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GR 110854

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G.R. No.

110854 February 13, 1995

PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., petitioner,


vs.
HON. MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as Secretary of
Labor and Employment, and GENERAL MARITIME & STEVEDORES
UNION (GMSU), respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent entered into a three-year Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with expiry date on November 27, 1991. During the freedom period,
the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) questioned the majority status of
respondent through a petition for certification election. The election conducted on
February 27, 1992 was won by private respondent; and on March 19, 1992, respondent
was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner's rank-and-file
employees.
Respondent's CBA proposals were received by petitioner and counter-proposals
were made by petitioner. The negotiations collapsed, and on August 24, 1992,
respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). The NCMB tried but failed to settle the parties' controversy.
 Then, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. The
Secretary of Labor resolved the bargaining deadlock between the parties through an
Order dated March 4, 1993. The Secretary of Labor ordered that  the Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services and the General Maritime Services Union to execute new collective
bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement so executed shall be
effective from 22 September 1992 and up to five years thereafter, subject to renegotiation
on the third year of its effectivity pursuant to Article 253-A of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed a grave abuse of


discretion in making the CBA effective on Sept. 30,1992 when she assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute and not on March 4, 1993 when she rendered judgment over the
dispute?

RULING: The petition is partially meritorious.

Public respondent fixed the effectivity date on September 30, 1992. when she
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Petitioner maintains it should be March 4. 1993,
when public respondent rendered judgment over the dispute.

The applicable laws are Articles 253 and 253- A of the Labor Code, thus:

Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement.
— When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the
agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both
parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.

and;

Art. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. — Any Collective Bargaining


Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is
concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside the sixty-day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such
other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6)
months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such
Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such
date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on
the duration of collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights
under this Code.

In Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC, 192 SCRA 414 (1990), this court
interpreted the above law as follows:

In light of the foregoing, this Court upholds the pronouncement of the NLRC holding the
CBA to be signed by the parties effective upon the promulgation of the assailed
resolution. It is clear and explicit from Article 253-A that any agreement on such other
provisions of the CBA shall be given retroactive effect only when it is entered into within
six (6) months from its expiry date. If the agreement was entered into outside the six (6)
month period, then the parties shall agree on the duration of the retroactivity thereof.

The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the parties was
promulgated June 5, 1989, the expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the provision of
Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon. by the parties. But since no
agreement to that effect was made, public respondent did not abuse its discretion in
giving the said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public respondent is within the
ambit of its authority vested by existing law.

In the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, 189


SCRA 179 (1991), this Court reiterated the rule that although a CBA has expired, it
continues to have legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA has been entered
into. It is the duty of both parties to the to keep the status quo, and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.   Applied to the
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case at bench, the legal effects of the immediate past CBA between petitioner and
private respondent terminated, and the effectivity of the new CBA began, only on March
4, 1993 when public respondent resolved their dispute.

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