RULE 67: Expropriation

1. Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, 20 June 2000 (DAVID)

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls

within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the
subject property.

Facts:

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1)
3 a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated
April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It reasoned that eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take
private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action
for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of
such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely
incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not within this Court.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an
action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the
property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed
before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.

Aggrieved, Petition for Review on Certiorari appealed directly to this Court,

raising a pure question of law assailing the RTC’s decision.

Issue:

Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or
expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

Ruling:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether

an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover money, or where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have
the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in
actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class
cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other
factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of
first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first
organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
 In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum
of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and
right to take private property for public use.

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is

whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms,

for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government
does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent
sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public
benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand."

2. National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 (1992) (DE GUZMAN)
Facts:
Petitioner NAPOCOR filed seven (7) eminent domain cases before the RTC of Bacolod
City for the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to the
necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good with the offer of
corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process.
However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case.

Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation and
thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas
based on tax declaration of the properties. In compliance to the order of respondent judge,
petitioner deposited corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the
amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National Bank.

Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed
value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as
P29,970,000.00. Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the
provisional value to that stated in the motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to
deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from receipt of order while holding in
abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said order which the
petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to pay
in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property.

Petitioner contends that such order is in violation of due process and abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondent judge, additionally respondent judge’s refusal to issue a writ
of possession until full payment, even when they had already deposited the provisional
values violated the Rules of Court and PD 42, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to the possession of the subject property after depositing the
provisional value fixed by court?

RULING:
YES. PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain
proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take
 possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with
PNB to be held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court.

In Municipality of Biñan vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al., this Court ruled that there are
two (2) stages in every action of expropriation:

1. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit.
2. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final.

In this case, the respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by failure to issue the
writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in compliance
to the mandate of PDD 42. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the
provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant
petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and
directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.

3. Visayan Refining Co. V. Camus, 40 Phil. 550 (1919) (FERNANDO) Sorry kung pangit. Di ko
magets :(
Facts: Upon the direction of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General filed a
complaint with the CFI (Rizal) in the name of the Government of the Philippines for the
condemnation of a certain tract of land in Paranaque for military and aviation purposes.
The petitioners herein are among the defendants named. Likewise, it was prayed that the
court will give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated after the
necessary deposit (provisional) of P600, 000.00 as the total value of the property.
Through the order of the public respondent, Judge Camus, the prayer was granted.

During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrer questioning the
validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no law authorizing the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved for the revocation of the order on
the same ground stated and with additional allegation that the deposit had been made
without authority of law since the money was taken from the unexpended balance of the
funds appropriated by previous statutes for the use of the Militia Commission and the
authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain could not be found in those
statutes. The demurrer and motion were overruled and denied respectively by Camus.
This prompted the petitioners to file this instant petition to stop the proceedings in the
CFI.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Government can initiate expropriation proceedings
in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

Ruling: Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very complete scheme of judicial
expropriation, deducing the authority from its ultimate source in sovereignty, providing in
detail for the manner of its exercise, and making the right of the expropriator finally
depended upon payment of the amount awarded by the court.

As has already been indicated the petition before us proceeds on the idea that the
expropriation proceedings in question cannot be maintained by the Philippine
Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for military and aviation purposes; and while it is not urged that a special
legislative Act must be passed every time any particular parcel of property is to be
expropriated, it is claimed and this really amounts to the same thing that the Government
cannot institute and prosecute expropriation proceedings unless there is already in
existence a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for the land to be taken.

We are of the opinion that the contentions of the petitioners, in whatever way they may be
understood or expressed, are not well founded.

It is undeniable that a military establishment is essential to the maintenance of organized

society, and the courts will take judicial notice of the recent progress of the military and
naval arts resulting from the development of aeronautics.

expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the

Governor-General, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that
already on the statute books.

Furthermore, if the Government complies with the requirements of law relative to the
making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be at once given
to it, just as is permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized by law to
exercise the power of eminent domain. Special legislative authority for the buying of a
piece of land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of pins;
and in the case of a forced taking of property against the will of the owner, all that can be
required of the government is that it should be able to comply with the conditions laid
down by law as and when those conditions arise.

The contention that the authority to maintain such a proceeding cannot be delegated by
the Legislature to the Chief Executive, is in our opinion wholly erroneous and apparently
has its basis in a misconception of fundamentals. It is recognized by all writers that the
power of... eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms.

