Topic: Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67), Grounds (Art. 55)

Kristina P.
Rizon
Persons and Family Relations | EH 409
Module 5 Case Digests
Topic: Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67), Grounds (Art. 55)
Case 1
Partosa-Jo vs CA, GR 82606, December 18, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, respondent who admitted to
have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the
husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support
which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support
but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. He then elevated the decision
to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was
dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not
covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and
Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy
and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She
even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
Issue/s:
Whether there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of
conjugal property.
Ruling of Supreme Court:

Supreme Court is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial
support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the
private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. The petition was granted and in
favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be
divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the
determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those
that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
Case 2
Ong v. Ong, GR No. 153206, Oct. 23, 2006
Facts:
William Ong and Lucita Ong were and their union was blessed with 3 children. In 1996,
Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before
RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical
violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. It was on 1995 when petitioner
protested respondents decision to let their son go to Bacolod and she wants to bring their son
back, turned into a violent quarrel with respondents hitting the petitioner on the head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondent’s head asking her to
leave the conjugal house. The RTC granted appeal for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision
when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separation to
Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.

It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have
given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the
abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
Case 3
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, 30 January 1968
Facts:
Estrella and Severino was married and begotten 6 children. Estrella filed an action
against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband
aside from abandoning her also mismanaged their conjugal properties. Severino contended
that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite
his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business.
Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard
Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The
latter suspected that her husband had a mistress hence, the urgency of the separation of
property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor
of the concubine.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and whether
or not there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

No, the husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and
support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one
must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. The law
provides that there must be real abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment
must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the
husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. In the case, the
Court believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently.
Thus, the SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband
as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter
disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Case 4
Najera v. Najera G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009
Facts:
Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with Alternative Prayer for Legal separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator
Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that respondent is
presently living in the US. They were married but are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the
time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest
only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting effort to find a job at
the time of marriage; only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was
respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent
did not give petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with
petitioner and falsely accuse her of having an affair with another man whenever he came
home, and took to smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was
quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and
attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after the said incident respondent left the family
home, taking along all their personal belongings, and abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner
reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting
the annulment of their marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.

No, the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner justifiable
cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of
marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code.
Case 5
Gandionco v. Penaranda, GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
Facts:
In 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided
over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. Respondent also filed with
the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage.
Application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the
action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation.
The respondent judge ordered The payment of support pendente lite. In this recourse,
petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of
the criminal case for concubinage.

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in
the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c),
Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." That the contentions of the
petitioner is incorrect basing on Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. A
decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the
amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify
or reduce the same.
Topic: Defenses (Art. 56), Condonation
Case 6
People v. Schnekenburger, 73 Phil 413
Facts:
In 1926, the accused, Schneckenburger married Elena Cartagena and after seven years
of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately
each other.“ Both appearing to live conveniently separated from each other for the rest of their
lives and commit and bind themselves not to bother or interfere or mix under any concept in
their public or private lives, each granting giving complete freedom of action in any event and
in every respect”, which means they are separating already”. In 1935, the accused
Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the
civil court in the State of Mexico and contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia
Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as
husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the
Mexico Court, complainant instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the
other for concubinage. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. Whereas on the
trial for the offense of concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the
case was dismissed. However, upon appeal, the accused was convicted of concubinagethrough
reckless imprudence.
Issues/s:
Whether or not Mr. Schneckenberg can be convicted for concubinage.

As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission,
"consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense
prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise
with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the
vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for
adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after
its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as
effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted, without costs.
Case 7
Bugayong v. Ginez G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956
Facts:
Petitioner, a US Navy serviceman, began receiving letters informing him of the alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife, the respondent. He admitted that respondent even informed him
by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. Petitioner, then, sought for his wife and when the two
met, they both proceeded to a certain house where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1
day. Then they repaired to the petitioner’s house and again passed the night therein as
husband and wife. On the following day, petitioner tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery. But respondent, instead of
answering the query, merely packed up and left, which the petitioner took as confirmation of
the acts of infidelity imputed on his wife. Petitioner went to Ilocos “to soothe his wounded
feelings.” Petitioner, then, filed for legal separation against his wife, who in turn filed a motion
to dismiss on ground of condonation.
Issue/s: Whether or not there is condonation.

Yes, there was condonation. Pursuant to previous jurisprudence, there is condonation to
the alleged adultery on the part of the husband. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders,
a legal separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. Further, single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where
the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
Moreover, pursuant to foreign jurisprudence, a divorce suit will not be granted for
adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known or there is sexual
intercourse after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a single night. Since the parties
have stayed together as husband and wife for more than two nights after the knowledge of
wife’s infidelity, condonation is established.
Case 8
Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao, G.R. No. 196842, Oct. 9, 2013
Facts:
In 1975, She and Alfredo, Chief of Hospital in Davao were married at the Assumption
Church, Davao City. Their union was blessed with two sons. However, in 1983, their marriage
turned sour. At this time, Rosa unearthed photographs of, and love letters addressed to Alfredo
from, other women. An opportunity to work as nurse in United States opened up for Rosa.
Before leaving, Rosa took up the matter again with Alfredo, who remained opposed to her
working abroad. Furious with Rosa‘s pressing, Alfredo took his loaded gun and pointed it at
Rosa‘s right temple, threatening and taunting Rosa to attempt to leave him and their family.
Alfredo was only staved off because Rosa‘s mother arrived at the couple‘s house. Alfredo left
the house in a rage: Rosa and her mother heard gun shots fired outside. Rosa acted up to her
plan and left for the US. While in the US, Rosa became homesick and was subsequently joined
by her children who were brought to the US by Alfredo. During that time his entire family was
in the US, Alfredo never sent financial support. In fact, it was Rosa who would remit money to
Alfredo from time to time, believing that Alfredo had stopped womanizing. Rosa finally learned
of Alfredo’s extra-marital relationships.
Issue/s: Whether or not there was condonation.

Yes, there was condonation. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent
with the DOJ, over Rosa’s complaint, and after choosing to exercise such jurisdiction, need not
defer to the dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as Alfredo. In other words, the
Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the DOJ. Alfredo next argues that
Rosa had pardoned his concubinage, having admitted to knowing of his womanizing and yet
continuing with their relationship as demonstrated in Rosa’s annual visits to him in Davao.
We can find nothing in the record which can be construed as pardon or condonation. It is true
that the offended party has to a considerable extent been patient with her husband's
shortcomings, but that seems to have been due to his promises of improvement; nowhere does
it appear that she has consented to her husband's immorality or that she has acquiesced in his
relations with his concubine. While such a claim is not necessarily preposterous, we hold that
such is a matter of defense which Alfredo should raise in court given that Rosa s complaint and
its accompanying affidavits have created a prima facie case for Concubinage against Alfredo and
mistress. The petition was DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Ombudsman were AFFIRMED.
Topic: Defenses (Art. 56), Consent
Case 9
People v. Sensano and Ramos, 58 Phil 73
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married and had a child whom Mariano
allegedly abandoned when he went and stayed in Cagayan for three years without letters or
financial support to the former who worked hard for herself and her son until she met the
accused Marcelo Ramos who later took care of them. Ventura charged Sensano and Ramos for
adultery, found by the court guilty of the crime charged and served their sentence. Sensano
after serving her sentenced and leaving her paramour made steps to reconcile with and go back
to her husband but to no avail - She and her child were abandoned for the second time. So,
they went back to her co-accused Ramos. Despite the knowledge that she resumed living with
her codefendant, her husband did nothing to assert his right as her spouse. He went abroad for
seven years and presumably had completely abandoned them. When Ventura returned home,
he charged Sensano of adultery for the second time in order to obtain divorce under Act No.
2710.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Ramos can file adultery against his spouse for the second time being the
offended party.

No, the Court concluded that the evidence in this case as well as the conduct of Ramos
showed that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and former
co-defendant. He is therefore under the law not authorized to institute the criminal proceeding.
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:
Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The court, in reversing the decision of the
court aquo found the argument of the Solicitor General that his seven years of acquiescence in
the adultery of his wife is due to his absence in the country which made him impossible to take
any action against the accused, to be unmeritorious.
Case 10
Matubis v. Praxedes, G.R. No. L-11786, Oct. 25, 1960
Facts:
In 1943, Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married. In 1948, they entered
into a contract wherein they agreed that they shall live separately and that they should not
prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from their
separation. In January 1955, Zoilo began cohabiting with Asuncion, who later gave birth to their
child. In April 1956, Socorro filed a complaint for legal Separation on the ground of
abandonment and concubinage against Zoilo. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription and condonation/consent.
Issue/s:
Whether or not action was prescribed? Whether or not Socorro consented to the
commission of concubinage by her husband?

Yes, Under Art. 102 of the Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from after the date when cause occurred (now 5 years under Art. 57, FC).
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very
admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in
January of 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. The agreement gives no
room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on
the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law specifically provides
that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented
in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
Topic: Defenses (Art. 56), Connivance
Case 11
Arroyo, Jr. v. CA, 203 SCRA 750
Facts:
Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri. Both defendants pleaded not
guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery as
defined under Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for
reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband,
complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later con traded marriage with another
woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts
on his credibility and whether or not Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from
filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto.

The case cited does not support petitioner Neri’s position. No such acquiescence can be
implied: the accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to
marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after discovering
the illicit affair. While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the
sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit
affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior
to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was
executed only on 23 November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on
16 February 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December
1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri’s manifestation is both dated
and signed after issuance of our Resolution in 1991.
Topic: Defenses (Art. 56), Mutual Guilt or Recrimination, Collusion, Prescription
Case 12
Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil 168
Facts:
In 1955, William H. Brown filed suit to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife
Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from
1942 to 1945, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot
a baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from
internment and that they have lived separately thereafter. Brown prayed for confirmation of
the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the
defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be
just and equitable. The court declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due
time, despite service of summons and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, if collusion exists between the
parties. It was found out during the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant Fiscal that
after the liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children
by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the
ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of
similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted.

