PSEUDO OPERATIONS

00

by

IPAUL MELSHEN
Major.L U.S. Marine Corps Reserves

DTIC
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE ELECTE
MAY 19
Newport, Rhode Island h

February 19,86

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11. TITLE (include Security Classiticationj

Pseudo Operations

12 PERSONAL AUTHOR S)
Me lshen, Paul MAJI USMCR
13.
O RPOT13b.
YP TIME COVERED 114. DATE OF REPORT (Yvar, Month, Day) I S..PAGE COUNT
V TNAL FRMTO 1986, March 86
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17 COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and Identify by block nutmbr)
FIELD CR~OUP SUB-GROUP Pouedo operations; psuedo force', background
information; tactical operational information',
leader/monitor,' frozen/unfrozen zones -

19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary ard identify by block number)

Pseudo operations are a form of tactics which should be used along with
conventional tactics as part of a total counterti~nsurgency strategy.
Conceptually, psuedo operations are operations which deploy a
counter-insurgent force which completely mirrors insurgent forces. Its
purpose is to infiltrate the civilian communities or operational areas
Udisguised as insurgents in order to develop background information on
* insurgents and to obtain tactical. operational information upon which to
* act and bring force to bear on the insurgents. The missions of psuedo
operations are to: (1)' gain information-, (2)' penetrate, isolate and
eliminate insurgent forces; (3) disperSe tactical operational information
to friendly tactical units; and (4)' destroy insurgent political
infra/structures.

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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PSEUDO OPERATIONS

The most likely type of warfare that U.S. military forces

will be involved in during the latter part of the 20th century

will be counterinsurgency warfare. The U.S. military has neither

had great success in this type of warfare nor has it developed

any new tactics for countering insurgency. Pseudo operations are

a counterinsurgency tactic which has been used successfully by

several ccuntries in counterinsurgency efforts. Pseudo opera-

tions establish pseudo units which completely mirror the enemy's

insurgent units.

Throughout the 20th century the British have used pseudo

operations on nurnerous occasions. Frank Kitson's efforts in the

Mau Mau Emergency are a classic example of the successful decen-

tralized use of pseudo operations. The Rhodesean Selous Scouts

are an example of a more centralized use of pseudo operations.

Other examples of successful pseudo operations can be seen in the

Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and in the insurgency in Mozam-

biquc. Although the United States military established several

types of programs in Vietnam which had pseudo type aspects in

them, they never fully established a concept for pseudo opera-

tions. The Phoenix program should not be viewed as pseudo opera-

tions.

Pseudo operations are a form of tactics which should be used

along with conventional tactics as part of a total count-rinsur-

gency strategy. Conceptually, pseudo operations are operations

ii

I.i
which deploy a counterinsurgent force which completely mirrors

insurgent forces. Its purpose is to infiltrate the civilian

communities or operational areas disguised as insurgents in order

to develop background information on insurgents and to obtain

tactical operational information upon which to act and bring

force to bear on the insurgents. The missions of pseudo opera-

tions are to: (1) gain information; (2) penetrate, isolate and

eliminate insurgent forces; (3) disperse tactical operational

information to friendly tactical units; and (4) destroy insurgent

political infrastructures.

Given the proven success of pseudo operations and the fact

that U.S. military forces are very likely to be involved in

counterinsurgency efforts, the Marine Corps should establish a

small cadre unit within its own force structure which would con-

centrate on pseudo operations. The unit could easily expand

within the force structure once the Marine Corps is committed to

an insurgency'.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

EXECUJTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . .. . ..

I INTRODUCTION . . . .. .. .... .. ....... . . 1

II THE BRITISH MODEL.....................................5

Early Use . . .. .. .. .. .... .. ....... 5
The Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960): Pseudo-Gangs
and the Mau Mau...................................8
Malaya and Northern Ireland.......................21

III THE RHODESIAN MODEL. ................. ......... 23

IV LACK OF AN AMERICAN MODEL............................41

Haiti-1919..........................................42
The Philippines--Pseudo Operations in the
Huk Insurgency....................................44
Vietnam--No Conceptual Model......................48
No American Model for Pseudo Operations . . . 55

V PSEUDO OPERATIONS: A CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . 56

Pseudo Operations...................................56
A Definition.......................... .. . . 56
Missions of Pseudo Operations...................56
Mission 1: Gain Information on Insurgent
Units...................................57
Pseudo Forces (Units, Gangs, Cell or
Individuals.....................................57
Sources for Pseudo Forces ...................... 58
Mission 2: Penetration, Isolation and
Elimination............................58
Penetration.......................................58
Isolation..........................................58
El.imination.......................................58
Mission 3: Disperse Tactical Operational
Information to Friendly
Tactical Units. ................. 59
Mission 4: Destroy Insurgent Political
Infrastructure........................59
Tactics, Techniques and Control Measures . . . 60
Frozen and Unfrozen Zones of Action . . . . 60
Continually Changing the Frozen Zone of
Action...........................................600
Det-..rmination of Boundarias of F-ozer ?ý,nýs 1-
bazsc Camp within the F'rozen Zone ............... 61
Use of U.S. Personnel/Leader and the Base
Camp............................................61 -

Using "Turned" Insurgents for Pseudo

Operations......................................62 !es

iv Dist Spca
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

The Continual Need for Turned Insurgents . . 63

What Kind of Insurgent Makes a Good Pseudo
Operator ................ ................. 64
Effectiveness of Pseudo Operations ..... .. 64
Laws and Pseudo Operations ... ......... ... 65
Command and Control of Pseudo Operations . 6
65

VI A MARINE CORPS CADRE UNIT ..................... 66

A Pseudo Operations Cadre Unit .......... .. 66
Organization of Pseudo Operations for an
Insurgency.......................................67
VII CONCLUSION ............ ................... 71 K

NOTES ..................... .......................... 74

p.'

I.

This Document Contains

Missing Page/s That Are
Unavailable In The
Original Document

-.. ..-....... ......... ...

S.......
.. ,. ....... ,.. ,. . . • .••- ., .,....-,.-.• . [-' €--• • .
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE PAGE

1. U.S. Ability to Wage Warfare ............. ............ 1

2. Likelihood of Warefare ........... ................ I

3. Pseudo Operations Cadre Unit ......... ............. 68

4. Organization of Pseudo Operations for an Insurgency 70

I.,

p'
L

vii
C
 PSEUDO OPERATIONS
N
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II the United States has demon-

strated little ability to successfully engage itself in low

intensity conflicts, while at the same time has established its

abilities to wage possible higher intensity conflicts with some

degree of success. Yet warfare in the last part of the 20th cen-

tury and probably beyond will, more than likely, be limited to

those conflicts at the lower end of the intensity level. This

dichotomy can be demonstrated in the following diagrams.

Figure 1 U.S. ABILITY TO WAGE WARFARE

ABILITY

INTENSITY OF WAR

LIKELIHOOD OF WARFARE
Figure 2
LIKELIHOOD

INTENSITY OF WAR

1i
 V

One of the key factors in the United States' inability to

successfully wage low intensity warfare has been its inability to

come to terms with insurgency in general and then its inability

to develop and pursue tactics that effectively counter and defeat

insurgency.
i

General Sir Frank Kitson, a veteran of numerous insurgency

wars, has stated that if there are eighty insurgencies there are
2
eighty different solutions to those insurgencies. No two

insurgencies are exactly the same. The key to defeating an

insurgency is understanding the insurgency itself.

One form of tactics which has successfully been used in

insurgency warfare to counter an insurgency is the use of pseudo

forces in pseudo operations. Pseudo forces are units which dis-

guise themselves as the insurgents. Pseudo operations are

operations which use this pseudo force to infiltrate the civilian

population or the insurgent infrastructure in order to bring

force to bear on insurgents.

.* Throughout the history of warfare pseudo operations have

been used in one form or another. The United States has used

pseudo type operations on several occasions, but have never had a

formalized concept for their use, nor has it ever deployed pseudo

=" operations as a tactic in a total counterinsurgency strategy.

Pseudo operations have never been used as the sole form of

tactics making up a total strategy in any insurcency. On the

contrary, they have been used primarily as a secondary tactic

along with o5 her conventional tactics and social, civic and eco-

nomic programs designed to counterinsurgency.

................................ .**y*. I.
 Since all insurgencies are unique to themselves and since

pseudo operations make up only one form of tactics used by the

counterinsurgents, the preferred method in examining pseudo oper-

ations is a case study method. Two case studies will be examined

I
in the research study. First, the decentralized British model

will be examined, concentrating on Frank Kitson's decentralized

pseudo operations againsts the Mau Mau. Second, the more cen-

tralized Rhodesian model of the Selous Scouts will be examined.

Both case studies will be described within the context of their

own particular insurgency.

Several examples of pseudo operations associated with the

U.S. military will then be examined. Following the discussion of

a lack of an American model, a cincept for future pseudo

operations to be used by the U.S. military, in general, and the

Marine Corps, in specific, will be proposed.

Finally, there will be a proposal for a expandable Marine

Corps cadre unit whose principal mission would be pseudo opera-

tions in an insurgency environment.

Four fundamental issues must be kept in mind while reading

this research: (1) the U.S. military has not been an effective
counterinsurgency force; (2) the United States will more than

likely be involved in insurgency warfare than in any other type

of warfare in the years to come; (3) all insurgencies are dif-

ferent and must be treated as such; and (4) pseudo operations are

a tactic and not a strategy.

.' . . o . . . .L _ . . - ... , . . ° . . .. . . . . . . ,. . .
 This research is an attempt to reduce the dichotomy of the

United States' inability to wage low intensity warfare and the

probable likelihood that this is in fact the type of warfare in

which it is most likely to be involved. It is an attempt to

develop a tactic for insurgency warfare.

4
 CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH MODEL

Early Use. The British have had the most experience in

pseudo operations. Although pseudo operations were essentially

established and utilized after World War II in the insurgency

wars of the period, the British did, in fact use the concept at

a much earlier date. The British developed counterinsurgency

tactics during the Boer War (1899-1902) which very closely resem-

bled those which they would use in the post-World War II insur-

gencies. The first stage of the Boer War followed a pattern of

set-piece type battles such as those at Elanaslaagte (21 October

1899) , Ladysmith (30 October 1899) , Modder River (28 November

1
i899) and Magersfontein (11 December 1899). Following the
surrender of the main Boer Army at Paardeberg (27 February 1900)

the remaining Boer commandos used guerrilla tactics to continue

the war. The war took this guerrilla form for the following two

years. The British devised several methods to defeat the remain-

ing Boer commandos. First, the British set up concentration

camps in which to place the Boer women and children, while at the

same time destroyed their crops and farms. This isolated the

commandos from their families. Second, the British constructed a

series of blockhouses connected with barbed wire and ran them

across the velt of South Africa. This restricted the maneuver of

the highly mobile Boer commandos. 2 Despite the concentration

camps, the destruction of crops and farms, and the network of

blockhousesz, the British Army still had to come to terms with

5
 k
defeating militarily the Boer commandos. The sluggish conventional

European British Army found it difficult to isolate and engage the

lightly equipped, horse mounted and highly mobile South African

farmers. The British realized that if they were going to defeat

the Boers militarily they would have to do it using Boer commando

tactics. They did this in a twofold manner. First, they modeled

the British Army in South Africa into a much more mobiie force.

While maintaining a set number of men to man the towns and gar-

risons, Major General John French's eight mobile columns were

allowed to perform the task of "'sieving' and 'scouring' in the

Eastern Transvaal." 3 Second, the British used captured Boers and

formed them into regular units in order to engage the guerrilla

Boer commandos. The British had always used captured Boers to

assist them from the very start of the war. These so-called

"joiners" individually joined the British units and acted as

guides and scouts.4 In October 1901 the British initiated a

large scale recruitment campaign to organize former commando

members into formal units. In this recruitment the British used

a "carrot and stick" approach. On the one hand they offered the

volunteers British Army wages and on the other they offered the

captured Boers the return to the concentration camps. The larg-

est units formed were the National Scouts and the Orange River
5
Colony Volunteers. These units were the closest thing that

could mirror the guerrilla Boer commandos. Their utility to the

British Army during the latter state of the Boer War was unques-

tioned. The Times of 21 May 1902 reported:

Of the usefulness of these National Scouts there can

be no doubt. In operations in their own districts

• _ . . •
 their local knowledge renders them invaluable. It was
a knowledge such as can never be acquired by agyone
who has not lived all his life on the veld.

The National Scouts were used in two ways. First, various

units of the National Scouts were used as scout and guide

sections for the British columns. Second, they were used as a

large unit which became a maneuver element for a British column.

Because the National Scouts were Boers themselves and because

their units were so similar to the guerrilla comma.ndos they

proved to be a highly effective force.

Although units like the National Scouts were an attempt to

get the Boers to fight in "their" war and an attempt to get units

that were similar to the guerrilla commandos, they were not pseudo

operations in the truest sense. They were not specifically

clothed to model the Boer commandos. However, they were designed

to get operational information and were equipped similar to the

commandos. Being Boers themselves and former members of the

commandos, they understood the guerrilla commando better than the

British Army commanders.

Following the war the Boer society was in a state of turmoil.

There was great hatred between the "bitterenders" and the

"joiners". The British government did little to alleviate this

situation by compensating the "joiners" with much less than what

they had offered the "joiners" in order to induce them into

service.