The provisions now generally found in the modern laws or constitutions of civilized
countries to the effect that private property shall not be taken for public use without
compensation have their origin in the recognition of a necessity for restraining the
sovereign and protecting the individual.

The provisions now generally found in the modern laws or constitutions of civilized
countries to the effect that private property shall not be taken for public use without
compensation have their origin in the recognition of a necessity for restraining the...
sovereign and protecting the individual.

Moreover, as will be at once apparent, the performance of the administrative acts

necessary to the exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of the state is lodged
by tradition in the Sovereign or other Chief Executive. Therefore, when the Philippine
Legislature declared in section 64 of the Administrative Code, that the Governor-General,
who exercises supreme executive power in these Islands should be the person to direct
the initiation of expropriation proceedings, it placed the authority exactly where one
would expect to find it, and we can conceive of no ground upon which the efficacy of the
statute can reasonably be questioned.

Even if there were no organic or constitutional provision in force requiring compensation

to be paid, the seizure of one's property without payment, even though intended for a
public use, would undoubtedly be held to be a taking without due process of law and a
denial of the equal protection of the laws.

Notes:
METHOD OF EXPROPRIATION.—If the Legislature prescribes a method of
expropriation which provides for the payment of just compensation and such method is so
conceived and adapted as to fulfill the constitutional requisite of due process of law, any
expropriation accomplished in conformity with that method is valid.
 PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.—There is no organic or constitutional provision in
force in these Islands requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the
judgment of condemnation.

PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION AS PREREQUISITE TO ACQUISITION OF

PROPERTY.—The system of expropriation prescribed by laws in force in these Islands
affords absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from
an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. In this connection our courts are directed
to make such final order and judgment as shall secure just compensation for the land
taken, and the right of the expropriator is finally made absolutely dependent upon the
payment of compensation by him.

GIVING OF PROVISIONAL POSSESSION TO GOVERNMENT ; OFFICE OF

PRELIMINARY DEPOSIT.—Where provisional possession is given to the Government
in an expropriation proceeding, upon the making of the deposit required by Act No. 2826
of the Philippine Legislature, the owner of the land is fully protected from any loss that
might result from the temporary occupation of the land by the Government in the event
that the Legislature should finally fail to appropriate any additional amount necessary to
satisfy the award of the court; for such preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of
prepayment upon the value of the property, if finally expropriated, and as an indemnity
against damage in the eventuality that the proceeding should fail of consummation.

4. Municipality of Binan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989) (PEÑA)

● There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with a
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The
second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
Court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the
Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

● A decision or order of partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done
in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, i.e, the appointment of
commissioners, the proceedings for the determination by said commissioners of just
compensation, the submission of their reports, and hearing thereon, and the approval of
the partition

● The Court holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no
less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of
condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice of said order and not the ordinary
period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the
provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of
the Implementing Rules to the effect that in “appeals in special proceedings in accordance
with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.

Facts: The Municipality of Biñan, Laguna filed a complaint before the RTC of San
Pablo for an expropriation suit. Therein involved defendants are the owners of eleven
(11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan. The land was intended for use as the new site of a
modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan. The Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor
of the plaintiff Municipality.
Erlinda Francisco, one of the defendant owners, filed a "Motion for Separate
Trial," and Motion to Dismiss. She claims that Municipality had submitted and obtained
approval of a "rezoning of the lots in question," it was premature for it to "file a case for
expropriation. The Court granted the motion for separate trial.
At the separate trial, Francisco presented the testimony of Atty. Josue L. Jorvina,
Jr. and exhibits the Land Use Map of the Municipality of Biñan, the Locational Clearance
and Development Permit. Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an Order granting the
Motion to Dismiss of Francisco. It dismissed the complaint for an expropriation suit
 against Francisco and amended the writ of possession to exclude the property. On the
ground that the clearance was a legal bar against the right of plaintiff Municipality to
expropriate the said property. The Municipality filed MR.
Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order,"
contending that the said Order of July 27, 1984 had become "final and executory on
August 12, 1984" for failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal within the reglementary period," fifteen (15) days counted from the notice
of the final order appealed from.
The Court issued an Order declaring the Municipality's motion for
reconsideration dated August 15, 1984 to have been "filed out of time. The Municipality
filed an MR to reconsider for both orders of finality and to the dismissal of the
expropriation suit. However, their motion was denied.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari at bar.