No, it cannot be granted. The court below correctly held that the appellant’s action was
already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years
after he learned of his wife’s adultery, which was upon his release from internment in
1945.Appellant’s brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that: “The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either
of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of
the petition.”
In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned law,
wherein Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be granted.
Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that: “An action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.” Brown did not
petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife’s adultery.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the
remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it
becomes unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown’s inaction for ten
years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation
would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error. The third
assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Topic: Procedure (Arts. 58-60), A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC Rule on Legal Separation
Case 13
Pacete v. Carriaga, GR No. 53880, March 17, 1994, 231 SCRA 321
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between
her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. Cited in her complaint, that
she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child; that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with
summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants
failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received
plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial,
the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to
be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
parties exists. If there is collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. “The stated provision calling for
the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That
other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action
cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings, including the
Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
Topic: Effects (Arts. 61-64)
Case 14
Sabalones v. CA, 230 SCRA 79
Facts:
Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to the respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, his
wife, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years as a diplomatic
service assigned to different countries. In 1985, Sabalones retired and came back to the
Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that
he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of
the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment. Respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the house in was being occupied by her and their six children and that they
were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and
lot in Forbes Park which was on lease. She also informed the court that despite her husband's
retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate
residence in Don Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their
three children. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and
order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein
because of his adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a)
disturbing the occupants of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of
the conjugal properties. The RTC found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous
marriage in 1981, with Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in
1985 at a separate residence. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and
the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was
not entitled to support from his respondent wife.

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost
nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal
partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be
renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals. In her motion
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her
children of the income therefrom on which they depend for their subsistence. She also testified
the numerous including various dollar accounts, two houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and
a Mercedes Benz. The private respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner
executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California,
U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the
prejudice of his legitimate family. These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband,
show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her
children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Let it be stressed that the injunction
has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of
conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the
meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the
administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
Topic: Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 68-73), Basic Obligations
Case 15
Azcueta v. Republic G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009
Facts:
Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married and bore no child then separated in
1997 after four years of marriage. Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, claiming that her husband
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage,
that Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to
married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of husband. Petitioner also
complained of physical violence.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding
that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.

Yes, after a thorough review of the records of the case, there was sufficient compliance
with the guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under
Article 36. The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina
stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to
wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
The Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
Case 16
Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, G.R. No. 139789, July 19, 2001 & G.R. No. 139808, May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Ilusorio the petitioner, seeks to reverse the Decision of the CA dismissing her
application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
the respondent and enforce consortium. Potenciano filed a petition to annul the portion of the
Decision of the CA giving visitation rights her wife Erlinda to her. Potenciano is about 86 years
of age, possessed extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He was, for many years, the
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. Erlinda and Potenciano are
married couple but they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. They have six
(6) children (co-respondents). In 1997, Potenciano arrived from USA. He stayed for five months
with Erlinda. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during such time, Erlinda gave
Potenciano an overdosed amount of Zoloft (instead of 100mg, she gave 200mg); thus,
Potenciano’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for Guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to his wife but rather he went and lived at
Makati with his children. Because of such event, Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her lawyer husband, Potenciano. CA denied such petition.
Issue/s: Whether or not the habeas corpus may be availed by Erlinda to compel Potenciano to
live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling of Supreme Court: Marital rights including overture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. No court is empowered as a
judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means process.
That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus
because P never prayed for such right.
In this case, Potenciano was found to be of sound mind and possesses the capacity to make
own choices. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not
be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy.
Case 17
Tenchavez v. Escano G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
Facts:
In 1948, Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32,
before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and they were already
estranged. In 1950, Vicenta left for the United Stated. On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had
several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship. Tenchavez then filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta
F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against
the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts and counterclaimed
for moral damages.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of
the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. it is not valid. Their marriage remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine
Law. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the
Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with
her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United
States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts
which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal
separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
Case 18
People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
Facts:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. In 1999, KKK
executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at
3 :00 a.m. in their residence and that he boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in
bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her
vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush, but he would threaten her into submission. One night, in the spouse’s
bedroom, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She
politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well. The
accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on
to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by
refusing to bend her legs. The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster, stretched her legs
apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands
and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to
protest by desperately shouting: “Don‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.” The
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges
as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to
cover up her extra-marital affairs.
Issue/s: Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

Yes, there can be marital rape. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have
property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage,
if not consensual, is rape. It is a violation of equal protection clause. The Court ruled that to
treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that
constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved. According to the Court, it is now
acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her,
and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines
and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
Topic: Property Relations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 74-148), Common Law Spouses,
Void
Case 19
Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael, GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001; 370 SCRA 414
Facts:
In 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot. In 1980, Zosima died hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of
the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him
after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store
inside. According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room.
On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told
her that Cirila was his mistress. Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper. She denied
having sexual intercourse with Francisco. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of
income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets. In 1991, few months before
Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot
to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion was left under his name. This was made in
consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the
deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. Francisco died and in 1993, the lot
received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s
nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-
law wife of Francisco.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Cirila’s favor
was valid.

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand
her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver–employee. Cohabitation means
more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no
longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and
women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco
in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Topic: System of Absolute Community (Arts. 88-104), Exclusive Properties, Liabilities of the
Absolute Community
Case 20
Ayala Investment & Dev. Corp, et. al. v. CA, GR No. 1183305, Feb. 12, 1998
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing
of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused
the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.

The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of
recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. Based from
jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with
AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be
made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM. The court did
not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted
when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil
Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin-
off of the loan itself.
Case 21
Wong v. IAC, GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
Facts:
In 1964, Romario Henson married Katrina. They had 3 children however, even during
the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. In
1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20-day
period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued a check which was
dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for
collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with
counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. The RTC ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ
of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico
Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos
and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied
through the conjugal property.

The spouses had been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized
her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with
unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed
to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of
the husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The writ of
execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over
properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for
Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband,
nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that
the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and
the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.
Case 22
Carlos v. Abelardo, GR No. 146504, April 9, 2002
Facts:
In 1989, respondent Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo
approached petitioner Honorio Carlos to borrow for purchase of house and lot. Manuel is the
son-in-law of Honorio. As a result, a check was then issued by Honorio to Pura Vallejo, seller of
the subject house and lot, as full payment. Honorio inquired the status of the loan he extended
to the spouses. Manuel acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they are not yet in a
position to make a definite settlement. However, Manuel showed violent resistance to the
inquiries of Honorio, even making death threats to the latter. In 1994, Honorio made a formal
demand for the payment of the loan but the spouses failed to comply with such demand.
Honorio then filed a complaint for collection of money and damages against the spouses. This
includes collection of the principal of the loan, legal interests from the date of formal demand,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. Being separated in fact for
more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, Manuel and Maria Theresa filed separate
answers to the complaint of Honorio. Maria Theresa admitted securing the loan, but she
believed the loan was payable on a staggered basis. Manuel was asked to sign and
acknowledge. Manuel admitted receiving the amount but it is because of his share from the
profits earned by HL Carlos Construction, in which he works for. Manuel also denied having
made death threats to Honorio and by way of counterclaim, he asked for moral damages from
Honorio for causing the alienation of his wife’s love and affection, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit. In 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Carlos, ordering to pay the amount,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. Abelardo appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court
due to insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed a loan made by
Manuel. Honorio filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court.
Issue/s: Whether or not the loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged
against the conjugal partnership.

The petition of Carlos was granted. The decision of the appellate court is modified. In
pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, the loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership.
While Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his
wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to
purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Article 21 of the
Family Code, he shall be liable for such loan together with his wife. As for the loan, yes, as it has
redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in
the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the
construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders
that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was granted
and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest
including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Case 23
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao and got four children.
They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against
Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55,
thereby awarding the custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent
spouse. The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject
to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to
paragraph 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code. Few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for
execution, which was granted by the trial court. In 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the
earlier decision; the writ was partially executed. After more than nine months, Brigido filed a
motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held
that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.” Upon a motion for reconsideration, it
initially set aside its previous decision stating that net profit earned shall be computed in
accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted to its
original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in
the conjugal partnership.

Since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties are considered part
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the listed properties should be
divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
Topic: Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property
Case 24
Sabalones v. CA, 230 SCRA 79
Facts:
Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to the respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, his
wife, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years as a diplomatic
service assigned to different countries. In 1985, Sabalones retired and came back to the
Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that
he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of
the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical
treatment. Respondent opposed and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that
the house in was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for
their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park
which was on lease. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had
not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in Don
Antonio Heights, Fairview, Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children. She
prayed for the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their
conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She
also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of the
Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. The
RTC found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage in 1981, with Thelma
Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement in 1985 at a separate residence. The
court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's
share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his
respondent wife.
Petition was denied for lack of merit. The Court notes that the wife has been
administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without
complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is
that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at
least be given his share of the rentals. In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park
would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income therefrom on which
they depend for their subsistence. She also testified the numerous including various dollar
accounts, two houses in Quezon City and Cebu City, and a Mercedes Benz. The private
respondent also complained that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a quitclaim over
their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma
Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate
family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction
is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the
dissipation of the conjugal assets. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently
installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has
merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without
interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in
accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.
Case 25
Giuang v. CA, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Facts:
Judie Corpuz and Gilda Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have 3 children.
In1983, Spouses Corpuz bought a lot from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a
conditional deed of sale. In 1988, the spouses Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Gilda left for Manila to look for work abroad.
Unfortunately, she became a victimof an illegal recruiter. Harriet learned that her father
intended to sell the remaining half portion of the lot, including their house, to the Guiangs. She
wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet did not
inform Judie about this but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Guiang so that she would advise her
father. Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion. They executed a
document Deed of Transfer of Rights. Gilda returned from Manila. Her children informed her
that their father had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda was
complained against by Spouses Guiang before the Barangay authorities. Parties signed an
“Amicable Settlement” to wit: That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, to
leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding
without any charge. The plaintiff went to the Barangay Captain to question her signature on the
amicable settlement. Gilda filed for the nullification of the Deed of Sale executed by Judie in
favor of the Spouses Guiang. RTC rendered judgment in her favor. CA affirmed the RTC ruling
pursuant to Art 124 of the Family Code.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Contract of Sale was merely voidable and whether or not the
Contract of Sale was ratified by Gilda when she entered into an amicable settlement with the
spouses Guiang.

