Pepper v Hart

Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, is a landmark decision of the House of
Lords on the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. The court established the
principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, under certain circumstances, the court
may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to
interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen
as a breach of parliamentary privilege.[1]

The decision met a mixed reception. While the judiciary were cautiously accepting, legal
academics argued that it violated rules of evidence, damaged the separation of powers between
the executive and Parliament and caused additional expense in cases. The decision was subjected
to an assault by Lord Steyn in his Hart Lecture, delivered on 16 May 2000 and titled "Pepper v
Hart: A Re-examination", in which he disputed exactly what the House of Lords had meant by
their decision and also attacked the logic and legal theory behind it. Since Steyn's lecture, there
have been several judicial decisions which limited the precedent set by the House of Lords,
preventing the use of Hansard as a source of law, in criminal law cases or to overrule precedent
set prior to Pepper except in exceptional circumstances. The result of these changes, according to
Stefan Vogenauer, is that "the scope of Pepper v Hart has been reduced to such an extent that the
ruling has almost become meaningless".[2]

House of Lords

Again appealed, the case came before a 5-judge panel of the House of Lords, consisting of Lord
Mackay, Lord Keith, Lord Bridge, Lord Griffiths, Lord Ackner, Lord Oliver and Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. They initially agreed with the Court of Appeal by a 4-1 majority. [12] At the end of the
preliminary hearing, the judges became aware that, during the Finance Act's committee stage,
Financial Secretary to the Treasury Robert Sheldon remarked (in response to a question about
places for the children of teachers at fee-paying schools) "He mentioned the children of teachers.
The removal of clause 54(4) will affect the position of a child of one of the teachers at the child's
school because now the benefit will be assessed on the cost to the employer, which would be
very small indeed in this case", implying that the "expense" is meant to be the cost to the school,
not the average cost of having a pupil there. As a result of this discovery, the House of Lords
chose to reconvene as a 7-judge panel, including the Lord Chancellor.[13]

The court reconvened and issued its judgment on 26 November 1992, read by Browne-
Wilkinson. Browne-Wilkinson found in favour of Hart, and on the subject of Hansard wrote that:

My Lords, I have come to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, there are sound reasons for
making a limited modification to the existing rule [that Hansard may not be used] unless there
are constitutional or practical reasons which outweigh them. In my judgment, subject to the
questions of the privileges of the House of Commons, reference to Parliamentary material should
be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the
literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in court to
Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material clearly discloses the
mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words. In
the case of statements made in Parliament, as at present advised I cannot foresee that any
statement other than the statement of the Minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet
these criteria.[14]

In prior cases, the fear had been expressed that using parliamentary debates as evidence in court
could violate parliamentary privilege, under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688.[15] Browne-
Wilkinson held that:

In my judgment, the plain meaning of article 9, viewed against the historical background in
which it was enacted, was to ensure that Members of Parliament were not subjected to any
penalty, civil or criminal for what they said and were able, contrary to the previous assertions of
the Stuart monarchy, to discuss what they, as opposed to the monarch, chose to have discussed.
Relaxation of the rule will not involve the courts in criticising what is said in Parliament. The
purpose of looking at Hansard will not be to construe the words used by the Minister but to give
effect to the words used so long as they are clear. Far from questioning the independence of
Parliament and its debates, the courts would be giving effect to what is said and done there.[16]

Agreeing with Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Griffiths also wrote, in regards to legislative

The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation
which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a
purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared
to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation
was enacted.[17]

Mackay, in his dissenting judgment, came to the same conclusion as the rest of the House on the
interpretation of the Finance Act, but without the use of Hansard. Although he agreed that such a
use would not violate Article 9, he argued that it was not appropriate:

I believe that practically every question of statutory construction that comes before the courts
will involve an argument that the case [could use Hansard]. It follows that the parties' legal
advisors will require to study Hansard in practically every such case to see whether or not there
is any help to be gained from it. I believe this is an objection of real substance. It is a practical
objection not one of principle ... such an approach appears to me to involve the possibility at
least of an immense increase in the cost of litigation in which statutory construction is involved.
[18]

For several judges, the use of Sheldon's statement in Parliament was a deciding factor. In the
initial hearing, Lords Bridge,[19] Browne-Wilkinson and Oliver were all in favour of dismissing
Hart's case, later changing their mind with the new evidence available to them. [20] Lord Griffiths,
on the other hand, was not swayed by the use of Sheldon's statement; he wrote that " I should
myself have construed the section in favour of the taxpayer without recourse to Hansard".

