THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189626. August 20, 2018.]

GREGORIO AMOGUIS and TITO AMOGUIS, petitioners, vs.

CONCEPCION BALLADO and MARY GRACE BALLADO
LEDESMA, and ST. JOSEPH REALTY, LTD., respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint is conferred by law.

It cannot be lost through waiver or estoppel. It can be raised at any time in
the proceedings, whether during trial or on appeal. 1 The edict in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy 2 is not an exception to the rule on jurisdiction. A court that
does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case will not acquire
jurisdiction because of estoppel. 3 Rather, the edict in Tijam must be
appreciated as a waiver of a party's right to raise jurisdiction based on the
doctrine of equity. It is only when the circumstances in Tijam are present
that a waiver or an estoppel in questioning jurisdiction is appreciated. 4
The unique circumstances in Tijam are present in this case. Indeed, as
the petitioners in this case belatedly argue, the Regional Trial Court did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. However, under
the doctrine in Tijam, petitioners cannot now raise lack of jurisdiction as they
have waived their right to do so. Estoppel by laches has set in. Petitioners
did not question the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court during trial and
on appeal. It is only before this Court, 22 long years after the Complaint was
filed, that petitioners raised the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.
On November 24, 1969, Francisco Ballado (Francisco) and Concepcion
Ballado (Concepcion) (collectively, the Ballado Spouses) entered into
Contract Nos. 5(M) 5 and 6(M) 6 with owner and developer St. Joseph Realty,
Ltd. (St. Joseph Realty) to buy on installment parcels of land, which were
designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and were located in Block No. 1, Dadiangas
Heights Subdivision, General Santos City. Lot No. 1 had an area of 411
square meters, and Lot No. 2 covered 402 square meters. 7 The Ballado
Spouses initially paid a total of P500.00 for the lots, and had to pay P107.13
8 and P97.15 9 per month for Lot Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, both for 180

months starting on December 30, 1969. 10

St. Joseph Realty characterized the contracts as contracts to sell 11 and
provided for automatic rescission and cancellation, thus: cSEDTC

3) This contract shall be considered automatically rescinded

and cancelled and no further force and effect, upon failure of the
VENDEE to pay when due, three (3) consecutive monthly installments
or to comply with any of the terms and conditions hereof, in which
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 case the VENDORS shall have the right to resell the said parcel of
land to any person or purchaser, as if this contract has never been
entered into. In such a case[,] as cancellation of this contract, all the
amounts paid in accordance with the agreement together with all the
improvements made on the premises shall be considered as rents
paid for the use and occupation of the above mentioned premises and
as payment for the damages suffered for the failure of the VENDEE to
fulfill his/her part of this agreement and the buyer hereby renounces
his/her right to demand or reclaim the return of the same and obliges
himself/herself to peacefully vacate the premises and deliver the
same to the VENDORS. 12
The Ballado Spouses amortized until 1979 when Crisanto Pinili (Pinili),
St. Joseph Realty's collector, refused to receive their payments. They erected
a small house made of light materials for their caretaker. Pinili informed
them that it was an eyesore and was against the rules of the subdivision. He
advised to suspend the payment for the lots, and directed the Ballado
Spouses to remove the small house before payments could continue. He also
promised to return and collect after he had put their records in order, but he
never did. Francisco informed St. Joseph Realty that the small house had
already been taken down, but Pinili still did not come to collect. 13
On February 17, 1987, the Ballado Spouses discovered that St. Joseph
Realty rescinded their contracts. 14 They found out that St. Joseph Realty had
sent written demands to pay to the address of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, and not to
their residence as declared in the contracts. 15 They were only able to
receive the last letter dated December 31, 1986 in January 1987 as it had
their home address handwritten beside the typewritten address of the lots.
16

Concepcion immediately wrote St. Joseph Realty to ask for

reconsideration. She enclosed a check for their remaining balance worth
P30,000.00. She was the payee of the check issued by her employer, P. I.
Enterprises. She borrowed money from P. I. Enterprises and indorsed the
check in favor of St. Joseph Realty. After six (6) months, St. Joseph Realty
returned the check to the Ballado Spouses. St. Joseph Realty claimed that it
only inadvertently received the check. 17
Meanwhile, on February 9, 1987, St. Joseph Realty sold Lot Nos. 1 and
2 to Epifanio Amoguis (Epifanio), 18 father of Gregorio Amoguis (Gregorio)
and Tito Amoguis (Tito) (collectively, the Amoguis Brothers). 19 Epifanio paid
P56,280.00 for one lot and P52,650.00 for the other. 20 The Amoguis
Brothers then occupied the lots. 21 On August 18, 1987, titles were issued in
the Amoguis Brothers' names. 22
Francisco confronted the Amoguis Brothers when he saw that the
barbed fences, which he had installed around the lots, were taken down.
Epifanio told him that he bought the lots from St. Joseph Realty. Thereafter,
the Amoguis Brothers took down Francisco's mango and chico trees. 23 SDAaTC

