Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015septemberdecisions.php?

id=847

G.R. No. 214883, September 02, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. CRISTINA SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 214883, September 02, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISTINA SAMSON, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For review in this appeal is the May 6, 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, which affirmed the September 27, 2012 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12285,
convicting accused-appellant Cristina Samson (Cristina) for parricide committed against
her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), and sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The Antecedents

On August 14, 2002, Cristina was charged with the crime of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information
articulates the following criminal charges, viz: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 27th day of June, 2002 in Tarlac City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with intent to kill her husband Gerry Delmar, with whom she was united in lawful
wedlock, armed herself with a deadly weapon, a knife, and stabbed said Gerry Delmar
on his chest, which resulted to his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

When arraigned almost four (4) years later, Cristina entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the parties agreeing to a reverse trial on
account of her invocation of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Version of the Defense

The version of Cristina appears in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant 4 as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On June 27, 2002, CRISTINA SAMSON (Cristina) was in their house watching television
together with her children when her husband, Gerry Delmar (Gerry), who was drunk at
that time, arrived. Gerry asked Cristina if she had cooked food already but the latter
answered in the negative because she had no money to buy food. Gerry scolded and
uttered words against her, and then slapped her. They had an altercation for about ten
(10) minutes when Cristina's father arrived and pacified them. Gerry left but after thirty
(30) minutes, he returned. He pointed a knife at Cristina's neck. The latter begged
Gerry not to hurt her and to pity their children if something happens to her. Gerry
continued pointing the knife and told Cristina to stop talking or otherwise, he will put a
hole in her neck. Then, Gerry slapped Cristina's face twice. While Gerry was still holding
the knife, Cristina pushed him and he fell on the ground. She took the knife which
Gerry was holding and begged him not to come near her. She was holding the knife
near her chest pointed at Gerry when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time
that the knife went in contact with his chest. When she saw her husband bloodied, she
shouted for help and her father (Rodolfo Samson) and brother (Allan Samson) came
and brought Gerry to the hospital. Her relatives told her that Gerry died in the hospital.
(TSN, September 6, 2006, pp. 14-27)

On June 27, 2002, ALLAN SAMSON (Allan) was at home watching television with his
father. He heard yelling and shouting from the house of his sister Cristina and brother-
in-law Gerry. Since it was just ordinary for him to hear his sister and brother-in-law
fight, he and his father just ignored it. After fifteen (15) minutes of listening to their
quarrel, they heard Cristina cry for help. Upon hearing this, he immediately went to the
house of his sister and saw her holding Gerry and she requested him and his father to
bring Gerry to the hospital. They called a tricycle and he, together with his father,
brought Gerry to Talon General Hospital. The doctor, however, declared that Gerry was
already dead. Then, the tanod arrives and Allan instructed the tanod to call the siblings
and relatives of Gerry. When the relatives arrived, they went home. (TSN, November
18, 2006, pp. 4-6)5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief for the Appellee,6 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) provided the
following as its Counter-Statement of Facts: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On January 25, 1994, appellant Cristina Samson and victim Jerry Delmar were married.
They were blessed with two (2) daughters namely Christine and Cherrie Lou. The
couple lived in their own house which is just adjacent to the house of appellant's family.
The union of the two was never a peaceful one. Constant quarrels filled their household
and occurred in front of their children and other relatives.

On June 27, 2002, appellant and the victim had one of their usual fights. As testified by
appellant herself, she and her two children were watching television in their home when
the victim arrived drunk. Victim asked for his dinner but appellant was not able to cook
food which led to the fight. Christine, the youngest daughter of the appellant and the
victim, narrated that she witnessed the fight between her parents, that as the fight
escalated, appellant was able to get hold of the knife which was placed on the roof and
stabbed the victim. The victim fell on the ground and crawled until he reached the door.
Cristine remembered that people arrived in their home, helped the victim board a
tricycle and brought him to the hospital. Appellant, on the other hand, ran out and went
to her father and asked for money and left. That was the last night that Christine and
Cherry Lou saw their mother.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Ruling of the RTC

In its September 27, 2012 Decision, the RTC found the proffered self-defense of
Cristina to be untenable. In its view, there was no longer any threat to her life before
she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though there was an existent danger as there was an
altercation before the stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when, as
admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even concluded that it was
she who provoked him when she suddenly pushed him to the ground. She then took
the knife and told him not to come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed him.
After she took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak
of that would necessitate the need to kill Gerry. 8 Thus, the decretal portion of the RTC
decision reads in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding accused CRISTINA SAMSON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the felony of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, accused CRISTINA SAMSON is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
"Reclusion Perpetua" pursuant to R.A. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines).

Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Christine S. Delmar and
Cherrie Lo S. Delmar the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It stated that although there could have been an
unlawful aggression at the start when Gerry repeatedly slapped Cristina and held a
knife at her throat, it already disappeared when he put down the knife. According to the
CA, it was this precise act that gave Cristina the opportunity to push her husband and
gain control of the knife. Moreover, the fact that she fled and evaded arrest for four (4)
years contradicted her claim of innocence.10 The CA disposed as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 27, 2012 of the RTC, Branch 65, Tarlac
City in Criminal Case No. 12285, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay
damages and the cost of suit, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Hence, this appeal. chanrobleslaw

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not the CA erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of Cristina.

Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for
review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 12 Considering that
what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, this Court has
meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds
that there is merit in her appeal.

There appears to be a conflict between the testimony of Cristina and her daughter,
Christine Delmar (Christine). Cristina claimed that she got the knife from her husband
who fell down after she pushed him. After taking possession of the deadly weapon, she
told her husband not to come near her. She was holding the knife near her chest and
pointed towards him when he suddenly grabbed her and that was the time that the
knife went in contact with her husband's chest.

Christine, however, perceived it differently. According to her, she witnessed the fight
between her parents. She narrated that as the fight escalated, her mother was able to
get hold of a knife, which was inserted in the roof, and used it in stabbing her father.

Both the RTC and the CA believed the version of Cristina, but both were of the view
that before she stabbed her husband, there was no more imminent danger to her life.
For said reason, her fatal stabbing of her husband was not justified. chanrobleslaw

The Court's Ruling

Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the

accused that he committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon
the accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however, admits killing
the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by
clear and convincing evidence.13 Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. 14

To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the

accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 15

Presence of Unlawful Aggression even if Aggressor was Disarmed

Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important that needs to be proved by
the accused, for it to prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression. It must be proven
first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense.16 When the Court speaks of unlawful
aggression, it is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when
he puts the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense in actual or imminent
danger. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is present
only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. It must be
continuous, otherwise, it does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense. 17

The question now is: was there unlawful aggression when Cristina killed her husband?
The Court answers in the affirmative.

The Court hesitates to share the observation of the RTC and the CA that Cristina failed
to discharge the burden of proving that unlawful aggression was present when she
killed her husband.

Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry's aggression had already ceased when
he was disarmed, it is the Court's view that the aggression still continued. Her
perceived peril to her life continued and persisted until she put an end to it.

It must be noted that after she was able to take hold of the knife from her husband, he
did not stand down but, instead, continued to move towards her despite her plea that
he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated
her well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able to wrest the
weapon from her. It was not farfetched to presume that, being stronger, he could have
easily overpowered her and eventually killed her.

A similar situation was presented in the case of People v. Rabandaban18 (Rabandaban),

wherein the Court ruled that despite the fact that the accused succeeded in wresting
the bolo from his wife, he was still justified in using the weapon against her because his
life was still in danger. The Court explained:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxx When appellant got possession of the bolo he already must have been in a
precarious condition because of his wounds, one of which was described by the sanitary
inspector as "fatal" since the large intestine came out of it. And appellant, we think,
was justified in believing that his wife wanted to finish him off because,
according to the evidence, she struggled to regain possession of the bolo after
he had succeeded in wresting it from her. With the aggressor still unsubdued
and showing determination to fight to the finish, it would have been folly on
the part of appellant, who must already have been losing strength due to loss
of blood, to throw away the bolo and thus give his adversary a chance to pick
it up and again use it against him. Having the right to protect his life, appellant was
not in duty bound to expose himself to such a contingency. 19

[Emphases Supplied]
In Rabandaban, the victim, instead of running away from the accused husband after the
bolo was wrested from her, continued to struggle with him to regain possession of the
bolo. This fact, together with her husband's compromised condition, being already badly
wounded, justified him in finally neutralizing his wife who was then determined in
putting an end to his life. In the case at bench, the unlawful aggression would have
ceased if he just walked away from the scene considering that Cristina had gained the
upper hand, being the one in possession of the knife. Instead, Gerry chose to ignore
her plea not to come near her and continued moving towards her without regard to his
safety despite the fact that the knife was pointed towards his direction.

In both Rabandaban and the present case, the victims, despite having been disarmed,
still posed a threat to the lives of the accused. The danger to their lives persisted
leaving them with no other choice but to defend themselves lest they be the ones to be
victimized.
In that situation, Cristina had reasons to believe that her life was still in danger. It is to
be noted that before she was able to take hold of the weapon, her husband held the
same knife and pointed it at her throat. So when he, who was taller and stronger,
approached her and grabbed her by the arm, it was instinctive for her to take the
extreme precautionary measure by stabbing him before he could get back the knife and
make good his earlier threat of putting a hole in her throat.

