Int J Disaster Risk Sci (2019) 10:462–477 www.ijdrs.

com
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-019-00238-w www.springer.com/13753

ARTICLE

Disaster Risk Reduction in Cameroon: Are Contemporary

Disaster Management Frameworks Accommodating the Sendai
Framework Agenda 2030?
Henry Ngenyam Bang1 • Lee Stuart Miles1 • Richard Duncan Gordon1

Published online: 1 October 2019

Ó The Author(s) 2019

Abstract Many African countries are prone to numerous Keywords Cameroon
Communication
hazardous events, exacerbated by the vulnerability of their resistance
Disaster management
Disaster management
rapidly increasing population and leading to frequent dis- system
Disaster risk reduction
West Africa
asters that often have dire fiscal and development impli-
cations. Yet, there is declining sensitivity to these risks,
contrary to the conventional wisdom of disaster manage- 1 Introduction
ment (DM) principles. The primary aim of this research is
to understand the constraints and/or challenges limiting the The high incidence and frequency of hazards, emergencies,
ability of contemporary African DM systems/institutional crises, and disasters often threatens the economic and
frameworks from implementing adequate disaster risk sustainable development of many African countries. Yet,
reduction (DRR) measures. Using a qualitative, case study the response to these risks is unsatisfactory and is not in
based research strategy, this research investigates resis- accordance with standard operational disaster management
tance to the effective implementation of DM/DRR within (DM) practices (Myers 2011; Becker et al. 2013; Bang
Cameroon’s contemporary DM system by using the Sendai 2014; Adelekan and Asiyanbi 2016; Fraser et al. 2017).
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 guid- These challenges exist in Cameroon where evidence of
ing principles for DRR as benchmark. The findings reveal declining sensitivity to environmental risks abound (Bang
the existence of resistance factors that particularly com- et al. 2018, 2019).
plicate the communication, decision making, and coordi- To curb hazards/disaster risks in Cameroon (Table 1),
nation of DRR activities, the provision of resources, the government participates in several regional and inter-
aspects of international assistance, as well as DRR plan- national DM frameworks albeit with limited success (Bang
ning and policies. The authors argue that such resistance et al. 2016; Ashu and Van Nierkerk 2019). One explana-
factors contribute to making Cameroon’s DM system more tory hypothesis for this situation—advocated in this arti-
reactive and further undermine risk reduction. The article cle—is that the operational DM system in Cameroon is not
concludes by offering key recommendations that have the in conformity with international/conventional DM frame-
potential to alleviate the identified resistance factors as well works. Indeed, the hypothesis is informed by contemporary
as strengthen Cameroon’s DM, particularly in relation to findings indicating that operational DM systems in many
capacity building, training, research development, and African countries are more reactive than proactive (see
organizational resilience. Sect. 3).
Although contemporary research on the DM systems of
many African countries clearly reveals common opera-
tional challenges, the application of theoretical bench-
& Henry Ngenyam Bang marking that can aid the diagnosis of the problems has
hbang@bournemouth.ac.uk
often been disregarded or underutilized (Ashu and Van
1
Disaster Management Centre, Bournemouth University, Nierkerk 2019). As Fraser et al. (2017) note, many African
Dorset, Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, Poole BH12 5BB, UK countries have adopted a progressive, dynamic, and generic

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Table 1 Different hazard groups/types in Cameroon with some examples from 1980 to 2019
Hazard group Hazard type Examples

Natural Geological Volcanic eruptions—Mount Cameroon (1982, 1999, 2000, 2012)

Gas emissions from crater Lakes—Lake Monoum (1984); Lake Nyos (1986)
Potentially socionatural Meteorological Regular tornadoes, thunderstorms and lightning strikes in South, Far North, Adamawa, and North
Regions
Hydrological Flash floods—Kribi (1998); North Region (2008, 2014); Far North (1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999,
2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014); Douala (August 2000, June 2015); Limbe
(2001, July 2013); Yaounde (April 2008); Bakassi Peninsula (2014); Bamenda (marshy areas of
Mulang, below Foncha and Ntasin, August 2014)
Landslides—South West (Bafaka Balue, 1997; Wabane, August 2013); Center (Yaounde, 1998);
Bamboutous (June 2003); Bonduma neighborhood, Buea (August 2006); Kekem (October 2007);
Bamenda Escarpment (August 2009); Tombel-Bangem highway (August 2015)
Biological Elephant-caused destruction—Far North (Diamare, 1996, 1998, 1999; elephants from Kalfou
Wildlife Park 2014)
Famine, drought, and locust invasion—Far North (1998–1999–2001) with loss of 140 tons of cereals
per year; Maroua (2011)
Epidemics—Cholera (North and Far North, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2010, 2011, 2014; Douala, 2004,
2005, 2011); Meningitis (Far North, 1998); Red diarrhoea (East, 1997; Messock, 1998; Mbalmayo,
1999; Menchum Division, 2010; Far North, 2011); Measles (Maroua, 2008–2009); Malaria
(Northern Regions, 2013—more than 12,000 victims)
Technological Fires Fire incidents—Nsam (1998); Bafoussam market (1999); Mokolo market (1998); Limbe market
(2000); Sangmelima market (1998); Essos market, Yaoundé military headquarters ammunition
depot (2001); Kumba market (2005, 2009); Tiko market (2010); Mboppi market, Douala (2011);
Congo market, Douala (2012); Kumba Hospital (2019); SONARA Oil Refinery (2019)
Industrial Gas—Nsimalen (1996)
Transportation Road crashes—Average of 1000 per year
3 Plane crashes—Cameroon Airlines (1984, 1995); Kenya Airways (2007)
Train crashes—271 derailments in 1998; 5 crashes from October 2016-December 2017 (October
2016 in Eseka, November 2016 in Ndokoti, March 2017 in Elig-Edzoa, July 2017 in Makondo,
December 2017 in Maboni)
Social and Crowd-related Riots due to civil service salary slashed by 65% (1993)
anthropogenic Riots caused by fuel/food price hikes (February 2008, July 2014)
hazards
Civil unrest rallies by opposition parties (1992–1994)
Mass demonstrations in the Anglophone region following the unilateral declaration of independence
by the Interim Government of Ambazonia (October 2017)
Armed conflict Bakassi peninsular crisis—the 1990s
The Anglophone crises turned into an armed conflict—From 2017 and ongoing
Terrorist Boko Haram insurgency in northern Cameroon—From 2014 and ongoing
activity
Source Adapted from Bang (2016, p. 111)

agenda for disaster risk reduction (DRR), but its imple- Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR) working
mentation leaves much to be desired. The main aim of this document (UNISDR 2015a, p. 13–14; see Fig. 1)—can
research is to diagnose factors that pose obstacles and significantly improve DRM.
constraints (resistance factors) upon resilience and act as a Importantly, resistance is not simply restricted to aspects
hindrance to operational DRR in many African countries. that ‘‘actively’’ oppose (openly or covertly) the authority,
This article perceives the aim of DRR as ‘‘preventing conduct, and implementation of DM activities, which are
new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing often associated with noncompatibility or noncompliance.
residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening It also includes aspects that simply foster inertia in DM
resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable activities through neglect, incapacity, or even incompe-
development’’ (UNISDR 2017, p. 16). In theory at least, tence. Such resistance can be interpreted as representing an
DRR activities—as enshrined in the Sendai Framework for issue, area, or location, be it human, virtual, or physical,

