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Petitioner Respondents Maximo G Rodriguez The Government Corporate Counsel Bernardito A Florido

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 106043. March 4, 1996.]

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION


INC. (COCLAI), Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY (NHA), respondents.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.


The Government Corporate Counsel for NHA.
Bernardito A. Florido for ATCO Enterprises.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; CONSTRUED.


— As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain
t h e status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or
threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. As such, injunction is
accepted as the "strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy" to be used
cautiously, as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full
conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. Its issuance rests
entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case and is
generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. Moreover, it
may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his
rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the
principal action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE. — Before an injunction can
be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must
be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and 2) the act
against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence,
it should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bench, the Court of
Appeals was justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction.
The reason is that, while Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible entry was pending on
appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by
then President Corazon Aquino which covered the lot subject of the dispute and
by virtue thereof, an Original Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when
petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on
July 23, 1990, a certificate of title had already been issued to NHA. In view of
this intervening development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title before
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was only proper for the
Court of Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court, where Civil Case No. 90-337
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was pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a
material change in the status of the parties with regard to the said land.
Clearly, the government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the said
agency to restore the members of petitioner to their respective possession on
portions of Lot No. 1982.
4. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND
REGISTRATION; ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, CONCRETE AND CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF AN INDEFEASIBLE TITLE TO PROPERTY. — The Original Certificate
of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent NHA serves as a concrete and
conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the property. Accordingly, once a
decree of registration is issued under the Torrens systems and the one year
period from the issuance of the decree of registration has lapsed, without said
decree being controverted by any adverse party, the title becomes perfect and
cannot later on be questioned.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED UNDER AN


ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, INDEFEASIBLE AS THAT ISSUED UNDER A
JUDICIAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDING. — In the case at bench, the original
certificate of title was issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative
proceeding pursuant to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a
certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation
of the Public Land Law. Moreover, the said certificate of title was not
controverted by petitioner in a proper proceeding nor did it show that the
issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was
tainted with bad faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the
presumption of having been issued by the register of deeds in the regular
performance of his official duty.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY; ONLY
ISSUE INVOLVED IS PHYSICAL POSSESSION AND NOT OWNERSHIP. — In an
action for forcible entry, the only issue involved is mere physical possession
(possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor
ownership. As the case filed before the lower court is only one for forcible entry,
it is indicative that the legal title over the said property is not disputed by the
petitioner. There has been no assertion of ownership over the land, only that of
prior possession. At any rate, the judgment rendered in the ejectment case is
effective only with respect to possession and "in no wise bind the title or affect
the ownership of the land."
7. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLE AND DEEDS; MISCELLANEOUS SALES
PATENT; DENIAL OF APPLICATION RENDERS PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT
OCCUPATION ILLEGAL; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner has no legal leg to stand as
regards ownership because its Miscellaneous Sales Application was not acted
upon nor favorably considered by the Bureau of Lands. The Bureau, through its
Regional Director, rejected the subdivision survey previously submitted by
COCLAI, in an Order, dated May 19, 1983. In effect, petitioner's occupation of
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the land in question, after the denial of its application for Miscellaneous Sales
Patent, became subsequently illegal. Petitioner's members have, as a
consequence, become squatters whose continuous possession of the land may
now be considered to be in bad faith. This is unfortunate because squatters
acquire no legal right over the land they are occupying.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDY; INJUNCTION; GENERALLY
MAY NOT TRANSFER PROPERTY IN LITIGATION; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. —
Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary
injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to
another, this rule admits of some exceptions. For example, when there is a
clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject
property is covered by a Torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the
undisputed owner. In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit is covered
by a Torrens title under the name of NHA. A writ of injunction should issue so
as not to render moot and academic any decision which the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 90-337 will render and in order to prevent any irreparable
injury which respondent may sustain by virtue of the enforcement of the
decision of the MTCC.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J : p

This is a petition to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 28, 1991, in C.A. G.R. SP No. 23080, which reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25, dated November
17, 1988.
The antecedent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"The land subject of the dispute is Lot No. 1982 of Cad. 237
consisting of about 12.82 hectares located at Cagayan de Oro City.
Said parcel of land was formerly a timberland identified as Block No. F,
L.C. Project No. 8 of the Bureau of Forestry. On September 4, 1956, the
Bureau of Forestry released the said land as alienable and disposable
public land.
Subsequently, on January 29, 1964, the Bureau of Lands issued
Survey Authority No. 16-64 granting authority to the COCLAI to survey
the land in question for purposes of subdivision into residential lots. By
virtue of said authority, the COCLAI engaged the services of a geodetic
engineer to prepare the subdivision survey which was submitted to the
Bureau of Lands. On March 31, 1964, the Bureau of Lands, after
conducting an ocular survey, required the COCLAI, in behalf of its
members, to file a miscellaneous Sales Application over the land in
question which the latter did on August 13, 1970. The said sales
application was however held in abeyance by the Bureau of Lands
pending the final outcome of the civil case filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and the City of Cagayan de Oro against Benedicta
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Macabebe Salcedo, et al. for the annulment of Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-257 covering the land in question then pending before the
Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-41115. In said case, the COCLAI
was a party-intervenor.

