Jurisprudence - Resignation

What is resignation anyway? As held in the case of Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v.
NLRC,
[1991], resignation is a voluntary act of the employee which is beyond the control of the
employer. Once accepted by the employer, the employee loses his right to the job. The
Labor Code also recognizes resignation in Article 285 (a) which states:
“An employee may terminate without just cause the employee-employer relationship by
serving a written notice on the employer at least one month in advance. The employer
upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages.”
A resignation may also be either express, as when contained in a written document, or

implied, as can be inferred from the acts of the employee concerned. Also, to constitute
a resignation, it must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such. There
must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office accompanied by an act
of relinquishment. If the employee was merely “forced by circumstances” to submit his
resignation, there is no valid resignation and thus, there can be no effective dismissal of
the employee
Similarly, when an employee has submitted a letter of resignation due to circumstances

beyond his control, his dismissal was still deemed as constructive and therefore, illegal.
This is due to the fact that the Supreme Court has held that constructive dismissal is “an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay;
or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.” (Escobin v. NLRC, GR No. 118159, April 15, 1998)
The Philippine labor law and jurisprudence allows an employer-employee relationship to

be created between a company and a worker and also allows them to terminate their
relationship at any appropriate time and for legal causes. In the same manner that the
employer has the prerogative to terminate employment, for just or authorized causes,
enumerated under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code, an employee may also
terminate his employment under Article 285. The causes include serious insult by the
employer, inhuman and unbearable treatment, commission of a crime by the employer
against the employee and analogous cases. Once an employee resigns, he cannot
claim, as a matter of right, that he was illegally dismissed, unless he can make a case of
constructive dismissal.
Many persistent questions have been raised, these days after that shocking Papal
announcement, on why a well-entrenched leader of 1.3 billion Roman Catholic all over
the world would tender his resignation and just like that, leave a very powerful post that
is his for a lifetime. Every priest would silently aspire to become a bishop, an archbishop
and ultimately a cardinal. To become a pope is, as they say, a gift of God, not to be
aspired for but only prayed for “en pectore”, or in the silence of one's heart and God will
take care of the rest. John Paul II was shot, wounded and almost died. He was weaker
and perhaps more exhausted. But he never gave up. Why would Pope Benedict XVI?
Could there be a more serious cause? Different people have different views on the
matters but we all do not know what actually took place in the sanctum sanctorum of the
Vatican.
Well, it is not for us to speculate and to theorize, nor argue and bicker on such an issue.
Rather, it is useful to analyze and discuss labor cases involving resignations that turn
out to be imposed and not voluntary, and how do labor tribunals, and ultimately, the
Supreme Court, consider and pass upon them. As a general rule, any employee has the
freedom to resign, provided that his consent is freely given and not vitiated by force,
intimidation, threats, undue influence, nor hoodwinked, misled or pressured by a
glowing promise of a substantial separation package. However, resignations are
presumed to be valid and voluntarily made. He who seeks to impugn its validity bears
the burden of proof. And whenever resignations are held valid, the resigned employee
cannot demand any separation pay, except only if there is an agreement, collective or
individual, stipulation for resignation pay.
In the case of Bilbao vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines (GR 183915, 14 Dec 2011), the
Supreme Court upheld the validity of an employee's resignation and thwarted her
attempt to obtain reinstatement and backwages. The Court held: Bare and self-serving
allegations of coercion and intimidation, unsubstantiated by evidence, do not constitute
proof to sufficiently support a finding of forced resignation. For intimidation to vitiate
consent, the following elements must be present: 1. that intimidation caused the
consent to be given; 2. that the threatened act be unjust and unlawful; 3. that the threat
be real and serious; 4. that there is evident disproportion between the evil poised by the
threat and the resistance, and 5. that it produces a well-grounded fear on an impending
injury to person or property (citing Guatson vs. NLRC, 230 SCRA 815, 09 Mar 1994).
In the same case, the High Court held: An employee who resigns and executes a
quitclaim in favor of the employer is generally stopped from filing any further claim
against the employer for any entitlement arising from the terminated relationship (citing
Alfaro vs. CA, 416 Phil 316, 321, 2001). In the case of Vicente vs. CA (GR 175988, 24
August 2007), the Court declared: A resignation letter containing words of gratitude can
hardly come from an employee who is forced to resign (citing St. Michael Academy vs.
NLRC, 354 Phil 491 1998).
However, to be fair to all concerned, we hasten a caveat, that there are really some
employers who would subject their workers to undue pressure in order to ease them out
for some whimsical causes. In Penaflor vs. OCMC (GR 17711, 13 April 2010), the
Supreme Court declared that there was no valid resignation. Applying the basic
labor law principles of affording full protection to labor, the Court declared that
the company was guilty of constructive dismissal.
Therefore, all these speculations and guess work about the pope's resignation are
useless without the facts. And these facts are sealed in the inner chambers of the
Vatican. Thus, it will be good for us to limit our discussion on resignations, in the context
of Philippine laws and let the pope's case be decided above. Let us just focus on the
here and the now.
Requirements of Procedural Due Processs.

For valid termination based on authorized causes such as installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy,retrenchment to prevent losses, and closure or cessation of
operation, the employer must serve written notice to the individual employee concerned
and to the appropriate Regional Office of DOLE at least 30 days before the effectivity of
the termination.
Also, the employer must observe the following requirements as part of the process of
termination:
1. Good faith in the termination of employee, i.e., the implementation of the
company program resulting to termination of employees must be for a valid cause and
not merely a tool to circumvent the law on employee’s security of tenure;
2. The employer must adopt a fair and reasonable criteria in the selection of
employee to be dismissed; and,
3. The employee must be paid separation pay not less than the amount fixed by
law.
Criteria in Selection of Employee to be Dismissed.
In the selection of the employee to be dismissed, the employer must adopt of a fair and
reasonable criteria which must be applied in good faith, such as:
1. Less preferred status of employee;
2. Efficiency rating; and
3. Seniority.
Payment of Separation Pay.
In termination of employment due to authorized causes, the employer is required to give
separation pay to the employee concerned. The amount of separation pay depends on
the specified cause of termination.
1. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy – at least one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher.
2. In case of (a) retrenchment to prevent losses and (b) closures not due to serious
financial reverses – one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher.
3. No separation pay for closure due to serious business losses.
4. No separation pay is required when the closure of business is due to serious
business losses or financial reverses. (North Davao Mining, 1996.)
5. When closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and
ultimately for the benefit of the employees. The closure contemplated under Article 283
of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close
the business establishment. (National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC, 2000.)
Effects of Termination.
1. If the termination is for authorized cause and the employee is given 30-day prior
notice, the dismissal is valid.
2. If the termination is for authorized cause but the employee was not given 30-day
prior notice, the dismissal is valid but the employer may be ordered to pay nominal
damages to dismissed employee. In Jaka Food Processing vs. Pacot, 2005, the amount
of nominal damages is P50,000.00.
3. If the dismissal is not for a valid authorized cause, the dismissal is illegal,
whether or not there is 30-day prior notice. Consequently the employee shall be entitled
to reinstatement and backwages, and damages if warranted.
G.R. No. 162813 February 12, 2007

FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. and/or ALEXANDER UY, Petitioners,
vs.
JIMMY LEBATIQUE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated September
30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76196 and its Resolution 2 dated
March 15, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had
reversed the Decision3 dated October 15, 2002 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) setting aside the Decision 4 dated June 27, 2001 of the Labor
Arbiter.
Petitioner Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. (Far East) hired on March 4, 1996 private
respondent Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver with a daily wage of P223.50. He delivered
animal feeds to the company’s clients.
On January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work

particularly on January 22, 2000, when he was required to make a second delivery in
Novaliches, Quezon City. That same day, Manuel Uy, brother of Far East’s General
Manager and petitioner Alexander Uy, suspended Lebatique apparently for illegal use of
company vehicle. Even so, Lebatique reported for work the next day but he was
prohibited from entering the company premises.
On January 26, 2000, Lebatique sought the assistance of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Public Assistance and Complaints Unit concerning the
nonpayment of his overtime pay. According to Lebatique, two days later, he received a
telegram from petitioners requiring him to report for work. When he did the next day,
January 29, 2000, Alexander asked him why he was claiming overtime pay. Lebatique
explained that he had never been paid for overtime work since he started working for
the company. He also told Alexander that Manuel had fired him. After talking to Manuel,
Alexander terminated Lebatique and told him to look for another job.
On March 20, 2000, Lebatique filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of
overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter found that Lebatique was illegally dismissed, and
ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his full back wages, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave pay, and overtime pay. The dispositive portion of the decision is
quoted herein in full, as follows:
WHEREFORE, we find the termination of complainant illegal. He should thus be

ordered reinstated with full backwages. He is likewise ordered paid his 13th month pay,
service incentive leave pay and overtime pay as computed by the Computation and
Examination Unit as follows:
a) Backwages:
01/25/00 - 10/31/00 = 9.23 mos.
P 223.50 x 26 x 9.23 = P 53,635.53
11/01/00 – 06/26/01 = 7.86 mos.
P 250.00 x 26 x 7.86 = 51,090.00 P 104,725.53
13th Month Pay: 1/12 of P 104,725.53 = 8,727.13

Service Incentive Leave Pay
01/25/00 – 10/31/00 = 9.23 mos.
P 223.50 x 5/12 x 9.23 = P 859.54
11/01/00 – 06/26/01 = 7.86 mos.
P 250.00 x 5/12 x 7.86 = [818.75] 1,678.29 115,130.95
b) Overtime Pay: (3 hours/day)
03/20/97 – 4/30/97 = 1.36 mos.
P 180/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 1.36 = P 2,983.50
05/01/97 – 02/05/98 = 9.16 mos.
P 185/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 9.16 = 20,652.94
02/06/98 – 10/30/99 = 20.83 mos.
P 198/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x [20.83] = 50,265.39
10/31/99 – 01/24/00 = 2.80 mos.
P 223.50/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 2.80 = 7,626.94 81,528.77
TOTAL AWARD P 196,659.72
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The NLRC held that there was no dismissal to speak of since Lebatique was
merely suspended. Further, it found that Lebatique was a field personnel, hence, not
entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave pay. Lebatique sought
reconsideration but was denied.
Aggrieved, Lebatique filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.1awphi1.net
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the NLRC decision, reasoned that Lebatique was
suspended on January 24, 2000 but was illegally dismissed on January 29, 2000 when
Alexander told him to look for another job. It also found that Lebatique was not a field
personnel and therefore entitled to payment of overtime pay, service incentive leave
pay, and 13th month pay.
It reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the NLRC dated 27 December

2002 is hereby REVERSEDand the Labor Arbiter’s decision dated 27 June
2001 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioners assign the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS … ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DATED 15 OCTOBER 2002 AND IN
RULING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS … ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DATED 15 OCTOBER 2002 AND IN
RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT A FIELD PERSONNEL AND
THER[E]FORE ENTITLED TO OVERTIME PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
PAY.
THE COURT OF APPEALS … ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI FOR FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO ATTACH CERTIFIED
TRUE COPIES OF THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT.7
Simply stated, the principal issues in this case are: (1) whether Lebatique was illegally
dismissed; and (2) whether Lebatique was a field personnel, not entitled to overtime
pay.
Petitioners contend that, (1) Lebatique was not dismissed from service but merely
suspended for a day due to violation of company rules; (2) Lebatique was not barred
from entering the company premises since he never reported back to work; and (3)
Lebatique is estopped from claiming that he was illegally dismissed since his complaint
before the DOLE was only on the nonpayment of his overtime pay.
Also, petitioners maintain that Lebatique, as a driver, is not entitled to overtime pay
since he is a field personnel whose time outside the company premises cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. According to petitioners, the drivers do not
observe regular working hours unlike the other office employees. The drivers may report
early in the morning to make their deliveries or in the afternoon, depending on the
production of animal feeds and the traffic conditions. Petitioners also aver that
Lebatique worked for less than eight hours a day. 8
Lebatique for his part insists that he was illegally dismissed and was not merely
suspended. He argues that he neither refused to work nor abandoned his job. He
further contends that abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal. He also claims that he is not a field personnel, thus, he is entitled to
overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.
After consideration of the submission of the parties, we find that the petition lacks merit.
We are in agreement with the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining that of the
Labor Arbiter.
It is well settled that in cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the employer to prove
that the termination was for a valid cause. 9 In this case, petitioners failed to discharge
such burden. Petitioners aver that Lebatique was merely suspended for one day but he
abandoned his work thereafter. To constitute abandonment as a just cause for
dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear
intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee
relationship.10
The records show that petitioners failed to prove that Lebatique abandoned his job. Nor
was there a showing of a clear intention on the part of Lebatique to sever the employer-
employee relationship. When Lebatique was verbally told by Alexander Uy, the
company’s General Manager, to look for another job, Lebatique was in effect dismissed.
Even assuming earlier he was merely suspended for illegal use of company vehicle, the
records do not show that he was afforded the opportunity to explain his side. It is clear
also from the sequence of the events leading to Lebatique’s dismissal that it was
Lebatique’s complaint for nonpayment of his overtime pay that provoked the
management to dismiss him, on the erroneous premise that a truck driver is a field
personnel not entitled to overtime pay.
An employee who takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of
imagination be said to have abandoned his work and the filing of the complaint is
proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of
abandonment.11 A contrary notion would not only be illogical but also absurd.
It is immaterial that Lebatique had filed a complaint for nonpayment of overtime pay the
day he was suspended by management’s unilateral act. What matters is that he filed the
complaint for illegal dismissal on March 20, 2000, after he was told not to report for
work, and his filing was well within the prescriptive period allowed under the law.
On the second issue, Article 82 of the Labor Code is decisive on the question of who
are referred to by the term "field personnel." It provides, as follows:
ART. 82. Coverage. - The provisions of this title [Working Conditions and Rest Periods]
shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or
not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel,
members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic
helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by
results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
xxxx
"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their
duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
In Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, 12 this Court emphasized that the
definition of a "field personnel" is not merely concerned with the location where the
employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the employee’s
performance is unsupervised by the employer. We held that field personnel are those
who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to determine whether an employee is a field
employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be
determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be
made as to whether or not the employee’s time and performance are constantly
supervised by the employer.13
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, Lebatique is not a field personnel as defined
above for the following reasons: (1) company drivers, including Lebatique, are directed
to deliver the goods at a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the discretion
to solicit, select and contact prospective clients; and (3) Far East issued a directive that
company drivers should stay at the client’s premises during truck-ban hours which is
from 5:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00 p.m. 14 Even petitioners admit that the drivers
can report early in the morning, to make their deliveries, or in the afternoon, depending
on the production of animal feeds. 15 Drivers, like Lebatique, are under the control and
supervision of management officers. Lebatique, therefore, is a regular employee whose
tasks are usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade and business of the
company. Thus, he is entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees of Far
East, including overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.
Note that all money claims arising from an employer-employee relationship shall be filed
within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be
forever barred.16 Further, if it is established that the benefits being claimed have been
withheld from the employee for a period longer than three years, the amount pertaining
to the period beyond the three-year prescriptive period is therefore barred by
prescription. The amount that can only be demanded by the aggrieved employee shall
be limited to the amount of the benefits withheld within three years before the filing of
the complaint.17
Lebatique timely filed his claim for service incentive leave pay, considering that in this
situation, the prescriptive period commences at the time he was terminated. 18 On the
other hand, his claim regarding nonpayment of overtime pay since he was hired in
March 1996 is a different matter. In the case of overtime pay, he can only demand for
the overtime pay withheld for the period within three years preceding the filing of the
complaint on March 20, 2000. However, we find insufficient the selected time records
presented by petitioners to compute properly his overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter should
have required petitioners to present the daily time records, payroll, or other documents
in management’s control to determine the correct overtime pay due Lebatique.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated September

