G.R. No.

141284               August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the
Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null
and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial
review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.  The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage
the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority.  Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character
of the police force.  Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in
violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in visibility patrols

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the
President, in a verbal directive,

The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines the Chief of the PNP
and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order.

the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the 1 

"LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
2 

President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum,

the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. 7

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:

xxx

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in
the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to
national security.

3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized
syndicates whose members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and
firepower prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP
NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes
specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro
Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile
crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-
trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office]
and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the
state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility
over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and
police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing
crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates
is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is
achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force "TULUNGAN" shall be
organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating,
monitoring and assessing the security situation.

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO

II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY
MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION. 10

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in law enforcement.

The issues raised in the present petition are:

(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;

(2) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review; and,

(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

The petition has no merit.

First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in
the petition.

Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did
he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely:

(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;

(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 12

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The 13 

term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 14 

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and
the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is
not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.

This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards
above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.

It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone,
absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action.

has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of
the operation of the joint visibility patrols.

Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the
deployment of the Marines.

What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten
Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run.

Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain
to satisfy the requirement of standing.

This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional
issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient
stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interest is involved. 16 

In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
17 

importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 

In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will
stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue
now, rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the
President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision.
According to the IBP, no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the
police force.

It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP
prays that this Court "review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment." 19

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis.

In the performance of this Court’s duty of "purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as
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unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call
out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx

The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power
is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:

xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its
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letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President,

IMPORTANT
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his
Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila..." We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the
35 

situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among
the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has
sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian
character of the police force.

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts
that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3,
Article II of the Constitution.
36 

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. 37 

It cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of
the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction.
The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally "civil" functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that
bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation, are:

1. Elections; 42

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross; 43

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters; 44

4. Amateur sports promotion and development; 45

5. Development of the culture and the arts; 46

6. Conservation of natural resources; 47

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program; 48

8. Enforcement of customs laws; 49

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities; 50

10. Conduct of licensure examinations; 51

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students; 52

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities; 53

14. Conduct of census work; 55

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board; 56

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices; 57

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units. 58

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned. What we have here is
59 

mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will
gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded.

The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which
it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his
authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the President’s
determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained
that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to
safeguard peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom
and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the
shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.