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464 Bang et al. Disaster Risk Reduction in Cameroon

Fig. 1 The existence of resistance factors between risk reduction and recovery components of disaster management (DM)

where resistance can be identified and represents a major Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP) in the Ministry of
challenge that interrupts or undermines the effectiveness of Territorial Administration is the central agency responsible
operational DRR and consequently, the entire DM system. for organizing and coordinating DM activities, including
Conceptually, resistance factors can also exist in all the key all institutional structures concerned with DM in Cameroon
DM activities (Fig. 1). (MTAD/DCP 2009). The main stakeholder national and
Figure 1 shows the existence of resistance factors international agencies that collaborate with the DCP
between two main DM components. The framework blends include government ministries, international organizations,
contemporary DRR strategies and best practices as prof- municipalities, civil society, and nongovernmental orga-
fered by the SFDRR. As shown on the diagram, the guiding nizations (NGOs) (Fig. 2). Although government min-
principles operate across different aspects of DM (space istries are key players in Cameroon’s DRR landscape, they
dimension) and influence various stages of the DM (time have not developed their own DM frameworks, thereby
dimension). Resistance factors prevent the smooth opera- limiting their scope to engage fully with risk reduction
tion of these principles to enable effective DRR. Across the activities and interact with other DRR stakeholders (Bang
space and time of DM, resistance factors prevent the 2014; Ashu and Van Nierkerk 2019).
smooth operation of these principles to enable effective Generally, Cameroon’s organizational resilience to dis-
DRR. To prevent resistance, a key objective of this asters is weak and the DM system lays more emphasis on
research is to understand where and why they exist, or the disaster response than on risk prevention and mitigation.
reason for low resilience to DRR. Where the government DM strategy has shown a leaning
towards some disaster preparedness efforts, they have
remained theoretical rather than practical (Bang et al. 2014,
2 Brief Review of Disaster Risk Reduction 2019). For instance, although Law No. 86/016 of 1986,1
and Resistance in Cameroon adopted to reorganize civil protection, provided for the
creation of a national observatory for disasters, with local
Literature on disaster risks in Cameroon suggests chal- branches established to permanently monitor disaster-prone
lenges in operational DRR are ever present and there is areas. This organ has not yet been established more than
evidence of increasing disaster risk that is not matched by three decades after this law was enacted. In addition, DM
adequate DRR measures. For instance, although the leg- suffers from inadequate financial support due to the low
islative framework for DM has been reviewed several priority accorded to risk reduction in Cameroon’s national
times since independence, ‘‘the various ordinances and acts budget (Bang 2014, 2016).
do not provide a framework that demonstrates a clear
linkage between disaster mitigation and development 1
Law No. 86/016 of 6 December 1986 on the general reorganization
planning in the country’’ (Bang 2014, p. 565). The of civil protection in Cameroon (French). https://www.camerlex.com/
la-protection-civile-2225/. Accessed 8 January 2019.

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Int J Disaster Risk Sci 465

Fig. 2 Cameroon’s disaster

management institutional International Partners Development Organizations
framework and agreements International Financial International Development
Source Adapted from Bang Organizations⎯WB, IMF etc. Organizations⎯UNDP, UNICEF,
Bilateral/Multilateral Cooperation WHO, UNHCR
(2014, p. 581). DM Disaster
with Foreign Countries National & Local NGOs
management, DRR disaster risk International Cooperation for Civil National/Regional/Local Social
reduction, IMF international Protection Groups
monetary fund, NGO
Nongovernmental Organization,
UNHCF United Nations High
Commission for Refugees,
UNICEF United Nations Main National Organs
International DM Agreements DIRECTORATE Directorate of Civil Protection
Children’s Fund, UNDP United Sendai Framework for DRR
OF Emergency Medical Services
Nations Development Hyogo Framework for Action
International Decade for National CIVIL PROTECTION National Disaster Prevention &
Programme, WB World Bank, Management Organ
Disaster Reduction National Fire Services
WHO World Health International Civil Defense (Central
Organization Coordinating National Institute of Geological &
Organization Mining Research
African Regional Platform for DRR DM Agency) National Institute of Cartography
Global Platform for DRR National Risk Observatory

Key National & Local Government Stakeholders

Presidency of the Republic
Ministry of Territorial Administration
Ministry of Environment & Nature Protection
Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Social Affairs
Ministry of Higher Education
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Scientific Research & Innovation
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Housing & Urban Development
Municipalities & Councils
Fondoms & Chiefdoms

So far then, it can be deduced that most contemporary in the region brings scope for enabling development pro-
DM institutional frameworks in the African continent have cesses that can build resilience and mitigate risks.
not implemented adequate DRR measures. Often common
barriers are observed and cited in existing literature,
notably: (1) low priority given to risk reduction in national 3 Methodology
budgets; (2) poor information dissemination and knowl-
edge management; (3) failure to prioritize emergency The conventional DM/DRR model, as highlighted earlier,
response, creating poor risk governance, DRR unintegrated has limitations in its implementation in many African
into national plans, and the absence of a standard DRR countries. Indeed, priorities 1–3 of the SFDRR 2015–2030
budget monitoring system (UNISDR 2013, 2015a, b; lays emphasis on: (1) understanding disaster risk; (2)
World Bank 2018; Ashu and Van Nierkerk 2019). strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster
Moreover, a growing body of literature has begun to risk; and (3) investing in DRR for resilience (UNISDR
chart gaps in the relationship between climate change-in- 2015a, p. 14; also see Fig. 1 for DRR guidelines). Although
duced hazards and urban risk-reduction measures in many laudable, implementation in Africa leaves much to be
African countries—including capacity and resources chal- desired as the brief review in Sect. 3 shows. A notable in-
lenges that many DM systems and authorities face as quiry for this article, therefore, is to identify and evaluate
urbanization increases in the continent. This has created resistance factors in space and time (Fig. 1) that cause
blockages (resistance) to building up resilience in urban challenges to DRR.
centers, posing challenges for climate change adaptation, The choice of Cameroon as a case study is relevant to
public health resilience, and DRR in many growing African this research because the country’s hazard profile is
cities (Adelekan et al. 2015; Johnson 2015). As underlined increasing, especially within social and anthropogenic
by SFDRR, resilience is therefore a necessary imperative hazards (Table 1). For instance, in 2019, Cameroon’s
for Africa to develop. Indeed, the fast rate of urbanization anglophone crisis (involving insurgency in Cameroon’s
two English speaking North West and South West Regions)