Issue(s): 1.) whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court is a case, the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, instead of fifteen
(15) days.
2.) Whether or not a "locational clearance issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an expropriation suit

Ruling:1.) The special civil action of eminent domain shall be within 30 days. The Court
holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two
(2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is
thirty (30) days counted from notice of said order and not the ordinary period of fiteen
(15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing Rules
to the effect that in “appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal
shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required. In this case, the municipality's
motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely presented, well
within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefore; and it was error for the Trial
Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered
had become final and executory.

2.) No. The SC finds that the trial court was wrong for dismissing the said action.
Nothing in the record, discloses any circumstances from which a waiver by the
Municipality of the right to present contrary proofs may be inferred. So, in deciding the
issue without giving the Municipality that right to present contrary evidence, the Trial
Court had effectively denied the Municipality due process.
The SC will have to sustain the Municipality’s claim on the ground that
subsequently rendering its order sustaining Francisco's defense and dismissing the action
as to her, solely on the basis of said Francisco's evidence and without giving the plaintiff
an opportunity to present its own evidence on the issue.
The Court explained that the reception of Francisco's evidence first was wrong,
because obviously, her asserted objection or defense that the locational clearance issued
in her favor by the HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit was not a ground for
dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove the Municipality's lack of cause of
action but lack of cause of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action under Rule 16.
The ground is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which is obviously
not the same as plaintiff's not having a cause of action.

5. Provincial Government of Rizal v. Caro de Araullo, 58 Phil. 308 (1933) (DAVID)

[G.R. No. 36096. August 16, 1933.]

The value of the property expropriated was greatly enhanced between the time when the
extension of Taft Avenue was laid out and the date when the condemnation proceedings
were filed. Its value had further increased when the commissioners held hearings a year
and a half after these proceedings were filed. The value of the property was enhanced by
the purpose for which it was taken. The owners of the land have no right to recover
damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public
improvement for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow
them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is
the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the
construction of important public improvements.

The property is to be considered in its condition and situation at the time it is taken, and
not as enhanced by the purpose for which it is taken.

NOTE: Mahaba yung case ‘cause discuss lahat nung 52 lots dito about sa price ng
property nila. Iba-iba kasi may-ari.

Facts:

Fifty-two (52) lots and the improvements on ten lots are involved in this case owned by
different owners. The complaint for expropriation was filed on May 31, 1928. Defendants
appeared and admitted plaintiff’s right to expropriate the property in question, and the
court appointed four commissions to hear the parties and view the premises, assess the
damages to be paid for the condemnation and to report their proceedings to the court.
The only question involved in the case was the determination of the damages to which
the defendants were entitled.

In the case of most of the lots the evidence consists of the owner’s estimate of the value
of his land at the time of the hearing in 1929 or 1930, and for the plaintiff the testimony of
Colin M. Hoskins. Hoskins is a real estate broker and appraiser of real property who has
been engaged in that business for 7 years. He had participated in real estate transactions
in the municipality of Pasay and in the land taken for the extension of Taft Avenue. He
testified as to the value of the property in question in 1927 before the extension of Taft
Avenue was laid out, and as to its increased value at the time of the hearing.

Commissioners Magsalin, Arguelles, and Barrios state that in appraising the land
expropriated they gave great weight to Hoskins’ valuation of the land for 1927, which they
increased slightly. An examination of the record as to the individual lots shows, however,
that in most cases the commissioners disregarded the evidence and substituted their
opinion as to the value of the property, based on the inspection made by them. This they
were not authorized to do. The RTC approved the said report of the Commissioners and
ruled that there is an increase on the value of the subject property. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

What is the just and reasonable compensation to which the appellee is entitled for the
lots taken by the appellant through the exercise of the right of eminent domain?

or

Are the damages to be based upon the value of the property when the district engineer of
Rizal Province entered upon the land and laid out the extension of Taft Avenue in 1927,
or the value on May 31, 1928 when the condemnation proceedings were filed, or on the
value of the property at the time of the hearings before the commissioners in 1929 and
1930?