The two world wars did not produce many experiments into

pseudo operations. An exception to this was Otto Skorzeny's use

of German soldiers disguised as Americans during the German

_WA*FP--.b ±Ptr RP.. * .. p

counteroffensive of 1944 in the Ardennes. Obviously not an exam-

ple of British pseudo-gang warfare; the Skorzeny "commandos" use

in the Ardennes was Hitler's response to British commando attacks

on Germany and is an interesting footnote in pseudo wrfare.

Skorzeny's "commandos" wore American military police uniforms for

the primary purpose of misdirecting traffic, despite the more

popularized purpose of assassinating General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Despite the operation being hastily planned and poorly executed,

it did have limited success, primarily psychological. Skorzeny

himself had reservations about putting his commandos in American

7
uniforms. Skorzeny's Ardennes operation, known as "Operation

Grief" was really not pseudo operations as it was not in an insur-

gency war nor did it follow any of the tenets of pseudo opera-

tions. In fact, Skorzeny's commandos were breaking the rules of

the Geneva Convention. Although Otto Skorzeny's numerous exploits

have offered insights into raids and other special operations,

they have not been very relevant to the aspects of pseudo warfare

in an insurgency environment.

The Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960): Pseudo-Gangs and the Mau

Mau. The Kenyan Emergency saw some of the most innovative and

effective use of pseudo operations. In many ways Kenya saw the

initiation of this type of operations in the post-World War I1

period, although the British were beginning to deploy similar

type operations in Malaya. Much of the formulation of concepts

and the actual deployment of pseudo-gangs was done by Captain

Frank Kitson (now General Sir Frank Kitson, retired).

8
 The insurgency in Kenya was in many ways unique. First, Kenya

was one of the only British African territories (the other being

Rhodesia) that won its independence following a major insurgency.

The other British territories in Africa were able to make a rela-

tively peaceful transition to independence. Second, the actual

British troop commitment to the Mau Mau uprising was relatively

small. When compared to the other major British commitments to

operations in Korea and Malaya in 1952, the British military

commitment to Kenya was quite secondary. From the British point

of view "the Mau Mau uprising was looked on as a sideshow amongst

8 During the entire emergency the British Army never
sideshows."

had more than six King's African Rifles battalions and five
9
British battalions serving in Kenya at any time. Third, the Mau

Mau revolt was not a total national insurgency. In fact, the

insurgency was almost solely the effort of only one of the African

tribes living in Kenya. The Corfield Report which in 1960 sur-

veyed the causes and origins of the Mau Mau revolt stated:

Mau Mau in its shortest terms was the violent manifes-

tation of a limited nationalistic revolutionary m e-
ment confined almost entirely to the Kikuyu tribe.

The rebellion itself centered around Nairobi and in the

Central and Rift Valley Provinces. The State of Emergency was

proclaimed in October 1952 and lasted officially until January

1960, although in reality the rebellion actually ceased around

October 1956. Since the rebellion was primarily a Kikuyu tribal

rebellion, it found its roots in the many Kikuyu political orga-

nizations. It is believed that the Mau Mau was essentially the

11
banned Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) . This group differed

9
somewhat from the Kenya African Union (KAU) which remained a

legal party for some time during the Emergency. Although the KAU

was a mass party unlike the KCA it was still controlled and dom-

inated by the Kikuyu tribe. Finally, the insurgency was neither

Communist inspired or backed. Julian Paget, a British authority
on insurgency warfare and a soldier in the British Army who

served in Kenya during the insurrection noted this lack of

Communist backing.

There is no evidence that it was Communist inspired or

even received material Communist support. It was a
deliberate programme of insurgency, designed to enable
its supporters to dominate, first the whole Kikuyu
tribe and then the other tribes in Kenya. The ulti-
mate aim was to eliminate the whites in the colonylind
establish an independent, Kikuyu controlled Kenya.

A unique feature of the insurgency was the "oathing" rituals

adhered to by the Mau Mau. "Oathing" had not only historically

been practiced Kikuyu, but it

by the also held a significant
13
function within the KCA. Paget placed tactical significance to
the "oathing" rituals:

From the start, Mau Mau used "oathing" as one of their

main weapons, firstly, to control their own members,
and secondly, to intiidate those who were reluctant
to join the movement.
The Mau Mau had an organization which was known as the Kenya
Parliament. The organization itself was divided into an "active"
wing and a "passive" wing. The "passive" wing was supposed to

supply the "active" wing which was operating in the field, but as
H.P. Willmott has noted:

In reality Mau Mau scarcely had any organization

except in Nairobi, where the central committee and its
subordinate bodies functioned quite effectively until
mid-1954. The Mau Mafý lacked the sophistication to
organize itself .
10

* .P .-. Vm 6_ý 'A .'L 'I

 The "active" wing of the Mau Mau consisted of loosely formed

units which in most instances were held together by a forceful

leader and the superstitions behind "oathing". Although techni-

cally formed into platoons, companies and battalions by the Kenya

Parliament, in reality the "active" forces operated as isolated

gangs in the Aberdare and Mount Kenya forests. It has generally

been estimated that there were about 15,000 Mau Mau operating in

the "active" wing during the height of the emergency.

Actual hostilities started in 1952 with the killing of

African officials and the destruction of their property. On 20

October 1952 a State of Emergency was declared, with the subse-

quent commitment of British troops and expansion of local armed

forces. The insurgency consisted of a series of Mau Mau raids

and killings, primarily directed at the African population. Sur-

prisingly few Europeans were killed by the Mau Mau during the
16
entire insurgency. Clearly the oath taken by the Mau Mau to

kill at least one European was never fulfilled by each of its

members. In March 1953 a group of 1000 Mau Mau massacred 84

inhabitants of the village of Lari, while another group of Mau

Mau raided the Naivasha Police Station, releasing the prisoners

17
and stealing the food stores. This was the high point of the

Mau Mau campaign. The following year the British forces launched

a series of successful operations throughout the Kikuyu home-

lands. "Food denial" and

"resettlement" programs were also
18
incorporated into the British strategy. With the success of

these actions the Mau Mau ceased to become an effective insurgent

force and according to Kenneth W. Grundy:

ii
 from about mid-1954, the primary concern of the
forest fighters was simply survival. Virtually all of
their raids Wnceforth concentrated on securing food
and supplies.
Full control of anti-Mau Mau operations was taken away from the

Army and returned to the police in May 1956.

It was into this ongoing insurgency in Kenya that Frank

1
Kitson was assigned as a District Military Intelligence Officer
(DMIO) for the Kiambu district (one of the districts located near
Nairobi in the Central Province).20 Kitson arrived in Kenya nine
months after the declaration of the Emergency, at the height of
the insurgency. Kitson realized the need to get operational

information to soldiers in order to provide:

pinpoint information regarding the whereabouts
and future intentions of enemy groupliso that soldiers
could be put into contact with them.

Despite this need, Kitson noted:

The intelligence organizations were seldom capable of
doing this regularly, so the army did two things.
Firstly it complained about the inefficiency of the
intelligence organization and secondly it set about
looking for the enemy by conducting large-scaJ2 opera-
tions in likely areas on a hit-or-miss basis.
As a result, the British Army spent a great deal of time

and effort in large-scale patrolling with only minimal results.

Kitson z assessment highlighted two essential points in a coun-

terinsurgency operations. First, there is a fundamental need for

current operational information in order to conduct successful

tactical operations. Second, without good operational informa-

tion, standard counterinsurgency tactics become highly ineffec-

tual.

12

bNI.'.64.q-- L' ' -r

 In April 1954 a former captured insurgent named "James" who

had been interrogated by Kitson led a group of security forces to

several successful contacts. Upon return to Kitson's compound

James's actions gave Kitson an idea.

Gradually, as a joke, he taught our men all about the

Mau Mau ways. They started using Mau Mau slang, hand-
shakes and signs. They started wearing their buckles
upside down, so the boy scout badge on the buckle was
invert•q. They suddenly became Mau Mau--what a
laughl-

This joke soon gave Kitson and his Field Intelligence Assistant

(FIA), Eric Holyoak an idea:

Eric and I decided that we might cash in on the situa-

tion. Hitherto Mau Mau had fallen into the trap by
accident in one or two cases. We thought that we
might get Africans to impersonate gangsters as a regu-
lar means of information. Not only had we got James
who knew exactly how to behave as a terrorist, but he
had obliginyiy taught our team of seven men how to do
it as well.

Kitson saw some immediate problems with the concept. First,

captured terrorists were supposed to be handed over to the legal

authorities for prosecution. If convicted they would be hung.

The second problem was what would happen if they were disguised

as insurgents and they ran into an army or police patrol. Third,

there was the bureaucratic problem:

More import still was the question of what the Dis-

trict Commissioners and District officers would say.
We were also afraid that some people would con-
sider the whole project too dangerous and not worth
risking lives on. Finally, we were nervous of the
"experts on Africans" wh 9 were sure to say that the
idea just could not work.

Kitson developed a Special Methods Training Center where he

could train security force members along with captured Mau Mau

for pseudo-gang operations.

13
 In order to get Mau Mau personnel for his pseudo-gangs.

Kitson needed captured insurgents not dead ones:

Although most people felt that Mau Mau were better

dead, we preferred them al e. You can't get much
information out of a corpse.

Kitson modeled his pseudo-gangs by completely mirroring the

Mau Mau gangs. The members of the pseudo-gangs had to be Kikuyu.

They were clothed in the ragged wear typical of the forest gangs.

Their weapons were the home-made bolt-guns and out-dated rifles

similar to those which the Mau Mau used. Pseudo-gang members had

to allow their hair to become matted and braided and, in addi-

tion, they were not allowed to bathe often. Simple signs like

cleanliness or kept hair could compromise a pseudo-gang. If a

European was assigned to a pseudo-gang, he would have to put dye

on his face and wear a wig. Plus the European, although he was

usually the leader of the pseudo-gang, would have to stay in the

background and be as indistinguishable as possible. The pseudo-

gangs had to know the technical aspects of Mau Mau recognition,

i.e., handshakes, slang, signs, identification in apparel, etc.

Pseudo-gang members were allowed to take their wives or female W

friends with them on operations, since the majority of forest

gangs had females with them. Thus, a pseudo-gang had to become

identical to a Mau Mau unit. Their success rested on this essen-

tial factor.

Selection for pseudo-gang members was a specific problem, as

Kitson noted:

S. . the main job was to keep up-to-date with the way

of
each of gangsters,
the which and
the major gangs meant having them
replacing somebody from
from time
to time. Thus if we had just recruited somebody from

14
 one gang we would prefer the next man to come from a
different enemy group. In this way the field of
t.!:rcrists 2fom whom we could select was narrowed a
great deal.

Kitson then had to determine what sort of insurgent was best

suited and justified for recruitment for pseudo-gang operations:

On the whole it was best to rule out people who had

joined the Mau Mau because they were fanatically keen
on the movement politically . . .

There was a far bigger group who . . . merely joined

because all their friends had done so and because life
was getting rough in the Reserve. Many of these sur-
rendered when things got difficult in the forest and
such people could often be used. On the whole, how-
ever, they were rather feeble . -7with certain excep-
tions were not good people fo- I.,e job. By far the
best were the Africans who jo -d the gangs from a
spirit of adventure .... Their outlook was not far
from that of many young men of spirit anywhere else in
the world and they were the easier to handle because
they were the easiest to satisfy.
Thus, basically, there were three categories of captured Mau

Mau: (1) the small group who were political, hard-core doctri-
naires; (2) the largest group who joined merely because it was
the easiest thing to do at the time; and (3) the small group who
joined for the sake of adventure; they were neither doctrinaires
nor were they men who would succumb to minimal hardship. It was
.rom this last group that provided the best possible members for

pseudo-gang operations.
The "carrot and stick" approach to captured--Mau Mau insur-

gents and would-be pseudo-gang operatives was essentially basic.

Either they could accept the relatively comfortable existence at
the training camp or be hauled off to Nairobi to be hung. On
this matter Kitson specifically stated that:
• . the system only works when a suitable incentive
can be offered, when it can be balanced against a
15
 sufficiently horrific alternative and when an hgour-
able reason for changing sides can be displayed.

The training or "taming" of possible pseudo-gang operatives

was carried out in three phases. During the first phase the

prisoner was treated in a hard manner basically to get as much

information out of him and to see whether he would make a good

pseudo-gang operative. In the second stage the pseudo-gang

operative was "grddually incorporated into the community as a

friend,"' 3 0 but would not be told anything about pseudo-gang oper-

ations nor would he be left alone. When they were sure that the

"captured insurgent was completely trustworthy he was then allowed

to enter phase three and allowed to carry arms, go on patrols and

basically enter pseudo-gang operations. Entering this phase

three was very critical, but as Kitson noted:

Any African could fool me no doubt: one or two could

probably have got around Eric, but he would have to be
"I pvery clever to pass the scrutiny of the other Africans
in our teams, some of whom were loyalists, some of
whom were ex-terrorists, and all of whom had a výal
interest in making sure that there was no mistake.

