Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Cities
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cities

Viewpoint

High-rise Dubai urban entrepreneurialism and the technology of symbolic power

Michele Acuto *
School of Regulation, Justice and Diplomacy, Australian National University,
Australia
Cities Research Cluster, National University of Singapore

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Twenty-first century metropolises are often engaged in a rivalry for primacy in many different geograph-
Received 24 August 2009 ical scales. Dubai, a relatively new urban settlement, is not immune from such endeavor. The Emirate has
Received in revised form 27 November 2009 undertaken an impressive urban revolution in a rather explicit attempt to become a novel New York.
Accepted 12 January 2010
This viewpoint explores the present evolution of the city, illustrating how a centralized and hyper-
Available online 3 April 2010
entrepreneurial approach has characterized Dubai’s attempt to ascend in the ‘world urban hierarchy’
and establish itself as the image of the 21st century metropolis. Contrary to much of the eulogistic take
Keywords:
that often features in city rankings, an analysis of this venture through the city’s contemporary urban
Dubai
Global city
restructuring unveils the problematic social effects of Dubai’s quest for ‘‘symbolic power” – that tech-
Symbolic power nique of ‘worldmaking’ that confers influence by constituting the given by stating and mediating it.
Icon The compulsive sprawl of ‘icons’ and ‘vertical cities’ associated with this practice might set the Emirate
Skyscrapers on a perilous course with disastrous social consequences. In this view, the article draws upon some of the
most astonishing works-in-progress of this city – and the Burj Dubai in primis – to explain the complexity
of this power, and the many contradictions that can arise with it as quickly as Dubai’s skyscrapers.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Geddes, Lewis Mumford or Peter Hall described this competition

for urban status, have always rivaled for primacy in many different
‘‘Later, as he sat on his balcony eating the dog, Dr. Robert Laing geographical scales with varying degrees of entrepreneurship.
reflected on the unusual events that had taken place within this Dubai is not immune from such endeavor (see Fig. 1).
huge apartment building during the previous three months” I here want to explore the contemporary evolution of the Emirate,
J.G. Ballard, High-rise (opening line). illustrating how a centralized and hyper-entrepreneurial approach
has characterized Dubai’s attempt to ascend in this hierarchy and
Testified by the sprawling of city evaluations across publica- establish itself as the image of the 21st century global city. Contrary
tions worldwide, from Foreign Policy’s ‘‘Global Cities Index” onto to much of the eulogistic take that often features in city rankings, an
the Economist ‘‘Urban Livability” annual lists, tabloids and maga- analysis of this venture through the city’s contemporary urban
zines seem to have caught up with what researchers at Loughbor- revolution unveils the problematic social effects of Dubai’s quest
ough University’s GaWC Centre have been doing for more than a for ‘‘symbolic power” – that technique of ‘worldmaking’ that confers
decade: ranking metropolises. Ever since the early days of urban influence by mediating people’s understanding of the world. The
studies, scholars have been fascinated with those dominant compulsive sprawl of ‘icons’ and ‘vertical cities’ associated with this
metropolises where much of the human business is conducted. practice might set the Emirate on a perilous course with disastrous
New York, Tokyo, Paris and London have regularly been looked at social consequences. This essay is an attempt to analyze these
as the apogee of the so-called ‘‘world city hierarchy” (Hall, 1966). developments from a perspective that privileges social, rather than
Thanks to their economic, cultural, religious and political functions, the much discussed financial and environmental sustainability. It
these urban settlements have positioned themselves as ‘‘obligatory starts by enquiring into the rationale of symbolism, and by observing
passage points” (Callon, 1986) in the networks of social relations Dubai’s entrepreneurial evolution, considering how the city has at-
across the globe. Cities, long before theorists such as Patrick tempted to master this ‘soft’ power and apply it through its urban or-
der. A few years ago Mike Davis (2007) gave a distinctively pessimist
outlook onto this ‘‘Mecca of conspicuous consumption” while out-
* Address: School of Regulation, Justice and Diplomacy, Hedley Bull Centre,
lining the Sheikdom’s social polarization; 3 years later the situation
Australian National University, 2601 ACT, Australia. Tel.: +61 261250913; fax: +61
261257985. might indeed have worsened, as the city has put even more empha-
E-mail address: michele.acuto@anu.edu.au sis on the risky practice of symbolic power.

0264-2751/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cities.2010.01.003
 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284 273

Fig. 1. The Burj Khalifa (formerly Burj Dubai) – tallest building in the world, symbol-to-be of Dubai’s attempt to rise to world city status.

Technologies of symbolic power that form the core of human interaction: they allow for difference,
and consequently for the coexistence and continual creation of
Symbolic power is the capacity to control the social production individual as well as group identities. Mastering symbolic power,
of distinction by mediating other forms of power such as econom- in this sense, means ‘‘pursuing distinction” (Bourdieu, 1985, p.
ics and religion through human technology. According to Pierre 730) and voluntarily producing separations and social worlds that
Bourdieu, who originally theorized it, the influence of symbolism affect others’ identities and freedom for action.
rests upon ‘‘constituting the given by stating it” (1989, p. 14), thus Symbolic power is thus exerted by socializing others into a cer-
mediating social experiences and imposing socially accepted tain representation of the environment we live in, therefore getting
meanings which in turn affect the actions of others. Directly con- them to act accordingly. Symbolism is essentially a ‘‘power of def-
nected with a foucauldian understanding of power as inherent inition” (Anderson, 1987) by which individuals or groups gain a so-
quality of social interactions, this form of influence is an ‘‘invisible cial advantage on their ‘subjects’ thanks to the construction – in
power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those the minds of the latter – of some accepted imaginative geographies
who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that (Gregory, 1994). Typically, it can be exerted by either communica-
they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 164). Humans tive or physical means, though hybrid forms abound in the age of
can master the ‘technology’ of symbolic power by understanding the IT. For example, a group sitting in lecture theatre can be
the processes and dynamics that underpin the social world’s ‘‘sym- ‘coerced’ into exiting the room through its windows if the speaker’s
bolic systems” (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 724). These latter are the inter- rhetoric is so compelling that it convinces the audience these are
twined dispositions of symbols – language, image and built space – the only viable ways out. However, a similar result can also be
274 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