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466 Bang et al. Disaster Risk Reduction in Cameroon

has caused the displacement of 437,000 people from the reduction, management of crises and disaster events, aca-
affected region by 30 November 2018, with many demic journals, books, policy documents, and reports on
becoming refugees in neighboring Nigeria (UNHCR 2019). DM/DRR and related themes. Status reports of Cameroon’s
The northern part of the country also hosts more than DCP were invaluable as a resource. International DM
350,000 refugees and asylum seekers either fleeing the agreements, conference proceedings, declarations and
Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, or conflict in the speeches, including the documentation of DM stakeholder
adjacent Central African Republic. ministries, were also reviewed to have insight into DRR in
Consequently, this article is based on and presents Cameroon.
interpretivist, exploratory, and inductive research that The second phase (field research validation) involved an
investigated resistance to DRR using the case study of executive briefing involving senior emergency managers
Cameroon. The aim is to aid better understanding of from Cameroon. The briefing served as a peer-review and
resistance factors influencing Cameroon’s DM frameworks bench learning exercise where preliminary findings on the
and proffer solutions on how to assimilate, accommodate, research were presented, analyzed, and scrutinized to
reduce, and overcome the respective resistance factors. The ensure their validity. Feedback from the Cameroon team
project had two main phases. The first (research) phase greatly enriched the findings. A joint communique on the
adopted a qualitative methodology for empirical/primary research outcomes was produced with the visiting Camer-
data collection in Cameroon. Primary empirical data were oon team. The entire project adhered to strict ethical pro-
obtained from various sources—technical reports, official cedures. Participation was voluntary, and, at the
documents, and open, semistructured interviews (Bhat- participants’ request, careful consideration and treatment of
tacherjee 2012). interview responses that could reveal identity were made
Initially, the research pursued a purposive sampling anonymous. Hence, transcription of the interview sessions
criterion (Etikan et al. 2016) and identified 18 interviewees concealed the names and any other identifiable information
within Cameroon’s DM system (Agencies and Ministries) about the interviewees.
directly involved with DM/DRR policy formulation and Analysis of the data was informed by the full version of
implementation, administration/governance, and the coor- grounded theory (Henwood and Pidgeon 2006). The data
dination of emergency management activities. Sampling collected from Cameroon were transcribed, anonymized,
criteria focused on interviewing very experienced DM coded, and subjected to constant comparative analysis to
technocrats (15 ? years of service in the DM field) who establish linkages between relevant themes. The executive
held strategic DM/DRR related functions at the national briefing, where preliminary findings were presented, served
and regional levels and who could provide rich data on the as an opportunity to broaden and refine the analysis—fur-
main research themes. During the data collection process in ther sought and clarified manifestations of categories,
2017, 10 top/senior and mid-ranking technocrats (selected subcategories, or emerging themes in the data. Further-
from the 18) were interviewed who met the respective more, triangulation of different data sources was done in a
sampling criteria. Since Cameroon is bilingual (English mostly qualitative analysis, although basic quantitative
and French), the interviews were conducted in the preferred statistical analysis has been embedded within them
language of the respondent. Interpreters were not needed (Charmaz 2006). The structure of the findings (categories
because the researcher could understand both languages. and subcategories) was derived from interview themes that
The interviews took 40–65 min to conduct and covered the are consistent with responses, and also with new themes
depth and breadth of the inquiry because the respondents that emerged from coding comparative analysis of primary
engaged passionately in the dialogue and explored similar information sources.
DM themes due to the semistructured nature of the dis-
cussion (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2011). As a result, the
interviews generated data that are beyond the scope of this 4 Why Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience
article. Are Important to Cameroon
The SFDRR priority actions and guiding principles for
DRR (Fig. 1) were used as a benchmark to assess resis- Cameroon’s risk profile is firmly linked to its vulnerable
tance to DRR in Cameroon. The key interview themes population, which is exposed to natural, potentially
centered on aspects of DM governance, intersectorial socionatural, technological, and social and anthropogenic
stakeholder cooperation, integration of the DM system, hazards (Bang 2016; Table 1; Fig. 3), making risk reduc-
resource allocation and capacity for DRR, DRR education, tion and resilience imperative.
and crisis communication of vital information. Secondary The main natural hazards in Cameroon are volcanic
sources of information were acquired from documented eruptions, earthquakes, landslides, and toxic gas emissions
experiences of Cameroon’s institutional capability for risk from crater lakes associated to the Cameroon Volcanic

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Fig. 3 Cameroon map showing

locations of the main hazards in
the country Source Authors

Line (CVL)—a series of volcanoes that straddles the Gulf lakes. In 1984 and 1986 poisonous gases from Lakes
of Guinea and extends for over 1600 km in the country. Monoum and Nyos killed 37 and 1746 people respectively
Mount Cameroon is the highest and most active volcano in (Fogwe 2010; Bang 2016). Figure 3 shows the location of
West and Central Africa whose eruptions (eight times in the main hazards in Cameroon.
the twentieth century) are associated with earthquakes, Meteorological hazards like thunderstorms are often
which also pose a threat to population centers in the region accompanied with very strong winds, heavy rain, and
(Favalli et al. 2012). If an earthquake occurs in the tec- lightning that affect many parts of the country, especially
tonically active seismic zone in the South Region, there is a during the rainy season, damaging physical capital (Fogwe
risk that it can generate a tsunami that will affect the 2010). The storms also cause flash floods, exacerbated by
coastal region around Kribi (Fogwe 2010). Earthquakes the mountainous nature of the CVL. Statistics from the
also trigger landslides, which can also cause lahars/vol- emergency events database (EM-DAT) reveal that from
canic mudflows especially on the flanks of the CVL during 1990 to 2014, floods had the highest frequency of occur-
heavy downpours. The CVL also hosts dangerous crater rence (77.7%) of all natural hazards in Cameroon, followed

