UNIVERSITY OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL-RECOLETOS

SCHOOL OF LAW

In compliance with Labor Law II requirement

RESEARCH PAPER
ON
LABOR LAW II

Submitted by:
Pedrano, Ressie June
Pastro, Roy Jimenez
L02

Submitted to:
Atty. Vanessa P. Encabo
Labor Law II Professor

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 Table of Contents

Chapter 1

I. Introduction, p2

II. Review of Related Literature, p3

III. Issues, p8

Chapter 2

I. Discussion and Analysis,p9

(a) Vir-jen Shipping vs NLRC GR No. 58011=12 July 20, 1982

(b) Mc Burnie vs Gauzon GR No. 178034 and 178117 October 17, 2013
(c) Computer Innovation vs NLRC GR No. 152410 June 29, 2005
(d) Garcia vs NLRC GR No. 110494 Nov. 18, 1996
(e) PTTC vs NLRC GR No. 80600 March 21, 1990
(f) Triad Security vs. Ortega GR No. 160871 Feb. 6, 2006
(g) Waterfront Cebu vs Ledesma GR No. 197556 March 25, 2015
(h) Reyes vs NLRC GR No. 180551 Feb. 10, 2009

II. Case Analysis, p16

III. References, p35

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 Chapter 1

I. INTRODUCTION
In the Philippine Jurisdiction, the disposition of Labor Proceedings are non-litigious in
nature and must be expeditiously resolved to ensure the speedy administration of justice, as
entrenched in Article 218[211] of Book Five of the Labor Code on Labor Relations, which has laid
down the policy of the State in Labor Relations, among others: (a) to promote and emphasize the
primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation
and conciliation, as modes of settling labor and industrial disputes; (b) to promote free trade
unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and the promotion of social justice
and development; (c) to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement; (d) to promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as
union members and as employees; (e) to provide an adequate administrative machinery for the
expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes; (f) to ensure a stable but dynamic and just
industrial peace; and (g) to ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making
processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare. Likewise, to encourage a truly democratic
method of regulating the relations between the employers and employees by means of agreements
freely entered into through collective bargaining, no court or administrative agency or official shall
have the power to set or fix wages, rates of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of
employment, except as otherwise provided under Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Labor proceedings are set apart from civil and criminal proceedings in our legal system
mainly because of the fact that the Rules of Procedure in courts of law or equity are not binding in
the disposition of the former. In a plethora of labor cases, the Supreme Court has reiterated time
and time again that the speedy disposition and administration of justice in labor disputes is
mandatory as entrenched in the Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to
investments, and to expansion and growth.
It was likewise laid down by the High Court in Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. vs.
Gorombalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989; Sevillana vs. I.T. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 99047, April 16,
2001, [in Labor Cases] [s]implification of procedure, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure and without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process, is mandated to
insure a speedy administration of social justice. Which is why the Court has construed Article 227
[221] of the Labor Code as to allow the NLRC or a labor arbiter to decide a case on the basis of
position papers and other documents submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence
as observed in regular courts of justice.
In sum, the main distinction of labor cases from civil and criminal cases is that the
Philippine Legal System puts such high regard in the expeditious resolution of labor disputes.

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 Even the Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative
bodies like the NLRC (Bantolino, et al., vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10,
2003) and while the Rules of Evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not controlling
in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at least have a modicum
of admissibility for it to be given probative value (Uichico, et al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121434, June 2,
1997). In labor proceedings, as explained in the landmark case of as the landmark case of Gelmart
Industries Phils. vs. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 70544, November 5, 1987 citing Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations [69 Phil. 635 (1940)], the Court has pointed out there are "cardinal primary
rights which must be respected" in such proceedings. Not the least among them are those which
refer to the evidence required to support a decision:
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support the decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least, when directly attacked.". . .
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but evidence
must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.". . .
Logically though, even the speedy disposition of Labor cases, that is, the promulgation of
decisions, resolutions, and awards, obviously follows with it the remedy of Appeal. As explicitly
stated in Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code that “[d]ecisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.”
The focal point of this legal research would revolve solely on labor and/or industrial
dispute proceedings, specifically, on the matter of Appeals, reconciling the provisions of found in
the Labor Code, and incidentally, the NLRC Rules of Procedure as supplemented by the Rules of
Court, along with jurisprudences on labor cases decided by the Supreme Court.
In the pursuit of understanding the law, it is not new that certain provisions could be
interpreted and/or construed differently in varying circumstances or on a case to case basis.
Which is why there are a handful of jurisprudences clearing the technicalities and laying down
criteria to be observed in Appeals in labor proceedings in consonance with Article 229 [223] of the
Labor Code.

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The protection to labor is mandated in Section 9, Article II on State Policies and Section 3,
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines,
provides:
xxx
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.
xxx
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and
the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor
to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to
investments, and to expansion and growth.

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 xxx
Likewise, Presidential Decree No. 442 as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as the law currently governing employment practices and labor relations in the
Philippines also states in its basic policy as found in Article 3 of said code that “[t]he State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work.”
It is apparent not just in our Constitution and labor legislations, but also in a number of
decided Supreme Court cases pertinent thereto, which clarified the interpretation of important
provisions found in the Labor Code that our State puts protection to labor in such high regard. In
sum, we can only so conclude that such safeguard to labor is vital to protect the welfare of the
people as laid down in the legal principle salus populi est suprema lex.
In line with this, it is only logical to conclude that the speedy disposition of labor
proceedings is only in keeping with the Constitutional mandate of protection to labor, to ensure
that justice and substantial due process is afforded not just by the laborer but also by the
employer, as can be found in various rulings on labor proceedings that were promulgated by the
Supreme Court. Essentially too, in labor proceedings, the concept of appealing to the decision of
the Labor Arbiter or Regional Director, as the case may be, is also observed in labor dispute
proceedings, and like every other concept in law, the provision on Appeal as provided under
Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code has been subject to several interpretations and/or
construction.
Hence, there is a need that we must look further into the concept of Appeal for us to
understand better the labor dispute mechanisms, in the interest of the welfare of the laborer and
employer alike. Although generally, labor legislation is construed in favour of the laborer, there
are instances where the employer’s rights are also protected by law. This is why the concept of
appeal is important. Appeal from the decisions, awards or orders of the labor arbiter is allowed in
our jurisdiction: If there is prima facie evidence that there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Labor Arbiter; If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including
graft and corruption; If made purely on questions of law; and If serious errors in the findings of facts
are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
Thus, it is of utmost importance for us to take note of the hereunder landmark cases
which tackled not only substantial issues but also procedural issues on Appeals as construed in
labor dispute proceedings, to wit:
(1) Vir-jen Shipping vs NLRC GR No. 58011=12 July 20, 1982
(2) Mc Burnie vs Gauzon GR No. 178034 and 178117 October 17, 2013
(3) Computer Innovation vs NLRC GR No. 152410 June 29, 2005
(4) Garcia vs NLRC GR No. 110494 Nov. 18, 1996
(5) PTTC vs NLRC GR No. 80600 March 21, 1990
(6) Triad Security vs. Ortega GR No. 160871 Feb. 6, 2006
(7) Waterfront Cebu vs Ledesma GR No. 197556 March 25, 2015
(8) Reyes vs NLRC GR No. 180551 Feb. 10, 2009

Furthermore, the following provisions of law and/or procedures must also be taken into
great consideration for a bigger understanding on the concept of appeals as provided in the Labor
Code, hereunder as follows:
xxx
Article 229 (223). Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence that there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.

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In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating the dismissed employee, insofar as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation, or at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.

To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall impose
reasonable penalty, including fines or censures upon the erring parties.

In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party who
shall file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.

The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the answer
of the appellee. The decision og the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards, or orders.
xxx
xxx
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial
of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If
the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
xxx

xxx

The 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:

RULE VI.
APPEALS
xxx
Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. '(a) The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment
of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this
Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon
and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of
such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
xxx

xxx
Section 6. Bond. 'In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly
authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected

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only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the
case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme
Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration under
oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine.