Meanwhile, on August 22, 1979, the NHA filed an expropriation


proceeding before the former Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental at Cagayan de Oro City docketed as Civil Case No. 6806 to
acquire Cadastral Lot No. 1982, including the land involved in this
case, located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City with an area of
224,554 square meters which was then covered by OCT No. 0-257. In
said case, the COCLAI intervened claiming that instead of being paid
the amount of P300,000.00, they prefer to acquire residential lots in
any housing area of NHA. Upon learning of the pending suit before the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-41115) involving the annulment of the title
over the same land, the NHA sought the suspension of the
expropriation proceedings.
On September 11, 1982, the Supreme Court finally resolved G.R.
No. L-41115 annulling OCT No. 0-257 and declaring the land covered
thereby as public land.
On October 8, 1982, the Solicitor General furnished the Bureau of
Lands, Manila, with a copy of the Supreme Court decision prompting
the Director of the Bureau of Lands to order the District Land Officer in
Cagayan de Oro City to take appropriate action for inventory of each
and every portion of Cadastral Lot No. 1982. In response thereto, the
Regional Land Director of Region 10 informed the Director of Lands
that the members of COCLAI were occupying portions of the said lot by
virtue of the Survey Authority issued on March 19, 1964 and the
COCLAI's subdivision survey had already been submitted to the Central
Office for verification and approval but was held in abeyance.

On May 10, 1983, the President of the Philippines issued


Proclamation No. 2292 reserving the entire area of Cadastral Lot No.
1982 for the Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Project to be
implemented by the NHA. Under the said proclamation, the NHA was
granted the authority 'to develop, administer and dispose of Lot No.
1982 located at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, in accordance with
the guidelines of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program
and the approved development plan of the area'.
On May 19, 1983, the Bureau of Lands, through its Regional
Director, issued an order rejecting the subdivision survey previously
submitted by the COCLAI.

Sometime in November, 1986, the NHA, through its agents,


Virgilio Dacalos and Engr. Vicente Generalao, the area manager and
project engineer, respectively with the help of the policemen and
claiming authority under P.D. 1472, demolished the structures erected
by the COCLAI members. This action prompted the COCLAI to file a
forcible entry and damages case against the NHA employees and
police officers with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3,
Cagayan de Oro City docketed as Civil Case No. 11204.
After due hearing, the MTCC on November 17, 1988 rendered
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judgment ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 11204 to restore
the COCLAI members to their respective actual possession of the
portions of Lot No. 1982 but the court dismissed plaintiff's claim for
damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court in Cagayan de Oro City
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Thereafter, the prevailing
party, the COCLAI members, moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990.

While Civil Case No. 11204 was pending before the courts, the
President of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1988 Special Patent No.
3551 covering the entire area of Cadastral Lot No. 1982, and by virtue
thereof, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City issued on
January 3, 1990 an Original Certificate of Title No. P-3324 in the name
of NHA.
Thus, on July 24, 1990, a day after the COCLAI moved for the
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 11204, the NHA filed a
complaint for 'Quieting of Title With Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction' against the COCLAI and its president, Pablo Solomon, as
well as the City Sheriff, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-337.
Said case was assigned to Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court in
Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by Hon. Noli T. Catli. In its
complaint, plaintiff NHA alleged:

'4) That defendant landless association laid claim of a


portion of Lot No. 1982 aforestated alleging that they are entitled
to possession thereof and, in fact, filed a complaint for Forcible
Entry against certain Virgilio Decalos, Vicente Generalao, and
four (4) others, plaintiff herein not being made a party thereto,
which case is docketed as Civil Case No. 11204 assigned to
Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City;

5) That on November 18, 1988 defendant landless


association obtained a favorable decision from MTCC Branch 3;

6) That pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in


City of Bacolod et al. vs. Hon. Enriquez et al., G.R. No L-9773,
May 29, 1957 the said decision could not be enforced against
plaintiff herein as it was not a party to the said case;

7) That the claim of defendant landless association for


possession of a portion of said Lot No. 1982, subject-matter
hereof, is predicated or anchored upon the fact that said lot was
declared a public land;
8) That on January 3, 1990, however, plaintiff National
Housing Authority became the absolute owner of said Lot No.
1982, now the site of the Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Project, by virtue of Special Patent No. 3551 issued by Her
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, for which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3324 was issued in its name; . . .