Petitioners contend that the absence of Gilda’s consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Art 1390 of the Civil Code" ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: Those
where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
“Gilda’s consent was not obtained thru mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud but her consent was TOTALLY INEXISTENT. This being the case, said contract properly falls
within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two
lower courts. In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of
the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar. In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of
Rights and the 'amicable settlement' are null and void. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES
the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
Case 26
Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, et al. GR No. 147978, January 28, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the
respondents from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa.
After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of
payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance
from him that he would secure his wife’s consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she
was informed that respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife's written consent.

Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.” The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal;
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be
obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even
granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject
properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
She may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however
that is not sufficient to demonstrate consent.
Case 27
Vda. De Ramones v. Agbayani, GR. No. 137808, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 306
Facts:
Santos Ramones, without knowledge of his wife Aldegonda Ramones, sold part of the
lot that is part of their conjugal property to Aurora Agbayani. In 1980, Santos Ramones died
and afterwards Aldegonda built a septic tank and restroom in the land that was sold to
Agbayani. Thus, Agbayani filed a complaint. The RTC ruled that Deed of Sale is void since it was
without the consent of Aldegonda. The CA reversed RTC ruling since while Art 166 prohibits
the selling of property by the husband without the consent of his wife, the wife may
only question such transaction within 10 years and have it annulled as found in Art.
173 of CC. Aldegonda did no such action.
Issue/s:
Whether sale of real property belonging to conjugal partnership of husband
without his wife‘s consent is void.

The petition was denied, and CA decision was affirmed. There is no dispute that the lot
sold is the conjugal property of spouses Ramones. Article 166 read with Article 173 merely
makes it voidable. Family Code cannot be retroactively applied so Civil Code is law that governs.
Deed of Sale also governed under Civil Code. There is no proof that petitioner Aldegonda
Ramones filed any complaint to annul the Deed of Sale entered into by her husband. As held by
this Court in Villaranda,8 "her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus
prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.
Case 28
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Facts:
Shirley B. Nuega, the respondent, was married to Rogelio A. Nuega. Shirley sent Rogelio
money for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to eventually
build their home. In 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house from Rodeanna Realty
Corporation. Shirley claims that in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject
property with the developer through SSS financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding
monthly amortizations. Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The
following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information
that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She
also learned and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in 1992, that Rogelio
had been introducing Escobar as his wife. Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for
Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation
and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. Shirley learned that Rogelio had the
intention of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of
whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) of the existence of the
cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property
until the cases are closed and terminated. Rogelio, under a Deed of Absolute Sale sold the
subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of P380,000.00,
including petitioner’s undertaking to assume the existing mortgage.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is null and void for lack of the consent of the wife.
Ruling of Supreme Court: Yes, it is null and void. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A
buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the
seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale. The nullity of
the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s financial contribution in the
purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a
piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community
property. Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides: Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this
Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property
owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. The
only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by
the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement. Under the first exception
are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states: Art. 92. The following
shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse and the fruits as
well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of
the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article
92, it, therefore, forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio.
Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite
the fact that only Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by
the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Topic: Simultaneous Liquidation of Community Properties of two or more marriages
Case 29
Dael v. IAC, GR No. 68873, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 524
Facts:
Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida Durana, whom he had five children, upon
the death of Beinvenida; He contracted a second marriage with his former wife’s sister
Victorina. Cesario later on died in 1972. Respondents filed settlement over the property of
their deceased parents. Trial Court rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no
paraphernal properties brought to her marriage with Cesario. That the copra business was
formed during the first marriage and Victorina used the same facilities, credit and capital in
managing the business, and the main source of the income not only of Cesario and also
of Victorina during their respective lifetimes was the copra business. Hence, the extent of the
Estate of Victorina shall consist only of her share in the inheritance of the Estate of Cesario
Cabutihan. Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the marital community of proprietary interest continues to exist in the
second marriage, even after the Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership has been dissolved by
the death of Bienvenida.

The first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved because of death of
Bienvenida and it was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. There should be
liquidation of properties before contracting another marriage. Since there was none, the total
mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective
spouses. One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to
Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited by
him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida. The properties pertaining to the second
partnership shall also be equally divided, one-half (1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to
Victorina as their respective shares in their conjugal partnership properties. The share of
Cesario should then be divided among his heirs, namely, Victorina and his five (5) children. To
recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for distribution to her heirs shall consist of her one-half
(1/2) share in the conjugal properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth (1/6)
share in the estate of Cesario as an heir.
Case 30
Vda. De Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216
A partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages contracted by

Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer,. Second, with Dorotea de Ocampo. The action
for partition was instituted by a daughter and a son of the first marriage and the heirs of
Francisco Delizo, against their father and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine
(9) children, all surnamed Delizo. The defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the
properties described in the complaint were those of the second marriage. 1957, Nicolas Delizo
died and was substituted by his children in the second as party defendants. The lower court
rendered judgment on April 27, 1964, distributing the aforesaid properties as follows: (a)
onehalf (½) pro indiviso to the three (3) children of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo,
Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the deceased Francisco Delizo, viz.: Rancivillano Soltrifilo
Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe (b) one-fourth (¼) pro indiviso to the surviving spouse,
Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) one-fourth (¼) pro in equal shares to the children of both
marriages, nine (9) of whom were begotten during the second marriage, or into thirteen (13)
parts. In 1970, Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court rendered
judgment, affirming with modifications the trial court's decision. The CA disagrees with lower
court. Dorotea elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Conjugal Property of Gains is the property regime the Caanawan
lands belong to 1st or 2nd marriage.

Property belongs to CPG of the 2nd marriage as land was only registered during second
marriage. Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be
determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided
between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership.
Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32 of
the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership. to 18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro
indivision. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second marriages, which would
amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This should be distributed in equal shares to his
children of both marriages, 9 with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate child.
10 The widow. Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half (½) of the net remainder of the
second conjugal partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased husband which amounts
to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The share of the heirs of Rosa
Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof. In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take
into account the fact that the respondents-appellees are in possession of the Muñoz lands,
while the petitioners-appellants have been in possession of the Caanawan properties as well as
the house and lot in, Manila, as directed in the trial court's order of record on Appeal. Should it
be convenient for the parties, their respective shares should be taken from the properties
presently under their custody. Having reached the foregoing conclusions. it is unnecessary to
resolve the other legal questions raised in the appeal. The appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby modified as herein indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they
are hereby, remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this
judgment.
Topic: Immutability of Matrimonial Property Regime
Case 31
Matthews v. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Facts:
Spouses Benjamin (British) and Joselyn (Filipina) Taylor, bought a lot in Boracay which
was financed by Benjamin, also through the funds of Benjamin, they managed to improve and
convert the same lot to a vacation and tourists’ resort. When the spouses were falling out,
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of her husband and which authorized the
latter to maintain, sell, lease and sub-lease their Boracay Property. Joselyn and petitioner Philip
Matthews had an Agreement of Lease without the consent of Benjamin. Benjamin instituted a
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement against the two.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided funds
used in purchasing the same.

Benjamin has no right to nullify, which makes him not the owner. As provided in the FC
and Constitution, an alien/foreigner is prohibited to acquire public or private property/land in
the Philippines. Therefore, no declaration of can be made that the subject property was part of
the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
Topic: Conjugal Properties

Case 32
Spouses Ricky and Anita Wong, et. al. vs. IAC et.al.
Facts:
Romarico Henson the respondent married Katrina Pineda. They have three children but
even during the early years of their marriage they had been most of the time living separately.
The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage,
Romarico bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father, with money borrowed from an
office mate. In Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby Anita
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.
Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds.
Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. The Trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
Katrina’s liability was not criminal but civil in nature.The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong
filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The
reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. The RTC ruled in favor of the Wongs
then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to
Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption,
Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
Issue/s:
Whether or not debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied
through the conjugal property.

The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal
with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is
presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive
property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The
writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends
only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer
for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her
husband, nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence
submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so
far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the
debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
Case 33
Ching vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 124642, 23 February 2004
Facts:
The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. obtained a loan from the Allied Banking
Corporation. As an added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tadeo
and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly and
severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans. ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of preliminary attachment. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud
defendants employed in incurring the obligations by representing themselves as having the
financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not have such capacity. In 1983, the
deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp
stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo
Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out
of conjugal funds .She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-
party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties. She attached therewith
a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the liability.

The Petition is granted. The evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the
100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in
its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was
incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the
petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership
property of the petitioners. The respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of
stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the
name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the
conjugal partnership, owned the same. The respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of
PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish
that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership. In this case, the petitioner-husband
acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.
Case 34
Villanueva et al. vs. Court of Appeals et al., GR No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Facts:
In 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia
sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties, claiming that such are
her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas.
Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five children. During their marriage, they acquired real
properties and all improvements. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land which he inherited
from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary
shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land. Some of the properties earn income from
coconuts leased to corporations. In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and
cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate
son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita,
from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no
properties of her own from which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered
stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the
income of his properties. A settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in
favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her
heirs. CA upheld trial court’s decision.
Issue/s: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia
and Procopio are conjugal.