The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of
the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
appeal.
xxx

Which now reads in the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedures as:

RULE VI.
APPEALS
xxx
Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. '(a) The appeal shall be:
(1) filed within the reglementary period provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
(2) verified by the appellant himself/herself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court, as amended;
(3) in the form of a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and
the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, and with a statement of the date the
appellant received the appealed decision, award or order;
(4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed copies; and,
(5) accompanied by:
(i) proof of payment of the required appeal fee and legal research fee,
(ii) posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule, and
(iii) proof of service upon the other parties.

(b) A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop
the running of period for perfecting an appeal.

(c) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where the appeal
was filed his/her answer or reply to appellant’s memorandum of appeal, not later than ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly furnished
with a copy of the appeal to file his/her answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a
waiver on his/her part to file the same.

(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 218 (now 225) of the Labor Code, as amended, once the appeal
is perfected in accordance with these Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and
deciding only the specific issues which were elevated on appeal. (4a)
xxx

xxx
Section 6. Bond. 'In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond,
which shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.

In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission, and shall be accompanied by original or certified true copies of the
following:
(a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer,, his/her counsel, and the bonding
company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be effective until final disposition of
the case;
(b) an indemnity agreement between employer-appellant and bonding company;
(c) proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond: provided, that a check shall not
be considered as an acceptable security; and
(d) notarized resolution or secretary’s certificate from the bonding company showing its
authorized signatories and their specimen signatures.

The Commission through the Chairman may on justifiable grounds blacklist an accredited
bonding company.

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 A cash or surety bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until
the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award satisfied. The bond shall still be
liable even if the appeal is dismissed for non-perfection or for whatever ground. These conditions
shall be deemed incorporated in the terms and conditions of the surety bond, and shall be binding on
the appellants and the bonding company.

The appellant shall furnish the appellee with a certified true copy of the said surety bond
with all the above-mentioned supporting documents. The appellee shall verify the regularity and
genuineness thereof and immediately report any irregularity to the Commission.

Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the
Commission shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal, and censure the responsible parties
and their counsels, or subject them to reasonable fine or penalty, and the bonding company may be
blacklisted.

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on the meritorious grounds, and only
upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.

The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with the requisites in the
preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. (6a) (As
amended by the En Banc Resolution No. 14-15, Series of 2015; En Banc Resolution No. 06-18, Series of
2018)
xxx

A labor dispute proceeding starts when an employment case falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiter is instituted, as provided in Article 224 [217] of the Labor
Code. Once the conduct of compulsory arbitration with the labor arbiter is done, the labor arbiter
issues a decision, award or order on the merits of the case and through his/her adjudication on
the position papers and other evidences presented. The proceeding, being non-litigious in nature,
only gives the Labor Arbiter within thirty (30) calendar days to hear and decide the same after the
submission of the case by the parties (Article 224 {217] of the Labor Code). As such, when the
labor arbiter issues a decision, award or order, it becomes final after the lapse of ten (10) calendar
days unless appealed from to the Commission by either or both of the parties.

The Labor Arbiter’s decision becomes final and executory if not appealed on time. Such
being the case, the same can no longer be amended, pursuant to Article 229 [223] of the Labor
Code which provides that decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of such decisions, awards, or orders.

In relation thereto, Section 1, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules likewise provides that
“[d]ecisions, resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed
to the Commission by any or both parties within 10 calendar days from receipt thereof; and in case
of decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code, within five calendar days from receipt
thereof. If the 10th or 5th fay, as the case may be, falls on Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last day to
perfect the appeal shall be the first working day following such Saturday, Sunday, or holiday.”
Likewise, the appeal shall be filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office where
the case was heard and decided, pursuant to Section 3, Rule VI of the same Rules.

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 III. ISSUES
This research paper will answer the following certain issues on the interpretation and use

of the provision of Appeal as found in Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code, hereunder quoted as

follows:

(1) The computation of the reglementary period to file appeals;

(2) Appeal Bond Reductions: McBurnie Guidelines on Appeal Bond Reduction

(3) Distinction between “filing” and “perfection” of Appeal

(4) Example of Abuse of Discretion on the filing of Appeal

(5) Evidence Submitted on Appeal to NLRC

(6) Extended meaning of Appeal under Article 229 [223] re: Petition for Certiorari

i. Days to file Petition for Certiorari

(7) Exception to the General Rule of Indispensability of Technical Rules

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 Chapter II

I. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The law is clear on the concept of Appeal in labor dispute proceedings, we may find our refuge
in Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code of the Philippines in understanding the same, hereunder
quoted as follows:
Article 229 (223). Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are
final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal
may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence that there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion,
including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may

be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating the dismissed employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or at the option of
the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer
shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter

shall impose reasonable penalty, including fines or censures upon the erring parties.

In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the
other party who shall file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof.

The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from
receipt of the answer of the appellee. The decision og the Commission shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards, or orders.

However, like any other concept in our legal system, there are admittedly a lot principles
tied with the Labor Code that seem to be too difficult to interpret and/or construe no matter how
simple the wordings used by the legislators responsible for promulgating said labor legislations,
just like any other concept or principles in the field of law in general. This is where the landmark
rulings of the Supreme Court in labor dispute proceedings come into play. Most of the cases
discussed in this paper pertain to Appeals as found in the Labor Code and as an important
concept in labor dispute proceedings.

Thus, the following discussions pertain:

(1) On the matter of computation of the 10-day reglementary period

As we have discussed, Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code provides that the decisions,
awards or orders of the labor arbiter become final and executory unless appealed to the

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Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards or orders. The computation of the aforesaid reglementary period of ten (10) calendar days
has been subject of several interpretations. It has been a huge misconception in past labor dispute
proceedings that the reglementary period in said proceedings pertain to “working days” rather
than the words “calendar days” as exactly found in the Labor Code provision.
Thus, the Supreme Court laid down the clarification on the same, specifically in the case
of Vir-jen Shipping vs NLRC GR No. 58011-12, July 20, 1982, wherein the Court arrived at the
conclusion that the shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by Article 223 (now 229) contemplates
calendar days and not working days. It was persuaded to this conclusion, if only because it
believes that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has commanded that labor cases be
promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long periods for any acts to be done by the contending
parties can be taken advantage of more by management than by labor. Most labor claims are
decided in their favor and management is generally the appellant. Delay, in most instances, gives
the employers more opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with well-paid
talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the
workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less than
what is due them.
It only follows that Saturdays, Sundays and Legal Holidays are not to be excluded but
included in the computation of the 10-day (or 5-day period in case of the decisions, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Director) period.

(2) On the matter of Appeal Bond Reductions: McBurnie Guidelines on Appeal Bond
Reduction
In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall
either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award,
exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees, per Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure.
However, in the pursuit of justice and fairness, it is not necessarily mandatory that the full
appeal bond be given by the employer in case it does not have the sufficient finance to post the
same. Hence, reduction of said Appeal Bond in a reasonable amount is allowed, as the Supreme
Court has laid down in the case of Mc Burnie vs Gauzon GR No. 178034 and 178117 October 17, 2013,
provided such motion is filed observing the guidelines provided therein, to wit:
(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the
following conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is
posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by the
posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10,) of the monetary award
subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees;
(c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 1 0-day
reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine
the final amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards
of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount; and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that exceeds
the amount of the provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (1 0) days from
notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.”

(3) On the distinction between “filing” and “perfection” of Appeal

The case of Computer Innovation vs NLRC, GR No. 152410, June 29, 2005, is instructive
as to the distinction between “filing” and “perfection” of Appeal. As held by the Supreme
Court, an appeal is perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. Such
requirement for posting the surety bond is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with. The word
"only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety
bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be

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perfected. As evinced by the language of Article 223 (now 229), the posting of such bond is
required before the NLRC can acquire jurisdiction over the employer's appeal. x x x
Invocation of this rule as a means of argument against the strict imposition of the cash bond
requirement is off-base, taking into consideration Article 223 (now 229).