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468 Bang et al. Disaster Risk Reduction in Cameroon

by drought (16.7%), and landslides (5.6%) (CRED 2018). endemic diseases, and low educational attainment in many
And during this period, 85.9% and 14.1% of the mortality areas. This often causes devastating impacts to the popu-
was from floods and landslides, respectively. In 2012, the lations subjected to such shocks, which result in deaths, the
worst flooding in Cameroon in over 60 years hit northern displacement of people, damage to agricultural produce
Cameroon with devastating consequences. The floods and rural livelihoods, and the destruction of physical and
caused the greatest number of fatalities (more than 30 social infrastructure (Bang et al. 2018). Despite the high
deaths, about 3000 hospitalized, more than 60,000 dis- risk of hazards in the country, the authorities have been
placed), property and infrastructure damage, and disruption unable to learn, enhance, and engage effective DRR
of services throughout the region in more than three dec- strategies (Miles et al. 2017).
ades (Bang 2016; Bang et al. 2018, 2019).
Flooding often led to a rise in waterborne diseases and
health hazards such as dysentery, malaria, diarrhoea, cat- 5 Research Findings
arrh, and cough. The situation is worsened by frequent
epidemics (cholera, measles, and meningitis) in many parts Building on the identification of resistance factors outlined
of the country (Table 1). Other biological hazards like in Sect. 2, the findings suggest the existence of a number of
locust infestations and elephant-caused crop destruction are resistance factors to achieving DRR in Cameroon that
also a threat to agricultural production (FAO 2016; Bang cumulatively represent a major challenge. These barriers
et al. 2018). These hazards have dire consequences for undermine the implementation and effectiveness of DRR/
livelihoods, including food security, and are exacerbated DM in the country. The following resistance factors were
by the difficult socioeconomic challenges in the country. identified.
Cameroon’s DM system is also struggling to manage
technological disasters, which are becoming more promi- 5.1 Resistance in Communication
nent in the country. According to CRED (2018), from 1988
to 2018, 41 technological disasters occurred in Cameroon. The research identified two main types of resistance in
These events resulted in 1542 fatalities, 1272 injuries, and communication: weak precrisis early warning system
affected 3061 people. Analysis using the EM-DAT data- communication and weak intelligence on early warning
base shows that of all transportation accidents, rail crashes communication.
cause the highest number of injuries and are second to fire
hazards in terms of the total number of people affected in 5.1.1 Weak Precrisis Early Warning System
all technological disasters in the country. Communication
Anthropogenic hazards in Cameroon are dominated by
an increase in conflict due to the regional Boko Haram All respondents (100%) said precrisis disaster communi-
insurgency and the Ambazonian conflict. Since 2017, cation is very weak. Some mentioned the lack of adequate
Cameroon’s anglophone regions have become the primary structures at the local and regional levels to continuously
political concern for the government due to the Ambazo- educate or sensitize ‘‘at risk’’ populations about risk
nian crisis, which has escalated into an armed conflict. reduction measures, including about impending risks and
Violent clashes between the armed separatist fighters and possible disasters. One notable reason given in the inter-
the Cameroon security forces have caused the deaths of views was the ongoing challenge of disseminating infor-
several hundred innocent civilians, separatist fighters, as mation in several local languages in order to reach the
well as security forces. In addition, thousands of substantial diversity of ethnic groups in the country.
Cameroonians in the North and South West Regions have Respondents also emphasized that scientific early
fled over the border into Nigeria or relocated to other towns warning systems are very weak or limited. Responses
in the country. According to a recent report by the United indicate lack of consistency in monitoring risk zones, such
National High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the as the volcanically active Mt. Cameroon region, due to
conflict has led to 437,000 internally displaced persons poor, even complete lack of, maintenance of faulty moni-
(IDPs) and 35,000 Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria toring equipment. In fact, several respondents cited how
(UNHCR 2019). the 1999 eruption of Mt. Cameroon had especially taken
Additionally, urbanization is increasing the susceptibil- everyone by surprise largely because of inoperative
ity of population centers to natural hazards especially those equipment (interviewees; Miles et al. 2017). Eighty percent
in the Mt Cameroon region, which are at risk of lava flow of the respondents cited the devastating 2012 floods in
inundation, landslides, and flash floods (Favalli et al. 2012). Northern Cameroon where the hydrological regimes of the
Social vulnerabilities in the country are linked to economic rivers in the region were not monitored, although the
deprivation, deficient infrastructures, prevalence of region experiences annual flooding (Bang et al. 2019).

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These examples have clear implications for the level of documents and communications are in the French lan-
integration of data gathering, monitoring, and intelligence guage. This practice is in contradiction to official govern-
information available for DRR and crisis planning. ment policy that requires such documents and
communication to be available in both English and French.
5.1.2 Weak Intelligence on Early Warning Communication According to the respondents (60%), this has implications
for prompt communication for English-speaking DM
The research was also informed (60% of interviewees) that technocrats. Consequently, there are delays in key deci-
although the bottom-up reporting of any impending risks is sions and actions. There is another form of ‘‘communica-
expected to follow protocol, top-down confidence in the tion resistance’’ in existence that stems from weaknesses in
quality and accuracy of any information provided from the coordination and integration of stakeholders within key
bottom-up sources is very weak and often causes delays. communication flows that are essential if delays and inertia
This is particularly true with early warning information are to be avoided. Without speedy decisions, DM cannot be
about imminent risks, which is passed upwards through the undertaken that may eventually save lives, reduce casu-
hierarchy to inform decision making and action but is often alties, and limit infrastructural damage.
ignored. Eighty percent of the respondents complained that
reports or information on imminent risks underwent a 5.2 Resistance in Decision Making
wasteful time-consuming process of vetting, cross check-
ing, and verification to ensure ‘‘accuracy.’’ One respondent One of the ways in which delays in decision making
quipped: ‘‘the authorities have failed to realize that scien- occur—that was regularly cited among respondents—re-
tific risk assessment and early warning is not 100% certain lates to the desire for disaster managers to conform exactly
but based on probability.’’ Interview transcripts also reveal and prescriptively to guidelines or written instructions on
that disaster predictions are a double-edged sword. If the what actions to take before and during a crisis situation. Put
anticipated disaster fails to occur, precautions, prepara- succinctly by one respondent, ‘‘what does the text say?’’
tions, and evacuations that have been taken are regarded as This is obviously a good thing in many respects; but for the
wasteful and ill-informed. Those responsible are vilified, fact—as another respondent highlighted—that the DM
regarded as incompetent, and may not be taken seriously legislation is narrow, not explicit, and lacks clarity on
again in subsequent periods of high hazard risk. As a result, responsibilities. Further responses alleged that while some
scientists fear to provide information on impending risks disaster managers at the national level have basic knowl-
for fear of being ostracized if their predictions are not edge of DM legislation, those at the regional and local
completely accurate. Thus, an additional form of commu- levels are not very knowledgeable about or fully under-
nication resistance exists, which pertains to levels of con- stand ‘‘what the text says.’’ Several reasons for this were
fidence and lack of assurance in the quality and accuracy of cited. These include that local disaster managers did not
crisis communication in place. This scepticism fosters have access to the respective texts, have not been
resistance in terms of inertia and delay in handling and empowered to understand the legislation, or simply did not
processing crisis communications. This lag time in bother to find out. At best, these tendencies represent the
response may have important implications in shaping the prevalence of top-down, hierarchical, and differential
speed and direction of disaster outcomes. organizational behavior, adapted to and based on a highly
Of the three communication deficiencies revealed by our legal-bound and document-based decision-making culture
investigation, weak precrisis early warning communication in DM.
seems to be the most entrenched (Fig. 4).
5.3 Resistance in the Coordination of Disaster Risk
5.1.3 Administrative Bottlenecks in Crisis Communication Reduction Activities