achieved by our cold-blooded orator through more material means its 1833 establishment by Sheik Maktoum bin Bati. Despite having
such as a set of green ‘‘exit” signs on the windows, or even by suffered an acute epidemic of smallpox in its original settlement –
erecting a wall in front of the theatre’s only door. Distinction is the Bur Dubai – first, and a devastating fire in its marketplace –
so produced thanks to the speaker symbolic capital, a potential Deira – afterwards, the city has undergone a rapid evolution from
constituted by mediating other forms of power such as the speak- its pre-industrial conurbation to a post-industrial centre in little
er’s oratory and social status in the first instance, or economic and more than 50 years (Pacione, 2005) (see Fig. 2).
material capabilities in the second example. Contemporary Dubai, solidly in the hands of its founder’s fam-
In our case, the symbolic power nested in the city is equally ily, the al Maktoum dynasty, is the product of a super-fast urban-
twofold. As Australian architect William Mitchell noted in Placing ism (Bagaeen, 2007, p. 174) that embodies its greatest
Words, the urban is nowadays the context through which social comparative advantage with the rest of the region: the ability to
relations unravel. ‘‘The spaces and places of twenty-first century diversify and rapidly reinvent its function to external needs. Its
cities – wrote the author – provide contexts for communication, pearl-based commerce of the Nineteenth century was rapidly re-
serving not only to shelter and protect their inhabitants, but also placed by trade with South Asia in the early 1900s, and boosted
to ground and sustain meaningful interaction among them” by the discovery and burgeoning of the oil industry in 1966. How-
(2005, p. 3). Symbolic interactions pervade the urban in all its lay- ever, the Emirate did not stop at the black gold. In 1971, the sheik-
ers, not just as physical definitions of the world around us but also dom formed a union by joining forces with Abu Dhabi and
as communicative actions that become dynamically superimposed presenting an intricate Islam-inspired constitution to the other five
to the material structures of the city, as well as immaterial ‘virtual’ former states of the Trucian Oman which, lost their British tute-
worlds of networked interactions that flow through the city’s infra- lage, gathered in the present-day United Arab Emirates. Shortly
structures. The city has many symbolic ‘voices’: street signs, inter- afterwards, Dubai engaged in planned expansion of its banking
twined public spaces, gated entrances, transport systems, sector and its Jebel Ali port, also developing a lucrative trade rela-
entertainment hubs, markets and so on, all contribute to the defi- tionship with Iran during the First Gulf War with Iraq in 1980–
nition of the ‘‘spatialization” (Lefebvre, 1991) of the city. All of 1988. Incentives to attract international capital have included a
these coexist in a ‘‘plurality of competing, complementary and strong policy of low taxation (if not free zones such as Jebel Ali),
overlapping symbolic and spatial orders” (King, 2004, p. 3) that de- unproblematic business barriers and the branding of the city as
fines the socio-spatial texture of the urban. stable enclave within the political turmoil of the Middle East. Then,
These contemporaneous ‘‘city worlds” (Massey et al., 1999) since the 1990s, the Emirate has sought to diversify its economic
intersect to define a complex social milieu – the ‘urban’ – that is activities in order to reduce its dependence on declining oil re-
increasingly home to the majority of humanity (Burdett and Sudjic, serves (which account today to only 5.1% of the GDP), and seek
2008). It is not just one of them that affects individuals in the city, the status of ‘developed economy’ by 2010 – a result that, arguably,
but the spatial relationship among them, which creates a particular has now been attained.1 Tourist-oriented development began to ap-
symbolic system characteristic of that locality. Symbolic power, in pear scattered across the sprawling urban landscape, illustrating the
these contexts, is as the means to communicate and exert influence changing priorities of the city’s governance and its attempt to attract
across levels and its ownership is a crucial social issue. As we walk not solely capitalist elites but also high-income customers by estab-
through the streets, the city presents us a world of images, material lishing itself as an exclusive leisure destination (Elsheshtawy, 2004,
constructs and social interactions which define the range of p. 180). Dubai soon grew to become the world’s top immigration hub
choices available to its users. It constrains (or enables) our mobil- (Benton-Short et al., 2005), as its rulers sought to make of this con-
ity, and constitutes a multi-structured mise-en-scène of built dition a brand of the Middle-Eastern metropolis.2
(doors, walls, bridges) as well as inscribed (signs, sounds, graffiti) The sheikdom has ‘‘happily embraced globalization” (Hirst,
forms of social coordination and communication (Mitchell, 2005, 2001) and grounded its entrepreneurialism in an open-door eco-
p. 8). The spatial organization of the city influences not only the nomic liberalism that has often been in tacit contrast with many
possibilities for movement, but also the consciousnesses and social regional neighbours. The governing elite, headed today by one of
practices of those who interact with the urban environment, be the descendents of the ruling family, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid
they inhabitants, ‘‘aliens” or transient ‘‘guests” (Sassen, 1999). al Maktoum – Dubai’s ruler and the UAE Prime Minister – has held
Global cities are often the pinnacle of this intricate relationship: solid control over the expansion and diversification of the Emir-
they are not solely media where this power is nested in the rela- ate’s activities. Its ‘hybrid’ form of government, indissolubly inter-
tionship between the city and its local community. They are first twined with the family’s patrimonial network, is essentially ‘‘little
and foremost hubs that project symbolism towards much wider more than an extended system of patronage” (Davidson, 2008, p.
audiences, which in turn define their identity. Global cities are 158) where public and private melt together without clear-cut
the synthesis of global and local processes due to their positioning boundaries. The Sheik himself is the founder and current major
at the crucial intersection of manifold worldwide networks, shareholder (99.67%) of Dubai Holding, the state-led company that
becoming quite simply the strategic sites of globalization. Yet, they manages twenty sectoral developers ranging from real estate to
are not solely passive agents in the social processes that underpin entertainment.
this phenomenon: they are equally active in that they are consti- In February 2007, with compounded annual growth rates of 13%
tuted by vibrant communities that exert command and control confirming the remarkable economic performance of the 1990s,
functions on those very same processes. The problem is, however, Sheik Mohammed laid out the Dubai Strategic Plan 2015 with
that with world city status come world-class questions. the inspiring – as much as bumptious – title: ‘‘Dubai. . . where
the future begins” (DSP, 2007). Yet, the future proved rockier than
predicted in the document as the global financial crisis hit later
Entrepreneurial Dubai

1
Staring down to a traffic-clogged Sheik Zayed Road from the According to the latest World Bank figures the UAE constitute a high-income
economy, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi solidly leading the seven sheikdoms. See the
40th level of the Shangri-La hotel, it is almost impossible to con-
latest 2009 WB Country Groups projections at www.web.worldbank.org (Accessed 25
ceptualize, for a foreign observer, that Dubai was nothing but a July 2009).
cramped village of fishermen until the mid-Nineteenth century. 2
See for instance ‘‘Emirate rebrands itself as a global melting pot.” Financial Times,
Yet, this minute Middle-eastern Emirate has come a long way since 12 July 2005 and Marshal (2005).
 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284 275

Fig. 2. Sheik Zayed road – a strip of burgeoning skyscrapers that constitutes the spine of Dubai.