Ruling:

With regard to the value of the lots:

As clearly appears from the evidence of record, the value of the property in questions
was greatly enhanced between the time when the extension of the streets was laid out
and the date when the condemnation proceedings were filed, because of the fact that
one of the widest and most important streets in the City of Manila was to be extended
through the municipality of Pasay, thereby making the land affected practically a part of
the City of Manila and giving it a frontage on one of the city’s principal boulevards. The
 property had further increased in value when the commissioners held hearings a year
and a half after these proceedings were filed. In other words, the value of the property
was enhanced by the purpose for which it was taken. Owners of the land have no right to
recover damages for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public
improvement for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow
them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is
the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the
construction of important public improvements.

"The fundamental doctrine that private property cannot be taken for public use without
just compensation requires that the owner shall receive the market value of his property
at the time of the taking, unaffected by any subsequent change in the condition of the
property." (20 C.J., 826, 828.)

With regard to the value of the improvements:

The decision of the trial judge as to the value of the improvements on the lots mentioned
in the twelfth assignment of error is affirmed. The defendants are entitled to recover legal
interest on the value of their property from the time when it was taken by the plaintiff.

6. Republic v. Vda de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974) (DE GUZMAN) mahaba alaga siya sorry
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi from
July 1, 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to year basis, from July 1 of each
year to June 30 of the succeeding year. The Republic sought to renew the same but
Castellvi refused. The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of
the contract because it would be difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of
the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the property. Castellvi then brought a suit to eject the
Philippine Air Force from the land.

While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed on June 26, 1959 complaints
for eminent domain against the respondents over the three parcels of land. In its
complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the
above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare. The court authorized the Republic to
take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga. Furthermore, the lands in the complaint are declared
expropriated for public use, and that the fair market value of the lands is fixed at P5.00
per square meter.

During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings began.
The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period,
and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE:

WON the compensation should be determined as of 1947 (when the contract of lease
commenced) or 1959(when the expropriation proceedings began)? 1959

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the property was deemed taken only when the
expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959, as such the value of just compensation
shall be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year.
 The elements of “taking” of property for purposes of eminent domain are: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be
for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In this case, the 2nd and 5th element was lacking. Therefore, the “taking’ of the Castellvi
property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the
same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the
Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of
that year.

Moreover, under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation”
is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled
that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the
Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the
Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was
filed.

7. Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987) (FERNANDO)
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which
these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the
government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation.

The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the
aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which empowers the
petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of
export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of
establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.

Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners
to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the
government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied and a hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further hearing of the expropriation case.

Issue: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been
repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533/ is the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional

Ruling: No. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
 property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court.

Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not held before
the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings
would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence
in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess

the just compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings, is the
well-entrenched ruling that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from
expropriating authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession
thereof was actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages—including
attorney's fees—from which the consequential benefits, if any should be deducted, with
interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after the date of
actual taking.

In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation
which the Court may consider as one of the factors in arriving at 'just compensation/ as
envisaged in the Constitution.

Therefore,the Court held that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to
appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and
void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why the Court exists in
the first place.

8. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. V. Republic, 143 SCRA 466 (1986) (PEÑA)

● The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar the
Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent
domain covers all forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes
rights which are attached to land.

Facts:The Republic filed before the CFI of Benguet and Baguio a complaint for
expropriation against ten (10) defendants, among them Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The
Republic stated that it needed the property for the site of the PMA. It also averred that it
had occupied since May 6, 1950, the area covered by the mining claims of the defendants
and had already installed therein permanent buildings and other valuable improvements
in the belief that the area was unoccupied portions of the public domain. According to the
Appraisal Committee constituted under Administrative Order No. 144, the President
directed that the reasonable and fair market value of the rights and interests of all the
defendants cannot exceed the total sum of P532,371.40.
Benguet Inc. then filed a motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the Republic did not
need and has not occupied the areas covered. Also, they stated that the ground is rugged
in terrain for which the Philippine Military Academy could have no use.
They also alleged that the authority given by the President of the Philippines for
the expropriation proceedings refers to privately owned mineral lands, mining interests,
and other private interests of private individuals and entities of private individuals in
certain portions of the site surveyed for and presently occupied by the Philippine Military
Academy at Loakan, Baguio.
The trial court heard Benguet Consolidated Inc.’s motion to dismiss. Since the
possibility of an amicable settlement was raised, the representatives of both parties agreed
that pending any definite settlement, the hearing of the motion to dismiss would be held
in abeyance. The trial court issued an order that the defendants are no longer challenging
plaintiff’s right to condemn the property, and the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is
hereby declared to have lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned.
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. took exception to the order of condemnation by filing
a motion stating that it had not manifested, impliedly or expressly that it was no longer
challenging the plaintiff’s right to expropriate its former mineral claims. In the same
motion, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. moved for the setting of a date for the continuation of
the hearing of its motion to dismiss.
In the course of the proceedings, a Board of Commissioners to assess and
establish the reasonable amount of compensation was formed. The Board of
Commissioners submitted their report recommending the payment of P43,703.37 to the
ten (10) defendants as just compensation. The parties filed their objections to the
Commissioners’ report. The trial court rejected the Commissioners’ Report and made its
own findings and conclusions. On its order, the trial court rendered that the "just
compensation of the surface area of the four (4) claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. in
the amount of P128,051.82 with interest at 6% per annum from May 6, 1950 until fully
paid, plus attorney’s fees in an amount equal to 5% of the sum fixed
On appeal before the IAC, it reversed and set aside the findings of the trial court.
The appellate court ordered that (1) condemning the mineral claims described in the
complaint belonging to the defendants for the public use. (2) adjusted the just
compensation to be paid to Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 25.1082 Has. x P300.00
7,532.46.
Hence, this petition for review filed before the SC.