There is evidence that even in precrisis and crisis situa- Findings also reveal that prior to crises or disasters, inter-
tions, bottom-up communication with and among disaster sectorial coordination between DM agencies at the
managers is not straightforward. Information goes through national, regional, and local levels is minimal. Senior dis-
a long evaluation process, and is also hampered by aster managers indicated that supportive agencies and
administrative bottlenecks and complicated reporting pro- ministries to Cameroon’s DCP also rarely organize risk
cedures. According to 70% of the interviewees, this arises reduction related preparatory activities. Indeed, stakeholder
because Cameroon’s DM legislation has no guidelines for agencies are requested to help mostly during crisis situa-
stakeholder involvement, especially for scientists who tions. At that moment, they struggle to provide their ser-
should be monitoring and interpreting imminent risks. vices because there have not been sufficient preparatory
Respondents also mentioned that most official government time and simulation exercises allocated to crisis planning.

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Fig. 4 Percentage of
interviewee responses to types
of deficiencies in
communication. EW Early 100
warning 90

% of Respondents
80
70
60
50 100
40 60 70
30
20
10
0
Weak Precrisis EW Weak Intelligence on Administrave
Communicaon EW Communicaon Bolenecks in Crisis
Communicaon
Communicaon Deficiency Types

In these circumstances, agencies redefine their role to suit permanent basis, probably based on their skills, and
what they can offer, and not what they ought to offer. recruited and paid by the state, human resources for DM
Agencies concerned with risk monitoring and assessment, will always be lacking.
logistics, and relief and rescue services fall within this Transcribed interviews reveal key resistance factors
bracket. A senior disaster manager, for example, mentioned exist around financial and budgetary aspects. In particular,
specifically that officials’ adherence to key texts also meant that budgetary allocations for DRR and DM as a whole are
a corresponding restriction on the encouragement, level, not enshrined in legislation, are unavailable to cooperating
and intensity of intersectorial cooperation. This was espe- DM agencies, and not even explicit within the operating
cially relevant in cases where DM planning documents, budgetary provisions of the DCP. Seventy percent of the
plans, and texts did not specifically stipulate in what form respondents highlighted that stakeholder ministries and
such cooperation should take place, demonstrating agencies are reluctant to make any budgetary provision for
notable instances of inertia (resistance). DRR/DM because they do not consider disaster issues as
part of their respective responsibilities. When a crisis
5.4 Resistance in the Provision of Resources occurs, the government pledges to provide financial sup-
port to the affected area, which in many instances is very
Findings on resistance in the provision of resources fall limited, and many promises that involve huge funds are not
into three categories: insufficient human capital resources, kept. Because the DCP is not financially able to handle
insufficient financial resources, and insufficient material most crises, the presidency always intervenes to provide
resources. The structural provision for disaster managers is support. This lack of adequate financial resources heavily
not sustainable. All the respondents (100%) highlighted the impacts disaster preparedness, and especially affects neg-
problem of lack of professionally trained disaster managers atively on contingency planning for risk reduction, as the
at all levels of the DM system. ‘‘Skilled disaster managers focus is more on crises management, when more resources
who can make strategic policies and plans on DRR in the are made available.
country are not available,’’ opined a senior disaster man- Findings also show that the provision of material
ager. In reality, government administrators at the national, resources for DRR is an issue. Respondents with technical
regional, and local levels (ministers, governors, divisional DM knowledge and specialist responsibility criticized the
officers), who double as disaster managers (albeit without lack of vital equipment needed for risk reduction activities.
DM training) as well as other members drawn from They mentioned that some key services lack the 4-wheel
diversified sectors of the society are all expected to assist drive vehicles needed for fieldwork in remote areas. In
during crises. A respondent further explained that such some instances, the repair of equipment resources is also
members, whose main jobs may be remote from DM, can lacking. For example, a respondent said prior to the 1999
be transferred to work in other regions of the country. As a Mt. Cameroon eruption, many seismometers used to
result, the entire team may not be available when they are monitor Mt Cameroon were not functioning and had not
needed. They stressed that without disaster managers who been replaced. This includes other essential technical
can be deployed to work in particular locations on a equipment required to take measurements for risk

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Int J Disaster Risk Sci 471

Fig. 5 Percentage of responses

on resistance in the provision of
human, financial, and material
resources 100
90
80
70

