4-24, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/24/foreign-policy-
congress-trump, y2k]

And yet, the US president has extensive power to craft and implement foreign policy. The constitution provides the president with
tremendous authority, but the decades-long atrophy of Congress’s role as a coequal branch in executing US foreign

policy has ceded even more power to the president. The president now has the ability to start wars anywhere in
the world, and to use nuclear weapons on a moment’s notice.

As historian Arthur Schlesinger wrote in his classic, The Imperial Presidency: “What began as emergency powers temporarily confided to presidents soon hardened
into authority claimed by presidents as constitutionally inherent in the presidential office: thus the imperial presidency.”

There is a robust, longstanding debate about the balance between legislative and executive branch powers on foreign policy. After Schlesinger first wrote about the
imperial presidency, Congress attempted to re-establish its authority through the War Powers Act, imposing a number of requirements on the president’s ability to
send troops into battle.

And while the extent of Congress’s role on foreign policy has ebbed and flowed ever since, especially since the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 the power of the president to wage war and conduct foreign policy with few constraints has

continued to grow.

Which brings us to today. Trump sitting in the Oval Office, sending out early morning tweets threatening war – without
even the consultation of his cabinet and with no strategy in place – has raised the stakes on reining in the imperial presidency.

It would seem difficult to expect a Republican-controlled Congress to impose genuine constraints on a Republican president. And yet, on a few important occasions
during Trump’s tenure, Congress has rejected actions by Trump that would have undermined national security: Congress forced Trump to approve new sanctions on
Russia with veto-proof majorities; so far Congress has rejected Trump’s attempts to gut the budgets of the state department and USAid; and, to date, Congress has
not taken Trump’s bait on the Iran deal by passing legislation that would sink it. But these are the exceptions to the norm of this Congress’ continued acquiescence
to the executive branch on foreign policy – even bad foreign policy.

If there were ever a time for Congress to reassert itself on foreign policy, this is it.

First, Congress must use its legislative authority and power of the purse to force the administration to adopt reasonable policies. As the world faces the gravest crisis
of forcibly displaced people since the second world war, Congress must provide funding and support for refugees and humanitarian assistance. Congress must pass
legislation to protect special counsel Robert Mueller and the investigation into collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. And Congress must continue to
provide robust funding to the state department and USAid.
Second, Congress must hold regular, high-profile hearings that call senior administration officials to testify on the main threats confronting the US – and call them
back regularly to provide updates on policy. From responding to Russian aggression to US policy on Syria to the status of North Korea policy, Congress must now
play a leading role in keeping the administration honest.

And third – and most importantly – Congress

must reassert its authority as a coequal branch of government in
matters of war and peace. Today, the US is fighting conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen,
and beyond. The recent US military strikes on Syria – which could have resulted in escalation with Russia and
Iran – did not have congressional approval. It is the responsibility of Congress to vote on any new US
military intervention to ensure that it has the support of the people’s representatives.
Whether or not one believes Congress would realistically constrain a president of the same party, there is precedent. In 1966 Democratic Senator J William Fulbright
held a series of public hearings on the conduct of the Vietnam war being waged by a president – Lyndon Johnson – of his own party, which helped spark a national
debate.

From Vietnam to Iraq, the US has rushed into disastrous wars with limited congressional debate and quick
acquiescence. Today, America faces the prospect of major conflict – with North Korea, Iran, Syria, Russia, China

and more. With Donald Trump in the White House, there is no room for error. Congress must begin to act before it’s
too late.
 Off
TEXT: The United States federal government should:
---reduce presence in Asia in consultation with allies

---stipulate that its commitment to Japanwill be limited to Article 5

---strengthen Japan A2AD

---do TCBMs

Solves China, maintains deterrence & assurance

Wertheim 20 – Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War & Peace Studies at Columbia;
Deputy Director of Research & Policy at the Quincy Institute

Stephen Wertheim, Deputy Director of Research and Policy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible
Statecraft and a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at
Columbia University, The Price of Primacy: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World, March/April
2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/price-primacy

In the past three years, the Trump administration and a flotilla of defense analysts have proposed a
strategy of “great-power competition,” which would generally intensify geopolitical contestation in the
service of maximizing Washington’s military power. Precisely the opposite is needed. Competition
among great powers is inevitable, but it should be a byproduct of underlying interests and is hardly to
be desired in its own right. As the United States attempts to elicit cooperation from China and Russia on
combating climate change and governing global finance, it should avoid costly military rivalries and
ruinous large-scale wars. Washington should therefore significantly reduce its forward-deployed
military presence in Asia and Europe alike, while retaining the ability to intervene if either power truly
threatens to become a hostile hegemon in its region .

Despite the rising alarm in Washington, China is not poised to dominate East Asia by force. Having
grown in rough proportion to China’s economy, the People’s Liberation Army remains focused on local
issues: defending the Chinese mainland, winning disputes over small border areas and islands, and
prevailing in what China sees as its unresolved civil war with the government in Taiwan. A new
administration should abandon its predecessors’ overreactions to Chinese military expansion. In order
to prevent a serious clash in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s interests outstrip those of
Washington, the United States should extricate itself from maritime jurisdictional disputes and cease
freedom-of-navigation operations and surveillance near disputed islands. It is not worth antagonizing
China over such issues.

The possibility that China might become more belligerent if it continues to grow stronger is a legitimate
concern. To account for this possibility without taking actions that make it more likely, Washington
should strengthen the defenses of U.S. allies in Asia in ways that do not provoke China. The United
States can provide its allies with so-called anti-access/area-denial [A2/AD] capabilities, such as improved
surveillance and missile systems, which would severely impede any Chinese attack without signaling an
offensive posture. It could then retract its offensive weaponry. In Taiwan, such an approach would
fulfill the long-standing U.S. objective of preserving a peaceful status quo, deterring a Chinese invasion
while dissuading Taiwan from thinking it could back its independence aspirations with U.S. forces.
If it took this approach, the United States would still have ample time to mobilize and deploy its forces
if China were to turn bellicose. For now, Washington must make a serious bid to secure Beijing’s
cooperation on core objectives, especially climate change. To attempt to contain China would be a
grave mistake, guaranteeing Chinese enmity and directing resources into military escalation instead of
environmental cooperation. The United States should clearly prioritize the present danger of an
uninhabitable planet above the speculative and manageable prospect of an aggressive peer.
 Off
TEXT: The United States should maintain non flexible responses to Senkaku conflict
unless and until China commits to working in a G-2 with the US to solve global
problems including climate change and enter negotiations with China

The CP competes, solves, and solves China warming coop

Goh 16 [Evelyn Goh is the Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National
University, where she is also the Director of Research in the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, “Is a
‘Grand Bargain’ the Way Forward in Northeast Asia?”, December 2016,
https://globalasia.org/v11no4/cover/is-a-grand-bargain-the-way-forward-in-northeast-asia_evelyn-goh]
IanM

Strategic efforts are defined by their ultimate “big picture” goals. So what
ought to be the endpoint for strategic diplomacy
in Northeast Asia? In this article I argue that from a broad perspective of regional order, one ultimate goal must be to forge
a feasible and sustainable “grand bargain” among the resident great powers. For at least the last two-and-a-half
decades, Northeast Asia has been plagued by multiple uncertainties, especially regarding the economic and
security implications of China’s resurgence and the durability of American preponderance and
leadership in the region. The latter is currently the greatest of these “unknown unknowns,” following Donald J. Trump’s election as the
next US president. Moreover, these questions sit alongside other important and enduring regional uncertainties, particularly Japan’s
“abnormal” military condition, the divisions between the two Koreas and the divide between Taiwan and Mainland China. In recent years, key
voices on both the Chinese and American sides have mooted notions of closer collaboration and joint
great-power management in response to these multiple uncertainties — for instance, the idea of
Washington and Beijing acting as a G-2 to tackle global problems, or President Xi Jinping’s concept of a “new model of
major power relations” between China and the US. But the necessary foundations for any such strategic collaboration
must be new and fundamental mutual agreements between the US, China and other major East Asian
states. In this vein, a number of scholars and analysts have begun to discuss more seriously the prospects for negotiating grand bargains of
one type or another, which may help ease these uncertainties by creating the foundations for a stable new regional order. There are two
notable examples. First, in 2012, Hugh White published a subsequently much-debated book, The China Choice, calling for Washington to take
seriously the need to share power with Beijing, and suggesting that this should take the form of a new concert of powers involving the US,
China, Japan, India and possibly Indonesia. The book pays more attention to making the case for why this radical choice is necessary than to
how it should be put into practice, but in a small section White lists seven “essential understandings” that the two sides must agree upon. In
essence, these would be the basis for a new grand bargain between China and the US. The list focuses on mutual legitimacy: treating each other
as equals; recognizing each other’s domestic political systems; respecting each other’s national interests and right to develop armed forces
sufficient to defend themselves; committing to resolve differences peacefully; agreeing on the norms of legitimate conduct; mutual willingness
to counter attempts to dominate; and the ability to sell this to domestic audiences.1 White does not provide more substantive explanations for
what the power-sharing bargain between the US and China might look like, but the one controversial condition he does mention is that a
regional concert would have to include a more “normal,” independently militarized — and nuclear-armed — Japan. The second example is
Charles Glaser’s
argument in 2015 that the US ought to adopt “limited geopolitical accommodation to
avoid conflict” toward China.2 He specifically proposes that Washington should negotiate a grand
bargain that would trade ending the US commitment to defend Taiwan for China’s peaceful settlement on fair
terms of its territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and Beijing’s official acceptance of America’s military security role in East Asia,
including its alliances and forward deployment. He argues that such a grand bargain would not be neatly symmetrical, but could be acceptable
if the two sides can agree to “trade across multiple issues, making both sides better off, but not necessarily equally.” Apart from generating a
lot of controversy, these two views help advance the debate on US strategy toward contemporary China, if only by forcing us to consider more
seriously the terms under which a scenario of “negotiated change” (as opposed to a war-torn power transition) might occur.3 In this sense, the
debate these works aim to fuel is about the content of a putative grand bargain between the US and China. To put into context the debate
about a possible new grand bargain for the analytical and policy challenges of strategic diplomacy in Northeast Asia, I offer in this article three
entry-points for discussion. First, I set out the comparative advantages of adopting a grand-bargain framework to
understand how a new regional order might be negotiated. Second, I underscore the fact that prior strategic bargains already
exist in the wider Asia-Pacific region, and consider how these may interact with the proposals for a new grand bargain. Finally, I briefly review
some recent key Chinese ideas about such bargains to highlight the obstacles and opportunities faced by strategic diplomats seeking to broker a
new grand bargain in Northeast Asia. THE ‘GRAND BARGAIN’ APPROACH At its most basic level, a grand bargain between two states may be
understood in contractual terms: it consists of a bundle of agreements by which state X gives up something of significant strategic value to
itself, in exchange for state Y committing to something that is of equal or greater strategic value. The overall purpose would be to bring about
more clarity and predictability regarding their goals and interactions. A
grand bargain is based on the notion that co-existence among
states (and especially major powers) is built upon reciprocal commitments , or fundamental political compromises ,
which allow some form of strategic exchange and interdependence to develop. Between great powers, grand bargains in their most advanced
form must entail some form of negotiated constraints to their exercise of power. Grand bargains basically involve implicit or explicit
agreements about the mutually acceptable terms on which peaceful relations can be conducted. These include understandings about
recognition and status, mutual rights and responsibilities, mutual spheres of influence, terms of exchange, and conditions of restraint. It is on
this basis that scholars sometimes argue that the US
and China, or China and Japan, will need to negotiate a grand bargain
between themselves and even with other key states in East Asia, for regional security and stability to prevail.4
In general, the big advantage of a bargain approach to understanding and influencing great power relations is its innate relationality — the
reciprocal and transactional assumptions underpinning bargains oblige us to examine and try to reconcile the preferences, goals and tactics of
each of the parties involved. This
sits in contrast, for example, to the one-sided, unilateral notions of
containment or appeasement that often seem to dominate debates about how to respond to China’s rise. Thinking about bargains
involves taking seriously what the other side wants and values. Moreover — and importantly, given our project’s starting point to understand
international order as a complex system — a grand bargain approach is by definition wider. On the one hand, it connotes
linkage across issues, as Glaser suggests. But it also crucially entails a systemic perspective beyond just the bilateral relationship: the
lens of a grand bargain should additionally allow us to view the broader regional and historical contexts that clearly affect the attractiveness,
viability and scope of any putative new US-China bargain, for instance. From such a starting point, we may identify at least two issues critical to
the possibility of a grand bargain in contemporary Northeast Asia: the effects of existing strategic bargains, and Chinese notions of the
acceptable terms for a bargain with the US. Both of these issues affect how desirable proposals for grand bargains like White’s and Glaser’s
might be from the points of view of China and crucial US allies in the region. STRATEGIC BARGAINS IN THE STATUS QUO ANTE Strategic
bargains form the sinews of international order, and while they are most likely to be struck at critical junctures — such as
following crises or wars — once struck, they do not simply disappear but continue to evolve and might be
renegotiated. As such, anything we may propose in the contemporary setting would in fact be a new grand bargain between the US and
China. It would not be created from scratch, because the status quo ante is already marked by a series of grand, regional,
trilateral and bilateral bargains. This is a fundamentally important point — it shows that Washington and
Beijing (and other Northeast Asian states, for that matter) have been and are capable of striking bargains. But this
understanding also presents constraints for any new proposed bargain, because it will involve revising or
renegotiating previous, disintegrating or ongoing bargains between the US and China, and between them and Taiwan,
as well as Japan. The most important systemic context for a new bargain is the post-Cold War economic-security grand bargain between
China and the US. The economic side of this bargain is crucial, but is undergoing a difficult transformation. In simple terms, the bargain is based
on intensified interdependence underpinned by the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Like other states that support that bargain, China
has gained access to the US market in exchange for its undervalued currency, which in turn supports massive US government spending.
Essentially, this is a bargain that stipulates that China and other key lenders and exporters keep accumulating US dollars while the US keeps
consuming foreign goods and services.5 As Michael Mastanduno argues, this grand systemic bargain has been fatally undermined by the global
financial crisis, which will force the US eventually to draw down domestic consumption and borrowing, and consequently also reduce its
tolerance for China’s export-led growth strategy. In parallel, since the 2008 crisis, China has redoubled its focus on developing its domestic
consumer market, and tried to diversify its foreign reserve holdings away from an over dependence on dollars. Both these trends are reducing
their mutual interdependence, and as the “special economic relationship” becomes less special, so too will their mutual strategic restraint be
dampened and their security relationship further strained.6 Given this trend, China’s incentives to strike a new asymmetrical bargain with the
US like the one Glaser suggests are unclear. On the security side, any new US-China grand bargain would have to
grapple with another central but disintegrating previous bargain. During the Cold War, the East Asian order was underpinned by the
alliance between the US and Japan, in which Washington extended its security umbrella to Japan in
exchange for the country’s disarmament, pacification and guaranteed alignment with the “free world.” In effect, this bargain saw the
US step into the breach between Japan and China as an “outside arbiter play[ing] a policing role.” By making Japanese
defense dependent on itself, the US extended a “dual reassurance,” simultaneously guaranteeing China and Japan security against each other
and obviating the need for them to engage in direct security competition.7 After 1995, the revitalization of the US-Japan alliance based on
Japan playing a more active regional and global military role seemed to undermine Washington’s ring-holding ability between Japan and China.
Beijing began to regard the US-Japan alliance less as a means to constrain as to facilitate Japan’s
remilitarization, a view reinforced by the central role of the alliance in the more recent US “pivot,” or rebalance, to Asia.8 There is
also a growing view within China that the US used the cover of the alliance to “illicitly transfer”
sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to Japan during the 1970s.9 Using the lens of these disintegrating strategic
bargains highlights the major unresolved sticking point of Japan’s increasingly contested role in the regional order. While Glaser does take
Japan into account, his main concern is whether ending the US defense commitment to Taiwan will have a negative impact on the credibility of
the US alliance with Japan. But the US-Japan alliance has already changed in character — and from China’s point of view, to the detriment of a
previous bargain. Thus, any
proposed new Sino-American bargain that takes the US-Japan alliance as a
constant while asking both China and Japan to make concessions in their territorial disputes is unlikely to be
acceptable. Many Chinese no doubt would prefer to continue to characterize Japan as a second-rate “American lackey,” but increasingly
under President Xi’s strategy of “striving for achievement,” these two allies are being differentiated, with the US viewed as China’s only
strategic competitor and Japan as one of its key “hostile countries.”10 Against this background, the assumption that Japan’s “normalization” is
an inevitable prerequisite for regional power-sharing is too casual. Arguably, there is now more than an unintentional security dilemma
between China and Japan,11 and their growing conflicts of interest and nationalism are likely to create a spiral of insecurity that will undermine
the prospects for a US-China grand bargain that involves any compromise between China and Japan. Pre-existing and evolving bargains also
surround the issue of Taiwan, which is central to Glaser’s proposed strategy of territorial accommodation. On Taiwan, China and the US
achieved a limited bargain during the 1979 normalization, based on the principle of “one China.” Beijing was accorded diplomatic recognition
and authority over all of China, and Washington recognized that Taiwan is part of China and relinquished the right to encourage Taiwanese
independence (though not the right to sell arms to Taiwan). While they agreed on the peaceful means for resolving the problem, they disagreed
on the necessity of reunification as the eventual outcome.12 Since then, China and the US have each tried to negotiate alternative bargains
with Taiwan, partly in order to stabilize the remaining ambiguities of the status quo ante. The rival models come across clearly in an illuminating
exchange between a Chinese and an American scholar, Jia Qingguo and Alan Romberg.13 Beijing’s offer is in the form of the “one country, two
systems” track toward reunification, whereby Taiwan would trade independence for the preservation of its separate political system (exactly
how is unspecified) and even control of its own armed forces.14 The current US bargain with Taiwan aims at preserving the status quo,
exchanging the US defense commitment and arms sales for Taiwan’s “three No’s” to war, unification or independence. Ceasing the US
commitment to defend Taiwan, as Glaser suggests, will mean not only withdrawing the US bargain, but also making the Chinese one
unnecessary, thus changing the potential terms of reunification. Understanding this context is important, because it suggests that while Taiwan
is central to China’s security and national identity, Beijing may not place as high a value on potential US accommodation on this issue as Glaser
suggests. Within the discourse on this in China, there is grave doubt anyway on whether the Taiwan card is really that powerful anymore in the
relationship with the US, given that China thinks time is on its side.15 Thus, while accommodation on Taiwan is essential, it is unlikely to be
sufficient to make Glaser’s grand bargain acceptable to the Chinese.16 REGIONAL AND CHINESE IDEAS ABOUT STRATEGIC BARGAINS Within
China, a debate is growing slowly but steadily away from Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui policy of biding time to develop comprehensive
national power, towards questions of what kind of great power China should be and whether China ought to support or challenge the existing
order. But this is still a gradual awakening, and without more coherence in narrowing down the parameters of this struggle for identity, power
sharing with the US cannot be an option seriously favored by opinion leaders in the face of growing popular nationalism within China. Other
countries in East Asia, meanwhile, either sustain national security identities that feed upon the assurance of continued US primacy, ground their
national security strategies upon at least some degree of US-China rivalry, or seek to retain some strategic autonomy by forestalling great
power domination. For all three reasons, any new bargain premised upon a potential US-China condominium is distasteful. Looking beyond
Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, it is hard to imagine effusive support for the concert of great powers that White suggests, which would by
definition exclude the majority of these small states. This was already evident in ASEAN’s successful attempts to undermine an earlier
Australian initiative to construct an Asia-Pacific Community centered on the major powers. Once again, picking out Indonesia as a sub-regional
power only elicits alarm and resistance from this collection of states that have expended so much political and institutional effort to create for
ASEAN a driving seat in regionalism precisely in order to avoid great power dominance that would undermine their autonomy. Returning to
Northeast Asia, the ideational, domestic political and strategic complexities that many scholars so vividly underscore on the US side are
replicated on China’s part. First (and perhaps helpfully for anyone inclined to propose new bargains), the
idea of strategic bargains
comes naturally to many Chinese foreign policy interlocutors and their counterparts. For example, both
China and Japan see the recent intensification of their territorial dispute in the East China Sea as resulting from the other
side reneging on their 1972 normalization agreement to set aside the dispute: the Chinese perceive Tokyo to have reneged on it
in 2012 when the Noda government bought the Senkaku islands, while the Japanese see Beijing as having reneged earlier in the 2000s by
significantly increasing paramilitary and military operations in the area and allowing more aggressive forms of confrontation on the ground. In
the South China Sea, also, the Chinese see then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2010 diplomatic intervention in publicly criticizing Chinese
assertiveness as reneging on US professions of neutrality, while many Americans viewed reports of Chinese pronouncements about the area as
a “core interest” for the country as evidence of an expanding Chinese sphere of influence, and as an assertion that runs counter to professions
of China’s “peaceful rise.” Second, there
is a discourse in China on what a strategic bargain with the US might look
like, particularly since the emergence of talk of a possible G2 and President Xi’s notion of “a new model of
major power relations.” In a fairly typical liberal vein, Wu Xinbo argues that “it is time for China and the United
States to try to reach an understanding on the evolving regional architecture through candid
dialogue,” encompassing “more equal relations between the two sides of the Pacific.”17 The theme of a more equal exchange is echoed in a
recent project by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences on US-China relations, which states that China
would support a “positive leadership role” for the US if the latter would also support a “more positive
and vigorous role in East Asia” that “leaves more room for maneuver for China in terms of claiming territorial rights
and military development.” Specifically, the US needs to “recognize China’s sovereignty claims within its historical rights,” “avoid
getting involved in the territorial disputes between China and its neighbors” and “should never interfere militarily in the disputes
and crises between China and its neighbors.”18 At least one Chinese scholar, Shi Yinhong, has explicitly discussed what a more
equal bargain between China and the US would look like at a broader, grand strategic level. His proposition is for a “peaceful ‘final settlement’”
based on “selective preponderance” in complementary realms.19 The US would accept China’s leading position in Asia based on its superior
economic size, trade volume and regional influence; mutual deterrence based on China having military parity and even marginal superiority in
China’s offshore areas (with Taiwan’s eastern shore being the “prudent” line); peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland; and China
“maintaining strategic space in a substantial but still narrow span of the western Pacific.” In return, China would accept overall US military
superiority globally and in the central and western Pacific; and preponderant American influence in other regions of the world. CONCLUSION
Diplomacy that is strategic needs to start from a consideration of the desired strategic ends. In terms of order in Northeast Asia, one
indispensable goal must be some modus vivendi among the major powers. As this brief overview suggests, there are some significant hurdles to
be negotiated if we look slightly further down the line to consider how attractive current US-oriented propositions of a new grand bargain
might be to a Chinese audience. At the same time, these proposals would have to contend with ongoing attempts at renegotiating and
contesting a number of bargains underpinning key bilateral relationships and regional order in East Asia. Any form of negotiated change in the
US-China bilateral relationship will require significant reversals in the mindsets and ambitions of the US and China. The same huge challenges
face attempts to consider deep-seated changes in the China-Japan relationship. The bottom line is that a grand bargain is
possible in Northeast Asia — but it will entail sea changes in attitudes and expectations on all sides. History suggests that groups of
states find it very difficult to undertake transformational changes like this without the radical impetus or shock of war. But perhaps strategic
diplomacy can help, at least by creating opportunities to stimulate what often seems to be the unthinkable between Washington and Beijing,
and between Beijing and Tokyo — non-military co-operative modes of security behavior and non-zero-sum
strategic interactions with each other.