Contrary to the trial court's assessment, she did not show aggression towards her
husband when she pushed him after he pointed the knife away from her. She was, in
fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards him when she just stood her ground, with
the knife in hand, asking him not to come near her.20

It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife, walked away and
Cristina still went after him. If that were the case, she could not assert self-defense.
She was no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation for the earlier aggression.
Retaliation is inconsistent with self-defense and in fact belies it. In retaliation, the
aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused
attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was
injured by the accused.21

Now that unlawful aggression has already been established, it is well to consider the
other two requisites in order to determine whether the self-defense is complete or
incomplete.

Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed

The requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed is met if the person
invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner equivalent to the means of attack
used by the aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the self-defense utilized by an
accused is to defend himself "depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the
physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as
well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the
occasion of the assault."22 Moreover, the nature and location of wounds are considered
important indicators whether or not to disprove a plea of self-defense. 23

In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victim's chest supports the
argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by
stabbing him. It was a reasonable means chosen by her in view of the attending
circumstances, to wit: that her stronger husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife
to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain
from coming near her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly
weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She did not have the time
or sufficient tranquillity of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used.
In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. 24 When it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction
that act or to mitigate his liability. 25
cralawred

Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not negate the reasonableness
of the means employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the weapon used by the
one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required. 26 What the law requires
is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the
emergency, the imminent danger to which the accused is exposed, and the instinct
more than reason, that moves or impels his defense; and the proportionateness thereof
does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury. 27

Lack of Sufficient Provocation

The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. The Court cannot sustain the trial court's observation that it
was Cristina who provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving
him cannot be considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of
aggression.28 She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband
removed the knife away from her throat, to save herself from what she had perceived
to be a danger to her life. Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same
reasonable way.

Flight as an Indication of Guilt or Non-guilt

The CA took the fact of Cristina's flight and evasion of arrest for four (4) years against
her. To the appellate court, it belied her claim of innocence.

Under the attendant circumstances, the Court cannot subscribe to that view.

Generally, flight, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance

from which an inference of guilt might be established, for a truly innocent person would
normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence.29 It has been held, however, that non-flight may not be construed as an
indication of innocence either. There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is
proof of innocence, for the Court is not blind to the cunning ways of a wolf which, after
a kill, may feign innocence and choose not to flee. 30 In Cristina's case, she explained
that she took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her
husband's siblings.31 The Court finds such reason for her choice to flee acceptable. She
did not hide from the law but from those who would possibly do her harm.

The RTC and the CA might have some hesitation in accepting her explanation for her
choice of action. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, a cloud of uncertainty lingers.
In such a case, it is the duty of the Court to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.

Considering that Cristina was justified in killing her husband under Article 11, paragraph
1 of the RPC, she should be exonerated of the crime charged. For the same reason, the
Court finds no act or omission from which a civil liability may arise.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The May 6, 2014 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05832, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-
appellant, Cristina Samson, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institution for
Women, Mandaluyong City. The Superintendent is DIRECTED to cause the immediate
release of appellant, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause and to report
the action she has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid with Associate Justices Nina G.
Antonio-Valenzuela and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.  Rollo, pp. 2-9.

2
 Penned by Judge Ma. Magdalena A. Balderama. CA rollo, pp. 10-15.

3
 Id., as quoted in the RTC Decision, p. 47.

4
Rollo, pp. 33-45.

5
 Id. at 37-38.

6
 Id. at 62.

7
 Id. at 67-68.

8
 Id. at 51.

9
 Id. at 52.

10
 Id. at 7-8.

11
 Id. at 9.

12
People v. Balagat, 604 Phil. 529, 534 (2009).
13
People v. Debs Santos, G.R. No. 207818, July 23, 2014.

14
People v. Genosa, 464 Phil. 680, 714 (2004).

15
People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625, 635.

16
Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384, 396-397.

17
People v. Camilla, Jr., 620 Phil. 775, 796 (2009).

18
 85 Phil. 636 (1950).

19
 Id. at 637-638.

20
 TSN, September 6, 2006, p. 9.
21
People v. Gamez, supra note 15, at 636.

22
Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 846, 857.

23
People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 197546, March 23, 2015.

24
Jayme v. People, 372 Phil. 796, 804 (1999).

25
Rimano v. People, 462 Phil. 272, 289 (2003).

26
People v. Padua, C.A., 40 O.G. 998, as cited in Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal, Book
One, Seventeenth Ed. 180 (2008).

27
People v. Rabanal, 436 Phil. 519, 532 (2002).

28
People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366, 373 (1947).

29
People v. Beriber, G.R. No. 195243, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 528, 543-544.

30
People v. Diaz, 443 Phil. 67, 89-90 (2003).

31
 TSN, October 4, 2006, p. 15.