(4) An example of Abuse of Discretion on the filing of Appeal

The case of Garcia vs NLRC, GR No. 110494, Nov. 18, 1996, lays down an example of grave
abuse of discretion on the filing of appeal, wherein the the Court took note in the instant case
that records bear out that private respondent did not comply with the foregoing mandatory rules on
appeals. After receiving a copy of the decision, private respondent through its president, wrote the
labor arbiter who rendered the decision and expressed dismay over the judgment. No appeal was
taken therefrom within ten (10) days from September 10, 1992, the date private respondent received a
copy of such judgment. Neither was a cash or surety bond posted by the private Respondent.
Assuming arguendo that said letter is considered a valid notice of appeal, the lack of posting
of a cash or surety bond as required by law, is fatal. The posting of bond in appeals of employers
with monetary consideration is not merely a procedural matter but jurisdictional. It is elementary
that when a judgment in question involves a monetary award, the second paragraph of Article 223
(now 229) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, provides that an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the NLRC in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
The NLRC in the instant case has clearly committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
jurisdiction in treating the letter of private respondent’s president as an appeal from the judgment of
the labor arbiter.
Time and time again, the Court has held that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to
conform with the rules regarding appeal will certainly render the judgment final and
executory, hence, unappealable.

(5) On evidences Submitted on Appeal to NLRC

Unlike the rules of procedure in the court of law or equity, labor proceedings allow the
submission of evidences on appeal to the Commission. In the landmark case of PTTC vs NLRC, GR
No. 80600, March 21, 1990, the Court noted that “On appeal to respondent commission, petitioner
submitted uncontracted evidence showing payment to private respondent of his holiday pay and rest
day pay, and private respondent's non-entitlement to incentive leave pay due to his enjoyment of
vacation leave privileges, consistent with Article 95, Chapter III, Title I, Book III of the Labor Code.
Such evidence was, however, rejected by respondent commission on the erroneous justification that
it was not presented at the first opportunity, presumably when the case was pending with the labor
arbiter.”
It held, “The belated presentation of the evidence notwithstanding, respondent commission
should have considered them just the same. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, who
has impartially taken a contrary view vis-a-vis that portion of said decision of respondent
commission which he is supposed to defend, technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor
cases. Labor officials should use every and reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.
Thus, even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to respondent commission is enough basis for the latter to have been more
judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence
can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent
with equity and the basic notions of fairness.”

(6) On the extended meaning of Appeal under Article 229 [223] re: Petition for Certiorari
In the case of Triad Security vs. Ortega, GR No. 160871, Feb. 6, 2006, wherein the
petitioners maintain that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as

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it accepts of certain exceptions such as when an appeal would not be an adequate remedy there
being an order or execution already issued and the implementation of said writ loomed as a great
probability.

The Court held that “It is a basic tenet of procedural rules that for a special civil action for
a petition for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioners insist that the NLRC is bereft of authority to rule on a matter
involving grave abuse of discretion that may be committed by a labor arbiter. Such conclusion,
however, proceeds from a limited understanding of the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC under
Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code which states:

ART. 223 (229). APPEAL

Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter.
In the case of Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to
explain the scope of said article of the Labor Code to mean –
x x x Also, while the title of Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of appeal as
that term is understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the office of
certiorari, nonetheless, a closer reading thereof reveals that it is not as limited as
understood by the petitioners x x x.
xxxx
Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant thereof to
the NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the meaning of appeal as that
term is used in the Code x x x.
Likewise, in the same case, [the] Court quoted with approval the following observation
of the Court of Appeals:
The Court did not see how appeal would have been inadequate or ineffectual under the
premises. On the other hand, being the administrative agency especially tasked with the
review of labor cases, [the NLRC] is in a far better position to determine whether
petitioners’ grounds for certiorari are meritorious. Neither is there any cause for worry
that appeal to the Commission would not be speedy as the Labor Code provides that the
Commission shall decide cases before it, within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt
of the Answer of Appellee x x x.
Given the foregoing, it was held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petition for certiorari brought before it.”

i. Days to file Petition for Certiorari

The case Waterfront Cebu vs Ledesma, GR No. 197556, March 25, 2015, is instructive as to
the days of filing a petition for Certiorari. A petition for certiorari must be filed with the CA
beyond the 60-day period, as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial

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of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If
the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In the case of Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, The Court categorically ruled
that the present rule now mandatorily requires compliance with the reglementary period. The
period can no longer be extended as previously allowed before the amendment, thus:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an
intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if
there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended
law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions
under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been
preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of
Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The Court held that the rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is
essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case
or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on
compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions
for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.
In the subsequent case of Domdom v. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the
absence of a specific prohibition in Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, for the extension of the 60-
day period to file a petition for certiorari was construed as a discretionary authority of the courts
to grant an extension.
Republic v. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc. clarified the “conflict” between the rulings in
Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, in that the former is the general rule while the latter is
the exception, thus:
“What seems to be a “conflict” is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing
rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application
of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the
other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the
Court’s sound discretion.”

In relaxing the rules and allowing an extension, the case of Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals reiterated the necessity for the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for the failure to file the petition for certiorari within the 60-day
period.
In Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court said:
“It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for
persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.”
Among the “recognized exceptions” are: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to
relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the

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prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. (see Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals)

(7) Exception to the General Rule of Technicalities

Generally, technical rules are indispensable as a matter of procedural law. However, there
is an exception to the general rule of indispensability of technical rules as laid down by the Court
in the case of Reyes vs NLRC, GR No. 180551, Feb. 10, 2009 provides the exception to the general
rule of technicalities.
In said case, the Court noted that it is evident from a perusal of records that petitioner
indeed failed to provide the CA a written explanation as to why he did not personally serve a copy
of his Petition therein upon the adverse parties, as required by Section 11, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The records also readily reveal that petitioner did not file a timely Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 November 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
However, herein petitioner submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his Petition
before the CA, and the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the greater interest of
substantial justice. Reyes attributes the technical flaws committed before the appellate court to
his former counsel, and he urged the Court to excuse him therefrom since compliance with the
procedural rules calls for the application of legal knowledge and expertise which he, as a layman,
cannot be expected to know.
While it is true that for petitioner's failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised
Rules of Court, his petition should be expunged from the records, as in the case of Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, where the the Court stressed the mandatory character of Section
11, Rule 13. However, in numerous cases, the Court has allowed a liberal construction of said rule
when doing so would be in the service of the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction of the SC.
The Court held in the case of Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations Commission the
following justification for its non-insistence on a written explanation as required by Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court:
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice.
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on
the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice,
it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.
The call for a liberal interpretation of the Rules is even more strident in the instant case
which petitioner's former counsel was obviously negligent in handling his case before the Court of
Appeals. It was petitioner's former counsel who failed to attach the required explanation to the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343. Said counsel did not bother to inform petitioner, his client, of
the 10 November 2006 Resolution of the appellate court dismissing the Petition for lack of the
required explanation. Worse, said counsel totally abandoned petitioner's case by merely allowing
the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration to lapse without taking any
remedial steps; thus, the 10 November 2006 Resolution became final and executory.
The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Hence, if counsel
commits a mistake in the course of litigation, thereby resulting in his losing the case, his client
must perforce suffer the consequences of the mistake. The reason for the rule is to avoid the
possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence of his or her counsel to

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escape an adverse decision of the court, to the detriment of our justice system, as no party would
ever accept a losing verdict. This general rule, however, pertains only to simple negligence of the
lawyer. Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive, reckless and
inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since, in such a case, the client is effectively deprived
of his or her day in court.
The circumstances of this case qualify it under the exception, rather than the general rule.
The negligence of petitioner's former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably resulted
to the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available to the petitioner. Not only was
petitioner deprived of the opportunity to bring his case before the Court of Appeals with the
outright dismissal of his Petition on a technicality, but he was also robbed of the chance to seek
reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition. What further impel this Court to heed the call for
substantial justice are the pressing merits of this case which, if left overshadowed by
technicalities, could result in flagrant violations of the provisions of the Labor Code and of the
categorical mandate of the Constitution affording protection to labor.
Higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner should not be denied his day
in court and made him to suffer for his counsel's indiscretions. To cling to the general rule in this
case would only to condone, rather than rectify, a serious injustice to a party - - whose only fault
was to repose his faith and trust in his previous counsel - - and close our eyes to the glaring grave
abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC.
The Court likewise found, after ruling on the procedural matters in the instant case,
remanding the case to the appellate court for the determination of the substantive matters would
only cause further delay, so in the interest of fairness, it has resolved the substantive issues found
therein.