Compelled by these events, the Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for

damages, injunction with writ of preliminary injunction, mandatory
injunction, cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees on
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 December 23, 1987. 24 They also prayed for a temporary restraining order to
enjoin the Amoguis Brothers from erecting walls around the lots. 25
St. Joseph Realty filed its Answer. 26 It was its affirmative defense that
the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and that
jurisdiction was properly vested in the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. 27 The Amoguis Brothers, on the other hand, filed their Answer
with Cross-Claim against St. Joseph Realty, and Counterclaim against the
Ballado Spouses. 28 The parties did not reach an amicable settlement. The
case was archived in 1989 without prejudice, pending the submission of a
settlement by the parties. Five (5) years later, on April 8, 1994, the case was
revived upon motion by the Ballado Spouses. 29
After numerous postponements, on February 7, 1996, the Ballado
Spouses were finally able to present their evidence in chief. 30 They testified
and presented their evidence, among which were receipts to prove
payments of installments, original copies of the contracts, the transmittal
letter of the P30,000.00 check to St. Joseph Realty, and the check. They also
presented St. Joseph Realty's rescission letter with its envelope, addressed
to the lots and not to their residence, bearing "first attempt, cannot be
located," "second attempt, cannot be located," and "third attempt, cannot
be located" written on it. 31
Finally, they presented as evidence Concepcion's February 21, 1987
reply letter asking for her remaining payables, 32 St. Joseph Realty's letter
acknowledging receipt of Concepcion's February 21, 1987 letter, documents
of sale of the lands from St. Joseph Realty to the Amoguis Brothers, and
Concepcion's September 12, 1987 letter to St. Joseph Realty, proving that
she did not know that the lands had already been sold to and titled under the
names of the Amoguis Brothers in August 1987. 33
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and
against St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs,
ordering —
1. Defendant St. Joseph to receive the sum of P30,000.00
from plaintiffs to fully pay the two residential lots;
2. To execute registrable deeds of sale in favor of plaintiffs
over the two parcels of land;
3. To pay plaintiffs —
a. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
b. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; acEHCD

c. P30,000.00 in concept of attorney's fees;

d. and the cost of suit.
4. Declaring Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25862 and
T-29295 in the names of Gregorio Amoguis and Tito Amoguis,
respectively, NULL and VOID, and ordering the Register of Deeds to
cancel said titles;

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 5. Ordering St. Joseph to refund the Amoguises the total
sum of P108,730.00 with interest at 6% per annum from February
1987 until fully paid; and
6. Ordering the Amoguises to remove all their
improvements from the land, to vacate the same and deliver
possession thereof to plaintiffs upon presentation of new certificates
of title in their names.
SO ORDERED. 34

Based on the preponderance of evidence, the Regional Trial Court

concluded that the Ballado Spouses proved their desire to complete their
payment, and that it was Pinili who refused to receive their payment
because of the small house erected on the lands for their caretaker. It also
ruled that based on evidence, St. Joseph Realty never made attempts to
collect from them. St. Joseph Realty's notices of rescission were deliberately
sent to the wrong address of the lands involved, and not to the Ballado
Spouses' home address. 35
The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to St. Joseph Realty's
allegation that it only inadvertently received the check for P30,000.00. It
was clear that St. Joseph Realty was already negotiating the sale of the lands
to Epifanio when it received Concepcion's check. When St. Joseph Realty saw
that it could sell the lots for higher prices, it returned the check to
Concepcion. As regards the Amoguis Brothers, the Regional Trial Court ruled
that they were in bad faith when they bought the lots. Epifanio did not deny
that Francisco informed him that they were in the process of completing
payment. Despite this, Epifanio still cut down Francisco's trees and set up his
own fence. 36
Finally, the Regional Trial Court noted that the Ballado Spouses failed
to file a formal offer of evidence. However, this was not detrimental to their
case as some of these documents were admitted by St. Joseph Realty,
including the contracts to sell and the letters that it sent to the Ballado
Spouses through the wrong address. 37
Only the Amoguis Brothers timely filed their appeal brief. Since St.
Joseph Realty failed to file its appeal brief, the Court of Appeals considered it
to have abandoned its appeal. 38 SDHTEC

The Amoguis Brothers argued that the Regional Trial Court should have
considered valid the rescission or cancellation of the contract to sell, and
that they should not have been declared as buyers in bad faith. They
contended that the evidence presented by the Ballado Spouses should not
have been considered as it was not formally offered. They averred that in
case there was no valid rescission or cancellation of contract, St. Joseph
Realty should have been ordered to pay them the cost of their
improvements, attorney's fees, litigation expense, and moral and exemplary
damages. 39 They did not raise the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.
On September 26, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, 40
affirming the Regional Trial Court February 28, 2001 Decision 41 with
modification:
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 WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification. We uphold the findings of the
court a quo nullifying the certificates of title issued to the Amoguises.
The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees plus cost of
the suit in favor of the Ballados is likewise affirmed with the
modification that such should be paid solely by St. Joseph and the
Ballados are likewise ordered to execute an absolute deed of sale
upon full payment by the Ballados of the deficiency in the purchase
price of the subdivision lots. The amount adjudged to be paid by St.
Joseph to the Amoguises should however, be modified as the same
should only be P108,930.00. The Amoguises' other monetary claims
are denied for want of basis.
SO ORDERED. 42

Though not raised, the Court of Appeals discussed at the outset the
issue of jurisdiction. Since the Ballado Spouses wanted St. Joseph Realty to
comply with the provisions of the contracts to sell, the Complaint was for
specific performance. The subject matter of the case involved subdivision
lots. Therefore, jurisdiction was lodged with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board:
Such being the case, the court a quo should not have taken
cognizance of the case as it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB, for brevity) which exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction over such matters pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 entitled "Regulating the sale of Subdivision Lots and
Condominiums, providing penalties for violations thereof." The
provision states:
SECTION 3. National Housing Authority. — The
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this
Decree.
This jurisdiction was later delineated and clarified by
Presidential Decree No. 1344 which provides: AScHCD