US China G-2 solves existential climate change AND international stability

Bush 11 [Richard Bush is a nonresident senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at
Brookings “The United States and China: A G-2 in the Making?”, 10-11-2011,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-united-states-and-china-a-g-2-in-the-making/] IanM
Zbigniew Brzezinski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics
each attracted a lot of attention for their proposals that the United States and China form what they called a G-2.
The essence of these proposals was that, as the two largest economies, as members of the UN Security Council, and as the most
prominent rising power and the strongest “status-quo” power, these two nations should work together
to address the big challenges facing the international system. They and only they could provide the
global public goods that the world required. It is fair to say, however, that people outside the United States paid far more
attention to Brzezinski’s and Bergsten’s G-2 idea than did Americans themselves. The proposal sank like a stone in Washington but caused great
ferment overseas, particularly among countries that would be unhappy if Beijing and Washington acted upon the idea. Now there are a couple
of “germs of reality” in the Brzezinski-Bergsten G-2 idea. In the sixth month of his presidency, President Barack Obama laid out a grand vision
for bilateral relations between the two countries. On the occasion of the first Strategic and Economic Dialogue, he said, “ The relationship
between the U.S. and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the
world…. If we advance [our mutual] interests through cooperation , our people will benefit and the world will be
better off—because our ability to partner with each other is a prerequisite for progress on many of the
most pressing global challenges.” President Obama and President Hu Jintao have repeatedly stated their “commitment to building
a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century, which serves the interests of the American and Chinese
peoples and of the global community.” Moreover, there are some “pressing global challenges” that stem from the policies of
the two countries. Global macroeconomic imbalances are the result, primarily of the bilateral economic
imbalance between the United States and China and the related domestic policies. China saves too much and the United
States consumes too much. That asymmetry leads to a large bilateral trade imbalance and the necessity for China to recycle
its export earnings, usually by purchasing American debt. This bilateral imbalance affects the stability of the global economy ,
and the only way to reduce this instability is for China to consume more and the United States to save more. The problem of climate
change is similar. China and the United States are the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Unless they
are willing to tackle the problem, global warming will continue to endanger the planet.
Case
Flexible Response Adv
 A2: Flex Response---1NC
Flexible response collapses alliances, doesn’t deter China, and causes rapid escalation
---Flexible response kills deterrence:

- O’Hanlon assumes US has more economic power than it does proven by numerous forecasts which think he’s wrong, means China isn’t afraid of sanctions
- O’Hanlon’s example for sanctions working is Ukraine---but sanctions didn’t stop Russia from attacking in the first place and Ukraine remains corrupt and unstable---which proves sanctions won’t deter China from a fait accompli
- Fundamentally, O’Hanlon’s strategy is to give up the area in question and use sanctions to force them to give it back which signals US doesn’t actually care about the region in the first place and means adversaries know they can just wait sanctions out magnified with
China because they know US will be hurt more by a trade war
- Independently, causes China to probe more to see how US defines “proportional response” which causes miscalc – turns the aff

---Flexible response causes escalation, which turns the aff---it requires striking China in regions around the globe, which causes retaliation and entanglement in global hotspots BUT doesn’t deter because China’s interests in key areas like Senkaku’s outweigh

---Flexible response kills alliances:

- Framing issue---status quo competition is goldilocks for alliances---it signals we’re committed and builds interoperability---means plan is a shock that only causes abandonment fears
- O’Hanlon’s sanctions would shear off allies who rely on China for trade and whose economy would collapse if they stuck with the US, means plan causes full Asian tilt towards China
- Senkaku’s is existentially important for Japan---flex response makes clear the US doesn’t give a fuck about it by delineating regions it will and won’t protect with full force which causes intense abandonment fear for Japan because if we don’t defend there, why
defend anywhere else---forcing Japan to develop nukes to defend their interest themselves

Forney 20 [Andy Forney is a U.S. Army officer and received his PhD from Texas Christian University,
“Choosing Interests While You Sleep? #Reviewing The Senkaku Paradox", 1-29-2020,
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/29/choosing-interests-while-you-sleep-reviewing-the-
senkaku-paradox] IanM
O’Hanlon argues his framework provides a rational, practical, and achievable option within the United States’ current fiscal and technological
reality. Several of his assumptions, however, bear further assessment. O’Hanlon
undergirds his vision of economic warfare
with a bullish appraisal of the current and future economies of the United States, Europe, and their
respective global partners.[5] This runs counter to many contemporary projections of the global
economy, particularly in regards to China’s growing economic power. O’Hanlon acknowledges but ultimately
dismisses these projections. If you follow his logic, economic sanctions led and enforced but the U.S. could
rapidly isolate China or Russia, motivating them to eventually reverse course on their intended or executed military
actions. The reality of sanction regimes, however, has proven uneven.[6] O’Hanlon’s  exemplar of success
—the aforementioned targeting of Russian oligarchs—stressed elements of the U.S.-European partnership in a manner not
seen since the founding of NATO and the proposal of the Marshall Plan. And testing China’s burgeoning
economic power by attempting economic sanctions risks shearing off partners in a region where the
United States does not enjoy a multi-state, multi-generational security and economic framework like it
currently does in Europe.
China and Russia, moreover, could also pursue aggressive actions as a test of U.S. hegemony in the global security environment. The sanctions
against Russian oligarchs again provides another good case in point. While
O’Hanlon deems the sanctions successful
insofar as Ukraine remains independent and not a part of greater Russia, one has to measure this
against the purported Russian goals. Granted, Ukraine is independent, but it remains a corrupt state
with an active insurgency still taking place in its eastern provinces, and any plans for it to join the EU or NATO have
been shelved. In the process, the viability of NATO has come under question and European countries have
had to reprioritize their economies, at great electoral risk, to increase defense spending and update their energy infrastructure away from
Russian oil and gas. While China has been less overt in its actions, purported
interference in recent Taiwanese elections,
continued island-building in the South China Sea, and infrastructure loans tied to the Belt and Road
Initiative have displayed its ambition to test the current global economic and security environment as
well.

Finally, as part of economic warfare, the U.S. and its partners would use force outside of the immediately
contested region against economic targets—shipping, infrastructure, or natural resources—as a means to
accelerate the cessation of hostilities without direct confrontation. The U.S. and its partners would  use asymmetric advantages
in power projection and lethality in geographic locales where they maintain systemic overmatch, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.[7] It
is tempting to see these as low-cost/low-risk attacks in regions where the U.S. and its partners enjoy a military advantage, but this
approach potentially leads to geographic escalation, something that O’Hanlon claims an asymmetric defense reduces. It is
hard to imagine a scenario in which seizing a Chinese mining conglomerate in Africa, for example,
represents a clear first step towards returning Taiwan, or how this does not lead to attack on U.S. and
partner interests around the globe. The interests, frankly, do not seem to match.

Towards this end, the

potential flashpoints that O’Hanlon uses to assess his asymmetric defense proposal—the
Senkakus, Taiwan, and the Baltics—exemplify the true problem that the United States faces in an era of great power
competition. While these three areas represent relatively low stakes to the United States, they are, in fact,
of existential importance to U.S. partners. China and Russia could threaten military action below the threshold of active
conflict just to test the validity of existing treaties and partnerships. O’Hanlon treats such fait accompli aggression as a given, and while he does
not disavow that the U.S. and its partners may pursue an operational pathway that leads to liberation of seized territory, he does not favor it.
Instead, he wants to pursue economic coercion to return to a status quo antebellum. Aggression against any of the flashpoints that O’Hanlon
identifies, however, forces the U.S. and its partners to reassess and reframe their strategic relationship. If
the U.S. fails to react, or
reacts in a manner that is perceived less than proportional to the actions taken, the global economic and
security environment that O’Hanlon believes resilient enough to weather great power competition
could immediately be undermined—much as the European Great Powers had to reassess their respective strategic calculi during
the crucible of crisis that was August 1914.

This should not be seen as a condemnation. It is the reality of U.S. power at the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century. What
O’Hanlon ultimately describes in The Senkaku Paradox is a grand reevaluation of U.S. interests in the face of great power warfare. Should
measures taken by China and Russia to remake the global security environment force the United States to reassess those regions and thereby
the partnerships it is willing to expend blood and resources to maintain? Or is the maintenance of the current security environment, composed
of overlapping treaties that swear to the common defense, the proper means to deter great power war? O’Hanlon seems to prefer
the
former, arguing for a delineation between those interests the United States would fight for and those
it would seek resolution through a sanctions regime and the discreet expansion of the initial conflict
outside of the initial geographic focus. Such decisions clearly would test existing alliances and partnerships,
but would notionally prevent great power war while adding options for deterrence and, as needed, armed conflict.

Is there a middle path that generates flexibility in terms of options, but reassures and strengthens partnerships? Potentially. In a series of
recent documents, national policymakers and strategists have begun to shape the notion of competition on a global scale. O’Hanlon only
mentions the recent National Defense Strategy’s task of expanding the competitive space in passing. Thus, one cannot easily fathom his
assessment of the task or its implications. It could be that, as he prepared his book, competition as a concept had not been fully defined. And it
still may not be, but the recent Joint Concept on Integrated Campaigning, the Joint Doctrine Note on the Competition Continuum, the U.S.
Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept, and several recent articles from defense intellectuals have gone further towards shaping this idea.[8]
These diverse works all agree: countering Chinese and Russian aggression below the threshold of armed conflict requires active engagement in
the competitive space by the United States and its partners globally, particularly in currently contested regions. The goal would be to prevent
the great power wars that O’Hanlon seeks to avoid, but in a manner that strengthens our alliances and partnerships in a non-escalatory
manner.

How can we characterize competition, and how does O’Hanlon’s asymmetric defense proposal fit within its
conceptual framework? Militarily, successful competition requires the defeat of a competitor’s information and unconventional/proxy
warfare, the preparation of the operational environment, and the evidence of a credible deterrent. The ability of the U.S. and its partner to
calibrate its force posture to meet perceived threats in a contested region requires using the same asymmetric advantages—power projection,
emerging technologies, and existing partnerships—that O’Hanlon describes in The Senkaku Paradox. Competition, however,
recognizes and legitimizes our partners’ claims to contested regions by supporting efforts to defend
the integrity of their borders. Such a strategy aligns the interests of the United States with the
existential interests of its partners, identified herein as the Baltics, the Senkakus, and the viability of an independent Taiwan.
O’Hanlon would instead earmark these regions for loss and, hopefully, return through sanctions,
economic actions, and discreet military force outside the region in question.
On its face, active engagement in competition seeks to generate military and diplomatic options for national policy makers. As O’Hanlon rightly
points out, the United States currently only possesses two options in the face of near-peer aggression: acquiescence or rapid escalation at a
global level. Successful expansion of the competitive space provides at least two more: operate below the
threshold of armed conflict with all elements of national power in a manner intended to deter overt aggression ,
and maintain strategic initiative and posture oneself to deny a near-peer adversary its operational
objectives in a fait accompli attack in a manner that limits escalation and sets the conditions for a negotiated
settlement. At the same time, competing in contested regions naturally reaffirms our commitment to
partners while also serving to engender multi-echelon interoperability.
 A2: Senkaku War---1NC
Crisis management solves any Senkaku conflict
---defense ministers of both are committed to communication, peace, and cooperation

---they’re building new hotlines and increasing consultations to prevent crises and to de-escalate them if
they do happen

---both sides know how important the overall relationship and don’t want Senkaku dispute to ruin it

Doornbos 12-15 [Caitlyn Doornbos is a senior researcher for Stars and Stripes citing high level
Chinese and Japanese officials, “Chinese, Japanese defense ministers address Senkakus dispute during
first video call together”, 12-15-2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/chinese-japanese-defense-
ministers-address-senkakus-dispute-during-first-video-call-together-1.655354] IanM

The defense ministers of China and Japan during a video call on Monday reaffirmed their competing sovereignty claims
over a chain of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea , according to statements by the ministers’ offices.

The islands – known as the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyu Dao in China – have a surface area of about 2 ½ square miles and are also
claimed by Taiwan. The area surrounding the islands is said to contain a wealth of natural resources, including fish, oil and natural gas.

During the Monday video conference, Japan Minister of Defense Nobuo Kishi expressed “strong concerns about the attempts to unilaterally
change the status quo by coercion,” according to the Japanese ministry’s statement.

Kishi was referring to an increasing number of Chinese vessels sailing near the Senkakus.

China on Nov. 3 broke a record for the number of days per year that vessels from the country are spotted near the disputed islands, spending
284 days there this year – two more than the record 282 set in 2019, according to the Japan Coast Guard.

During the call, Kishi also “firmly delivered Japan’s position over the Senkaku Islands” and “strongly urged [China] to refrain from action that
could escalate tensions,” according to the statement.

The Senkakus, northeast of Taiwan, are part of the “first island chain,” an area that stretches into the South China Sea and that China aims to
dominate.

The U.S. recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and the Trump and Obama administrations have said an attack on the Senkakus would
invoke the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, meaning the U.S. military would be obligated to respond.

Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe during the call did not waver on Beijing’s position, adding that “China is firmly
determined to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” according to the Chinese statement.

“Bothsides should focus on the overall and long-term situation, strengthen consultations and properly
handle differences, so as to truly make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship,” the
statement said.

It was the first time the two defense leaders have met since Kishi’s appointment in September, according to both statements. Wei
and
Kishi also discussed increasing transparency and coordination, pledging to create a hotline between the
ministries for better communication.

“It
is necessary to maintain high-level exchanges, promote practical cooperation, strengthen
multilateral coordination, accelerate the construction of air-sea liaison mechanism and actively build
constructive bilateral security relations,” the Chinese ministry said in the statement.

The ministers also agreed to “continue communications between defense authorities considering the
great importance of stable Japan-China relationship for peace, stability and prosperity in the region and also
in the international community,” according to the Japanese statement.
Conflict over the Senkakus doesn’t escalate – Wargames.
---the US would likely respond with carrier support which puts China in a bind and China knows they’d
lose ultimately, so they’d never try it in the first place

---prefer this---it looked at exactly what their scenarios are describing and found it wouldn’t go nuclear
and it’s from August so assumes everything

Osborn 20 (Kris, defense editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as
a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics &
Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks.
He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History
Channel. He also has a master’s degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. “Who
Would Win a U.S.-Japan vs. China War? A Recent War Game Presents Some Clues.” August 10, 2020. The
National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/who-would-win-us-japan-vs-china-war-recent-
war-game-presents-some-clues-166549)

A recent think tank wargame explores the prospect of a massive war between China and America and
Japan in 2030, introducing many war-time questions about submarines, amphibious attack, surface ships and fifth-generation fighters.
According to a story in Foreign Policy, the Center for New American Security’s wargame unfolds as follows: “… A Chinese flotilla lands
50 soldiers on Uotsuri Jima, an island in the East China Sea that is part of the Senkakus, an island chain owned by Japan but also
claimed by China. Declaring a 50-mile exclusion zone around the Senkakus , Beijing deploys a ring of surface
ships, submarines, warplanes, and drones—backed by ballistic missiles based on the Chinese mainland…” Japan
counterattacks, sending in amphibious warships, submarines, surface warships and aircraft-backed
Marines. Given the existing “Mutual Defense Pact,” the U.S. sends aircraft carriers and other assets to
support Japan, with specific instructions not to exchange fire with Chinese forces. That does not work, according to the wargame scenario.
Therefore, war between China and the U.S.-Japan alliance ensues. By any estimation, it would be the largest
engagement the world has seen in just about 100 years, and like no other in history, it would be entirely
multi-domain. A maritime engagement between the United States and China would likely incorporate a wide range
of complex and dangerous variables. Initially, by 2030 the Chinese Navy is likely much larger and potentially just as sophisticated
as the U.S. Navy, or at least in a position to rival American technical supremacy. Much of the outcome of this kind of war might be decided by
several distinct factors, such as the technical evolution of Aegis radar and accurate, long-range sensors. Both the U.S. and Chinese
warships will be armed with massive, long-range attack weapons, so it would seem that the prevailing force would be
that with the best and highest resolution sensors. The force “out-ranging” the other with intelligence, search, and reconnaissance through
aerial or surface drone sensors and sensor-enabled F-35s, might be likely to rule the day. Given this, the country with the best air support would
be likely to emerge victorious, hinging upon on whether the Chinese fifth-generation J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters can equal or out-perform the
F-22 and F-35. The winner of that engagement would be much better positioned to out-range and out-attack the opposing force. Ultimately,
the country with the more advanced AI-enabled sensors, long-range weapons and surface-to-air-to-undersea networking would destroy the
other. Who will have better sensors and networking? Perhaps the country with superior space weapons, electronic warfare capabilities and
“hardened” communications would be best positioned? Also, whose communications would get jammed? Who has better alternatives to GPS?
Who has more lower flying, faster, armed and better networked satellites? The country with this advantage could potentially destroy large
portions of the opposition military from space in the initial portions of any conflict. By 2030, satellite-fired weapons will likely be here, scalable
lasers will bring unforeseen range both within and beyond the earth’s atmosphere and satellite sensor sophistication and weaponization would
likely determine the victor. Interestingly, one of the wargame circumstances described in the Foreign Policy report involved a decision to “jam”
or attack Chinese communications systems as opposed to pursuing a more kinetic or direct fire option. Also, Aegis radar and other elements of
the Navy’s ship-based layered defenses would determine whether Chinese land-fired anti-ship missiles were able to successfully destroy U.S.
carriers and warships. Should the U.S. Navy succeed in engineering new, extremely sophisticated layered ship defenses with now-emerging
weapons such as laser interceptors, drones and electronic warfare by 2030, Chinese attacks might be stopped. Same would be true on the
Chinese side, meaning the maritime force with the best defenses would most likely have an upper hand. Given all of these factors, sheer force
size in terms of numbers of ships, provided each had several hundred, might be less significant than the technical elements of the weapons
themselves. This area of war, it seems clear, would also expectedly hinge upon air power, because if U.S. stealth fighters and bombers were
able to penetrate Chinese airspace and destroy land-fired weapons, then ship defenses would have a tremendous advantage as well. Undersea
war would also be decisive, as the country dominating below the surface would be in position for forward attack and clandestine
reconnaissance missions. At least initially, it
is likely that the U.S.-Japan alliance would attack with the more limited
goal of liberating the island chain or at least repelling the Chinese presence from the contested area of the East China
Sea. This brings a potential advantage as the strategy would be to avoid a major, protracted ground war
against China’s one-million strong, armored land Army.

***No escalation and crisis management checks.

---economic interests mean no nation attacks and crisis communication channels mean we can talk it out
with other allies

Yu & Kim ’19 [Yun & Ji Young; MPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford; assistant
professor in the Department of Japan Studies, College of Languages and Cultures, Hanyang University;
May 2019; “The stability of proximity: the resilience of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu
Dispute”; https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/19/2/327/5017427; International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific, Volume 19, Issue 2; accessed 9/3/20; TV]

A bleak picture of Sino-Japanese relations prevails in the current discourse based on the seemingly
irreconcilable factors stemming from concerns over international power politics, historical memory, and
ideological differences. These factors contribute to a relationship of ‘hot economics and cold politics’ between China and Japan,
characterized by a lack of mutual trust. Against this backdrop, the territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu between
China and Japan plays a critical role in defining the two countries’ relations .1 In particular, China’s rapid
economic and military growth further encourages the alarming analysis of a possible armed conflict between
the two regional powers. There are still several pacifying factors in Sino-Japanese relations, such as the
alignment of economic interests, extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States, and the
maritime settings in East Asia that favor defensive capabilities (Goldstein, 2013: 69–75). Nevertheless, the territorial
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and the issues of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea are two of the most important
ongoing disputes between China and Japan that could easily strain the Sino-Japanese relations (Sakuwa, 2009: 519–520). Particularly since
2010, Japanese academics have sounded the alarm, skeptical of China’s self-proclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ and wary of the potentially devastating
effect of the precarious Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute (Kawashima, 2014; Matsuda, 2015; Aoyama, 2016). Would the conflict over
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands eventually lead China and Japan to an armed clash, escalating into a major security crisis in
East Asia?