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 II. CASE ANALYSIS
G.R. No. L-58011-12. July 20, 1982.
VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO BISULA, RUBEN ARROZA, JUAN GACUTNO,
LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG, SIMPLICIO
BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE ENCABO, Respondents.

Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., for Petitioner.

Solicitor General and Romeo M. Devera for Respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Brief Background:
The instant case revolves around a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment or setting
aside, on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission in consolidated NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79.
Herein private respondents have a manning contract for a period of one (1) year with petitioner in
representation of its principal Kyoei Tanker Co. Ltd. The terms and conditions of said contract
were based on the standard contract of the NSB. The manning contract was approved by the NSB.

When the vessel M/T Janu was enroute to Australia, the private respondents demanded to
petitioner, through cable communication vessel that they were not contented with the salary and
benefits stipulated in the manning contract, and demanded that they be given 50% increase
thereof, as the ‘best and only solution to solve ITF problem.’ Vir-jen Shipping countered their
offer with only 25% increase, considering the losses the petitioner were to suffer in the drastic
increase demanded by the seamen. The respondent seamen agreed but the principal Kyoei Tanker
Co. Ltd. terminated the manning contract for the unexpected and unreasonable demand for
salary increase of the officers and crew of M/T Janu.

Petitioner wrote the NSB asking permission to cancel the manning contract which was
approved by the latter. By reason thereof, the seamen were disembarked in Japan and repatriated
to Manila, and they then filed a complaint with the NSB for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
wages. However, the NSB found that the termination of the services of the seamen before the
expiration of their employment contract was justified ‘when they demanded and in fact received
from the company wages over and above the contracted rates which in effect was am alteration and
modification of a valid and existing contract.’ Respondent seamen appealed the decision to the
NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and
other monetary benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the
ground that the termination of said contract by petitioner was without valid cause.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the respondent NLRC had no more jurisdiction to entertain private
respondents’ appeal because the NSB decision became final and executory for failure of said
respondents to serve on the petitioner a copy of their ‘APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM OF
APPEAL’ within the ten (10) day reglementary period for appeal and even after the expiration of
said period.

(2) Whether or not the respondent Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion in said NSB Cases Nos. 2250-79 and 2252-79 when it adjudged the
petitioner liable to the respondents-seamen for terminating its employment contracts with them
despite the fact that prior authorization to terminate or cancel said employment contracts and to
disembark the said respondents was first secured from, and was granted by, the National Seamen
Board, the government agency primarily charged with the supervision and discipline of seamen
and the approval and enforcement of employment contracts.

Ruling:
(1) On the jurisdictional issue of the appeal, the Court referred to Article 223 (now 229) of the
Labor Code which provides the provision of appeals, Article 223 of the Labor Code literally
provides:

"Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiters or compulsory arbitrators

are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties
within ten (10) days from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:

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 (a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter
or compulsory arbitrator;
(b) If the decision, order, or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft
and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the Appellant.

To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall
impose reasonable penalty, including fines or censures, upon the erring parties.”

The Court arrived at the conclusion that the shortened period of ten (10) days fixed by
Article 223 (now 229) contemplates calendar days and not working days. It was persuaded to this
conclusion, if only because it believes that it is precisely in the interest of labor that the law has
commanded that labor cases be promptly, if not peremptorily, dispose of. Long periods for any
acts to be done by the contending parties can be taken advantage of more by management than
by labor. Most labor claims are decided in their favor and management is generally the appellant.
Delay, in most instances, gives the employers more opportunity not only to prepare even
ingenious defenses, what with well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out the
efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that not infrequently the latter either
give up or compromise for less than what is due them.

(2) The Court held that the NLRC has indeed overstepped the boundaries of its reviewing
authority and was over-lenient. As to whether or not respondents had breached their contract
with petitioner is a factual issue, which peculiar nuance to determine is with NSB, the fact-finding
authority for the case at hand. Notwithstanding the fact that even if it was nothing more than the
interpretation of the cablegram sent by respondents to petitioner on March 23, 1979 that were the
only question to be resolved, that is, whether or not it carried with it or connoted a threat which
naturally panicked petitioner, which, to be sure, could be a question of law, still, the Court sees
that the conclusion of the NLRC cannot be justified. The Commission ruled that in the exercise of
their right to present any grievances they had and in their desire to alleviate their condition, it
was but well and proper for respondents to make a proposal for increase of their wages, which
petitioner could accept or reject. The Court did not see it that way.

In its manifestation and comment, even the Solicitor General submitted that there was
valid justification on the part of petitioner and/or its principal to terminate the manning contract.
Likewise, the Court said, “It is timely to add here in closing that situations wherein employers are
practically laid in ambush or placed in a position not unlike those in a highjack whether in the air,
land or mid-sea must be considered to be what they really are: acts of coercion, threat and
intimidation against which the victim has generally no recourse but to yield at the peril of
irreparable loss. And when such happenings affect the national economy, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, they must be treated to be in the nature of economic sabotage. They should not be
tolerated. This Court has to be careful not to sanction them.”

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 G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 G R. Nos. 186984-85 , October 17, 2013
ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner, vs. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC.
and E. GANZON, INC., Respondents.
REYES, J.:
The relevance of the instant case pertains to the matter of Appeal Bond Reduction.
Brief Background:
Andrew James McBurnie is an Australian National who instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims against the respondents. He claimed that on May 1, 1999, he
signed a five-year employment agreement with EGI as Executive President to manage the latter’s
hotels and resorts located in the Philippines. McBurnie worked until November of the same year
until he had an accident and had to return to his homeland to recuperate. However, when he left
for Australia, he had not yet obtained a DOLE permit to work in the Philippines; and while he was
there, EGI terminated his contract because his services were no longer need since the intended
project would not push through.

EGI, in its opposition to McBurnie’s complaint, denied the existence of employer-

employee relationship because the agreement was to jointly invest in a company to manage
hotels, and the alleged employment contract was executed solely for the purpose of obtaining a
working permit.

The Labor Arbiter declared the illegal dismissal illegal and awarded $985,000.00 as salary
and benefit plus P2,000,000.00 for damages and attorney’s fee. EGI appealed to NLRC and posted
an appeal bond of P100,000.00, and filed a memorandum of appeal and a motion to reduce bond
to which the Commission denied and required an additional bond of more than P54 Million.
Because of EGI’s failure to post the required additional bond, thus the appeal was dismissed.

EGI appealed to the CA which enjoined the enforcement of the LA’s decision in favour of
McBurnie.

Issue:
Whether or not an appeal bond reduction is allowable in cases of appeal of an employer.

Ruling:
On the matter of the filing and acceptance of motions to reduce appeal bond, as provided in Section
6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the
following guidelines shall be observed:

(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be entertained by the NLRC subject to the
following conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is
posted;

(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion shall be accompanied by the posting
of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10,) of the monetary award subject of
the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees;

(c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to suspend the running of the 1 0-day
reglementary period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;

(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion to reduce bond and determine the
final amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of
meritorious grounds and reasonable amount; and

(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or requires a bond that exceeds the
amount of the provisional bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (1 0) days from
notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.”

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 G.R. NO. 152410, June 29, 2005
COMPUTER INNOVATIONS CENTER/NELSON YU QUILOS, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and REYNALDO C. CARIÑO, Respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Brief Background:
Herein private respondent Reynaldo Cariño (Cariño) was hired in September of 1995 by
petitioner Computer Innovations Center (CIC) as Instructor of Computer Technical Course, and
he was promoted to Head of the Education Department of CIC in May of 1997. On March 26,
1998, Cariño received a call from petitioner Nelson Yu Quilos (Quilos) of CIC, who advised Cariño
to resign from his position. Two days later, or on March 28 1998, Quilos met Cariño at the
company's technician's laboratory and informed the latter that his services with the company
should cease by March 31, 1998. Thus, the aggrieved Cariño lodged a complaint for illegal
dismissal against CIC and Quilos with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional
Arbitration Branch in Davao City.