9) That the claim of defendant landless association has


created a cloud on plaintiff's title to Lot No. 1982
aforementioned, which claim is apparently valid or effective but
is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective and unenforceable and
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prejudicial to plaintiff's title, the land, subject-matter hereof,
having ceased to be a public land;
10) That defendants Solomon, et al. threatened or are
about to enforce the decision in said Civil Case No. 11204 in
violation of plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action,
and tending to render the judgment herein ineffectual, unless
restrained or enjoined by this Honorable Court;
11) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission of the act herein complained of;
12) That the commission of the act herein complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
plaintiff;
13) That the plaintiff is willing and ready to file a bond
executed to the defendants in an amount to be fixed by this
Honorable Court, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to said
defendants all damages which they may sustain by reason of the
injunction if the Court should finally decide that the plaintiff was
not entitled thereto.
Acting on the plaintiff's prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction, the Regional Trial Court issued an
Order on July 24, 1990 stating thus:
'. . . let a RESTRAINING ORDER be issued to Defendants
Pablo Solomon and Cagayan de Oro Landless Association, Inc.
and the City Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff of MTCC, Branch 3, or
anybody acting in their behalf or acting as their agent or
representative. And until further orders from this court, they are
enjoined to refrain or desist from enforcing the decision of Civil
Case No. 11204 until this court resolves this complaint.'
Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
stating, among others, as a ground therefor that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment in another case. (Apparently, the NHA has
filed an action for 'Injunction with Damages' against COCLAI and its
President before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro
City docketed as Civil Case No. 89-399 to prevent the MTCC from
executing its decision in Civil Case No. 11204, but this was dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 19, 1990 on the
ground that the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204, had been
upheld by the Supreme Court when it denied NHA's petition for
certiorari. The RTC, Branch 17, further stated that '. . . (I)f plaintiff
believes that it is the owner of the property subject of that civil case
(No. 11204), then it should ventilate its claim in some other case but
not in a simple case of injunction.)'

On August 10, 1990, the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-
337 issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss as well as plaintiff
NHA's prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204. The motion for
reconsideration filed by plaintiff NHA was likewise denied by the
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Regional Trial Court in its Order dated August 17, 1990." 1

Aggrieved by the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the NHA appealed
to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court. The
decretal portion of the said decision, reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED the
questioned Orders of respondent judge are hereby declared null and
void and respondent judge is ordered to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to respect the possession of the petitioner over the land
subject of the dispute . . ." 2

Hence, this petition.


The issues raised by petitioner are: whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling (a) that the National Housing Authority (NHA) is entitled to the
injunction prayed for; and (b) that NHA has a better right to the possession of
Lot No. 1982, as a necessary consequence of ownership.

As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or


maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual
or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. 3 As such,
injunction is accepted as the "strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy"
to be used cautiously, as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only
upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. 4 Its
issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of
the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
5 Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or

protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action. 6
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following
requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a
right to be protected; and 2) the act against which the injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right. 7 Hence, it should only be granted if the
party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto. 8
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals was justified in ruling that NHA
was entitled to the writ of injunction. The reason is that, while Civil Case No.
11204 for forcible entry was pending on appeal before the Regional Trial Court,
Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by then President Corazon Aquino which
covered the lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof, an Original
Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when petitioner moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate
of title had already been issued to NHA. In view of this intervening
development, NHA filed a complaint for quieting of title before the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, it was only proper for the Court of
Appeals to direct the Regional Trial Court, 9 where Civil Case No. 90-337 was
pending, to grant the writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement
of the decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material
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change in the status of the parties with regard to the said land. Clearly, the
government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the impending enforcement
of the decision in Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the said agency to restore
the members of petitioner to their respective possession on portions of Lot No.
1982.

Petitioner claims that Special Patent No. 3351 issued by then President
Corazon Aquino on July 1, 1988 and the corresponding issuance by the Register
of Deeds of Original Certificate of Title No P-3324 in the name of NHA had
entrusted only the administration of the disputed lot to the said agency but not
the ownership thereof. It also alleges that, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2290,
issued on May 10, 1985, declaring the land situated at Barrio Macabalan,
Cagayan de Oro City, as Slum Improvement Settlement (SIR) area, it is illegal
for NHA to claim ownership over the said land. Furthermore, petitioner also
claims that "respondent Court overlooked the fact that the issues on ownership
and possession are sub-judice before RTC, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in
Civil Case No. 90-337 . . ." 10 Hence, it concludes that the appellate court
cannot pass upon these issues as there is still no final judgment on said civil
case.