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate

the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices ;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

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 Moreover, the prefatory statement of Presidential Decree No.
957 which Presidential Decree No. 1344 sought to expand states:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and
obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and another similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude
also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances,
and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales
of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value[.]
We may likewise add that litigants with cases cognizable by the
HLURB cannot directly resort to judicial review as Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1344 additionally states:
SECTION 2. The decision of the National Housing
Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. It is
appealable only to the President of the Philippines
and in the event the appeal is filed and the
decision is not reversed and/or amended within a
period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed
affirmed. Proof of the appeal of the decision must be
furnished the National Housing Authority. 43 (Emphasis in
the original, citations omitted)
AcICHD

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that since neither St. Joseph
Realty nor the Amoguis Brothers raised the issue of jurisdiction before the
Regional Trial Court, they must be considered estopped from raising it on
appeal. 44
On the issue that the Ballado Spouses did not formally offer their
evidence, the Court of Appeals cited Vda. De Oñate v. Court of Appeals. 45
That case ruled that evidence not formally offered may still be appreciated
by a trial court provided that "first, [it] must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, [it] must have been incorporated in
the records of the case." 46 The Court of Appeals cited People of the
Philippines v. Alicante , 47 where this Court ruled that when a party fails to
offer the purpose of a witness' testimony, the opposing party has the duty to
immediately object "at the time when the victim was called to the witness
stand, without proper explanation thereof or at anytime before the
prosecution rested its case." 48 In this case, St. Joseph Realty and the
Amoguis Brothers failed to timely enter their objection.
As to the admissibility of documentary evidence over which no formal
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 offer of evidence was made, the Court of Appeals reviewed the transcript of
stenographic notes and noted that of the documents which Concepcion
identified, only the contracts to sell were attached. The Regional Trial Court
should have considered only these documents as documentary evidence for
the Ballado Spouses. 49
As to the rescission of contracts to sell, the Court of Appeals sustained
that it was improperly and unlawfully done by St. Joseph Realty. It cited
Palay, Inc. v. Clave, 50 where this Court ruled that while the suspensive
condition of full payment of purchase price has not been complied with,
there must, at the very least, be a notice to the defaulting buyer of the
rescission. With the passage of Republic Act No. 6552, also known as the
Maceda Law, the manner to rescind or cancel a contract to sell or a contract
of sale has been codified. Rescission or cancellation shall take place 30 days
from receipt of the buyer of a notarized notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission. 51 The buyer must also be paid the full cash surrender value. 52
The Court of Appeals likewise cited Siska Development Corporation v. Office
of the President, 53 which provided that the Maceda Law shall apply to
contracts entered into before its effectivity. Thus, even if the Maceda Law
was passed close to three (3) years after the contracts to sell were executed,
it still must apply to them. 54
The Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the Regional Trial
Court. St. Joseph Realty presented a notarized demand of rescission during
trial. However, the Ballado Spouses had always insisted that they never
received any notice of rescission from St. Joseph Realty. Furthermore, St.
Joseph Realty did not offer to pay the cash surrender value of the payments
they had made. Thus, the requirements for a valid rescission under the
Maceda Law were not met. 55
The Court of Appeals stated that since St. Joseph Realty did not validly
rescind the contracts to sell, it had no legal basis to sell the properties to the
Amoguis Brothers. It should make a refund of the purchase price to them,
with a 6% per annum interest rate reckoned from February 1988 until fully
paid. 56 TAIaHE

Finally, the Court of Appeals reconsidered the Regional Trial Court's

finding of bad faith on the part of the Amoguis Brothers, who merely relied
on the misrepresentation of St. Joseph Realty that the properties were
already abandoned by the Ballado Spouses. The Amoguis Brothers only
discovered the Ballado Spouses' subsisting claim after they had already
purchased the properties. The Court of Appeals ordered that only St. Joseph
Realty should pay damages to the Ballado Spouses. 57
The Amoguis Brothers filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its August 7, 2009 Resolution. 58
Hence, the Amoguis Brothers filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of the Court of
Appeals September 26, 2008 Decision and August 7, 2009 Resolution. 59
The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:
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 First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction was
lost by waiver or estoppel;
Second, whether or not testimonial and documentary pieces of
evidence which are not formally offered may be appreciated by a trial court;
and
Finally, whether or not petitioners Gregorio Amoguis and Tito Amoguis
are buyers in good faith and have preferential right to Lot Nos. 1 and 2.