This philosophy clearly indicated the need to have friendly host-

country operatives interspersed into a pseudo-gang. A "turned"

insurgent had to be continually watched until his loyalty was

proven. The best method for doing this was by having a "turned"

insurgent be a member of a pseudo-gang which consisted primarily

of host-country operatives. In addition, a pseudo-gang was

normally led by a European, either a local Kenyan or a British

security force member.

16

""I,
 Kitson's pseudo-gangs were able to bring force to bear on

the insurgents by coming into contact themselves with the insur-

gents or by gathering tactical operational information on the

insurgents from the local populace and then transmitting that

information to regular forces. In addition, the pseudo-gangs

were able to establish a wealth of background information on the

insurgents through their interface with the populace and the

insurgents.

Kitson felt that the pseudo-gangs were most effective in

working in areas which were inhabited--the tribal Reserves, the

Settled Areas and the cities. Here the pseudo-gangs could oper-

ate and gain information from the populace; the same information

as if it were given to the actual insurgents. From this source

the pseudo-gangs obtained tactical operational information and

background information which would allow them or friendly tac-

tical units to close with the insurgents.

If a pseudo-gang was able to penetrate an insurgent force

before being detected there was always the great chance that the

pseudo-gang would be able to capture insurgents and thus build-up

the supply of information after appropriate interrogation.

It was in the forests that the pseudo-gangs met their great-

est challenge. In the forest there was no civilian populace.

The Mau Mau alone existed in this refuge. A contact by security

forces could only be with the insurgents. The difficulty of

effective pseudo operations in the isolation of the forests was

specifically noted by Kitson:

17
 • . . it was easier to get some sort of results inside
[the forests), but to do a really good job inside took
more training and experience than outside. In addi-
tion the strain and discomfort of living as a Mau M
inside the forest was greater than doing so outside.

As for the matter of tracking down the insurgents living

within the forest, the situation necessitated the need for normal

conventional tactics. In essence it was "a matter for straight

33
forward patrolling and nothing to do with pseudo work. ,

Kitson was not the only member of the security forces in

Kenya to adopt pseudo operations. Francis Erskine a platoon

commander in the Kenya Regiment was using pseudo operations in

the souther part of Kitson's district. Erskine, however, was

using pseudo-gang primarily for immediate tactical kills. Kitson

disagreed with the use of pseudo operations purely for offensive

purposes.

It would have ruined the system. If everyone 3 ad done

it. It would have compromised the situation. 3

Kitson believed that the long-term intelligence gathering should

not be seconded to quick short-term tactical results.

The large scale battalion size operations proved ineffective

in the Mau Mau insurgency. Large cordcn and search operations

never were able to achieve results because they seldom acted on

current pinpoint tactical operational information. The most

effective means for counterinsurgency operations was the combina-

tion of small unit tactics and pseudo-gang operations. Thus:

By July 1955 nearly everyone had realized that small

patrols, pseudo-gan• or tracker combat teams were the
right answer.

It was through the close coordination among these small units

that the Mau Mau campaign was able to be waged effectively and

18

.................-.............. •.u• .•.•-.........o.•'•.,_•...J•.., .....

successfully. The most important concept which was accrued in

the counterinsurgency campaign was that "the key to fighting

terrorism lay in getting enough operational information

quickly."36

Pseudo-gang operations were effective during the Mau Mau

Emergency for a multiplicity of reasons. First, because the

insurgency was not a complete national uprising, the insurgents S

were able to be isolated. The British security forces were able

to concentrate pseudo-gang operations within the Kikuyu tribe and

within their tribal areas. Second, their was a wealth of knowl-

edge and experience brought to pseudo-operations through the local

European Kenyans and through Kikuyu security force members which

facilitated their use as pseudo-gang operatives. These men not

only knew the region in which they were operating but they also

knew the habits and customs of the Kikuyu in the Mau Mau. Third,

the chain of command and operating procedures remained relatively

unencumbered by large bureaucratic entanglements. In fact, some

of the pseudo-gang operations were run as low as at the company

level. Fourth, tactical operational information because of t- s

simple chain of command was able to be transmitted to local

friendly tactical units which could then in turn bring force to

bear on the insurgents. Fifth, "turned" insurgents had a real

motivation factor to turn and then work for the security forces

as pseudo-operatives. They could either work as pseudo-gang

members or be hung. And finally, the Mau Mau never established a

deep rooted infrastructure which was impenetrable by pseudo-gangs.

The farther away from the cities the less effective was the Mau

19
Mau political infrastructure. Thus the insurgents that operated
in the cities and Reserves had some form of political and support
infrastructure but those Mau Mau operating in the forests were

left to maintain themselves by their own individual resources,

37
especially during the latter days of the insurgency.
Although the pseudo-gang operations were highly effective in
combatting the Mau Mau insurgency its operational implementation

suffered from several shortcomings. The Mau Mau insurgency had

gone on for almost two years before serious attempts to perform

pseudo-gang operations were initiated. Earlier implementation

could have greatly inhibited the organizational build-up of the
Mau Mau infrastructure within the cities.
It was not until the end of the Mau Mau insurgency that

pseudo-gang operations and training were placed under centralized

control. Some of the founders of pseudo-gang operations in Kenya,

like Kitson, felt that pseudo-gangs should be recruited, trained

and deployed locally. Others, like General Lathbury, felt that
the formation and training of pseudo-gangs should be centralized.
By the end of the war this latter view was incorporated by the

security forces. Although centralization was inevitable as a

legitimate goal for the high command, much of the effectiveness
of pseudo-gang operations in Kenya came as a result of its local
organization and t!,ining. Kitson has later stated that the

operational situation had changed greatly by the time General

Lathbury took over. Because the insurgency threat had greatly
diminished, centralization may have been necessitated. The
"target" [isolated insurgent gangs surviving in the forest] as

20
Kitson called it was different.38 Kitson advised against over
centralization. He felt that pseudo operations must always be

properly integrated with the security forces, and the security

forces must be held accountable for them. As Kitson has noted:
If it (pseudo operations] is just controlled at the
top it will not be contlled at all. It must be
integrated at all levels.
In general, the organizational questions were not enough to
hinder the operational effectiveness of the pseudo-gangs. Pseudo-
gang operations proved to be effective when used as a method for
obtaining tactical operational information for tactical units and
when used in congruence with standard operational counterinsur-
gency tactics. The Kitson model demonstrated one of the finest
examples on the use of pseudo operations in a counterinsurgency

campaign.

Malaya and Northern Ireland. The Communist insurgency in

Malaya lasted from 1948 to 1960. British security forces used a

variety of tactics to counter this insurgency. Although used,

pseudo-gang operations were not deployed to the extent that they
were in Kenya. The Special Operations Volunteer Force was a unit
which consisted of some 200 men that was composed of surrendered

insurgents and led by police officers. 4 0 This unit performed

pseudo-type operations along with normal tracking and patrolling
tactics. Because the insurgents were Chinese it was easier to
racially separate them from the Malayan citizenry. Because of
this fact a wide use of pseudo-operations was not necessary.
Many of the captured Chinese insurgents were "turned" and then

used as guides for the security forces who were then directed to

21
insurgent strongholds. This, again, was not a true model of
pseudo-gang operations.
Because the situation in Northern Ireland is ongoing little

is actually known about British pseudo operations there. General

Sir Frank Kitson having commanded 39 Brigade in Belfast refused
to comment on pseudo operations there for specifically the rea-

son that the situation is ongoing. But as Kitson has said:

People will always say you cannot do it (pseudo oper-
ations]--but it might work. It might w~jk in one
little area. It is up to you to define it.

22

A--p
 CHAPTER III

THE RHODESIAN MODEL

The war in Rhodesia (1965-19S0) witnessed some of the

most effective and organized pseudo operations that have ever

taken place during insurgency warfare. The pseudo operations

evolved through gradual requirements necessitated by the increas-

ing intensity of the insurgency war. The insurgency war itself

was actually a war within a rebellion.

Like in most insurgencies (the Cuban Revolution being a

noteworthy exception) the Rhodesian insurgency first had its

roots in political parties and political opposition to the exist-

ing government. In 1961 Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party

took exception to the new Southern Rhodesian constitution. South-

ern Rhodesia at that time was still a self-governing British

colony. Violence soon erupted in the African townships and the

National Democratic Party was banned. Nkomo re-established the

party under a new name, the Zimbabwe African People's Union

(ZAPU). In 1963 Ndabaningi Sithole and the more radical elements

of ZAPU broke away and founded the Zimbabwe African National

Union (ZANU). For the next several years the fighting which took

place in Rhodesia was not against the Rhodesian Government or

their Security Forces, but rather between the two African politi-

cal movements. On numerous occasions the African townships out-

lying Salisbury and Bulawayo werv the scenes of violent mob riots

between the supporters of ZAPU and ZANU. It was also during the

early 1960s that a few nationalists were being sent to Ghana,

Tanzania and Communist Bloc countries for training..

23
 Meanwhile the Rhodesian Government was primarily concerned

with maintaining the privileged status of the minority white pop-

ulation. The foe of the Rhodesians during the early 1960s was
I. -t
the British Government and not the African nationalists. The

Rhodesian krmy up to that time had been trained to fight a con-

ventional war in service with the British Army. In fact, the

Rhodesians had seen service in both World Wars ard in Malaya.

In the First World War, Africans were recruited for the all-
volunteer force, the Rhodesian Native Regiment (led by white
officers and NCOs), and saw service in German East Africa.

Rhodesian whites saw action in the German East African campaign

and in France.
In the Second World War the Rhodesians fielded three squad-
rons for the Royal Air Force and saw service in Europe, North
I 2
Africa and the Middle East.
The Rhodesians' first experience with counterinsurgency war-
fare occurred in Malaya in the early 1950s. The Rhodesians
provided one squadron of men, "C" Squadron, to serve with the
3
British Special Air Service Regiment (SAS).
During the mid-1950s some thought was given to counterinsur-
gency by the military but this area of conflict was still consid-
ered to be within the realm of the Rhodesian police, the British

South African Police (BSAP). By the time the counterinsurgency

operations fell into the lap of the Army, the BSAP had been
overworked and the insurgents had been able to gain certain

advantages in the war.

24
 However, by the late 1950s, there was a gradual shift in
emphasis in military training within the Rhodesian forces; plus
the Rhodesians were becoming increasingly aware of their need for
"self-reliance". By the early 1960s counterinsurgency training
was beginning to be incorporated into the Army's training. But
because the Rhodesian Government was pre-occupied with their
relations with Britain they were unable to formulate any counter-
insurgency strategy. Pseudo operations were not even considered
or thought about at this time. Underestimating the growth of the
insurgency and with their brief successful Malayan experience
still in mind, the Rhodesians felt confident in their counter-
insurgency capabilities.
In 1965 Rhodesia declared its Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) which thus started a fifteen year rebellion
from its mother country, Great Britain. Up until mid 1966 the
armed struggle hal been relatively non-existent. In July 1964 a
small group of insurgents known as the "Crocodile Gang" killed a
white Melsetter factory worker at a road block.4 Until UDI this
had been the most serious armed incident.
In April ot 1966 a team of ZANU insurgents crossed into
Rhodesia from Zambia, and then divided into three groups. One of
the three groups was completely wiped out at a battle on Hunyani
Farm, rear Sinoia. This contact would later be known as 'iThe
Battle of Sinoia" by the victorious ZANU Party after they achieved

power in Rhodesia. In reality it was not much of a battle. Seven

insurgents were killed with no Rhodesian losses. A couple of
weeks following the Battle of Sinoia, a farmer and his wife were

25

. r- . 2. .,A. !A ' .- V S~-A.. t.0 I 0.

killed near Hartley. Surprisingly these deaths were to be the
last white civilian deaths until 1972. For the next six years
the Rhodesian Security Forces almost systematically eliminated
5
the guerrilla forces operating within the country.
The Battle of Sinoia had a significant impact on the coun-
terinsurgency strategy of the Rhodesians. First, it ended the
BSAP's exclusive control of counterinsurgency operations. A
Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established. The Army now had
co-equal status with the BSAP at all tactical levels. Second,
senior members of the Security Forces began to contemplate new
tactics for combatting the insurgency.

The first exercises using pseudo operations took place in

October and November 1966. The principal proponent of pseudo
operations at that time was Senior Assistant Commissioner Oppie
Oppenheim of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and as a
result the exercises were run under the auspices of the CID and

the Special Branch, both of the BSAP.6 However, members of the

Army did participate in the exercise. Few people shared Oppen-
heim's optimism on the utility of pseudo operations. Assisting
the exercises as instructors were men who had either pseudo oper-
ation experience in Kenya or vast knowledge of the African bush.
The original concept was unique for three reasons. First, the
exercise functioned primarily as a survival test. Second, no
particular insurgent forces were singled out as the forces which
the pseudo forces would operate (still in a very early stage of
the war, the pseudo forces operated as if they were against any
insurgent unit and not a particular one). Third, white Europeans

26

J!.oo. = - = ° • .=.. o...-°= - o , o - o- . ° • . * . - .. . "I. .' 6.-

'Aj o °
with blacken faces were used as pseudo operators. The results of

the exercise did not impress skeptics of pseudo operations and

the plan to create pseudo teams was postponed.

However it was the concept of this particular operation that

was wrong and not the notion of pseudo operations. First, although

survival techniques are extremely important while operating in

the bush, the primary mission of pseudo operations is to gather

operational information and this must be done by having some

interface with the civilian population. Second, a "general"

insurgent cannot be viewed as the opponent that one faces in an

insurgency. The insurgent opponent must be completely mirrored.