30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76196 and its Resolution dated
March 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONto the effect that the case is
hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the exact
amount of overtime pay and other monetary benefits due Jimmy Lebatique which herein
petitioners should pay without further delay.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175481 November 21, 2012
DIONISIO F. AUZA, JR., ADESSA F. OTARRA, and ELVIE

JEANJAQUET, Petitioners.
vs.
MOL PHILIPPINES, INC. and CESAR G. TIUTAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"Justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine," 1 Although we are committed to protect the
working class, it behooves us to uphold the rights of management too if only to serve
the interest of fair play. As applied in this case, the employees who voluntarily resigned
and executed quitclaims are barred from instituting an action or claim against their
employer.
By this Petition for Review on Certiorari, 2 petitioners Dionisio F. Auza, Jr. (Auza),
Adessa F. Otarra (Otarra) and Elvie Jeanjaquet (Jeanjaquet) assail the August 17, 2006
Decision3 and November 15, 2006 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 01375, which reversed the July 22, 2005 Decision 5 and November 30, 2005
Resolution6 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and consequently
dismissed their Complaints for illegal dismissal against respondents MOL (Mitsui O.S.K
Lines) Philippines, Inc. (MOL) and Cesar G. Tiutan (Tiutan), in his capacity as its
President.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent MOL is a common carrier engaged in transporting cargoes to and from the
different parts of the world. On October 1, 1997, it employed Auza and Jeanjaquet as
Cebu’s Branch Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively. It also employed
Otarra as its Accounts Officer on November 1, 1997.
On October 14, 2002, Otarra tendered her resignation 7 letter effective November 15,
2002 while Auza and Jeanjaquet submitted their resignation letters 8 on October 30,
2002 to take effect on November 30, 2002. Petitioners were then given their separation
pay and the monetary value of leave credits, 13th month pay, MOL cooperative shares
and unused dental/optical benefits as shown in documents entitled "Remaining
Entitlement Computation,"9 which documents were signed by each of them
acknowledging receipt of such benefits. Afterwhich, they executed Release and
Quitclaims10 and then issued Separation Clearances.11
In February 2004 or almost 15 months after their severance from employment,

petitioners filed separate Complaints 12 for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC against respondents and MOL’s Manager for Corporate Services, George
Dolorfino. These complaints were later consolidated.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
In an Order13 dated May 26, 2004, Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon directed the parties
to submit their respective Position Papers within 10 days from receipt of notice.
Petitioners’ counsel of record, Atty. Narciso C. Boiser (Atty. Boiser), received the same
on June 22, 2004.
In their Position Paper,14 respondents alleged that petitioners were not dismissed but
voluntarily resigned from employment. In fact, separation benefits were paid to them for
which quitclaims were duly executed. Hence, petitioners are effectively barred from
instituting any action or claim in connection with their employment. They likewise
posited that petitioners are guilty of laches by estoppel considering that they filed their
complaints only after the lapse of 15 months from their severance from employment. To
support these allegations, respondents submitted together with the said Position Paper,
documentary evidence, affidavit of witnesses and a formal offer of exhibits.
Instead of promptly filing their Position Paper, petitioners, on the other hand, wrote the
Labor Arbiter on July 7, 2004 requesting for additional time as they were looking for
another lawyer because Atty. Boiser was frequently out of town. 15 They were able to
secure the services of Atty. Amorito V. Cañete (Atty. Cañete), who filed on July 29,
2004 an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to File Complainants’
Position Paper.16However, in an Order17 of even date, the Labor Arbiter refused to
recognize Atty. Cañete’s appearance without the corresponding withdrawal of
appearance of Atty. Boiser. Nevertheless, petitioners were given 10 days from date to
submit their Position Paper. The next day, Atty. Boiser filed a Manifestation that Atty.
Cañete had been engaged by petitioners as a co-counsel.
Subsequently and notwithstanding the earlier refusal of the Labor Arbiter to recognize
the appearance of Atty. Cañete, petitioners filed on August 11, 2004 a verified Position
Paper18 signed by the said counsel. They averred in said pleading that their consent to
resign was not voluntarily given but was instead obtained through mistake and fraud.
They claimed that they were led to believe that MOL’s Cebu branch would be
downsized into a mere skeletal force due to alleged low productivity and profitability
volume. Pressured into resigning prior to the branch’s closure as they might be denied
separation pay, petitioners were constrained to resign.
Petitioners further averred that their separation from employment amounts to

constructive dismissal due to the shabby treatment they received from Tiutan at the time
they were being compelled to quit employment. Aside from Tiutan’s incessant
imputations that the Cebu branch is overstaffed, manned by incompetent employees,
and is heavily losing money, Auza was stripped of his authority to sign checks for the
branch’s expenditures; his and Otarra’s assigned company cars, cellphones and
landline phones were recalled; representation expenses were cut off; and travel and
hotel expenses were drastically reduced. These were done to them despite the fact that
the Cebu branch had consistently surpassed the performance goal set by the Manila
office as shown by documentary evidence submitted. Later, they discovered that the
planned downsizing of the Cebu branch was a mere malicious scheme to oust them and
to accommodate Tiutan’s own people. This is because after they were duped to resign,
additional employees were hired by the management as their replacement; they moved
to a bigger office; and more telephone lines were installed. In view of their illegal
dismissal, petitioners thus prayed for reinstatement plus backwages as well as for
damages and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners also filed a Supplemental Position Paper 19 to show an itemized computation
of backwages due them and to further reiterate that their signatures in the resignation
letters and quitclaims were conditioned upon respondents’ misrepresentation that the
Cebu office will eventually be manned by a skeletal force, which, however, did not take
place.
Subsequently, respondents filed a Motion to Expunge and/or Strike Out Position Paper
for Complainants Dated August 9, 2004 Filed by Atty. Amorito V. Cañete. 20 They
pointed out the belated filing of petitioners’ Position Paper and the lack of authority of
Atty. Cañete to file and sign the same, among others. The Labor Arbiter granted the
Motion in an Order21 dated November 12, 2004 ratiocinating that a Position Paper must
be filed within the inextendible 10-day period as provided under Section 4, Rule V of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. In this case, petitioners’ counsel of record, Atty. Boiser,
received on June 22, 2004 the May 26, 2004 Order requiring the parties to file position
papers within 10 days from receipt thereof. However, petitioners were only able to file
their Position Paper on August 11, 2004, way beyond the said 10-day period. And for
being filed late, said pleading must be stricken off the records. Consequently, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed the Complaints without prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC22 claiming that the Labor Arbiter defied judicial
pronouncements that the failure to submit a Position Paper on time is not a ground for
dismissing a complaint. Moreover, considering their dilemma at the time when Atty.
Boiser could hardly be reached and the unfortunate non-recognition order by the Labor
Arbiter of their new counsel, Atty. Cañete, petitioners prayed for the relaxation of the
rules to admit their Position Paper which, they contended, was filed only two days late
since they were given an extension of 10 days from July 29, 2004 to file the same in an
Order of even date.
In their Reply,23 respondents countered that petitioners’ Position Paper was filed more
than 60 days late from receipt by Atty. Boiser (who remained petitioners’ counsel of
record) of the Labor Arbiter’s May 26, 2004 Order. They insisted that this inexcusable
delay should not be allowed. The Labor Arbiter should have dismissed the Complaints
with prejudice in the first place; a fortiori, the NLRC should also dismiss the appeal for
want of merit. Moreover, petitioners’ appeal deserves outright dismissal as no appeal
may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice, the remedy being
only to revive or re-file the case with the Labor Arbiter.
In its Decision24 dated July 22, 2005, the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that
petitioners’ Position Paper was filed late. It held that the 10-day period given to
petitioners for filing their Position Paper should be reckoned from Atty. Cañete’s receipt
on August 9, 2004 of the July 29, 2004 Order of the Labor Arbiter. The filing, therefore,
of petitioners’ Position Paper on August 11, 2004 is well within the allowed period,
hence, there was no basis in dismissing the Complaints for failure to prosecute.
Also, instead of remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC opted to decide the
same on the merits, in consonance with its mandate to speedily dispose of cases. In so
doing, it found that petitioners’ resignation letters and quitclaims are invalid and were
signed under duress. The NLRC noted that contrary to the representations made to
petitioners, the Cebu branch was not actually closed but merely transferred to another
location with a bigger office space and with new employees hired as petitioners’
replacements. Further, the NLRC noted that under MOL’s employment manual, an
employee who voluntarily resigns shall only be entitled to benefits if he/she has
rendered 10 years of continuous service. Hence, the grant of benefits to petitioners is
questionable considering that each of them rendered only five years of service. It
therefore opined that petitioners’ receipt of benefits is just part of respondents’ plan to
secure their resignations.
The NLRC concluded that petitioners were illegally dismissed and thus granted them
the relief of reinstatement, full backwages computed in accordance with the
computation presented by petitioners in their Supplemental Position Paper, and
attorney’s fees. For Tiutan’s bad faith in pressuring both Auza and Otarra to resign,
moral and exemplary damages were likewise awarded to the two. The dispositive
portion of the NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, we find respondents guilty of illegally dismissing complainants

consequently they are ordered to reinstate complainants to their positions without loss
of seniority rights with full backwages from the time they were illegally dismissed until
their actual reinstatement, the backwages are computed as of June 30, 2005 as follows:
Dionisio F. Auza, Jr. – P2,106,165.90;
P1,203,705.13 for Adessa F. Otarra and P685,027.68 for Elvie Jeanjaquet, subject to
further recomputation. In addition, respondents are ordered to pay moral and exemplary
damages of P500,000.00 to Dionisio F. Auza, Jr. and P100,000.00 to Adessa F. Otarra.
Further, respondents are ordered to pay complainants equivalent to 10% of the total
amount awarded as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.25
Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. 26 With respect to
petitioners, they moved that their entitlement to 27 sacks of rice, which was discussed in
the body of the NLRC Decision but omitted in the dispositive portion thereof, be
declared. For their part, respondents alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to
entertain petitioners’ appeal; hence, it usurped the jurisdiction and function of the Labor
Arbiter to hear and decide the case which had been dismissed without prejudice.
Reiterating this argument, respondents also subsequently filed An Urgent Motion to
Dismiss Instant Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. 27
The NLRC, in its Resolution 28 dated November 30, 2005, granted petitioners’ motion by
awarding 27 sacks of rice to each of them in addition to the monetary awards. On the
other hand, it denied respondents’ motions by upholding its jurisdiction to entertain
petitioners’ appeal in line with its authority to correct errors made by the Labor Arbiter
and in order to prevent delays in the disposition of labor cases.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
A Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 29 was filed by respondents with the CA. In a
Resolution30 dated January 13, 2006, the CA issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent the enforcement of the NLRC Decision of July 22, 2005 upon respondents’
posting of a bond. A writ of preliminary Injunction 31 was then issued to further restrain
the implementation of the assailed Decision.
On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision 32 annulling and setting aside the
Decision of the NLRC. The CA did not find any element of coercion and force in
petitioners’ separation from employment but rather upheld the voluntary execution of
their resignation letters as gleaned from the tenor thereof. It opined that petitioners were
aware of the consequences of their acts in voluntarily resigning and executing
quitclaims. Notably, however, the CA did not touch upon the issue raised by
respondents regarding the NLRC’s lack of jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the
CA’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) 4th Division of Cebu City dated 22 July 2005 in NLRC Case No. V-
000079-2005 (RAB-VII-02-0342-04 and RAB-VII-02-0418-04) as well as the Resolution
of the public respondent Commission dated 30 November 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new decision is entered dismissing the complaints filed by private
respondents for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.33
A motion for reconsideration34 was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied by
the CA in a Resolution35dated November 15, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners ascribe upon the CA the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION

AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE NLRC
DECISION RENDERED ON THE BASIS OF FACTUAL FINDINGS WHICH
WERE NOT CONTROVERTED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED
PETITIONERS;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT DISMISSED BUT VOLUNTARILY
RESIGNED FROM THEIR JOBS;

RULING THAT THE RELEASES AND QUITCLAIMS WERE INVALID AND
THEREFORE NOT A BAR TO THE FILING OF A COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL;
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE TENOR OF THE LETTERS OF RESIGNATIONS IS
PROOF THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT FORCED TO RESIGN;

DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR THE FAILURE OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO ATTACH THE PETITIONERS’ POSITION
PAPER AND SUPPLEMENTAL POSITION OR EVEN THE PRO-FORMA
COMPLAINTS;

ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF PETITIONERS TO THEIR FORMER
POSITIONS WITH FULL BACKWAGES FROMTHE DATES THEY WERE
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED UNTIL THEIR ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT; and
8. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.36
Petitioners insist that they were not given any choice but to resign after respondents
informed them of the impending closure of the branch and that they would not receive
any separation pay if the closure would precede their resignation. They claim that they
had no personal reasons to forego their employment from which they were receiving
huge salaries and benefits. Thus, the CA gravely erred in holding that their resignations
were voluntarily made and in not dismissing respondents’ Petition for Certiorari despite
their failure to attach thereto petitioners’ Position Paper and Supplemental Position
Paper.
In their Comment,37 respondents assert that the CA’s finding of petitioners’ voluntary

resignation from employment is based on substantial evidence and is final and
conclusive on this Court. Further, the CA was correct in giving due course to their
petition since they have attached all the pleadings and documents required for sufficient
compliance with the rules. They counter that it is this instant petition which should be
dismissed as its certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by Auza without
authority to sign in behalf of the other petitioners. Finally, respondents ask this Court to
resolve the issue regarding the NLRC’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal filed before
it.
Our Ruling
This Court finds no merit in the petition.
On Procedural Issues:
The NLRC has jurisdiction to entertain
petitioners’ appeal filed before it.
To settle the issue of the NLRC’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal, we quote in part
Article 223 of the Labor Code concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC:
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:ART. 223. APPEAL.
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter;
xxxx
and Section 2, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure 38 which provides:
Section 2. Grounds. – The appeal may be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter
x x x;
xxxx
Clearly, the NLRC is possessed of power to rectify any abuse of discretion committed
by the Labor Arbiter. Here, the NLRC, in taking cognizance of petitioners’ appeal and in
resolving it on the merits, merely exercised such power. This is because the Labor
Arbiter, in not admitting petitioners’ Position Paper (albeit filed late) and in dismissing
petitioners’ Complaints for failure to prosecute, acted with grave abuse of discretion as
hereinafter explained.
First, "the failure to submit a Position Paper on time is not a ground for striking out the
paper from the records, much less for dismissing a complaint in the case of the
complainant."39 As mandated by law, the Labor Arbiter is enjoined "to use every
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively, without
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." 40
Next, the Labor Arbiter committed grave error in dismissing the Complaints on the
ground of failure to prosecute under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. 41 Under
this rule, a case may be dismissed on the ground of non-prosequitur, if, under the
circumstances, the "plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude." 42 In the case at bench, no negligence can be
attributed to petitioners in pursuing their case. The records show that petitioners
themselves wrote the Labor Arbiter on July 7, 2004 to request for additional time to
submit a Position Paper since their counsel, Atty. Boiser, was frequently out of town and
so they had to secure the services of an additional counsel to prepare and file their
Position Paper. Unfortunately, the Labor Arbiter refused to recognize the appearance of
their new counsel, Atty. Cañete. Under the circumstances, petitioners should be given
consideration for their vigilance in pursuing their causes. As aptly held by the NLRC, the
delay in the filing of their Position Paper cannot be interpreted as failure to prosecute on
their part. "Failure to prosecute" is akin to lack of interest. 43 Here, petitioners did not
sleep on their rights and obligations as party litigants.
In view of these, it is clear that the NLRC did not err in entertaining petitioners’ appeal
and in considering their Position Paper in resolving the same. It merely liberally applied
the rules to prevent a miscarriage of justice in accord with the provisions of the Labor
Code. As it is, "technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties." 44
Petitioners’ subsequent and substantial
compliance with the rules on verification
and certification of non-forum shopping
calls for the relaxation of technical rules.
Respondents assail this Court’s authority to entertain the instant petition despite the
defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to it.
True, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was executed and signed
solely by Auza without proof of any authority from his co-petitioners. Thence, in a
Minute Resolution45 dated February 26, 2007, this Court required petitioners to submit
such proof of authority. In compliance therewith, petitioners thereafter submitted a
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping 46 this time executed and signed by
Auza, Otarra and Jeanjaquet.
Ample jurisprudence provides that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for
the relaxation of the rules. 47 Indeed, "imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure are to be disregarded, except where substantial rights would otherwise be
prejudiced."48 Due to petitioners’ subsequent and substantial compliance, we thus apply
the rules liberally in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The CA did not err in giving due course

to respondents’ petition for certiorari
despite failure to attach petitioners’
Position Paper and Supplemental
Position Paper.
Petitioners deplore the CA’s refusal to dismiss respondents’ Petition for Certiorari for
deliberately failing to attach a copy of petitioners’ Position Paper as well as their
Supplemental Position Paper, pleadings which are relevant in rendering a decision.
This contention fails to impress.
It is within the CA’s determination whether the documents attached by a petitioner are
sufficient to make out a prima facie case since the acceptance of a petition as well as
the grant of due course thereto are addressed to the sound discretion of the appellate
court. The Rules of Court, aside from the judgment, final order or resolution being
assailed, do not specify the documents, pleadings or parts of the records that should be
appended to the petition but only those that are relevant or pertinent to such judgment,
final order or resolution.49 As such, the CA has discerned to judiciously resolve the
merits of the petition based on what have been submitted by the parties. At any rate, the
subject Position Paper and Supplemental Position Paper were submitted by petitioners
themselves in their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari and, hence, had also been
brought to the attention of the CA.
On the Substantive Issues:
Petitioners voluntarily resigned from employment.
After a careful scrutiny and review of the records of the case, this Court is inclined to
affirm the findings of the CA that petitioners voluntarily resigned from MOL.
"Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office." 50 The

overt act of relinquishment should be coupled with an intent to relinquish, which
intent could be inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation.51
It appears that petitioners, on their own volition, decided to resign from their positions
after being informed of the management’s decision that the Cebu branch would
eventually be manned by a mere skeletal force. As proven by the email
correspondences presented, petitioners were fully aware and had, in fact,
acknowledged that Cebu branch has been incurring losses and was already
unprofitable to operate.52 Note that there was evidence produced to prove that indeed
the Cebu branch’s productivity had deteriorated as shown in a Profit and Loss
Statement53 for the years 2001 and 2002. Also, there was a substantial reduction of
workforce as all of the Cebu branch staff and personnel, except one, were not retained.
On the other hand, petitioners’ assertions that the Cebu branch was performing well are
not at all substantiated. What they presented was a document entitled "1999
Performance Standards",54 which only provides for performance objectives but tells
nothing about the branch’s progress. Likewise, the Cebu Performance
Reports55 submitted which showed outstanding company performance only pertained to
the year 1999 and the first quarter of year 2000. No other financial documents were
submitted to show that such progress continued until year 2002.
Contrary to their assertions, petitioners were not lured by any misrepresentation by

respondents.1âwphi1 Instead, they themselves were convinced that their separation
was inevitable and for this, they voluntarily resigned. As aptly observed by the CA, no
element of force can be deduced from their letters of resignation as the same even
contained expressions of gratitude and thus contradicting their allegations that same
were prepared by their employer. In Globe Telecom v. Crisologo, 56 we held that
allegations of coercion are belied by words of gratitude coming from an employee who
is just forced to resign.
Petitioners aver that right after receiving their separation pay, they found out that the
Cebu branch was not closed but merely transferred to a bigger office and staffed by
newly hired employees. Notably, however, despite such knowledge, petitioners did not
immediately contest their resignations but waited for more than a year or nearly 15
months before contesting them. This negates their claim that they were victims of
deceit.57 Moreover, no adequate proof was presented to show that the planned
downsizing of Cebu branch did not take place. Similarly, petitioners’ allegations of bad
faith on the part of respondents are unsupported by records. No proof whatsoever was
advanced to show that there was threat of withholding their separation pay unless their
resignation letters were submitted prior to the actual closure of the Cebu branch or that
they were subjected to ill treatment and unpalatable working conditions immediately
prior to their resignation.
In addition, it is well to note that Auza and Otarra are managerial employees and not
ordinary workers who cannot be easily coerced or intimidated into signing something
against their will.58 As borne out by the records, Auza was the Local Chairman of
International Shipping Lines Association for five years, president of their Homeowner’s
Association and an active member of his community. Otarra, on the other hand, was
officer of various church organizations and a college professor at the University of the
Visayas.59 Their standing in society depicts how highly educated and intelligent persons
they are as to know fully well the consequences of their acts in executing and signing
letters of resignation and quitclaims. Although quitclaims are generally against public
policy, voluntary agreements entered into and represented by a reasonable settlement
are binding on the parties which may not be later disowned simply because of a change
of mind.60 "It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, that
the law will step in to bail out the employee." 61 Hence, we uphold the validity of the
quitclaims signed by petitioners in exchange for the separation benefits they received
from respondents.
All told, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that petitioners were not illegally
dismissed from employment but instead voluntarily resigned therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 17, 2006 and
Resolution dated November 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01375,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Here are selected February 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
labor law and procedure:
Abandonment; elements. Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against the

petitioner-corporation. For its defense, petitioner-corporation alleged that the
respondents abandoned their work and were not dismissed, and that it sent letters
advising respondents to report for work, but they refused. The Court held that for
abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and
(b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt acts. The employer has the burden of proof to
show the employee’s deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment
without any intention of returning. Mere absence is not sufficient. There must be an
unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue his employment. Based
on the evidence presented, the reason why respondents failed to report for work was
because petitioner-corporation barred them from entering its construction sites. It is a
settled rule that failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served
does not necessarily constitute abandonment. The intent to discontinue the employment
must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. Petitioner-
corporation failed to show overt acts committed by respondents from which it may be
deduced that they had no more intention to work. Respondents’ filing of the case for
illegal dismissal barely four (4) days from their alleged abandonment is totally
inconsistent with the known concept of what constitutes abandonment. E.G. & I.
Construction Corporation and Edsel Galeos v. Ananias P. Sato, et al., G.R. No.
182070, February 16, 2011.
Constructive dismissal; defense of resignation. Respondent, a security guard, filed an

illegal dismissal case against the petitioner. To refute the claim, petitioner alleged that
respondent was not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned.
Petitioner alleged that respondent’s resignation is evident from his withdrawal of his
cash and firearm bonds. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in
a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor
of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate
oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an
office. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment.
Thus, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment. Should the employer interpose the defense of resignation, it is
incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned.
On this point, the Court held that petitioner failed to discharge its burden. Moreover, the
filing of a complaint belies petitioner’s claim that respondent voluntarily
resigned. Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Ronald P. Valderama,G.R.
No. 186614, February 23, 2011.
Resignation of Employee. While the letter states that Peñaflor’s resignation was
irrevocable, it does not necessarily signify that it was also voluntarily executed.
Precisely because of the attendant hostile and discriminatory working
environment, Peñaflor decided to permanently sever his ties with Outdoor Clothing.
This falls squarely within the concept of constructive dismissal that jurisprudence
defines, among others, as involuntarily resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and
unfavorable conditions set by the employer. It arises when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer exists and has become unbearable to the
employee. The gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the
prevailing circumstances. With the appointment of Buenaobra to the position he then
still occupied, Peñaflor felt that he was being eased out and this perception made him
decide to leave the company.
The fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift the burden of proving
that the employee’s dismissal was for a just and valid cause from the employer to
the employee. In Mora v. Avesco [G.R. No. 177414, November 14, 2008,
571 SCRA 226], the Court ruled that should the employer interpose the defense of
resignation, it is still incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee
voluntarily resigned. Manolo A. Peñaflor vs. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing
Corp., et al., G.R. No. 177114, April 13, 2010.
1. Constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. The guarantee of security of