Change to the law

Before Pepper, it was impossible to use Parliamentary discussions as evidence in court cases;
William Blackstone wrote in the 18th century that to allow judicial review of "unreasonable"
legislation was to "set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be
subversive for all government".[22] Historically, the courts had been more lenient; while this
suggestion first appears in the 14th century, with the intention that legislation was best
interpreted by those who had written it, the principle was not strongly followed. In Ash v Abdy,[nb
1]
Lord Nottingham chose to refer to the parliamentary history of the Statute of Frauds, and in
Millar v Taylor,[nb 2] the first case to explicitly state this principle (as "The sense and meaning of
an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into law, and not from the
history of changes it underwent in the House where it took its rise"),[23] the court chose to depart
from it.[24] The principle was most used during the 19th and 20th centuries, with a noted example
being Beswick v Beswick,[nb 3] where Lord Reid maintained that it would be inconvenient and
expensive for lawyers to have to refer to Hansard when preparing cases.[25] Both the English and
Scottish Law Commissions agreed with the rule in their 1969 Report on the Interpretation of
Statutes.[26]

During the late 20th century there was a gradual "retreat" from this rule; in Sagnata Investments
Ltd v Norwich Corporation,[nb 4] the courts allowed Hansard material to be submitted to
determine the purpose of legislation (but not to interpret the statute), and in Pickstone v
Freemans plc,[nb 5] it was allowed to assist in the understanding of delegated legislation. A noted
attack on the rule was made by Lord Denning in Davis v Johnson,[nb 6] where he said that
asserting that the courts could not use Hansard was similar to saying that the judges "should
grope about in the dark for the meaning of an Act without switching on the light. In some cases
Parliament is assured in the most explicit terms what the effect of a statute will be. It is on that
footing that members assent to the clause being agreed to. It is on that understanding that an
amendment is not pressed. In such cases I think the court should be able to look at the
proceedings."[27] Despite these exceptions, the courts regularly maintained that it was not possible
to use internal Parliamentary discussions as an aid to legislative interpretation.[28] The result of
Pepper was an a reversal of that rule; a court could use internal Parliamentary discussions where
it was relevant to "the very point in question in the litigation", where a piece of legislation is
"ambiguous or obscure, or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity", with the intention
being to understand "the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the
ambiguous or obscure words".[29]

The decision in Pepper has been linked to a positive move in statutory interpretation that had
been proceeding since the end of the Second World War. Previously, the dominant approach was
that of the literal rule, supplemented by the golden and mischief rules (that interpretations should
not be made if they were to lead to absurdity, and that interpretations should take into account
the intention behind the statute). These approaches all limited the amount of material which
could be used by a judge when interpreting the actions of Parliament. Following the 1969 Law
Commission report The Interpretation of Statutes, British courts began to use a more purposive
approach, which directed that when interpreting a statute they should examine the purpose
behind it, rather than simply using the text of the statute itself. [30] In effect, this widened the
amount of material judges could use, including not only the statute but reports made by
government bodies, the Law Commission and Royal Commissions. The impact of Pepper was to
include Hansard in this list of acceptable material, not only to establish the overall purpose of an
act but to define what was meant by a particular provision.