Third, white Europeans could never pose operationally as black

insurgents.
The one positive aspect of the 1966 exercise was the iden-

tified need for tracking capabilities in insurgency warfare. As

a result a Tracker Combat Unit was established in the Rhodesian

Territorial Army (their Reserve forces).

The attack on Altena Farm near Centenary on 21 December 1972

marked the beginning of the heated armed conflict stage of the

insurgency. On 26 January 1973, JOC finally approved the use of

pseudo operations. The first team was initiated by the Special

Branch, BSAP, and consisted of six Africans, two Police

Constables and four former insurgents. These men were dressed in

ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the military

wing of ZANU) uniforms, given communist weapons and artifacts and

then sent out to the Bushu Tribal Trust Land (TTL). The team was

soon sent out to other TTLs and proved successful in gathering

27

~ %0 A0 X^
information. However, because the team was beginning to become
influenced by African spirit mediums it was pulled out of the
8
field and further operations were temporarily postponed.

In the meantime, the Army began to experiment in pseudo

operations. Rhodesian SAS personnel with Special Branch guidance
trained several African teams and began operating in the TTLs.
The majority of the pseudo teams were African but they were led
and monitored by white Europeans. On 31 August 1973 reacting on
information received through its pseudo disguise an Army pseudo
team obtained its first kills of insurgent forces. In addition
the pseudo teams reacting on information received were able to
recover arms caches. There were some shortcomings with the teams,
primarily in coordination. One of the original Army initiators
of pseudo operations, Andre Rabie, was killed by a mistake in his
identity. 9 This incident highlighted the need for close coor-
dination between the Security Forces and the pseudo teams. For
once in the bush, a team would be considered as insurgents when

they came into contact with the Security Forces.

Special Branch was also realizing at that time that pure SAS
type soldiers were not er- "ght to handle the intricacies of pseudo
10
operations. What was more essential was to have a good knowl-
edge of the language, customs and people in the area, and then

combine that with combat and survival skills. Naturally, these

men were hard to find. This requirement in personnel was often
filled by the Territorial Army and other services."

28
 Pseudo teams were heloed into Mozambique and then walked
back into Rhodesia just as if an insurgent team was penetrating

into the country. This technique was used to establish who were
the insurgent contactmen within the country.

By the end of 1973 the pseudo operations concept was fully

accepted by the Special Branch as a viable form of tactics to
counter the insurgency. It also had a few Army proponents. It
was during this year that a new Army regiment was formed, the
Selous Scouts. It was the mission of the Selous Scouts to per-
form pseudo operations. The Army provided the manpower while the
Police provided the intelligence. Major Ron Reid Daly was brought
out of retirement to command the regiment while Superintendent
Mac McGuinness commanded the Special Branch detachment assigned
to the unit. There was also a division of responsibility between
the Army and Special Branch which was laid down by the Prime
Minister Ian Smith in a formal directive.
The Army was responsible for:
(1) the housing, training and discipline of all Army
personnel;
(2) the tactics adopted in the field by operational
units in conjunction with other armed services;

(3) the movement and physical deployment of opera-

tional units and their resupply;

(4) the briefing of the Army Commander and the

Brigadier commanding the Joint Operational
Commands in the field; and
(5) the control and direction of Army liaison at sub
Joint Operfion Commands and for overall commu-
nications.

29

Wq
 Special Branch was responsible for:
(1) The physical recruitment and mental preparation
of personnel other than Army [meaning the turning
of terrorists] to be employed in operations;
(2) The compilation and sifting of intelligence
gleaned from all available sources for the brief-
ing of teams to be deployed in the field;

(3) Redirection and advice of personnel whilst

deployed in the field, and subsequent full
debrief (Special Branch details from Joint Opera-
tional Command being invited to attend) and com-
pilation of reports for circulation to Special
Branch stations;
(4) The control and dissemination of intelligence
gleaned by the Selous Scouts and overall security
of the unit in all facets;
(5) The welfare and employ on non military personnel
(turned terrorists] and guidance o 3 Police offi-
cers seconded to the Selous Scouts.

The directive also assigned the task for the newly formed

regiment. It was:
(1) Tasked to carry out operations of a clandestine
nature wherever it may be called upon to serve,
drawing its manpower from the combined services
and other less obvious channels (tame terror-
ists] while receiving instructions from the
Overill Coordinating Committee, the Director of
the CentralandIntelligence Organisation, Service
Commanders Joint Operational Commands;

(2) In day to day events, the authority vested in

the Director General Central Intelligence
Organisation is delegated to the Commanding
Officer, Special Branch who, in turn, is respon-
sible for ensuring that the Commissioner of
Police is kept fully informed of Scout activ-
ities and the unit is run in accordance with the
concept laid down upon its inauguration, i.e.
the clandestine elimination of terrorist•
terrorism both within and without the country.

4-

30

¶. %>t~q-¶.
<-.~5R~~t - - t~ .'A T. 5. ." R_ X. 1 2"% A .. a KA A4
 Turned (or tame) insurgents were paid out of Special Branch

funds, thus the Army administrative and pay systems had no knowl-
edge of turned insurgents being in the ranks of the Selous
Scouts. This knowledge was only held at higher operational

levels. Because of its need for a cover the Selous Scouts were
referred to as the Army's Tracking Wing. No direct mention was
ever made to its pseudo operations.
The year 1974 was a highly productive year for pseudo opera-
tions. In addition the regiment had now perfected its selection
course for joining the regiment. The selection process consisted

of rigorous physical endurance, survival and always the unknown

quantity of what was to happen next. Recruits for the selection
course came from all the regiments in the Army and from other
15
branches of the Security Forces including the Territorial Army.
However, 1974 was significant for a much greater reason. A
coup d'etat in Portugal forced that country to withdraw from its
African colonies. As a result Rhodesian's flanks (Mozambique)

were now exposed to open infiltration. Nevertheless, the insur-

gents did not make use of this fact for several years due to
their own political infighting within their host nations, Mozam-
16
bique and Zambia.
In 1976 the insurgency war resumed again in earnest. With

the exposed flanks now facing Rhodesia, the Selous Scouts as a

unit were being used more and more for external raids and recon-
naissance. Although such raids like those at Nyadzonya/Pungwe

and Chimoio were massively successful, they greatly reduced the

numbers and effectiveness of pseudo operations within Rhodesia.

31
 Despite the highly publicized external operations, the pseudo

operations continued. The effectiveness of pseudo operations was

essential to the Rhodesian counterinsurgency effort. The Selous

Scouts have been credited by Combined Operations for being dir-

ectly or indirectly responsible for 68% of the killed insurgents

the war. 17 Obviously, what this

within Rhodesia at the end of

statistic proves is that basically through pseudo operations the

pseudo teams were either able to eliminate the insurgents on con-

tact or were able to relay timely tactical operational informa-

tion to friendly tactical units and have those units eliminate

the insurgents.

A primary requirement in pseudo operations is keeping up to

date with information and in order to do this one must have a

constant new flow of turned insurgents either for information

or more important to act as operational members. Ron Reid Daly

in his book Selous Scouts: Top Secret War described the many

methods and techniques in utilizing captured insurgents:

if a terrorist group was attacked by Fireforce

and all were killed with the exception of one or two
prisoners, we could turn those prisoners and adopt
the group's identity, and function as them in an
adjacent area sufficiently far enough away from any
locals who could identify them. Or, we might appear
in the guise of a new group just arrived from Mozam-
bique. In this instance the newly turned terrorists
would introduce our callsign to the contactmen and
policemen and establish their bona fides with the
local population.

For a prisoner to be of any use to us, it was abso-

lutely vital that his identity was totally protected
and that neither the locals in the area of the con-
tact, or anyone back at the Security Force base knew
of his capture or even of his existence. If it was
ever necessary for him to be taken into an area to make
vital indications, he would be taken with a hood cover-
ing his head so that his identification was impossible.

32

| |
 But even where a prisoner had become compromised or
blown, we could still get useful service from him,
with him acting . . . as we termed it . . . as a
rear-rank instructor, pointing out the principal
contactmen and other people whf- could be of use to
our groups in particular areas.
U
Thus when a captured insurgent was taken to a Selous Scout
fort 19 the first priority was to give him as best medical atten-
tion as possible. In many cases the insurgent would be wounded
and would require surgery. The insurgent knew full well that had
he remained with his fellow insurgents he would probably have
been left to die. Thus if the insurgent survived his wounds he
inevitably felt a sense of debt to the Selous Scouts. As a
result the unit would build on this feeling and attempt.. to turn
him to fighting for their side. When Special Branch personnel

interrogated an insurgent immediately after his recovery, the

insurgent was normally more than willing to give information.
One thing a captured insurgent seldom did was to admit to his own
killing of civilians or government personnel. Following the
interrogation the decision was made as to whether to recruit the
insurgent for pseudo operations or not. The recruitment itself
was often quite easy as Reid Daly has noted:
The recruitment of the terrorist itself was a fairly
simple matter.
We had soon found that the best recruiting method was
to send another former terrorist to visit him in hos-
pital. He would draw up a chair by his hospital bed,
and have a long conversation, dwelling in particular
upon the hardships the terrorists were experiencing
in the bush .

The tame terrorist, would then, if he had not already

been identified by the capture, for we tried, if pos-
sible, to use a recruiting agent who was already
known to the captured terrorist, reveal to te aston-
ished man that he also had been a terrorist.

33
 No physical pressure was ever put on the insurgent to force

him to switch sides:

The turning itself comprised no magic formula
no one was every beaten up by his Special Branch
interrogational . . . in fact, quite the reverse was
the interrogational technique, as it was vital a
trusting relationship be quickl 1lestablished between
the prisoner and his questioner.

The insurgent knew that if he was convicted of crimes he

would be hung. This obviously weighed heavily in his decision.

As a terrorist went through an initiation phase he was

observed by the Selous Scout members and would eventually be
chosen to go on operations with them. However, no unit was ever

obligated to take a specific turned terrorist with them to per-

form pseudo operations. The whole concept depended upon trust
,IN.

between the pseudo operators (between the Rhodesians and the

turned insurgents). There was one incident in April 1975 where a
turned insurgent betrayed his team, shot them while they were
asleep, and then fled to Mozambique. Seven Selous Scouts were

killed. This was the greatest single loss of Selous Scouts dur-
ing the entire war. 22 Needless to say, there will always be this
type of risk in pseudo operations. It is imperative for the
senior leadership to minimize its occurrence.
By 1974 the Selous Scouts were fully operational in their

pseudo operations. Their tactics had to be slowly modified as

the situation in Rhodesia changed. The original method was for

pseudo operators to gather enough information on the insurgents

that would allow them to get close enough to the insurgents and
then eliminate them. However, there was one intrinsic problem.

34

.-
Once the pseudo operators initiated a contact, their cover as

insurgents was normally compromised.

In 1973 the Rhodesians began to deploy company size units of

the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) as reaction units (fireforce)

to insurgent hostilities. By 1974 these RLI reaction units were

now deployed to eliminate the insurgents based on pseudo opera-

tion information. Thus:

pseudo groups were merely to make contact with

terrorists groups through terrorist contactinen and
arrange meetings. Then instead of the groups appear-
ing at those meetings and shooting them, helicopter
borne fireforces would be sent to keep the appoint-
ments instead.

In this manner, the pseudo group who had set them up

for the kill, could afterwards protest their inno-
cence of involvement and stay on in the area seeýng
other terrorist groups, with their covers intact.

During the actual operational phase of the pseudo units the

white members of the unit would have to be detached from the unit

itself.

The European element of the groups would never move

around with the African members, for that would have
given them away. Instead, they stayed out of sijht
in hill bases and directed operations from there.

By having the white European members at an isolated base

camp he not only could control his unit from sporadic information

brought back to him by the African members of the unit, he could

also keep more sophisticated communication equipment at that base

camp. Sophisticated communication equipment would obviously com-

promise a pseudo unit. The communication equipment allowed the

team leader to keep radio contact with the reaction units and

call on them when the need arose.

35
 Camouflage for the non-African members was always a problem.

They had to ensure that their identity was not compromised. They

could never go into African villages no matter what kind of con-

cealment they undertook and attempt to pose as an insurgent. It

was during the movement phase to the isolated base camp (where

the European member would control the unit) that it was critical

for camouflage. In order to conceal their identify white Euro-

peans blackened their faces, wore broad brimmed hats and grew

beards. In this manner their identity would not be compromised

if observed from a distance.

When a pseudo unit operated in an area, that area was iso-

lated from normal regular troop movements. This prevented the

regular troops from coming into contact with the pseudo operators

and thus lessened the likelihood of an unfortunate mistake in

identity. These areas, or frozen areas as they were called, were

identified by natural boundaries as natural boundaries were more

readily identifiable by both the pseudo operators and the regular

forces. Other activities were allowed to go on in the frozen

area in as practical a manner as possible, as Reid Daly noted:

As a matter of policy, normal activity in a frozen

area was encouraged so as not to arouse the terror-
iets' suspicions. If, for example, a crime was
reported within a frozen area, the Police would
inform us immediately stating the places they wished
to visit for investigational purposes. We would
immediately warn any Selous Scouts' pseudo groups
operating there and . . . only afterwards . . . yve
the Police permission to go into the frozen area.