% Respondents
60
100 90
50
40 80
30
20
10
0
Insufficient Human Insufficient Financial Insufficient Material
Capital Capital Resources
Types of Resources

assessment. The research revealed that the few available donations amounting to more than 1.5 billion FCFA
resources are usually under pressure and if they have (African Financial Community Franc; about USD
access to them, it is only for a short time. As a result, 3,000,000), and a substantial amount of it was embezzled
scientists are always never fully resourced to complete (Bang 2016). This type of resistance results in a lack of
their work. This obviously has implications for the effec- compliance with and ineffective administration of such
tiveness of scientific monitoring and assessment of risks in international assistance in line with the requirements of the
the country. international funders and agencies.
A closer look at the three types of resistance to resources
reveals that insufficient human and financial capital are 5.6 Resistance in Formulating Disaster Risk
exceedingly predominant in Cameroon’s DM system Reduction Plans and Policies
(Fig. 5).
All respondents (100%) struggled to identify a compre-
5.5 Resistance in International Assistance hensive DRR policy and plans for Cameroon. The infor-
mants said there is no strategic plan for DRR policy and
Our research has unveiled major issues in relation to the civil protection in Cameroon. Isolated DRR instruments
ability of top government officials to handle international exist in a variety of texts, legislation, and guidelines in
aid and disaster relief. Often national DM frameworks are different government stakeholder ministries and in the
unable to process large amounts of immediate relief private sector. These contemporary DM/DRR laws, legis-
assistance—they are unable to handle the potential for lation, decrees, and ministerial instructions are disaster-
embezzlement and corruption by officials who have access driven. For example, shortly after the 1986 Lake Nyos
to and their hands on major new sources of income coming disaster (1746 people killed), the government enacted Law
from abroad. All respondents (100%) expressed concerns No. 86/016 of 6 December 1986—mentioned earlier in
that a substantial amount of foreign funds provided for DM Sect. 2, reorganizing civil protection in Cameroon. Two
and risk reduction purposes are often diverted for other years later in 1988, a train crash in the Nsam neighborhood
uses. For example, after the 2012 floods that hit North of Cameroon’s capital, Yaoundé killed several people
Cameroon, the government obtained USD 108 million when the petrol it was carrying ignited. This incident,
from the World Bank to repair damaged hydraulic infras- known as the Nsam Fire Disaster, triggered Decree No.
tructures— the Lagdo and Maga Dams in the region 98/031 of 9 March 19982 to organize emergency man-
(World Bank 2013). The funds were disbursed, but some agement and major risk relief plans in the country, and also
respondents intimated issues of transparency and a lack of
clarity existed as to how the resources were used (Bang 2
Decree No. 98/031 of 9 March 1998 (French) is about the
et al. 2019). Furthermore, during the 1986 Lake Nyos organization of emergency plans for disasters or major risks. https://
disaster, the Cameroon government received foreign cash www.camerlex.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/recueil-des-textes-
MINATD.pdf (pages 448–450). Accessed 21 December 2018.

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472 Bang et al. Disaster Risk Reduction in Cameroon

led to Decree No. 96/054 of 12 March 19963 that estab- 6 Discussion

lished the National Council on Civil Protection (NCCP).
Because the country subsequently experienced several The research presented in this article demonstrates that
minor to major fire incidents, this series of events provided implementation of international disaster management
the impetus for Law No. 2001/182 of 25 July 2001,4 frameworks that articulate DRR remains very limited. The
reorganizing the National Fire Brigade (Sappeurs Pom- SFDRR puts more pressure on African DM frameworks to
piers) (MTAD 2011; Bang 2014). These examples show a ensure that DRR measures are implemented as effectively
lack of foresight in the formulation of DM/DRR legislation as possible. Yet planners still largely fail to consider
and plans. resistance factors that impede DM in these resource poor
countries where political, social, and cultural traditions and
5.7 Resistance in Mainstreaming Disaster Risk norms are notably different. As a result, there is the
Reduction into Sustainable Development Plans propensity for resistance, situated in political, social, and
cultural contexts that constitute formal and informal chal-
Respondents were very sceptical that Cameroon is main- lenges to the implementation of effective DM strategies.
streaming DRR into development plans and policies. The detailed findings, which reveal that resistance to
Cameroon has signed on to many international frameworks DRR is embedded and operating in time and space within
and actions that stipulate measures for DRR (Fig. 2). These the DM frames and systems in Cameroon, align with
include the 1994 Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action research on related themes (Becker et al. 2013, Adelelam
for a Safer World; the 2000 Millennium Development and Asiyanbi 2016, Bang et al. 2018, World Bank 2018).
Goals; the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable We argue that resistance to contemporary DM systems in
Development; the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action Africa is often due to wider political, cultural, social, and
2005–2015; the 2007 Global Platform for Disaster Risk economic dimensions linked to development that influ-
Reduction; the 2012 Sustainable Development Goals; the ences many aspects of DRR governance. The findings
2014 African Regional Platform for DRR; the International can—albeit to a limited extent—be extrapolated to other
Civil Defence Organisation, and the SFDRR. At face value, African countries, raising the question whether universally
the ratification of these international agreements indicates accepted Western DM frameworks remain completely
commitment for DRR and sustainable development. In appropriate to or are fully applicable in African countries.
reality, their implementation leaves much to be desired. The findings have shown that Cameroon’s legislative
Cameroon’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Growth frame is disaster-driven, undermining DRR activities. The
and Employment Strategy Papers, and Cameroon’s Vision Hyogo Framework for Action stressed the importance of
2035 Strategy Plan all articulate risk reduction as a priority good legislation to support DRR. This was reiterated dur-
for government to promote development in the country. All ing the SFDRR (UNISDR 2015a). Cameroon is a signatory
respondents (100%), however, expressed doubts about to these agreements, but does not comply. Indeed, if
implementation, citing very little or no government com- Cameroon and other high-risk African countries are to
mitment to actualise these DRR commitments. achieve sustainable development, its DM systems should
Figure 6 is a graphical representation of how intense or have conscious foresight, mitigating negative drivers and
entrenched the resistance factors that exist in Cameroon’s risk through positive actions, albeit with consideration for
DM system actually are when analyzed from the survey its unique socio-political and cultural environment.
responses. As shown on the chart, the four most important Findings on decision making exposed poor knowledge
are the provision of resources, mainstreaming DRR into of DM legislation, with implications for both proactive and
sustainable development, formulating DRR plans and reactive DM governance measures. When a crisis strikes,
policies, and coordination of DRR activities. disaster managers waste valuable time making enquiries
about the right course of action. Since the ‘‘text’’ might not
address all plausible situations in great detail and may not
be very explicit (or is extremely vague in some instances),
a lot of time is lost trying to seek advice or wait for
instructions from the top level of the political hierarchy.
3
Decree No. 96/054 of 12 March 1996 established the composition This creates unnecessary delays and critical actions might
and powers of the National Council on Civil Protection. https://www. be missed. This highlights a lack of the bureaucratic ini-
camerlex.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/recueil-des-textes-MIN
ATD.pdf (pages 445–447). Accessed 21 Dec 2018.
tiative and an absence of the entrepreneurial resilience
4
Law No. 2001/182 of 25 July 2001 reorganized the National Fire
required to solve emerging DM problems.
Brigade (French). https://www.osidimbea.cm/institutions/gouverne
ment/sapeurs-pompiers/. Accessed 10 March 2018.

