JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.

OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

FACTS:
On 8 March 1996, burnt dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao were
discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela. Two informations for murder were filed.
The RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused therein and sentenced them to two
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that
time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where
we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Later on, SPO2 Maderal was arrested and he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners herein as the persons responsible.
Respondent filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25
June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to
complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order
denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the
meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the
case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in
an Order dated 21 September 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order,
seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to
nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
 On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the
prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad
issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for
murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s
cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the
temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in
view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of
Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

ISSUES:
Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit
his person to the jurisdiction of the court;

RULING:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the
accused.
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the forecited case of Santiago,
seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of
one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose
prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to
a special appearance. These pleadings are:
(1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for
dismissal are included; 18

(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack

of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and

(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of
the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person.

The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest. We hold that the circumstances forcing us to
require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash
the warrant of arrest.

------------------------------------------------------EXTRA----------------------------------------------------
Other Issues:
1. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when warrants of arrest
were quashed on the ground of prematurity constituted by the subsequent filing of
petition for review with the secretary of justice;
2. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when the case was
dismissed based on the decision of the same case but with different accused;
 3. Whether or not the orders set aside by a nullified proceeding is deemed
reinstated;
4. Whether or not the reinstatement of the case constituted double jeopardy;

Ruling
1. Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they
still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of
Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should
not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.

2. Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another

case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion. A decision, even of
this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal
of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. We never ruled in Leaño
that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused therein.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in
Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and
perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground
of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the
facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.

3. Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the

orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals
likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order
quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore, those warrants of arrest
are henceforth deemed unquashed.

4. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed

before arraignment. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the
case was dismissed