Frozen areas were frequently changed in order to not estab-

lish a recognizable pattern and the whole pattern of boundaries

had to be re-established.

36
 By 1976 the insurgency had greatly intensified. The Selous

Scouts began to perform a whole new series of operations com-

pletely different from pseudo operations. They were involved in

external raids, established hunter-1iller teams and provided long-

range reconnaissance. Pseudo operations were still being con-

ducted and were still the most effective method for obtaining
tactical operational information. However, the other operations

which the Selous Scouts had to perform drew greatly on their

resources for pseudo operations.

In 1978 the insurgent leaders Ndabamingi Sithole and Able

Muzorewa decided upon an internal agreement with the Smith Gov-

ernment. Their insurgent forces were used as auxiliary forces

for the internal agreement government which was formed in 1979.

The Selous Scouts along with their counterparts in Special Branch
were ordered to take charge of the training and administration of

the auxiliaries. This was an additional drain on pseudo opera-

tions. But by this time the Army as a whole was pushed to its
limits and the war itself was lost.
In order to fulfill the need for pseudo operations Special
Branch detachments began to organize their own pseudo teants.

These teams lacked the skill, training and effectiveness of the

teams which had been deployed by the Selous Scouts and their
Special Branch counterparts.
In December 1979 Rhodesia returned to colony status and in

March 1980 Robert Mugabe came to power and disbanded the Selous

Scouts. With the large number of turned insurgents in the Selous

Scouts there is little doubt why the former insurgent leader and

now Prime Minister of Zimbabwe wanted the unit disbanded.

37
 Frank Kitson's pseudo operations in Kenya were decentralized
while the Rhodesian pseudo operations were an extremely central-
ized affair (although at the end of the war they became less so).

The Portuguese in their insurgency war in Mozambique had also

formed a unit used primarily for pseudo operations. The unit

known as Flechas or "arrows" was centrally controlled by the DGS

(Portuguese Security). The Flechas were reconnaissance units

disguised as FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao "Ie Mozambique)
insurgents that operated in the bvsh for long periods of time to
gather intelligence. The Flechas were centrally controlled more

because of the DGS's complete lack of confidence in the Army's G2

section than for any other reason. 26 Because of the Rhodesians

preference to work with the DGS and the Flechas during the early
1970s it is conceivable that the Rhodesians drew on this central

organization from the Portuguese. Reid Daly had also studied

Portugal's use of the Flechas. 27

One of the major problems with the centralized control of

the Selous Scouts was that they in essence became a "law unto
themselves". From their very inception in 1973 the Selous Scouts
were covered in secrecy for obvious reasons. As of 1977 they

were under control of COMOPS with the Army being completely in

the dark about their operations. By 1979 allegations were ram-
pant that the Selous Scouts were more concerned with ivory poach-
28
ing than they were with pseudo operations. The Selous Scouts'
ability for tracking and their secret sojourns into the bush
greatly inflamed these allegations. The results of these alle-
gations were that reid Daly was court-martialled, reprimanded and

38
retired and the Commander of the Rhodesian Army, Lieutenant Gen-
29
eral John Hickman was sacked and placed on the retirement list.
The central organization and intense secrecy were key to the suc-
cess of the pseudo operations that were run in Rhodesia. These

two factors, however, also made the unit susceptible to indisci-

pline and corruption. As General Sir Frank Kitson has noted
about pseudo operations, "If it's just controlled at the top it
will not be controlled at all." 3 0

It is hard to disagree with the fairly established fact that

pseudo operations brought about the majority of insurgent kills
within Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Army was simply too small to pro-
vide cordon and search operations on a grand scale. The use of
pseudo operations coupled with the fireforce concept proved
effective. Fireforces, however, had to react to many more con-
tingencies than just those brought on by the information gathered

by the pseudo operators. Fireforce like the Selous Scouts were

stretched to the limit by the end of the war.
It is interesting to note that one of the skills which
brought about much of the success of the Selous Scouts was that

of tracking. When acting as insurgents pseudo operators could

not rely on sophisticated electronic equipment. One of their

greatest tools for locating insurgent forces was the art cf track-
ing. It is significant that this same element of pseudo opera-
3 1
tions was stressed by Kitson in his pseudo operations in Kenya.

39
 The Selous Scouts were the most organized formation for
pseudo operations in the history of modern insurgency warfare.
Their training and selection for men for the regiment were rigor-
ous and readily prepared the soldiers for tracking, survival and
pseudo operations. Operationally they relied upon the human
resources of white Europeans, both military and non-military;
African military troops; and turned insurgents. An appropriate
method for turning captured insurgents was established which
provided current, up-to-date information for pseudo operations.
Because they worked co-equally with the intelligence service they
were able to relay the tactical operational information to
friendly regular units in a rapid and efficient manner which
allowed the regular units to eliminate the insurgents. The
result being the most effective use of personnel assets in order

to wage a counterinsurgency campaign.

40
 I
CHAPTER IV

LACK OF AN AMERICAN MODEL

The United States military has never seriously considered

pseudo operations as a viable form of counterinsurgency tactics.
This, of course, is not to say that the United States has not
participated in some form of pseudo operations in the 20th cen-
tury, but rather that the United States has never had a doctrinal
concept on pseudo operations nor has it deployed pseudo opera-
tions as a tactic in a general counterinsurgency strategy. This
lack of deployment of pseudo operations in U.S. counterinsurgency
warfare is brought on by both systemic and philosophical reasons.
The United States military system does not promote pseudo
operations because their deployment is not considered a proper
utilization of its officer corps. Officers assigned to pseudo
operations cannot command platoons, companies, battalions, etc.,
in a normal tactical sense, nor do pseudo operations allow offi-
cers to be advisors or act as an advisory head. These factors
reduce promotional likelihoods and thus cause a natural systemic
tendency to avoid these type of operations.

There is a perception within military hierarchies of an

inherent "vulgarity" in pseudo operations. General Sir Frank
Kitson has alluded to this general reluctance by an officer corps
(not only an American officer corps) to pursue this "dirty" war-
fare:
Their [the officer corps'] natural reluctance to grasp
anything new was accentuated by their ability to see
that promotion prospects were at best uncertain in a
partisan forcl. Furthermore the whole idea was a
little vulgar.

41
 Thus this perception of inherent vulgarity in pseudo operations
has led many strategists to conclude that pseudo operations are
not a "proper" or "nice" tactic which should be included in a
counterinsurgency strategy.
Despite the systemic and philosophical reasons for not
deploying pseudo operations as a tactic incorporated into a

larger counterinsurgency strategy, several examples of pseudo

type operations used by U.S. or U.S. allies do exist.
Haiti-1919. The American military intervention in Haiti was
the longest intervention that the United States has had in Latin

America. It lasted from 1915 to 1934. The problems in Haiti

were numerous and complex. Economic turmoil, political unrest,

revolution and insurgencies were the norm during the period. In

1)18 a revolutionary by the name of Charlemagne Peralte was lead-
ing a band of some 5000 adherents or Cacos in the northern port
of Haiti. 2 The United States Marines who had been in Haiti from
the start of the intervention, were assigned to pacifying the
country and deal with Peralte. While the Marines were kept busy
with patrols, the Cacos were ambushing the local gendarmes. The
Marine patrols proved to be ineffective in quelling the uprising.
Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hannekan conceived of a method in

which he could come into contact with Charlemagne Peralte. Han-

nekan had several Haitians pretend to oppose the U.S. interven-
I
tion in Haiti while in fact they were really attempting to dis-
cover the whereabouts of Peralte. To give added realism to this
pseudo group Hannekan staged several false attacks against his
3
own positions.

42
 Upon discovering information on an insurgent meeting with
Peralte, Hannekan along with Marine Corporal William R. Button
and eighteen hand picked gendarmes set out to attend the meeting.

Both Hannekan and Button spoke fluent Creole. They disguised

themselves as Cacos--they were "garbed as Cacos in worn denim

(the two blancs being blacked with burned cork)."'4 Hannekan him-
self had received
information that Peralte would be wearing a
5
blue suit and Panama hat.
Disguised as Cacos Hannekan and his team were able to slip

through six Caco outposts along the way to Charlemagne's camp.

Once Hannekan and his team were at the camp, Charlemagne was
singled out as he was dressed exactly as intelligence information

had indicated. Hannekan then proceded to drqw his .45 caliber

pistol, walk up to Charlemagne within a range of fifteen feet and
fire two bullets into Charlemagne's chest, killing him. A fire
fight between Hannekan's team and Charlemagne's guards followed
the shooting, in which Hannekan and his Haitians prevailed. The
death of Charlemagne Peralte established a peace in the northern

part of Haiti.
This small example of pseudo operations in Marine Corps

history highlights several basic tenets of pseudo operations in

general. First, patrols, cordon and search operations and other

standard counterinsurgency tactics often prove ineffective when

there is no tactical operational information upon which to react.
One method of obtaining tactical operational information is

pseudo operations. Second, normally guest forces have a hard

time in passing themselves off as the host nation's insurgents.

43
Disguise, not only in clothing but also skin texture and color is

often necessary. And third, getting into an infrastructure of an

insurgency is what is of greater importance than just offensive

operations. Offensive operations which solely seek high numbers

of kills should be made completely secondary to those operations

which seek the base of the insurgency itself. Thus, this small

episode in 1919 in Haiti exemplifies some of the basic tenets of

pseudo operations.

The Philippines--Pseudo Operations in the Huk Insurgency.

The Huk insurgency lasted from after World War II till the late

1950s, although by 1954 the insurgency was no longer effectively

being waged. 6 Huk was an abbreviation of Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa

Hapan (which had been previously been abbreviated to Mukbalahap)

which translated meant the People's Army Against Japan. The

Huks were a Communist organization. They had carried on guerrilla

operations against the Japanese during World War II. Following

the war they continued the insurgency against the newly formed
Philippine government. There was a U.S. Military Assistance and

Advisory Group (MAAG) in the Philippines but in general, U.S.

"military advisors refrained from any form of unconventional mil-

itary tactics. It was noted about U.S. military advisors in the

Philippines that:

many MAAG officers felt that [unconventional]

techniques violated the military managerial and tac-
tical principles that had won World War II in the
forties and were surely applicable to revolutionary
conflicts in the fifties. Filipino officers consid-
ered these MAAG views so inappropriate and unaccept-
able that many of them refused to associate with their
MAAG counterparts or communicate to them the true
conditions i% the countryside or in the Philippine
Armed Forces.

44
StI
 The Filipinos derived much of their own tactics themselves.

Their formation of battalion combat teams (BCTs) was basically a h

response to the Filipinos inability to form divisions along U.S.

lines. In fact, the BCTs proved highly effective in the counter-

insurgency ccmpaign.9 The Filipinos also used "hunter-killer"

units and pseudo operations in their tactics. These operations

were initiated in a gradual process by the Filipinos themselves.

In essence:

The Filipinos had no models to base themselves on and

most of their American advisors were equally inexperi-
enced. They [the Filipinos] arrived at these courses
of action by reflecting upon their .2xperience which,
in early years, was matly one of failure, and seeking
to apply its lessons.

Thus, the Filipino experience in pseudo operation came from

F'.

their own initiation and with often times little support from

their American advisors. In 1948 a unit was formed by the Fili-

pinos purely for mission of pseudo operations. This unit was

known as Force X. When a Huk commander in Southern Luzon died

some of his unitL then tried to establish contact with the com-

mander of the Huk units in Central Luzon. The Filipino military

took advantage of the situation and tasked the 16th Philippine

12 {
Constabulary Company to become Force X. Force X was isolated

in a jungle training camp and underwent training for what the

Filipinos called "Large Unit Infiltration." The training is

suberbly described in the following passage:

The basic idea was to make this specially trained

force into a realistic pseudo-Huk unit that could, in
enemy guise, infiltrate deep into enemy territory.
The men in training were divested of all items that
could identify them as soldiers. They were given the
things generally found on Huk dead, such as soiled
handkerchiefs and love mementoes from girl friends.

45
U
 During the four-week training period, all conversa-
tion was conducted in terms of the preassigned enemy
identities--the enemy ranks, aliases, and pet names
commonly used in guerrilla units of Southern Luzon.
The men were addressed as comraces, brothers, members
of the proletariat. They were taught Huk songs. They
learned how to deliver speeches in Huk style.
They became familiar with the descriptions of the
leaders of Southern Luzon guerrillas. Some, who
resembled known guerrilla leaders, posed as those
individuals. All men were required to take on the
appearance of hunted guerrillas during those days.
They became, and stayed, dirty, unshaven, badly in
need of haircuts. Like the enemy, these soldiers were
unhappily forced • renounce bathrooms, shaving cream,
and razor blades.
When Force X was finally ready it set out to establish
contact with the Huk units in Central Luzon. False battles with
Philippine Constabulary units were held to give Force X some
credence. As Force X headed north it ran into Huk outposts which
it completely fooled and soon they were linked up with several
Huk squadrons directly in the midst of the Huk operational areas.
After six days together Force X on a pre-arranged signal attacked
the Huk units while at the same time directed in three Philippine
Constabulary companies. The two Huk squadrons were destroyed.
Although this pseudo operation was successful others were not. 15

It was felt by the commander of the operation that certain

prerequisites had to be met in order for pseudo operations to
succeed. These prerequisites were: (1) poor communication
between insurgent units had to exist; (2) the operation must be
planned and conducted in total secrecy; (3) an appropriate cover
plan must be developed and every man in the unit must know the
cover plan; (4) priority in the destruction of the enemy should
be--first, enemy leaders or fanatics--second, elite organizations--

46
and third, effective enemy support elements; and (5) the maximum
16
number of turned insurgents should be used.