The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is
on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement
that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they
are presumed conjugal. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and
Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased
on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia.Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during
the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is
that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Case 35
Pintiano- Anno vs. Anno, GR 163743, Jan 27, 2006
Facts:
In 1963, Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno and respondent Albert Anno were married.
They had no children. Petitioner contends that during their marriage, they acquired land. In
1974, the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband. Petitioner
contends that she and her spouse had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land; that they both worked on the land, and, that
they also hired a caretaker to oversee it. The petitioner contends that without her knowledge,
respondent Albert executed two documents of transfer covering the subject land. In 1996, an
Affidavit of Waiver, respondent Albert waived and quitclaimed in favor of petitioner's first
cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion of the subject land. Respondent
Albert conveyed to respondent Suanding the remainder of the land in a Deed of Sale. In both
documents, respondent Albert declared that he is the lawful owner and possessor of the
subject land. Petitioner filed a case against respondents Albert Anno and Suanding with the
MTC for Cancellation of the Waiver of Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and
Damages, with a prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In her complaint,
petitioner alleged that the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of spouses Anno,
and thus could not have been validly conveyed by respondent Albert to respondent Suanding
without her written consent as spouse. Respondent Albert did not file an Answer. For his part,
respondent Suanding took the stand. He testified that respondent Albert represented to him
that the land was his exclusive property as the land was part of his inheritance and he had been
in possession thereof prior to his marriage to petitioner. He likewise presented a 1997
Certificate from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, stating that no improvements were listed
in their records as introduced by respondent Anno on the subject land. MTC ruled in favor of
petitioner. Respondent Suanding appealed to the RTC and thus declared the land to be the
exclusive property of the vendor, respondent Albert Anno, which he could validly sell without
the consent of petitioner-spouse. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. It
likewise found petitioner's evidence insufficient to prove that the subject land was acquired by
spouses Anno during their marriage.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses
Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the consent of the other.

The Court finds no merit in the petition. The petitioner failed to substantiate by
preponderance of evidence her claim that the subject land was conjugal in nature. Petitioner
did not identify when she and her husband, respondent Albert, first occupied and possessed
the land. Neither did she present any witness to prove that they first occupied the land during
their marriage and that they both worked on the land. While petitioner claimed that they also
hired a caretaker to oversee the land, the records show that the caretaker was appointed only
in 1989. Indeed, even the documentary evidence adduced by petitioner failed to show when
exactly the spouses Anno first took possession of the land. While the initial tax declaration she
presented was dated 1974, it cannot be automatically deduced therefrom that occupation of
the subject land was likewise done in the same year. To so conclude will amount to speculation
or conjecture on the part of the court. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court,
declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be equated with its acquisition for, in the
ordinary course of things, occupation of a piece of land usually comes prior to the act of
declaring it for tax purposes. More importantly, the 1974 tax declaration presented by
petitioner cannot be made a basis to prove its conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax
purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert, who sold the land as his
exclusive property. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that tax declarations, especially of
untitled lands, are credible proof of claim of ownership and are good indicia of possession in
the concept of an owner.
Case 36
Go vs. Yamane, GR No. 160762, May 3, 2006
Facts:
In the civil case “Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane
v. Cypress Corporation”, Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman was the counsel who handled the
plaintiffs in the said case. To satisfy the lien for attorney's fees, a parcel of land, registered in
the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane (wife of Leonardo Yamane), was scheduled to be sold at
public auction on August 11, 1981. Spouses Josephine and Henry Go, the petitioners, were
awarded the said land as the highest bidders in the auction. Respondent Leonardo Yamane filed
a complaint for annulment and cancellation of Sale to petitioners, invoking a third-party claim.
Respondent contended that the land was a conjugal property and could not be held responsible
for the personal obligations of Muriel and the two other Pucays. The RTC ruled against
respondent, reasoning that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the late
Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property. The Court
of Appeals ruled otherwise, saying that the property acquired during marriage is presumed to
be conjugal unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the
purpose. The property was acquired by couple from a certain Eugene Pucay during their
marriage and, therefore, was a conjugal property.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in Muriel Pucay’s name was a conjugal property and
should not be held responsible for the obligations of Muriel Pucay and her sisters.

The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions. Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
"As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name
the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As to the
responsibility of the then established conjugal property, the contract or transaction between
Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appear[s] to have been incurred for the exclusive
interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her
two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly,
whatever expenses were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private and
exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against the
contested conjugal property.
Case 37
Ferrer vs. Ferrer, GR No. 166496, Nov. 9, 2006 (Art. 120)
Facts:
Josefa Bautista Ferrer the petitioner alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a
half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer and Ismael M. Ferrer. Before her marriage to
Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
67927. He applied for a loan with the Social Security System to build improvements thereon,
including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple's conjugal funds. From their
conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Petitioner averred
that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the
warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he
had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in
favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. Petitioner argued that her husband
had no other property, and his only property had been sold to the respondents; hence, she has
the legal right to claim for reimbursement from the respondents who are now the owners of
the lot and the improvements made.
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner’s complaint fails to state a cause of action against the
respondents.

The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the
Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner's spouse nor can
they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner
for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner's right to be reimbursed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Case 38
MBTC vs. Tan, GR. No. 163712, Nov. 30, 2006
Facts:
Upon application of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company for extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage, the Office of the Provincial Sheriff issued a “Sheriff‘s Notice of Sale”
setting on the sale at public auction of four mortgaged parcels of land registered in the name of
Jose B. Tan. Spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a complaint against Metrobank for
removal of cloud on the title in question and injunction before the Regional Trial Court before
the scheduled public auction. Eliza Go Tan avers that she never gave her consent or conformity
to encumber the title in question. The real estate mortgages are null and void because Jose B.
Tan had already fully paid the obligations secured by the mortgages. On the other hand,
Metrobank alleged that the Spouses Tan, together with their two sons, obtained a credit line
from which they made availments from time to time. Consequently, the line was gradually
increased. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Tan. Metrobank appealed before the
Court of Appeals. By Decision the CA affirmed RTC’s decision and accordingly dismissed the
appeal. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same has been dismissed. Hence, this
petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the mortgage covering
the title in question would render the encumbrance void.

Eliza Go Tan the respondent claimed that did not give her consent to the mortgage of
the title in question, the same is belied by her signature on Real Estate Mortgage which is
annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of the title. Her bare denial that the signature was
forged, without more, does not lie. In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to
the mortgage covering the title in question would not render the encumbrance void under the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting that the property
covered by the title is conjugal that it was acquired during respondent’s marriage which is what
would give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal property. The statement in the title that
the property is “registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property
Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan” does not
prove or indicate that the property is conjugal. The presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code that properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in
the instant case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first be established that the
property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during
the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar.
Case 39
Matthews vs. Taylor, GR. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Facts:
Spouses Benjamin (British) and Joselyn (Filipina) Taylor, bought a lot in Boracay which
was financed by Benjamin, also through the funds of Benjamin, they managed to improve and
convert the same lot to a vacation and tourists’ resort. When the spouses were falling out,
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of her husband and which authorized the
latter to maintain, sell, lease and sub-lease their Boracay Property. Joselyn and petitioner Philip
Matthews had an Agreement of Lease without the consent of Benjamin. Benjamin instituted a
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement against the two.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided funds
used in purchasing the same.

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of
Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his
expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of
the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the
alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
Case 40
Ocampo vs. Ocampo, GR. No. 198908, August 3, 2015
Facts:
Virginia filed a petition to declare her marriage with Deogracio void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition,
but gave the parties 30 days to submit an inventory of their conjugal partnership for liquidation.
As both parties failed to agree to a project of partition, hearing ensued where they adduced
evidence to prove their entitlement to the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership.
After the hearing, the RTC issued an order declaring that the parties are entitled to a 50-50
sharing of the properties. Virginia filed her notice of appeal of the order, while Deogracio
opposed it; the RTC denied Deogracio’s motion. The Court of Appeals denied Virginia’s appeal
and her subsequent motion for reconsideration. Thus, Virginia elevated her case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Deogracio should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
Ruling of Supreme Court: The petition lacks merit. While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital
knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships,
however, which will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they
were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. The former spouses both substantially
agree that they acquired the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage. The
certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption
under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate
of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article
116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is “registered in the
name of one or both of the spouses.” Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption,
said properties were obtained by the spouses’ joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
jointly owned by them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses’
properties on the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should
be affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Petition, denied. CA
decision affirmed.
Case 41
Costuna v. Domondon, GR. No. 82753, Dec. 19, 1989
Facts:
Spouses Amadeo and Estela Costuna acquired three parcels of land and registered in the
name of Amadeo Costuna. In 1977, Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs which
were treated at various hospitals on different dates. At the request of his relatives and while
already being ill, Amadeo went to Samar where he stayed with his sister to sign documents that
needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties and never returned to Estela. A feud
ensued among Amadeo’s relatives and Estela over his custody prompting Estela to institute a
petition for habeas corpus. Five days later, Amadeo filed an action for partition before the
Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court. In 1978, after failing to get Estela’s consent to the
desired partition, Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale over the one-half
undetermined portion of the conjugal property in favor of Laureana Domondon (respondent)
without the consent of Estela. Estela Costuna instituted special proceedings claiming pro
indiviso one half share over the lots after Amadeo’s death. On the other hand, Domondon filed
an action to compel Estela to give her conformity to the deed of sale executed by Amadeo,
which was granted by the trial court and ordered Estela to affix her signature on the deed of
sale. The sale of the 1/2 of the conjugal properties to Domondon was allegedly for the payment
of Amandeo’s hospital expenses, which Estela never rebutted. Estela, however, avers that the
sale was void because her consent was not given and argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying Articles 166 and 167 of the new Civil Code and related jurisprudence.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the sale of conjugal properties by the husband may be validly made
without the consent of the wife, and whether or not the conjugal partnership should be made
liable for the payment of Amadeo’s hospital dues who allegedly abandoned the conjugal home
and his wife.