Petitioners argue that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was
timely raised by St. Joseph Realty in its Answer with Counterclaims. Even
assuming that it was never raised, jurisdiction is a question of law that
cannot be lost through waiver or estoppel, and may be raised at any time,
even during appeal. Further, if there was a remedy under the law, that
remedy must be exhausted first before the parties come to court. The
administrative remedy should have been sought before the Housing and
Land Use and Regulatory Board, and then appealed to the Office of the
President. 60 The Ballado Spouses counter that St. Joseph Realty never
moved that its affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction be heard; instead, it
actively participated in the proceedings together with the Amoguis Brothers.
61 cDHAES

Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of

the Regional Trial Court. Laches had already set in.
As the Court of Appeals discussed motu proprio, Presidential Decree
No. 957 instituted the National Housing Authority as the administrative body
with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the trade and business of subdivision
and condominium developments. It provided for mechanisms where entities
can apply for licenses to develop and sell subdivision lots or condominiums
with the intent of curbing fraud instigated on purchasers of real estate. A
performance bond is also required of these entities to guarantee their
undertaking under the subdivision and condominium plans. For greater
transparency, their subdivision and condominium plans must likewise be
registered. The following transactions, however, were beyond the
administrative body's regulatory supervision, and were exempt from license
and performance bond requirements:
(a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of
land among co-owners and co-heirs.
(b) Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original
purchaser thereof and any subsequent sale of the same lot.
(c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for
the account of a mortgagee in the ordinary course of business when
necessary to liquidate a bona fide debt. 62
Presidential Decree No. 1344 63 was later on enacted to add to the
National Housing Authority's jurisdiction. It was no longer just a licensing
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 body for subdivision and condominium developers. Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1344 gave authority to the National Housing Authority to hear
and decide cases:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 provided that appeals from
decisions of the National Housing Authority shall be made to the President of
the Philippines within 15 days from receipt. ASEcHI

In between the approval of Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1344, the
Maceda Law was approved. 64
Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's or tribunal's power to hear and
determine cases of a general class or type relating to specific subject
matters. 65 This jurisdiction is conferred by law. 66 To determine a court's or
an administrative body's jurisdiction over a subject matter, allegations in the
complaint must be examined. 67 The nature of the action, as reflected in the
allegations in the complaint, and the reliefs sought determine jurisdiction
over the subject matter. 68 It is immaterial whether the claimant has a right
to the relief sought. 69
Presidential Decree No. 957 was approved on July 12, 1976, 11 years
before the Ballado Spouses filed their complaint. This means that the law
mandating the jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority, which later on
became the House and Land Use Regulatory Board, 70 had long been in
effect when petitioners filed their Answer and participated in trial court
proceedings. It behooved them to raise the issue of jurisdiction then,
especially since St. Joseph Realty, their co-respondent, raised it in its Answer
albeit superficially and without any discussion.
In their Complaint, the Ballado Spouses alleged that the properties
already sold to them by St. Joseph Realty were sold to the Amoguis Brothers
for a better price. They sought the cancellation of the titles issued to
petitioners as a result of their subsisting contracts to sell, which were neither
rescinded nor annulled. They argued that when St. Joseph Realty received
their check for P30,000.00, they had fully paid the purchase price. As against
St. Joseph Realty, they sought damages and specific performance. They
based their claim of full payment when St. Joseph Realty accepted the check
for P30,000.00. Upon St. Joseph Realty's acceptance, the Ballado Spouses
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 were able to fully comply with the terms of the contracts to sell. Without any
valid rescission, St. Joseph Realty was bound to carry out its obligations
under the contracts. As against petitioners, the Ballado Spouses sought
injunction and the cancellation of titles issued under their names. The
Amoguis Brothers were beneficiaries of St. Joseph Realty's breach of the
contracts to sell. They had no authority under the law to occupy the
properties and have them titled under their names.
According to Presidential Decree No. 1344, exclusive original
jurisdiction for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman is lodged with the National Housing
Authority.
In Antipolo Realty v. National Housing Authority, 71 this Court ruled that
the National Housing Authority, and not the regular courts, have initial
jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the subdivision
developer and of the buyer under a contract to sell.
Solid Homes v. Payawal 72 stressed that the jurisdiction of National
Housing Authority excluded that of the regular courts even in a concurrent
capacity. The respondent in that case, Teresita Payawal, argued that regular
courts had jurisdiction based on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 73 a law passed
after Presidential Decree No. 1344. This Court ruled otherwise:
The language of [Section 1, Presidential Decree 1344],
especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that
"exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the
private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the
National Housing Authority. ITAaHc

xxx xxx xxx

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and
PD No. 1344 the special law.
The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction
because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also
unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent
jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over the
complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power
are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of
this section, as we see it, is to reserve to the aggrieved party such
other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution
for the act complained of under the Revised Penal Code. 74 (Citation
omitted)
Solid Homes cemented the National Housing Authority's jurisdiction to
hear and decide claims for damages and attorney's fees incidental to
unsound business practices, claims for refund, and for specific performance
against subdivision lot or condominium unit owners, developers, dealers,
brokers, or salesmen. This Court ruled that the qualifier "and any other
claims" in Section 1 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1344 meant so. In Solid
Homes, this Court also ruled that as an administrative body, the National
Housing Authority possessed specialized competence and experience to
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 determine these allied matters. 75