Criticism

The House of Lords' statement on parliamentary privilege was assessed by the Joint Committee
on Parliamentary Privilege, which recommended that Parliament not counter the decision in
Pepper v Hart, but cautioned that this should not lead to any further weakening of parliamentary
privilege.[45] However, academics widely condemned the decision and the thinking behind it.
Academic Aileen Kavanagh questioned the logic used; the House of Lords was essentially
saying that, where a minister has made a statement about an act's intent that was not questioned
by Parliament, that statement can be used as evidence. However, there are many reasons why
Members of Parliament might not question a statement, and this does not necessarily indicate
that they approve of it; in the case of the Finance Act, for example, it could simply be that as the
statement was not going to be added to the statute, they found no reason to actively oppose it. [46]
At the same time, different Members of Parliament may approve of a statutory provision for
different reasons. The fact that a minister gives certain reasons for including a provision does not
necessarily indicate that Parliament agrees; only that Parliament also feels, for whatever reason,
that the provision should be included.[47] The decision also raises questions about the separation
of powers in the United Kingdom; it has been consistently maintained that it is Parliament, not
the executive, which passes legislation. If one accepts that statements by the executive can allow
them to specify the meaning of particular laws without formally including them in statutes where
they can be approved by Parliament, it violates this separation of powers, allowing the executive
to make law.[48]
With these issues, Kavanagh argues that there are likely to be consequences. Firstly, if judges
replace the text of a statute with the meaning given to it by a single minister in Parliament, there
is a risk that they will attribute a meaning to it which was not supported by the MPs;
interpretations, based on the views of ministers, are more likely to reflect the executive's
intention than that of Parliament. Kavanagh also suggests that it could impact on the actions of
ministers; rather than attempting to specify law through the difficult route of placing it in
legislation, they can simply make a statement within Parliament about the legislation's intent.[49]
Lord Mackay's worry that this would increase the cost of litigation was also considered; under
Pepper, every lawyer must go through every word said in both Houses of Parliament and in the
various committees to ensure that he is giving the best advice to his client. Academics have also
expressed worry about the reliability of Hansard as a source; "the debate on the Bill is a battle of
wits often carried out under extreme pressure and excitement where much more than the passage
of this Bill may be at stake. The Ministers supporting it cannot be expected to act as if they were
under oath in a court of law".[50]

The decision also contradicted previous precedent as to the nature of evidence. John Baker notes
that it violates strong rules which exclude the use of written evidence to interpret a document,
unless the evidence was found in said document.[51] Baker also argued that ministerial statements
should not be used as evidence because they are irrelevant; "no individual member of Parliament
is in a position to state what that intention is or to speak for the silent majority. Parliament acts as
a corporate body and the only expression of its common intention is the text to which the Queen
and both Houses have given their unqualified assent. What passes in one House is not formally
known to the other". An individual MP's statements, minister or not, may be based on a fault
understanding of the legal issues; MPs regularly vote for proposals having disagreed with the
statements of the spokesman simply because they like the proposal itself.[52]

J. C. Jenkins, who interprets Pepper as making the jobs of parliamentary draftsmen much easier
in some ways, also foresees it as making the job more difficult. Because of the added resources
courts can draw on, there is now increased pressure to produce statutes which will not be
interpreted in the wrong way. Departments sponsoring legislation normally prepare briefings for
their ministers when talking in Parliament; draftsmen may now be expected to vet these, a time-
consuming process. The draftsmen may also have to look at material produced by these
departments other than the statutes, as it may be discussed in court; in Pepper, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson considered a press release produced by the Inland Revenue.[53] The decision also
changes parliamentary practice. Under previous practice, if a minister was asked a question
publicly and could not immediately reply with an answer, or publicly made a statement that later
turned out to be incorrect, he would privately write a letter explaining or correcting himself. As a
result of Pepper, such private replies may have to be made publicly. In addition, Members of
Parliament are more aware that their statements, and those statements they induct Ministers to
make, may be looked at by the courts. As a result, these statements and inducements may be
structured differently, and MPs may be more concerned that their issues be dealt with "at length
and on the record", making parliamentary proceedings "more formal, more cluttered, and more
protracted".[54]