As a general rule, the husband may not validly sell real estates belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. However, the New Civil Code provides certain
exceptions. In this case, Amadeo sought the petitioner’s consent but was adamantly withheld
by the latter from her belief that the deed of sale was executed in fraud of her. What was sold
by Amadeo without the petitioner’s consent was only an undetermined one-half share in the
community properties, but he left intact the other undetermined 1/2 share which should
belong to Estela Cosuna. The Court concedes that the consent of the petitioner is essential for
the validity of the sale, however, the Court may relax the application of the law and consider
the sale as falling within the recognized exceptions if consent was unreasonably withheld.
Article 161 of the Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband or the wife for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The Court states that the benefit required by this article need not be quantified
into pesos or square meters of real property. It is enough that the well-being of both or either
spouses would undeniably redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The decision of
the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Topic: Liabilities of Conjugal Partnership
Case 42
Carlos v. Abelardo, GR. No. 146504, April 4, 2002
Facts:
Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached petitioner
Honorio Carlos to borrow for purchase of house and lot. Manuel is the son-in-law of Honorio.
As a result, a check was then issued by Honorio to Pura Vallejo, seller of the subject house and
lot, as full payment. In 1991, Honorio inquired the status of the loan he extended to the
spouses. Manuel acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they are not yet in a position
to make a definite settlement. However, Manuel showed violent resistance to the inquiries of
Honorio, even making death threats to the latter. In 1994, Honorio made a formal demand for
the payment of the loan but the spouses failed to comply with such demand. Honorio then filed
a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages against the spouses. Being separated
in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, Manuel and Maria Theresa filed
separate answers to the complaint of Honorio. Manuel admitted receiving the amount. Manuel
also denied having made death threats to Honorio and by way of counterclaim, he asked for
moral damages from Honorio for causing the alienation of his wife’s love and affection,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit. In 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Carlos.
Abelardo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court due to insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was
indeed a loan made by Manuel. Honorio filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied
by the appellate court.
Issue/s: Whether or not the loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged
against the conjugal partnership.

The Supreme Court granted the petition of Carlos. The decision of the appellate court is
modified. In pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, the loan is the liability of the conjugal
partnership. While Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was
used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his
family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Article 21 of
the Family Code, he shall be liable for such loan together with his wife. As for the loan, yes, as it
has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in
the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the
construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders
that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was granted
and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest
including moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Case 43
Carandang v. Heirs of Quirino de Guzman, GR No. 160347, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts:
Spouses Carandang and Quirino de Guzman were stockholders and corporate officers of
Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS). The Carandangs have equities at 54 % while Quirino has
46%. When the capital stock of MBS was increased in 1983, the Carandangs subscribed
P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the said amount was loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In
the subsequent increase in MBS’ capital stock on March 3, 1989, the Carandangs subscribed
again to the increase in the amount of P93,750. But, P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was
again loaned by Quirino. When Quirino sent a demand letter to the Carandangs for the
payment of the loan, the Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a pre-incorporation
agreement was executed between Arcadio Carandang and Quirino. Thereafter, Quirino filed a
complaint seeking to recover the P336,375 total amount of the loan together with damages.
The RTC ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to pay the loan plus interest,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. The Carandangs appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA,
but the CA affirmed the same. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Carandangs were also denied. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was not
included as a party-plaintiff. (

Although the spouses Carandang were correct in invoking the aforementioned doctrine,
the ground set forth entails an examination of “whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such
outcome are actually pleaded.” The first query seeks to answer the question of whether
Milagros is a real party in interest, while the latter query is asking if she is an indispensable
party. Since the issue of this case calls for the definition of an indispensable party, invoking the
abovementioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case because the doctrine talks about a ‘real party
in interest’ and not an ‘indispensable party’. Although it is important to take note that an
indispensable party is also a real party in interest. “In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-
owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the
recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner
who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.” Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not
an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the
spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of
the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
Case 44
SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp., GR. No. 143382, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts:
Mar Tierra Corporation, (respondent) through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez,
applied for a credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent
corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. Respondent corporation
was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing
operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against the corporation and individual respondents. The
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation
and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it
found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. Petitioner appealed to CA. It
affirmed RTC decision. Petitioned to SC.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement
entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party.

The Supreme Court upheld the CA. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.” The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as
a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the
principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used
in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an
obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation
redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or
services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner
and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the
burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the
transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
Case 45
Dewara v. Alvero, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011
Facts:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara were married before the
enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband
and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in US while Eduardo stayed in
Bacolod City. Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence against Eduardo. Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of two months and one day to 3 months, and to pay civil
indemnity. Elenita, represented by her attorney Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for
annulment of sale. Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal
because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to
answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the
property, she received no notice of the execution sale. That the jeep involved in the accident
was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection
pending the levy on execution of the property. Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale
of the property by her father and her aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the
alleged gross disparity between the actual value of the property and the monetary
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this Court of the
paraphernal character of the property. The records are bereft of proof that the consent of
petitioner's father and her aunt were vitiated or that, in reality, they intended the sale to be a
donation or some other contract.
Issue/s: Whether or not the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or
the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.

It is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he
suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered
in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus,... she may not
be compelled to answer for Eduardo's liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership
property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in his name. According
to Art. 163, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. fines and indemnities imposed
upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 have been covered if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
mentioned.
Case 46
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Jr. , GR No. 164201, Dec 10, 2012
Facts:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and others of murder
before the RTC. In 1997, the RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the
charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged
and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as
moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of
the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale
on execution were issued. Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of
Melecia.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.

No, under Article 122, the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family, Neither shall the fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
Topic: Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property
Case 47
Giuang v. CA, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Facts:
Judie Corpuz and Gilda Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have 3 children.
In1983, Spouses Corpuz bought a lot from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a
conditional deed of sale. In 1988, the spouses Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. In 1989, Gilda left for Manila to look for work abroad.
Unfortunately, she became a victimof an illegal recruiter. Harriet learned that her father
intended to sell the remaining half portion of the lot, including their house, to the Guiangs. She
wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet did not
inform Judie about this but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Guiang so that she would advise her
father. Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion. They executed a
document Deed of Transfer of Rights. Gilda returned from Manila. Her children informed her
that their father had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda was
complained against by Spouses Guiang before the Barangay authorities. Parties signed an
“Amicable Settlement” to wit: That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, to
leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding
without any charge. Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff
went to the Barangay Captain to question her signature on the amicable settlement. Gilda filed
for the nullification of the Deed of Sale executed by Judie in favor of the Spouses Guiang. RTC
rendered judgment in her favor. CA affirmed the RTC ruling pursuant to Art 124 of the Family
Code.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Contract of Sale was merely voidable and whether or not the
Contract of Sale was ratified by Gilda when she entered into an amicable settlement with the
spouses Guiang.

Petitioners contend that the absence of Gilda’s consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Art 1390 of the Civil Code" ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: Those
where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
“Gilda’s consent was not obtained thru mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud but her consent was TOTALLY INEXISTENT. This being the case, said contract properly falls
within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two
lower courts. In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of
the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar. In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of
Rights and the 'amicable settlement' are null and void. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES
the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
Case 48
Roxas v. CA, 198 SCRA 543
Facts:
Melania Roxas the petitioner is married to Antonio Roxas although they are already
estranged and living separately. Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio
Cayetano their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent. She the filed a
case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the contract of lease between Antonio and
Mr. Cayetano. Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the
complaint states no cause of action. The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing
Melania's complaint.
Issue/s:
Whether a husband may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the consent of the wife.

Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration does
not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. As stated in Black's Law
Dictionary, the word "alienation" means "the transfer of the property and possession of lands,
tenements, or other things from one person to another. The act by which the title to real estate
is voluntarily assigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form
prescribed by law." While encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in,
the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but
consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that impairs the use or
transfer of property or real estate”. Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of
things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a
price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite." Thus, lease is a grant of use
and possession: it is not only a grant of possession. Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance
but also a qualified alienation, with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and
subject to its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease.
Case 49
Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., GR No. 155043, September 30, 2004; 439 SCRA 649
Facts:
Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in favor of respondent,
binding himself to sell the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party within
30 days from date with a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
acknowledged receipt of a check from respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00, representing
earnest money for the subject property, the amount of which would be deducted from the
purchase price of ₱1,300,000.00. The RMOA stated that full payment would be effected as soon
as possession of the property shall have been turned over to respondent. Subsequently, Ester,
Arturo’s wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing her sister to act for and in her
behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent. Respondent sent a letter to Arturo
and Esther informing them of his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the
purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon the spouses to comply with their
obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. Respondent promised to pay the
balance of the purchase price. In a letter, respondent informed the spouses that he had set
aside the amount of ₱1,290,000.00 as evidenced by a check as full payment of the purchase
price. He reiterated his demand upon them to comply with their obligation to turn over
possession of the property. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property.
Issue/s: Whether or not the RMOA is an option contract or an earnest money.