In the years that followed, this Court tackled the issue of whether the
Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board's jurisdiction included the
cancellation of land titles issued to third parties due to the subdivision
developer's or owner's unsound business practices. Fajardo v. Hon. Bautista
76 ruled that it did. Apart from unsound business practices, the cancellation

of titles issued to third parties also involved claims for specific performance
against subdivision developers and owners. In Fajardo, the claimants sought
that the developer perform its obligations under the contract to sell, and the
cancellation of titles were but incidental.
These doctrines have been observed by this Court even in recent
cases. Presently, jurisprudence still dictates that when a buyer wants to
compel a developer to conform with the terms of the contract it executed,
jurisdiction lies with the Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board. 77
The Ballado Spouses' rights and interests lie not just as buyers of any
property, but buyers of subdivision lots from a subdivision developer. From
the circumstances between St. Joseph Realty and the Ballado Spouses, there
is no doubt that the then National Housing Authority had jurisdiction to
determine the parties' obligations under the contracts to sell and the
damages that may have arisen from their breach. The Ballado Spouses'
Complaint should have been filed before it. The National Housing Authority
also had jurisdiction over the injunction and annulment of titles sought
against petitioners as these were incidental to St. Joseph Realty's unsound
business practices.
Where there is no jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is
rendered null and void. A void judgment has absolutely no legal effect, "by
which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which
neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all
claims flowing out of are void." 78 Because there is in effect no judgment, res
judicata does not apply to commencing another action despite previous
adjudications already made. 79 CHTAIc

II

However, this Court has discussed with great nuance the legal principle
enunciated in Tijam. Estoppel by laches bars a party from invoking lack of
jurisdiction in an unjustly belated manner especially when it actively
participated during trial.
Estoppel by laches has its origins in equity. It prevents a party from
presenting his or her claim "when, by reason of abandonment and
negligence, he [or she] allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
[it]." 80 It is further elaborated by this Court in Regalado v. Go, 81 thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
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 warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it." 82 (Citation omitted)
In estoppel by laches, a claimant has a right that he or she could
otherwise exercise if not for his or her delay in asserting it. This delay in the
exercise of the right unjustly misleads the court and the opposing party of its
waiver. Thus, to claim it belatedly given the specific circumstances of the
case would be unjust.
I n Tijam, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog (the Ti jam
Spouses) filed a collection case against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
and Lucia Baguio (the Sibonghanoy Spouses). The Court of First Instance of
Cebu issued a writ of attachment over the Sibonghanoy Spouses' properties.
It was dissolved afterwards as the Sibonghanoy Spouses and the Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Manila Surety), their surety, filed a
counterbond. The decision on the collection case became final and
executory. As collection could not be made against the Sibongh anoy
Spouses, the Tijam Spouses tried to satisfy the judgment against the surety's
bond. Manila Surety opposed and argued that no demand was made on it.
The Court of First Instance ruled in the surety's favor. However, demand on
the surety was eventually made, and the Court of First Instance issued a writ
of execution. Again, Manila Surety opposed and tried to quash the writ of
execution. It argued that a summary hearing was required before the writ
should issue. Upon the Court of First Instance's denial to quash, Manila
Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals. It assigned errors committed by the
Court of First Instance in the issuance of the writ of execution but did not
raise the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of First
Instance's orders to execute. After Manila Surety received a copy of the
Court of Appeals decision, it asked for additional time to file its motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted an extension. Instead of filing
a motion for reconsideration, the surety filed a motion to dismiss raising, for
the first time, the Court of First Instance's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. As the amount involved was only P1,908.00, inferior
courts, and not the Court of First Instance, had exclusive original jurisdiction
over the collection case. This was mandated by Republic Act No. 296, the
Judiciary Act of 1948, which came into effect a month after the Tijam
Spouses filed their complaint before the Court of First Instance. 83 EATCcI

This Court ruled that the surety could no longer question the Court of
First Instance's jurisdiction over the subject matter due to estoppel by
laches. It premised that since Manila Surety actively participated during trial
and prevailed; invoking the Court of First Instance's lack of jurisdiction was a
last ditch effort to absolve itself from the effects of an unfavorable judgment
on appeal. On the 15-year delay before the issue on jurisdiction was raised,
this Court ruled that it could have and should have been raised earlier. The
surety's failure to do so was negligence on its part, "warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it." 84 Tijam set a precedent to stop legal machinations
where jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the parties have
already gone through long years of litigation. It was not so much an issue of
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 time than it was an issue of fairness. Though conferred by law, fairness and
equity must temper the parties' bravado to raise jurisdiction when they have
participated in proceedings in the lower courts or when an unfavorable
judgment against them has been rendered.
The following circumstances were present in Tijam: first, there was a
statutory right in favor of the claimant. Manila Surety had the right to
question the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction because it was the inferior
courts that had authority to try cases that involved the amount claimed.
Second, the statutory right was not invoked. Manila Surety participated in
the trial and execution stages. It even sought relief from the Court of
Appeals without questioning the Court of First Instance's jurisdiction. Third,
an unreasonable length of time had lapsed before the claimant raised the
issue of jurisdiction. It was only after the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court
of First Instance's order of execution did Manila Surety pursue the issue of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over collections for the amount involved was already
determined by law a month before the case was filed. Fifteen years had
lapsed before the surety pointed this out. Fourth, the claimant actively
participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court without
jurisdiction. The unreasonable length of time was, therefore, inexcusable as
the claimant was apprised of the prevailing law, as well as all stages of the
proceeding.
Calimlim v. Hon. Ramirez 85 unequivocally ruled that it is only when the
exceptional instances in Tijam are present should estoppel by laches apply
over delayed claims:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may
not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel. 86 DHITCc