tenure under the Constitution means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is
accorded the employee. (See De Guzman vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, July 19,
2000.)
2. No less than the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the labor’s right to
security of tenure. Under the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, specifically,
Article 279 of the said Code, the security of tenure has been construed to mean as that
“the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized” by the Code. The two facets of this legal provision are: (a) the legality
of the act of dismissal; and (b) the legality in the manner of dismissal. The illegality of
the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause, while illegality in the
manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process. If an employee is dismissed
without just cause, he is entitled to reinstatement with backwages up to the time of his
actual reinstatement, if the contract of employment is not for a definite period; or to the
payment of his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the employment
contract, if the contract is for the definite period. If the dismissal is for a just cause but it
was made without due process, the employee is entitled to the payment of an
indemnity. (Phil-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 95449, August
18, 1997.)
3. Security of tenure of probationary employee. It is settled that even if
probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the
constitutional protection of security of tenure. This means they may only be
terminated for just cause or when they otherwise fail to qualify as regular
employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them by the
employer at the time of their engagement. (Agoy vs. NRLC, 112096, 30 January
1996.)
Failure to show written resignation letter presumes there was dismissal of

employment
Conflicting allegations were presented by the parties. The seafarers alleged that they
were dismissed from employment. On the other hand, the company argues that the
seafarers resigned from their employment due to dissatisfaction over the ship’s
operation. The company presented a telex message from their principal addressed to
the local agent that the seafarers resigned.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes
termination by the employee of the employment contract by “serving written notice on
the employer at least one (1) month in advance.” Given that provision, the law
contemplates the requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a
written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer terminated the seafarers.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to the seafarers regarding the cause
of their dismissal. The principal furnished a written notice (telex) to the local agent
claiming that the seafarers were repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-
terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor
Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment contract
“akin to resignation” and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the telex message is “a biased and self-serving document that does not satisfy
the requirement of substantial evidence.” If, indeed, the seafarers voluntarily pre-
terminated their
contracts, then they should have submitted their written resignations.
As such, the company was held to have illegally dismissed their seafarers and were
made liable to pay the latter their salaries for the remainder of the unexpired portion of
the employment contracts.
Author’s Note: The Supreme Court computed payment to the seafarers of their

salaries based on their basic wage only without including allowances.
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Services, Inc. Ltd. Vs. Nathaniel
Doza, Napoleon De Gracia, Isidro Lata and Charlie Aprosta ; G.R. No. 175558 ; Second
Division ; February 8,2012 ; Associate Justice Arturo Brion, Ponente
SECOND DIVISION

MANOLO A. PE�AFLOR, �� G.R.
�� Petitioner, No.�177114

- versus�� - �� Present:

�� CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
OUTDOOR CLOTHING MANUFACTURING �� BRION,
CORPORATION,NATHANIEL T. SYFU, President, �� DELCASTIL
MEDYLENE M. DEMOGENA, Finance Manager, and PAUL LO,
U. LEE, Chairman, �� ABAD, and
�� PEREZ, JJ.
��Respondents.

�� Promulgate
d:

��
��
�January 21, 2010
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

�� D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Petitioner Manolo A. Pe�aflor ( Pe�aflor) seeks the reversal of the Court of

Appeals (CA) decision[1] dated December 29, 2006 and its resolution[2] dated March 14,
2007, through the present petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.� The assailed CA decision affirmed the September 24,
2002 decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that in turn
reversed the August 15, 2001 decision[4] of the Labor Arbiter.[5]

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

�� Pe�aflor was hired on September 2, 1999 as probationary Human
Resource Department (HRD) Manager of respondent Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing
Corporation (Outdoor Clothing or the company).� As HRD head, Pe�aflor was
expected to (1) secure and maintain the right quality and quantity of people needed by
the company; (2) maintain the harmonious relationship between the employees and
management in a role that supports organizational goals and individual aspirations; and
(3) represent the company in labor cases or proceedings.� Two staff members were
assigned to work with him to assist him in undertaking these functions. �

�� Pe�aflor claimed that his relationship with Outdoor Clothing went
well during the first few months of his employment; he designed and created the
company�s Policy Manual, Personnel Handbook, Job Expectations, and Organizational
Set-Up during this period.� His woes began when the company�s Vice President for
Operations, Edgar Lee (Lee), left the company after a big fight between Lee and Chief
Corporate Officer Nathaniel Syfu (Syfu). �Because of his close association with Lee,
Pe�aflor claimed that he was among those who bore Syfu �s ire. �

�� When Outdoor Clothing began undertaking its alleged downsizing
program due to negative business returns, Pe �aflor alleged that his department had
been singled out. On the pretext of retrenchment, Pe �aflor �s two staff members were
dismissed, leaving him as the only member of Outdoor Clothing �s HRD and compelling
him to perform all personnel-related work.� He worked as a one-man department,
carrying out all clerical, administrative and liaison work; he personally went to various
government offices to process the company�s papers. �

When an Outdoor Clothing employee, Lynn Padilla (Padilla), suffered injuries in a
bombing incident, the company required Pe �aflor to attend to her hospitalization needs;
he had to work outside office premises to undertake this task. �As he was acting on the
company�s orders, Pe�aflor considered himself to be on official business, but was
surprised when the company deducted six days � salary corresponding to the time he
assisted Padilla.� According to Finance Manager Medylene Demogena (Demogena),
he failed to submit his trip ticket, but Pe �aflor belied this claim as a trip ticket was
required only when a company vehicle was used and he did not use any company
vehicle when he attended to his off-premises work. [6]

�� After Pe�aflor returned from his field work on March 13, 2000, his
officemates informed him that while he was away, Syfu had appointed Nathaniel
Buenaobra (Buenaobra) as the new HRD Manager. This information was confirmed by
Syfu�s memorandum of March 10, 2000 to the entire office stating that Buenaobra was
the concurrent HRD and Accounting Manager. [7]� Pe�aflor was surprised by the news;
he also felt betrayed and discouraged.� He tried to talk to Syfu to clarify the matter, but
was unable to do so.� Pe�aflor claimed that under these circumstances, he had no
option but to resign.� He submitted a letter to Syfu declaring his irrevocable resignation
from his employment with Outdoor Clothing effective at the close of office hours
on March 15, 2000.[8]

�� Pe�aflor then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor
arbiter, claiming that he had been constructively dismissed.� He included in his
complaint a prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, illegally deducted
salaries, damages, attorney�s fees, and other monetary claims.

�� Outdoor Clothing denied Pe�aflor�s allegation of constructive
dismissal.� It posited instead that Pe�aflor had voluntarily resigned from his
work.� Contrary to Pe�aflor�s statement that he had been dismissed from
employment upon Syfu�s appointment of Buenaobra as the new HRD Manager
on March 10, 2000, Pe�aflor had in fact continued working for the company until his
resignation on March 15, 2000.� The company cited as evidence the security report
that Pe�aflor himself prepared and signed on March 13, 2000.[9]� �

Outdoor Clothing disclaimed liability for any of Pe �aflor �s monetary
claims.� Since Pe�aflor had voluntarily resigned, Outdoor Clothing alleged that he
was not entitled to any backwages and damages.� The company likewise denied
making any illegal deduction from Pe �aflor �s salary; while deductions were made,
they were due to Pe�aflor�s failure to report for work during the dates the company
questioned. As a probationary employee, he was not yet entitled to any leave credit that
would offset his absences.�

�� In his August 15, 2001 decision, the labor arbiter found that
Pe�aflor had been illegally dismissed. [10]�Outdoor Clothing was consequently ordered
to reinstate Pe�aflor to his former or to an equivalent position, and to pay him his
illegally deducted salary for six days, proportionate 13 th month pay, attorney�s fees,
moral and exemplary damages.�

�� Outdoor Clothing appealed the labor arbiter �s decision with the
NLRC.� It insisted that Pe�aflor had not been constructively dismissed, claiming that
Pe�aflor tendered his resignation on March 1, 2000 because he saw no future with the
corporation due to its dire financial standing.� Syfu alleged that he was compelled to
appoint Buenaobra as concurrent HRD Manager through a memorandum dated March
1, 2000 to cover the position that Pe�aflor would soon vacate. [11]� The appointment
was also made to address the personnel matters that had to be taken cared of while
Pe�aflor was on unauthorized leave.� Incidentally, Outdoor Clothing alleged that
Pe�aflor had already been given two notices, on March 6 and 11, 2000 (absence
without official leave memoranda or the AWOL memoranda), for his unauthorized
absences.� In a memorandum datedMarch 3, 2000 addressed to Syfu, Buenaobra
accepted the appointment.[12]

�� Pe�aflor contested Syfu�s March 1, 2000 memorandum,
Buenaobra�s March 3, 2000 memorandum, and the AWOL memoranda, claiming
these pieces of evidence were fabricated and were never presented before the labor
arbiter.� He pointed out that nothing in this resignation letter indicated that it was
submitted to and received by Syfu on March 1, 2000.� He claimed that it was submitted
on March 15, 2000, the same date he made his resignation effective. �The AWOL
memoranda could not be relied on, as he was never furnished copies of
these. �Moreover, he could not be on prolonged absence without official leave, as his
residence was just a few meters away from the office.�
��
�� The NLRC apparently found Outdoor Clothing �s submitted
memoranda sufficient to overturn the labor arbiter �s decision. [13]� It characterized
Pe�aflor�s resignation as a response, not to the allegedly degrading and hostile
treatment that he was subjected to by Syfu, but to Outdoor Clothing �s downward
financial spiral.� Buenaobra�s appointment was made only after Pe �aflor had
submitted his resignation letter, and this was made to cover the vacancy Pe �aflor �s
resignation would create. Thus, Pe�aflor was not eased out from his position as HRD
manager.� No malice likewise was present in the company �s decision to dismiss
Pe�aflor�s two staff members; the company simply exercised its management
prerogative to address the financial problems it faced.� Pe�aflor, in fact, drafted the
dismissal letters of his staff members. �In the absence of any illegal dismissal, no basis
existed for the monetary awards the labor arbiter granted.

�� Pe�aflor anchored his certiorari petition with the CA on the claim
that the NLRC decision was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, although he
essentially adopted the same arguments he presented before the labor arbiter and the
NLRC.�

In a decision dated December 29, 2006,[14] the CA affirmed the NLRC�s
decision, stating that Pe�aflor failed to present sufficient evidence supporting his claim
that he had been constructively dismissed.� The CA ruled that Pe�aflor�s resignation
was knowingly and voluntarily made.� Accordingly, it dismissed
Pe�aflor�s certiorari petition.� It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration that
Pe�aflor subsequently filed.[15]� Faced with these CA actions, Pe�aflor filed with us
the present petition for review on certiorari.

THE PARTIES� ARGUMENTS

Pe�aflor insists that, contrary to the findings of the NLRC and the CA, he had
been constructively dismissed from his employment with Outdoor Clothing.� He
alleges that the dismissal of his two staff members, the demeaning liaison work he had
to perform as HRD Manager, the salary deduction for his alleged unauthorized
absences, and the appointment of Buenaobra as the new HRD manager even before he
tendered his resignation, were clear acts of discrimination that made his continued
employment with the Outdoor Clothing unbearable.� He was thus forced to resign.�

Outdoor Clothing claims that Pe�aflor voluntarily resigned from his work and his
contrary allegations were all unsubstantiated.� The HRD was not singled out for
retrenchment, but was simply the first to lose its staff members because the company
had to downsize.� Thus, all HRD work had to be performed by Pe �aflor. � Instead of
being grateful that he was not among those immediately dismissed due to the
company�s retrenchment program, Pe�aflor unreasonably felt humiliated in
performing work that logically fell under his department; insisted on having a full staff
complement; absented himself from work without official leave; and demanded payment
for his unauthorized absences. �

THE ISSUE and THE COURT�S RULING

�� The Court finds the petition meritorious.
��
�� A preliminary contentious issue is Outdoor Clothing �s argument
that we should dismiss the petition outright because it raises questions of facts, not the
legal questions that should be raised in a Rule 45 petition. [16]�

We see no merit in this argument as the rule that a Rule 45 petition deals only
with legal issues is not an absolute rule; it admits of exceptions.� In the labor law
setting, we wade into factual issues when conflict of factual findings exists among the
labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA.� This is the exact situation that obtains in the
present case since the labor arbiter found facts supporting the conclusion that there had
been constructive dismissal, while the NLRC �s and the CA �s factual findings
contradicted the labor arbiter�s findings. [17]� Under this situation, the conflicting factual
findings below are not binding on us, and we retain the authority to pass on the
evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom. [18]
��
The petition turns on the question of whether Pe �aflor �s undisputed
resignation was a voluntary or a forced one, in the latter case making it a constructive
dismissal equivalent to an illegal dismissal. A critical fact necessary in resolving this
issue iswhether Pe�aflor filed his letter of resignation before or after the
appointment of Buenaobra as the new/concurrent HRD manager.� This question
also gives rise to the side issue of when Buenaobra �s appointment was made. � If the
resignation letter was submitted before Syfu�s appointment of Buenaobra as new
HRD manager, little support exists for Pe�aflor�s allegation that he had been forced
to resign due to the prevailing abusive and hostile working
environment.� Buenaobra�s appointment would then be simply intended to cover the
vacancy created by Pe�aflor�s resignation.� On the other hand, if the resignation
letter was submitted after the appointment of Buenaobra, then factual basis exists
indicating that Pe�aflor had been constructively dismissed as his resignation was a
response to the unacceptable appointment of another person to a position he still
occupied.