It was thought that the advantages of pseudo operations

were: (1) surprise contact with the enemy; (2) penetration of

the enemy's security systems; (3) establishment of the "extent

and nature of civilian support" in communication, liaison and

17
supply; and (4) identification of local government collusion.

Although the United States had military advisors in the

Philippines during the Huk rebellion, it is questionable as to

how much influence they had on the pseudo operations. As cited

earlier most American advisors were critical of irregular coun-

terinsurgency tactics, either through their lack of experience or

thiough their belief :.n the superiority of conventional tactics.

The Filipinos, on the other hand, were willing to learn from

their experience and from their past mistakes. They had several

successes in pseudo operations. They also had several failures.

Despite their understanding of much of the essential mechanisms

of pseudo operations, they never had the conceptual insight and

tactical efficiency of Frank Kitson and his efforts in Kenya.

Nor did they ever reach the established central organization of

the Rhodesian efforts. The pseudo operations that failed in the

Philippines were ones which were quickly put together without

adequate conceptual understanding, training, organization, and

support. The information gained on concepts, training and

organization from the successful operations were never fully

utilized by the Americans years later in Vietnam.

47

S. IN .~
 Vietnam--No Conceptual Model. The one striking fact about

American tactics in Vietnam is that pseudo operations were never

used as a form of tactics to gain tactical operational information.

It would be wrong to say that there were no forms of "pseudo type"

operations utilized, but there never was a conceptual model which

resulted in the organizational formation and use of pseudo opera-

tions. A brief description of Marine Corps and Army efforts in

this area illustrates this point.

The Marine Corps never contemplated pseudo operations as

they probably assumed that it was outside of their realm of capa-

bilities and missions (an inadequate assumption in counterinsur-

gency warfare). Reconnaissance units, rightly so, performed

their mission in reconnaissance.

The Marine Corps' Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program was

designed to place a squad of Marines into a village along with a

platoon of South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF). While in the

village the Marines provided security, trained the PF, and estab-

lished localized civil action programs. "The CAPs were the

only instance in which South Vietnamese troops were places
directly under the command of Americans. . 19 Although one
of the best methods for training local troops and for ensuring

civilian safety, the CAP program had nothing to do with pseudo

operations. 20

Another program used by the Marines in Vietnam was the use

of Kit Carson Scouts. Kit Carson Scouts were former Viet Cong

used by Marine units for "providing information on the Viet Cong,

identifying Viet Cong and their hiding places."'21 These turned

48
Viet Cong went through an initial period of observation. After
passing this observation they were issued equipment and underwent

a period of training with the Marines. If a Scout had a family,

they were relocated to a secure area to avoid Viet Cong reprisals.

The Scouts were used as guides and "scouts" for Marine patrols.
It was the goal of Lieutenant General Lewis Walt,
the III MAF
22
Commander, to have "two Scouts for each rifle company.:" There
was a reason for having two Scouts per unit as General Walt

pointed out: "Usually, the Scouts are assigned to a Marine unit

in pairs, to share their common language and help overcome the
23
problems of adjustment."
Like the CAP program, the Kit Carson Scouts received less
and less priority as the war went on. Although not pseudo opera-

tions per se, the Kit Carson Scouts program was an effort by the
Marine Corps to use turned insurgents. What separates the use of

the Scouts from pseudo operations is there was no systematic

method specifically organized to break into the Viet Cong infra-

structure. Following the initial information with which they
departed, the Scouts were then used primarily as "point men" for
Marine patrols. Because being part of a patrol there was no way
they could transmit tactical operational information to that

patrol. Like the CAP program, the Kit Carson Scouts program was
a good counterinsurgency technique, but the program was not pseudo
operations.
Despite these several effective programs, the Marine Corps
never developed a concept for pseudo operations. In fact, the

few irregular tactics that they did initiate had only limited

49

. L 1ýI IWLI .tWT

%P. 0... eý týI
longevity. The program for turning the captured insurgents never

developed any higher than the use of them as scouts, and the CAP
program did not even attempt to address pseudo operations. Both
programs could have easily argumented pseudo operations had
pseudo operations been initiated.
The Army fared little better than the Marines in trying to

incorporate some form of pseudo operations into their general

strategy. Any form of these type of operations would have been

undertaken by the Special Forces. And like the Marines several

irregular programs were initiated by the Army but none ever
developed into a conceptual model or functioning organization
along a pseudo operations concept.
The most well known Special Forces program was their para-

military training of the Montagnard tribes and other minorities.

This Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program was initi-
ated for two primary reasons: first to get the minority groups
involved in the counterinsurgency effort; and second, to keep the
Montagnards and other minorities from being prime targets of
Communist propaganda and recruitment. 24 Other programs initiated
by the Special Forces were the training of paramilitary units

such as the mountain scouts which were used for long range recon-
naissance and the trail watchers program which provided border
25
and area surveillance. All of these programs and others simi-
lar to them were primarily used for expanding area defenses using
26
the CIDG camps as "bases for offensive strike force operations."'

The Special Forces teams were used as trainers, educators and

50
A/

U-
quasi-leaders of these paramilitary units. None of these opera-
tions ever bordered on being pseudo operations.
In late 1966 the Special Forces developed what was called
"unconventional operations." Mobile guerrilla forces were estab-

lished. These units were South Vietnamese paramilitaries led by

Special Forces personnel whose mission was to infiltrate an area
and then:
interdict enemy scouts, conduct surveillance,
seek out enemy forces and installationsT 7 and collect
intelligence along their axis of advance.
Tactically there was little difference between the mobile guer-
rilla forces and the previous strike forces coming from the CIDG
camps used earlier.

Other unconventional operations were Projects Omega and

Sigma. These programs were used for long-range reconnaissance
and intelligence gathering. These projects consisted of recon-
naissance elements and reaction forces (Mike Forces). Project

Delta was a much expanded version of the Omega and Sigma Pro-
jects. These programs were essentially large scale reconnais-

sance in force missions, and not pseudo operations.

One point to note on these operations is that some of the
personnel were disguised as Viet Cong. Road scout teams, known

as Roadrunners, consisted of four-man teams of indigenous person-

nel.
They dressed and were armed to pass as VC, and would
follow tr2ls used by the VC to observe and talk with
the enemy

51
 The Roadrunners were a small element which performed a pseudo

type function. However, it was not pseudo operations because

there was no concerted effort to penetrate the insurgent infra-
structure. Their primary mission was that of a scouting decoy.
Special Forces members were also assigned to the Special
Operations Group (SOG) which did a wide variety of special opera-
29
tions, none of which paralleled pseudo operations.
A final example of pseudo type operations run by the United
States was the Phoenix program which tended to be a joint Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)--South Vietnamese program which at
times included the Special Forces. 30 Technically the program
came under the auspices of a structure known as CORDS--Civil in
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support which was headed
by Robert W. Komer and was formed in 1967. 31 The Phoenix program

(known as Phung Hoa 2_ by the Vietnamese) was an extension of the

ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) program which
was designed to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). 32
The Phoenix program incorporated the use of Vietnamese agencies
which ICEX had not. The latter being a joint CIA-MACV program.
In order to neutralize the VCI, Phoenix attempted to have

the intelligence agencies "pool their information on the VC

infrastructure at the district, province, and Saigon levels and

agree on assigning responsibility for exploitation." "33 Although

information was channeled centrally, exploitation of that infor-

matlon was done locally.

Exploitation--that is, the taking of action on the

intelligence screened, collated, and put into usable
form at the district centers--was the responsibility
initially of the subsector adviser, who was to avWl
himself of the most suitable resources in the area.

52
Thus Phoenix had no troops of its own and had to rely on the dis-

trict for exploitation and neutralization.

William Colby who took over CORDS in 1968 and was probably
the person most responsible for the direction of the Phoenix pro-

gram has described how suspects were categorized.

Suspects were assigned to one of thzee categories:
"A" for leaders and formal party members, "B" for
holders of other responsible jobs--cadre--and "C" for
rank and file members and followers. And the decision
was taken that those in the "C" category should be
ignored, since Phoenix was directed against the VCI
command and control s5ucture and not the occasional
adherent or supporter.
By using informants and captured Viet Cong the police at
the local districts tried to neutralize the VCI. However, the
Vietnamese police considered this centralized program of pene-
trating the VCI "unrealistic and far too difficult."' 3 6 In order
to create an incentive for the police CORDS introduced a quota

system.
To satisfy the demands of Phoenix, they merely had to
fulfill a quota which they proceeded to do by a vari-
ety of techniques, the most common of which was to
list as VCI individuals killed or captured in routine
military sweeps. Although the purpose of the system
was to generate targeted operations against specific
high-level VCI members, a large number of each monthly
"bag" was made up, in fact, of untargeted suspects
labeled as VCI after the fact. Another technique that
helped fill the quota was to arrest as VCI the low-
level peasants who merely paid taxes or joined VC mass
organizations because they had no choice. In fact,
they were not VCI at all. Moreover, it later turned
out th some of the VCI "eliminations" were completely
faked.

In short, the local establishment tended to be more concerned with

the status quo than with counterinsurgency. They soon adopted the
quotas and systems management techniques of the American way of
fighting insurgency. The number cf VCI neutralized by the Phoenix

53
 38 3
program have ranged from 20,000 to 100,000. 3 However, it has
been noted that "the majority of those individuals killed were
40
not even party members..
According to Douglas Blaufarb, a CIA agent with years of
experience in Vietnam, the Phoenix program suffered from an
intrinsic defect which was:

. . . a simplified view of the complexities of village

life in Vietnam and of the ability of the central
authority to intervene directly in the internal 0 arrange-
ments of thousands of villages simultaneously.
The Phoenix program was an:
* . . overly complex program(s) for the American and
Vietnamese personnel who were required to carry them
out, demanding too much trained and dedicated manpower
and a subtile approach wlych was only possible if
attempted on a small scale.
In 1970 the Phoenix program's own initiator, Robert Komer,
described the program as "a small, poorly managed, and largely
ineffective effort." 4 2

For many reasons the Phoenix program never came close to

becoming pseudo operations. First, there was never any real
attempt to impersonate the VC or VC cells. The information on

the VC was gained primarily through informants because this was

the easiest method for corrupt Vietnamese intelligence and police

systems. Second, there was no effort to get tactical operational
information to tactical units. Much of the neutralization of the
VCI was done through assassination. Third, it was impossible to
create background information if the VCI was continually being
killed. And finally, the Phoenix program and pseudo operations

work on completely different premises. The Phoenix program.

worked on a highly centralized system relying on relatively high

54
grade type sources--informants.

populace, tracking,
Whereas,

on a decentralized system and rely on a large number of low grade

sources--the local
pseudo operations work

and current trends,

U
captured insurgents, etc.
There is little wonder why the Phoenix program never was a
success and never neutralized the VCI. It was a centralized
system relying on statistics and "body counts" for results. The
centralized system created a situation which was subject to
corruption and abuses. Concerning the organization of pseudo
operations, General "Sir" Frank Kitson has stated, that if pseudo
operations are just controlled at the top, they will not be con-
44
trolled at all.
No American Model for Pseudo Operations. From the cited
examples it is apparent that the United States military has never

developed a concept or model for pseudo operations. This is not

to say that the United States military has not partaken in
certain aspects of pseudo operations. However, it has never
combined these various aspects into a concise workable model
which can be used as a form of tactics in counterinsurgency

operations. Whether it is because of the "vulgarity" of these

types of operations; whether it is because of the U.S. military's
natural trait to over centralize or the military's need to sys-
tems manage an insurgency war; whether it is from lack of knowl-

edge or fear of official career risk; the fact remains: pseudo

operations have not been incorporated into U.S. counterinsurgency
tactics.

55
 CHAPTER V

PSEUDO OPERATIONS: A CONCEPT

The following is a proposed concept for pseudo operations.

N
Pseudo Operations:
o A Definition. Pseudo operations are operations which
deploy a counterinsurgent force which completely mirrors insur-
gent forces. Its purpose is to infiltrate the civilian communi-
ties or operational areas disguised as insurgents in order to
develop background information on insurgents and to obtain
tactical operational information upon which to act and bring
force to bear on the insurgents.
o Missions of Pseudo Operations. The missions of pseudo
operations are:
(1) Gain information (background information) -on
insurgent forces operating in the assigned area or
area of operations (AO).
(2) Penetrate, isolate and eliminate (or capture)
insurgent forces.
(3) Disperse tactical operational information rapidly
to friendly tactical units.
(4) Destroy insurgent political infrastructures estab-
lished within the civilian community.
Members of a pseudo force must be of the same local ethnic group-
ing, tribe and/or race of the members of the insurgent forces.
Having established pseudo forces, these forces can then
proceed in performing the stated missions.

56
-wp
Mission li Gain Information on Insurgent Units.