The RMOA signifies a unilateral offer of Arturo to sell the property to respondent for a
price certain within a period of thirty days. The RMOA does not impose upon respondent an
obligation to buy petitioner’s property, as in fact it does not even bear his signature thereon. It
is quite clear that after the lapse of the 30-day period, without respondent having exercised his
option, Arturo is free to sell the property to another. This shows that the intent of Arturo is
merely to grant respondent the privilege to buy the property within the period therein stated.
There is nothing in the RMOA which indicates that Arturo agreed therein to transfer ownership
of the land which is an essential element in a contract of sale. Unfortunately, the option is not
binding upon the promissory since it is not supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
As a rule, the holder of the option, after accepting the promise and before he exercises
his option, is not bound to buy. He is free either to buy or not to buy later. In Sanchez v. Rigos,
in an accepted unilateral promise to sell, the promisor is not bound by his promise and may,
accordingly, withdraw it, since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration.
Pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes of the nature of an offer to sell
which, if acceded or consented to, results in a perfected contract of sale.
Topic: Property Bought on Installment Paid from Mixed Funds
Case 50
Jovellanos v. CA GR No. 10078, June 18, 1992
Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos contracted with Philamlife a lease and conditional sale agreement of a
property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first wife, Leonor,
with whom he had three children. Leonor died in 1959. In 1967, Daniel was remarried to
Annette (respondent). On December 18, 1971, Mercy (daughter from first marriage) and her
husband, built an extension at the back of the said property. In 1975, the lease was paid and
Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel. The following day, he then donated the
said property to his children in the first marriage (petitioners). 1985, Daniel died. Annette now
claims that the said property is the conjugal property belonging to the second marriage due to
the fact that the deed of absolute sale was dated during the celebration of their marriage (Jan.
8, 1975).
Issue/s:
To which marriage does the property belong to as conjugal property?
Ruling: The Court held that the said property belongs to the second marriage, but also
proclaims that reimbursements should be made to the children of the first marriage (in line
with ART 118 of the FC). The contract entered into by Daniel and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" with a lease period of twenty years.
During the twenty-year period, Daniel had only the right of possession over the property. The
lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing leased. Generally,
ownership is transferred upon delivery, however, the ownership may still be with the seller
until full payment of the price is made.
Only at the time when the payments are made in full will the deed of absolute sale be
given, entitling the buyer (Daniel) as the true owner, rather than just having inchoate rights to
the property. The time when he was able to pay the remaining balance, he was already married
to his second wife, Annette, which makes the said property as their conjugal property. ART 118:
“any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed”
Depriving the children from the first will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted
during the first marriage, wherein a portion of the payment came from.
Case 51
Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., GR No. 155043, September 30, 2004; 439 SCRA 649
Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife who owns a parcel of land in
Makati City. Armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Arturo, executed a
Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) in favor of Galicano Macatangay, Jr. in which
Arturo acknowledged he received a P 5,000 pesos check from Macatangay as earnest money to
be deducted from the purchase price of P 1.3 million pesos. Arturo binds himself to sell the land
to Macatangay within 30 days from receipt of the check. Subsequently, Esther executed
another SPA appointing her sister to act in her behalf for the transfer of property. The spouses
had a marital squabble and in effect, Macatangay made an annotation in the title of the
property to protect his interest. After informing the spouses that he is ready to pay the in full
amount, Esther, through her SPA, prepared a contract to sell the property to the extent of her
conjugal interest for P 650,000 less the sum already received by the spouses, along with
surrendering the deed of absolute sale upon full payment to Macatangay within 20 days.
However, the deed of sale was never delivered, nor was the property in his possession, thus, he
sued the spouses. The RTC dismissed the complaint as the SPA could not have authorized
Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. The CA reversed this decision,
ruling in favor of Arturo, as it is void, and cannot affect the transaction between Esther and
Macatangay, but the RMOA executed by Arturo is valid and may affect his conjugal share in the
property.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the sale of the property is valid based on conjugal share.

No, the sale of the property is not valid as Arturo and Esther appear to have been
married before the effectivity of the Family Code. There is no indication that they have adopted
a different property regime, as there was no pre-nuptial agreement between them. Their
property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses
forms part of their conjugal partnership. Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator
of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law and is the sole
administrator. Esther, as the wife is not entitled for joint administration, as Arturo is statutorily
designated as administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the Esther’s consent. Similarly, the wife
cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of
the husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.
Topic: Property Bought on Installment Paid from Mixed Funds
Case 52
Jovellanos v. CA, GR No. 100728, June 18, 1992
Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a contract of lease and conditional sale
agreement of a property. When the agreement took place, Daniel was still married to his first
wife, Leonor, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. Leonor died in 1959 and in
1967, Daniel was remarried to Annette, the respondent. Mercy Jovellanos, the daughter from
the first marriage, and her husband, built a house at the back portion of the said property. In
1975, the lease was paid and Philamlife executed a deed of absolute sale to Daniel and the
following day, he then donated the said property to his children in the first marriage
(petitioners). When Daniel died, Annette now claims that the said property is the conjugal
property belonging to the second marriage because the deed of absolute sale was dated during
the celebration of their marriage. The RTC favored Annette but declared that the amounts
advanced by the partnership of the first marriage, and those paid by Mercy and her husband,
should be reimbursed by the conjugal partnership of Annette. CA affirmed this ruling but
modified its ruling to be based on Art. 118 of the Family Code.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property is a conjugal property of the second marriage.

Yes, the property is a conjugal property of the second marriage but reimbursements
must also be made to the children of the first marriage, as stated in Art. 118 of the Family Code.
The contract between Daniel and Philamlife has a lease period of twenty years, and when he
was able to fully pay the said property during his second marriage, the property became a
conjugal property with his second wife. But reimbursements still has to be made to the children
of the first wife as it will be unfair due to the fact that the lease was contracted during the first
marriage.
Topic: Ownership of Improvements Made on Separate Property
Case 53
Francisco Muñoz, Jr. v. Erlinda Ramirez, et. al, Gr. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
Facts:
The spouses Eliseo Carlos and Erlinda Ramirez previously owned a property which was
mortgaged to GSIS by Eliseo, with Erlinda’s consent. They were able to secure a loan, payable
within twenty years and constructed a residential house on the lot. The title for the property
was transferred to Muñoz by virtue of Deed of Absolute Sale, which was executed by Erlinda
herself. Erlinda then filed a complaint for nullification of the deed of absolute sale and claimed
that there was only a mortgage transaction and the documents transferring the title to Muñoz
were falsified, presenting evidence of the forgeries of Eliseo. Muñoz then showed evidence on
the paraphernal nature of the property which was under Erlinda’s name. The RTC ruled in favor
of Muñoz, stating that the forgeries were immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was
not necessary. The CA reversed this, stating that the property has become conjugal property
when it was used as collateral for the loan that was paid through conjugal funds, pursuant to
Art. 158 of the Civil Code.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is paraphernal or conjugal.

The property in question is a paraphernal property as it is a property acquired by
gratuitous title by either spouse and shall be excluded from the community property. Since the
lot was inherited by Erlinda from her parents, it remains to be her exclusive property. Thus, the
property is paraphernal and Eliseo’s signature are not needed for transfer of documents,
favoring the petitioner.
Topic: Sale/Mortgage of properties of the conjugal partnership needs the consent of the
spouses, Otherwise void
Case 54
Sps. Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang v. CA, et. al., GR No. 125172, June 26, 1998, 95 SCRA 264
Facts:
Spouses Gilda and Judie Corpuz bought a property at South Cotabato, which became
their conjugal home. They sold half of the lot to spouses Antonio and Luzvimida Guiang. With
the departure of Gilda to Manila, Judie planned to sell the remaining half of the lot to the
Guiang spouses without her consent. One of their daughters wrote a letter to Gilda to inform
her of her father’s plans. Gilda went back to Cotabato, and discovered that their children are
not living in their conjugal home, with her husband nowhere to be found. She then discovered
that their conjugal home has already been sold by her husband to the Guiang spouses and filed
a case against them for trespassing. The Guiang spouses then executed an amicable statement
to ratify the deed of transfer of rights of the property. Gilda then filed a case to declare the
deed of transfer of rights of the conjugal home null and void on ground that it was sold without
her consent. The RTC favored Gilda and CA affirmed its decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the deed of transfer of the property is void since the wife did not give
consent for its sale considering it’s a conjugal property.

Yes, the deed of transfer of right of their conjugal home is null and void. In accordance
to Art. 124 of the Family Code, in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. However, these powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. Thus, without Gilda’s consent, the conjugal property cannot be
sold.
Case 55
Jose Uy, et. al., v. CA, et. al., GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
Facts:
When Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered from stroke and was in comatose, his wife, Gilda,
filed a petition for declaration of the incapacity of his husband and assumption of sole
administrator of their conjugal property. This will render her to be authorized to sell the their
conjugal property, as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions, thus
the necessity to sell them. The RTC granted Gilda’s petition, but was oppose by their son, who
filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that the petition made by her mother was a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father, not pursuant to Art. 124 of
the Family Code. He further stated that it should follow the rules governing special proceedings
in the Revised Rules of Court. During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her
daughter and son in law. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Gilda may assume the role as sole administrator of their conjugal
properties.

No, Gilda cannot be made sole administrator and sell the properties even if her husband
is in a comatose state. The proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court and will have the same powers and duties as a guardian. But, if a spouse
shall sell property as sole administrator of a conjugal estate, observance of the procedure for its
sale required judicial guardians, not those in the Family Code.
Case 56
Abalos v. Macatangay, GR No. 155043, Sept. 30, 2004
Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife who owns a parcel of land in
Makati City. Armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Arturo, executed a
Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) in favor of Galicano Macatangay, Jr. in which
Arturo acknowledged he received a P 5,000 pesos check from Macatangay as earnest money to
be deducted from the purchase price of P 1.3 million pesos. Arturo binds himself to sell the land
to Macatangay within 30 days from receipt of the check. Subsequently, Esther executed
another SPA appointing her sister to act in her behalf for the transfer of property. The spouses
had a marital squabble and in effect, Macatangay made an annotation in the title of the
property to protect his interest. After informing the spouses that he is ready to pay the in full
amount, Esther, through her SPA, prepared a contract to sell the property to the extent of her
conjugal interest for P 650,000 less the sum already received by the spouses, along with
surrendering the deed of absolute sale upon full payment to Macatangay within 20 days.
However, the deed of sale was never delivered, nor was the property in his possession, thus, he
sued the spouses. The RTC dismissed the complaint as the SPA could not have authorized
Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. The CA reversed this decision,
ruling in favor of Arturo, as it is void, and cannot affect the transaction between Esther and
Macatangay, but the RMOA executed by Arturo is valid and may affect his conjugal share in the
property.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the sale of the property is valid based on conjugal share.