that year, spiking on worldwide markets in September 2008. De- by mirroring much of Singapore’s logistic achievements in mari-
spite the diversification strategy, the effects of widening recessions time and air traffic. Likewise, it aims at positioning itself as a cat-
and stock market crashes have significantly impacted Dubai. alyst for the locational flexibility of international capitals by
Although the ruler has promptly dismissed the possibility of jetti- establishing a set of ‘‘lucrative niches” (Khalaf, 2005) that, building
soning the 2015 plan, strategic revisions are underway, as the sink- on the successful example of the Jebel Ali port, can place Dubai as a
ing demand for real estate and low oil prices have – for the first focal point in a vast array of industries. Even in the wake of the
time – forced a reality check upon the ambitions of the Emirate disastrous impact that the crisis had on many crucial financial
and a necessary rapprochement with its oil-rich neighbour Abu centres, Dubai seems to have performed relatively well. Firstly, as
Dhabi. Many foreigners have quite literally ‘fled’ Dubai as market a recent article by Manuel Aalbers (2009, p. 39) pointed out, ‘‘the
prices precipitated to an historical low (Worth, 2009). financial crisis does not lead to the fall of Wall Street (New York)
Obviously the many works-in-progress have risen more than a and The City (London), but it does accelerate the trend towards a
few eyebrows: how sustainable is this reach for primacy in so shift in financial centres” that favours Eastern metropolises such
many fields? What are the social costs of these mega-develop- as Hong Kong, Shanghai and Dubai. Secondly, as a follow-up study
ments? Undeniably, when the global financial crisis hit the UAE by GaWC demonstrated, Dubai has actually improved its compara-
in late-2008, countless migrant workers where sacked or sent to tive advantage on some of the classic command cores of the
‘unpaid vacation’ or saw their working visas revoked as sites re- world’s economy by resulting as a ‘‘winner” in the crisis, much
duced their personnel.3 To date, at least half of the UAE’s construc- alike Singapore, Sydney and Beijing, against negative performances
tion projects have been put on hold – or even cancelled.4 by more traditional hubs such as Tokyo, Frankfurt and Brussels
Yet, it seems like Dubai’s rulers approach withstands almost (Derudder et al., 2009).
unchanged.5 The city still seeks to become a global mobility hub On the 9th September 2009, perhaps as a sign of recovery, Sheik
Mohammed participated to a pompous ceremony for the launch of
the brand new Dubai Metro, set to become longest automated me-
3
See for instance ‘‘Crisis leaves Dubai migrant workers out in the cold.” Agence- tro network in the world with more than 70 km of track, bringing
France Presse 15 February 2009; and Lila Allen, ‘‘The dark side of the Dubai dream”,
about a revolution capable of solving Dubai’s chronic traffic prob-
published by BBC News on 6 April 2009.
4
These amount for ca. $582bn of works. Cf. Paul Lewis ‘‘Dubai’s six-year building lems.6 However, as BBC commentator Julia Wheeler sarcastically
boom grinds to halt as financial crisis takes hold.” The Guardian, 13 February 2009. noted, much of this issue might ‘‘have already been solved – by
5
Answering to questions on the crisis in a town-hall e-session on the 1st July 2009, the global economic crisis.”7
the ruler and UAE Prime Minister has stressed that, whilst some revisions might be
underway, the DSP 2015 will not modified as the vision of that document cannot be
altered. ‘‘My vision is open towards the future, with no limits whatsoever, whereas
6
strategies and plans designed to enact this vision are always adjustable to the Cf. ‘‘Mohammed officially launches Dubai Metro.” Available at http://
circumstances.” Timelines are the only issue under discussion. A full text of the town- www.sheikhmohammed.co.ae (Accessed 24 October 2009).
7
hall is available at www.uaepm.ae/en/media/e-sessions/Public-e-Session-en- Julia Wheeler, ‘‘First Gulf Metro System to Open.” Published by BBC News on 9
010609.html. (Accessed 2 August 2009). September 2009.
276 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

Despite the global recession, the history of the Emirate is a bla- in somewhere” (Sudjic, 1996). Dubai, in this sense, has been deeply
tant testimony that Dubai epitomises a phenomenon labelled by seduced by the so-called ‘‘Bilbao effect” and the potential of ‘wow-
many urban theorists as the ‘‘entrepreneurial city” (Harvey, architecture’ of defining a city’s image in the eyes of foreign audi-
1989; Hall and Hubbard, 1998; Jessop, 1997). Concerned not solely ences (Rybczynski, 2002). It has learnt that, in the present ‘‘society
with the management of its urban community, but rather oriented of spectacle” (Debord, 1994), audiences can be captivated through
towards wider audiences, the city has attempted to mirror the path a proficient usage of symbolism.
followed by many other world cities on the way to global signifi- Nonetheless, the Emirati fixation with the iconic is not simply a
cance (see for example Olds and Yeung, 2004). Dubai has, in this whim of its multi-billionaire leaders, as many Western commenta-
sense, perfectly embodied all three typical characteristics that tors have wrongly argued. Iconicity is, in Dubai, a crucial pillar of
Bob Jessop (1997) postulated as core features of entrepreneurial the entrepreneurial narrative that asserts the Sheikdom’s vibrant
cities. It has rigorously pursued innovative strategies, which are presence in world affairs. It is a testimony to the city’s dynamism
reflexive of a purposeful aim: that of achieving a global city status and a proof of its commitment to progress. Likewise, iconicity is
comparable to London and Tokyo. Likewise, it has sustained this also often intertwined with a search for innovation and competi-
venture with a constantly entrepreneurial narrative targeted at tiveness that is to be reflected in unparalleled constructions. Dubai
global elites in an effort to brand Dubai as the archetype of success. is trying to be, in the worlds of Alabbar, ‘‘New York in the making.”9
If, as Jessop has recently pointed out, the presence of innovation Rather than a caprice, the impressing eccentricities of the hopeful
with an explicit purpose distinguishes the real entrepreneurs from global city are a vivid sign of its urban entrepreneurialism.
those ‘‘that happen for whatever reason(s) to perform well eco- To become symbolic capital with global influence, however, Du-
nomically” (Jessop and Sum, 2000, p. 2289), the Emirate is a para- bai’s architectural icons need to adhere to those widespread ste-
gon of the former. Symbolic power is certainly not left to the reotypes that represent modernization and power. As the theory
textbooks, but carefully applied and sought after in order to seduce of symbolic power tells us, symbolic objects are significant only
a global audience. Indeed, Dubai’s goal is to carry the day in the if recognized as such: they depend, as Emile Durkheim (1984)
‘‘race for excellence” its ruler devoted himself to (al Maktoum, underlined before Bourdieu, on ‘‘logical conformism” between
2006). individuals who agree upon the meaning of a symbol. In order to
create an icon that has significance (and consequently influence)
over a widespread audience, one has to relate to the symbolic sys-
Global city euphoria tems shared or understood by as many as possible in such audience
– the ‘dominant’ culture. Dubai needs to locate itself prominently
Mohammed Alabbar, chairman of Emaar – one of Dubai’s three within the imaginative geographies (Gregory, 1994) of the audi-
real estate titans – has a recurring expression to describe the ratio- ences it tries to reach, not just putting itself on the map as an exotic
nale beyond his constructions: ‘‘we aim – he says with compelling location, but rather speaking the language of a globalization it tries
assertiveness – to create a global landmark.”8 He, just like Sultan to master.
Ahmed bin Sulayem of Nakheel Properties and Mohammed al Ger- Skyscrapers are obviously the most common example of this,
gawi of Dubai Holding, has to carry out the epic implementation of but there are other features that reify progress today: mobility
Sheik al Maktoum’s vision. The Emirate’s planners have all been en- hubs such as ultra-modern airports or international trade centers
trusted with the task of building – where not creating anew upon a occupy much of the global imaginary of what 21st century global-
sandy tabula rasa – an instantly recognizable image of Dubai that ization is. They are the ‘‘signs of modernity” (King, 2004) and some
testifies the ascendance of the sheikdom, while also feeding its com- of today’s most ‘‘obvious candidates for housing globalized flows,
pulsion to set standards on a worldwide scale. whether metaphorical or material” (McNeill, 2005, p. 43). Simi-
Alabbar’s statement is not abandoned to rhetoric. As the city has larly, first-class hotels and shopping malls denote vitality of busi-
quickly grown in both regional importance and urban extension, ness and tourist industries, as much as environmentally viable
Dubai embarked in a ‘‘frantic quest for hyperbole” (Davis, 2007, mass-developments are the latest in world-class engineering and
p. 54) that has symbolized its attempt to ascend to the Olympus urbanism. In this context, the ability of the Emirate is in its mirror-
of global cities. Function is not the primary concern in a land of ing and enhancing of dominant symbols of modernity. Being ‘mod-
endless anonymous horizons and (once) seemingly bottomless ern’ is, in current world city-speak, maintaining a globalized
financial availability. Form is the key focus of today’s architecture entrepreneurial edge that is reflected in prominent urban restruc-
in Dubai, whose fundamental criterion is globality. turing – mostly geared towards efficiency and sustainability – as
Lacking a strongly preconceived historical image, the Emirate well as in the vitality of one city’s transformative and advanced
allows for an easier construction of a global city façade. However, producer services economy. This does not imply that Dubai needs
while this ‘historical vacuum’ can offer much space for place pro- to change the understanding of what a modern metropolis is, but
motion (Bradley et al., 2002), it can also hinder the formation of rather that it has to conform, and excel, in such globalizing ap-
a convincing brand of what Dubai is – an identity which to date re- proach. As a government planning official suggested to me whilst
mains relatively weak. In order to solve this distinctiveness puzzle, visiting the endless halls in the Mall of the Emirates: ‘‘Dubai does
the governing elite has put much emphasis on the creation of land- not reinvent, it does better and bigger.”10 In this sense, the ‘icons’
marks and world-class structures capable of ‘controlling’ and dom- that are sprawling around Dubai are not ends in themselves: sym-
inating architectonically the development of a unique urban bolic power is a transfigured form of other types of power, be they
identity (Eben Saleh, 2001, p. 328). By doing so, the Emirate has economic, religious or political. Icons are Dubai’s means for global
embarked in an almost unprecedented – with the exception of reach. Sheik al Maktoum underlined this himself in a recent inter-
Las Vegas, perhaps – attempt to create a set of predetermined view: ‘‘We are not growing in order to be a model for its highest
‘‘experiences to be consumed” by foreigners (Zukin, 1997). In this building in the world, best airports, and most luxurious hotels, and
context, monumental developments and high-tech public spaces the largest seaport and man-made islands: the Dubai model is
are supposed to rise as cornerstones of the city’s symbolic system
by creating an instantly-recognizable skyline, with a boosterism-
ridden architecture concerned with making ‘‘nowhere suddenly
9
See the BBC 2 series Dubai Dreams, episode 3: ‘‘Alabbar” (December 2005).
8 10
See the BBC 2 series Dubai Dreams, episode 3: ‘‘Alabbar” (December 2005). Interview with Senior Official from the Dubai Municipality, 7 July 2009.
 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284 277