Calimlim clarified the additional requirement that for estoppel by

laches to be appreciated against a claim for jurisdiction, there must be an
ostensible showing that the claimant had "knowledge or consciousness of
the facts upon which it is based." 87
Figueroa v. People of the Philippines 88 framed the exceptional
character of Tijam:
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional
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 circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule
enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in
Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always
been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's
absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases
similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibong hanoy. Indeed, the fact
that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court
does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over
the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not
by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the
person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does
not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not
suffer any harm. 89 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Thus, Tijam will only apply when given the circumstances of a case,
allowing the belated objection to the jurisdiction of the court will additionally
cause irreparable damages, and therefore, injustice to the other party that
relied on the forum and the implicit waiver.
In Tijam, this Court ruled that long delay in raising lack of jurisdiction is
unfair to the party pleading laches because he or she was misled into
believing that this defense would no longer be pursued. A delay of 15 years
in raising questions on subject matter jurisdiction was appreciated by this
Court as estoppel by laches.
I n Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin , 90 this Court recognized
the unfairness in allowing a party who sought affirmative relief from a
tribunal and invoked its jurisdiction to later disavow the same jurisdiction
upon passage of an adverse ruling. It ruled that raising lack of jurisdiction
over a subject matter a little under a year since a complaint is filed does not
amount to laches. cEaSHC

I n Figueroa, this Court observed the injustice caused to the party

pleading laches. Restoration of and reparation towards the party may no
longer be accomplished due to the changes in his or her circumstances.
Laches, however, was not appreciated as it was a mere four (4) years since
trial began that the petitioner in that case raised the issue of jurisdiction on
appeal.
I n Bernardo v. Heirs of Villegas, 91 this Court identified the propensity
of litigants who, to exhaust the time and resources of their opponents, will
plead lack of jurisdiction only when an unfavorable decision is obtained in
order to re-litigate the case. The delay of 10 years in raising jurisdictional
issues in that case was appreciated as laches.
In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when:
(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
(2) the statutory right was not invoked;
(3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant
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 raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought
affirmative relief from the court without jurisdiction;
(5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which
forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction;
(6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied
on the forum and the claimant's implicit waiver.
Tijam applies in this case. The allegations, determinative of subject
matter jurisdiction, were apparent on the face of the Complaint. The law that
determines jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority had been in place
for more than a decade when the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty
raised lack of jurisdiction in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative relief
from the Regional Trial Court and actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings. Therefore, there was no valid reason for petitioners to raise the
issue of jurisdiction only now before this Court.

III

On the issue of the admissibility of the Ballado Spouses' testimonial

and documentary evidence, the Amoguis Brothers argue that it was unfair to
fault them for not objecting when the former's counsel started his direct
examination without offering the purpose of the witnesses' testimonies. Had
they done so, it would alert the Ballado Spouses' counsel of the defect. Rule
132, Sections 34 and 35 of the Rules of Court are mandatory, regardless if
an opposing party timely objected. The jurisprudence relied upon by the
Court of Appeals is not applicable in this case as People of the Philippines v.
Alicante 92 was a rape case and it was the 13-year-old victim's testimony
that was not offered. Meanwhile, this is a civil case. In Alicante, there was
already a sworn statement made by the victim before she took the stand; in
this case, only Francisco verified the Complaint, while Concepcion identified
the documents and testified on their claims. The Regional Trial Court judge
could not have known the purpose of Concepcion's testimony. 93 The Ballado
Spouses, on the other hand, reiterated that timely objections should have
been made. 94 CTIEac

Rule 132, Sections 34 to 36 of the Rules of Court govern the manner of

offering and objecting to evidence:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which
the evidence is offered must be specified.
Section 35. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a
witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to
testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be
done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
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 Section 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally
must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three
(3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed
by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Following these provisions, a witness' testimony must be offered at the
start, when he or she takes the stand for the first time and before questions
are propounded to him or her. Documentary or object evidence, on the other
hand, must be orally offered after the presentation of a party's witnesses
unless the court orders or allows that a written formal offer is filed.
All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the court cannot
consider them. 95 This rule ensures that judges will carry out their
constitutional mandate to render decisions that clearly state the facts of
cases and the applicable laws. 96 Judgments must be based "only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit." 97 This rule also affords
parties their right to due process by examining the evidence presented by
their opponent, and to object to its presentation when warranted. 98 SaCIDT

However, testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely

objected to by an opposing party may be still be considered by the court.
The purpose of offering a witness' testimony is for the court to expertly
assess whether questions propounded are relevant and material, and if the
witness is competent to answer. It is to aid the court in ruling over objections
made by opposing counsel. Catuira v. Court of Appeals 99 was instructive:
The petition is devoid of merit. The reason for requiring that evidence
be formally introduced is to enable the court to rule intelligently upon
the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a general
rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and
competency. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by
counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the
latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere privilege which
can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the
earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak
may operate as a waiver of objections.
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the
questioned testimony when private respondent was called to the
witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to
object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection
became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was
called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the
proponent. Most apt is the observation of the appellate court:
While it is true that the prosecution failed to offer in
evidence the testimony of the complaining witness upon
calling her to testify and that it was only after her
testimony and after the petitioner moved that it be
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 stricken that the offer was made, the respondent Court
did not gravely err in not dismissing the case against the
petitioner on the ground invoked. For, she should have
objected to the testimony of the complaining witness
when it was not first offered upon calling her and should
not have waited in ambush after she had already finished
testifying. By so doing she did not save the time of the
Court in hearing the testimony of the witness that after all
according to her was inadmissible. And for her failure to
make known her objection at the proper time, the
procedural error or defect was waived. 100 (Citations
omitted)
Catuira also discussed that litigation is not a game of surprises. Rules
of procedure and evidence are in place to ensure the smooth and speedy
dispensation of cases. Where the opposing party belatedly raises the
technicality that the witnesses' testimonies were not formally offered to
"ambush" 101 the party presenting them, the court may not expunge or
strike them out. cHECAS

Under the rules, a timely objection is a remedy available to petitioners.