No, the sale of the property is not valid as Arturo and Esther appear to have been
married before the effectivity of the Family Code. There is no indication that they have adopted
a different property regime, as there was no pre-nuptial agreement between them. Their
property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains. The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses
forms part of their conjugal partnership. Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator
of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law and is the sole
administrator. Esther, as the wife is not entitled for joint administration, as Arturo is statutorily
designated as administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the Esther’s consent. Similarly, the wife
cannot dispose of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of
the husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.
Case 57
Bautista v. Silva, 502 SCRA 334, Sept. 19, 2006
Facts:
Spouses Pedro and Berlina Silva owns a property, which has a Transfer Certificate, to
which Pedro, through a SPA, purportedly executed by Berlinda in his favor, executed a deed of
absolute sale on the property, for Spouses Claro and Nida Bautista. As a result, the first Transfer
Certificate was cancelled, and another Transfer Certificate was issued in the names of Spouses
Bautista. It was contended that the signature of Berlinda on the presented SPA was a forgery
and that the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was executed by Pedro, was not authorized by
Berlina. The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale null and void, in favor of the spouses
Bautista.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property can be sold without the consent or knowledge of the wife,
Berlina.

No, the property cannot be sold to another since there was no consent from the wife.
Case 58
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Miguela Dailo, GR No. 153802, March 11, 2005
Facts:
Spouses Marcelino and Miguela Dailo purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City,
registered under the name of Marcelino. Through a SPA to Lilibeth Gesmundo, Marcelino
obtained a loan from the Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB), with the property in San
Pablo as mortgage. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of HSLB. All of these took place without the knowledge and consent of the
wife, Miguela. When the loan matured, the loan remained outstanding thus HSLB started the
foreclosure of the mortgaged property, and when after a year of not being redeemed, it
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. When
Marcelino died, Miguela found out about the mortgage and claimed that she did not give
consent to it. She further claimed that the property was a conjugal property and thus filed for
Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against HLSB.
HSLB prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was
the exclusive property of Marcelino. The RTC declared the documents null and void, favoring
Miguela, to which the CA affirmed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the conjugal property can be made as payment for the loan obtained by
the late Marcelino, even without the consent of his wife, Miguela.

No, the conjugal property cannot be made as payment for the loan obtained by
Marcelino. This is because this was done without the consent of Miguela. Under Art. 121 of the
Family Code, to make a conjugal partnership be a payment for a liability without the knowledge
of the other spouse defeats the objective of the Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family. Thus, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for
the payment of the principal obligation.
Case 59
Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 475
Facts:
By a Deed of Absolute Sale, David Pelayo conveyed to Melki Perez two parcels of
agricultural land found in Davao. This execution of the deed was signed by Loreza Pelayo, his
wife, and another witness, whose signature is illegible. In the deed, Loreza only signed on the
third page, under the space provided for witnesses, resulting for Perez's application for
registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Davao was denied. Thus,
Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed but she then refused. This
led Perez to file for an instant complaint for specific performance against spouses Pelayo,
stating that the lots were in consideration of his services as David’s attorney-in-fact to make
representation and negotiation in an ejectment suit. Pelayo then sent a letter to the Register of
Deeds requesting to not anymore entertain transactions concerning the lots and countered that
the deed was without the consent of his wife, Loreza, and should be null and void, invoking Art.
166 of the Civil Code to support his claim. The RTC declared the deed null and void, favoring
Pelayo, to which the CA reversed the decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the deed was null and void because it was executed without the
consent of the wife, Loreza.

No, the deed is valid, as when Lorenza affixed her signature on the Deed of Sale, even
when on the space provided for witnesses, implies her consent to the contract of sale. Lorenza
has knowledge of the sale but was only not able to sign on the corresponding pages. Thus, this
is proof of her consent in selling their conjugal property.
Case 60
Spouses Ravina v. Villa Abrille, et. al., GR. No. 16070, October 16, 2009
Facts:
Spouses Pedro and Mary Anne Abrille are involved in a case where Lot 7, was acquired
by the spouses during marriage, and Lot 8, was a lot acquired by Pedro before marriage. A
house was built on these lots from their DBP loan. When Pedro had an affair with another, he
offered to sell the house and the two lots to spouses Ravina, without the consent of his wife. As
a result, Pedro along with the spouses Ravina and some members of the Civilian Armed Forces
transferred the belongings from the house to an apartment, which prevented Mary Ann and
their children to enter their house. Mary Ann then filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance and Damages, to which Pedro contended that the house was built on his
own money. The RTC ruled that half of Lot 7 and 8 should go to Mary Ann’s share and they
should pay for the belongings that were lost, as well as for moral and exemplary damages. The
CA then ruled that the sale of Lot 7 was null and void, while Lot 8 was valid.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the sale of the lot was valid without the consent of the wife, Mary Ann.

The sale of the lot was not valid without Mary Ann’s consent as it is of conjugal nature,
and there is no evidence that the property was acquire by Pedro through barter or exchange
with his other exclusive property. The house built on both lots is conjugal property, as it has
been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, through the loan from DBP. Thus,
upon sale of the conjugal partnership, consent of both spouses is needed.
Case 61
Spouses Aggabao v. Dionisio Parulan, Jr., et. al., Gr. No. 165803, September 1, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Aggabao were offered 2 parcels of land at Paranaque City by real estate broker
Atanacio. Elena Parulan showed the spouses Aggabao documents of TCT of the two lots, tax
declarations, an SPA executed by Dionisio, her husband, authorizing Elena to sell the property.
P 200,000 was paid by the spouses as earnest money and Elena made a handwritten receipt of
how payments will be made thereafter. Spouses Aggabao, accompanied by the real estate
broker, went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown by Elena. They
discovered that one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the
encumbrance had been cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation, and the loan was
effected through SPA executed by Dionisio, in favor of Elena. The other parcel of land had an
annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baños Rural Bank, with the same SPA, with a
court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan. The spouses met with
Atty. Zarate and confirmed that the lot involved was conjugal property. The spouses then paid
in full the final amount of P7 00,000.00 to Elena, who executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in their
favor but did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT, as it is not yet in her
possession, but assured the spouses that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be given to
them after a week. On March 19, 1991, the TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the
name of the spouses because Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT. The
spouses then learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody
of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, the brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots. Having sour
relations now, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action praying for the
declaration of the Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Aale executed by Elena, and the cancellation
of the title issued to the spouses. The spouses then filed their own action for specific
performance with damages against Parulan. The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale
annulled, and the CA affirmed this.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the lots should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed
without the consent of Dionisio.

The ruling of the CA was sustained as the buyers of the lots were not acting in good
faith. This is because they did not inquire into the wife’s authority to sell. Article 124 of the
Family Code applies to the sale of conjugal properties. Sole administration does not include
disposition or encumbrance without consent of the other spouse. Thus, this is void.
Topic: Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime
Case 62
Metrobank and Trust Co. v. Pascual, G.R. No. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008
Facts:
After the declaration of their marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, ex-spouses Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga filed for the dissolution of
marriage and the liquidation of conjugal partnership gains. A lot in Makati was purchased by
Florencia during their marriage and this was used as mortgage for Florencia to obtain a loan
from Metrobank. When Florencia failed to pay her loan to Metrobank, the bank initiated
foreclosure and published a notice of sale, to which Nicholson filed a complaint to declare the
nullity of the mortgage of the property, alleging that it is of conjugal nature and mortgaged
without his consent. Metrobank averred that it is paraphernal in nature as it was only
registered in Florencia’s name. The RTC ruled in favor of Nicholson, stating that it cannot be
validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholson’s consent, to which Metrobank appealed by
invoking Art. 160 of the Family Code. The CA affirmed the court’s decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is still a conjugal property after the dissolution
of the marriage.

Yes, the property is still a conjugal partnership even after the dissolution of the
marriage. While the declaration of the nullity of marriage of the ex-spouses severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the nature of the property acquired
before the declaration of nullity continues to subsist as conjugal property until after the
liquidation and partition of the partnership. Thus, Florencia has the right to mortgage half of
the property even without the consent of Nicholson.
Case 63
Spouses Buado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
Facts:
Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol
based on civil liability arising from criminal offense of slander filed by the spouses. The RTC of
Bacoor rendered a decision ordering Nicol to pay for moral damages, litigation expenses,
exemplary damages and cost of suit. This was also affirmed by the CA. Afterwards, the court
issued a writ of execution for Nicol‘s personal properties to satisfy judgment, but was deemed
insufficient to satisfy the said judgment. As a result, the deputy sheriff issued a notice of levy on
Nicol’s property to auction it. An auction sale was held and the spouses were the highest
bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. A year later, Romulo
Nicol, Erlinda’s husband, filed a complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages
with preliminary injunction against the spouses Buado and the deputy sheriff, and alleged that
the spouses connived with the deputy sheriff to levy on his property without exhausting the
personal properties of Erlinda. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol
amounted to P40,000 only, which is way cheaper than what was valued for the property. The
RTC dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol, but CA reversed the decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Erlinda’s criminal liability can be charged to the conjugal partnership.