Fig. 3. ‘‘The Address” Downtown Burj Khalifa – one of two twin exclusive hotels in the heart of the metropolis.

beyond that.”11 Symbolic developments are the means to narrate Soared into the Emirate’s cityscape in little more than 4 years at the
and unfold the city’s urban entrepreneurialism on a global scale in impressing pace of one floor every 3 days, with a record height of
the language of the dominant culture. The ‘Dubai model’ is about 828 meters, the spire was already a dominant presence in the urban
reaching primacy in this latter (see Fig. 3). fabric before completion. This high-rise, whose final elevation was
The best example of this symbolic capital is the construction of jealously kept secret by the firm that designed it – the American
the spectacular Burj Dubai: the tallest building in the world.12 Skidmore, Owings and Merrill – until its grand opening on the 4th
of January 2010, is reminiscent of The Mile High Illinois envisaged
by Frank Lloyd Wright in 1956 for Chicago and never realized.13 It
11
Media e-Session with the Prime Minister al Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai, 18 April embodies that classic human fascination with towers, symbols of
2009. Available at www.uaepm.ae/en/media/e-sessions (Accessed 29 July 2009). power and dominance that have occupied the urban imaginary for
12
The Burj, inaugurated on the 4th January 2010, has been officially re-named ‘‘Burj centuries (Huxtable, 1984; van Leeuwen, 1992; Markus, 1993). As
Khalifa” in honor of the President of the UAE and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khalifa
the constructions evolved, this skyscraper has attracted interests
bin Zayed al Nahyan, in an unexpected act of submission by Sheik Mohammed to its
wealthy neighbor. Yet, ‘‘Burj Dubai” remains the most common ‘brand’ of the building
from all around the world, with investors of all nationalities rushing
in the media, popular imagination and even official presentations such as that of the to secure a spot in the new Emirati icon during a two-night frenzy in
inauguration, which showcases the story of the skyscraper to endless queues of
visitors seeking a ticket for the panoramic terrace at the 124th floor. I have chose to
13
maintain the ‘‘Burj Dubai” denomination for consistency with the popular usage, and The firm itself, along with the developer (Emaar) have repeatedly stretched the
to avoid anachronisms. comparison. Curiously, Wright’s project was never seen as financially viable.
278 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