Petitioner's contentions are bereft of merit.


The Original Certificate of Title (No. P-3324) issued to respondent NHA
serves as a concrete and conclusive evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property. Accordingly, once a decree of registration is issued under the Torrens
systems and the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration
has lapsed, without said decree being controverted by any adverse party, the
title becomes perfect and cannot later on be questioned. 11
Furthermore, in the case at bench, the original certificate of title was
issued by the Register of Deeds, under an administrative proceeding pursuant
to Special Patent No. 3551. Thus, it is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding as the land covered by said
certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public
Land Law. 12 Moreover, the said certificate of title was not controverted by
petitioner in a proper proceeding nor did it show that the issuance of the
Original Certificate of Title by the register of deeds to NHA was tainted with bad
faith or fraud. Hence, said certificate of title enjoys the presumption of having
been issued by the register of deeds in the regular performance of its official
duty. 13
Also, OCT No. P-3324 issued in the name of respondent NHA, clearly
states:
"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, the said parcel of land with all the
appurtenances thereunto of right of belonging unto the NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY and to its successors-in-interest or assigns
forever, subject to private rights, if any there be." 14

Clearly the certificate of title vested not only ownership over the lot but
also the right of possession as a necessary consequence of the right of
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ownership.
Respondent is not merely the administrator of the said lot. It cannot be
denied that Proclamation No. 2290 gave authority to the NHA to dispose of Lot
No. 1982. In the said Proclamation the President of the Philippines granted to
NHA the authority to "develop, administer and dispose" of Lot No. 1982, located
at Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City, "in accordance with the guidelines of the
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program and the approved development
plan of the area."
On the other hand, petitioner's only basis for claiming the disputed lot is
lawful entry and possession for an extended period of time and, as a matter of
fact, there is a final judgment in its favor in the case for forcible entry before
the MTCC. As to this, settled is the rule that, in an action for forcible entry, the
only issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership. 15 As the case filed
before the lower court is only one for forcible entry, it is indicative that the legal
title over the said property is not disputed by the petitioner. There has been no
assertion of ownership over the land, only that of prior possession. At any rate,
the judgment rendered in the ejectment case is effective only with respect to
possession and "in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." 16

Indeed, petitioner has no legal leg to stand as regards ownership because


its Miscellaneous Sales Application was not acted upon nor favorably
considered by the Bureau of Lands. The Bureau, through its Regional Director,
rejected the subdivision survey previously submitted by COCLAI, in an Order,
dated May 19, 1983.
In effect, petitioner's occupation of the land in question, after the denial of
its application for Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently illegal.
Petitioner's members have, as a consequence, become squatters whose
continuous possession of the land may now be considered to be in bad faith.
This is unfortunate because squatters acquire no legal right over the land they
are occupying. 17
Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary
injunction, transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to
another, this rule admits of some exceptions. For example, when there is a
clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject
property is covered by a Torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the
undisputed owner. 18 In the case at bench, the land subject of the suit is
covered by a Torrens title under the name of NHA.
A writ of injunction should issue so as not to render moot and academic
any decision which the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 90-337 will render
and in order to prevent any irreparable injury which respondent may sustain by
virtue of the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 23080 is AFFIRMED.

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SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 97-103.
2. Id., at pp. 106-107.
3. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. De los Angeles , 164 SCRA 543
(1988); Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643 (1986).
4. Cleveland v. Martin, 218 III. 73; 75 NE 722 cited in Laureta, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on Injunctions, p. 2 (1989 ed.).
5. Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 76 (1989);
Detective and Protective Bureau Inc. v. Cloribel, 26 SCRA 255 (1968);
Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225 (1946).
6. Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445 (1946).
7. Sales v. Securities and Exchange Commission , 169 SCRA 109 (1989).
8. Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 493 (1989).
9. Revised Rules of Court, Rule 58, Sec. 2.
10. Rollo , p. 17.
11. Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil 558 (1922); Reyes and Nadres v. Borbon
and Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791 (1927).
12. Lacaste v. Director of Lands, 63 Phil. 654 (1936), El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga,
60 Phil. 17 (1934); De los Reyes v. Razon , 38 Phil. 480 (1918) cited in
Noblejas and Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 179 (1986 ed).

13. Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5, par. (m).


14. Rollo , pp. 50-51; Emphasis supplied.
15. Joven v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700 (1992); Ganadin v. Ramos , 99
SCRA 613 (1989).
16. Revised Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 7.
17. Buenavente v. Melchor, 89 SCRA 222 (1979), City of Manila v. Garcia, 19
SCRA 413 (1967).
18. See Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 77
(1989).

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