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Int J Disaster Risk Sci 473

Fig. 6 Percentage of responses

on resistance factors in 100
Cameroon’s DM system. DRR
Disaster risk reduction 90
80
70

% Response
60
100
50 90
80 80
40 70
60 60
30
20
10
0
Communication Decision Coordination of Provision of International Formulating Mainstreaming
Deficiency Making DRR/DM Resouces Assistance DRR Plans and DRR into
Activities Policies Sustainable
Development
Resistance Factors

The findings also reveal weak DM and risk reduction urbanization, population growth and the constant demo-
communication systems. Cultural factors are partly to graphic trends that substantially increase the degree of risk
blame. Cameroon, like many African countries, has hun- and the probabilities of loss of life. Van Niekerk et al.
dreds of different local languages. Coupled with a high (2013) reported that direct investments in DRR in Africa
illiteracy rate, communication with and education of local remain low and spending on DRR as an aspect of national
populations is a challenge. While the media can help create budgets is weak and inaccurate. Van Niekerk and his col-
public awareness about risks and DRR interventions, their leagues also attributed the main reason to not only the
meager coverage and inability to translate the message into limited resources that many African governments have to
local languages limit the utility of media reportage in invest in DRR, but often their lack of aptitude to disag-
promoting effective public sensitization of DRR. With gregate specific budgetary allocations to DRR. Foreign aid,
limited help on risk reduction from the state, the impor- therefore, becomes important for Africa’s DRR activities.
tance of community resilience has become even more Foreign aid has played a significant role in shaping
apparent, as communities become even more reliant upon Cameroon’s DM landscape, although such aid also is
doing things for themselves. subject to abuse. International assistance is essential at
The SFDRR stresses that national authorities should times of crisis and disasters and can also provide the much-
promote the cooperation of multiple stakeholders and needed funds for DRR. Indeed, development aid packages
diverse institutions at all levels, including affected com- often articulate the need to mainstream DM practices into
munities and the private sector (UNISDR 2015a). Inter- development, with risk reduction becoming a central inte-
estingly, the government acknowledges that in order to grated activity. As such, identified resistance has always
reduce disaster risk, numerous players at the local, regio- provided rationales for DM authorities in Cameroon to
nal, and national levels need to work together (MTAD/ demonstrate that their DM frameworks and capacities have
DCP 2005). Interministerial, cross-sectorial, and multilevel been overwhelmed and therefore require sizable interna-
cooperation are challenging, however, as this research has tional assistance. For example, much of the local and for-
uncovered. What is unclear is how responsibility for DM is eign cash donations to the Cameroon government
shared, and what level and degree of linkages and inter- following the 1986 Lake Nyos disaster that amounted to
action between the different agencies is required (Bang around 1.5 billion FCFA (about USD 3,000,000) were
2014). embezzled (Bang 2016). This highlights issues of inap-
Our research also found that national funding of risk propriate disbursement of foreign assistance after receipt
reduction activities is very minimal, a conclusion con- (Bang et al. 2019). The identification of resistance factors
firmed by the DM reports of the DCP (MTAD/DCP 2005). also offers opportunities to use and rationalize the exis-
This can be attributed to Cameroon’s economy and internal tence of resistance as an opportunity to improve resilience
politics. Cameroon’s weak economy has placed greater via the undertaking of new measures or attracting new
pressure on the government to handle not just increased resources for improving resilience.
frequency of disasters (Miles et al. 2017), but also

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The political will to invest in risk reduction is in doubt. all levels, and to empower those at risk to achieve pro-
Cameroonian politicians prefer to respond to hazards with tection against disaster impacts (UNISDR 2013).
relief aid, which the population appreciates, rather than Another cultural issue peculiar to Cameroon is the
invest in risk aversion measures that are not very con- country’s bilingual nature. In principle, all official docu-
spicuous. Therefore, political decisions associated with ments in Cameroon are translated into French and Eng-
DM are exacerbating vulnerability to hazards. How suc- lish—the two main official languages. In practice,
cessful African countries are in reducing their actual and however, most official documents are in French, which
potential rate of risks critically depends on the political limits access to DM knowledge by the English-speaking
leadership’s commitment and ability to implement and populace. This has often led to noncompliance where
enforce appropriate DRR measures (Van Nierkerk et al. community leaders and local people are not sufficiently
2013). informed of risk aversion measure due to a language
Our research results also reveal that Cameroon’s DCP is barrier.
powerless to coordinate across stakeholder ministries. The Based on the findings of this research, more robust
DCP is a directorate under the Ministry of Territorial discourse that addresses underlying risk drivers, promotes
Administration, and lacks the power, authority, and fund- risk-sensitive development, and reforms risk governance in
ing to perform any risk reduction functions; this matches Africa is needed. We believe that understanding resistance
findings from Bang (2014). The most successful DM to DRR is central to the development of effective disaster
institutions tend to be associated with order, power, con- risk management at the local, regional, and national levels.
trol, and security, and therefore have substantial political That is why, regardless of efforts and ever-stronger com-
and policy connotations (Hills 2000). Cameroon’s DCP mitments by many African governments and DM systems
lacks these attributes. to enhance resilience, there remain major challenges
Appropriate human resources required for effective influencing DRR implementation in developing economies.
DRR are lacking. While Cameroon has several research This research is important because deciphering resistance
institutions with skilled researchers in various aspects of to DRR in Cameroon will enable resistance factors to
risk reduction, it lacks DM technocrats. Senior disaster achieve greater prominence as part of any search for resi-
managers are political appointees, usually without DM lience indicators. Table 2 is a summary of the identifiable
training and/or experience, who may be sacked, replaced, resistance factors in Cameroon and recommendations on
or transferred at any time. To enhance resilience, there is a how to resolve these obstacles.
need to be entrepreneurial in thinking and acting on
resistance to DRR. Human capital plays a critical role in
providing resilience to DM systems and processes. Such 7 Conclusion and Recommendation
‘‘gatekeepers’’ can act as innovators or policy entrepre-
neurs in DM (Miles 2016), with great potential to fill To a limited extent, the research presented in this article
‘‘resistance gaps.’’ The identification of such gatekeepers in adds even greater weight to the need to further question and
many African DM systems is very important, albeit beyond explore any (apparent) success of conventional DM
the scope of this article. frameworks in promoting DRR in developing countries.
We argue that a peculiar DM culture in Cameroon is Using the case study of Cameroon, our research offers
partly responsible for most of the identified resistance further insight into how understanding specific resistance
factors. There is generally a relaxed and unconventional factors in African countries could shape the basis of greater
manner of performing DM and other administrative func- questioning in the future. In particular, this research has
tions. Although incorrect, this attitude is acceptable to tested the hypothesis that the operational DM system in
many simply because that is how it has been done by others Cameroon is not in conformity with contemporary inter-
before. Without adequate monitoring and evaluation of DM national DM frameworks. Based on the guiding DRR
activities, many wrong decisions become a norm. For principles contained in the SFDRR to which Cameroon is a
example, the perception of DM in the country is erro- signatory, this article presented conceptual ideas on resis-
neously synonymous to assisting disaster affected com- tance factors and their implications for DRR in Cameroon.
munities with relief aid. Interestingly, the government Our findings reveal that there is clearly identifiable
acknowledges difficulties in engaging in risk reduction resistance in the DRR phase of Cameroon’s DM system.
activates due to the lack of a culture of prevention among These factors include resistance in communication; deci-
the populace, and insufficient interest in civil protection in sion making; coordination of DRR activities; provision of
the private sector (MTAD/DCP 2005). We contend that the resources; international assistance; formulation of DRR
government is the architect of that culture. Yet African plans and policies, and incorporation of DRR into sus-
governments have been urged to create a culture of DRR at tainable development plans.