2007 when office and habitable spaces reached exorbitant prices be- embodies Sheik Mohammed’s idea for Dubai. However, if Bunnell
tween three and four thousand US dollars per square foot.14 could justly argue that Petronas Towers was also a ‘‘space of con-
The high-rise symbolizes Dubai’s quest for uniqueness and pri- test” where there was, in its initial ‘socialization’ phase vis-à-vis
macy in the world city hierarchy. In this race, it also shows con- its urban community, a ‘‘sense of popular problematisation”
certed effort of all the key players of the Emirate: Sheik, local (1999, p. 18), the same might not be for our Emirati behemoth. In-
government, major stakeholders and transnational capitalist elites. deed, the Burj is used by the rulers to ascertain a local identity in
To these latter Emaar – its constructor – has targeted the market- relation to a migrant population, but this does not necessarily
ing of the Burj, which will offer a multifunctional hub pinpointed translate in either the assimilation of the expats, or the construc-
on its Armani Hotel & Residence that will house 160 suites and tion of a more multi-ethnic Arab societal basis. The ‘citizenship’
144 cutting-edge apartments. Moreover, the building is just the of Dubai seems to remain confined to either its original Emirati
pinnacle of a much wider Emaar development know as ‘‘Down- lineage (constituting a mere 10% of the whole resident population;
town Burj Dubai” that spreads over 500-odd acres of Dubai’s see Bagaeen, 2007 and Benton-Short et al., 2005), or the transient
CBD, alongside Sheik Zayed Road with an estimated US$ 40 billion elite visitor/user who, paradoxically, often owns far more ‘right’
capital investment.15 Of course, the development does not stop to than the migrant. As noted by Leslie Sklair: ‘‘the dominant forms
the Burj Dubai in terms of world-class standards: the site houses, of architectural iconicity for the global era are increasingly driven
immediately below the tower, the world’s largest shopping centre, by those who own and control the corporate sector” (2006, p. 21).
the already operating Dubai Mall, circled by a boulevard that in Ema- The Burj is no exception. Cutting-edge apartments, offices and ho-
ar’s vision should rival with the Champs-Élysées in width, length and tels within it are mainly designed and marketed towards them and
prestige. Adorned with a Guinness-record aquarium and an ice hock- are mainly built to house globalizing flows. Even if the degree of
ey rink three times thicker than those in the National Hockey League, exclusion appears to be minimal (indeed almost anyone could en-
the Mall boosts the Emirati fascination with water spectacles. As the ter the Dubai Mall), the form and function of the development has
progressively dazzled shopper makes his way through the Mall to- a preconceived ‘‘in-built user” (Latour, 1992) that is hardly tailored
wards the Burj Dubai, the top-ranking boutiques leave the center towards low-income inhabitants.
stage to another urban champion occupying much of the adjacent As case of Downtown Burj Dubai illustrates, the Emirate’s archi-
30-acres lake – the Dubai Fountain. Designed to replicate and, need- tectural development mirrors the precepts of entrepreneurialism
less to say, amplify Las Vegas’s Bellagio Fountain, this gigantic water in a staggering – as much as exclusionary – expression of symbolic
spectacle is supposed to spray an average 22,000 gallons of water at power. It seeks to impress and set the meter of comparison at a
150 meters in height at any given moment, with multiple cycles of global scale, topping on measurements and audacity, while con-
color-shape combinations.16 vening a dynamic-innovative image of the city. In this, the Burj is
This iconic Downtown enterprise is reminiscent of a similar not dissimilar from its ‘predecessors’ Burj al Arab and Emirates
project: the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) and its Petronas Twin Towers. Likewise, it is self-referential: Dubai is an almost manda-
Towers building development. Set to become the tallest edifice of tory prefix for most of the developments, and even if the official
the world at the end of the 1990s, the story of the KLCC has a very denomination has been changed at the last minute in a rather
similar narrative to that of the Burj. As explained by Tim Bunnell: unpredictable sign of submission to the Union and its oil-rich
neighbor Abu Dhabi, the phrase ‘Burj Dubai’ remains the most
widespread way to refer to the behemoth – used not only by the
‘‘the building is seen to both image Malaysia as a ‘world-class’
popular media but also in several official documents and in the
national player (and Kuala Lumpur as a ‘world city’) as well as
building’s inauguration exposition itself. More importantly, the
to promote new ‘ways of seeing’ among citizens” (1999, p. 1).
construction and rhetoric of the skyscraper it is reflexive of a
In this sense, both cases demonstrate how the iconic high-rises straightforward strategy: as Sheik al Maktoum sees it, Dubai has
are more than simply consequences of urban speculation – which to be ‘‘number one in the world, in everything.”17 Contrary to, for
is often indicated as the original reason for skyscraper develop- example, Foster’s ‘gherkin’ Swiss Re tower in London, the Burj Dubai
ment (van Leeuwen, 1992). Petronas Towers, just like the Burj Du- seeks to make this statement loudly and visually: it does not rely on
bai, ‘‘cannot be understood merely as a function of land values” a ‘‘civilized dialogue between the tower and its nearest neighbors”
(Bunnell, 1999, p. 4) and has to be appreciated beyond its aesthetic (Sudjic, 2005, p. 317) but rather stands out and informs the entire
value in its social role (Sklair, 2006). The symbolic function of the skyline in order to shape the image of Dubai as a whole. The iconic
iconic skyscraper in the contemporary metropolis is to define the becomes, in this paradigmatic policy, a trampoline for the wider
presence of the city on a world stage, while also constituting – or world. It epitomizes the means by which Dubai seeks to persuade
re-constituting – the identity of the locals through a preponderant of its progress and its participation in the ‘international’ whilst also
symbol. As Ada Louise Huxtable prosaically put it: ‘‘the tall build- trying to seduce the global audience through the soft power of its
ing probes our collective psyche as it probes the sky” (1984, p. 11). symbolic capital, and the global visibility of its urban spaces (Fig. 4).
The icon becomes a powerful defining element for the local iden-
tity, becoming a representative image of what the urban communi-
ties in Dubai, Kuala Lumpur, New York, London and the like are. In Dubai’s splintering cities – real and imagined
this sense, it is not surprising that leaders have sought these devel-
opments as ‘pinnacles’ of their visions. Indeed, as KLCC represented In a 1997 article published on the Scientific American, William
PM Mahathir Mohammad aspirations for Malaysia, the Burj Mitchell asked: ‘‘Do we still need skyscrapers?” In the age of IT and
locational flexibility, the need for hyper-concentrated office build-
14 ings in the midst of the key cities of the globe seemed to him ques-
As indicated by Emaar Chairman Mohammed Alabbar at the Council on Tall
Buildings and Urban Habitat earlier last year. Cf. ‘‘Burj Dubai offices to top US$4,000 tionable at best. However, Mitchell warned, high-rises are not yet
p e r s q f t ”. Z a w y a . 5 M a r c h 2 0 0 8 . w w w . z a w y a . c o m / s t o r y . c f m / s i d - dinosaurs: their symbolic value goes far beyond their function
zawya20080305042540 (Accessed 20 July 2009). Even the Burj Dubai, however, has (1997, p. 113). Contrary to Mike Davis’s prediction that, after 9/
been impacted by the real estate crisis, with prices dropping substantially.
15
11, concrete bunkers and decentralized functions were to replace
See for example the special issue ‘‘Burj Dubai” in Arabian Business 11 (1), January
4–9, 2010.
16 17
The fountain is designed by the Los Angeles-based WET Design, who originally Interview with Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum in the CBS documentary
developed the Bellagio project. Dubai Inc., firstly aired in the program ‘‘60 Minutes” on 14 October 2007.
 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284 279

Fig. 4. The seven-starred Burj Al Arab – for many years the trademark of Dubai’s success.