We argue that the possibility of an armed conflict is extremely low, considering the prior practices in the
bilateral crisis management employed by the two countries. The term ‘bilateral crisis management’ is
distinguishable from ‘internal crisis management mechanism’ The former refers to high-level political,
diplomatic, and military dialog/exchanges, while the latter refers to domestic institutions relevant to crisis management,
decision-making processes, executive leadership, and intelligence-sharing mechanism. Some scholars have accused Japan and
China of lacking effective internal crisis management mechanism, which will make any clash over the islands difficult to
contain (Hafeez, 2015: 73; Bush, 2010). Although this observation may be true, we believe that the two countries have
nevertheless engaged with each other actively and successfully through state-to-state ‘bilateral crisis
management’ measures, which have been effective in preventing further escalation once conflicts have
broken out. And the operation of these measures could account for the resilience of the relationship between
the two countries, even during periods of turbulence.

Throughout the late 1990s to early 2000s, the

‘shelved’ dispute remained tranquil as both countries engaged in the
active prevention of any escalation over the islands. Downs and Saunders’ insightful examination of the two disputes in 1990
and 1996 demonstrates that the Chinese government prioritized economic development over nationalist goals
in managing the crises (Downs and Saunders, 1998). Up until the early 2000s, China and Japan had engaged in ‘ active dispute
management’ through the limited access of both countries’ nationals to the islands; the avoidance of social
mobilization on this issue, especially in China; and, Japan’s constrained use of the islands (Fravel, 2010a).
 A2: US China War---1NC
No China war – fears are overblown
 Diplomacy, institutional ties, and economic flows have expanded
 Tensions and criticism occur against a cooperative backdrop
 Far lower military spending than cold war
 Nukes kept at low alert
 Water barriers limit escalation and build in negotiation time because of low force numbers and
unclear barriers – can’t conquer anything
 Other countries act as buffers
 Ideologically against conflict

Shifrinson 2/8/19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an assistant professor of international relations at Boston

University. The ‘new Cold War’ with China is way overblown. Here’s why. February 8, 2019.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/02/08/there-isnt-a-new-cold-war-
with-china-for-these-4-reasons/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f8ca8195c4e4]

Is a new Cold War looming — or already present — between the United States and China? Many
analysts argue that a combination of geopolitics, ideology and competing visions of “global order” are
driving the two countries toward emulating the Soviet-U.S. rivalry that dominated world politics from
1947 through 1990.

But such concerns are overblown. Here are four big reasons why.

1. The historical backdrops of the two relationships are very different

When the Cold War began, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was fragile and tenuous. Bilateral diplomatic
relations were barely a decade old, U.S. intervention in the Russian Revolution was a recent memory,
and the Soviet Union had called for the overthrow of capitalist governments into the 1940s. Despite
their Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, the two countries shared few meaningful diplomatic,
economic or institutional links.

In 2019, the situation between the United States and China is very different. Since the 1970s,
diplomatic interactions, institutional ties and economic flows have all exploded. Although each side has
criticized the other for domestic interference (such as U.S. demands for journalist access to Tibet and
China’s espionage against U.S. corporations), these issues did not prevent cooperation on a host of
other issues. Yes, there were tensions over the past decade, but these occurred against a generally
cooperative backdrop.

2. Geography and powers’ nuclear postures suggest East Asia is more stable than Cold War-era Europe

The Cold War was shaped by an intense arms race, nuclear posturing and crises, especially in continental
Europe. Given Europe’s political geography, the United States feared a “bolt from the blue” attack would
allow the Soviet Union to conquer the continent. Accordingly, the United States prepared to defend
Europe with conventional forces, and to deter Soviet aggrandizement using nuclear weapons.
Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union also feared that the United States might attack and wanted to deter
U.S. adventurism. Concerns that the other superpower might use force and that crises could quickly
escalate colored Cold War politics.

Today, the United States and China spend proportionally far less on their militaries than the United
States and the Soviet Union did. Though an arms race may be emerging, U.S. and Chinese nuclear
postures are not nearly as large or threatening: Arsenals remain far below the size and scope
witnessed in the Cold War, and are kept at a lower state of alert.

As for geography, East Asia is not primed for tensions akin to those in Cold War Europe. China can
threaten to coerce its neighbors, but the water barriers separating China from most of Asia’s
strategically important states make outright conquest significantly harder. Of course, as scholars such as
Caitlin Talmadge and Avery Goldstein note, crises may still erupt, and each side may face pressures to
escalate. Unlike the Cold War, however, U.S.-Chinese confrontations occur at sea with relatively limited
forces and without clear territorial boundaries. This suggests there are countervailing factors that may
give the two sides room to negotiate — and limit the speed with which a crisis unfolds.

3. The Cold War had just two major powers

The Cold War took place in a bipolar system, with the United States and Soviet Union uniquely powerful,
compared with other nations. This dynamic often pushed the United States and the U.S.S.R. toward
confrontation and contributed to more or less fixed alliances; moreover, it encouraged efforts to
suppress prospective great powers, such as Germany.

In 2019, it’s not at all clear we are back to bipolarity. Analysts remain divided over whether the U.S.
unipolar era is waning (or is already over) — and, if so, whether we are heading for a new period of
bipolarity, modern-day multipolarity or something else. Regardless, most analysts accept that other
countries will play a central role in East Asian security affairs.

Russia, for example, still benefits from legacy military investments, India is developing economically and
militarily, and Japan is beginning to build highly capable military forces to complement its still-significant
economic might. Even if these nations aren’t as powerful as the United States or China, their presence
makes for more fluid diplomatic arrangements and more diffuse security concerns than during the U.S.-
Soviet competition. The resulting security dynamics are therefore likely to look very different.

4. Ideology plays less of a role in U.S.-Chinese relations

Many people see the Cold War as an ideological contest between U.S.-backed liberalism and Soviet-
backed communism. But that’s not the whole story.

The early 20th century saw liberalism, communism and fascism vie for ideological preeminence. With
fascism defeated alongside Nazi Germany, the postwar stage was set for a struggle between
communism and liberalism to reinforce the U.S.-Soviet contest. That each ideology claimed universal
scope ensured that the ideologies served as rallying cries for Third World conflicts, which were
subsequently associated with the U.S.-Soviet struggle.

The respective “ideologies” of the United States and China do not favor this type of contest today.
Indeed, analysts calling for a hard-line stance against China have faced difficulties even identifying a
coherent Chinese ideological alternative. And while some researchers claim that a nascent ideological
contest pitting an “autocratic” China against the “liberal” United States is emerging, this narrative
ignores the political contests that shape Chinese politics (and have parallels in U.S. politics). Autocracies
and democracies often cooperate. And on one important ideological issue — how they organize their
economic lives — China and the United States have both embraced economic growth via trade, the
private sector and semi-free markets.
 Senkaku Deterrence DA---1NC
Biden’s reaffirmation has signaled resolved and modified Chinese behavior – the plan
reverses that and causes the Chinese to execute a land grab
Bosack 11/20 – Dr. Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the
Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a
Mansfield fellow.

Dr. Michael Bosack, November 20 2020, “Japan's need for a clear U.S. commitment over the Senkakus”,
The Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/11/20/commentary/japan-
commentary/japan-us-senkakus-commitment/

PYEONGTAEK, SOUTH KOREA – During a telephone conversation between senior defense officials last
week, Washington reiterated its position that the Senkaku Islands fall under the United States’ scope of
alliance commitments to Japan.

This came just a few days after President-elect Joe Biden also reaffirmed this pledge in his first
telephone call with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Reports of this have rekindled a long-standing
debate on the utility of such statements of commitment.

The Senkaku Islands are the source of territorial disputes between Japan, China, and Taiwan. The five
uninhabited islands in the East China Sea are themselves unremarkable, but the maritime area around
them is important both for natural resources and access between mainland Asia and the broader Pacific
Ocean.

Disputes over the territory came to a head in 2012 when the Japanese government purchased the
islands from private landowners, effectively nationalizing the Senkakus. Since that time, China has
engaged in a slow but steady campaign to change the status quo in administration of the islands so that
the country may eventually vie for unilateral control.

Washington has stated and reiterated its position that the Senkakus fall under U.S.-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty obligations. The first statement of commitment came in 2010 when then-Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton asserted during a joint news conference that the islands were covered under the
treaty. The first presidential-level assertion came in 2014 when President Barack Obama stated it. Senior
U.S. officials have reaffirmed this point in joint statements and communiques since.

Still, many question the nature and validity of this constantly renewed commitment. Is the United States
really ready to get dragged into a war over rocks in the middle of the ocean? Will any adversary actually
buy the notion that Americans will defend the Senkakus? If the U.S. has already made a commitment,
why is the Japanese government so keen for its U.S. ally to renew it time and again?

The simplest answer is that the United States and Japan are allies and that it is only natural for them to
display solidarity in the face of a Chinese government that is consistently threatening the rules-based
international order. But alliance management, as with most things in life, is almost never simple.

Questions like those surrounding the Senkakus are useful for understanding some of the fundamental
principles of defensive alliances, especially the two basic fears associated with military pacts. The first
fear is that of abandonment; that is, the fear that an ally will fail to meet its end of the bargain and
abandon its obligations in a time of need. The second is that of entrapment — that a security
commitment to an ally will draw one into an unwanted war.

These fears exist in any alliance relationship, but the Senkaku Islands issue illustrates those fears well.
For the Japanese side, many have made the case that Tokyo has at least a modicum of fear that
Washington will not take action to support the defense of the Senkakus. This would explain the
government’s consistent desire to renew U.S. commitments in joint statements and senior level
discussions.

For the U.S. side, the fear of entrapment can influence behavior in one of two ways. First would be
reticence to offer explicit commitments. Policy advisors arguing for such caution would assert that
extending U.S. commitment is more likely to embolden the Japanese government; in other words, they
believe that Japan might take unnecessary risks in responses to any would-be challengers to the
Senkakus.

The second way would be a desire for extreme clarity in expressions of commitment. In this case, policy
advisors would argue that failure to offer a clear commitment could alienate Japan, which might cause
an unwanted, unilateral response to a Senkaku Islands crisis rather than a coordinated alliance decision.
Those individuals would also argue that failure to offer a commitment would embolden adversaries,
which could then lead to escalation that would eventually entrap the United States in conflict anyway.

To mitigate fears of abandonment and entrapment, allies tend to be explicit in their alliance designs and
their stated commitments. Indeed, this gets at the core of why countries sign alliance treaties in the first
place: treaties and associated commitments clarify rights and obligations to each other, and this helps
manage expectations.

In the case of the Senkakus, these consistent statements of commitment reduce the fears of
abandonment and entrapment and allow the allies to focus their energies on coordinated activities.

Treaties and commitments are also important because they signal to adversaries the potential costs of
picking a fight with one of the allies. Absent those signals, would-be adversaries could miscalculate
how the allies might respond to certain actions.

It is critical to understand that lack of information or enough bad information can contribute to conflict.
In the case of alliances, broadcasting commitments eliminates some of those information problems.

One of the cases that many will point to about the folly of failing to provide clear commitments is the
Korean War. On Jan. 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared the so-called “Acheson Line,”
identifying the territories that fell under U.S. defense commitments.

This declaration was meant to have a stabilizing effect in East Asia, but there was a major problem:
South Korea was clearly left out of the areas covered under the Acheson Line. Many argue this policy
misstep is what emboldened the communist bloc enough to convince Josef Stalin to give Kim Il Sung the
greenlight to invade South Korea.

This example is especially salient for the Japanese, who are loath to allow any seams that could be
exploited by a Chinese government that already has designs for the Senkakus. Hence, the Japanese
government has been keen to ensure that its U.S. ally clarifies its treaty commitments as a clear signal
to the Chinese of the potential costs of military action associated with the islands.
Has it worked though? The deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. alliance has not stopped Chinese activity in
vying for control of the Senkakus, but one can make a strong case that it has changed the nature of it.
Rather than using overt military capabilities as one may observe in the South China Sea, the Chinese
have focused on employing its coast guard and fishing fleets around the Senkakus. While this is still a
cause for concern, it has lowered the level of incidents that could potentially occur, at least for the
time being.

Thus, whatever the debates may be, there seems to be utility in the U.S. and Japanese governments
making their allied position abundantly clear. The allies recognized the flashpoint for crisis that the
Senkakus represent and have used statements of commitment to signal an important message:
Starting a fight in the Senkakus is against the best interests of all parties involved. This in turn has
influenced Chinese behavior.

Although a mere statement is not going to stop Chinese ambitions in the East China Sea altogether, the
renewed commitments help eliminate perceived gaps in the alliance and warn off Chinese military
action that could potentially lead to consequential miscalculation. Considering the positive impact this
has on regional peace and stability, tacking on a few redundant statements in phone calls and joint
communiques seems like a small price to pay.

***Senkaku seizure turns case---emboldened China pockets concessions, leads to

Japan transition war and attacks on Okinawa which draw in US
Peter Navarro 16. Professor at the University of California-Irvine. "Senkaku Suicide Scenarios: China vs.
Ameripan". HuffPost. 4-5-2016. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/senkaku-suicide-
scenarios_b_9583586?
guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93YXJvbnRoZXJvY2tzLmNvbS8yMDE5LzA5L3doeS10aGUtc2V
ua2FrdS1kaWFveXUtaXNsYW5kcy1hcmUtbGlrZS1hLXRvb3RocGFzdGUtdHViZS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQA
AAG7yKMnrU3IsIHoI2pi8-UwQEOF8b_Lc_fKU79tBly9Szq33fQIhvFuJWNQJmdQQ-
Z6k7Qq6VWuzRFSuJjGIlPAMtj-
thPwXIWNb4PVYlRvt60v9X6aJD2YkqmgBlaulJZPGCX2ETV9LUi7OpQrHwmzhGq3XB7_YRYrLZTn4FHKJ

China doves dismiss the Senkaku Islands as “rocks in the sea” not worth risking the nuking of American
cities or Japanese blood. On the surface, this seems right:

The Senkakus are five small, uninhabited volcanic islets with a total land area of less than three square
miles. The largest and tallest of the islets is Uotsuri. With an elevation a little higher than the Eiffel
Tower — just over 1200 feet - Uotsuri features a barren, hilly, and beautiful landscape.

The smallest islet is Taishō with a narrow spire-like elevation of about 250 feet and a land area no bigger
than the size of about 14 football fields. It is one of two islets, along with the 383-foot tall Kuba, that
accounts for the name given to the Senkakus by British sailors - the Pinnacle Islands.

Unsinkable Aircraft Carriers?

There are two very big problems with the “rocks in the sea” critique - one economic, one strategic.
Economically, the UN Law of the Sea Treaty established Exclusive Economic Zones that extend 200
nautical miles in concentric circles around tiny habitable “rocks” like the Senkakus. At stake are not just
fertile fishing grounds but also the potential of huge, Persian Gulf-size oil and gas reserves underneath
the seabeds surrounding the islands.

Strategically, the Senkaku “rocks” are located about 200 miles east of mainland China, 120 miles
northeast of Keelung, Taiwan, and about 100 miles from Ishigaki Island, part of Japan’s Okinawa
Prefecture.

Here, China has already brazenly illustrated its ability to transform tiny specks of reefs and shoals in the
South China Sea into heavily armed, cruise-missile equipped garrisons and command centers replete
with 10,000-foot runways. In the hands and bulldozers of Beijing, the relatively far larger Senkakus
would pose a significant increased threat both to Taiwan and Japan’s Okinawan territories.

Attack Scenarios

In the Clausewitz scenario, China’s military grows against the backdrop of a shrinking US naval fleet and
a withering Japanese economy. At some point - as early as 2020 - China may seize its “war by algebra”
moment and simply overpower Ameripan forces.

In a “wag the dog” scenario, President Xi Jinping and the Communist Party are about to be engulfed by a
sea of domestic discontent over economic stagnation or environmental pollution or Orwellian
repression. To rally support, Xi orders a full-scale invasion - think Argentina trying to grab the Falklands
from Britain here, with a far greater Chinese chance of success.

In a “people’s war at sea“ scenario, Beijing recruits Chinese commercial fishing vessels to get close to the
islands and lay strings of mines. China has one of the biggest mine arsenals in the world and regularly
trains its commercial fisherman to carry mines on behalf of the motherland.

And how about the “flotilla” scenario? Private Chinese citizens whipped into a nationalist frenzy
advance in a flotilla of “freedom boats,” land in the dead of night on Uotsuri, and plant the Chinese flag.
All Hell breaks loose on social media and both Beijing and Tokyo are faced with rocks in the sea and hard
place choices.

And by the way, to measure Chinese nationalism on the “crazy scale,” it’s off the charts. In 2012, violent
Senkaku demonstrations erupted in over a hundred Chinese cities. One protester wrote: “Even if China
is a graveyard, still need to kill all Japanese. Even if no grass grows in China, still need to recover Diaoyu
Islands.”

America Dragged Into War?

Would America have Japan’s back in a Senkaku Suicide Scenario as it is required to do by treaty? Then
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said firmly in 2010: “the [Senkaku] islands are part of our mutual
treaty obligations.” Secretaries of State Chuck Hagel and John Kerry reiterated that pledge. Says
Heritage Foundation scholar Dean Cheng:

The United States has consistently said that the US-Japan mutual security relationship covers
the Senkakus because those islands are under the administrative control of Japan; and I believe
 that, as with other treaty commitments, any decision to walk away from that commitment will
have devastating consequences.

So if I were to be asked to the White House to talk to the chief executive in a situation where
the Chinese have seized the Senkakus, I would be advising the President that he must stand firm
with Tokyo, make very clear to Beijing that this would not be allowed to stand, and to extend
support, including weapons, including American forces, to the aid of the self-defense forces, in
retaking those islands.

Counterattack Scenarios

Professor Lyle Goldstein of the US Naval War College says the US should do absolutely nothing.

Those are rocks. They’re not important to anyone. They’re not important to Japan. They’re not
important to China. They’re certainly not important to the United States.

If, however, the US stays on the sidelines, a war between Japan and China could quickly go nuclear.
Japanese forces, outnumbered though it may be, are quite capable and may, in the early stages of any
war, get the upper hand. At that point, national pride - and perhaps survival of the Chinese Communist
Party — would likely dictate China bombing Tokyo.

The fait accompli alone gives China the confidence to seize Taiwan
Fisher 13 – Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs at IASC
Richard D. Fisher, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy
Center, 9/20/13, Osprey vs. Bison in the the East China Sea,
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.321/pub_detail.asp

Stability in the region between Taiwan and Japan, and the security of Taiwan, hinges on an arms race
that will soon be accompanying the heightened paramilitary engagements between Japanese, Chinese
and, occasionally, Taiwanese Coast Guard ships over who will control the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands in the East China Sea.

For now this contest for control is confined to shoving matches largely between Chinese and Japanese
Coast Guard ships, which take several days to deploy. However, China is now developing the means to
project decisive force to these islands in hours, not days. Should China gain the upper hand in this arms
race there is a greater chance it will use force to occupy the islands and then set its sights on the
strategically more attractive nearby Sakashima island group.

For now, though, the upper hand is held by the United States, which has just completed the initial
deployment of 24 U.S. Marine Corps Bell-Boeing MV-22B Osprey conventional, or twin tilt rotor aircraft,
to Futenma Base in Okinawa. This unique aircraft, by virtue of its twisting rotors and engines at the ends
of its wing, can take off like a helicopter, and then cruise at about 280 miles per hour, carrying up to 24
troops or about six tons of cargo to a range sufficient to reach the disputed islands. In a full-out surge,
the 24 MV-22Bs at Futenma could potentially put about 500 troops or about 140 tons of weapons and
material on the Senkakus or the Sakashimas in about one hour. On September 17, 2013, Kyodo reported
thatcurrent commander of U.S. Marine forces on Okinawa, Lt. General John Wissler, told Okinawa
Governor Hirokazu Nakaimu about the Osprey, “That aircraft has the ability to reach the Senkakus,
should we need to support any sort of Japan-U.S. security treaty.”

China is also accumulating rapid lift assets. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has taken delivery
of the first Ukrainian-built Zubr (Bison) large hovercraft. The first example, delivered in May, is now
undergoing final modifications in Shanghai. At least three more are expected initially, but China may
build many more of an indigenous version. Developed by the former Soviet Union to give its Naval
Infantry the ability to rapidly invade NATO countries along the Baltic Sea, the Zubr can lift about 500
troops or up to 150 tons of armor, weapons and material up to speeds of 66 miles per hour. With just
four Zubr hovercraft, the PLAN could potentially put 2,000 troops or up to 600 tons of weapons and
material on the Senkakus in about four to five hours, or it could reach the island of Miyako-jima in about
six to seven hours with a much reduced payload.