Issue(s): 1.) whether the perfection of a mining claim grants exclusive possession even
against the government
2.) whether or not in expropriation proceedings an order of condemnation may be entered
by the court before a motion to dismiss is denied.

Ruling:1.) No. The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that the
petitioner’s property is no longer part of the public domain. The power of eminent
domain refers to the power of government to take private property for public use. If the
mineral claims are public, there would be no need to expropriate them. The mineral
claims of the petitioner are not being transferred to another mining company or to a
public entity interested in the claims as such. The land where the mineral claims were
located is needed for the Philippine Military Academy, a public use completely unrelated
to mining.
The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected does not bar the
Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain
covers all forms of private property, tangible or intangible, and includes rights which are
attached to land.
2.) No. the steps from Secs. 4, 5, and 6 must follow one another is evident from the
provisions of the rules as well as from the inter-relation between the steps and the
dependence of one upon the previous step. Therefore, no order of condemnation may be
entered if the motion to dismiss has not been passed upon and over-ruled, and no
assessment should be undertaken unless and until an order of condemnation has already
been entered.
The first step is the presentation by defendants of their objections and defenses to
the right of plaintiff to take the property for the use specified, which objections and
defenses shall be set forth in a single motion to dismiss (Section 4). The second is the
hearing on the motion and the unfavorable resolution thereon by the court. That an
adverse resolution on the motion to dismiss, if objections and defenses are presented, is
required because the rule (Sec. 5) authorizes the court to enter an order of condemnation
only if the motion to dismiss is overruled, or if no motion to dismiss had been presented.
The second step includes the order of condemnation, which may be embodied in the
resolution overruling the motion to dismiss. The third is the appointment of
commissioners to assess the just compensation for the property (Sec. 6).
In the instant case the ruling on the motion to dismiss was deferred by the trial
court in view of a possible amicable settlement. The order of the lower court was not
challenged by the petitioner. Instead, it filed its second motion for clarification. The
 order of the lower court was not challenged by the petitioner. Instead, it filed its second
motion for clarification. It is to be noted that in its motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration, the petitioner stated: "Defendant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., does not
dispute the right of the government to exercise the power of eminent domain with respect
to its property. However, in so doing this Court failed to comply with the basic
constitutional provision that said power can only be exercised upon payment of just
compensation. . . ." Under these circumstances, the petitioner is estopped from
questioning the proceedings of condemnation followed by the court.
After a party whose mineral land is being expropriated has shifted its position to
the issue only of just compensation, it cannot later claim that its motion to dismiss (which
operates as an answer in expropriation cases) should have been first before entry of
condemnation order. It is very clear from the statements of the petitioner that it had
already abandoned its earlier stand on the propriety of expropriation and that its intent
shifted to the just compensation to be paid by the plaintiff for its condemned properties.

9. Coscolluela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, 15 August 1988 (DAVID)

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases,
an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever
private property is taken for public use. Just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of
the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner who is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

Facts:

On March 8, 1976, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo
owned by petitioner Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction
of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project.

On April 4, 1976, the trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation and
ordered the public respondent to pay the plaintiffs. The CA modified the RTC’s judgment.
On motion of the petitioner, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to
implement the judgment of the appellate court.

