SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-25769. December 10, 1974.]

FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners, vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.

Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for
respondent.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J : p

A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial1 led this

Court to act affirmatively on a certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a
case then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering the length of time
that had elapsed, it is readily discernible why an inquiry into the matter is
well-nigh unavoidable. The accusation for robbery against petitioners
Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was filed as far back as December 31,
1951. The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the
crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For a
period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the
Court of Appeals. On that day, there was a resolution remanding the records
of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain
witness deemed material for the disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution
was amended by a second resolution dated August 5, 1959, which granted
the motion for counsel of appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the
decision so that evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters
may be received and that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be
rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4 Accordingly, the case was
returned to the lower court with the former decision set aside so that the
trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a year because the
offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set
for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged that when thereafter he did take
the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized as
a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged
crime, there was even a failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead of
rendering a new decision, the former one having been set aside as required
by the Court of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years having elapsed without
anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against
them due to such inordinate delay in their disposition, which covered the
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 period of December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade;
thus did they invoke their constitutional right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent
Court of Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on
the part of counsel for petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second
motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the answer on behalf
of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above set forth were
substantially admitted. However, a special and affirmative defense raised
was that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the
Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office exercising
Judicial functions and that without the Court of Appeals being made a party
to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was expressed that under
the circumstances, it was not adequately shown that the right to a speedy
trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps
necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original
trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant
for the conclusion that the right to a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in
both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due
respect. There is thus merit in the petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a
recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, . . ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were
innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety
and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be
kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of
course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As was
also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance
of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty,
or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case."
11 The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine announced, even before

the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case,

Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with the
requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be
"free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay
down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year,
the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom." 14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took
effect, People v. Castañeda, 15 where it was shown that the criminal case
had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did finally
take place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed
decision of conviction and acquitted the accused. As was pointed out by the
ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an
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 example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the
moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings
against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately
discharged from the custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the above
judgment that the dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide
was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first
information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months
from the time the original complaint was filed during which time on the three
occasions the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for
postponements and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar
for the month it was supposed to have been heard. 17 The same result
followed in Esguerra v. De la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was filed on
August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally prosecuted for an
alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a year
and three months, with the lower court twice dismissing the case, he still
had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus compelling
him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the
case was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed
appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court
on this specific issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos. 19 Here, for a period of
about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of
falsifying his deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently
withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was
able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a
motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It
ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused moved to
dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed
again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in
Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed."
20 The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial

fiscal did not intervene until an information was filed charging the accused
with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not
say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the
prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does
not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals.
Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy
trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is
authorized to be commenced." 21 The latest decision in point, Acebedo v.
Sarmiento, 22 presented an even clearer case. The information for damage
to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May
19, 1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the
motion in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now
covering almost eight years, when the trial was commenced. When one of
the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal
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 sought the postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for
dismissal. The lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him, even if
thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial
should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has
not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved
to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they
had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances
permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that
should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate
tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to
them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision
in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their
plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for
the conclusion reached by us — considering the controlling doctrine
announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been
met. The decisive question has been answered. There is an affirmation of the
worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much significance
should be attached to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the
People of the Philippines that the Court of Appeals should have been made
the party respondent. What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord
respect to this particular constitutional right. It did amount at the very least
to a grave abuse of discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading may then
be singled out, it cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one of the most
important safeguards granted an accused. To deny petitioners the remedy
sought would be to exalt form over substance. At any rate, the petition could
be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the defenses that could have interposed to justify the action taken
were invoked by the People of the Philippines. They certainly did not avail.
Our decisions on the right to a speedy Trial speak too categorically to be
misread. This is one of those situations then where, in the apt language of
the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give
way to the realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores,
et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its
order of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the
order of January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for reconsideration are
hereby set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The
criminal case against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are
ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.

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 Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:

My concurrence is predicated upon the fact that the previous decision

was set aside by the Resolution of August 5, 1959 of the Court of Appeals.
There is, therefore, no abandonment or modification of the principle
enunciated in Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden (78 Phil., 608-609).

Footnotes
1. According to Article III, sec. 1, par. 17 of the 1935 Constitution: "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf." Such a provision is reproduced substantially as worded in Article IV,
Section 19 of the present Constitution. The requirement at present includes
an impartial as well as a speedy and public trial. Moreover, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused,
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.

2. Petition, pars. 1-3.

3. Ibid, par. 4.
4. Ibid, par. 5.

5. Ibid, par. 6.
6. Ibid, par. 7.

7. Ibid, par. 8.
8. Ibid, par. 9.

9. L-28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247.

10. Ibid, 249.
11. Ibid, 250.

12. 45 Phil. 650.

13. Ibid, 651.

14. Ibid, 652.

15. 63 Phil. 480 (1936).

16. Ibid, 486.

17. Cf. Kalaw v. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852 (1937).
18. 66 Phil. 134 (1938).
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 19. 66 Phil. 215 (1938).

20. Ibid, 234-235.

21. Ibid, 234.
22. L-28025, December 16, 1970, 36 SCRA 247.

23. Urbayan v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., L-15379, August 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016.

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