If it actually came to a race between the Osprey and the Bison, getting there first would make all the
difference, as without the advantage of surprise, an adequately armed defender could significantly
damage incoming hovercraft or helicopters. But the outcome would also depend on the result of
intensive air and sea battles around these islands. For now, the superior performance of the U.S.
Lockheed-Martin F-22A fifth-generation fighter and the Virginia class nuclear-powered attack submarine
provide a margin of superiority that undergirds deterrence, but this could change quickly as the PLA Air
Force increases the number of capable fourth-generation fighters supported by AWACS radar aircraft,
followed by fifth-generation fighters that could even the odds, especially if China decides to strike first.
Growing numbers of PLAN air defense destroyers like the new Type 052D could also help deny air
dominance to Japanese and U.S. forces.

However, China could also gain the upper hand should it successfully develop its own tilt rotor aircraft,
an ambition it likely has been pursuing for most of the last decade. In a surprising revelation, an article
published August 28, 2013 on the web page of the China Helicopter Research and Development Institute
(CHRDI) goes further, saying that China is now developing a quad tiltrotor design called the Blue
Whale,with the goal of carrying 20 tons of cargo at speeds in excess of 300 miles per hour, with a
combat radius of 500 miles. A model of the Blue Whale appeared at a Chinese helicopter technology
expo recently held in Tianjin, at least confirming it is an active program.

Blue Whale’s performance goals are very close to a now lapsed Bell-Boeing program to develop a V-44
Quad TiltRotor, which faded with evolving heavy-lift requirements for the U.S. Army’s Future Combat
System of programs, in turn cancelled in 2009. CHRDI does not reveal when they expect the Blue Whale
to enter service or how China will overcome technical challenges for a quad tiltrotor that a 2005 U.S.
Defense Science Board study said would take 20 to 25 years to overcome. By 2008 to 2009 the heavy lift
program was punted to the U.S. Air Force-controlled Joint Future Theater Lift program, intended to
develop a replacement for the venerable Lockheed-Martin C-130, perhaps by the late 2020s. China may
think it can succeed with a quad tiltrotor design before the U.S. fields a new vertical heavy lifter. The
operational implications of such a capability go well beyond the East China Sea, but may matter there
sooner.

For Beijing, control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the much larger Sakashima Islands, which have
ports and airfields, is not simply a matter of salving historical resentments or even controlling resources;
it is a contest for geostrategic position to influence the future of democratic Taiwan. From the
Senkakus and especially the Sakashimas, the PLA can more easily impose an air and sea blockade on
Taiwan or launch multi-axis attacks to rapidly take airfields to aid follow-on invasion forces. Before
making any military moves, mere possession of these islands allows Beijing to exert far greater political
pressure on Taipei to make “peace” at the expense of its virtual American ally and Tokyo. Occupation of
the islands would also give Beijing greater legitimacy on which to develop latent claims to other
islands in the Ryukyu chain.

The Miyako Strait in the Sakashimas also must be passed by Chinese naval forces trying to reach the
Pacific Ocean. This group of seemingly negligible islands are in fact the lock in the door that keeps the
PLA Navy from cruising the Pacific at will, a key link in the so-called “First Island Chain.” For Tokyo and
Washington, preserving Japanese control over these islands proves to Beijing that it cannot use force
to solve maritime territory disputes, but also gives Japanese and U.S. forces a large number of island
base options from which to counter China’s rapidly growing air and naval forces.

At a time when Washington is far more preoccupied with preserving adequate strategic capabilities
under threat from sequestration-enforced defense budget reductions, an expensive heavy-lift tiltrotor
development program, like so many other programs, has crossed the line from “need” to “needless
luxury.” But the absence of this level of capability may have consequences. Without the means to put
decisive counter-invasion forces on these islands at a moment’s notice, Japan will have to consider
something it has been very reluctant to do: militarize these islands. Tokyo is already considering the
development of a 500 km short-range ballistic missile to defend these distant islands. Missiles, of
course, fly much faster than the Osprey. On one level, China’s looming threat justifies such moves, but
deploying missiles will encourage China’s buildup as well as anti-Japan factions in Taipei.

Despite its much advertised military and political-economic pivot/rebalance toward Asia, it remains an
uncomfortable fact for Washington that successful military deterrence of Beijing will also require that
the U.S. remain ahead in a growing, multi-faceted arms race. In the East China Sea this arms race and its
implications are taking shape rather rapidly.

Goes nuclear
Dr. Adam Lowther 15, Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global
Strike Command, with Alex Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University, Taiwan and the Prospects for
War Between China and America, August 11, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-
prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/

Possible Scenario¶ While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, someanalysts
believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would
come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath
of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage
the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. ¶ If thwarted in its initial
efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger
measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option,
would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and
the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command
and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a
nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of
forcing de-escalation.¶ In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would
occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S.
intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not
China.¶ Itis also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American
conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional
military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the
United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.¶ In essence, the only effective option
in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without
making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that
mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly
rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.¶ China likely has no desire
to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical
objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests ,
including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional
hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection
beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.¶ China’s maritime land reclamation
strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful
place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the
Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. ¶ Although China criticizes the United States for playing the
role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing
may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic
audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. ¶ Central
to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the
return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many
Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which
China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.¶ Should China
succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally
and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. ¶ China sees
the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the
next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will
likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for
action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee
Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis . The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when
the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.¶ Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou,
China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that
simulate an attack on Taiwan.¶ China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be
certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear
capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or
capitulate.¶ While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not
impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China
is not the United
States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious
thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the United States may be unprepared
for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe.
 A2: China Attacks
China won’t attack---potential US nuclear response deters them BUT plan greenlights
low level attacks
---China has no rush, they don’t need Senkaku’s for energy or anything and they prefer gray zone attacks
NOT invasions because they fear the potential for US to use nukes which outweighs BUT it means plan
greenlights their ability to

Bosack 19 [Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka
Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He was the deputy chief of government relations at Headquarters, U.S.
Forces Japan, and is a former officer in the U.S. Air Force, “China's Senkaku Islands ambition”, 6-12,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/06/12/commentary/japan-commentary/chinas-senkaku-
islands-ambition/#.XuPBlkVKiUl] IanM

Some observers are concerned that China will eventually take military action to seize the Senkakus,
worrying that countries will be dragged into a great power war over uninhabited rocks in the middle of the
ocean, but this ignores a few key things. First, for China, there is no rush. Its energy situation is not so
dire that it urgently needs to tap into whatever resources may exist in the vicinity of the islands. It also
does not immediately need the fishing rights—besides, the China Coast Guard’s response to illegal fishing
in the area actually contributes to its argument that it co-administers the waters around the Senkakus. Second,
China is a gray zone revisionist power. For China, the measure of success is how much it can change the
status quo without eliciting a strong, consolidated international response. The way it does that is by
operating just beneath the level of illegality and exploiting gaps in the rules-based international order. After
all, if it is not in direct violation of international legal provisions, there will always be a seam in any multinational effort to counter China’s
behavior. For China to succeed in this plan, all it takes is for government officials from the international
community to say, “What’s the big deal? Let the China Coast Guard take care of Chinese vessels.” Once
the presence of Chinese assets becomes so commonplace that policymakers fail to notice or care, it will
have achieved its interim step of de facto co-administration . After that, China can initiate the next step of
its plan: angling for sole administration. This means that China will start pushing the boundaries on what it does
in the waters and airspace around the Senkakus. Perhaps China plants an oil rig in Japanese-administered
waters. Or perhaps the Chinese coast guard starts harassing Taiwanese and Japanese fishing vessels that are
legally operating in the area.
Testing Adv
 Top
No broader naval collapse impact- US has global navy and carriers those don’t go away
and countries still perceive it
 A2: Emboldenment---1NC
Plan causes Japan to lashout – Japan has historically only escalated territorial disputes
at times when US commitments are low
---Japan only escalates conflicts when US commitment is in question---prefer it because its based on a
historical anlaysis---there cards are theoretical descriptions, but ours are what actually happened

French 18 (Erik, PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University. Currently a visiting lecturer at the
College of Brockport in New York. Former Adjunct Instructor at American University’s School of
International Service. Eric is a Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and a Junior Scholar with the
Carnegie International Policy Scholars Consortium. His research has been published by the Naval War
College Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Third World Quarterly, and Asia Policy “The US-Japan
Alliance and China's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence” August
2018. Syracuse Dissertations, https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context=etd)

Strategic coordination appears to have had a positive effect on the US’ ability to reassure and deter China in
the ECS. Across the cases, increases in US coordination (in 1996 and 2013) are associated with subsequent increases in
Japanese policy support and more successful deterrence and reassurance toward China. Similarly, in 1991-
1996, limited coordination was associated with Japanese fears of abandonment , less support for US policy toward China,

and less successful deterrence and reassurance toward China. This provides some support for H1, H2a, and H2b. It is important to note,
however, that there are limits to the fit between the cases and these hypotheses. Most importantly, the sudden uptick in escalation from 2009-2013 occurred
despite no corresponding shift in US strategy. Indeed, the first-movers in the dispute were China and Japan, with the US reacting to the escalation by subsequently
changing its strategy in 2013 and 2014. There are a number of reasons for why this shift may have occurred. China, believing the 2008 financial crisis to be a
harbinger of US decline, may have been emboldened to pursue its claims more forcefully. Similarly, the perceived distance between the US and Japan during the
Hatoyama administration may also have convinced China that the alliance was drifting apart. Finally, the chaos and internal division of the DPJ administrations in
Japan may have contributed to more erratic Japanese conduct toward the dispute, contributing unnecessarily to increased tensions with China. The US

experience in managing the Senkakus provides disconfirming evidence for the strategic arguments in
favor of distancing. While some strategists contend that a coordination strategy toward Japan will only
encourage it to escalate disputes with China , the opposite has largely proved true in practice. Indeed, the
dispute has escalated the farthest and risked US entrapment the most when Japan believes that it
cannot depend on a firm US commitment to its defense. As such, H3 and H4a are not supported by these cases. Furthermore,
Japanese hedging behavior has not been associated with improved deterrence and reassurance
outcomes for the US, contrary to the predictions of H4b. Finally, increases in US coordination with Japan do not seem to
have imposed significant constraints on the US ability to deter or reassure China , contrary to the predictions of H5.
 A2: Naval Power---1NC
Naval power’s irrelevant.
---oceans unpatrolled by the US are just as peaceful as where US does patrol and their ev overestimates
the stabilizing effect so err neg

Fettweis 18 Christopher J. Fettweis, Political Science Professor at Tulane University. [Psychology of a

Superpower: Security and Dominance in US Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press]//BPS

Robert Dahl famously defined power as the ability to get actors to do what they would normally not.102 If
the states of the Pacific
Rim, Persian Gulf, or anywhere else would be doing roughly the same things without the presence of the
U.S. military, its power cannot be responsible for their actions. Oceans unpatrolled by the U.S. Navy
appear to be just as stable as those with its carriers. U.S. leaders probably overestimate the degree to
which they control the sea and the world at large.

BUT inevitable even in 2030.

---US is massively modernizing it’s ships, increasing global presence, and has numerous warships ready
to go by 2030

Mizokami 18 Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has
appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast, cofounder of Japan Security
Watch. [Introducing the 5 Most Powerful Navies on the Planet (in 2030), 12-6-2018,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/introducing-5-most-powerful-navies-planet-2030-38047]//BPS

The United States The United States, the dominant naval

power worldwide in 1945, will continue to dominate the seas eighty-
five years later. By 2030 the Navy will be halfway through its thirty-year shipbuilding plan and have built three
Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carriers to begin replacing existing Nimitz-class carriers. Amphibious ship
numbers should be slightly higher than current numbers, and the first ship in class to replace the Ohio ballistic
missile submarines should enter service in 2031 . In surface combatants, all three Zumwalt-class cruisers will be in service
—assuming the program remains fully funded—and the Navy will have built thirty-three more Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. A next-
generation version of the Littoral Combat Ship will enter production in 2030 . Under current plans the U.S. Navy should
reach its three-hundred-ship goal between 2019 and 2034, but after that period the number of surface combatants begins to drop. These plans
also assume a higher than average shipbuilding budget, while at the same time the service must compete with the budget demands of other
services—particularly the Air Force—and domestic programs. While U.S. naval superiority isn’t ending any time soon, the
period after 2030 will be a critical one.
 A2: ME War
The Mediterranean’s stable and current missions solve
---cooperation overwhelms tensions, they all fear Mutually assured destruction, don’t want oil to be
jeapordized AND NATO independently de-escalates tensions because Europe can stop ship bumping

Shazwanis Shukri 19, PhD International Studies at Cardiff University, Senior Lecturer at Universiti Utara
Malaysia, “Combatting Terrorism at Sea: Assessing NATO’S Maritime Operations in the Mediterranean,”
12/31/2019, http://jis.uum.edu.my/images/vol152019/105-116.pdf [OAE = Operation Active Endeavour]

OAE was launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US as one of the eight initiatives
in response to fight against international terrorism. The operation began its task with the main mandate
to monitor and provide surveillance assistance for vessel movements in the entire Mediterranean Sea.
OAE demonstrated NATO’s coherence and resolve in the fight against terrorism with expanded
maritime security cooperation with numerous NATO partners, especially those participating in the
Mediterranean Dialogue. OAE has achieved substantial improvement in NATO’s and its partners,
cooperation, which has resulted in significant success in maintaining the security of the Mediterranean
Sea from terrorist activities.

During the course of the operation, OAE has successfully detected, boarded, and intercepted hundreds
of suspicious vessels which might have had connections with terrorist organizations . Apart from that,
OAE has also escorted hundreds of merchant vessels while traversing the Straits of Gibraltar in order to
protect them from possible terrorist attacks. In addition to tracking and patrolling suspect vessels, the
continuous presence of NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea also helped with disaster relief and
emergency situations, and provided assistance for high visibility events against the threat of terrorism.
OAE has played a vital role in the effort to fight terrorism at sea. OAE has continually enhanced the
cooperation with its partners and increased extensive operations at sea. As a result, no terrorist plot
has been detected in the Mediterranean since the beginning of the operation. Early detection of
potential terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean has significantly helped to disrupt any attempt to attack
the merchant vessels crossing the sea. In sum, the presence of NATO has favourably prevented terrorist
activities in the Mediterranean Sea and simultaneously preserved the safety and security of the
homelands of the Alliance and its partners.
 A2: FON
FON is fine---China can’t and hasn’t been able to take over the ECS, but they want to---
only the plan makes the SCS a Chinese lake
---China stopped land acquisition, haven’t achieved level of control necessary to take the waterway, 5 other parties still are making successful
territory claims and China’s position is under pressure

---even if China has expanded some – it hasn’t changed other nations from sailing, and it hasn’t changed the overall power balance

---their behavior demonstrates they want to take over the entire SCS---the only thing stopping them is US pre-eminence which they can’t match
militarily and serves as a constant reminder their position is vulnerable

---prefer our ev---it’s recent, and is from a PhD

Romaniuk and Burgers 19, Phd and Phd candidate [Dr. Scott N. Romaniuk is a Postdoctoral
Research Fellow in Security Studies at the China Institute, University of Alberta, and Tobias Burgers is a
doctoral candidate at the Otto-Suhr-Institute (Free University of Berlin), “China’s Next Phase of
Militarization in the South China Sea”, 3-20-2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-next-phase-
of-militarization-in-the-south-china-sea/] IanM

China’s astonishing expansion into the South China Sea’s 1.35 million square miles and its subsequent militarization of the
region over the past several years has cultivated a complex security environment . The initial phase of that growing
complexity was predicated on geopolitical interest and expansion, notably during U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term in office.

Although it has been argued that regional

tensions may remain stable because China has ceased its land
acquisition endeavors to the south, the complex regional security environment may enter into a new phase of heightened tension
and complexity during 2019. This next phase could emerge as a result of China’s dedicated push to consolidate its gains in the South China Sea
(SCS) through the use of military and political powers in tandem with sharp threats as a result of military patrols and a quantum leap in the
deployment of surveillance aircraft, guided-missile destroyers, and a bank of military equipment.

Despite a momentary lull

in adding to its treasure trove of SCS features, China’s behavior in the SCS
exemplifies the aim of achieving regional dominance. However, Beijing has yet to achieve the level of
control it seeks over the strategically vital waterway. In a region where five other parties – Vietnam,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Taiwan – have made territorial claims, China’s position
remains under pressure and its territorial assets under continued threat.

Indeed, Beijing’s
outcry over what it sees as provocative U.S. incursions, which China has treated as naked military aggression,
serves as a strong indication that China’s assets in the SCS and the country’s interests in the region
remain vulnerable. So long as external threats persist, acquisition and buildup can be expected to move forward.
With China’s initial island-building campaign nearly 10 years old, the next phase of China’s SCS expansion is the consolidation and military
fortification of its territorial assets – garrisoning the many tiny islets once deemed uninhabitable, including the strategic Scarborough Shoal
(Huangyan Dao), lying just 140 miles west of the large Philippine island of Luzon and currently under development. The establishment of
military bases has culminated in the creation of China’s “strategic triangle.” Even with the construction of aircraft bases, detection systems, and
weapon delivery systems, the
impact of China’s methodical efforts in the SCS have failed to yield considerable
change in the status quo of power relations.

Over the past several years, China has expanded existing reefs and atolls by thousands of acres, but its
military presence and preparedness still fall short of a level adequate for claiming control over the
entire SCS. The process is likely to be a much longer one than expected. Islet acquisition and development has not
mitigated existing territorial claims by other states sharing the sea, nor are those claims – supported by
distant partners and allies – likely to disappear in the near or distant future.
A combination of three factors exponentially raises the potential for further militarization in the SCS: China’s past expansion and continuing
consolidation, which clash with persistent claims by states situated adjacent to the SCS; Washington’s
declaration that the
freedom of navigation (FON) principle of customary international law should be preserved; and Beijing’s
departure from past promises not to further develop its SCS assets.

Civilian and rescue operations have been the main justification for the ongoing construction of military installations and the placement
of weapons and weapon systems, including sophisticated combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-ship (ballistic) missiles, and
jamming technology, in spite of President Xi Jinping’s guarantee that China’s territorial assets would not be militarized. Beijing has indicated
that future United Nation’s (UN) peacekeeping missions involving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would necessitate additional bases. These
steps are key to strengthening China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capacity.

In light of China’s inability to match all aspects of U.S. military capability – at least in qualitative terms, though
numerically-speaking, China possesses extraordinary military strength – in the short term, a military presence beyond China’s immediate
borders is a logical and necessary rung if China hopes to project its power to a level that goes beyond parity in the SCS. China’s military
investment continues to increase and the country, while facing a cluster of opposition off its eastern shores, has only a single front on which to
focus. Such incidents as the arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officers, Meng Wanzhou and China’s persistent trade dispute with the United
States have generated considerable attention, providing useful foliage for Chinese activities in the SCS. As a result, China’s interests in the SCS
have become relatively peripheral in the media.

FONOPs are effective at signaling resolve now which resolves miscalc

---empirics disprove escalation---US has been pursuing FONOPS for decades yet nothing happened

---they solve miscalc by signaling we will defend and empirically prevent China from expanding

Wiegand 11-24 [Krista E. Wiegand is Director of the Global Security Program at the Howard H. Baker
Jr. Center for Public Policy and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee.
She is a specialist in territorial and maritime disputes, maritime law, and East Asian security. “HOW
BIDEN SHOULD HANDLE THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES,” https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/how-
biden-should-handle-the-south-china-sea-disputes/, y2k]

U.S. Strategies and Operations

The United States has carried out 23 freedom of navigation operations since October 2015, with
frequency and intensity increasing each year. The official purposes of these operations are to challenge
excessive maritime claims and to ensure freedom of navigation, but unofficially, they credibly
signal resolve and U.S. capabilities while limiting the potential for military
escalation. Although the United States justifies the operations strictly in the context of upholding a
broader worldwide position on freedom of navigation, they indirectly serve as part of the U.S.
deterrence strategy against China. From China’s perspective, even if freedom of navigation operations
are conducted in all claimants’ waters, they are clearly targeted at China.

In July 2020, the United States sent two aircraft carrier strike groups — the Nimitz and Ronald Reagan —
to conduct freedom of navigation operations and naval drills in the South China Sea, which were
conducted at the same time as Chinese naval exercises in disputed waters. The U.S. Navy has also
conducted several joint military exercises and carrier group transits with allies and security partners in
the region, through or near the South China Sea. In 2019 alone, the United States conducted 85 military
exercises — including Balikatan conducted with the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and Rim of the
Pacific, the largest international maritime exercise, involving the armed forces of 10 states, including
Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, and until a couple of years ago, China,
before it was kicked out.

**Carrier presence solves effective FONs without miscalc risk

---they signal US plans to safeguard interests in Asia

Captain Sean R. Liedman 15, U.S. Navy, was the commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing
Eleven operating the P-8A and P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. He has twice served in
the Air Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operation’s staff and also as the executive assistant to the
deputy commander of U.S. Central Command. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and
do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government, "A U.S. Naval Signal in the South China Sea,"
10-28-2015, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-naval-signal-south-china-
sea/p37185, DOA: 11-3-2015, y2k

Recent U.S. naval maneuvers in the South China Sea signal how the United States plans to safeguard its interests
in the Asia-Pacific region, says Capt. Sean Liedman, CFR’s Navy fellow and an expert in maritime strategy. Freedom-of-
navigation operations conducted by U.S. warships, like the USS Lassen, are intended to push back against
excessive maritime claims by states like China, and help ensure the free flow of global commerce through
the region. At the same time, these operations serve as an assurance for U.S. allies “to enhance stability and
security in the region,” Liedman says in a written interview.
What are the U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region?