�� The question of when Pe�aflor submitted his resignation letter
arises because this letter � undisputably made � was undated. � Despite
Pe�aflor�s claim of having impressive intellectual and academic credentials, [19] his
resignation letter, for some reason, was undated. Thus, the parties have directly
opposing claims on the matter.� Pe�aflor claims that he wrote and filed the letter on
the same date he made his resignation effective � March 15, 2000. �Outdoor
Clothing, on the other hand, contends that the letter was submitted on March 1, 2000,
for which reason Syfu issued a memorandum of the same date appointing Buenaobra
as the concurrent HRD manager; Syfu�s memorandum cited Pe �aflor �s intention to
resign so he could devote his time to teaching.� The company further cites in support
of its case Buenaobra�s March 3, 2000 memorandum accepting his
appointment.� Another piece of evidence is the Syfu memorandum of March 10, 2000,
which informed the office of the appointment of Buenaobra as the concurrent Head of
HRD � the position that Pe�aflor occupied.� Two other memoranda are alleged to
exist, namely, the AWOL memoranda of March 6 and 11, 2000, allegedly sent to
Penaflor.

Several reasons arising directly from these pieces of evidence lead us to
conclude that Pe�aflor did indeed submit his resignation letter on March, 15, 2000, i.e.,
on the same day that it was submitted.

First, we regard the Syfu memorandum of March 1, 2000 and the memorandum
of Buenaobra of March 3, 2000 accepting the position of HRD Head to be highly
suspect.� In our view, these memoranda, while dated, do not constitute conclusive
evidence of their dates of preparation and
communication.� Surprisingly, Pe�aflor was never informed about these memoranda
when they directly concerned him, particularly the turnover of responsibilities to
Buenaobra if indeed Pe�aflor had resigned on March 1, 2000and a smooth turnover to
Buenaobra was intended.� Even the recipients of these communications do not appear
to have signed for and dated their receipt. The AWOL memoranda, to be sure, should
have been presented with proof of service if they were to have any binding effect on
Pe�aflor.

Second,we find it surprising that these pieces of evidence pointing to a March 1,
2000 resignation � specifically, Syfu�sMarch 1, 2000 memorandum to Buenaobra
about Penaflor�s resignation and Buenaobra �s own acknowledgment and
acceptance � were only presented to the NLRC on appeal, not before the labor
arbiter.� The matter was not even mentioned in the company �s position paper filed
with the labor arbiter.[20]�� While the presentation of evidence at the NLRC level on
appeal is not unheard of in labor cases, [21] still sufficient explanation must be adduced to
explain why this irregular practice should be allowed. In the present case, Outdoor
Clothing totally failed to explain the reason for its omission.� This failure, to us, is
significant, as these were the clinching pieces of evidence that allowed the NLRC to
justify the reversal of the labor arbiter�s decision. �
�
Third, the circumstances and other evidence surrounding Pe �aflor �s
resignation support his claim that he was practically compelled to resign from the
company.�

Foremost among these is the memorandum of March 10, 2000 signed by Syfu
informing the whole office (�To: All concerned�) about the designation of Buenaobra
as concurrent Accounting and HRD Manager.� In contrast with the suspect
memoranda we discussed above, this memorandum properly bore signatures
acknowledging receipt and dates of receipt by at least five company officials, among
them the readable signature of Demogene and one Agbayani; three of them
acknowledged receipt on March 13, 2000, showing that indeed it was only on that day
that the appointment of Buenaobra to the HRD position was disclosed.� This evidence
is fully consistent with Pe�aflor�s position that it was only in the afternoon of March
13, 2000 that he was told, informally at that, that Buenaobra had taken over his
position.� It explains as well why as late as March 13, 2000, Pe�aflor still prepared
and signed a security report,[22] and is fully consistent with his position that on that day
he was still working on the excuse letter of certain sales personnel of the company. [23]

We note that the company only belatedly questioned the motivation that
Pe�aflor cited for his discriminatory treatment, i.e., that he was caught in the bitter fight
between Syfu and Lee, then Vice President for Operations, that led the latter to leave
the company.[24] After Lee left, Pe�aflor alleged that those identified with Lee were
singled out for adverse treatment, citing in this regard the downsizing of HRD that
occurred on or about this time and which resulted in his one-man HRD operation. We
say this downsizing was only �alleged� as the company totally failed � despite
Penaflor�s claim of discriminatory practice � to adduce evidence showing that there
had indeed been a legitimate downsizing. Other than its bare claim that it was facing
severe financial problems, Outdoor Clothing never presented any evidence to prove
both the reasons for its alleged downsizing and the fact of such downsizing. �No
evidence was ever offered to rebut Pe �aflor �s claim that his staff members were
dismissed to make his life as HRD Head difficult.� To be sure, Pe�aflor�s
participation in the termination of his staff members � employment cannot be used
against him, as the termination of employment was a management decision that
Pe�aflor, at his level, could not have effectively contested without putting his own job
on the line.�

Pe�aflor�s own service with the company deserves close scrutiny. � He
started working for the company on September 2, 1999 so that by March 1, 2000, his
probationary period would have ended and he would have become a regular employee.
We find it highly unlikely that Pe �aflor would resign on March 1, 2000 and would then
simply leave given his undisputed record of having successfully worked within his
probationary period on the company�s Policy Manual, Personnel Handbook, Job
Expectations, and Organizational Set-up.� It does not appear sound and logical to us
that an employee would tender his resignation on the very same day he was entitled by
law to be considered a regular employee, especially when a downsizing was taking
place and he could have availed of its benefits if he would be separated from the
service as a regular employee.� It was strange, too, that he would submit his
resignation on March 1, 2000 and keep completely quiet about this development until its
effective date on March 15, 2000.� In the usual course, the turnover alone of
responsibilities and work loads to the successor in a small company would have
prevented the matter from being completely under wraps for 10 days before any
announcement was ever made.� That Pe�aflor was caught by surprise by the
turnover of his post to Buenaobra is in fact indicated by the company �s own evidence
that Pe�aflor still submitted a security report on March 13, 2000. �On the whole,
Pe�aflor�s record with the company is not that of a company official who would
simply and voluntarily tender a precipitate resignation on the excuse that he would
devote his time to teaching � a lame excuse at best considering that March is the
month the semester usually ends and is two or three months away from the start of
another school year.��

� In our view, it is more consistent with human experience that Pe �aflor indeed
learned of the appointment of Buenaobra only on March 13, 2000 and reacted to this
development through his resignation letter after realizing that he would only face
hostility and frustration in his working environment.� Three very basic labor law
principles support this conclusion and militate against the company �s case. �

The first is the settled rule that in employee termination disputes, the
employer bears the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal was for just
and valid cause. That Peñaflor did indeed file a letter of resignation does not help
the company’s case as, other than the fact of resignation, the company must still
prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. There can be no valid resignation
where the act was made under compulsion or under circumstances
approximating compulsion, such as when an employee’s act of handing in his
resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him no alternative but to
resign. In sum, the evidence does not support the existence of voluntariness in
Peñaflor’s resignation.

Another basic principle is that expressed in Article 4 of the Labor Code that all
doubts in the interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code should be interpreted
in favor of the workingman. This principle has been extended by jurisprudence to cover
doubts in the evidence presented by the employer and the employee. As shown above,
Pe�aflor has, at very least, shown serious doubts about the merits of the company �s
case, particularly in the appreciation of the clinching evidence on which the NLRC and
CA decisions were based.� In such contest of evidence, the cited Article 4 compels us
to rule in Pe�aflor�s favor.� Thus, we find that Pe�aflor was constructively
dismissed given the hostile and discriminatory working environment he found himself in,
particularly evidenced by the escalating acts of unfairness against him that culminated
in the appointment of another HRD manager without any prior notice to him.� Where
no less than the company�s chief corporate officer was against him, Pe �aflor had no
alternative but to resign from his employment.[29]

Last but not the least, we have repeatedly given significance in
abandonment and constructive dismissal cases to the employee’s reaction to the
termination of his employment and have asked the question: is the complaint
against the employer merely a convenient afterthought subsequent to an
abandonment or a voluntary resignation? We find from the records that Peñaflor
sought almost immediate official recourse to contest his separation from service
through a complaint for illegal dismissal. [30] This is not the act of one who
voluntarily resigned; his immediate complaints characterize him as one who
deeply felt that he had been wronged.
�
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitioner�s petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87865 promulgated on December 29, 2006 and March 14, 2007,
respectively. �WeREINSTATE the decision of the labor arbiter dated August 15, 2001,
with the MODIFICATION that, due to the strained relations between the parties,
respondents are additionally ordered to pay separation pay equivalent to the
petitioner�s one month�s salary.

Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 112965. January 30, 1997]
PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., BETTY GO-BELMONTE, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN,

ARTURO A. BORJAL, and ISAAC G. BELMONTE petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELIX R. ALEGRE,
JR.,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a "Memorandum for File" which did not mention the words "resign" and/or
"resignation" nonetheless juridically constitute voluntary resignation? In answering this
question, the Court took into account not merely the literal meaning of the words and
phrases used but, more importantly, the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing
as well as antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions, which were
inconsistent with the desire for continued employment of the writer, an intelligent
executive occupying a position of trust in thePhilippine Star and gifted with an unusual
writing ability.
These circumstances and actions are explained by this Court in resolving this
petition for certiorari assailing the Decision [1] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division) [2] in NLRC NCR CA 001863-91 entitled "Felix R. Alegre,
Jr. vs. Philippines Today, Inc." promulgated on September 30, 1993, which reversed the
decision of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., dated May 15; 1991. In a Resolution
dated November 16, 1993, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. [3]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are as follows: Petitioner Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI) is the
owner of the Philippine Star, a daily newspaper of national and international circulation,
while the individual petitioners are officers and members of the board of directors of PTI,
namely, Betty Go-Belmonte, chairman of the board; Arturo A. Borjal, president; Maximo
V. Soliven, publisher and chairman, editorial board; and Isaac G. Belmonte, treasurer.
Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI in July 1986 as a senior
investigative reporter of the Philippine Star with a monthly salary of eight thousand
pesos (P8,000.00). He later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the
publisher. His monthly compensation was correspondingly increased to ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00).
On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirty-day leave of
absence effective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for him
to undergo further medical consultations abroad. [4] Four days later, on October 24,
1988, he wrote a "Memorandum for File" [5] addressed to Petitioner Betty Go-Belmonte
with copies furnished to members of the board of directors of PTI, the text of which is
reproduced below:
"MEMORANDUM FOR FILE.
FOR : BETTY GO-BELMONTE
Chairman & CEO, The STAR Group of Publications
FROM : FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR.
DATE : 24 October 1988
SUBJECT : HAVING IT ALL
Truth like medicine hurts. But it cures.
The nice little chat we had last Thursday was most revealing. And certainly
disconcerting.
What you had to tell me pained me, of course. But it has helped me just as much. It
enabled me to see things clearly in their right perspectives. More importantly, it provided
me with the answers to the questions that had long nagged me in my wakeful state.
For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being treated like a pariah of sorts by most
of the senior executives around here. The frustration at my inability to put a finger at
such a feeling somehow enhanced the angst within me. Until our chat. Now all the
demons of my anxiety have been exorcised. And I am left alone to lick the wounds of
my betrayal. It isn't easy, I know. But I shall pull through. Your candor and demonstrated
faith in my person have been most assuaging. And for that alone, I am most grateful.
It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less than
the publisher himself, to join him at the Philippines Today, Inc., and the STAR Group of
Publications, I was unwittingly signing my own death warrant as well. The insults he had
later on hurled at my person, the malicious innuendoes he had spread around, casting
doubts on my personal and professional integrity, had mercilessly torn at my soul,
causing metaphysical death.
My credentials as a working journalist, I'd like to believe, got me this job at the STAR in
the first place. And my bylines in the series of articles in the STAR From Day One of my
official affiliation with the Company, should establish that fact.
I was an investigative reporter at the Manila Times when the publisher offered me to
work with him at the STAR in 1986. I was given the assignment as senior investigative
reporter, then chief investigative writer, until I was given a fancy title of assistant to the
publisher.
As a corporate guy assisting the publisher in his day-to-day official functionand this is
where I feel very strongly about citing some specifics of the things I did in this area, to
wit:
. . . (omitted are said "specifics" of Respondent Alegre's accomplishments as assistant

to the publisher deemed by this Court as not relevant to the appreciation of this
memorandum in relation to the consideration of the petition.)
As can be gleaned from this recital of some of the "things done" (despite my distaste for
trumpeting one's deeds, but has to be said, to set the record straight, in this instance),
one can see that I obviously don different hats at any one time, doing administration and
operations functions, apart from my journalistic duties. That I work as a teamplayer, and
trying hard to be good at (sic) it, cannot be denied.
FOR DOING ALL THESE in the best spirit of corporate team-upmanship, what did I get
in RETURN?
1. A pittance, salary/compensation-wise
2. Being conveniently bypassed in promotions, pay hikes, and other perks
3. Hindered from active participation in corporate affairs, by shooting at my ideas

that otherwise would have been workable and profitable for the Company and its
people (CF. Item 2 of my memo dtd 06 September 88 which had you interested
in and supportive of).
4. Personally and professionally maligned, and accused of being an NPA (non-

performing asshole, pardon my French).
By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable society:
ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove . . . anything or everything comes crashing down. I'M
HAVING IT ALL!
Since I am on leave, I guess I won't be able to see you for a while. I wish to take this
opportunity to express my profound appreciation and sincere thanks for your genuine
con-cren (sic) and honest initiatives to do a good turn on my behalf. You have been
most candid and forthright with me. I can't be any less.
Thank you for everything. God bless.
Very sincerely,
(Sgd.) FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR.
copy furnished:
Members-of the Board, Phils. Today, Inc.
Dr. Ronaldo G. Asuncion
Mr. Antonio Roces"
On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a

letter, [6] as follows:
"November 9, 1988
MR. FELIX ALEGRE
Dear Jun,
During our board meeting yesterday, we discussed your letter dated October 24, 1988,
and the Board decided to accept your resignation and that it would take effect on
November 22, 1988 upon expiration of your one-month leave.
I would like to take this opportunity to say that we were happy to have had you with the
STAR Group of Publications and that we would like to wish you the best of luck.
God bless. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
BETTY GO BELMONTE
Chairman of the Board