‘‘that obsolete behemoth” (2001, p. 44) of the skyscraper, tall destination for citizens both in Dubai as well as around the
buildings continued to sprawl in developing economies such as world.18 Capable of combining a 5 star hotel, luxury residential
the UAE and China. Dubai seems to corroborate this assumption, and serviced apartments and a myriad of business centers, the ‘‘ver-
as its sandy plains are rapidly substituted by the glassy verticality tical city – as it has been described by its designers – truly is a mark
of its corporate centers. Here visionary architecture melts into ‘‘in- of the epoch,” as it is meant to become a ‘‘beacon of inspiration for
stant urbanism” (Bagaeen, 2007), in a risky business that raises the region and the world” (Mitcheson-Low and O’Brien, 2009, p.
many questions. 16). Needless to say, much of the same has been said in regards to
The Burj Dubai is not the only case: as its foundations were still the Burj Dubai and the Burj al Arab before it, as this ‘vertical’ termi-
being drawn on the area that now hosts the Dubai Mall, another nology has been reverberating across the world. In London, for
‘iconic’ development was being planned by the government- example, Renzo Piano’s soon-to-be erected Bridge Tower – the
owned real estate company Nakheel, author of the famed palm is- ‘Shard’ on the Southwark – is being loudly promoted as ‘‘the vertical
lands off the shores of the Emirate. Amidst controversies, and with city.” Just like KLCC and the Burj, the soon-to-be-apex of The City is
numerous changes in the selected site, Nakheel has set out to build analogously multifunctional – in that it houses hotels, convention
its kilometer-high Al Burj (‘‘the tower”). Located now at the heart
of the Nakheel Harbour & Tower development in the Dubai Marina
north of the Jebel Ali port, the tower is supposed to create, as 18
See www.nakheelharbour.com/#/project/project_vision. (Accessed 10 August
Nakheel’s vision set out in 2004, an ‘all-inclusive community’ and 2009).
280 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

Fig. 5. London Southwark, The Shard’s construction site.

centers, shopping areas, cafés and the like – as well as globally ico- sioned by Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas’s Office for Metropolitan
nic. While creating a novel hinge in the European financial capital, it Architecture. Before being benched – and probably discarded –
also speaks to the world by describing a renewed and competitive by the financial crisis, the plan was meant to be realized by Nak-
London (see Fig. 5). heel next to the site of the new al Maktoum International Airport,
The interesting aspect of these vertical cities is, however, not which is set to become the largest of its kind by 2017. The pro-
the disproportionate and inhuman dimension. Rather, it is the at- posed 1.5 billion square foot artificial island at the core of this
tempt to create ‘‘a city within a city” – an expression that has ech- development will be divided in 25 identical city blocks and suppos-
oed in many mega-developments not just in the Emirate, as the edly replicate the urban fabric of Manhattan. The hinges of this
cases of Petronas Towers and the Shard testify.19 It is a move to- visionary experiment are at its northwestern corner: on the coastal
wards an almost independent structure that demands little external side an 82-storey coiling tower named The Spiral, and on the is-
plodding for its inhabitants. All of these developments are indicative land’s side a gigantic 44-storey sphere ‘‘conceived as a self-con-
of a worrying trend that is particularly evident in the Emirate: as the tained three-dimensional urban neighborhood” (Ouroussoff,
city seeks to market its unique melting pot of cultures and national- 2008). The concept of this multi-billionaire construction, which
ities as a catalyst for global expansion, its urbanism has turned into should cover a total area twice the size of Hong Kong Island, is a
‘‘demand-oriented planning” (Bagaeen, 2007, p. 175) that aims at practical application of Koolhaas’s famous call for a ‘‘new urban-
creating comfort zones for all of its wealthy expatriate and short- ism” against an expanding phenomenon – the ‘‘generic city” – that,
term visitors. Emirati developers have thus embarked in a multitude in his words, represents the contemporary ‘‘death of urbanism”
of ‘visions’ that have fragmented the city into several ‘coming-soon’ and our ‘‘refuge in the parasitic security of architecture” (Koolhaas
themed areas: the Internet City with its high-tech business centers, and Mau, 1995, p. 970). What OMA (according to its website) is try-
the Healthcare City organized in association with the Harvard Med- ing to achieve in Dubai’s Waterfront City is a synthesis of generic
ical School, the archipelago of privately-owned islets built to repre- (New York-style symmetrical blocks) and iconic (‘Sphere’ and
sent an atlas, the Lost City inspired by ancient civilizations, these and ‘Spiral’) that should inspire 21st century urbanism.20
countless others are supposed to constitute the future urban fabric of However, Koolhaas’s vision, if ever realized in the current eco-
the city. nomic downturn, might easily become a hallucination. The island,
The latest Emirati fantasy is perhaps best embodied by the re- just like the Burj Dubai, Nakheel Tower and the numerous thematic
cent proposal for a masterplan for Waterfront City, a project envi- developments planned across the Emirate, can morph into a self-
sufficient community with little or no connection with the rest of

19
On the Petronas Towers see KLCC Holdings Sdn Bhd. (ca. 1996) Kuala Lumpur City
20
Centre, Marketing brochure, reported in Bunnell (1999). For a more detailed explanation of the project’s rationale see www.oma.eu.
 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284 281

Fig. 6. A recurring scene of the Burj’s opening exhibition: an army of almost invisible cleaners maintains the showcase immaculate at all times.

the city. As it already happened in a smaller scale with the Burj al 984). Moreover, thanks to the Dubai Metro opened in 2009, tour-
Arab hotel, the Waterfront might turn into a ‘‘gated enclave, archi- ists and businessmen are able to transit across the high-speed via-
tecturally stupendous yet profoundly exclusionary” (Ouroussoff, ducts built along Sheik Zayed Road, reaching the Burj or Dubai Mall
2008). Customers of the hotel are already able to reach it directly from the airport in a matter of minutes, and virtually never exiting
from the airport via private, anonymous, air-conditioned shuttles anywhere else than in their comfort-proof enclave.
that bypass the other suburbs and deposit them right in front of Certainly, Dubai testifies that, as Pierre Bourdieu predicted in
the super-exclusive lobby. Non-resident visitors, on the other Distinction more than three decades ago, social divisions are today
hand, have to pay a 34 Dirhams tax to enter the premises, and created by seduction and desire rather than regulation and coer-
are constantly surveyed as they goofily move where access is cion (Bourdieu, 1984; Bauman, 2008). Symbolic power has substi-
granted. A similar fate might await Koolhaas’s island and the kilo- tuted – at least in the Emirate – brute force. However, ‘‘structural
meter-high towers. Indeed, much of the city’s viability is strictly violence” (Galtung, 1969) is far from absent: contrary to cases such
dependant on taxis and private limousines that congest the main Pyongyang or Yangon, where ‘urban’ coercion is mostly rooted in
streets with almost no pedestrian in sight. The chaos and heteroge- policing practices, oppression in Dubai comes with glossy bro-
neity of the few remaining suburbs that are not construction sites chures and red-carpeted entrances. Rather than originating from
or guarded malls and hotels is often fenced off from the visitor’s government actions, the increasing social (multi)polarization has
eye. Newspapers and tourist guides regularly portray areas such its roots in the governance partnership between the wealthy ruling
as Sabkha, Satwa and Deira’s Suqs like ‘‘exotic locales, places where family and corporate elites. It assumes the form of exclusive clubs
one can find some sort of authentic living” (Elsheshtawy, 2008, p. and lobbies, gated seven-star hotels and jet-set malls whose access
282 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