Interpretation and later development

There has been a dispute over the interpretation of the House of Lords' intent in regards to the
use of Hansard in court, sparked by Lord Steyn's Hart Lecture on 16 May 2000, titled "Pepper v
Hart: A Re-examination". Steyn suggested that Pepper v Hart was limited to "an estoppel
argument", and Hansard's use in court should "be confined to the admission against the executive
of categorical assurances given by ministers to Parliament"; essentially, that Hansard should only
be used if it the purpose is to establish that ministers made certain assurances to Parliament, with
the intent being to prevent the executive going back on its promises.[55] Stefan Vogenauer
disagrees that this was the House of Lords' intent in Pepper, pointing out that Hart's counsel had,
during proceedings, made an argument along the lines of estoppel — one the Lords had
completely ignored when making their decision.[56]

The courts' cautiously optimistic acceptance of Pepper, which included an attempt to include it
in the House of Lords' Practice Directions, soon began to wane. Although the lower courts
applied the decision and allowed the use of Hansard, and the Lords itself initially followed it in
R v Warwickshire County Council, ex parte Johnson,[nb 8] several objections and limits were
expressed in later obiter dicta and ratio decidendi.[57] The first judicial complaints were voiced in
1997 by Lord Hoffmann in The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and Meanings, where he
criticised the increased expense and drop in efficiency which it created.[58] In a speech to the
Chancery Bar Lord Millett calling the judgment "a regrettable decision" that "was not only
misguided in practical terms, it was in my view contrary to principle", saying that:

Lord Mackay of Clashfern dissented on practical grounds. He has been proved to be entirely
right. The decision has added enormously to the costs of civil litigation. Whenever a statute falls
to be construed, no counsel can afford to ignore its parliamentary history. The extra research is
time consuming and costly, and wholly unproductive. Rather than see his time wasted, Counsel
often feels obliged to place the fruits of his research before the court, thus prolonging the hearing
at still more expense. Yet in the seven years since the decision, I am aware of no case where the
material has been determinative, not even in Pepper v. Hart itself.[59]

The courts immediately began to "whittle down" the precedent set by Pepper.[2] The first direct
attack came through Massey v Boulden,[nb 9] where the Court of Appeal held that Hansard could
not be used in criminal law cases, since "the principle that penal statutes are to be narrowly
construed intervenes to resolve any ambiguity without resort to Hansard".[60]

In Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Lords Hobhouse, Hoffman and Millett
said that Mackay, with his dissenting judgment, had "turned out to be the better prophet", with
large amounts of inefficiency and expense associated with Pepper. In the Spath Holme judicial
review case,[nb 10] Lords Bingham, Hope and Hutton held that Hansard could only be used in
pursuit of "ascertaining the meaning of a particular word or phrase", rather than simply where a
piece of legislation is "ambiguous or obscure, or the literal meaning of which leads to an
absurdity".[61] In McDonnell,[nb 11] the Lords further limited the use of Hansard, saying it could not
be used to overrule precedent set before courts were able to reference it, except in exceptional
circumstances.[62] Wilson and others v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,[nb 12] the first
case involving Hansard after the Human Rights Act 1998 put further limits on the use of
Hansard; ministerial statements made in Parliament can not be treated as sources of law, only as
supporting evidence.[63] This "retreat" from Pepper was resisted in the Court of Appeal, primarily
by Lord Phillips, who praised the decision following Steyn's lecture in 2000, but has been
repeatedly emphasised in the House of Lords and Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.[64] As a
result of these changes, Stefan Vogenauer has said that "the scope of Pepper v Hart has been
reduced to such an extent that the ruling has almost become meaningless". [2] Despite the judicial
criticism and limits placed on Pepper, references to Hansard have apparently increased since the
beginning of the 21st century.[65] It is also noted that the most recent generation of House of
Lords and Supreme Court judges have been willing to regularly reference legislative history in
their arguments.[66] In Harding v Wealands,[nb 13] for example, three Law Lords were willing to
apply Pepper, even Lord Hoffman who had previously voiced concerns. Lord Carswell noted
that Pepper had been "out of judicial favour in recent years", but added that legislative history
was "perhaps especially as a confirmatory aid".