The Philippine Star"
The following day, Respondent Alegre wrote Petitioner Belmonte expressing

surprise over the acceptance of his "resignation" as stated in the above-quoted letter.
His letter [7] partly stated:
"It certainly beats me to be told that my 'resignation' has been accepted, when in truth
and in fact no such move, however implicit it may be, and no such letter has ever been
made from my end.
xxx xxx xxx
I am writing this letter not, certainly, to make any appeal, but simply to go on record that
I did not resign. I filed a leave of absence. Yes. And that was dully (sic.,) approved.
Then I sent you a memorandum for file expressing my sentiments on certain things,
candid statements that came to b4 (sic) expressed inspired by your candor and sincerity
in our last little chat. Now, if you read that memo to mean resignation, that is your
responsibility. And I am not just about to contest it. x x x"
This was followed by another letter on January 2, 1989, wherein Alegre, through
counsel, [8] reiterated that he never resigned. He accused petitioners of illegal dismissal
as can be perceived allegedly from the discrimination against him in promotions,
benefits and the ploy to oust him by considering his memorandum as a resignation. He
claimed that as a result, he suffered mental anguish, social humiliation, besmirched
reputation and moral shock. He thus demanded indemnification for "the material and
moral losses he has incurred". He further wrote that he was not insisting to be taken
back after being shown that he was no longer wanted in the company.
Counsel [9] for petitioners, in a reply on January 19, 1989, explained that the
acceptance of Alegre's resignation was a collective decision of the board of directors
since "nobody in his right mind would write a memorandum of the sort he wrote and still
not resign. To them, the memorandum was tantamount to a resignation even if Mr.
Alegre did not say so in so much words." With respect to his claim for damages,
petitioners' counsel said, "he has not shown any specific fact or circumstance that would
justify his claim, even remotely." Hence, "the Star cannot accede to the same."
On May 17, 1989, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages against herein petitioners. [10] The labor arbiter dismissed said complaint in his
decision of May 15, 1991. We quote significant portions of said decision:
"This office has minutely disected (sic) the letter and while it be said that nothing therein
mentions about resigning from his position as Assistant to the Publisher, a perusal of
the letter as a whole shows that the intention of the complainant was to resign from his
post. The subject as "Having it all" together with his frustrations and disappointment in
the office coupled with his statement that "when push comes to a shove, everything
comes crushing (sic) down" and that: he is "having it all" and with his concluding
sentence of "Thank you for everything" are (sic) clear indications that he was in fact
resigning.
As a journalist and a writer, complainant need not write his letter of resignation in black
and white. He can do so in many other ways, words and actions to show his real
intention of leaving his job.
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant's subsequent overt acts particularly his failure to report to his job after the
expiration of his leave of absence, his being gainfully employed with the Office of
Senator Laurel (as Chief of Staff) and his act of clearing and removing his personal files,
things and belongings from his desk prior to his (complainant) knowledge or receipt of
the letter accepting his resignation(,) clearly indicates that complainant was not
terminated from his job but rather he resigned from his job...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the

complaint for illegal dismissal and damages for lack of merit, and ordering respondent,
Philippines Today, Inc., to pay complainant the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS by way of separation pay in the interest of compassionate labor
justice and; dismissing Respondents (sic) counterclaim for damages for lack of merit. [11]
On appeal by Alegre, the above decision was set aside by the NLRC. Adopting the
definition in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) of resignation as a "formal
renouncement or relinquishment of an office," it held that herein Respondent Alegre did
not resign as there was no actual act of relinquishment to constitute complete and
operative resignation. According to the NLRC, the request for a leave of absence by
Respondent Alegre meant that he intended to return after the period of his absence.
Such intent was bolstered by his filing of a request for an extension of his leave.
Further, when he received the letter of Petitioner Belmonte dated November 9, 1988
informing him of the acceptance by the Board of his resignation, he immediately wrote a
letter to Petitioner Belmonte, expressing in no uncertain terms that he did not resign.
These circumstances led the NLRC to hold that Respondent Alegre was constructively
dismissed without just cause and to order petitioners to pay him full backwages for three
years from the time of dismissal, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. [12]
Issues
Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion:
1. in finding them guilty of illegally dismissing Respondent Alegre;
2. in awarding Respondent Alegre moral and exemplary damages and attorney's

fees without any factual and legal basis; and,
3. even assuming that Respondent Alegre was illegally dismissed, in contravening

and disregarding this Court's ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC (Second
Division) [13] by erroneously computing backwages, as it did not deduct the
amounts earned by Respondent Alegre while he was admittedly employed in the
office of Senator Sotero H. Laurel.
The pivotal question is whether the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre
addressed to Petitioner Belmonte constitutes a letter of resignation.
In construing it so, petitioners advance these arguments: (1) Respondent Alegre
had spoken openly to Petitioner Belmonte of his desire to leave the Philippine Star; (2)
the contents of his memorandum indicate an intention on his part not to return to his job
even if he did not categorically mention resignation; (3) he never returned to work after
his authorized leave expired and even cleared his desk of his personal belongings; and,
(4) he obtained employment as chief of staff of the office of Senator Sotero Laurel for
which he was paid a higher salary. Having been led to believe that Alegre wanted to
resign and in honestly perceiving his memorandum as a resignation letter, petitioners
cannot be held liable for moral and exemplary damages because they believe their
action was in accordance with law. Lastly, petitioners contend that, even assuming they
were liable for illegal dismissal, the NLRC, in granting backwages, should have
deducted the amount earned by Alegre from his subsequent employment.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had no intention of
resigning from PTI. He insists that: (1) in writing the memorandum, he was merely
lamenting the work environment at PTI and apprising Petitioner Belmonte of the
situation; (2) a resignation should be unequivocal in nature; (3) his non-return to work
after his original leave expired is explained by his subsequent request for an extension
thereof due to medical reasons; (4) and the letter of Petitioner Belmonte obviated any
desire for him to return to his work since petitioners practically terminated his
employment. He further contends that petitioners' tenacious resistance in admitting their
mistake bespeaks of bad faith and shows their real intention to end his services, which
entitles him to moral and exemplary damages. In representation of public respondent,
the Solicitor General supported private respondent's position.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Pivotal Issue: Did the Memorandum for File Constitute Voluntary Resignation?
After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre and a
careful deliberation on the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing and the
antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions of private respondent, we hold
that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation.
We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They are
more in accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor arbiter
correctly deduced from Alegre's memorandum and attendant actuations that he
resigned. In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation of what constitutes
"resignation." It adhered literally to the dictionary meaning of the word without relating it
to the peculiarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and quasi-
judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in making decisions, must not be
too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretations of words, phrases and
sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and
equitable judgment.
Incendiary words and sarcastic remarks negate alleged desire to improve

relations
Alegre's choice of words and way of expression betray his allegation that the
memorandum was simply an "opportunity to open the eyes of (Petitioner) Belmonte to
the work environment in petitioners' newspaper with the end in view of persuading (her)
to take a hand at improving said environment." Apprising his employer (or top-level
management) of his frustrations in his job and differences with his immediate superior is
certainly not done in an abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. A cordial or, at
the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to one's superiors, is still
observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial
notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent
among members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including
work sites. An employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the
employer being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden egg," [14] so to speak. An
aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and
frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach
said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and
discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing
ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his. employer professionally,
and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful
and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a baleful pen. Here, respondent
Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is too affrontive,
combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment, even when read by an
objective reader. His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks, to quote some:
"For quite a time, I got this sinking feeling of being treated like a pariah of sorts by most
of the senior executives around here. The frustration at my inability to put a finger at
such a feeling somehow enhanced the angst within me. . . .Now all the demons of my
anxiety have been exorcised. And I am left alone to lick the wounds of my betrayal. x x x
It has never occurred to me that, in my acceptance of the invitation from no less than
the publisher himself, to-join him . . . I was unwittingly signing my own death warrant as
well. The insults he had later on hurled at my person, the malicious innuendoes he had
spread around casting doubts on my personal and professional integrity, had
mercilessly torn at my soul, causing metaphysical death."
negate any desire to improve work relations with Petitioner Soliven and other PTI
executives. Such strongly worded letter constituted an act of "burning his bridges" with
the officers of the company.
Seeking relief incompatible withwriting offensive letter
Any management officer, much so an immediate superior, would be offended, if not

enraged, with the insults and innuendoes stated in said memorandum; more so
because the memorandum was not directly addressed to him but to the chairman and
CEO and copy furnished all other officers and members of the board of directors. Any
discerning mind can perceive that the letter is not simply a recitation of respondent
Alegre's gripes, disappointments, frustrations and heartaches against the company and
its officers particularly Petitioner Soliven, as postulated by the Solicitor General in his
comment. [15] If it were so, why was it not addressed directly to the person concerned?
His memorandum clearly indicated that his problems involved, or were supposedly
caused by only one person, Mr. Soliven, his immediate superior. But it was not even
addressed to him! How can he expect amends in their relations if that was all he
wanted? The Solicitor General was simply turning a blind eye to the obvious fact that
said memorandum, for all intents and purposes, was intended, wittingly or unwittingly, to
end employment relations.
Respondent Alegre a well-educated journalist
It should not escape our attention that respondent Alegre is a. professional

journalist and persuasive writer. On top of that, he was a law graduate. He must have
known the drilling effect of his bitter and sarcastic remarks upon the petitioners and
must have intended the same. Ordinary words are to be construed in their ordinary
meaning. Commonsense dictates that Alegre meant to resign when he wrote the
memorandum. Otherwise, he should have used a more tempered language and a less
confrontational tone. Moreover, he held a position of evident responsibility requiring the
utmost confidence of his immediate superior. As assistant to the publisher doing, in his
very own words, "administration and operations functions, apart from (my) journalistic
duties," it is apparent that Alegre was not employed simply for his writing skills. Top
management certainly reposed full trust and confidence in him and placed him in a
position of considerable management influence.
PTI officers of uncommon intelligence and perception
Furthermore, his memorandum was addressed to the chairman and chief executive
officer of PTI and furnished all members of the board of directors. These officers which
include the likes of the late Betty Go-Belmonte, Maximo V. Soliven and Arturo A. Borjal,
long-time and well-respected journalists acclaimed locally and internationally, are
themselves people of uncommon perception and intellect. They will not miscomprehend
the meaning and intent of Alegre's memorandum, which was not by any means a simple
way of seeking relief but well a way to get out of the company. What else could he have
meant with these concluding remarks:
"By and large, all that I got are the twin demons of a civilized, unconscionable society:
ECONOMIC INJUSTICE and PROFESSIONAL SABOTAGE.
When push comes to a shove . . . . anything or everything comes crashing down. I'M
HAVING IT ALL!"
Respondent Alegre, being a journalist himself and having worked with them for
sometime, knew how his letter would be perceived and received. Besides, as discussed
earlier, Alegre is likewise a well-educated man of more than average intelligence. The
conclusion is inevitable that he had more than enough sense to anticipate the
consequences and effects of his words and actions. Indeed, what a man sows, he
reaps.
Trust and confidence breached
In addition, respondent Alegre is a highly confidential employee who holds his job at
the pleasure of his employer or, stated otherwise, for as long as he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer. Corollarily, he likewise must repose trust and confidence in
his employer or, at the very least, his immediate superior. But any superior hurled with
invectives from a confidential employee, much more one occupying a managerial
position at the same time, will definitely lose trust and confidence in the latter. And there
can be no way to interpret such letter other than as a withering of trust and confidence
by the employee in his boss. The use of offensive language can only mean expression
of disloyalty and disrespect. It renders the writer unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. It is beyond human nature to expect two persons with
underlying mistrust in each other to continue to work together effectively, not to say,
harmoniously.
Antecedent, Contemporaneous and Subsequent Actions Affirming Resignation
In addition to his memorandum and the circumstances attendant thereto which were
just discussed, the Court notes some peculiar actions confirming Alegres' intention to
terminate his employment with the Star.
(1) Medical reasons for leave of absence not proved
First, he claims that his leave of absence was due to medical reasons, for which he
was supposed to seek relief abroad. However, the Court scoured the records but found
nothing to show that he actually underwent any medical check-up. Much less, medical
examination abroad. Nothing really backs up such claim except his bare statements
which, evidentially, are at best self-serving.
(1) Cleared desk of personal belongings
Second, respondent Alegre cleared his desk of his personal belongings even before
he knew of the acceptance of his resignation. [16]Such act certainly bares his intent to
leave his job. Respondent Alegre has not refuted nor offered any sufficient explanation
for this action. We cannot but-give due credit to the petitioners' contention that such act
was expressive of his intent to resign.
(1) Did not report back to work
Third, respondent Alegre did not return to his job after his authorized leave of
absence expired in November 1988. Although he sent another letter [17] requesting for
an extension of his leave, there is no showing on record that the same was approved by
petitioners. It is standard office procedure that applications for leave of absence are
subject to the approval of the employer. These are not automatically granted upon filing.
Except to cite in his request "travel log (sic) coupled with advice of my physician,"
respondent Alegre has not proven the emergency nature of the cause/s of his extended
leave. Again, we cannot but give due credence to petitioners' contention that this was
another operative evidence of Alegre's intent to resign.
His non-return to work, though, is not equivalent to abandonment of work. For in the
latter, it is necessary to prove "clear and deliberate intent" coupled with unjustified.
absence and overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore. [18] In the case at bench, Alegre voluntarily resigned through his
memorandum albeit written in the guise of a grievance letter. The law and jurisprudence
on abandonment have thus no application in the present case.
(4) Not deprived of chance to return to work
Fourth, if Respondent Alegre had really no intention to resign, he could have

reported back to work. His contention that he was effectively deprived of any chance to
return to his work because of the acceptance of his purported resignation cannot be
sustained. He claims that he received the notice dated November 9, 1988 only on
December 6, 1988. But this means that for about two weeks after his leave expired, he
had all chances to return to his work. Yet he chose not to. The obvious reason is that he
had actually no intention of doing so.
(5) Alegre expressly manifested intention to resign
Prior to sending his memorandum, Respondent Alegre informed Petitioner