The United States has three strategic objectives for the Asia-Pacific Region: One, enhance stability and security; two,
facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system; and three, ensure respect for universal rights
and freedoms. Additionally, the United States has security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, and is
attempting to strengthen those.

What are the U.S. objectives with this type of operation in the South China Sea?

The military objectives of this freedom-of-navigation operation can be tied to each of the three previously mentioned strategic objectives.
While the United States has declared in numerous public fora that it is not a party to any of the disputed sovereignty claims in the Asia-Pacific
region, two of its treaty allies—Japan and the Phillipines—are parties to disputed maritime claims with China. Conducting this operation
is a clear signal aimed at assuring U.S. allies to enhance stability and security in the region.

Regarding the free flow of commerce, it

has been estimated that as much of 50 percent of all global oil tanker
shipments pass through the South China Sea, and more than half of the world's top ten shipping ports are
located in and around the South China Sea, so freedom of navigation is of paramount importance for all states
in the region.

Finally, these operations are designed to counter excessive maritime claims that violate customary international law as reflected in the United
Nations Convention On The Law of the Sea (PDF) (UNCLOS), which the United States considers to part of the body of fundamental rights of the
international community.

How often does the Navy conduct these types of patrols?

Their frequency has varied over history. The Department of Defense’s Freedom of Navigation Program (PDF) and DoD publishes an annual
report (PDF) of them. A quick review of the data indicates a high of twenty-eight in 1998 compared to as few as twelve in other years.

What are the military requirements for this type of operation?

It is important to note that the Freedom of Navigation Program is not solely a military activity; it also consists of consultations and
representations by U.S. diplomats. Freedom of navigation operations can be conducted along a spectrum of naval
force ranging from a Carrier Strike Group, to a single ship, to a single maritime patrol aircraft, or combinations thereof. This
operation in the South China sea was reportedly conducted by a single guided missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, with a P-8 Poseidon maritime
patrol and reconnaissance aircraft providing overwatch.

Does this signal any change in U.S. policy?

No. Freedom of navigation on the high seas has been a vital national interest since the founding of the country. The Defense Department’s
Freedom of Navigation Program formally began in 1979 and was furthered clarified by the U.S. Oceans Policy (PDF) in 1983.

It is important to note that the United States has conducted these operations against allied nations such as Japan and the Phillipines and
partner nations such as Saudi Arabia to stand by the principal of not acquiescing to excessive maritime claims.

Are there risks involved?

There is some risk of strategic miscalculation, and also some risk of a tactical mishap that could have strategic implications.
Regarding the strategic miscalculation, the United States has telegraphed this operation for some period of
time to avoid surprising China. On the tactical side of the equation, military operations in areas of constrained geography increase
the likelihood of an inadvertent collision, but the assumed professionalism of Chinese and U.S. naval forces coupled
with an assumption of mutual adherence to the recently agreed upon Code for Unplanned Encounters
at Sea should reduce risk.
 I law Fails---1NC
‘Might makes right’ doesn’t matter---I law inev fails
---self defense sustains interventions globally, drone attacks, and authorizes war

---that violence is lawful under I law---proves it can’t stop endless war or stability

Hurd 19 [Ian Hurd is Professor of Political Science and the Director of the International Studies
program at Northwestern University. His research and teaching are on international law and politics in
theory and in practice, and political science research methods "“If I Had a Rocket Launcher”: Self-
Defense and Forever War in International Law." https://houstonlawreview.org/article/7952-if-i-had-a-
rocket-launcher-self-defense-and-forever-war-in-international-law]

Rationalizations for intervention are as old as the interstate system itself. The language and resources by which this is
done vary over time, and in their changes, we can see something of the internal workings of state power.[69] Self-defense is today a
dispositive claim that makes intervention lawful, and it is both evidence of and a contribution to the core idea of liberal
internationalism that law and institutions are the foundation of world order,[70] but one that authorizes
war as much as it outlaws it.

Second, self-defense law today helps sustain the contemporary practice of small-scale and pervasive military operations.
Drone attacks, targeted killings, and more have come to mark a new form of war in which the enemy is a dispersed
group of people, the battlefield is anywhere on the globe, and the goal is to defeat those who seek to
undermine the state. Harold Koh has described this as the “Forever War” because it describes military operations that
are unbounded by battlefield limits, time, or realistic win conditions. He fears that the United States may be moving toward this
state of affairs and is particularly concerned that American military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, as well as “such
related topics as torture, Guantánamo, and drones,”[71] are all legally part of a war with “al Qaeda and associated forces.” The legal
implication, arising from Congress’s enactment of the Authorization to Use Military Force from Congress in 2001,[72] is that the United States
can target any person anywhere in the world on the grounds of self-defense if that person can be understood as in line with the anti-American
ideas of al Qaeda. The policy implication, as Rosa Brooks and others explain, is that a constant state of war is the new
normal.[73]
The United States has entered a legal formulation in which its attacks against any person anywhere in the world are lawful as long as the United
States believes that the person poses an imminent threat. The “battlefield” is wherever the enemy happens to be, and the “enemy” is anyone
who the United States understands as a threat to its security. “War” ends when all such people are killed. Its victory conditions
are
impossible, and its battlefield is unlimited. Its foundation is the international law of self-defense
understood as the pursuit of national security agaisnst outside threats. Stephen Walt explored this fact in Afghanistan, where “by 2016 the
United States seemed trapped in a war it could neither win nor leave,” and the only certainty was the continuation of military destruction with
costs to all sides.[74]

Finally, the net effect is that state violence is today lawful under a much broader set of circumstances and
with more agency on the part of governments than was imagined by the Charter. This is not far from the world of the 1890s and the Hague
Conferences, of which one observer remarked at the time, “[T]he convention . . . leaves the Powers free to declare war at their pleasure,
provided only that the pretext be capable of formulation.”[75] The many degrees of freedom for lawful war today serves
the interests of strong governments but is likely worse for the people against whom that violence is
directed. In this sense, the main function of the rule is not “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”[76] as the U.N. Charter
would have it but instead to provide a path for governments to attack their enemies around the world. This would probably not be a surprise to
Bruce Cockburn on the Mexican hilltop in 1983.
Ilaw fails --- norms and alliances don’t matter and plenty of thumpers
---i-law fails---Russia tramples on norms, current system failed to maintain peace, great power politics
dooms it inevitably, UN can’t stop Russia from invading Georgia and Ukraine

---autocracies thump---they’re not constrained and will do whatever they want regardless

Yoo, 14 – John, Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley (“Ukraine and
the fall of the UN system,” Oxford University Press, 5/3/14, http://blog.oup.com/2014/05/ukraine-un-
system-international-law-failure-pil/ //red)

Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its continuing military pressure on Ukraine demonstrates
that the United Nations-centered system of international law has failed. The pressing question is not whether Russia has
violated norms against aggression — it has — but how the United States and its allies should respond in a way that will strengthen the international system. It
should be clear that Russia has violated the UN Charter’s restrictions on the use of force. It has resorted to “the use of force against the territorial integrity” and
“political independence” of Ukraine in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter’s founding principles. Russia
has trampled on the fundamental
norm that the United States and its allies have built since the end of World War II: that nations cannot use force to change borders unilaterally.
Like the League of Nations in the interwar period, the current system of collective security has failed to maintain
international peace and security in the face of great power politics. According to widely-shared understandings of the UN
Charter, nations can use force only in their self-defense or when authorized by the Security Council. Great powers with permanent vetoes on

the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) can always block formal efforts to respond
to their own uses of force. Hence, the United Nations remains as powerless now as when Vladimir Putin ordered the
2008 invasion of Georgia. The United Nations and its rules have not reduced the level of conflict between
the great powers. That doesn’t mean there has not been a steep drop in conflict, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. From 1945 to the
present, deaths due to great power wars have fallen to a level never seen under the modern nation-state system. Collective
security, however, is not the agent of this “Long Peace,” as diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis has called it. Rather, the
deterrent of nuclear weapons and stable superpower competition reduced conflict during the Cold War.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the U nited States has continued to supply the global public goods of
security and free trade on its own. Democratic nations’ commitment to maintaining that liberal international order, not the collective security of
the UN Charter, has kept peace among the great powers. As someone who worked in the Bush administration during the 2003 Iraq War, I am struck by today’s
absence of criticism for Russia’s violations of international law and its effective neutering of the United Nations. About a decade ago, criticism of the United States
reached unprecedented heights for its failure to win a second Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. The United States and its allies claimed that it
already had authority from Iraq’s refusals to obey its obligations at the end of the 1991 Gulf War and its continuing threat to regional peace. Some of the United
States’ closest European allies, such as France and Germany, violently disagreed — although these nations seem to urge compromise today with Russia. Even
though the United States went to war without Security Council authorization, it sought to build a legal case in support. UN
rules only constrain
democracies that value the rule of law, while autocracies seem little troubled by legal niceties. Paralysis
continues to afflict the democratic response to the invasion of Ukraine. The United States responded to the
invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea with the symbolic measures of sanctioning a few members of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle, kicking

Moscow out of the G-8, and halting NATO-US military cooperation. Russian officials mocked the United States and raised the price of natural gas sold
to Ukraine, an implicit warning to other European nations that depend on Russian natural gas. The Russian and US stock markets sighed with relief that no serious
economic disruptions would follow.

I-law fails—no one abides by it and countries don’t care about US accession
---countries look at US commitment as domestic law NOT i-law, which means plan won’t spill over

---I law is illusory---nations don’t follow it

Paulsen 9 (Michael, Professor @ St. Thomas School of Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1762, lexis) jl
Thus, though treaties are part of the supreme law of the land under the U.S. Constitution, their
legal force as they concern the international law obligations of the United States is, as a matter of
U.S. law, always limited by (1) the Constitution's assignment of certain indefeasible constitutional
powers to the President and to Congress with respect to foreign affairs and war; (2) the power of
Congress to enact inconsistent, overriding or limiting legislation;  [*1786]  (3) the fact that many
treaty commitments do not create self-executing U.S. domestic law obligations ; and (4) the
President's foreign affairs executive power to interpret , apply, suspend (in whole or in part), or even
terminate a U.S. treaty's international obligation as a matter of U.S. law. It is worth pausing to
consider exactly what all of this means, for its implications are mildly stunning, especially with
respect to U.S. war powers: it means that a treaty of the United States that is the law of the land
under Article VI of the Constitution - be it the U.N. Charter, the Geneva Conventions or any other
major agreement at the center of the contemporary regime of international law - may not
constitutionally limit Congress's power to declare war or the President's Commander-in-Chief power
to conduct war as he sees fit. It means that Congress always may act to displace, or disregard, a
treaty obligation. It means that the President, too, always may act independently to displace, or
disregard, a treaty obligation. It means that treaties, as a species of international law with the
strongest claim to U.S. domestic constitutional law status, never meaningfully constrain U.S.
governmental actors. Their force is utterly contingent on the prospective actions and decisions of
U.S. constitutional actors. n55 This conceptualization threatens all that the community of
"international law" scholars hold most dear. For it seems to say that the United States may
disregard the seemingly most sacred of international law treaty obligations almost at will. The
answer to such a charge is yes, this analysis suggests precisely that. At least it does so as a matter of
U.S. constitutional law. This does not mean, of course, that the United States must or should
disregard important international law treaty obligations as a foreign policy matter. It certainly does
not need to do so; other nations might validly regard such actions as a breach of international law;
such nations might become very angry at the United States's actions (or they might not); and such
breaches, and reactions, may have serious international political repercussions. These are very
serious policy considerations. But as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, it remains the case that
Congress, and the President, may lawfully take such actions, hugely undermining the force of such
international treaties as binding national law for the United States. The conclusion is blunt, but
inescapable: international law in the form of U.S. treaties is primarily a political constraint on U.S.
conduct - a constraint of international politics - more than a true legal constraint. The "binding"
international law character of a treaty obligation is, as a matter of U.S. law, largely illusory.
 Trilat Turn
Plan collapses trilateralism---it’s high now and working
Park et al 18 [ROY D. KAMPHAUSEN is Senior Vice President for Research at the National Bureau of
Asian Research (NBR), JOHN S. PARK is Director of the Korea Working Group and an Adjunct Lecturer at
the Harvard Kennedy School. He is also a Senior Advisor for Political and Security Affairs at the National
Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), RYO SAHASHI is a Research Fellow at the Japan Center for International
Exchange. He is also a Professor of International Politics and Director for the Center for Asian Studies at
Kanagawa University in Yokohama, ALISON SZALWINSKI is Director for Political and Security Affairs at
the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), “the case for u.s.-rok-japan trilateralism”, February 2018,
https://www.nbr.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/publications/special_report_70_trilateralism_february2018.pdf] IanM

MAIN ARGUMENT Trilateral cooperation between the U.S., the ROK, and Japan is a necessary and
effective approach to address many of the traditional and nontraditional challenges both within and outside Asia.
Trilateral initiatives are most successful when they are based on countering shared threats and promoting
concrete, common interests, rather than being carried out just for the sake of the three countries doing something together. Rooted in such
shared interests and values, the
U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship has made significantly more concrete, substantive
progress than other trilaterals in recent decades. However, as security challenges in East Asia grow increasingly acute, a
more concerted trilateral approach from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan is needed. In early 2016, the relationship appeared to be
entering a golden period of cooperation , as progress on sensitive issues such as missile defense,
information sharing, and historical disputes offered room for cautious optimism. But momentum has notably
slowed over the last year. On the one hand, coordination between Japan and the ROK has not been smooth due to a lack of strategic trust. On
the other hand, there are ongoing concerns
about the U.S. commitment to the region. The three nations must
work together to address the lingering tensions and concerns that inhibit greater trilateral cooperation
and emphasize that such cooperation is necessary to protect each country’s citizens and preserve a rules-
based order in Asia.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS • The U.S., the ROK, and Japan should prioritize military coordination, especially trilateral military
exercises, to strengthen security vis-à-vis North Korea. • Cooperation on addressing nontraditional security challenges provides an opportunity
to build strategic trust. In particular, the three countries should participate in combined HADR and peacekeeping activities, explore ways
to improve regional energy security, and collaborate on addressing security threats in the cyber and space domains. • U.S., ROK, and Japanese
leaders should publicly emphasize the importance of trilateral security cooperation to gain popular approval
within each nation and promote broader Asian regionalism and democratic values.

Extinction---trilateralism solves laundry list of existential problems

Kamphausen et al 18 [ROY D. KAMPHAUSEN is Senior Vice President for Research at the National
Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), JOHN S. PARK is Director of the Korea Working Group and an Adjunct
Lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is also a Senior Advisor for Political and Security Affairs at
the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), RYO SAHASHI is a Research Fellow at the Japan Center for
International Exchange. He is also a Professor of International Politics and Director for the Center for
Asian Studies at Kanagawa University in Yokohama, ALISON SZALWINSKI is Director for Political and
Security Affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), “the case for u.s.-rok-japan
trilateralism”, February 2018, https://www.nbr.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/publications/special_report_70_trilateralism_february2018.pdf] IanM

Nontraditional Security The opportunities for trilateral cooperation on nontraditional security are less
structured and often considered less pressing than those in the traditional security realm. Yet they offer tangible benefits if the three
nations can figure out how to address these issues in a way that is constructive for the broader relationship. The main avenues for
nontraditional security cooperation that have been identified in the past are HADR, peacekeeping, and antipiracy.

All three nations have established capabilities and resources for HADR, making it an area ripe for future trilateral
cooperation. Japan and South Korea have in recent years provided humanitarian assistance inside and outside Asia but have not
cooperated on any projects, despite being present in the same nations. For example, both countries have worked on projects in the Philippines
over the past year, with the Korean Red Cross establishing a hurricane response center in April 2017 in Passi, Iloilo, and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency carrying out numerous projects across the Philippines (including in Iloilo).66 The United States and Japan already have
robust cooperation on HADR, as evidenced during Operation Tomodachi following the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.67

Participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations is generally seen as a way for U.S. allies to assume greater responsibility for burden
sharing with the United States. Although Japan has been quite active in peacekeeping operations in the past, its last ongoing peacekeeping
operation in the UN Mission in South Sudan ended in May 2017. The operation had been a source of controversy over ammunition sharing
between South Korean and Japanese troops, which illustrates some of the limitations on bilateral cooperation even as far abroad as Africa.68

Other prospects for instability and insecurity in the region still exist. There are concerns over the upcoming
Olympic Games in Tokyo in 2020, including over cyberterrorism. The CEO of the Tokyo Olympics has noted that “the level of threat
that terrorism poses gets more and more complicated each year. No one knows how sophisticated
[terrorism] will have become by 2020.”69 All three countries also worry that growing instability on the Korean
Peninsula could lead to a humanitarian disaster, including a nuclear accident or refugee crisis. The following
recommendations detail additional considerations for improving trilateral cooperation on nontraditional security
 A2: Sino-Japanese War---1NC
No Sino Japan war – economic interdependence and domestic politics tamp down
tensions
---economic ties mean Abe won’t risk war and neither will China

---good relations with China are key for Suga’s political position, so he won’t risk attacking

Johnson 19 [Jesse Johnson is a staff writer for Japan Times citing professor from Lehigh University,
“Tenuous ties: Few signs of substance behind warming Sino-Japanese relations as communist China
marks 70th anniversary”, 9-30, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/30/national/politics-
diplomacy/tenuous-ties-signs-substance-behind-warming-sino-japanese-relations-communist-china-
marks-70th-anniversary/#.XuQwKUVKiUk] IanM

Economic equilibrium Despite these security concerns, one area where the two countries have maintained
more of a semblance of equilibrium has been the economic sphere — especially as the U.S., Japan’s top ally, wages a
bitter trade war against China. Some experts have said that the economic conflict could push Japan and Abe, who
has also had to deal with his own trade threats from Trump, closer to China. “Abe is suspicious of China, but realistic
enough to accept that a perpetual state of high tension with China is not in Japan’s interests,” said
Hughes. He “is clearly close to the U.S. on many security issues that relate to China, but on economic issues, Japan is worried that the United
States’ ire on trade might also turn on Japan and that the U.S. is doing damage to the current international trading order.” Nevertheless, Abe
has successfully managed to negotiate the “first stage” of a new trade deal last Wednesday that both appeared to placate Trump’s onerous
demands and minimize the economic fallout for Japan. But with
both countries facing sustained economic pressure
from the White House, the two economic giants will also be looking to use their improved ties to uphold the
free-trade regime. Zhang Baohui, director of Lingnan University’s Center for Asian Pacific Studies in Hong Kong, noted that although the
Trump factor “is one of several … motivating Japan to improve ties with China,” Abe’s efforts to improve relations with China started
significantly earlier than the current U.S. administration. “China
is … Japan’s largest trading partner, a plain fact that
cannot be ignored,” he said. What’s more, he added, good relations with China “will also reduce domestic
opposition to constitutional reform, which remains an important agenda of Abe.”
2NC
Courts CP
 A2: Perm Do CP---2NC

1---Topical aff must add a condition that reduces commitment---CP is distinct because
it forces US NOT to intervene without actually limiting the conditions in defense pacts

2---Severs certainty
Pacelle 2 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2002 (Richard,
“The role of the Supreme Court in American politics: the least dangerous branch?” pg 102

Judicial decisions are not self-fulfilling directives. Because of institutional limitations, courts cannot
implement their own decisions. Thus, the Court must rely on other individuals and institutions to carry
out its directives. Because of these potential problems, many argue that the Court should not be active
in policy-making. Ultimately, it is an empirical question, like broader notions of capacity. If the justices
make decisions that lower courts do not apply or implementers ignore there is a loss of institutional
legitimacy for the Court.

“Resolved” means firm decision

AHD 6 American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved
Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To decide or
express by formal vote.

“Should” means must

Words & Phrases 6 Permanent Edition 39, p. 369
C.D.Cal. 2005. “Should,” as used in the Social Security Administration’s ruling stating that an ALJ should call on the services of a medical advisor when onset
must be inferred, means “must.”—Herrera v. Barnhart, 379 F.Supp.2d 1103.—Social S 142.5.

3---Agent: Only the executive can withdraw from defense commitments---CP rules not
to intervene
Chris Mullen 19, JD from the New York University School of Law, “Pushing Back: Reasserting A Role For
Congress in the Withdrawal from International Agreements”, New York University Journal of
International Law and Policy, 51 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 493, Winter 2019, Lexis
1. International Effects

Under international law, either the terms of the agreement itself or the
default rules contained within the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) establish the guidelines for withdrawal from treaties. For example,
the current Paris Agreement on climate change contains binding [*512] terms for withdrawal in the international sphere. That treaty restricts
withdrawal to "any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party." Thus, should the President
wish to withdraw from this agreement, under international law he could not diverge from these agreement terms as agreed to by the United
States. As
"the only channel of communication between [the United States] and foreign nations," the
Executive is uniquely entitled, as a default mechanism, to communicate the country's intention to
withdraw from international agreements. As long as no restrictions are put in place by the terms of the agreement itself, this
assertion holds true for treaties and various types of executive agreements . However, as Oona Hathaway, professor
of international law at Yale Law School, notes, "that well-settled rule tells us nothing about withdrawal from treaties as a matter of domestic
law - nor about the allocation of power among the branches of government in the decision to withdraw." Thus, a decision by the Executive to
publicly terminate an international agreement cannot wholly eliminate the domestic effects of such an agreement.