They waived their right to this remedy when they waited until the case was
submitted for resolution to do so.
The rules on examination of witnesses and objecting to them are not
separate for civil and criminal cases. A witness, whether in a criminal or civil
case, is presented to support and prove the allegations made by the party
presenting him or her. The witness must be competent, and his or her
testimony must be relevant and material. Whether the case is civil or
criminal, objection or failure to offer the testimony of a witness must be
made immediately. 102
As to the Ballado Spouses' documentary evidence, the Court of Appeals
was correct to consider only the contracts to sell. These were the only
documents attached to the written formal offer of evidence that they filed.
Hence, these documents should be considered as the only documentary
evidence formally offered. When a party fails to formally offer his or her
documentary or object evidence within a considerable period after the
presentation of witnesses, he or she is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to do so. 103 The party, therefore, as in this case, runs the risk of
weakening his or her claim or defense.

IV

Petitioners argue that they are buyers in good faith, as determined by

the Court of Appeals. As innocent purchasers, reconveyance is no longer a
feasible option against them especially since they have introduced a
multitude of improvements on the properties. They have occupied the land
since 1987. 104 According to the Ballado Spouses, the Amoguis Brothers
never denied that they were buyers in bad faith. They testified that they told
Epifanio that they had bought the lands as the latter was destroying the
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 fences they had put up and cut down the trees they had planted. Despite
protests from the Ballado Spouses, petitioners continued introducing
improvements over the properties. 105
In their Reply, petitioners argued that the finding of good faith by the
Court of Appeals can no longer be disturbed by the Ballado Spouses as they
did not appeal the Court of Appeals September 26, 2008 Decision. 106 AHDacC

A buyer in good faith is one who purchases and pays fair price for a
property without notice that another has an interest over or right to it. 107 If
a land is registered and is covered by a certificate of title, any person may
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title, and he or she is not obliged
to go beyond the four (4) corners of the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. 108 This rule does not apply, however,
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when
the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. 109
(Citation omitted)
The Regional Trial Court ruled that petitioners were in bad faith
because they did not deny Francisco's testimony that he had informed them
of his ownership when they occupied the properties. Despite this, petitioners
continued to make improvements on the lands. 110 The Court of Appeals, on
the other hand, made a conflicting finding. It ruled that it was St. Joseph
Realty that made representations to the Amoguis Brothers and assured them
that the previous buyers had abandoned their purchase of the properties. It
appreciated that the Amoguis Brothers found out about the Ballado Spouses'
claim only after they had bought them. 111 Due to these conflicting findings,
this Court is compelled to review whether respondents were bad faith
purchasers. 112
It is incumbent upon a buyer to prove good faith should he or she
assert this status. This burden cannot be discharged by merely invoking the
legal presumption of good faith. 113 This Court rules that based on the
evidence on record, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Though they
were informed by Francisco on his claim to the properties only after their
purchase, it is undisputed from the records that mango and chico trees were
planted on the properties, and that they were cordoned off by barbed wires.
St. Joseph Realty also informed them that there were previous buyers, who
allegedly abandoned their purchase. To merely claim that they were buyers
in good faith, absent any proof, does not make the case for them.
The Regional Trial Court found that petitioners were in bad faith.
However, it did not order their solidary liability with St. Joseph Realty. It
ordered damages, attorney's fees, and the cost of suit to be borne by St.
Joseph Realty alone. The modification in this regard made by the Court of
Appeals was, therefore, superfluous.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' September 26, 2008 Decision and August 7, 2009 Resolution in CA-
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 G.R. CV No. 73758-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED. IDSEAH

SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, A.B. Reyes, Jr. and Gesmundo, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1. Magno v. People of the Philippines, 662 Phil. 726, 735 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third
Division], citing Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457 (2010) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].

2. 131 Phil. 556 (1968) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].

3. Magno v. People of the Philippines, 662 Phil. 726, 735 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third
Division], citing Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457 (2010) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].

4. See Republic v. Bantigue Development Corporation, 684 Phil. 192 (2012) [Per J.
Sereno, Second Division]; Frianela v. Banayad, Jr., 611 Phil. 765 (2009) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division].
5. Rollo , pp. 92-92-A.

6. Id. at 93-93-A.

7. Id. at 92 and 93.

8. Id. at 92.

9. Id. at 93.
10. Id. at 87.

11. Id. at 99.

12. Id. at 92-A.

13. Id. at 109.

14. Id. at 110.

15. Id. at 108.

16. Id. at 112.

17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 110.

20. Id.

21. Id. at 106-107.

22. Id. at 112.

23. Id. at 107.
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 24. Id. at 86-91.

25. Id. at 89.

26. Id. at 99-102.

27. Id. at 101.

28. Id. at 94-98.

29. Id. at 106.

30. Id. In the trial court's decision, it noted that trial commenced "after so many
postponements by the parties."
31. Id. at 107-108. A portion of St. Joseph Realty's rescission letter stated, "If you
desire to seek reconsideration of the notice of rescission, please see us in our
office within ten days from your receipt of this letter and file your request in
writing."