Belmonte of his intention to resign from the Philippine Star. This is shown by the
testimony (cross examination) of the late Mrs. Belmonte before the labor arbiter on
January 13, 1990 as follows:
"ATTY. BORRETA:
And you took that action, meaning the Board acted on this Memo for File which you
considered as his letter of resignation without consulting or talking with the complainant
first?
WITNESS:
The complainant had also applied for leave of absence and he talked with me that he
was leaving for the United States. Actually I remember he requested a conversation but
he did not specify what the conversation was about, Your Honor. He was telling me that
he wanted to leave, has signed another job. And I told him that is not my prerogative
and I am only Chairman of the Board; and he came upon the recommendation of our
Publisher and he was at that time Assistant to the Publisher; that he should talk to the
Publisher first and I even advised him to patch up whatever differences he might have.
In that conversation, he said something about leaving and he even said to me that when
he leaves, he would ask his two (2) sons who were working with us to leave too. And I
think I made a comment, and that must be what he was referring to. I said; oh, but your
sons are very hardworking. In fact I said the Publisher, Max Soliven, told me that 'sana
you were as good as your sons' maybe that was his feeling. That is my way of trying to
tell him that your sons are very hard-working because he said when I leave I am going
to ask them to leave too. Maybe because of that he gave me the impression that he
wanted to leave.
ATTY. BORRETA:
And this happened before he wrote this memo for file on October 24, 1988?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir
ATTY. BORRETA:
And because of that you got the impression that he had the intention to resign?
WITNESS:
Yes sir" [19]
(6) Assumed job in another office
Finally, the most telling of the actions undertaken by Respondent Alegre which
evidently demonstrate his intent to resign was his immediate employment as chief of
staff of the office of then Senator Sotero H. Laurel, with a much higher compensation
at P14,600.00 per month plus P2,000.00 per month driver's allowance. He admitted in
his testimony before the labor arbiter on November 6, 1989 that he was employed
therein about a year before (the date of his testimony) or sometime in November
1988. [20] The date coincided with the period of his leave of absence or immediately
thereafter. If he had no intention of resigning and was on leave for medical reasons as
he alleged, why then did he commence a new job in another office at about the same
period? His assumption of a new job prior to receiving Mrs. Belmonte's letter on
December 6, 1988 is clearly inconsistent with any desire to remain in employment with
PTI. This is particularly evident because both jobs required full-time work. Moreover,
working in a newspaper which prides in its independence from partisan activities is
incompatible with a concurrent political office held by respondent.
Side Issue: May a Resignation Be Unilaterally Withdrawn?
Having established that Respondent Alegre resigned, we now tackle the corollary
issue of whether he can unilaterally withdraw his resignation. We hold that he cannot do
so.
The case of Intertrod Maritime, Inc. vs. NLRC [21] is in point. The employee therein
who was a ship engineer, while at Port Pylus, Greece, requested for relief due to
"personal reasons." The master of the ship, who had authority to "sign off" an employee
requesting relief, approved his request but informed the employee that repatriation
expenses were for his account and that he had to give thirty days notice in view of
clause 5 of the employment contract. When the vessel was at Port Said, Egypt four
days later, the master "signed him off" and paid him in cash all amounts due him less
repatriation expenses. On his return to the Philippines, the employee filed a complaint
charging his employer with breach of employment contract and violation of the National
Seamen Board rules and regulations. He claimed that his request for relief was only for
the sole purpose of enabling him to take care of a fellow member of the crew who was
hospitalized in Greece. Hence, after he was disallowed from disembarking thereat, the
reason no longer existed and, consequently, he was illegally dismissed when he was
forced to "sign off" in Egypt even as he signified his intention of continuing his work.
The Court ruled against the employee. It held that resignations, once accepted, may
not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts the
withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not, the employee cannot
claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed,
is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to
them.
Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which
requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is
consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds-himself in a situation where he
believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the
service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his
employment". [22] If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is
severance of the contract of employment.
A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor and
he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment.
He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To
allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom
to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held
that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment including hiring. [23] The law, in protecting the rights of the
laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. [24]
Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of respondent Alegre after its
acceptance by petitioners can no longer be withdrawn without the consent of the latter.
In fairness to the employer, an employee cannot backtrack on his resignation at his
whim and without the conformity of the former.
The instant case is unlike Molave Tours Corporation vs. NLRC [25] and People's
Security, Inc. vs. NLRC. [26] In Molave, acting on reports that the employee was on
several occasions found drunk within work premises, the employer required him to
explain in writing said charges. Notwithstanding his explanation and request for a
confrontation with his accusers, the employee was made to sign a resignation letter.
Two months after, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter, affirmed by
the NLRC, found that the employee was merely forced and intimidated into resigning.
The Court reiterated that resignation must be voluntary on the part of the employee. It
thus ordered the employer to reinstate the employee and award backwages and other
benefits due him since there was no effective resignation.
Likewise in People's Security, there was a finding of involuntary resignation. The
employees therein who were security guards were not given assignments by their
employer after the latter's security services contract with Meralco expired. The
employees requested for loans to be deducted from their security bond deposits, which
requests were denied by the employer who insisted that they must turn in their
resignations first before their security bond deposits could be released. Not having been
given new work assignments and being in dire financial need, the employees submitted
their resignation letters. Three months later, they filed money claims which were later
amended to include illegal dismissal. The employer contended that the employees
voluntarily severed their employment because they turned in their resignation letters
and assumed jobs with another security agency. Again the Court held that resignation is
a voluntary act of the employee. When the employees were told that they would not be
granted loans unless they resigned, they had no choice since they desperately needed
money to meet their respective families' needs. They were also forced to accept jobs at
another agency as a practical solution to their employment problems which were
caused by the employer's refusal and failure to provide them with new assignments.
In the case of Indophil vs. NLRC, [27] on the other hand, the employee voluntarily
submitted a resignation letter but later tried to retrieve the same. He contended though,
that he was thereafter prevented by the company guard from entering the work
premises because of his resignation. He sued for illegal dismissal. His employer
claimed abandonment of work since he was required to report and to explain his
unauthorized absences but did not. In holding that there was no dismissal, the Court
regarded the employer's act of requiring the employee to report and explain his
unauthorized absences as non-acceptance of the previous resignation of the employee.
Thus, the employer still considered him as its employee in spite of the filed resignation
letter. With respect to the latter's allegation that he was prevented by the company
guard from entering the premises, the Court chided him for not having inquired into its
veracity and for simply relying on the bare statement of the guard. It said that the
employee should be more vigilant of his rights.
The above three cases are dissimilar to the case at bar. In the first two cases, there
were involuntary resignations while in the third there was an unaccepted resignation. In
the instant case, however, the resignation was voluntary and it was accepted by the
employer. Thus, our grant of the petition.
Since we find no case of illegal dismissal, we will no longer pass upon the two other
issues raised by petitioners which are mere consequences of the contrary finding made
by the NLRC. Necessarily, there can be no award of any moral or exemplary damages,
backwages and separation pay.
Epilogue
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code mandate a bias in favor of labor. Hence,
this Court, as a matter of judicial policy, leans backwards to protect labor and the
working class against the machinations and incursions of their more financially
entrenched employers. In the present case, however, it is obvious to us that private
respondent's memorandum could not have been intended merely to persuade
management to improve the work environment at the Philippine Star. Rather, it was
evidently a recitation of the facts and reasons why respondent Alegre could no longer
continue working under what he believed were unbearable conditions in the work place.
The offensive language used by a well-educated man endowed with unusual writing skill
could not have been intended merely for the "suggestion box." That it was addressed
and given to persons of uncommon perception themselves takes the letter out of
ordinary employer employee communications. It is true that there was no direct mention
of the word "resignation." However, the incendiary words employed denote a clear
intent to end the writer's association of trust and confidence with his superiors and
employer. This intent becomes even more manifest when viewed in light of attendant
acts of Alegre, particularly his prolonged leave of absence, his clearing of his own desk
of personal belongings, his failure to report back to work after the expiration of his
approved leave, his verbal expression of his intent to resign, and most notably, his
assumption of a higher paying job in a political office which was incompatible with his
work at the Star.
In deciding cases, this Court does not matter-of-factly apply and interpret laws in a
vacuum. General principles do not decide specific cases. Rather, laws are interpreted
always in the context of the peculiar factual situation of each case. Each case has its
own flesh and blood and cannot be decided simply on the basis of isolated clinical
classroom principles. The circumstances of time, place, event, person, and particularly
attendant circumstances and actions before, during and after the operative fact should
all be taken in their totality so that justice can be rationally and fairly dispensed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the NLRC are SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court is made PERMANENT . No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177114 April 13, 2010
MANOLO A. PEÑAFLOR, Petitioner,
vs.
OUTDOOR CLOTHING MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, NATHANIEL T. SYFU, President,
MEDYLENE M. DEMOGENA, Finance Manager, and PAUL LEE, Chairman, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
In our Decision of January 21, 2010, we granted petitioner Manolo Peñaflor’s (Peñaflor) petition for
review on certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of December 29, 2006 and
resolution of March 14, 2007. We found that Peñaflor had been constructively dismissed from his
employment with respondent Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation (Outdoor Clothing).
Outdoor Clothing now seeks a reconsideration of this ruling.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Peñaflor was hired as probationary HRD Manager of Outdoor Clothing on September 2, 1999. On
March 13, 2000, more than six months from the time he was hired, Peñaflor learned that Outdoor
Clothing’s President, Nathaniel Syfu (Syfu), appointed Edwin Buenaobra (Buenaobra) as the
concurrent HRD and Accounting Manager. After enduring what he claimed as discriminatory
treatment at work, Peñaflor considered the appointment of Buenaobra to his position as the last
straw, and thus filed his irrevocable resignation from Outdoor Clothing effective at the close of office
hours on March 15, 2000. He thereafter filed an illegal dismissal complaint with the labor arbiter
claiming that he had been constructively dismissed. The labor arbiter agreed with Peñaflor and
issued a decision in his favor on August 15, 2001.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter’s ruling in its
September 24, 2002 decision. When Peñaflor questioned the NLRC’s decision before the CA, the
appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s decision. Hence, Peñaflor filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Court.
The Court’s January 21, 2010 Decision
Our January 21, 2010 decision focused on resolving the issue of whether Peñaflor’s resignation from
Outdoor Clothing was voluntary or a forced one, the latter making it a constructive dismissal
equivalent to an illegal dismissal. We found it crucial to determine whether Peñaflor filed his
resignation letter before or after the appointment of Buenaobra as concurrent HRD and Accounting
Manager. If the resignation was submitted before Syfu’s appointment of Buenaobra, little support
would exist for Peñaflor’s allegation of constructive dismissal, as the appointment would merely be
intended to cover the vacancy created by Peñaflor’s resignation. If however the resignation was
made after the appointment of Buenaobra, then factual basis exists to consider Peñaflor as
constructively dismissed by Outdoor Clothing, as the resignation would be a response to the
unacceptable appointment of another person to a position he still occupied.
Peñaflor claimed that he filed his undated resignation letter on the very same date he made his
resignation effective – March 15, 2000. On the other hand, Outdoor Clothing contended that the
letter was submitted on March 1, 2000. In support of this allegation, Outdoor Clothing presented
three memoranda:
a. the March 1, 2000 memorandum from Syfu to Buenaobra appointing the latter as the
concurrent HRD and Accounting Manager;
b. the March 3, 2000 memorandum from Buenaobra to Syfu accepting the appointment; and
c. the March 10, 2000 office memorandum from Syfu informing all concerned of Buenaobra’s
new appointment.
Our analysis of the records led us to conclude that Peñaflor submitted his resignation on March 15,
2000 as a response to the appointment of Buenaobra to his post.
We considered suspicious Outdoor Clothing’s above memoranda because these were only
presented to the NLRC on appeal, but not before the labor arbiter. They were not even mentioned in
Outdoor Clothing’s position paper filed with the labor arbiter. The failure to present them and to
justify this failure are significant considering that these are clinching pieces of evidence that allowed
the NLRC to justify the reversal of the labor arbiter’s decision.
The surrounding circumstances of the issuance of these memoranda also cast doubts on their
authenticity. Although the memoranda directly concerned Peñaflor, he was never informed of their
contents nor given copies. While the March 10, 2000 memorandum bore signatures of its recipients,
there were no marks on the March 1 and 3, 2000 memoranda indicating that their intended
recipients actually received them on the date they were issued. It was likewise strange that
Peñaflor’s resignation and Buenaobra’s appointment would be kept under wraps from the supposed
filing of Peñaflor’s resignation letter on March 1, 2000 up to Syfu’s issuance of the March 10, 2000
office memorandum, since the turnover of responsibilities and work load alone to a successor in a
small company such as Outdoor Clothing would have prevented the resignation from being kept a
secret.
We also considered the timeliness of Peñaflor’s resignation. It was highly unlikely for Peñaflor to
resign on March 1, 2000, as claimed by Outdoor Corporation, considering that he would have
become a regular employee by that time. It did not appear logical that an employee would tender his
resignation on the very same day he was entitled by law to be considered a regular employee,
especially when downsizing was taking place and he could have availed of its benefits if separated
from the services as a regular employee.
Considering the above circumstances, and applying basic labor law principles, the Court ruled that
Peñaflor was constructively dismissed from his employment with Outdoor Clothing. We thus
reversed the CA’s decision and resolution and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter which
found the respondents (Outdoor Clothing and its corporate officers) jointly and severally liable to pay
Peñaflor backwages, illegally deducted salaries, proportionate 13th month pay, attorney’s fees,
moral and exemplary damages.
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Outdoor Clothing now moves for the reconsideration of the Court’s January 21, 2010 Decision. It
alleges that the Court erred in declaring that Peñaflor was constructively dismissed from his
employment despite his submission of an "irrevocable resignation" letter. It also claims that the Court
erred in holding all the respondents jointly and severally liable to pay Peñaflor the salaries and
damages awarded in his favor.
Outdoor Clothing maintains that Peñaflor’s resignation was voluntary; Peñaflor resigned because he
wanted to disassociate himself from a company that was experiencing severe financial difficulty and
to focus on his teaching job. Indeed, Peñaflor’s own letter stating his decision to irrevocably resign
from his employment with Outdoor Clothing was a clear indication that he was not forced to leave
the company.
Outdoor Clothing also relies heavily on the three memoranda it presented before the NLRC to
support its claim of Peñaflor’s voluntary resignation. Although belatedly filed, Outdoor Clothing
claims there is nothing in the rules which disallows the filing of new documents before the NLRC.
"Submission of additional documents, albeit belatedly done, should always be looked upon with
liberality especially when the same was important for any factual determination of the case." 1
Since it was Peñaflor who filed the resignation letter, Outdoor Clothing posits that the burden of
proving that the resignation was involuntary rests on Peñaflor. The evidence presented by Peñaflor
simply failed to overcome this burden and thus, his resignation should be deemed voluntary and
should absolve Outdoor Clothing of any liability for illegal dismissal.
Additionally, Outdoor Clothing asserts that the Court erred in reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision
which ordered all the respondents jointly and severally liable for the sums due to Peñaflor. There
was nothing in the decision of the Court or even those of the CA and the administrative bodies
finding Outdoor Clothing’s corporate officers Syfu, Medylene Demogena (Demogena), and Paul Lee
(Lee) to have personally acted in bad faith or with malice with respect to Peñaflor’s resignation.
Assuming Outdoor Clothing is indeed liable to Peñaflor for illegal dismissal, it would be legally out of
line to consider its corporate officers solidarily liable with the company without a finding of bad faith
or malice on their part.
THE COURT’S RULING
Other than the issue of solidary liability of the respondents in the present case, Outdoor Clothing
raises no new matter that would merit a reconsideration of the Court’s January 21, 2010 Decision.
Peñaflor’s resignation letter read:
Mr. Nathaniel Y. Syfu