“The” is a mass noun

Webster’s 8 Merriam-Webster's Online Collegiate Dictionary, 08, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/the

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

USFG means all three branches

Columbia Encyclopedia No Date["United States," http://www.answers.com/topic/united-states, ]
The government of the United States is that of a federal republic set up by the Constitution of the United States, adopted by the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. There is a division of powers between the federal government and the state governments. The federal government

consists of three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial . The executive power is vested in the President
and, in the event of the President's incapacity, the Vice President. (For a chronological list of all the presidents and vice presidents of the United States, including
their terms in office and political parties, see the table entitled Presidents of the United States.) The executive conducts the administrative business of the nation
with the aid of a cabinet composed of the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Departments of State; Treasury; Defense; Interior; Agriculture; Commerce;
Labor; Health and Human Services; Education; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Energy; and Veterans' Affairs. The Congress of the United States,
the legislative branch, is bicameral and consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is formed by the federal courts and headed by
the U.S. Supreme Court. The members of the Congress are elected by universal suffrage (see election) as are the members of the electoral college, which formally
chooses the President and the Vice President.

4---It’s a PIC out of reduce: Courts cannot ‘reduce’ commitments

Harold Leventhal 81, Circuit Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
“Association of National Advertisers, Inc., et al., v. FTC”, Statutes and Court Decisions, Federal Trade
Commission, p. 649

Congress considered these safeguards to be necessary to provide the same degree of protection that
exists in Congress with respect to its exercise of legislative power. So the answer to that portion of the court’s opinion that
makes Congressmen out of FTC Commissioners, as I interpret it, is that the majority opinion elsewhere in citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978), recognizes that such a fundamental change in agency procedure cannot be
made by the courts. We cannot make Congressmen out of Commissioners any more than we could by our decision make errand boys for the court out of members

of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Courts cannot reduce or circumscribe statutory agency power and by the
same token they cannot grant powers that only Congress can give. Courts have no power to supplant
the Senate, House and President by creating a legislative body of five members whose acts would not be subject to judicial
review except to the same extent as Congressional statutes. Such a body would actually be a five man Federal Trade Congress.
 A2: Perm Do Both---2NC
Perm gets nullified
Baker 94 Thomas E. Baker, Alvin R. Allison Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law, 1994,
“FEATURE ARTICLE: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FIRST DECADE CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF THE
NATION, 1981-1991,” 19 Nova L. Rev. 323

 [*337]  The
mootness doctrine focuses judicial attention on "the sequence of litigation events out of a
traditional and constitutional concern for the very existence of a 'case or controversy' itself." n74 If a
matter earlier in controversy is somehow resolved, the judgment of the federal court has nothing to
accomplish. The lack of a judicial task ends the Article III power. Justiciability must be actual and
present, not merely speculative or historical. Legislation can overtake the litigation and render it moot.
For example, in Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., n75 the Supreme Court declared the case moot due to
amendments to a federal statute that were enacted while the case was pending. Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit's judicial handiwork, analyzing rather arcane issues of federal banking law, was rendered a nullity. n76
 A2: US Action Key
Legal restriction to introducing force is globally perceived by both allies and
adversaries
Waxman 14 [Matthew C. Waxman, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow for
Law and Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, “The Power to Threaten War,” the yale law journal
123:1626 2014, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/the-power-to-threaten-war, y2k]
As a prescriptive matter, Part II also shows that examining threatened force and the credibility requirements for its effectiveness calls into
question—and may ultimately upend—many orthodoxies concerning the policy advantages and risks attendant to various allocations of legal
war powers, including proposed reforms.23 Although the President faces no significant and direct legal limits on his
power to threaten force, the President’s flexibility to later use force indirectly affects decision-making about
threatening it, with major implications for securing peace or dragging the United States into conflicts.
Moreover, allocations of legal powers affect potential conflicts not only because they may constrain U.S.
actions but also because they may send signals and shape other states’ (including adversaries’)
expectations of U.S. actions.24 That is, most analysis of war powers is inward-looking, focused on audiences
internal to the U.S. government and polity, but thinking about threatened force prompts us to look outward, at how
law affects external perceptions among adversaries and allies. Here, extant political science and studies of American
strategy offer few clear conclusions, but they point the way toward more sophisticated and realistic policy assessment of legal doctrine and
proposed reform.

The CP absolutely spurs allied adjustment, even if it’s contested domestically---the

actor is irrelevant
Scott R. Anderson 18, Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and Senior Fellow in
the National Security Law Program at Columbia Law School, “Saving NATO”, Lawfare, 7/25/2018,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/saving-nato

For NATO allies concerned primarily with international law, it’s largely irrelevant that precisely who can withdraw
from treaties is unsettled under U.S. law . To prevent states from having to audit each others’ legal and political systems when
entering into treaty arrangements, international law recognizes certain officials—including heads of state—as having the ex officio authority to
provide and revoke their state’s consent. The
only relevant limit on this authority applies where an official’s grant
of consent to a treaty is in “manifest” violation of relevant domestic law provisions “of fundamental
importance,” a very high bar unlikely to be met here . So even if withdrawal from NATO were contested in
the United States, other member states are likely to treat any decision by Trump to withdraw as effective and
adjust their understanding of their respective international legal obligations accordingly.
 A2: Certainty Deficit

Court ruling against commitments send a credible signal of alliance limitation---it’s the
exact same signal as the aff
Dunne 20 [Charles Dunne is a Non-resident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. “There’s No
Consensus on US Middle East Policy; Time to Apply the War Powers Act,” 1-23,
http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/theres-no-consensus-on-us-middle-east-policy-time-to-apply-
the-war-powers-act/, y2k]

The continual partisan churn over the applicability of the War Powers Act to particular disputes in the Middle East
tends to deflect attention from the central issue: how much power should the executive be granted to
wage war, with the personal discretion of the White House incumbent, and what the proper constitutional role of
Congress is in circumscribing that power. The latest crisis with Iran is helping to bring that very issue to the fore and some new
signs of bipartisan consensus have emerged lately. Congress must first resolve its own internal disagreements on presidential war powers or
devise new legislation that would offer binding clarity. In the meantime, though, it
would be important for policy-makers to
consider more seriously the advantages of routinely applying the War Powers Act to US engagements in the Middle
East. Submitting US military engagements in the Middle East to votes under the War Powers Act would require a degree of
bipartisan congressional consensus that would, in turn, help command broader support from the American public on the purpose, size,
composition, and duration of US military commitments in the Middle East. It would also put American
allies—particularly those in the
Gulf Cooperation Council—on notice that US involvement in their defense (and in their internecine conflicts)
comes with limitations prescribed by a broad consensus of the US political system. Failing an
agreement between Congress, the White House, and the courts on the routine applicability of the Act, a
legal restructuring of the AUMF would serve a similar purpose. As some 2020 presidential candidates have argued, replacing
the current authorization with time-limited, renewable joint resolutions—perhaps tailored to specific situations and requiring regular
congressional review—would help ensure that both Congress and the White House remain in sync on how, and indeed whether, to pursue
military activities in the Middle East. This
would have a salutary effect on how the United States conceives of and
executes its overall approach to the region. Politics might once again stop at the water’s edge. And given that the water, these
days, is most often that of the Gulf, such a reorientation would make for a stronger, more unified, and more coherent American approach to
the region.
Adv 1
 A2: Senkaku War
No escalation and crisis management checks.
---economic interests mean no nation attacks and crisis communication channels mean we can talk it out
with other allies

Yu & Kim ’19 [Yun & Ji Young; MPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford; assistant
professor in the Department of Japan Studies, College of Languages and Cultures, Hanyang University;
May 2019; “The stability of proximity: the resilience of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu
Dispute”; https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/19/2/327/5017427; International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific, Volume 19, Issue 2; accessed 9/3/20; TV]

A bleak picture of Sino-Japanese relations prevails in the current discourse based on the seemingly
irreconcilable factors stemming from concerns over international power politics, historical memory, and
ideological differences. These factors contribute to a relationship of ‘hot economics and cold politics’ between China and Japan,
characterized by a lack of mutual trust. Against this backdrop, the territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu between
China and Japan plays a critical role in defining the two countries’ relations .1 In particular, China’s rapid
economic and military growth further encourages the alarming analysis of a possible armed conflict between
the two regional powers. There are still several pacifying factors in Sino-Japanese relations, such as the
alignment of economic interests, extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States, and the
maritime settings in East Asia that favor defensive capabilities (Goldstein, 2013: 69–75). Nevertheless, the territorial
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and the issues of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea are two of the most important
ongoing disputes between China and Japan that could easily strain the Sino-Japanese relations (Sakuwa, 2009: 519–520). Particularly since
2010, Japanese academics have sounded the alarm, skeptical of China’s self-proclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ and wary of the potentially devastating
effect of the precarious Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute (Kawashima, 2014; Matsuda, 2015; Aoyama, 2016). Would the conflict over
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands eventually lead China and Japan to an armed clash, escalating into a major security crisis in
East Asia?

We argue that the possibility of an armed conflict is extremely low, considering the prior practices in the
bilateral crisis management employed by the two countries. The term ‘bilateral crisis management’ is
distinguishable from ‘internal crisis management mechanism’ The former refers to high-level political,
diplomatic, and military dialog/exchanges, while the latter refers to domestic institutions relevant to crisis management,
decision-making processes, executive leadership, and intelligence-sharing mechanism. Some scholars have accused Japan and
China of lacking effective internal crisis management mechanism, which will make any clash over the islands difficult to
contain (Hafeez, 2015: 73; Bush, 2010). Although this observation may be true, we believe that the two countries have
nevertheless engaged with each other actively and successfully through state-to-state ‘bilateral crisis
management’ measures, which have been effective in preventing further escalation once conflicts have
broken out. And the operation of these measures could account for the resilience of the relationship between
the two countries, even during periods of turbulence.

Throughout the late 1990s to early 2000s, the ‘shelved’ dispute remained tranquil as both countries engaged in the
active prevention of any escalation over the islands. Downs and Saunders’ insightful examination of the two disputes in 1990
and 1996 demonstrates that the Chinese government prioritized economic development over nationalist goals
in managing the crises (Downs and Saunders, 1998). Up until the early 2000s, China and Japan had engaged in ‘ active dispute
management’ through the limited access of both countries’ nationals to the islands; the avoidance of social
mobilization on this issue, especially in China; and, Japan’s constrained use of the islands (Fravel, 2010a).
Adv 2
 A2: Might Makes Right
China has strategic interests in maintaining naval norms---that means it will not
establish a “might makes right” principle
Vuković 20 [Siniša Vuković, Associate Director of Conflict Management Program at The Johns Hopkins
University, “Halting and Reversing Escalation in the South China Sea: A Bargaining Framework,”
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12868, y2k]

As history shows, freedom of the seas will prevail once it serves the challenger’s interests. China’s
spectacular rise will eventually tip cost‐benefit considerations in favor of this regime. Beijing already
has a world‐class merchant marine and fishing fleet, a large and effective coast guard, a globally
renowned shipbuilding capacity, and the ability to harvest and extract economically important maritime
resources (McDevitt, 2016). In 2015, two‐thirds of container traffic passed through ports that were
either Chinese‐owned or recipients of large Chinese investments . China’s five biggest carriers control 18
per cent of all container shipping handled by the world’s top‐twenty companies. Moreover, the PRC is
investing billions of dollars in the further expansion of its wide network of ports, which are by all
appearances commercial, but can be easily adapted to function in essential military missions. Outside of
the East China Sea, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in August 2017 (Cabestan,
2019; Kynge et al., 2017; Tweed and Leung, 2018). No regime other than freedom of the seas could
yield higher returns for a seafaring power with global interests. China already avails itself of the
freedom of navigation principles the US supports. It would not be in China’s own interest to subvert a
regime that underpins its capacity to project power globally and serves its growing ambitions.
 A2: Naval Power
Naval power is resilient and there’s no impact
Gregg Easterbrook 18, Fellow in Economics, then in Government Studies, at the Brookings Institution,
and a Fellow in International Affairs at the Fulbright Foundation, February 2018, It's Better Than It Looks:
Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear, Chapter 6: Why is Violence in Decline?, p. 136-139

FROM BEFORE THE COMMON ERA until Pearl Harbor, great powers competed at sea as much as on land.
Carthage, Rome, and Troy fought regularly on the waters of the Mediterranean. Enormous fleets—the 1588 Spanish Armada boasted 130 ships
—plied the oceans, fighting other fleets, seizing prizes, and staking claims to territory. Even in the days of sail, warships crossed the world: early
in the sixteenth century, the Chinese and Portuguese navies clashed repeatedly near what's now Hong Kong. For millennia, nations sunk into
their navies amounts that might have ended want, only to behold the investments literally sink. During the modern era, Argentina, Brazil,
Britain, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States have expended groaning chests of treasure on warships. Naval rivalries
between Britain and Germany helped ignite both world wars. The Pacific Theater fighting of World War Il began in part because of America's
1940 decision to forward-deploy its fleet from California to Hawaii, closer to Tokyo, and in part because Japan placed an existential wager on
the maritime theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a member of the society of famous persons who proved, following their deaths, to have been
wrong about practically everything. Many centuries of an extravagant naval arms race culminated in the October 1944
Battle of Leyte Gulf, where 367 warships and 1,800 aircraft hammered at each other with cannon, bombs, torpedoes, and battleship shells
weighing up to 3,000 pounds apiece. Then the naval arms race stopped. So did naval fighting. The seas have been
quiet for nearly seventy- five years, perhaps the longest stretch without bloodshed on the waters since first the sail was hoisted.
Some Argentine and British ships clashed during the 1982 Falklands conflict , and Iranian and Iraqi vessels scuffled
around oil tankers during the mid- 1980s, but big fights at sea have come to a halt, as has the great-power naval
competition. The last time a major naval battle occurred, India was not yet an independent nation , the solid-
state transistor had not been invented, and the Dodgers played in Brooklyn. Century upon century of great-power
competition at sea ended with a final score of 10—0. That's the number of supercarrier strike groups
possessed by the United States (ten) versus the number possessed by all other nations combined (zero).
World War Il left the warships of the Axis powers in Davy Jones's locker. The Soviet Union tried to step in with bucket-of-bolts vessels that
craved return to port; since about 1960, the US
Navy has enforced hegemony over the blue water. "Hegemony" has a bad
reputation in political science, assumed always to be undesirable. In this case, the size,
power, and competence of the US Navy
has banished fighting from much of Earth's surface. For a half-century, no nation has even attempted
to contest US naval dominion. The all-electric, stealth- hull cruisers the United States builds are so
advanced —nicknamed "arsenal ships" for their firepower—that no other nation has even experimented with a vessel
of this general type. The supercarrier strike groups that America deploys—full-deck, nuclear-powered
carriers bearing long-range jets, protected by guided-missile destroyers and screened by nuclear submarines—
are so potent, to say nothing of so expensive ( naval hegemony cost the United States $155 billion in 2017), that no other nation
has tried to build one. China and Russia possess no nuclear supercarriers, and have none under
construction. The limited-deck, diesel-powered carriers China began laying down in 2015 will be suitable for patrolling coastal areas but
not for the open ocean, while everything the US Navy builds is intended to travel beyond the horizon. Because the
US Navy operates far from the homes of Americans, many are not attuned to its size and might. Soldiers can march in Fourth of July parades,
and Air Force fighters can perform Super Bowl flyovers; the Navy's boats can be observed only on the waves. Most who live in other nations are
not attuned to the US Navy either. There's no compelling reason to think about a well-behaved military force stationed on the opposite side of
the globe. Under US Navy hegemony, piracy still occurs, but great powers have not seized merchant ships in three
generations. That cargo ships whose decks are stacked with containers of valuable goods can steam anywhere without fear of being
impounded by a warship is the unseen reason global trade took off, and global trade benefits almost everyone, while reducing war. The reality
that the US Navy rules the blue water both reduces a historic cause of conflict and enables the prosperity
of the contemporary era. Speaking at West Point as president, Obama said that the United States does not use its might to acquire
territory or seize resources. Instead, American might is employed to pursue what US leaders believe is best for the
world. Such beliefs may be wrong, even tragically so. But has any other nation that possessed overwhelming military force ever refrained
from using force for conquest or pursuit of riches? That is the unseen question of the oceans—unseen because fighting on the water has
stopped.
 A2: Mediterranean War
The Mediterranean’s stable and current missions solve
Shazwanis Shukri 19, PhD International Studies at Cardiff University, Senior Lecturer at Universiti Utara
Malaysia, “Combatting Terrorism at Sea: Assessing NATO’S Maritime Operations in the Mediterranean,”
12/31/2019, http://jis.uum.edu.my/images/vol152019/105-116.pdf [OAE = Operation Active Endeavour]

OAE was launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US as one of the eight initiatives
in response to fight against international terrorism. The operation began its task with the main mandate
to monitor and provide surveillance assistance for vessel movements in the entire Mediterranean Sea.
OAE demonstrated NATO’s coherence and resolve in the fight against terrorism with expanded
maritime security cooperation with numerous NATO partners, especially those participating in the
Mediterranean Dialogue. OAE has achieved substantial improvement in NATO’s and its partners,
cooperation, which has resulted in significant success in maintaining the security of the Mediterranean
Sea from terrorist activities.

During the course of the operation, OAE has successfully detected, boarded, and intercepted hundreds
of suspicious vessels which might have had connections with terrorist organizations . Apart from that,
OAE has also escorted hundreds of merchant vessels while traversing the Straits of Gibraltar in order to
protect them from possible terrorist attacks. In addition to tracking and patrolling suspect vessels, the
continuous presence of NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea also helped with disaster relief and
emergency situations, and provided assistance for high visibility events against the threat of terrorism.
OAE has played a vital role in the effort to fight terrorism at sea. OAE has continually enhanced the
cooperation with its partners and increased extensive operations at sea. As a result, no terrorist plot
has been detected in the Mediterranean since the beginning of the operation. Early detection of
potential terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean has significantly helped to disrupt any attempt to attack
the merchant vessels crossing the sea. In sum, the presence of NATO has favourably prevented terrorist
activities in the Mediterranean Sea and simultaneously preserved the safety and security of the
homelands of the Alliance and its partners.
1NR
DA
 Impact OV---2NC

Independently --- they dropped it kills the NPT because it ends US unconditional
support for article 5 and Japan pulls out --- that causes global crises independent from
prolif --- extinction
---it’s the cornerstone of global security only thing preventing global crisis – this is independent of Japan
getting nukes or not it’s an immediate perception based impact

de Rivière 20 [Mr Nicolas de Rivière, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
Security Council, “The NPT is an irreplaceable bulwark against the risk of nuclear proliferation,” 2-26,
https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-NPT-is-an-irreplaceable-bulwark-against-the-risk-of-nuclear-
proliferation, y2k]

The Treaty is one of the cornerstones of our collective security system. It is an irreplaceable bulwark against
the risk of nuclear proliferation. It is, indeed, the only instrument that makes it possible to prevent nuclear war,
as stated in the preamble to the Treaty, while also permitting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Its preservation is essential,
because the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has not
disappeared, and because our world today is more uncertain and volatile than ever.

We are witnessing a troubling degradation of our strategic environment, the instability of which is nourished
by asymmetries and escalations. The Security Council is regularly convened to address all these crisis situations, which are
multiplying, from the Levant to North-East Asia, while the management of proliferation crises unfortunately remains a major
priority that continues to require us to take action. In that context, what should be our common road map and how can we ensure the
preservation of the NPT and the balance of its three pillars?
 A2: Plan is good for assurance
Even small risk of the link causes extinction and reverses solvency
---it forces Japan to act more aggressively cuz they think the US isn’t going to confront China so they feel
the need to – that wrecks relations and makes miscalc inevitable

Lionel Fatton 19. P. Fatton* Webster University Geneva; Research Institute for the History of Global
Arms Transfer, Meiji University, A new spear in Asia: why is Japan moving toward autonomous defense?,
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 19, (2019) 297–325 doi: 10.1093/irap/lcy006 Advance
Access Publication 3 April 2018

The evolutions of Japan’s defense posture could have destabilizing consequences for the Asia-Pacific
region as well. The high level of distrust, if not hostility, between China and Japan since the end of the
Second World War has portended spiraling tensions caused by action– reaction dynamics between
competitive defensive measures (Samuels, 2007). The US–Japan alliance has mitigated this security
dilemma by guaranteeing Japan’s survival and acting as a ‘bottle cap’ on the resurgence of Japanese
militarism (Christensen, 2011, 236). A militarily more autonomous and powerful Japan would alarm
China. The ‘egg shell’ perception, which has gained momentum in Beijing since the mid-1990s and
posits that the alliance is an incubator of Japanese rearmament, would strengthen (Christensen, 2011,
236). Not only would Sino-Japanese relations deteriorate due to the prospect of Japan’s revival as a
great power, US–China relations would also be undermined by Beijing’s recognition of the alliance as a
destabilizing factor. The United States and China, the world’s two largest economic and military powers,
are widely regarded as holding the faith of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is often dropped out of the
equation despite its disruptive potential. A more autonomous Japan does not only raise the prospect of
a military clash with China in the East China Sea, it also increases the likelihood of a Sino-American war.
The US–Japan alliance could become the thread between an emotionally-charged territorial dispute and
what would be a cataclysmic great power conflict (Miller, 2015). Deng Xiaoping said in the late 1970s
that half of heaven would fall if Japan and China were to fight each other. Today, the whole heaven
would collapse if the United States were embroiled.