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Int J Disaster Risk Sci 475

Table 2 Sendai Framework guidelines and their corresponding resistance elements/factors and suggestions for alleviating them
Sendai Corresponding Resistance factors Alleviation of resistance factors or
framework resistance elements in recommendations
guidelines (see Cameroon’s DM
Fig. 1) system

9,10 Deficiencies in communication

Weak precrisis early Lack of EW communication structures at Risk monitoring/EW systems to be enshrined in
warning (EW) regional/local levels. Weak scientific EW legislation and backed by political will,
communication systems. Inconsistency in monitoring risk commitment, and provision of required
zones resources to scientists. Scientific research
institutes should be given responsibility for EW
Weak intelligence on EW intelligence goes through a wasteful time- All EW intelligence should be expedited up the
EW communication consuming administrative vetting process decision-making process
Inaccuracy in EW information may cause those More scientific technocrats should be appointed to
concerned to be vilified strategic DM positions
Administrative Bottom-up communication goes through a long Bottom-up crisis communication should be
bottlenecks in crisis chain of reporting process simplified with situational awareness easily
communication available to all DM stakeholders
6,7,9 Decision making Desire to take decisions based on ‘‘the text,’’ Adequate DM plans should be produced that have
which is not explicit. Regional/local disaster clear roles and responsibilities
managers less knowledgeable on DM issues DM training programs should be rolled out to all
DM stakeholders at all levels
2,4,6 Coordination of DRR/ Pre-crisis intersectorial coordination for DRR is Regular national level stakeholder DM
DM activities minimal coordination meetings should be organized
10 Provision of resources
Insufficient human Lack of skilled disaster managers There should be more professionally trained
capital Top disaster managers are political appointees disaster managers to work at all levels—
particularly strategic and operational levels
Insufficient financial No legislative budgetary provisions for DRR There should be budgetary provision for DRR in
resources Insufficient funds for DRR all stakeholder ministries and agencies and
enshrined in legislation
Insufficient material Insufficient scientific DRR monitoring All required DRR equipment should be regularly
resources equipment assessed, provided, and adequately maintained
Delays in repairs of DRR equipment
10 International Embezzlement and corruption There should be strict monitoring of international
assistance (IA) Disasters as bait for foreign funds serve as assistance to prevent waste, embezzlement, and
disincentive for DRR diversion for other non-DM related purposes—
culprits should be punished to deter others
International assistance for DM/DRR diverted
for other purposes.
1,3,7,8 Formulating DRR No comprehensive DRR/DM policies plans and The country should regularly update its DM
plans and policies programs. DRR/DM legislation is disaster- legislative framework to reflect contemporary
driven and lacks foresight DM challenges and important DM foresights
1,3,4 Mainstreaming DRR Not sufficiently integrating DRR measures into All development programs should identify
into sustainable long-term development plans and programs potential risks and inculcate risk reduction
development (SD) Not complying to several international measures in their implementation
agreements on DRR for sustainable
development
DM disaster management, DRR disaster risk reduction

The various resistance factors identified are not sur- for generalized measures across an entire DM system.
prising. They have been diagnosed in other African coun- Comprehensive systems overhaul would prove expensive
tries and often attributed to their operational political, especially in the context of DM systems in developing
economic, and sociocultural environment. By understand- countries where resources are already stretched. Targeted
ing and evaluating where in particular these resistance measures could include reform of procedures, honed reor-
factors have resonance, their mitigation will avoid the need ganization of DM agencies, selective refining of

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communication strategies, and enhancement of wider Bang, H. 2016. 30 years after the Lake Nyos disaster: What prospects
stakeholders and community groups. for rehabilitation and reintegration in the region? Disaster
management, social vulnerability, risk perception and relocation
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informs risk reduction interventions and also urban plan- Publishing.
ning, public health, and other risk-sensitive development Bang, H., L. Miles, and R. Gordon. 2018. Enhancing local livelihoods
policies (Fraser et al. 2017). Although current practice resilience and food security in the face of frequent flooding in
Africa: A disaster management perspective. Journal of African
places emphasis on protecting development gains through Studies and Development 10(7): 85–100.
attempts at mitigating major disasters, resilient develop- Bang, H., L. Miles, and R. Gordon. 2019. Evaluating local
ment approaches include efforts to increase political vulnerability and organisational resilience to frequent flooding
commitment for DRR; improve identification and assess- in Africa: The case of Northern Cameroon. Foresight 21(2):
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governance of DRR and integrate DRR into emergency structures for disaster risk reduction and climate change
response management (UNISDR 2013); we also advocate a adaptation in Southern Africa. Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk
greater focus on everyday risks. To achieve those goals, we Studies 5(2): 1–5.
Bhattacherjee, A. 2012. Social science research: Principles, methods,
have suggested recommendations on how to mitigate the and principles, 2nd edn. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace
identified resistance factors (Table 2). Independent Publishing Platform.
There is a long road ahead if Cameroon is to substan- Charmaz, C. 2006. Constructing grounded theory: A practical guide
tially enhance the resilience of its DM and DRR frame- through qualitative analysis. London: Sage.
CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters). 2018.
works when there is probably a rather short time before the The emergency events database. Brussels, Belgium: Centre for
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