Chief Corporate Officer
Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation
Sir:
Please accept my irrevocable resignation effective at the close of office on March 15, 2000.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
Manolo A. Peñaflor2
While the letter states that Peñaflor’s resignation was irrevocable, it does not necessarily signify that
it was also voluntarily executed. Precisely because of the attendant hostile and discriminatory
working environment, Peñaflor decided to permanently sever his ties with Outdoor Clothing. This
falls squarely within the concept of constructive dismissal that jurisprudence defines, among others,
as involuntarily resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer.
It arises when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer exists and has become
unbearable to the employee.3 The gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person
in the employee’s position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing
circumstances.4 With the appointment of Buenaobra to the position he then still occupied, Peñaflor
felt that he was being eased out and this perception made him decide to leave the company.
The fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift the burden of proving that the employee’s
dismissal was for a just and valid cause from the employer to the employee. In Mora v. Avesco, 5 we
ruled that should the employer interpose the defense of resignation, it is still incumbent upon the
employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. To our mind, Outdoor Clothing did not
discharge this burden by belatedly presenting the three memoranda it relied on. If these memoranda
were authentic, they would have shown that Peñaflor’s resignation preceded the appointment of
Buenaobra. Thus, they would be evidence supporting the claim of voluntariness of Peñaflor’s
resignation and should have been presented early on in the case – any lawyer or layman by simple
logic can be expected to know this. Outdoor Clothing however raised them only before the NLRC
when they had lost the case before the labor arbiter and now conveniently attributes the failure to do
so to its former counsel. Outddor Clothing’s belated explanation as expressed in its motion for
reconsideration, to our mind, is a submission we cannot accept for serious consideration. We find it
significant that Peñaflor attacked the belated presentation of these memoranda in his Answer to
Outdoor Clothing’s Memoranda of Appeal with the NLRC, but records do not show that Outdoor
Clothing ever satisfactorily countered Peñaflor’s arguments. It was not until we pointed out Outdoor
Clothing’s failure to explain its belated presentation of the memoranda in our January 21, 2010
decision that Outdoor Clothing offered a justification.1avvphi1
Whatever doubts that remain in our minds on the credibility of the parties’ evidence should, by the
law’s dictate, be settled in favor of the working man. Our ruling that Peñaflor was constructively
dismissed from his employment with Outdoor Clothing therefore stands.
We modify, however, our ruling on the extent of liability of Outdoor Clothing and its co-respondents.
A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and employees.
Obligations incurred as a result of the directors’ and officers’ acts as corporate agents, are not their
personal liability but the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent. As a rule, they are
only solidarily liable with the corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they
acted with malice or bad faith. In the present case, malice or bad faith on the part of the Syfu,
Demogena, and Lee, as corporate officers of Outdoor Clothing, was not sufficiently proven to justify
a ruling holding them solidarily liable with Outdoor Clothing. 6
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT respondents’ motion for reconsideration and MODIFY our

Decision dated January 21, 2010. Respondent Outdoor Clothing is hereby ordered to pay petitioner
the following:
a. backwages computed from the time of constructive dismissal up to the time of the finality
of the Court’s Resolution;
b. separation pay, due to the strained relations between the parties, equivalent to the
petitioner’s one month’s salary;
c. illegally deducted salary for six days, as computed by the labor arbiter;
d. proportionate 13th month pay;
e. attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and
f. costs against the respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.
LAGUNA
METTS ��
�� G.R. No. 185220
CORPORATION,��
��
�� Petitioner,

��
��Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
��
�� CARPIO,
�� - v e r s u s
-��
��CORONA,
��
��LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
��
��
��
��COURT OF APPEALS,
ARIES C. CAALAM and
GERALDINE ESGUERRA,
�� Respondents.��
�� Promulgated:
��
��
��
��
��
��July
27, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C.
Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation
(LMC).[1] The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents and found that
they were illegally dismissed by LMC. On appeal, however, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a
decision dated February 21, 2008. Private respondents� motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008.

Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008 resolution of the
NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time
to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [2] The motion
alleged that, for reasons[3] stated therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court
of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period.[4] Thus, a 15-day extension period
was prayed for.[5]

In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,[6] the Court of Appeals granted the
motion and gave private respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within
which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the
said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are
no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.[7] This was denied in a resolution
dated October 22, 2008. According to the appellate court, while the amendment of
the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to
discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip
the Court of Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in
exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice.

Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and
October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in this petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. It contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted private respondents� motion for extension of
time to file petition for certiorari as the Court of Appeals had no power to grant
something that had already been expressly deleted from the rules.

We agree.

Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be
discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. [8] As a corollary,
rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings
are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly
and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.[9]

In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ruled:

Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which
to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable
and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition
asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was
specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their
case. (emphasis supplied)

While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for
filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,[11] the amendments to Rule
65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for
certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such
extensions.

Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. � The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

�� The petition shall be filed in the Supreme
Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

�� No extension of time to file the petition
shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding 15 days.[12] (emphasis supplied)

With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. � The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

�� If the petition relates to an act or an
omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court�s
appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules,
the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
�� In election cases involving an act or
omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be
filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases
indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would
not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the
meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a
construction different from that previous to its amendment.[13]

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority
would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the
amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there
can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition
for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially
to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a
case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions
to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As
the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filedstrictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.

In granting the private respondents� motion for extension of time to file
petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The
action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the Court of Appeals
of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a
power it did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise. [14] For this
reason, the challenged resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008
were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess of its
jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant
extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the
reasons proffered by private respondents� counsel did not qualify as compelling.
Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. [15] Standing alone, it is not a
sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.[16]

As to the other ground cited by private respondents� counsel, suffice it to
say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit.
Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a motion to be allowed to
litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the law look tenderly
on the disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license
to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations enjoins
everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe procedural rules as an
aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing honesty and
good faith.[17] For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest
for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all
courts are devoted.[18]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions dated
August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104510 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the said case is
ordered DISMISSEDfor having been filed out of time.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174179
"x x x.
On the CA’s Review of the NLRC’s Factual Findings

We agree with the petitioners that as a rule, the CA cannot undertake a re-
assessment of the evidence presented in the case in certiorari proceedings under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[29] However, the rule admits of exceptions.
In Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc.,[30] we held that the
CA may examine the factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether or not its
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, whose absence justifies a
finding of grave abuse of discretion. We ruled:
We agree with the petitioners that, as a rule
incertiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA
does not assess and weigh each piece of evidence introduced in the
case. The CA only examines the factual findings of the NLRC to
determine whether or not the conclusions are supported by substantial
evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the recent case of Protacio v. Laya
Mananghaya & Co., we emphasized that:
As a general rule, in certiorariproceedings under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion.
The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination
of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the
appellate court may examine and measure the factual
findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by
substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated to
affirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of
labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial
evidence. [31] (italics and emphasis supplied; citation
omitted)
As discussed below, our review of the records and of the CA decision shows
that the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in awarding
the petitioners ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees without basis in fact and in law.
Corollary to the above-cited rule is the basic approach in the Rule 45 review of
Rule 65 decisions of the CA in labor cases which we articulated in Montoya v.
Transmed Manila Corporation[32] as a guide and reminder to the CA. We laid down
that:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed
CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error
that we undertake under Rule 65.Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to
the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA
decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision
from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the
NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the
NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other
words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule
65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision
challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in
a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form,
the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine
whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling on the case?[33] (italics and emphases supplied)
In the present case, we are therefore tasked to determine whether the CA
correctly ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding
10% attorney’s fees to the petitioners.
x x x."

Jurisprudence - Resignation

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What is resignation anyway? As held in the case of Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v.

A resignation may also be either express, as when contained in a written document, or

Similarly, when an employee has submitted a letter of resignation due to circumstances

The Philippine labor law and jurisprudence allows an employer-employee relationship to

Requirements of Procedural Due Processs.

G.R. No. 162813 February 12, 2007

On January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work

WHEREFORE, we find the termination of complainant illegal. He should thus be

01/25/00 - 10/31/00 = 9.23 mos.

P 223.50 x 26 x 9.23 = P 53,635.53

11/01/00 – 06/26/01 = 7.86 mos.

P 250.00 x 26 x 7.86 = 51,090.00 P 104,725.53

13th Month Pay: 1/12 of P 104,725.53 = 8,727.13

01/25/00 – 10/31/00 = 9.23 mos.

P 223.50 x 5/12 x 9.23 = P 859.54

11/01/00 – 06/26/01 = 7.86 mos.

P 250.00 x 5/12 x 7.86 = [818.75] 1,678.29 115,130.95

b) Overtime Pay: (3 hours/day)

03/20/97 – 4/30/97 = 1.36 mos.

P 180/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 1.36 = P 2,983.50

05/01/97 – 02/05/98 = 9.16 mos.

P 185/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 9.16 = 20,652.94

02/06/98 – 10/30/99 = 20.83 mos.

P 198/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x [20.83] = 50,265.39

10/31/99 – 01/24/00 = 2.80 mos.

P 223.50/8 x 1.25 x 3 x 26 x 2.80 = 7,626.94 81,528.77

It reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the NLRC dated 27 December

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

THE COURT OF APPEALS … ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE

THE COURT OF APPEALS … ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated September

Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 175481 November 21, 2012

DIONISIO F. AUZA, JR., ADESSA F. OTARRA, and ELVIE

In February 2004 or almost 15 months after their severance from employment,

Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

Petitioners further averred that their separation from employment amounts to

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

WHEREFORE, we find respondents guilty of illegally dismissing complainants

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners ascribe upon the CA the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

6. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

7. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

8. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE

In their Comment,37 respondents assert that the CA’s finding of petitioners’ voluntary

This Court finds no merit in the petition.

The NLRC has jurisdiction to entertain

petitioners’ appeal filed before it.

and Section 2, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure 38 which provides:

Petitioners’ subsequent and substantial

compliance with the rules on verification

and certification of non-forum shopping

calls for the relaxation of technical rules.