CIC, however, claimed that it received reports from its other employees regarding Cariño's
purported unprofessional conduct, adverting to a general lack of interpersonal skills and
moonlighting activities which conflicted with the interest of CIC – the moonlighting activities
which Cariño admitted during the meeting on March 28, 1998, and had refused a promotion
offered by CIC conditioned on his termination of involvement with other computer schools.
Instead, as claimed by CIC, Cariño announced during the said meeting that he would resign from
CIC, reporting for work only until March 31, 1998.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on August 29, 1999, concluding that Cariño had
been illegally dismissed, and further ordering petitioners to pay the amount of Two Hundred
Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos (P220,666.66) representing
backwages, separation pay, and thirteenth (13th) month pay. A copy of the Decision was received
by petitioners on November 5, 1999, and on November 15, 1999, they filed a Notice of Appeal
dated November 12, 1999 before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch, Davao City, attaching
thereto a Memorandum on Appeal. They likewise posted a bond of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), a sum nowhere near the sum of the award made by the LA. However, in their
Memorandum of Appeal, petitioners had requested a reduction of the cash or surety bond to Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) – citing the ground for the reduction of the appeal bond was the
purportedly great possibility of the reversal of the Labor Arbiter's decision in light of the serious
errors in the findings of fact and application of law as well as the harshness and unfounded nature
of the award.

The Commission denied said motion for reduction of appeal bond and dismissed the
appeal on the ground of "non-perfection." The NLRC ruled that "the mere perception [that] the
appealed decision would be reversed on appeal [did] not justify the reduction of the required appeal
bond." The NLRC decision was affirmed by the CA.

Herein petitioners has invoked the ruing in Star Angel case that there is a distinction
between the filing of an appeal within the reglementary period and its perfection, and that the
appeal may be perfected after the said reglementary period. In Star Angel case, it was held that
the filing of a motion for reduction of an appeal bond necessarily stays the reglementary period
for appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the ground for appeal bond reduction in the instant case is allowable.

Ruling:
The Court referred to Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code which is quite clear-cut on
the matter. The relevant portion of Article 223 (now 229) provides:
ART 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. . . .
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphasis Supplied)

19 | P a g e
 Logically, it is inferred that by the explicit provision of law, an appeal is perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. Such requirement for posting the surety
bond is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with. The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that
the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the
exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. As evinced by the language
of Article 223 (now 229), the posting of such bond is required before the NLRC can acquire
jurisdiction over the employer's appeal. x x x Invocation of this rule as a means of argument
against the strict imposition of the cash bond requirement is off-base, taking into
consideration Article 223 (now 229).
Likewise, the NLRC Rules of Procedure reaffirms the explicit jurisdictional principle
in Article 223 (now 229), even as it allows in justifiable cases, the reduction of the appeal
bond, to wit:
RULE VI.
APPEALS
....
Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. '(a) The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and
proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop
the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
....
Section 6. Bond. 'In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly
authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final
disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive
of damages and attorney's fees.
The employer, his counsel, as well as the bonding company, shall submit a joint declaration
under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine.

The Commission may, in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the
amount of the bond. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect appeal.(Emphasis Supplied)

As it is very clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure [kindly
note that the governing rules of procedure of NLRC is now the 2011 NRLC Rules of Procedure]
that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond
requirement, and that the Court should give utmost regard to this intention. There is a
concession to the employer, in excluding damages and attorney's fees from the computation
of the appeal bond. Not even the filing of a motion to reduce bond is deemed to stay
the period for requiring an appeal. Nothing in the either Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of
Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond that is less than the monetary award in the
judgment, or would deem such insufficient postage as sufficient to perfect the appeal.

The appeal bond requirement is a rule of jurisdiction and not of procedure, and it
cannot be trifled with. There is little leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation thereof,
and certainly none premised on the ground that its requirements are mere technicalities. It
must be emphasized that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises
solely from grant of statute, namely the Labor Code. Non-compliance with such legal
requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. The
herein petitioners cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of rules for their
act of negligence.

Moreover, while indeed the Court noted that in Star Angel case it was held that the
filing of a motion for reduction of an appeal bond necessarily stays the reglementary period
for appeal. However, in the instant case, the motion for reduction of appeal bond, which was
incorporated in the appeal memorandum, was filed only on the tenth or final day of the
reglementary period. Under such circumstance, the motion for reduction of appeal bond can

20 | P a g e
no longer be deemed to have stayed the appeal, and the petitioner faces the risk, as had
happened in this case, of summary dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection.

In the Star Angel case to the distinction between the period to file the appeal and to
perfect the appeal has been pointedly made only once by the Court in the case of Gensoli v.
NLRC thus, it has not acquired the sheen of venerability reserved for repeatedly-cited
cases. The distinction, if any, is not particularly evident or material in the Labor Code; hence,
the reluctance of the Court to adopt such doctrine. Moreover, the present provision in the
NLRC Rules of Procedure, that "the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the
running of the period to perfect appeal" flatly contradicts the notion expressed in Star Angel
that there is a distinction between filing an appeal and perfecting an appeal.

Said disposition of Star Angel was premised on the ruling that a motion for reduction
of the appeal bond necessarily stays the period for perfecting the appeal, and that the
employer cannot be expected to perfect the appeal by posting the proper bond until such
time the said motion for reduction is resolved. The unduly stretched-out distinction between
the period to file an appeal and to perfect an appeal was not material to the resolution of Star
Angel, and thus could properly be considered as obiter dictum.

The Court, in closing, said, “One final note. As earlier stated, the underlying purpose of
the appeal bond is to ensure that the employee has properties on which he or she can execute
upon in the event of a final, providential award. The non-payment or woefully insufficient
payment of the appeal bond by the employer frustrates these ends. Respondent Cariño alleges
in his Comment before this Court that petitioner Quilos and his wife have since gone abroad,
and wonders aloud whether he still would be able to collect his monetary award considering the
circumstances. Petitioners, in their Reply and Memorandum, do not aver otherwise. Indeed,
such eventuality appears plausible considering that Quilos himself did not personally verify the
petition, and had in fact executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of his counsel, Atty.
Bernabe B. Alabastro, authorizing the filing of cases in his name. It does not necessarily follow
that the absence of Quilos from this country precludes the execution of the award due Cariño.
However, if the absence of Quilos from this country proves to render impossible the execution
of judgment in favor of Cariño, then the latter's victory may sadly be rendered pyrrhic. The
appeal bond requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or inconsequential victories by the
laborer, and it is hoped that herein petitioners' refusal to post the appropriate legal appeal bond
does not frustrate the ends of justice in this case.”

21 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 110494. November 18, 1996.
REY O. GARCIA, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second
Division, composed of HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ as Presiding Commissioner HON.
ROGELIO RAYALA as Commissioner, and MAHAL KONG PILIPINAS, INC, Respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Brief Background:
Herein petitioner Rey O. Garcia was hired by private respondent Mahal Kong Pilipinas
and edit articles, new items, literary contributions, essays, manuscripts, and other features to be
published in the Say Magazine and other publications owned by private Respondent. On March
16, 1992, petitioner’s employment was terminated. At that time, he was allegedly receiving a
monthly salary of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00). Thus, Garcia filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against private respondent with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Summons were thereafter duly served on private respondent to appear for a mandatory
conference to be held on April 29, 1992, and on the appointed date, private respondent,
represented by Necy Avecilla, sought a postponement of said conference which motion was
granted and reset the conference on May 8, 1992. Yet again, on May 8, 1992, private respondent
failed to appear prompting the Labor Arbiter to reset the conference on May 27, 1992 - with
warning that failure to appear and submit its position paper on said date will be deemed a waiver
of its right to be heard and to present its evidence.

On May 27, 1992, both parties appeared. Herein etitioner filed an amended complaint, a
copy of which was served on private respondent in open court, and by mutual agreement of the
parties, the filing of their respective position papers as well as the next hearing was scheduled on
June 9, 1992. However, on said date private respondent yet again failed to attend and instead filed
a letter requesting for the postponement of the hearing. Petitioner objected and instead moved
that private respondent be declared in default and that he be allowed to present his evidence ex
parte. Said motion was granted and petitioner was given one (1) week to submit his position paper
and documentary evidence after which the case was to be considered submitted for decision.
Herein petitioner filed his position paper on June 11, 1992 and on June 15, 1992, private respondent,
through a letter from Marilou L. Bocobo, requested Labor Arbiter Nieves V. de Castro for time to
answer petitioner’s allegations. The letter-request, found to be merely dilatory, was denied.