Respondent Republic filed a motion to set aside the order of May 7, 1986 as well as the
writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, contending that the funds of the National
Irrigation Authority (NIA) are government funds and therefore, cannot be disbursed
without a government appropriation. The lower court issued an order directing instead
that the respondent Republic deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the
name of the petitioner, the amount adjudged in favor of the latter. The appellate court
rendered the questioned decision setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial
court on the ground that public or government funds are not subject to levy and
execution.

In this instant petition, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court as being
violative of his right to just compensation and due process of law. As admitted by the
respondent Republic, the NIA took possession of the expropriated property in 1975 and
for around ten (10) years already, it has been servicing the farmers on both sides of the
Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project in Iloilo Province and has been collecting fees therefor by
way of taxes at the expense of the petitioner. On the other hand, the petitioner, who is
already more than eighty (80) years old and sickly, is undergoing frequent hospitalization,
and is made to suffer further by the unconscionable delay in the payment of just
compensation based on a final and executory judgment.

Issue:
 Whether or not public funds such as those of the respondent NIA cannot be disbursed
without the proper appropriation.

Ruling:

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases,
an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation whenever
private property is taken for public use.

In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in operation since
1976. The project is benefitting the farmers specifically and the community in general.
Obviously, the petitioner’s land cannot be returned to him. However, it is high time that
the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious
for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s property,
allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on
the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably
used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government
officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.

Needless to state, no government instrumentality, agency, or subdivision has any

business initiating expropriation proceedings unless it has adequate funds, supported by
proper appropriation acts, to pay for the property to be seized from the owner. Not only
was the government able to make an initial deposit of P2,097.30 but the project was
finished in only a year’s time. We agree with the petitioner that before the respondent NIA
undertook the construction of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project, the same was duly
authorized, with the corresponding funds appropriated for the payment of expropriated
land and to pay for equipment, salaries of personnel, and other expenses incidental to
the project. The NIA officials responsible for the project have to do plenty of explaining as
to where they mis-directed the funds intended for the expropriated property.

In the present case, the Barotac Viejo Project was a package project of the government.
Money was allocated for an entire project. Before bulldozers and ditch diggers tore up the
place and before millions of pesos were put into the development of the project, the basic
responsibility of paying the owners for property seized from them should have been met.

Another distinction lies in the fact that the NIA collects fees for the use of the irrigation
system constructed on the petitioner’s land. It does not have to await an express act of
Congress to locate funds for this specific purpose. The rule in earlier precedents that the
functions and public services rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects
(Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, supra, at p. 625) is not applicable here.
There is no showing of any public service to be disrupted if the fees collected from the
farmers of Iloilo for the use of irrigation water from the disrupted property were utilized to
pay for that property. The petitioner’s land was not taken for the construction of a road,
bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the
National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects for rent
or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems and
sells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominy for the
agencies to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering
the payment of just compensation to the former owners.
chanrolebs.com : virtual law library

10. Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, 29 June 2005 (DE GUZMAN)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

11. Vda De Ouano v. Republic, G.R. No. 168770, 09 February 2011 (FERNANDO)
Facts: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency
pursued a program to expand theLahug Airport in Cebu City. As an assurance from the
government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said property so long as
Lahug ceases its operation or transfers its operation to Mactan-Cebu Airport.
Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a
complaint for the expropriation of said properties for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said
projects and ordered for just compensation to the land owners, at the same time directed
the latter to transfer certificate of ownership or title in the name of the plaintiff.

At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the
Mactan-Cebu airport opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights.
This then prompted the landowners to demand for thereconveynace of said properties
being expropriated by the trial court under the power of eminent domain. Hence, these
two consolidated cases arise.

In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the
land owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled
in favor of the petitioners Oaunos and against the MCIAA for the reconveyance of their
properties but was appealed by the latter and the earlier decision was reversed, the case
went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the reversed decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the abandonment of public use of the expropriated properties
entitles the petitioner to reacquire them.

Ruling: The notion that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires
unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable.
Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was
absolutely transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely
entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to
sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no
occasion to apply the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is conditional.

The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its

continued devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is
terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek
its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation
received.

In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really
without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words,
in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the
mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state
must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private
property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or
condition as it were—allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of
the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the
property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the
declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to
another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen’s own private gain, is
offensive to our laws.