The damage is irreversible---can’t renegotiate or reassert security guarantee

---it’s impossible to reassure allies because they no longer trust anything the US says anymore, you can’t
put nuclear genie back in the bottle

Lanoszka 18 – Alexander Lanoszka, International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo.

[How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation, Chapter 1 of Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics
of Nuclear Proliferation, Cornell University Press, ProQuest]//BPS
How Alliances Might Reverse Nuclear Proliferation

The guarantor could lose a lot from the spread of nuclear weapons, even among its allies. Nuclear weapons undercut the ability of the
superpower guarantor to project its power and influence as well as to control escalatory dynamics.46 Accordingly, when it learns or suspects
that its ally might be seeking an independent nuclear deterrent, the guarantor has incentives to thwart such ambitions as quickly and as
comprehensively as possible. To begin with, diplomatic relations with affected allies and adversaries are at stake, especially if the guarantor is
seen as not doing enough to restrain the proliferating ally. It could even be seen as culpable if its (perceived) inaction benefits the proliferator
at the expense of others. Local security dilemmas could subsequently intensify.47 Although the ally seeks nuclear weapons to satisfy its defense
needs, others could see its behavior as sufficiently threatening that they acquire their own new weapons. As such, the guarantor prefers its ally
to dismantle its nonpeaceful nuclear program. It might perhaps wish to monitor all nuclear activities, denying its ally enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities as well. Such a comprehensive nonproliferation campaign would address any international doubts about the ally’s
willingness and ability to restart its nuclear weapons program. How can the guarantor get the nuclear genie back into the
alliance bottle?

I argue that pursuing this task is extremely challenging for the guarantor. States that have decided to undertake a
nuclear weapons program typically do so recognizing and accepting the risks and costs involved . And so the
guarantor is no longer deterring its ally from seeking nuclear weapons. The guarantor is instead trying to compel
that very ally to stop its proliferation-related behavior— a harder undertaking, since scholars agree that
deterrence is easier than compellence.48 Moreover, the alliance bottle is broken and must be fixed first, requiring the
guarantor to undo the harm inflicted on the security guarantee that prompted the ally to desire nuclear
weapons in the first place. Reasserting security guarantees is challenging when the affected ally has had
its faith in its received commitments badly shaken at a time when it faces a hostile threat environment .
The guarantor might have to make credible commitments to restore troop levels or to retain existing troop levels. Yet making such
commitments believable is difficult when the guarantor has already revealed an interest in limiting
them. Alternatively, the factors that led to the unfavorable alliance adjustments in the first place could still exist. The guarantor might have
enduring economic problems or irrevocably different foreign policy interests.
 A2: Non-unique/Turn

China won’t probe to destroy alliance---they also fear the DA

---alliance prevents Japan from developing a stronger military and nukes which China would hate

Vogel 19 [Professor Ezra F. Vogel is the Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at
Harvard University. He has had a long association with Harvard, receiving his Ph.D. in sociology there in
1958, and then teaching at the university from 1967 to 2000, “Japan and China: Facing History,” Chapter
11 pg. 581-583 of the book, 7/30/19, https://www.scribd.com/read/443275154/China-and-Japan-
Facing-History, DS]
Yet faced with a strong China, the Japanese have every reason to maintain their ties to the United States, which have grown stronger and deeper in the seven
decades since World War II. The Japanese have close relations with the United States in every sphere—military, political, economic, and cultural. There is a high
level of comfort between the Americans and the Japanese, and an open exchange of ideas and opinions. Although some in China have an interest in ex- panding
relations with Japan, it
is not in China’s interest to detach Japan from the U.S.-Japan military alliance, for an
independent Japan would develop a stronger military and possibly develop nuclear weapons to defend
itself. The Chinese have not erased their image of the Japanese as a militaristic aggressive people, and they believe that the U.S.-Japan
Alliance can still help keep the cork in the bottle. Japanese strategists are aware that the Chinese economy will soon be several times
larger than their own, that China is putting far more resources into its military than Japan could match, and that Japan’s military manpower cannot compare with
that of China, which has ten times the population. The Japanese are therefore firmly committed to cooperation with the U.S. military. Though the Japanese are
prepared to increase their cooperation with China, their relationship with the U.S. military and the U.S. government since 1945 has made the Japanese feel far more
secure working with Americans than with an authoritarian Chinese government that has expressed so much hostility toward Japan.

China wants to keep Japan from going nuclear too!

---China doesn’t want a nuclear japan and recognizes that US alliance maintains that

Glassman 18 [Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Tama University
Center for Rule Making Strategies in Japan, and a senior advisor at Pacific Forum International, a
Honolulu-based think tank; he previously served there as executive director for 16 years. He was a
member of The Japan Times editorial board from 1991 to 2001 and continues to serve as a contributing
editor there, “Japan’s Disarmament Tightropes and Triangulation, Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia book,
1/2/18, https://www-taylorfrancis-com.mutex.gmu.edu/books/e/9781315165936, DS]

Japan’s nuclear policies and their inconsistencies are largely irrelevant to its relationship with China. For
Beijing, Japan’s quest for disarmament is hypocritical since Tokyo enjoys the benefits conferred by the US nuclear umbrella; an irritant (Japan suspended aid to
China after its last nuclear test in 1995); or a point of convergence: Beijing is committed to nuclear disarmament but it is waiting for the US and Russia to reduce
their arsenals to levels equal to that of China before it considers shrinking its own stock of nuclear weapons. China
acknowledges that the US
extended deterrent has prevented Japan from going nuclear and thus serves Chinese interests.

Biden maintains and strengthens the alliance---BUT Japan is watching his China policy
like a HAWK
---alliance is strong---US reaffirmed article 5 and Japan trusts it because they know Biden loves the
alliance and both sides are looking to bolster the alliance and Japan is reassured because US boosted its
pacific strategy, BUT Tokyo is watching Biden’s Asia policy very closely – that magnifies the risk of a link
Johnson 1-24 [Jesse Johnson is a Staff Writer for Japan Times, “New U.S. defense chief confirms
Senkakus fall under security treaty”, 1-24-2021,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/24/national/politics-diplomacy/us-japan-defense-
senkakus/] IanM

Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi confirmed Sunday in his first talks with new U.S. defense chief Lloyd
Austin that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea fall under the scope of the two allies’ security
treaty.

Kishi spoke by phone with Austin, who became the first Black U.S. defense chief after being confirmed
to his post Friday, with the pair also pledging to further bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance and maintain
and strengthen a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” according to the Defense Ministry.
The teleconference was the first ministerial-level talks between Japan and the United States since President Joe Biden’s inauguration on
Wednesday.

Austin “affirmed that the Senkaku Islands are covered by Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and
that the United States remains opposed to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East
China Sea,” the Pentagon said in a statement.

Article 5 states that the U.S. will defend territories under Japan’s administration in the event of an
armed attack.

China, which also claims the Senkakus and calls them the Diaoyu, has repeatedly sent government
vessels near the islands in what some observers say is a campaign to test, normalize and slowly erode
Japan’s response to the incursions.

“Both ministers oppose attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East and South China seas
… and pledged to maintain a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, including freedom
of navigation and flight,” the Defense Ministry said in a statement.

Kishi called Austin’s remarks “very encouraging” and said he would aim to build a relationship of trust
while further strengthening deterrence.

“I felt that Defense Secretary Austin has a strong interest in the security environment in Asia and
attaches importance to the Japan-U.S. alliance,” Kishi said.
Austin’s reaffirmation of Article 5 comes after Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga received a similar reassurance in November from Biden, president-
elect at the time, that the Senkakus were covered under the treaty.

In a move that could complicate attempts to repair Sino-Japanese ties, Beijing on Friday passed a bill that allows its coast guard more freedom
to use weapons on foreign ships involved in illegal activities in waters it claims, state-run media reported, heightening the chance of a
miscalculation.

Tokyo has been working to maintain balance between Beijing, a top economic partner, and the U.S., its closest security ally, as Sino-American
ties plunge to fresh lows over matters including trade, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea.

In a sign that Japan and the U.S. were looking to encourage more countries to join the regional security
fold, the two ministers also agreed that their allies would play a central role in “strengthening
cooperation with various partners both inside and outside the region” in order to maintain and
strengthen a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” the Defense Ministry said in a statement.
Tokyo, which has been watching closely how the Biden administration approaches Asia and China
policy, was also likely to be encouraged by Austin’s apparent embrace of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-
Pacific Strategy after the talks.
 A2: No link /deterrence fails

Even if nukes are a horrible idea and Japan doesn’t think US will use them---they still
want us to defend Senkaku’s with nukes because they think it does deter China and its
tied to overall nuclear umbrella
Satoh 17 [Ambassador Yukio Satoh is vice chairman of the Japan Institute of International Affairs in
Tokyo. An accomplished Japanese diplomat, he has served as the permanent representative of Japan to
the United Nations. He also served as the ambassador of Japan to the Netherlands from 1994 to 1996
and to Australia from 1996 to 1998, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Japan’s Security”, October 2017,
Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 2 Center for Global Security Research,
https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/satoh-report-final.pdf] IanM

In such contingencies, there is no role for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence capabilities, as a threat to
employ U.S. nuclear weapons in a gray zone contingency would simply not be credible. On the other
hand, the indirect link to the U.S. nuclear umbrella is useful, insofar as it would help induce Beijing to
be more cautious than otherwise. It should be obvious that Japan does not expect the United States to
utilize its nuclear strategy to support Japan’s position on the Senkaku Islands. But, for the sake of
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, it is critically important for Washington to make clear its
commitment to defend Japan and, if necessary, to employ nuclear weapons if Japan’s efforts to defend
the islands were to lead to military conflict with China.

Japan and the United States have hitherto taken three important steps to this end. First, since the
1960s, U.S. presidents have repeatedly expressed the country’s commitment to extend deterrence,
including the nuclear umbrella, to Japan. Notably, President Trump reiterated this traditional
commitment in his first meeting with Prime Minister Abe in February 2017. Secondly, the Obama and
Trump administrations have affirmed that the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty covers the Senkaku Islands,
signifying Washington’s recognition of Japan’s control of the islands. And thirdly, the 2015 Guidelines
for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation stated that the two governments would take measures to ensure
Japan’s peace and security “in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies,” making it clear
that the so-called “gray zone contingencies” are within the purview of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation.  

Japanese perceptions moot any link turn---they think the DA is true and will act on it
---No link turn – even if theoretically the plan increases deterrence---Japan doesn’t see it that way
because they watch US extremely closely and any sign of wavering commitment causes them to pursue
a bomb – that’s Saunders

Emily Cura Saunders 16, PhD Candidate at the Claremont Graduate University and Graduate Research
Associate at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Bryan L. Fearey, Director of the National Security
Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “To Pursue an Independent Nuclear Deterrent or Not? Japan’s
and South Korea’s Nuclear Decision Making Models”, in Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges, Ed.
Apikyan and Diamond, p. 39-40
A major security concern for Japan is a rising China, both in its military strength and economic policies .
The Japanese worry that their economic edge of the 1980s has been in decline due to competition with China, and as a result, China is
becoming competitive vis-à-vis regional economic dominance. The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a Third US-Japan
Strategic Dialogue forum in which they note, “Japan
is seriously studying the American strategic posture in this
region. Will the US choose Japan or China as a strategic partner? Will it choose neither? Unless the US
chooses to promote the Japan-US relationship to a level like that of the Anglo-American special relationship, Japan
may withdraw from the alliance and the US may find itself an isolated power in the Pacific.”58 This relationship needs to
be carefully considered when thinking about Japan’s potential nuclear. Similarly, Japan watches how the United States deals with North Korea.
Japanese officials want to know how the United States will stem the tide of proliferation in the region. The United States has a long history of
assurances when it comes to Japanese anxieties over nuclear posture. A more recent development is that Japan has asked to be more involved
in the process of nuclear posture planning. The Japan Times noted that “Two days after the latest nuclear test by the North, U.S. President
Barack Obama told Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a telephone meeting that there would be no change whatsoever in America’s commitment to
defend Japan, including nuclear deterrence through its nuclear umbrella over Japan.”59 The United States needs to continually express its
intent to provide Japan with security in both words and deeds. It is important that the United States continually involves Japan in discussions
concerning the nuclear umbrella. Japan finds itself on the same tightrope the United States finds itself on, specifically how to applaud/pursue
reductions of and emphasis on nuclear weapons while simultaneously maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Japan was
apparently sufficiently satisfied with the final draft of the 2010 NPR and their consultations beforehand. However, Japan was insistent on
further discussions addressing more willing to talk of their specific concerns, holding high-level meetings to discuss the details and implications
of the 2010 NPR. There were, however, still a few points of contention. One of the largest issues between Japan and the United States on the
NPR is the different threat priorities. While Japan is not impervious or ignorant towards terrorism, they see state actors as their main threats,
whereas the NPR identified nuclear terrorism as the highest priority, specifically “preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.”60
Japan, on the other hand, sees China and North Korea as its biggest threats, not terrorism. In the Pacific Forum dialogue at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, “Japanese participants have warned of a potential problem should the United States not pay sufficient
attention to traditional state-based nuclear security threats.”61 Another point of contention was how the 2010 NPR dealt with China. The NPR
stated, The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats,
such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, are growing. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a
greater role in supporting international rules, norms, and institutions.62 This is in stark contrast to the stance as articulated in from Japan’s
White Papers (vide supra). This less-than-confrontational
language in the 2010 NPR further increases Japan’s anxieties
about the U.S.-Sino relationship. While the fear of abandonment may not be analytically founded, the
fear remains that perhaps the United States will look for different allies in the region. Should Japan believe
that the United States and China were becoming closer, would they be inclined to either look for security guarantees
elsewhere, or move toward an independent deterrent? While these sources of tension exist, Japan is nevertheless very proud
of its partnership with the United States, and vice-a-versa. The aforementioned 2013 White Paper highlighted the US-Japan partnership. It
explained the “peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense
capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.”63 Japan, like South Korea, has never actually pursued a nuclear weapons program.
They have, however, like South Korea had major security threats and tensions. The security model does not hold true in this case. Japan is
surrounded by two nuclear weapons states, each of which has continually provoked Japan, and yet, while some of these threats are quite
provocative, Japan has yet to respond with direct proliferation activities. Japan
does, however, closely monitor its
relationship with the United States, and when regional threats are coupled with a perceived wavering of
U.S. support and commitment, Japan is more likely to hint at an independent deterrent.

Allies are globally interconnected---they watch US commitment to low stakes like

Senkaku’s for cues about overall U.S. reliability
---allies around the world watch how US responds in crisis situations---if US abandons an ally that is
vulnerable, they think US is just as likely to abandon them --- prefer our ev it’s from a PhD who is the
president for European policy analysis

Dr. A. Wess Mitchell 11, President of the Center for European Policy Analysis, Doctorate in Political
Science from the Otto Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft at Freie Universität, Master’s Degree from the
Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, and Jakub J. Grygiel, Associate Professor at the Catholic University of America and
Fellow at The Institute for Human Ecology, “The Vulnerability of Peripheries”, The American Interest,
3/1/2011, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/03/01/the-vulnerability-of-peripheries/

Up and down the frontier of American global power, from the South China Sea to the Middle East, from the Caucasus to
the north Central European plain, U.S. allies are increasingly nervous. Along the littoral rim of East Asia, South Koreans,
Japanese, Taiwanese and others in the region watched anxiously throughout 2010 as China ratcheted up efforts to assert control
over strategic waterways and challenge the U.S. position in Asia. In the Middle East, too, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf States ended the year less confident than ever that the United States would somehow bestir itself to contain an aspiring nuclear-
armed Iran. And on Europe’s eastern fringe, despite efforts at détente with Moscow, Poland and the Baltic States entered 2011 with
deep uncertainties about America’s long-term regional commitment in the face of a decrepit but atavistically revisionist Russia.

Viewed separately, these are unrelated regional silos, each with its own geopolitical rhythm , security logic and
ranking in the hierarchy of American strategic and political priorities. But seen together, a different picture
emerges. In all three regions, small, geopolitically exposed states with formal or informal U.S. security
commitments straddle age-old strategic fault lines in close proximity to rising or resurgent power centers. In all
three, assertiveness on the part of these larger powers has led American allies to reassess U.S. assurances. And in all three, American allies have
been at best temporarily reassured, and at times unsettled, by Washington’s response. This has led them all, to one degree or another, to
invest in new strategic options to hedge against the possibility of eventual American retrenchment.

Amid the now globally accepted thesis of American decline, America’s global
rivals are doing what aspirant powers have done at
moments of transition for millennia: hypothesis-testing. They are probing the top state on the outer limits of its power
commitments, where its strategic appendages are most vulnerable and its strength is most thinly spread. If history is any guide at all,
they are reading America’s responses to gauge how much latitude they have to make low-cost revisions to the
system in their favor. But both they and American allies are watching not just how America responds to probes in
their own neck of the woods but also to the probes of powers—and to the needs of similarly situated
allies—in other regions. Lacking the geopolitical equivalent of a stock market, they are gathering valuable cues about
America’s intentions in their own neighborhood by tracking how it handles revisionists at other points
on the U.S. strategic perimeter.

If accurate, this assessment holds profound implications for American statecraft in the early decades of the 21st century. It suggests
a
degree of global interconnectedness that has been largely absent from contemporary policy thinking. If America’s rivals are
indeed testing the hypothesis of its decline through probes on the strategic periphery, and if they and our allies are making strategic
calculations based on how Washington reacts to these tests, then this raises serious questions about the wisdom of the
recent U.S. emphasis on great power relationships and the occasional, de facto downgrading of traditional alliances in search of successful
engagement gambits. It also calls into question the deeper assumptions underlying our current strategic thinking. While a relative attenuation
of the U.S. position due to the “rise of the rest” is a reality, an American power free-fall of the kind envisioned by some foreign and even U.S.
commentators is not inevitable; how
the United States responds to its competitors’ probes will be an important
ingredient in determining the scale and pace of the change that does occur. In short, the hypothesis of precipitous
American decline needs to be disproven before its growing momentum transforms it into a self-fulfilling juggernaut. And only America can
disprove it.
 A2: Chen
Weakening Senkaku commitment threatens Japan mainland---they’d be forced to
militarize
---the most probable scenario for Senkaku’s being seized is through non-violent measures which plan
doesn’t defend from---Japan knows this and think that any risk China can get onto the island unscathed
threatens Japanese mainland forcing prolif

French 18 (Erik David Ph.D. in Political Science, Syracuse University, August 2018, “The US-Japan
Alliance and China 's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence,” 5-22-20,
https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context=etd, hec)

Each of the three great powers has a stake in the future of the Senkaku Islands and the ECS more broadly. The US’ takes no
side in disputes over the sovereignty of the Senkakus or the validity of each states’ EEZ claims. The US does, however, have a
reputational interest at stake given Japan’s current administrative control over the Senkakus. If the US were to
allow Japan to be coerced into relinquishing the islands to China, it would likely damage Japan’s
confidence in the US commitment to Japanese security more generally. The Senkakus also form part of the first
island chain, a series of islands running from Japan to the Malay archipelago which curtail the Chinese Navy’s (PLAN) ability to access the West
Pacific, and therefore have
strategic significance for US efforts to keep Chinese maritime power in check. 7
Japan and China each have significant interests in the Senkakus and ECS. Japan worries that Chinese
control over the Senkakus could better allow the PLAN to threaten Japanese sealanes.8 China aspires to expand its
maritime influence and break out of the first island chain. Japan and China both have an interest in accessing the potential untapped (albeit
limited) seabed resources in the ECS, including modest oil and gas fields.9 There are also potentially lucrative fishing grounds in the ECS that
both states would prefer to control.10

No prolif now, but Trump’s the brink.

---allies are hedging their bets now and sticking with the US BUT they are becoming increasingly willing to consider nuclear proliferation

---the only thing stopping that is the credibility of security guarantees which allies think are sufficient now BUT there watching his next moves

Brewer 10-2-2020, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (Eric, “Why Trump’s Retreat from US Allies Could Have Nuclear
Consequences,” Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/10/why-trumps-retreat-us-
allies-could-have-nuclear-consequences/168896/)

So far no country is openly dashing for the bomb, but allies appear to be hedging their bets. There has
been an uptick in the debate in South Korea over whether to develop nuclear weapons. Germany
appears increasingly willing to consider a European alternative to the U.S.-provided nuclear umbrella .
Saudi Arabia is improving its nuclear capabilities and keeping its options open to enrich and reprocess.
Officials in countries from Turkey to Brazil have spoken approvingly of developing nuclear weapons. A
number of countries—including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, Australia and South Korea are improving or
plan to improve their domestic missile or space programs, thereby providing pathways to potential
nuclear weapons delivery options. For some of these countries, the development of these capabilities is
tied to concerns about U.S. staying power.
It is hard to imagine that the U.S. alliance system—and Washington’s nonproliferation track record—
could survive another four years of a Trump presidency. By comparison, a Biden administration would
bring a degree of desperately needed strategic competence and international leadership that would
provide an important course correction. But it is not clear that the U.S. would be out of the woods
entirely. Some differences with allies run deeper than the current president. Indeed, a Biden
administration would still face challenges managing the widening strategic divides with Saudi and
Turkey, and several potential Biden administration policy objectives—from changes to U.S. nuclear use
policy, to a continued focus on burden sharing—could be in tension with plugging U.S. credibility gaps
and strengthening nonproliferation.