32. Id. at 108.

33. Id. at 109.

34. Id. at 114.

35. Id. at 111-3.

36. Id. at 112-113.

37. Id. at 113.

38. Id. at 16.

39. Id.

40. Id. at 56-83. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 73758-MIN, was penned
by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Michael P. Elbinias and Ruben C. Ayson of the Twenty-Third Division, Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.

41. Id. at 104-115. The Decision, docketed as Civil Case No. 3687, was penned by
Pairing Judge Jose S. Majaducon of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City.

42. Id. at 82-83.

43. Id. at 66-67.

44. Id. at 68.

45. 320 Phil. 344 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

46. Id. at 350.

47. 388 Phil. 233 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

48. Id. at 245.

49. Rollo , pp. 73-75.

50. 209 Phil. 523 (1983) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].

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 51. Rollo , pp. 77-78.
52. Rep. Act No. 6552, Sec. 3 provides:

  Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of

real estate on installment payments, including residential condominium
apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to
tenants under Republic Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty-three hundred eighty-nine, where
the buyer has paid at least two years of installments, the buyer is entitled to
the following rights in case he defaults in the payment of succeeding
installments:

  (a) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments due within
the total grace period earned by him, which is hereby fixed at the rate of one
month grace period for every one year of installment payments made:
Provided, That this right shall be exercised by the buyer only once in every
five years of the life of the contract and its extensions, if any.

  (b) If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty per cent
of the total payments made and, after five years of installments, an
additional five per cent every year but not to exceed ninety per cent of the
total payments made: Provided, That the actual cancellation of the contract
shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act
and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
  Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the
computation of the total number of installment payments made.

53. 301 Phil. 678 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].

54. Rollo , pp. 78-79.

55. Id. at 79.

56. Id. at 79-80.

57. Id. at 81-82.

58. Id. at 84-85. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr.
and concurred in by Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Ruben C.
Ayson of the Former Twenty-Third Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro
City.

59. Id. at 40.

60. Id. at 47.

61. Id. at 130.

62. Pres. Decree No. 957, Sec. 7.

63. Approved on April 2, 1978.

64. Approved on August 26, 1972.

65. Mitsubishi Motors v. Bureau of Customs, 760 Phil. 954, 960 (2015) [Per J.
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 Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; De Joya v. Judge Marquez , 516 Phil. 717, 723-
724 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division].
66. Magno v. People of the Philippines, 662 Phil. 726, 735 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third
Division], citing Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457 (2010) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].
67. Padlan v. Dinglasan , 707 Phil. 83, 91 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

68. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Domingo, 599 Phil. 554, 561 (2009)
[Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
69. City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, 671 Phil. 610, 629 (2011) [Per
J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].
70. Exec. Order No. 648 (1981) transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial
functions of the National Housing Authority to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986,
the renamed the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission to the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board.
71. 237 Phil. 389 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].

72. 257 Phil. 914 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

73. Batas Blg. 129, Sec. 19 provides:
  Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
  (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

  (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;

xxx xxx xxx

  (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or
the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00). *Before amendment by Republic Act No. 7691.

74. Solid Homes v. Payawal , 257 Phil. 914, 918-920 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First
Division].
75. Id.
76. 302 Phil. 324 (1994) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].

77. See Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407 (2005) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]; Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 966 (2002)
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 [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

78. Arevalo v. Benedicto, 157 Phil. 175, 181 (1974) [Per J. Antonio, Second
Division].
79. Hilado v. Chavez , 482 Phil. 104 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Second Division].
80. International Banking Corp. v. Yared, 59 Phil. 72, 92 (1933) [Per J. Villareal, First
Division].
81. 543 Phil. 578, 598 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

82. Id. at 598.

83. Magno v. People of the Philippines, 662 Phil. 726, 735 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third
Division], citing Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457 (2010) [Per J. Brion,
Second Division].
84. Id.
85. 204 Phil. 25 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].

86. Id. at 34-35.

87. Id. at 36.
88. 580 Phil. 58 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

89. Id. at 76.

90. 503 Phil. 288 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
91. 629 Phil. 450 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].

92. 388 Phil. 233 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

93. Rollo , pp. 48-49.
94. Id. at 131.
95. Heirs of Pasag v. Spouses Parocha , 550 Phil. 571, 581 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division].

96. CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 14 provides:

   Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
97. People of the Philippines v. Franco, 336 Phil. 206, 210 (1997) [Per J. Francisco,
Third Division] citing 6 Comments on the Rules of Court 123 (1980 ed.), U.S.
v. Solaña, 33 Phil. 582 (1916) [Per J. Carson, First Division] and Dayrit v.
Gonzalez, 7 Phil. 182 (1906) [Per J. Tracey, En Banc].
98. Republic of the Philippines v. Gimenez, 776 Phil. 233, 256 (2016) [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].

99. 306 Phil. 424 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].

100. Id. at 426-427.
101. Id.
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 102. RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 36.

103. Constantino v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 68 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo, First
Division].
104. Rollo , pp. 51-52.
105. Id. at 131.

106. Id. at 144-145.

107. Hemedes v. Court of Appeals , 374 Phil. 692, 719-720 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-
Reyes, Third Division].
108. Id.
109. Sigaya v. Mayuga, 504 Phil. 600, 614 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second
Division].

110. Rollo , p. 113.

111. Id. at 81-82.
112. Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

113. Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 410 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].

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