Pseudo forces posing as insurgent forces operate within the

civilian community or area oi operations. Pseudo forces must

learn everything they can (on a clandestine basis) about insur-

gent forces and proceed to "mirror" the insurgent units in the
size of their units, organization, idiosyncracies, methods, etc.
This mirror is critical for all future operations of the pseudo
force. From the information gathered from the civilian community

the pseudo force develops background information on the insurgent

units. This information is reported to intelligence organizations
whenever it is safe and possible to do so without being compro-
mised. Background information must be continually exploited as
it helps in the "mirroring" process.
These missions are interrelated and should be integrated
into a total operational concept.

o Pseudo Forces (Units, Gangs, Cells or Individuals). In

order to perform the missions of pseudo operations a pseudo force
or forces (units, gangs, cells, or individuals) are established
which completely "mirror" insurgent forces. The pseudo forces

must be identical to the operating insurgent forces in:

oo size of units
oo organization
oo tactics
oo race and/or ethnic grouping
oo weaponry
oo idiosyncracies
oo methods
oo signs of identification

57
 o Sources for Pseudo Forces. The possible sources for
members in a pseudo force unit are:

oo local populace
oo host nation's military, paramilitary, police
oo "turned" insurgents
Mission 2: Penetration, Isolation and Elimination.

o Penetration: In order for the pseudo force to penetrate

an insurgent unit, cell or individual, it must adequately
"mirror" the insurgent unit. Penetration can be physical or by

si(:ht. The tactical situation and operational requirements will

determine whether or not the insurgents will be isolated and
eliminated.
o Isolation: The pseudo force should attempt to isolate
the insurgent unit to facilitate in the elimination of that unit.

By isolating the insurgent unit the pseudo force can call on

friendly tactical units to assist in the elimination of the
insurgent unit.
By isolating the insurgent unit from the civilian popu-
lation the pseudo force reduces the likelihood of compromising
itself not only to possible insurgents but also to the civilian

community on a whole.
o Elimination: Elimination of the insurgent unit can be
done by one of two primary methods. The insurgent unit can be
eliminated by:

oo the pseudo force itself; or by

oo a friendly local tactical unit

58
 Elimination by a friendly local tactical unit is the pre-
ferred method as it should maintain the pseudo force's identity
and allow it to continue to perform its mission.
Mission 3: Disperse Tactical Operational Information to Friendly
Tactical Units.
In an insurgency environment tactical units have a need
for rapid and precise tactical operational information upon which
to act. This deliverance of rapid tactical operational
information helps to eliminate numerous and often futile cordon
and search operations and large sweep/patrol type operations.
The pseudo force upon determining when and where to elimi-
nate an insurgent relays tactical operational information to
friendly local tactical units as to the description, size, and
location of the insurgent force. In order to avoid a mistake in
identity by the tactical unit the pseudo force must disassociate
itself from the insurgent force. This can be done by prearranged

plan or signal. The pseudo force leader must have adequate com-
munications which to rapidly transmit tactical operational
information to "stand-by" or local tactical units. When the
pseudo force has been withdrawn the pseudo force leader "unfreezes"
his zone and allows the tactical unit to enter the zone and elimi-
nate the insurgent unit.
Mission 4: Destroy Insurgent Political Infrastructure.

When pseudo operations have reached advanced stages the

pseudo force can proceed to dismantle their informant network and
the insurgent political infrastructure. When to destroy the
political infrastructure will always be a calculated risk. The
capture and elimination of insurgent political members greatly

59
increases the chances that the pseudo force will be compromised.

In addition, it can dry up operational information sources, espe-

cially in the case of informants. On the other hand, if the

insurgent political infrastructure is allowed to continue,

recruitment and the insurgency will continue. The reason that

the destruction of the political infrastructure is normally the

last mission of the pseudo force is that penetration into this

area is often the most difficult. However, elimination of the

political infrastructure is of primary importance in defeating an

insurgency.

Tactics, Techniques and Control Measures:

o Frozen and Unfrozen Zones of Action. Whenever a pseudo

force is operating in an area, friendly tactical units must be

restricted from this area. This control measure protects the

pseudo force from being mistakenly identified as an insurgent

force by friendly tactical units. Thus, the zone of action in

which a pseudo force is operating in is frozen from friendly

tactical units for the period that the pseudo force is operating

in that zone. This zone of action is called a frozen zone.

When a pseudo force is not operating in an area, this area

is known as an unfrozen zone. A pseudo force may unfreeze a

frozen zone of action when it calls on a friendly tactical unit

to assist it in eliminating the insurgent unit in that zone.

o Continually Changing the Frozen Zone of Action. In order

to keep the identity and not compromise the pseudo force the

frozen zone must be continually changed. If no conventional

force operations are being run in a given area the insurgent

60
units may become aware of the fact that pseudo operations are

being run in that area. Thus the frozen zone or at least the
shape of it must be continually changed.

Conventional operations can be run in a frozen zone pro-

vided there has been proper prior planning and coordination made

between the pseudo force and the friendly tactical units.

o Determination of Boundaries of Frozen Zones. The bound-
aries of frozen zones must be determined by dominant and perma-
nent geographical features that are easily recognizable to both
the pseudo force and the friendly tactical units. By using
dominant and permanent geographical feature the frozen zone will
be easily delineated by both parties and will prevent a mistake

in identity.
o Base Camp within the Frozen Zone. If at all possible a
base camp should be established within the frozen zone by the
pseudo force. Sophisticated communication equipment for commu-
nication with friendly tactical units can be kept in the base
camp. Unless the insurgent forces are using the same type of
communications equipment, this sort of equipment would probably
compromise a pseudo force. The base camp system is a preferred
method for running pseudo operations. More than one person

should always remain at the base camp.

o Use of U.S. Personnel/Leader and the Base Camp. Not all

members of a pseudo force have to be from the insurgent unit's

ethnic grouping or race. The leader of a pseudo force can be an

American which probably would not allow him to perform an actual

pseudo force functional role in a Third World country due to skin

61

A.! - A-!
color, language barriers and other ethnological differences.
However, the American leader can set up an isolated base camp
and have members of his functioning pseudo force report to him
clandestinely. The leader can then relay information to friendly

tactical units while in the se-urity of his base camp without

fear of being compromised to the civilian population or local
insurgents.

For additional security the American leader can have on-call

artillery fires or close air support. He can have on-call, a
friendly tactical unit for protection. He can also act as a
guide for friendly units called for the purpose of isolation and
elimination of insurgent units.

A base camp must always be manned by more than one person.

Communications and coordination with friendly units are essential.
o Using "Turned" Insurgents for Pseudo Operations. "Turned"
le

insurgents are the best source for members in a pseudo force.

Some captured insurgents can be made to fight for th 3ounter-
insurgent cause. Interrogator/translator teams and intelligence
officers can evaluate captured insurgents in rear areas. Captured
insurgents should be isolated and evaluated for their accept-

ability for pseudo operations. It must be stressed that most

captured insurgents will not be good material for pseudo opera-
tions for various reasons; the captured insurgent may be unable
to switch allegiance because he still believes in his cause, his
capture may have been already compromised to the civilian commu-

nity, he may personally not be able to function as a pseudo force

member, or for numerous other reasons. The selectivity of captured

P
62

,-::•
~r ~ ~ ~'f• ~ :i''i'r ~ ~••• ~ "• ~•••- ~ • •~•• . JL-AP
AA t.P.°. _%-ý2• . "'A- "*.. A."6"" ' . A
insurgents for use in pseudo operations should be strict and

cautious. A newly "turned" insurgent should never operate inde-

pendently immediately but rather should become a member of an
already proven pseudo force. In addition, the members of the

pseudo force must be willing to accept the newly "turned" insur-

gent on their team. These precautions in the selection of

"turned" insurgents for the use in pseudo operations reduce the

likelihood of a "turned" insurgent to "return".
o The Continual Need for "Turned" Insurgents. There is a

continual need for "turned" insurgents. Newly turned insurgents

keep the pseudo force current on all the up-to-date techniques

and methods of the insurgent units. This need is greatly

increased if the insurgent units know that pseudo forces are in

fact operating in their area.

It is through recently captured insurgents that the best

operational information can be obtained. Recently captured

insurgents will have the best up-to-date information on the
political and military infrastructure; location of insurgent

units; new tactics, weapons and policies of the insurgents; and

present relationships with the civilian community. The latter

point also concerns the identification of informers within the

civilian community which might be detrimental to the pseudo

operations. It is upon the initial capture of insurgents that

the evaluation procE of insurgents for their use in pseudo gang

work should 1,

63
 o What Kind of Insurgent Makes a Good Pseudo Operator. It
must be remembered that not all insurgents are fervent ideologues.

People are motivated to join an insurgency for basically three

reasons:
oo politically motivated/or believe in the caise
oo motivated by the fact that it is the easiest
choice to make
oo motivated by excitement/love of adventure
Insurgents from this last group are probably the easiest to
turn. Neither political ideologues nor insurgents with lack of
motivation should be considered because o: their great likelihood

to "re-turn" .

o Effectiveness of Pseudo Operations. Pseudo operations may

not be tactically effective in all insurgencies. Even if they
are effective in an insurgency they may be effective in only a
limited sense or only in limited areas of operation. The lesser
the communication between insurgent units and the local Copulace
(or other insurgent units) the greater the chance that pseudo
operations will be effective. The op, site is also true. The
greater the communication between insurgent units and the popu-
lace (or other insurgent units) the lesser the chance that pseudo

operations will be effective.

An insurgency must be carefully evaluated as to when and
where to use pseudo operations. Pseudo operations should always
be kept as a tactical tool in which to counter an insurgency.
There will always be some area or some form in which pseudo oper-

ations can be used in an insurgency. As no two insurgencies are

completely alike, no use or form of pseudo operations will be

64
 completely alike. The insurgency itself dictates the type of
pseudo operations that are deployed.
The key to all pseudo operations is to "out-insurgent" the
insurgents.
Laws and Pseudo Operations:
If U.S. forces are committed to an insurgency in another

country the legal framework for pseudo operations will be within

the context of that host nation's legal system. U.S. forces,
however, still must comply with the existing laws of the U.S.
military, the United States, and the world legal systems.
Because an insurgency is an "undeclared" war, many legal parame-
ters are vaguely defined.

Comand and Control of Pseudo Operations:

Pseudo operations are most effective when decentralized and
used at the lowest level possible. The size and nature of the
insurgency, however, will dictate the actual scope of pseudo

operations. Pseudo operations whether run at battalion, regiment

or division level must follow the normal chain of command. Con-
trol must follow the standard operating procedures. The authority

7 for the Marine Corps to run this form of counterinsurgency tactic

is drawn from the National Security Act of 1947 which allows the
"* Marine Corps to perform "such other duties as the President may
* direct."1

65
 CHAPTER VI

A MARINE CORPS CADRE UNIT

A Pseudo Operations Cadre Unit:

The following is a model on how a pseudo operations cadre
unit could be maintained in the existing force structure of the
Marine Corps. This model is only one of many possible models on
which a pseudo operations cadre unit could be created.

A pseudo operations officer would work under the CG FMFLANT

or FMFPAC under the cover of Area Research Officer. His mission
would be to coordinate all research concerning pseudo operations

and report to the CG.

The Area Research Officer would be in-charge of several
Specific Area Research Officers (Specific Area Pseudo Operations
Officers) who would be assigned the task of investigating specific

possible contingency areas. Their primary responsibility would

be to research the feasibility and use of pseudo operations in a
possible insurgency area. The Specific Area Research Officers
must research the Clausewitzean "Center of Gravity" for the
iiLsurgency and then determine the use and applicability of pseudo
operations as a tactic in that insurgency. The number of
L
Specific Area Research Officers would be determined by the
Commanding General as to the number of specific contingency areas
he wanted to evaluate for the use of pseudo operations.
In addition to the Specific Area Research Officers, one Gen-

eral Research Officer should be assigned to work under the Area

Research Officer. The task of the General Research Officer would

66
be to research various functions which would be applicable to

pseudo operations when used by the Marine Corps. The General

Research Officer should research such functions as tactics,

communication, tracking, intelligence, and any other functions

that would specifically relate to pseudo operations. The General

Research Officer would work on the coordination of these tactics
with standard conventional Marine Corps tactics.

See Figure 1 for a diagram of the Pseudo Operations Cadre

Unit.
Organization of Pseudo Operations for an Insurgency
Once the Marine Corps is committed to an insurgency, it can

expand its pseudo operations capability by an expansion of the

cadre unit. This expansion will be to take place within the

existing force structure of the Marine Corps.

The Area Research Officer will continue to be titled as such

(as will all the other officers with similar titles), but will in

fact become the head Pseudo Operations Officer in charge of all

pseudo operations within the command that he is serving.

The Specific Area Research Officer of the area where the

i.nsurgency now exists and where the Marine Corps in now committed

will become the Operations Officer for pseudo operations. This tl.

individual's research and background into this specific area

should make him the best qualified for the job. He will monitor
and :c.ntrol the operations of the pseudo teams.