These challenges are not insurmountable, but it would be naïve to assume that the United States can
simply go back to status-quo ante. By staking out extreme positions with few political consequences—
indeed, the Republican Party has embraced many of Trump’s positions—Trump has altered the terms of
the debate. Trumpism—and its characteristics of retrenchment, nationalism, and hostility toward the
U.S.-created international order—will survive after he leaves office and shape U.S. political discourse. An
extreme oscillation between engagement and pull back from the international community is, for many
allies, no more tenable than U.S. withdrawal. And this is precisely their concern: That Trump is a
harbinger of things to come. That the U.S. is walking away from the international order that it built and
led for more than 70 years.

Countries do not take lightly the decision to develop nuclear weapons. However, history suggests that a
total loss of confidence in U.S. security guarantees can cause allies to pursue them . It is almost
impossible to know how close we are to that point now. Trumps actions certainly get us closer.

Only the plan, which turns Trump rhetoric into operational reality, triggers the DA
---security guarantees are sufficiently credible now to stop prolif because Trump is still legally obligated
to defend, only the plan removes that and spurs widespread prolif

Lanoszka 19 – Assistant Professor of IR at Waterloo

Alexander Lanoszka, Honorary Fellow at City University of London, recent author of Atomic Assurance:
The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, Alliances and Nuclear Proliferation in the Trump Era, The
Washington Quarterly 41(4): 85-101

The danger of U.S. allies wanting their own nuclear weapons appears to have intensified since Donald
Trump was elected president of the United States in 2016. During the election campaign, Trump complained that the United States
contributed too much to the security of its allies while they failed to pay their fair share of the common defense burden. If those allies failed to
boost their defense spending, he warned, then they should not expect the United States to rescue them if they came under attack.1 In what
would be a radical departure from existing U.S. nonproliferation policy, he even intimated in an election debate that he would accept decisions
by South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.2 Even though
concerns about his support for Seoul and Tokyo
going nuclear have waned, expectations that the presidency would soften his approach seem otherwise
to find disappointment. News outlets warn of his destructive management of alliances amidst trade wars and acrimonious leadership
summits.3 National debates have erupted in allied capitals over the desirability of greater strategic
autonomy from Washington. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has echoed French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for the
formation of a European army that would allow their countries to achieve greater independence in their foreign and defense policies. Because
allies can no longer rely on the United States in the age of Trump, they might even try to get the so-called absolute weapon to deter stronger
adversaries like Russia or China on their own.4 The link between alliances and nuclear proliferation has never been as clear as the folk wisdom
suggests. Very rarely in international politics can a state be reasonably confident that its allies would come
to its aid in the event of an attack. Well before Trump took office, fears existed that a security guarantor
like the United States might simply opt out of a war at the expense of a beleaguered ally, especially if
nuclear escalation was possible.5 Abandonment fears, in other words, are natural for states to have even
in the best of circumstances. But for abandonment fears to induce such an extraordinary decision as
nuclear weapons acquisition, something much more fundamental has to change to destroy enough
confidence in a received security guarantee. In this essay, I argue that security guarantees to U.S. allies are
adequate, and will remain so in the foreseeable future , for deterring allied nuclear proliferation .
Abandonment fears have undoubtedly intensified with the Trump administration, but not to such an
extent that nuclear proliferation appears highly likely. Specifically, the United States still provides
deterrence-by-denial capabilities —that is, the capabilities to attrite, if not to defeat, adversaries in defensive battles—to key
allies through its overseas deployments and military planning . It does not depend solely on extended nuclear deterrence
or the threat of nuclear punishment to dissuade potential adversaries from attacking its allies. Accordingly, allied states do not rely
on the rhetoric of the White House alone to gauge the strength of their received security guarantees .
They also refer to what is happening operationally at the military level. That is not to say that rhetoric is
unimportant, but it is a noisy signal of intentions and can be interpreted in multiple ways since it can
service domestic consumption or even intra-alliance bargaining over burden sharing . When worrisome
rhetoric becomes operational reality, states would be more likely to get so alarmed as to consider
seriously the nuclear option. Yet, such historical moments are rare: they have occurred only during the
Eisenhower (1953-1961) and Nixon administrations (1969-1974), when global nuclear nonproliferation rules and
various enforcement mechanisms were in their infancy .6
 A2: No Prolif

Filter the prolif debate through the link---U.S. support is the only meaningful barrier to
nuclearization.
Lee 19, Researcher @ Harvard International Review (Dennis, August 18 th, “A Nuclear Japan: The Push
for Weaponization,” Harvard International Review, https://hir.harvard.edu/a-nuclear-japan-the-push-
for-weaponization/)
It is no surprise that the only country that has ever experienced the horror of nuclear weapons is also one of their staunchest opponents. Since the end of the
Second World War, despite pursing peaceful civilian uses of nuclear energy, both the Japanese government and its general population have been opposed to the
weaponization of nuclear technology. However, much has changed since the late 1940s, and as regional geopolitics
change, so too may Japan's stance. Despite many diplomatic missions to the region, including a recent visit by Japan's prime minister,
Southeast Asia continues to be an issue for Japan . Animosity and tensions still exist from the conquests by Imperial Japan during the
Second World War, and in addition, many nations in the region depend heavily on the Chinese investment, crowding out Japan's own. As the situation

develops, it is not impossible for Japan to develop nuclear weapons as a way of contesting China 's
increasing economic and military influence. In fact, China has already begun to clash with Japan: the territorial dispute

over Senkaku/Diaoyu Island continues to be extremely dangerous to Sino-Japanese relations many believe that
the risk of armed conflict between the two nations is the highest since the Second World War. In addition, North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons and
missile launch capabilities, causing much unease in the Japanese government. At the end of the Second World War, many factors contributed to Japan's anti-nuclear
weapon stance. While the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki played a major role in its definition, the promise of US protection solidified this position. Both the
Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952 and the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security essentially guarantee that Japan is protected by the United States'
military might, including its massive nuclear arsenal. Even so, in the past, regional events have triggered a move toward
Japanese nuclear weaponization. In the 1960s, China's first nuclear weapons test led the Japanese Prime Minister to investigate the possibility of
weaponization. In 1995, another investigation occurred as a result of the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, when North Korea threatened war in response to
possible sanctions. Conducted by the Japanese Defense Agency, the secret investigation decided that developing nuclear weapons would harm USJapan relations.
Notably, all of these investigations and reports proceeded in spite of a 1955 law that specifically prohibits Japan from researching and developing nuclear weapons.
Japan has been at the forefront of developing next generation nuclear technology. Despite the 2011 Fukushima
nuclear disaster, in which a nuclear meltdown resulted in the release of large amounts of radioactive material, the newly elected Japanese government continues to
support the construction of nuclear power plants. Japan also owns 42.7 metric tons of plutonium, which, according to the
Congressional Research Service, has the potential to create over 1,000 nuclear weapons , a stockpile that is
predicted to increase to over 1 10 metric tons by 2020. Japan's ability to create a nuclear weapon is , according to the Center for Strategic

and International Studies, "a screwdriver's turn away." In combination with missile technologies developed by the Japanese Aerospace Exploration

Agency, Japan could develop its own nuclear deterrent should it decide that the United States's is inadequate or
unnecessary. Japan's reliance on US military support may also be changing. Experts predicted that the warming of relations between Washington and Beijing would
distance Tokyo. The Cold War is over, and the strategic need to have an extended US presence in Japan has lessened. There have been movements in both the
United States and Japan for the United States to reduce its presence in the Japanese Islands. Younger
Japanese are increasingly
nationalistic and favor weaponization in greater numbers, but whether Japan will risk relations with the
United States remains to be seen. Here, the US policy toward other East Asian allies has a large impact on
Japan, which might see the lack of support for Taiwanese independence as an abandonment. The only significant barrier preventing
Japan from developing nuclear weapons is the security it obtains from relying on the United States. Japan values the
economic and security benefits the relationship has brought, causing reluctance among the Japanese government to perform any actions that would damage this
relationship. However, if
the government, for whatever reason, is able to overcome this reluctance, Japan could
quickly and easily acquire a nuclear deterrent. The prospect of Japan becoming a nuclear power is disturbing; it is currently one of the
most outspoken advocates against nuclear weapons and this action would severely undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While it may seem

unlikely at first glance, increasing external threats, such as that of China, as well as the increasing amount
of youth nationalism, may be enough to push Japan over the edge . The only barrier may be the strength
of the US-Japanese alliance.
BUT even if they don’t prolif --- even moves to go for it cause extinction – pre-emption
Friedberg 15 [Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton. The
Debate Over US China Strategy. Global Politics and Strategy. May 19, 2015]

If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US security partners in
East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might improve their prospects
for balancing against Chinese power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between
theory and reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could not
produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its former allies lost the
protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at which they acquired their own would be
one in which they would be exposed to coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it
contains a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea, Japan
and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and Japan), a multipolar
nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to instability.48

No veto players and Japan is shifting away from non-nuclear principles now but on the
brink
Basu, 20 – (Dr. Titli Basu is Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre. Her research interests include
Japanese security, strategy and foreign policy; Japan and the Indo-Pacific; great power politics in East
Asia; and India-Japan relations. “Japan’s Security Choices in an Uncertain East Asia,” 1-17-20,
https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/japans-security-choices-in-an-uncertain-east-asia/) nL

In the post-war era, Japan has incrementally expanded the narrow interpretation of Article 9. Within the
constraints of exclusively defense-oriented policy, discussions on developing an independent capability
to strike foreign military bases or cost-benefit analyses of the nuclear option have taken place. Striking the
enemy to neutralize its military capacity with the objective of securing Japan is considered by proponents a defensive military strategy — “offensive defense” or
“active defense.” Maneuvering the East Asian security landscape which hosts nuclear powers and three out of the top 10 nations in terms of military expenditure,
Japan is evaluating its options. The Nuclear Option The Japanese government maintains that possessing nuclear weapons is
not unconstitutional. The possibility of a nuclear armed Japan gained attention when Kenneth N. Waltz, within the framework of his neorealist theory,
stressed that Japan will eventually go nuclear. Post-war Japan has at times weighed the nuclear option ,

particularly following China’s first nuclear test in 1960s. During the Cold War, Japan’s three non-nuclear principles coexisted with a
secret deal with the United States permitting the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa in certain
contingencies. Japan’s political class has debated the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the parliament and

others have urged discussion on revising the three non-nuclear principles.

 Extra
Assurances to the Senkaku is at 100%
Bhattacharya 8-1 [Digital news writer at Republic World, “US Vows '100% Steadfast Commitment' To
Japan With Chinese Incursions Into Sankaku Islands,” 8-1-2020, https://www.republicworld.com/world-
news/us-news/us-vows-100-percent-steadfast-commitment-to-japan-with-chinese-incursions-i.html,
y2k]

China is poised to face a renewed challenge with greater grit and muscle-power from democratic
nations to its bellicose attitude and dreams of territorial expansion in the waters of Asia.

The United States in its latest has lent a helping hand to Japan to handle Beijing's repeated incursions
into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, a Japanese daily has reported.

"The United States is 100% absolutely steadfast in its commitment to help the government of Japan
with the situation," Lt. Gen. Kevin Schneider, the highest-ranking US military officer in Japan, was
quoted as saying in a virtual press briefing. "That's 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, seven days a
week."

This comes just days after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called "for a new alliance of
democracies" to counter Beijing. The Senkaku Islands is an uninhabited chain of islands in the East China
Sea which is administered by Japan, but claimed by China. The islands are located just northeast of
Taiwan and, in terms of distance, is closer to the Chinese mainland than Japan's home islands.

Schneider noted that Chinese ships usually "would go in and out a couple of times a month and now we
are seeing them basically park and truly challenge Japan's administration". "The duration of the
incursions is beyond anything that we've seen in a long, long time," he said while adding that the US was
offering Japan surveillance and reconnaissance assistance to assess the situation.

While the US giving explicit support is rare, it comes ahead of the end of a Chinese seasonal fishing
ban scheduled for mid-August, the Nikkei Asian Review reported. Four years ago, 230 Chinese ships had
gathered around the Senkakus – both fishing ships and Chinese Coast Guard vessels – with some
entering Japanese territorial waters.

Plan spills over to global alliances – proven by empirics, studies, and interviews with
officials
---prefer our author he has a PhD and a slew of qualifications

Dr. Hal Brands 18, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Dr. Eric S. Edelman, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, PhD
in U.S. Diplomatic History from Yale University, and Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken, President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Senior Research Professor at
the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), PhD and MA in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins
University, “Credibility Matters: Strengthening American Deterrence in An Age of Geopolitical Turmoil”,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Report, May 2018,
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Credibility_Paper_FINAL_format.pdf

A later generation of scholars, however, departed from Schelling’s analysis. Few scholars question the importance of credibility per se, if
credibility is defined as the perception that the United States will act to defend its key interests. What they have critiqued, rather, is the
idea that establishing credibility requires regular demonstrations of American resolve, particularly through the use of
force. Some scholars have noted, for instance, that concerns with resolve and credibility led the United States to undertake policies—such as
escalation in Vietnam—that incurred losses far out of proportion to the reputational gains.

16 Others claimed to find little evidence that past demonstrations of resolve actually mattered in
affecting opponents’ calculations of credibility. In one widely read study, Daryl Press contended that Western
appeasement of Hitler at Munich had little or nothing to do with his subsequent aggression, and that Nikita
Khrushchev’s repeated climb-downs on Berlin and other issues in the late 1950s had scant impact on Western perceptions of his resolve.17
Press and other scholars argued that other variables—the balance of capabilities and the perceived importance of the interests at stake—were
paramount in determining perceptions of credibility.18 Other scholars have made similar arguments, claiming that “politicians’ persistent belief
in the value of reputation for resolve is merely a cult of reputation,” or even, in an extreme form, that “credibility is an illusion—and an
exceptionally dangerous illusion at that.”19

Such doubts may be most prevalent within the ivory tower, and relatively few policymakers would
share academics’ skepticism about the importance of credibility and demonstrations of resolve .20 Yet it is
worth nothing that a similar skepticism has emerged in some surprising quarters of the policymaking community of late. As Jeffrey Goldberg
wrote in 2016, then-President Obama believed that the U.S. foreign policy community “makes a fetish of ‘credibility’—particularly the sort of
credibility purchased with force.” As the president acidly remarked, “Dropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs
on someone is just about the worst reason to use force.”21

It would require an extended essay to adjudicate these debates regarding credibility and its constituent parts. Yet three key points can briefly
be made here. First, and most important, the more extreme critiques of credibility and U.S. policymakers’ preoccupation
therewith are badly overstated. For one thing, accepting that credibility is an illusion, or that past behavior has no impact
on perceptions of an actor’s subsequent credibility, requires accepting that normal rules of human interaction—in
which past behavior is crucial to expectations about future behavior—are simply suspended in the
international arena. If a person reneges on a commitment, his peers and interlocutors will likely doubt his sincerity with respect to other
commitments; there is no logical reason to suspect that similar patterns do not prevail in international
politics. For another thing, deeming credibility an illusion requires accepting that virtually all U.S. officials
who think otherwise—in part because they know, from experience, that U.S. allies as well as adversaries are constantly assessing
recent American behavior in hopes of divining what Washington will do in the next crisis— are simply mistaken. Not least, there
is now considerable historical analysis and evidence illustrating that credibility does matter and past
actions do indeed affect reputations. Scholars have convincingly argued that:

• Ronald Reagan’s decision not to retaliate meaningfully for Hezbollah’s attacks on the Marine barracks in
Beirut in 1983 had a corrosive effect on how other terrorists and state sponsors perceived U.S. intentions. When
U.S. officials threatened Syrian president Hafez al-Assad with retribution if he did not cease supporting Hezbollah, for instance, Assad
replied that he did not credit American threats.22

• Conversely, the U.S. willingness to defend South Korea in 1950 influenced Soviet perceptions of
American resolve to resist further East bloc military advances . As William Stueck writes in his definitive history of
the Korean War, “Stalin’s immediate successors learned the lesson that to arouse the United States from a slumber through blatant
military action could prove a costly mistake. It would take more than a generation and a new group of leaders before the Soviet
Union would run a repeat performance.”23

• The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam did encourage additional East bloc challenges in the Third World—in
Angola, for instance—by signaling a declining U.S. willingness to act decisively to head off Soviet and Cuban advances in peripheral
areas.24
 • John F. Kennedy’s
perceived irresolution in handling the Bay of Pigs invasion encouraged
Khrushchev to bully him at the Vienna Summit in 1961. His actions there and in response to the construction of the
Berlin Wall also influenced the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba a year later.25

• Early U.S.
irresolution and failure to make good on coercive threats in dealing with the Balkan crisis in the early
1990s led actors in that crisis to doubt subsequent U.S. promises and threats . Later shows of resolve, by
contrast, had a constructive impact on the subsequent behavior of those actors. “Whenever US officials failed to respond to probes
and challenges, violence escalated. When resolve was demonstrated through mobilizing military forces or airstrikes, escalation was
controlled.”26

• Tepid U.S. responses to al-Qaeda attacks during the 1990s, along with the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia following
the deaths of less than 20 American servicemen in 1993, encouraged Osama bin Laden to escalate his strikes in the
belief that the United States would react to a shocking attack on the homeland by withdrawing from the greater Middle East.27

Moreover, and notwithstanding the academic skepticism discussed above, there

has also emerged a growing body of social
science literature in recent years indicating that the extreme critiques of credibility are unpersuasive,
because past actions and demonstrations of resolve do influence subsequent expectations. Studies have
shown that:

• “States
that have honored their commitments in the past are more likely to find alliance
partners in the future. Conversely, alliance violations decrease the likelihood of future alliance formation.”28

• Backing down in a dispute with a given challenger increases the likelihood that the challenger
“will escalate the current dispute,” whereas an effective response that forces the challenger to back down decreases
the likelihood that the challenger will subsequently escalate. In other words, retreating now encourages more severe challenges
later; resisting now can have the opposite effect.29

• “A defender that enjoys superiority in military resources but does not use force in some manner in a current conflict
is at a higher risk of experiencing a re-challenge than is a defender that enjoys military superiority and uses it in
some.” In essence, demonstrations of resolve through the use of force are important in shaping the future
behavior of adversaries.
30

• “Behavior
in earlier conflicts . . . becomes the basis for inferring likely behavior in response to
subsequent challenges. . . . A country that yielded in a dispute in the previous year is more than two and one-half times as
likely to be challenged than is a country that has not yielded in the previous ten years.”31

In short, there is good reason to think that credibility and resolve are more than mere figments of
policymakers’ imaginations.

History is on our side – once credibility is hurt, other reassurances don’t matter
Bleek 14 Philipp C., Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program
(Monterey Institute of International Studies – Middlebury College), Fellow at the James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 58.3, 4/14, DOI: 10.1177/0022002713509050, SAGE)

While the South Koreans secretly acquired components for an indigenous nuclear weapon capability, US actions
continued to undercut the credibility of the US commitment. Following Gerald Ford’s assumption of the
Presidency, the United States announced the Pacific Doctrine, which advocated a burden-sharing approach similar to the
Guam Doctrine. WhilePresident Ford provided assurances that the United States would not continue scaling
down its troop levels in the ROK, South Korean policy makers were uncertain whether US domestic politics
might lead to changes in that position (Siler 1998). As a result of this uncertainty surrounding the
credibility of the US commitment, South Korean decision makers continued to develop nuclear weapons
as a way to ensure the country’s security (MacDonald 1988). Indeed, South Korean president Park told the Washington
Post that his country would actively pursue the nuclear option if the United States withdrew its nuclear umbrella
(Ha 1978).

Forward presence means nothing if reliability is undermined by commitment

Elaine Bunn 10, Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense
University, “The Future of US Extended Deterrence”, PERSPECTIVES ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE, p. 37
Thus, one aspect of reassurance rests on how well allies believe  the United States can deter actions against
those allies’ interests. But just as the United States is reexamining deterrence, it must consider the requirements of extended
deterrence in the evolving security environment: how to assure allies and friends that the United States will meet its security commitments to
them, so they will not feel the need to develop their own nuclear weapons or other capabilities that the United States would view as
counterproductive. While US views on deterrence are evolving, so may those of US allies–including whom they are concerned about deterring,
as well as the role of offenses and defenses, and the role of US capabilities versus their own capabilities to underpin deterrence. To be sure,
extended deterrence is more than just extended nuclear deterrence. US conventional
capabilities play an important – and
increasing – role in extended deterrence. Defenses, particularly missile defenses, have gained acceptance, even enthusiasm,
among some allies as a complementary part of extended deterrence ( witness the emphasis and resources Japan is putting
into the Aegis/SM-3 system and Patriot, or the desires of the Polish government for US missile defense deployments).
Forward military presence and force projection capabilities continue to help the United States extend
deterrence to allies. Beyond just military capabilities, extended deterrence broadly understood rests on
the overall health of the alliance relationship, including shared interests, dialogue, consultation, and
coordinated defense planning and exercises. In addition, the United States’ reputation as a security
guarantor is shaped by trends in US behavior in the international arena. Historically many allies have been conflicted on this–
on the one hand, fearing abandonment (wondering if the United States will really be there when needed, illustrated by the age-old question,
“Would the U.S really trade New York for Berlin (or Los Angeles for Tokyo, or Chicago for Ankara)?”); and on the other, fearing entrapment or
entanglement (getting pulled into situations or conflicts against the ally’s interests). To
be assured, allies need to
have confidence in American judgment and reliability; if not, specific capabilities – nuclear or otherwise
– do not really matter.