is not hindered by force, but by price. In principle, everyone is wel- spread imaginary of the city is not a postcard but a set of com-
come in the many visionary developments sprawling across the puter-graphic rendered and photoshopped images of what Dubai
city from the Dubai Mall to the Burj al Arab. However, this tenet will be, rather than what it is. Yet, in the current economic scenario,
is confounded by a de facto reality: only those that are either cus- what Dubai will be might actually never materialize. Nakheel
tomers or nationals of the Emirate can afford much of these struc- Tower has been put on hold by its developers, and Waterfront City
tures, with countless low-income migrants virtually excluded by a has been suspended indefinitely (Stewart, 2009). Whether these vi-
subtle system of priority entries, fees, and membership cards. Just sions will eventually turn into reality or not is a question of regio-
like Mike Davis noted a few years ago, much of Dubai is nowadays nal and global ramifications, dependent on the capacity of the
organized on a thorough regime of ‘‘modular liberties based on the Emirate to recover from the real estate hit, continue to attract glo-
rigorous spatial segregation of economic function and ethnically bal elites, and rely on Abu Dhabi’s capacity to promote the UAE’s
circumscribed social classes” (2007, p. 62) (see Fig. 6). recovery.
The urban question facing the city today is thus that of frag- However, Dubai’s developments – be they planned, abandoned
mentation, which is a perverse effect of Dubai’s attempt to exert or in progress – represent an important lesson for metropolises
symbolic influence on a global scale. Symbolic power is exercised worldwide, especially in the present context where the debate on
here not solely to seduce worldwide audiences and persuade them economic sustainability seems to have overtaken many of the so-
of Dubai’s rise to global city status, but also to create an urban fab- cial concerns. Despite the chronic search for novel icons that can
ric that can accommodate so many different visions and demands. distinguish the sheikdom from its ‘opponents’ in the world city
The ‘‘spectre of splintering urbanism,” as Stephen Graham (2001) hierarchy, the real urban order of the Emirate – a conurbation of
would put it, is most certainly haunting the disorienting conurba- construction sites and soon-to-be gardens – and its urban lifestyle
tion of the Emirate. The city is slowly succumbing under a multi- – a quickly monotonous set of hypercomfortable and hyperexclu-
polarization that is, rather intentionally, creating separated worlds sive spaces – struggle to seduce beyond visual fascination. The
that are nothing but ‘‘transitory spaces” (Elsheshtawy, 2008) that manufactured landscapes of the city certainly attract and captivate
make of the metropolis ‘‘a paradise of personal security” (Davis, the visitor’s eye, but struggle to communicate any sense of urban
2007, p. 60) for those who can afford it. The ‘ordinary’ Dubai is van- cohesion and vitality of that ‘‘horizon of meanings” (Lefebvre,
ishing due to this very volatile process, which is in turn almost 1991, p. 222) that is often fundamental in rooting one’s attachment
completely demand-driven and highly influenced by global eco- to places such as Paris and London. What appears to be lacking in
nomic fluctuations. Even the older zones such as Al Ras in Deira the Emirate is the understanding that the ‘‘seduction of place”
are subject to the perverse logic of symbolic power: just like in (Rykwert, 2000) in the vast majority of today’s world cities is not
the case of many Chinatowns in the West (Anderson, 1987), these simply a product of symbolic power, nor only a function of a metic-
Suqs are being socially constructed as bounded ‘places’ to be expe- ulously planned locality. On the contrary, it is in the complexity of
rienced and ‘consumed’ in contrast with the high-income districts the urban order of cities such as New York that the ‘recipe’ for glo-
of Burj Dubai and Sheik Zayed. Low-income nationals, a rarity, and bal city-ness has to be found. What Tuan (1974) described as topo-
even lower-income migration workers, a significant but silent philia – the ‘‘love of place” – that develops in ourselves affective
minority with no leverage on the government’s deeds, are migrat- ties with the built environment around us, is rooted in two inter-
ing to outer dormitory suburbs as rents rise (Westley, 2006), and twined cognitive levels: one of high abstraction and one of specific
foreign expats are given the possibility – almost unique in the re- experience. Crucially, as Tuan reminds:
gion – to own land and develop commercial areas.
There is now a ‘‘fast-emerging world of premium connections”
‘‘at one extreme the city is a symbol or an image (captured in a
(Graham, 2001, p. 368) that is fast becoming the ‘ordinary’ Dubai.
postcard or a slogan) to which one can orient oneself; at the
The built-in user that is presently being inscribed in the technology
other it is the intimately experienced neighborhood” (1974, p.
of Dubai’s urban fabric is more and more the anonymous corporate
224).
elitist or the opulent transient tourist, which have little to contrib-
ute to the development of a local identity. Dubai is increasingly
developed for the ‘‘visitor class” (Eisinger, 2000) rather than its – Iconicity is but a part of this. Dubai is nowadays far from having
mostly invisible – inhabitants. The Emirate, despite much official developed more than just an attractive technique that seduces and
rhetoric about the original settlement’s legacy, is thus increasingly creates temporary attachment. The Emirate’s emphasis on sym-
based on Ferdinand Tönnies’ rationale of gesellschaft (‘‘society”) – a bolic power and global reach without much care for the social
group whose existence is merely functional to its members’ indi- dynamics on the ground, if not with intentional splintering of its
vidual interests, where neither community spirit nor social bond urban structure in different gated enclaves, might have put the
have much meaning (Tönnies, 1988). Dubai might soon become a sheikdom on its way to becoming the apex of the ‘‘consumerist
city with no inhabitants, and many users. city” (Sklair, 2009) like Las Vegas of the Middle East rather than
a ‘new’ Big Apple. Instead of following the much-cited path of Sin-
gapore, the Emirate is quickly turning into an immense, glittery,
A sustainable mirage? ‘‘Disneyzated” (Bryman, 1999) and super-modern ‘potemkin vil-
lage’ much closer to a theme park than an amalgamated cosmopol-
As the hotel’s chauffeur escorts the pampered visitor back to the itan hub. Moreover, these developments raise a set of critical
airport, one is left to wonder what Dubai really is. The precise questions: Can symbolic power be mastered on this scale and
shape of the ever-changing metropolis appears too slippery to be without any community bases? And, more importantly, what is
held firmly by the foreign observer, be it an urbanist or a simple the consequence of this attempt? Or in other words, how socially
tourist. This disorienting sense can puzzle many for its disjointed sustainable is Dubai’s symbolic power?
nature. Even the seemingly evident metropolitan nature of the The logic of symbolism requires some form of power to be trans-
Emirati conurbation becomes questionable if one scrapes deeper figured into influence through the symbols themselves, which
beneath the glittery surface. The aspiring global city soon becomes, otherwise become void of meaning if on their own. As the 2009 eco-
as Ian Parker (2005) once put it, a mirage. The landscape changes at nomic crisis shows, the basis for Dubai’s symbolic ascendance in the
a staggering pace as towers, apartment blocks and streets appear world city hierarchy might not be as solidly in the hands of the rul-
and disappear in the twinkling of an eye, while the most wide- ing family as this assumes. Dubai, due its hyper-entrepreneurialism,
 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284 283