The LA ordered the reinstatement of herein petitioner to his former position effective
August 16, 1992 with full backwages of P24,000.00 (from March 16, 1992 to August 15, 1992) and all
other benefits complainant was receiving prior to his termination with notice to respondent that
reinstatement order is immediately executory even pending appeal. Herein private respondent
received a copy on September 10, 1992, of the said decision. And instead of filing an appeal
therefrom, private respondent, through its company president Michael G. Say, wrote yet another
letter to the labor arbiter expressing surprise and disappointment of allegedly erroneous decision.

Since no appeal was filed from said decision, the same became final and executory.
Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on November 13, 1992. Private respondent filed a
petition for preliminary injunction with respondent NLRC. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration
of the said resolution contending that the subject decision had long become final and executory.
However, on March 10, 1993, respondent NLRC issued a resolution declaring the decision dated
August 13, 1992 as vacated and set aside and the writ of execution was declared quashed. A new
decision was rendered remanding the case for reception of evidence with dispatch.

Issue:
Whether or not the unverified letter sent by private respondent, through its company
president, is proper appeal.

Ruling:
The Court took note that in the case at bar, records bear out that private respondent did
not comply with the foregoing mandatory rules on appeals. After receiving a copy of the decision,
private respondent through its president, wrote the labor arbiter who rendered the decision and
expressed dismay over the judgment. No appeal was taken therefrom within ten (10) days
from September 10, 1992, the date private respondent received a copy of such judgment.
Neither was a cash or surety bond posted by the private Respondent.

Assuming arguendo that said letter is considered a valid notice of appeal, the lack of
posting of a cash or surety bond as required by law, is fatal. The posting of bond in appeals of
employers with monetary consideration is not merely a procedural matter but jurisdictional. It is
elementary that when a judgment in question involves a monetary award, the second paragraph

22 | P a g e
of Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, provides that an appeal
by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

The NLRC in the instant case has clearly committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
jurisdiction in treating the letter of private respondent’s president as an appeal from the judgment
of the labor arbiter.

Time and time again, the Court has held that the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Failure to
conform with the rules regarding appeal will certainly render the judgment final and executory,
hence, unappealable.

23 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 80600 March 21, 1990
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BOBBY TORIBIANO, respondents.

DP Mercado & Associates for petitioner.

Oscar E. Dinopol for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Brief Background:
The instant case is one of illegal dismissal of an employee of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (PTTC). Herein private respondent is a counter-clerk and long distance operator
working for petitioner. On August 24, 1985, he was terminated by the petitioner-company for
tampering with the vodex receipt by writing the amount of P41.15 as appearing in the duplicate
while the original copy issued to the customer was P113.25. Petitioner-company alleged that the
same was done by the complainant out of his illegal interest and the difference of P72.10 in the
receipt was used for his own personal comfort; that his intention to tamper (with) and malverse
company funds is very glaring to be ignored. It was further argued that the acts of the
complainant reflect that he is morally deprived and, therefore, could not be trusted considering
that he violated the trust and confidence reposed upon him which constitutes a valid reason for
his termination.

The assailed decision of respondent Commission which affirmed with modification the decision of
Labor Arbiter Nicolas S. Sayon, ordered the herein petitioner to: (1) reinstate complainant to his
former position without payment of backwages; (2) pay complainant his unpaid wages for the
month of July, 1985; and (3) pay complainant his entitlement on holiday pay, rest day pay and
incentive leave pay for three years starting from August 23, 1982 to August 23, 1983. On appeal to
respondent commission, petitioner submitted uncontracted evidence showing payment to private
respondent of his holiday pay and rest day pay, and private respondent's non-entitlement to
incentive leave pay due to his enjoyment of vacation leave privileges, consistent with Article 95,
Chapter III, Title I, Book III of the Labor Code. The same was however rejected by respondent
commission on the justification that it was not presented at the first opportunity, presumably
when the case was pending with the labor arbiter.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the offense committed by the employee justifies his outright dismissal.
(NO)
(2) Whether or not the submission of uncontracted evidence by petitioner on appeal to
respondent Commission should have been allowed by the latter. (YES)

Ruling:
(1) Per the findings of the labor arbiter, it was proved that the private respondent was indeed
alone in the office on July 26, 1985. He was busily performing his duties both as a counter-
clerk and long distance operator at the same time. The functions of which dual positions
precisely caused him to commit a mistake in the entry receipt through negligence. It was
further found that private respondent had repeatedly brought to the attention of
petitioner-company his predicament of having to singly perform manifold duties but the
same were left unheeded.

The Court found no cogent reason to disturb such findings. It is the well-entrenched rule
that when the conclusions of the labor arbiter are sufficiently corroborated by the
evidence on record, the same should be respected by appellate tribunals since the Labor
Arbiter is in a better position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the contending
parties. Even the failure of petitioner to present witnesses or counter-affidavits will not
constitute a fatal error as long as the parties were given a chance to submit position papers
on the basis of which the labor arbiter rendered a decision.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, even the assumption that there may have been a valid
ground for dismissal of the private respondent, the imposition of a supreme penalty would
certainly be very harsh and disproportionate to the infraction he committed, especially if
it was put into consideration that it was his first offense in his seven (7) years of faithful
and satisfactory service with the company. In addition, the fact that the imputed
defalcation involved only the meager sum of P72.10, the same has bolstered the credibility
of the explanation of private respondent's defense.

24 | P a g e
 The Court said, “While an employer has its own interests to protect and, pursuant thereto,
it may terminate an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an
employee must not be abusively exercised. Such power should be tempered with
compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution
of said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee's position but his livelihood
as well.

This ruling is only in keeping with the constitutional mandate for the State to afford full
protection to labor such that, when conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be
counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.”

Even if herein petitioner-company's claim that the offense is of the nature of falsification,
which justifies outright dismissal, was of no moment. It is not for the Court to rule upon
in the present petition if whether or not the infraction committed by private respondent
constitutes a criminal act. Of course, the private respondent cannot be considered
faultless entirely so that he may be absolved from liability. Thus, the modification of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering reinstatement of private respondent to his former
position without backwages is the proper relief, without prejudice and subject to the
condition that should he commit a similar offense, the same will justify his outright
dismissal.

(2) Evidence submitted on Appeal to the NLRC

The Court noted that, “On appeal to respondent commission, petitioner submitted
uncontracted evidence showing payment to private respondent of his holiday pay and rest
day pay, and private respondent's non-entitlement to incentive leave pay due to his
enjoyment of vacation leave privileges, consistent with Article 95, Chapter III, Title I, Book
III of the Labor Code. Such evidence was, however, rejected by respondent commission on
the erroneous justification that it was not presented at the first opportunity, presumably
when the case was pending with the labor arbiter.”

It held, “The belated presentation of the evidence notwithstanding, respondent commission

should have considered them just the same. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, who has impartially taken a contrary view vis-a-vis that portion of said decision of
respondent commission which he is supposed to defend, technical rules of evidence are not
binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every and reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Thus, even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to respondent commission is enough basis for the latter to have been
more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that
said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action
would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.”

25 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 160871 February 6, 2006
TRIAD SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES, INC. and ANTHONY U. QUE, Petitioners, vs.
SILVESTRE ORTEGA, JR., ARIEL ALVARO, RICHARD SEVILLANO, MARTIN CALLUENG,
and ISAGANI CAPILA, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Pertinent Provisions:
Article 229 (223). Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only
on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence that there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be

perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award
in the judgment appealed from.

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating the dismissed employee, insofar
as the reinstatement aspect is concerned shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided herein.

To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter shall
impose reasonable penalty, including fines or censures upon the erring parties.

In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other
party who shall file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.

The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
the answer of the appellee. The decision og the Commission shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards, or orders.

Article 294 (279). Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,
and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Subsequent to the ruling in Triad Security case, the NLRC amended its 2005 Rules of
Procedure and replaced it with 2011 Rules. One important amendment is the addition of Rule
XII titled “Extraordinary Remedies,” which allows a party to file a petition to annul or modify
an order or resolution of a labor arbiter on the ground of abuse of discretion or series errors in
the findings of facts, fraud, among other grounds.