67
 Figure 3 a

PSEUDO OPERATIONS CADRE UNIT

I

PSEUDO OPERATIONS CADRE UNIT i

COMMANDING
GENERAL
(G-2 or S-2)

FMFLANT, FMFPAC,
DIVISION, REGIMENT, OR
BATTALION

AREA
RESEARCH
OFFICER

(PSEUDO OPERATIONS OFFICER'

U AREAGEEA
RESEARCHRESEARCH

- ARE Aresearches-
'
(SPECIFIC AREA PSEUDO tactlus
OPERATIONS OFFICERS) communication
tracking
each officer researches Inteligence
specific possible
contingency area

68

IU. I
 The other Specific Area Research Officers will become liaison
officers to the local police, paramilitary and military units,
intelligence organizations and any other organization that might
provide assistance to pseudo operations. Liaison officers will
coordinate information through the normal Marine Corps intelli-
gence chain of command.
The General Research Officer will become the Training Officer
in charge of training pseudo teams. He will receive members for
the pseudo teams from personnel acquired by the Liaison Officers
from their local host nation sources. In addition, the Training
Officer can acquire "turned" insurgents via the intelligence
chain of command. The Training Officer will be responsible for

establishing a training camp for the training of the pseudo

teams.
The pseudo teams will be under direct command and control of
the Area Research Officer and more specifically the Operations
Officer. The number of teams, their size, their functioning,
etc., will depend upon the nature of the insurgency itself.

See Figure 2 for a diagram of the Organization of Pseudo

Operations for an Insurgency.

69
 Figure 4

ORGANIZATION OF PSEUDO OPERATIONS FOR AN INSURGENCY

I ~PSEUDO OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION

COMM ANDING
GENERAL
(G-2)

comuncaio

/ ~AREA
- ~RESEARCHj

*OPIERA

pLcIAtISONce PESEDTEAMSH TRAINeeG

OF F:: PRTON

70
 CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Low intensity conflicts and counterinsurgency wars are more

likely the types of wars in which the United States will be
involved. The United States military is more capable of perform-
ing in wars of a higher intensity. In addition, it has not devel-

oped new tactics for waging war in low intensity conflicts. The
United States military has never fully appreciated the role of

pseudo operations in insurgency warfare.

Pseudo operations are a form of tactics which can be used to
combat insurgency. This form of tactics has had great success in

several insurgencies of the 20th century. It must be stressed

that pseudo operations are a tactical means for combatting insur-
gency, to be used as only one of many forms of tactics and pro-
grams in a total counterinsurgency strategy.
Pseudo operations are operations which create a pseudo force,

units which disguise themselves as insurgents, to infiltrate the

civilian population or insurgent infrastructure in order to bring
force to bear on the insurgents. Pseudo operations seek to gain
background information on the insurgents and seek to distribute

tactical operational information rapidly to friendly tactical

units.

Pseudo operations can be effectively used in insurgencies.

They can be used in a limited form or in a specific area when not
usable in the insurgency on a whole.

71
 Analysis of several insurgencies in which pseudo operations

have been used provide the following tactical guidelines:

9 Pseudo operations are most effective when communication

between insurgent units is poor.
* Pseudo operations must be run in the same medium that the
insurgents are attempting to spread their insurgency.
* The pseudo force must "mirror" the insurgents in every
aspect.

* Pseudo force members must be comprised of members of the

same race and origin of the insurgents.
0 "Turned" insurgents are a good source for members of a
pseudo force but they must always be in the company of regular
pseudo force members.

* A decentralized system is the best method to run pseudo L

operations as it allows tactical operational information to be

dispersed rapidly from the pseudo force to friendly tactical

units.
* Conventional operations like tracking and patrolling should

be used when the insurgent force is in an isolated sanctuary away

from the civilian populace.
* Pseudo operations must be integrated into a strategy with

other conventional tactics.

The missions of pseudo operations are: (1) gain information

(background information) on insurgent forces operation in an area

or area of operations; (2) penetrate isolate and eliminate (or

capture) insurgent forces; (3) disperse tactical operational

information rapidly to friendly tactical units; and (4) destroy

72
insurgent political infrastructures established within the civil-

ian community. Tactical methods which can support these missions

are frozen zones, base camp systems, tracking, rnd U.S. personnel

as pseudo force leaders. The insurgency itself will indicate

what will be the most effective methods to use.

If the Marine Corps expects to be successful in a counter-

insurgency environment, it must break away from the notion that

existing conventional tactics will suffice in that environment.

Using purely conventional tactics to fight an insurgency war des-

tines the counterinsurgents to failure. Unconventional wars

require unconventional tactics. Pseudo operations are a form of

unconventional tactics which have proven to be successful in past

and should be incorporated into Marine Corps strategies for

counterinsurgency warfare.
Similar to all wars, insurgencies require of the counter-

insurgents; flexibility, open-mindedness and above all, leadership.

Commanders must have even greater flexibility, open-mindedness

and leadershi.p in order to adapt to unconventional warfare.

"There is only one prerequisite for pseudo operations--an open

mind." Commanders should never hesitate nor worry about limita-

tions in order to attempt pseudo operations.

Pseudo operations are a more appropriate tactic for

insurgency warfare than many of the conventional tactics now con-

templated. They must be included with other counterinsurgency

tactics if the United States is to successfully execute a

counterinsurgency campaign.

73
 NOTES

Chapter I
1. Diagrams provided by Colonel Stanley G. Pratt, USMC,
Department of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, R.I.
2. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army
(Retired), England: 6 January 1986. General Kitson served in
the Kenya Emergency, 1953-1955; the Malaya Emergency 1967; Aden
1958; Cyprus, 1963-1964; and Northern Ireland, 1970-1972.

Chapter II
1. See Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1979).
2. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, Armed Forces and
Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.,
1985), p. 3.

3. Pakenham, p. 496.
4. Albert Grundlingh, "Collaborators in the Boer Society,"
Peter Warwick, ed., The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War
1899-1902 (Harlow, England: Long2an Group, Ltd., 1989), p. 265.
5. Ibid., p. 269.
6. Ibid., p. 270.

7. Glen B. Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando (New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 84. For the Skorzeny Ardennes
operation see Infield, pp. 78-93, also see Charles Foley, Commando
Extraordinary (New York: Longman's, Green and Co., 1954), pp. 114-
127.

8. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber,

1977), p. 13.
9. W.P. Willmott, "Kenya in Revolt," Ashley Brown and Sam
Elder, eds., War in Peace (London: Orbis Publishing Ltd., 1981),
p. 112.
10. F.D. Corfield, Historical Survey; of the Origins and
Growth of Mau Mau (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office,
1960), p. 7.

74

S. .. ... •. . . . ............ ...-... .. •. .°-. .. .. * ,- * . .•

 11. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of
"Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1966), pp. 331-334.
12. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London:
Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), p. 86.
13. Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 331-334.
14. Paget, p. 86.
15. Willmott, P. 110.

16. By the end of 1956, 95 Europeans (63 military and 32

civilian) had been killed, as compared to 2,341 Africans (524
military and 1,817 civilian). 11,503 Mau Mau died in the fight-
ing. Paget, p. 104.
17. Ibid., p. 93.

18. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

19. Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa (New
York: Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 81.
20. Frank Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie
and Rockliff, 1960), p. 17.

21. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 29.

22. Ibid.
23. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, p. 74.
24. Ibid., p. 75.

25. Ibid., p. 75
26. Ibid., p. 95.
27. Ibid., p. 126.
28. Ibid.
29. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 48.

30. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, pp. 126-127.

31. Ibid., p. 127.

32. Ibid., p. 171.
33. Ibid.

75
 34. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army
(Retired), England: 6 January 1986.

35. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs, p. 190.

36. Kitson, Bunch of Five, p. 62.

37. See Wilmott, pp. 110-111 and Kitson, Gangs and Counter-
Gangs, pp. 78-82.

38. Kitson Interview.

39. Ibid.

40. Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (New

York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975), p. 364.

41. Kitson Interview.

Chapter III

1. Those insurgents who went to Ghana were taught by Soviet

advisors. It is paradoxical that neither the Soviet Union nor
Ghana made good examples for insurgency theory.

2. Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, Chimurenga (Marshall-

town, South Africa: Sygma Books (PTY) Ltd. and Collins Vaal
(PTY) Ltd., 1982) , p. 10.

3. The commander of the squadron, Captain George Peter

Walls, would become the Cormi~ander of the Rhodesian Army and later
Commander of Combined Operations.
4. James Baldwin, Black Fire (London: Julian Friedmian Pub-
lishers, Ltd., 1978), pp. 53-74.

5. Moorcraft and McLaughlin, pp. 17-26.

6. Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts (Alberton, R.S.A.: Galago

Publishing (PTY) Ltd., 1984), p. 48.

7. Ibid., p. 50.

8. Ron Reid Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton,

R.S.A.: Galago Publishing (PTY) Ltd., 1982), pp. 24-26.

9. For a Qetiiled account of Andre Rabie's death see Reid

Daly, pp. 35-36.

10. The Rhodesian SAS allowed only white Europeans to be a

member of the regiment.

76
 I
11. Stiff, pp. 43-55. Linguists and National Park Rangers
provided excellent pseudo team leaders; men who knew the language
and the terrain.

12. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

13. Ibid., p. 61.

14. Ibid., p. 60.

15. Reid Daly, pp. 134-140.

16. For a detailed account on some of the political violence

within the insurgent parties see Report of the Special Commission
on tne Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo (Lusaka:
Government Printer, 1976).

17. Reid Daly, p. 13.

18. Ibid., p. 103.

19. A Selous Scout fort was normally an isolated, walled

compound with a helo pad in the center. A captured insurgent
could be flown into the compound or fort unrecognized by locals
due to the fact that no one could see into the fort.

20. Reid Daly, p. 304.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., pp. 142-144.

23. Stiff, p. 73.

24. Ibid.

25. Reid Daly, p. 153.

26. Al J. Venter, The Zambesi Salient (Old Greenwich:

Devin-Adair Company, 1974), p. 107.
27. Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., Armed Forces
and Modern Counter-Insurgency (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1985), p. 158 and 176.

28. Ibid., 173. While I was observing the war in Rhodesia

in 1979 and 1980 there were numerous rumors that the Selous
Scouts werc in fact very much into the business of ivory poach-
ing. Members of the Selous Scouts and other Army units made such
allegations to me at the time.

77
 29. Ibid. Also see Reid Daly, pp. 321-422.

30. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army

(Ret.), England: 6 January 1986.

31. Ibid.

Chapter IV

1. Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber,

Ltd., 1977), p. 63.

2. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. and Nancy Gordon Heinl, Written

in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1978), p. 453.

3. J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story (New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981), p. 184.

4. Heinl, p. 457.

5. Ibid.

6. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S.

Doctrine and Performance (New York: The Free Press, 1977),
p. 36.

7. Ibid., p. 24.

8. Hans Heymann, Jr. and William W. Whitson, Can and Should

the United States Preserve a Mlilitary Capability for Revolution-
ary Conflict? (R-940-ARPA), The Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA.,
January 1972, p. 46. Quoted in Blaufarb, p. 38.

9. Blaufarb, p. 36.
10. Ibid. , p. 28.

11. Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter

Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 143.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 144.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 146.

16. Ibid., pp. 146-148.

78

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 17. Ibid., p. 148.
18. See Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy (New
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970) and F.J. West, Jr., The Village
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972).

19. Edward Doyle and Samuel Lipsman, The Vietnam Experi-

ence: America Takes Over, 1965-1967 (Boston: Boston Publishing
Co., 1982), pp. 65-66.
20. General Lewis W. Walt, USMC, the III MAP Commander, was
a great proponent of the CAP program. The Army was not. General
William Westmoreland, USA, later explained, "I simply had not
enough numbers to put a squad in every village and hamlet . .
Ibid., 66. This point has been debated. It is interesting to
note that this excellent counterinsurgency technique received
only limited attention at higher policy making levels--"The
Marine approach was never considered by civilian foreign policy
experts or debated beyond the military confines of the JCS."
Ibid.

21. Walt, p. 44.

22. Ibid.
23. Walt, p. 45.
24. Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971
(Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), p. 19.
25. Ibid., pp. 32-34.
26. Ibid., p. 34.

27. Ibid., p. 135.

28. Charles M. Simpson, Inside the Green Berets (Novato,

CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 153.
29. Ibid., pp. 143-144 and pp. 146-147.
30. Blaufarb, pp. 245-248 and Simpson, p. 216.

31. Robert W. Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency

in South Vietnam," in David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler,
Revolutionary War: Western Response (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1971), p. 50.
32. William Colby, Honorable Men: My LIfe in the CIA (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 267.

33. Blaufarb, p. 245.

79
 34. Ibid.
35. Colby, p. 268.

36. Blaufarb, p. 247.

37. Ibid.

38. Colby, p.. 272.

39. Joseph A. Amter, Vietnam Verdict (New York: Continuum
Publishing Co., 1982), p. 327.
40. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army Concept and Vietnam: A
Case Study in Organizational Failure, Unpublished PhD. Thesis,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: 1983, p. 628.
41. Blaufarb, p. 276.
42. Ibid.
43. Komer, p. 53.
44. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army
(Retired), England: 6 January 1986.

Chapter V
1. "The
Congress, National
61 Stat. 495, Security
Sec 206 Act
(C). of 1947," Public Law 253, 80

Chapter VII
1. Interview with General Sir Frank Kitson, British Army
(Retired), England: 6 January 1986.

h8 a0