is a consumer-driven bazaar that risks creating a ‘‘voodoo city” Indeed, a critical western observer might be reminded of a fa-
where a fictional façade masks increasing social inequality (Harvey, mous 1975 novel by James Ballard – High-rise – when confronted
1988). If the worldwide demand for state-of-the-art hotels and elite with technological ‘visions’ such as Burj Dubai and Waterfront City.
leisure resorts continues to fall, if the sustainability of the Sheik’s In Ballard’s narrative, a revolutionary London Docklands sky-
diversification strategy is disproved by the real estate bubble burst, scraper is both protagonist and mise-en-scène for a macabre story
if the viability of the Emirate as a logistic hub becomes questionable, of social degrade and urban decay. Built as a self-sufficient ‘‘vertical
the city might vanish as quickly as it appeared. Nakheel Tower and city” (Ballard, 1975, p. 9) for bourgeois occupants that are system-
the sci-fi Sphere on the corner of Waterfront City might remain pa- atically stratified according to floor and class, the high-rise offers
per dreams and the Burj Dubai turn into an empty skeleton – sym- all the necessary super-modern amenities. Yet, shortly after the
bols indeed, but just of a memento to the visionary audacity of last of the thousand suites is occupied, the inhabitants of the tower
those who conceived a global city of ‘‘non-places” (Augé, 1995). Du- start to exhibit increasingly barbaric behaviors whilst infrastruc-
bai is in fact the result of an almost endemic search for ‘‘supermo- tures quickly break down one after the other. In 3 months, profes-
dernity” (Ibid) – the belief that humankind can control all the sionals are turned into scavengers and prides, as each and every
facets of social experience and overcome every environmental lim- social norm collapses within the walls of the skyscraper. At last,
itation with the application of technology. However, this approach as the opening line narrates, the central character Robert Laing is
has two key social downsides: it creates homologous spaces, which pictured banqueting on its dog considering the events that brought
reiterate similar power structures, and it grants benefits only to about such degeneration. As Ballard himself notes, careful planning
those that can access such technologies. In this sense, Dubai’s case, and architectural mastery did not prevent the apocalypse; quite
when analyzed in both its urban entrepreneurship and its urban rev- the contrary, the symbolic power projected through the edifice
olution, corroborates much of David Harvey’s (2008) critical argu- contributed to the collapse of social order. People felt less and less
ment: urbanization in the Emirate has certainly played ‘‘a crucial compelled to leave the structure as artificial divisions (between in-
role in the absorption of capital surpluses [. . .] but at the price of bur- side and outside as well as among tiers of the inside) became social
geoning processes of creative destruction that have dispossessed divisions. The ‘‘secret logic of the high-rise” (Ballard, 1975, p. 136),
the masses of any right to the city whatsoever.” Dubai epitomizes that of dividing and fencing from the indiscrete eye, allowed for
– in some sense to an extreme – the critical questions surrounding deviance and psychosis. Overall, the lesson of High-rise is a crucial
the contemporary debate on the right to the city (Marcuse, 2009; one: symbolism requires interaction between technology and soci-
Brenner et al., 2009). For whom is the Emirate being built? What ety, but the social dynamics unfolding among these elements are
are the effects of this quest for hyperbole on the city’s inhabitants not always predictable, let alone governable. The pursuit of distinc-
that are often concealed to the eye of the venerated visitor? tion can, on the contrary, have particularly perverse effects as tech-
The splintering trend that Dubai has taken on reminds of an- nology takes up a ‘life of its own’ and individuals respond in
other architectural case famous amongst social scientists: that of countless ways to the power of definition.
Robert Moses’s Long Island parkway bridges in New York. The Apocalyptic parallels with Ballard’s vision notwithstanding, the
master urbanist of the Great Apple implemented for decades, be- case of Dubai’s splintering urban order brings up many controver-
tween the 1920s and the 1970s, a systematic logic aimed at build- sies. It shows that paying too much attention to the symbols and
ing bridges, overpasses and arcs that would impede the transit of not to the human interaction that underpin them can set urbanism
buses on these parkways. Yet the reasons for this cookie-cutter on a perilous course, which can spin out of control if the basis of
approach were far from technical (Caro, 1975). Allowing for cars, symbolism – either economic or social – diverge from the ex-
characteristic of the middle and upper classes of the time, and not pected. The Emirate’s attempt to define its identity while simulta-
for public transport, the means of the lower-income strata, the neously projecting it globally (the final object of its symbolic
symbolic power embedded in ‘‘his monumental structures of con- seduction) is highly dependent on the availability of speculative
crete and steel embod[ied] a systematic social inequality, a way of capitals. Likewise, it is greatly contingent on Dubai’s capacity to se-
engineering relationships among people” (Winner, 1989, p. 23). duce international elites and re-shape global mobility networks.
Moses’s bridges have defined New York’s topological arrangement Abu Dhabi, in comparison, has put far more emphasis on explicitly
of power relations for almost a century, far beyond their initial servicing global elites by relying on its own financing as derived
purpose. In this sense, technology, as Langdon Winner (Ibid) re- from both vast oil resources and energy trading, in order to ‘‘refrain
minds us, is not just an instrument of power and politics: it also from Dubai’s mistakes” (Kerr, 2009). Dubai, instead, continues to
has power and politics. Once completed, the Burj Dubai and pursue a strategy of grandeur rooted in mobility, tourism and ad-
Waterfront City will exert symbolic influence on those that will vanced producer services, which is mostly pinpointed on financial
transit and inhabit them whether their creators will want it or and real estate investment. All of this, whilst racing for primacy in
not. all sectors, and managing local social dynamics. Whether this is (at
This analogy brings about a final consideration about the ‘art’ of least economically) sustainable in the long run it remains a dicey
symbolic power that often slips the minds of Dubai’s planners. question. Yet, the Dubai model is already spreading across the Gulf,
There is, as Latour (1992) would put it, a ‘‘mindless power” in arti- and beyond: Qatar, for instance, has just recently laid down the
facts that outlasts human control. We can construct technological masterplans for Lusail City, another visionary oasis built from
assemblages that have particular built-in users, and we can apply nothing to compete as a global city.
specific devices for specific functional purposes, but the will inev- The venture of becoming a strategic site of globalization is a
itably acquire social feature – and thus consequences – of their costly activity that needs sustainable long-term plans and careful,
own as they become embedded in the symbolic systems of our as well as constant, balancing of global and local processes. Seeking
societies. Symbolism, in other words, requires social interaction, global city status is a risky business, one that Dubai has embraced
but this latter is not always controllable. The mastery of symbolic wholeheartedly with ambitions far greater than many other
power, the pursuit of difference, is not just about being capable of metropolises. The question here is not just an economic one: the
creating symbols (or, in Dubai-speak, ‘‘icons”). It is also, if not city has yet to prove that it is capable of managing the immense
chiefly, about being able to manage and direct such powers of def- technology it is putting in place. Ultimately, what the case of Dubai
inition towards the intended divisions, and sustaining them teaches us is that, just like Norman Klein pointed out in the case of
through the ever-changing complex of socialization processes spectacular urbanism of the Vatican and Las Vegas, ‘‘by decoding
underpinning daily urban relations. scripted space, we learn how power [is] brokered between the
284 M. Acuto / Cities 27 (2010) 272–284

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alienating an invisible working class and creating an urban order Elsheshtawy (ed.), pp. 169–199. Routledge, London.
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I owe a note of gratitude to Leslie Sklair for pointing out this excellent work to me.