Brief Background:
Herein petitioner Triad Security and Allied Services, Inc., (Triad Security) is a duly
licensed security agency owned by co-petitioner Anthony U. Que, while respondents Silvestre
Ortega, Jr., Ariel Alvaro, Richard Sevillano, Martin Callueng, and Isagani Capila were formerly
employed by petitioner Triad Security as security guards., respondents filed a complaint on March
25, 1999 against petitioners and one Ret. B/Gen. Javier D. Carbonell for

26 | P a g e
underpayment/nonpayment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day,
service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, and attorney’s fees, which was amended on April 20, 1999
to include the charges of illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, underpayment/nonpayment of
allowance, separation pay, and claims for 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages as well
as night shift differential. According to respondents, during the time that they were receiving
compensation which was below the minimum wage fixed by law while being in the employ of
petitioners, they were, and were also made to render services every day for 12 hours but were not
paid the requisite overtime pay, nightshift differential, and holiday pay. They likewise lamented
the fact that petitioners failed to provide them with weekly rest period, service incentive leave
pay, and 13th month pay. As a result of these perceived unfairness, a complaint was filed by
respondents filed before the Labor Standards Enforcement Division of the Department of Labor
on January 6, 1999. Their services were terminated without the benefit of notice and hearing
when the petitioner learned of the complaint.

Petitioners denied respondents’ claim of illegal dismissal for their part and explained that
management policies dictate that the security guards be rotated to different assignments to avoid
fraternization and that they be required to take refresher courses at their headquarters; which
respondents allegedly refused to comply with, and went on leave or simply refused to report at
their headquarters instead. As for respondents’ money claims, petitioners insisted that
respondents worked for only eight hours a day, six days a week and that they received their
premium pays for services rendered during holidays and rest day. The service incentive leave of
respondents was allegedly made payable as soon as respondents applied for said benefit.

The Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered herein petitioners to them to
their former jobs as security guards, and to pay jointly and solidarily complainants’ backwages
and to such further backwages accrued until reinstatement order is complied with by petitioners
herein. Petitioners failed to seasonably file an appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission, the decision of the labor arbiter became final and executory prompting respondents
to file a motion for the issuance of writ of execution. Several issues were raised as regard the
computation of the awards for the respondents to the point that the issue was elevated to the
Court of Appeals – which led the appellate court to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
the execution or enforcement of the Labor Arbiter’s order.

The Court of Appeals took note of the "procedural but fatal flaw" committed by petitioners
when they immediately elevated their case via petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
without first seeking recourse from the NLRC in violation not only of the Rules of Procedure of
said body but also of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the NLRC may issue a writ of certiorari under Art. 229 of the Labor Code.
(YES)
(2) Whether or not the award of either separation pay and/or backwages preclude that of the
other. (NO)

Ruling:

(1) Although the petitioners maintain that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not absolute as it accepts of certain exceptions such as when an appeal would
not be an adequate remedy there being an order or execution already issued and the
implementation of said writ loomed as a great probability.

The Court held that “It is a basic tenet of procedural rules that for a special civil
action for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, petitioners insist that the NLRC is bereft of authority to rule on a
matter involving grave abuse of discretion that may be committed by a labor arbiter. Such
conclusion, however, proceeds from a limited understanding of the appellate jurisdiction of
the NLRC under Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code which states:

ART. 223 (229). APPEAL

27 | P a g e
 Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained
only on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter.

In the case of Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion to
explain the scope of said article of the Labor Code to mean –

x x x Also, while the title of Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of appeal as that
term is understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the office of certiorari,
nonetheless, a closer reading thereof reveals that it is not as limited as understood by the
petitioners x x x.

xxxx

Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant thereof to the
NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the meaning of appeal as that term is
used in the Code x x x.

Likewise, in the same case, [the] Court quoted with approval the following observation of the
Court of Appeals:

The Court did not see how appeal would have been inadequate or ineffectual under the
premises. On the other hand, being the administrative agency especially tasked with the
review of labor cases, [the NLRC] is in a far better position to determine whether petitioners’
grounds for certiorari are meritorious. Neither is there any cause for worry that appeal to
the Commission would not be speedy as the Labor Code provides that the Commission shall
decide cases before it, within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the Answer of
Appellee x x x.

Given the foregoing, it was held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition
for certiorari brought before it.”

(2) Petitioners insist that their monetary obligation, as contained in the February 28, 2000
decision of the labor arbiter, had already been fully satisfied, and posit the argument that
with respondents’ receipt of their separation pay, they had opted not to seek
reinstatement to their former jobs and elected instead to sever their employment with
petitioner Triad Security. In fact, according to petitioners, respondents had already found
new employments and to award them further backwages would be tantamount to unjust
enrichment. Thus, petitioners maintain that there is no more basis to hold them liable for
the accrued backwages stated in the recent computation.

Such argument is untenable.

The award of either separation pay and/or backwages does not preclude that of the
other as this court had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both.

The Court held that “Article 279 (now 294) of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

Article 294 (279). Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title.
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and reinstatement.
These are separate and distinct from each other. However, separation pay is granted where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable,
or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable and backwages.

28 | P a g e
 Backwages and separation pay are, therefore, distinct reliefs granted to one who was illegally
dismissed from employment. The award of one does not preclude that of the other as this court
had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both.

In this case, the labor arbiter ordered the reinstatement of respondents and the payment of their
backwages until their actual reinstatement and in case reinstatement is no longer viable, the
payment of separation pay. Under Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code, "the decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall be immediately executory, even pending appeal." The same provision
of the law gives the employer the option of either admitting the employee back to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before his dismissal or separation from employment or
the employer may choose to merely reinstate the employee to the payroll. It bears emphasizing
that the law mandates the prompt reinstatement of the dismissed or separated employee. This,
the petitioners failed to heed. They are now before this Court insisting that they have fully
disposed of their legal obligation to respondents when they paid the latter’s separation pay. [The
Court] do[es] not agree.

It should be pointed out that an order of reinstatement by the labor arbiter is not the same
as actual reinstatement of a dismissed or separated employee. Thus, until the employer
continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the
labor arbiter, their obligation to respondents, insofar as accrued backwages and other
benefits are concerned, continues to accumulate. It is only when the illegally dismissed
employee receives the separation pay that it could be claimed with certainty that the
employer-employee relationship has formally ceased thereby precluding the possibility of
reinstatement. In the meantime, the illegally dismissed employee’s entitlement to backwages, 13th
month pay, and other benefits subsists. Until the payment of separation pay is carried out, the
employer should not be allowed to remain unpunished for the delay, if not outright refusal, to
immediately execute the reinstatement aspect of the labor arbiter’s decision.”

29 | P a g e
 G.R. No. 197556, March 25, 2015
WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. AND MARCO PROTACIO, Petitioners, v.
ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Pertinent Provisions:
Sec. 4, Rule 65. (RULES OF COURT). When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion. x x x

Brief Background:
This case is one of illegal dismissal: herein respondent Ildebrando Ledesma was illegally
dismissed from his employment by petitioner Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc.
(Waterfront). Respondent was employed as a House Detective at Waterfront located at Salinas
Drive, Cebu City. Complaints were filed before Waterfront by Christe Mandal, a supplier of a
concessionaire of Waterfront, and Rosanna Lofranco, who was seeking a job at the same hotel
- from the affidavits and testimonies of Mandal and Lofranco during the administrative hearings
conducted by Waterfront, the latter found, among others, that Ledesma performed non-
consensual sexual acts and/or overtures to both Mandal and Lofranco. Hence, Ledesma was
terminated from his job.

Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and the LA found that the allegations
leveled against Ledesma are mere concoctions, and concluded that Ledesma was illegally
dismissed. However, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA and held that Ledesma’s acts of
sexual overtures to Mandal and Lofranco constituted grave misconduct which justified his
dismissal from employment. Ledesma filed a MR which was subsequently denied by NLRC in a
Resolution dated February 22, 2010.

A copy of the said Resolution was received by Atty. Gines Abellana (Atty. Abellana),
Ledesma’s counsel of record, on March 15, 2010 and on May 17, 2010,14 or sixty-three (63) days
after Atty. Abellana received a copy of the NLRC’s Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, said counsel filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA. In its Comment, Waterfront prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition on
the ground that it was belatedly filed.

Ledesma, now assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion for leave to file amended petition
on August 5, 2010, and sought the admission of his Amended Petition for Certiorari. Ledesma
contended amended petition that his receipt on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15,
2010 by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the 60-day reglementary period within which to
file the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims that the petition was timely filed on May 17, 2010. Said
leave of court to Ledesma was granted by the CA, and admitted his amended petition for
certiorari. The CA rendered a Decision dated March 17, 2011, reversing the Decision of the NLRC
and reinstating the ruling of the LA. A motion for reconsideration filed by Waterfront was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated June 21, 2011. Thus, the present petition for review on certiorari
where Waterfront raised the main issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed with
the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the unjustified failure of Ledesma to file his petition for certiorari before
the CA within the 60-day period is a ground for the outright dismissal of said petition. (YES)

Ruling:
The petition for certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the 60-day period

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial
of the motion.

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 If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation,
a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

In the case of Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, The Court categorically ruled
that the present rule now mandatorily requires compliance with the reglementary period. The
period can no longer be extended as previously allowed before the amendment, thus:

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention

to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been
no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under
Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The
removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65
simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari.

The Court held that the rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is
essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case
or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on
compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions
for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.

In the subsequent case of Domdom v. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the
absence of a specific prohibition in Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, for the extension of the 60-
day period to file a petition for certiorari was construed as a discretionary authority of the courts
to grant an extension.

Republic v. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc. clarified the “conflict” between the rulings in
Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, in that the former is the general rule while the latter is
the exception, thus:

“What seems to be a “conflict” is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the
foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict
application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60)
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on
the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the
Court’s sound discretion.”

In relaxing the rules and allowing an extension, the case of Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals reiterated the necessity for the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for the failure to file the petition for certiorari within the 60-day
period.

In Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court said:

“It is an accepted tenet that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when,
for persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure, however, should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.”

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 Among the “recognized exceptions” are: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to
relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. (see Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals)

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 G.R. NO. 180551 : February 10, 2009
ERWIN H. REYES, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, COCA-
COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. and/or ROTAIDA TAGUIBAO, Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE

Brief Background:
The instant case is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court filed by petitioner Erwin H. Reyes, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated
November 1o, 2006 and November 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343 of the
CA.

The dismissed employee was ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter by the NLRC
reversed said decision. When the appeal was raised to the CA, the appellate court dismissed
petitioner's Petition for Certiorari therein for failure to give an explanation why copy of the said
Petition was not personally served upon the counsel of the respondents, as required by Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Though the employee did not file a MR of the CA decision – despite this and the earlier
failure to furnish employer personally a copy of the petition, the SC entertained and granted
employee’s petition through the pen of Justice Chico-Nazario.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in not excusing herein petitioner’s
procedural lapses. (YES)

Ruling:
There is an exception to the general rule of indispensability of technical rules.

The Court noted that it is evident from a perusal of records that petitioner indeed failed to
provide the CA a written explanation as to why he did not personally serve a copy of his Petition
therein upon the adverse parties, as required by Section 11, Rule 13nof the Revised Rules of Court.
The records also readily reveal that petitioner did not file a timely Motion for Reconsideration of
the 10 November 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

However, herein petitioner submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his Petition
before the CA, and the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the greater interest of
substantial justice. Reyes attributes the technical flaws committed before the appellate court to
his former counsel, and he urged the Court to excuse him therefrom since compliance with the
procedural rules calls for the application of legal knowledge and expertise which he, as a layman,
cannot be expected to know.

While it is true that for petitioner's failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised
Rules of Court, his petition should be expunged from the records, as in the case of Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, where the the Court stressed the mandatory character of Section
11, Rule 13. However, in numerous cases, the Court has allowed a liberal construction of said rule
when doing so would be in the service of the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction of the SC.

The Court held in the case of Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations Commission the
following justification for its non-insistence on a written explanation as required by Section 11, Rule
13 of the Revised Rules of Court:

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They
were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice.
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that
on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.

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 The call for a liberal interpretation of the Rules is even more strident in the instant case which
petitioner's former counsel was obviously negligent in handling his case before the Court of
Appeals. It was petitioner's former counsel who failed to attach the required explanation to
the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343. Said counsel did not bother to inform petitioner, his
client, of the 10 November 2006 Resolution of the appellate court dismissing the Petition for
lack of the required explanation. Worse, said counsel totally abandoned petitioner's case by
merely allowing the reglementary period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration to lapse
without taking any remedial steps; thus, the 10 November 2006 Resolution became final and
executory.

The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Hence, if counsel
commits a mistake in the course of litigation, thereby resulting in his losing the case, his
client must perforce suffer the consequences of the mistake. The reason for the rule is to avoid
the possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence of his or her counsel
to escape an adverse decision of the court, to the detriment of our justice system, as no party
would ever accept a losing verdict. This general rule, however, pertains only to simple
negligence of the lawyer. Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable,
pervasive, reckless and inexcusable, then it does not bind the client since, in such a case, the
client is effectively deprived of his or her day in court.

The circumstances of this case qualify it under the exception, rather than the general rule.
The negligence of petitioner's former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably resulted to
the foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available to the petitioner. Not only was petitioner
deprived of the opportunity to bring his case before the Court of Appeals with the outright dismissal
of his Petition on a technicality, but he was also robbed of the chance to seek reconsideration of the
dismissal of his Petition. What further impel this Court to heed the call for substantial justice are
the pressing merits of this case which, if left overshadowed by technicalities, could result in flagrant
violations of the provisions of the Labor Code and of the categorical mandate of the Constitution
affording protection to labor.

Higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner should not be denied his day in
court and made him to suffer for his counsel's indiscretions. To cling to the general rule in this case
would only to condone, rather than rectify, a serious injustice to a party - - whose only fault was to
repose his faith and trust in his previous counsel - - and close our eyes to the glaring grave abuse of
discretion committed by the NLRC.

The Court likewise found, after ruling on the procedural matters in the instant case,
remanding the case to the appellate court for the determination of the substantive matters would
only cause further delay, so in the interest of fairness, it has resolved the substantive issues
therein.

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 References

A. 1987 Constitution of the Philippines

a. Section 9, Article II on State Policies
b. Section 3, Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights
B. Presidential Decree No. 442 as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines
a. Article 218[211] of Book Five of the Labor Code on Labor Relations
b. Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code
c. Article 227 [221] of the Labor Code
d. Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code
e. Article 294 [279] of the Labor Code
C. 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure
a. Rule VI. Appeals.
D. Republic Act No. 9347, June 24, 2006
E. 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
a. Rule VI. Appeals.
F. Revised Rules of Court
a. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court
b. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
c. Revised Rules of Evidence
G. The Labor Code with Comments and Cases Volume II-A and II-B by C.A. AZUCENA, JR.
H. Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. vs. Gorombalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989; Sevillana
vs. I.T. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 99047, April 16, 2001,
I. Bantolino, et al., vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003
J. Uichico, et al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121434, June 2, 1997
K. Gelmart Industries Phils. vs. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 70544, November 5, 1987 citing Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [69 Phil. 635 (1940)
L. Vir-jen Shipping vs NLRC GR No. 58011=12 July 20, 1982
M. Mc Burnie vs Gauzon GR No. 178034 and 178117 October 17, 2013
N. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Levantino et al., G.R. No. 153942, June 29, 2005
O. Computer Innovation vs NLRC GR No. 152410 June 29, 2005
P. Fernandez et al., vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 105892, January 28, 1998
Q. Sara Lee Phil. Inc., vs. Macatlang et al., G.R. No. 180, 147, June 4, 2014
R. Garcia vs NLRC GR No. 110494 Nov. 18, 1996
S. PTTC vs NLRC GR No. 80600 March 21, 1990
T. Triad Security vs. Ortega GR No. 160871 Feb. 6, 2006
U. Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118693, July 23, 1998
V. Waterfront Cebu vs Ledesma GR No. 197556 March 25, 2015
W. Reyes vs NLRC GR No. 180551 Feb. 10, 2009
X. Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 185220 : July 27, 2009
Y. Domdom v. Third & Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 182382-83

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 Z. Republic v. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012
AA.Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014
BB. Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
CC.Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998
DD. Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 141600. September 12, 200
EE. Star Angel vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 108914 September 20, 1994
FF. Gensoli v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113051. April 22, 1998

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