No, Erlinda Nicol’s liability cannot be charged to the conjugal partnership. According to
Art. 122 of the Family Code, the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. This means that the conjugal partnership
of gains has no duty to make payments for the liability of Erlinda.
Topic: Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership’s Assets and Liabilities
Case 64
Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Facts:
Ex-spouses Brigido and Rita Quiao was granted legal separation in 2005, as Brigido was
having an affair. The properties that were obtained during their marriage shall be divided
equally between them and subject to the respective legitime of their children. It was decided
that Brigado’s share of net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor
of their children, to which Rita filed a motion of execution, and Brigado paid Rita for it. After
nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification to defined “nets profits earned” and the
court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.” Brigido then filed for a
motion of reconsideration and claims that he has vested rights over his shares of the property
in the conjugal partnership which was violated by the Court’s order on forfeiture of net profits
in favor of his children.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Brigido, the offending spouse, has vested rights over the conjugal
partnership.

No, he does not have vested rights to the conjugal partnership because he is the guilty
party in the legal separation. It was established that the ex-spouses had no separate properties
before marriage, thus, these properties are conjugal in nature and should be divided equally
among them and their heirs. But since Brigido was the offending spouse, his share from the net
profits of the conjugal partnership has been forfeited in favor of the children.
Case 65
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014
Facts:
Spouses David and Leticia Noveras got married, produced 2 children, procured several
properties in the Philippines and the US, lived in California and eventually was granted
American citizenship. To supervise the business, David returned to the Philippines but after a
year, had an extra-marital affair. Leticia then filed a petition for divorce in California and the
court granted the nullification of the marriage, gave the custody of her children to her, as well
as all the ex-couple’s properties in the US. Leticia also filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
property in Baler in the Philippines, to which David filed a petition for granting him sole
ownership of the properties in the Philippines considering the US properties are already
granted to Leticia.
Issue/s:
Whether or not David can claim all properties in the Philippines after their divorce.

No, David cannot claim all properties in the Philippines. As provided in Art. 91 of the
Family Code, property owned before and during the marriage are under Absolute Community
Property and thus will be divide equally between the spouses. Since both are American citizens,
the court’s decision in California with regards to their property there will be governed by US
laws.
Case 66
Heirs of Protacio Go v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
Facts:
Jesus Gaviola sold 2 parcels of land to Protacio Go, Jr. in 1976. Two decades later, Go
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Waiver, affirming under oath that was his father
Protacio Go, Sr. and not him, who had purchase the lands. When the wife of Protacio Sr. died,
Protacio Sr. and his son Rito sold a portion of the property to Ester Servacio. In 2001, the heirs
of Protacio Sr. filed for an annulment of sale of the property and demanded the property back,
to which Servacio refused. The heirs of Protacio averred that since Protacio’s affidavit of
renunciation transformed the property into a conjugal property and thus the sale if it to
Servacio without prior liquidation of community property between their parents is now null and
void. The heirs also claim that Art. 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law, and that the
sale was void for being made without prior liquidation. The RTC ruled that the property is a
conjugal partnership but affirmed the sale as of it and denied the heirs’ motion for
reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the claim of the heirs on the conjugal property’s sale to Servacio was
void according to Art. 130 of the Family Code.

No, the sale to Servacio was valid. Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family
Code states that any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation, otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon
death of the wife of Protacio, Sr., the conjugal partnership was dissolved and an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and his other heirs dividing the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation. Thus, the appeal lack merit.
Case 67
Domingo v. Sps. Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Facts:
Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Tarlac, consisting of a one-
half undivided portion over another parcel of land, which was annotated on the Original
Certificate of Title. In the course of Anastacio’s lifetime, he has been borrowing money from
spouses Genaro and Elena Molina, and after Flora’s death, Anastacio sold the interest of the
land to the spouses Molina to pay for his debts. A TCT was registered and the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land was transferred to them. Upon learning of this, one of Anastacio’s
children filed for a Complaint of Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the
spouses Molina basing that his father cannot validly sell the interest over the property without
their mother’s consent, as she was dead during the time of sale of the property. The spouses
Molina countered that Anastacio surrendered the title of the property as payment for his debts,
reiterating that they are the owner of half of the land already, as they have already paid for its
taxes even before the title was registered under their names. When the spouses Molina died,
their adopted son substituted them during the pendency of the case. The RTC dismissed the
case in favor of the Domingo’s son, and the CA affirmed it.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property without Flora Domingo’s consent is
valid and legal.

No, the sale of the conjugal property is void without Flora’s consent. Although Anastacio
and Flora’s conjugal partnership was dissolved upon the wife’s death, Art. 130 of the Family
Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal property first and does not allow any disposition
or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to its liquidation.
Topic: Separation of Property, When Allowed
Case 68
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, Aug. 20, 2014
Facts:
Spouses David and Leticia Noveras got married, produced 2 children, procured several
properties in the Philippines and the US, lived in California and eventually was granted
American citizenship. To supervise the business, David returned to the Philippines but after a
year, had an extra-marital affair. Leticia then filed a petition for divorce in California and the
court granted the nullification of the marriage, gave the custody of her children to her, as well
as all the ex-couple’s properties in the US. Leticia also filed for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
property in Baler in the Philippines, to which David filed a petition for granting him sole
ownership of the properties in the Philippines considering the US properties are already
granted to Leticia.
Issue/s:
Whether or not David can claim all properties in the Philippines after their divorce.

No, David cannot claim all properties in the Philippines. As provided in Art. 91 of the
Family Code, property owned before and during the marriage are under Absolute Community
Property and thus will be divide equally between the spouses. Since both are American citizens,
the court’s decision in California with regards to their property there will be governed by US
laws.
Case 69
Adolfo v. Adolfo, G..R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015
Facts:
In 2004, Teofilo Adolfo filed a Petition for judicial separation of property against his wife,
Fe Adolfo, due to irreconcilable differences. He also filed for a separation of conjugal property,
but Fe claims that the property in question is her paraphernal property, as it was a portion of a
bigger lot owned by her mother, Petronila Tudtud, and further claimed that her mother
executed a quitclaim deed transferring a portion of the mother lot to Fe. The mother title TCT
T-15941 was then cancelled and a new one, TCT (17216)-5415, was issued under Fe. She
reiterates that she is the sole owner of the subject property and that the inclusion of Teofilo's
name in TCT 18368 does not make him a co-owner of the property. She alleged that Teofilo is
lazy, a drunkard, a wife abuser and has neglected his children and abandoned them to live in
Davao with a mistress wherein he sired four children. After some time, Teofilo went back to
Cebu City and reconciled with Fe, only to be separated again and Fe has never heard of Teofilo
no longer. When Fe sold the property to her brother, the brother mortgaged it to DBP and
when foreclosed, was later on sold to the Garcias, which also sold it back to Fe with a new TCT.
Fe then executed a deed of sale in favor to the Gingoyons but did not include the partition even
if they have already paid for the taxes of it. It was argued that when the Gracias executed the
deed of sale, the property has become conjugal in nature, since Teofilo did not sign the deed of
sale as he was in Davao at that time, thus rendering the transaction null and void. The RTC
nullified the Deed of Sale and ruled that it was a conjugal property. The CA reversed the
decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is a conjugal property.

It is a paraphernal property of Fe Adolfo. Teofilo cannot validly resort to a motion for
judgment on the summary judgment as the property in question is actually not a conjugal
property but a paraphernal property.
Topic: Voluntary Judicial Separation of Property
Case 70
Agustin De Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15
Facts:
The wife of Agustin De Luna sold a portion of their conjugal property to Jose Linatoc
during the subsistence of their marriage. This lot was sold with Agustin’s consent and issued a
deed of sale and deed of recognition wherein Agustin recognized his acquiescence to the sale of
the conjugal property. But such partitioning of the conjugal property is prohibited during
marriage and can only be done once a judicial separation is secure on the property in question.
The sale of the property can only be sold under the conjugal partnership and not of the
husband only. Claiming that they did not know of such prohibition, spouses De Luna wanted to
assail the validity of the property’s sale.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property can be recalled from Linatoc due to
ignorance of the prohibition.

No, the conjugal cannot be claimed back by the De Lunas. Even if the petitioners did not
know of the prohibition on partition of a conjugal partnership property during marriage, it is
not a valid reason for the petition of annulment of sales. The prohibition affects public policy, as
it is designed to protect creditors of the conjugal partnership and other third persons. Thus,
they cannot recover the property sold already.
Case 71
Maquilan v. Maquilan, GR No. 155409, June 8, 2007
Facts:
Virgilio Maquilan discovered his wife, Dita Maquilan, was having illicit sexual affair,
resulting for the former to file a case of adultery against her and her lover. Subsequently, he
also filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages under the ground of psychological incapacity on
the wife. Both wife and lover were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment as penalty. During the pre-trial, Virgilo and Dita entered into a
Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to partially separate their conjugal properties
without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. This
was approved by the RTC. However, Virgilio filed an Omnibus Motion, for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement
by Dita’s judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not explain to him clearly the
consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement and contends that the Compromise
Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was
convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. He further
argues that Dita’s share must be forfeited because she is the guilty spouse.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement is void in favor of what is stipulated in the
Family Code on the forfeiture of shares on the guilty spouse.

No, the Compromise Agreement is still valid as under Article 143 of the Family Code, the
Separation of Property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial
approval. The Compromise Agreement in question, which was judicially approved, is a
separation of property allowed under law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings
for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. Thus, the Compromise Agreement is
still valid without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons with pecuniary
interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Topic: Regime of Separation of Property – Definition and When Allowable
Case 72
Toda, Jr. v. CA, 183 SCRA 713
Facts:
Rose Marie Tuason-Toda filed a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for
alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against her husband, Benigno Toda,
Jr., alleging that the latter was having an extra-marital affair. After the hearings were held, Rose
Marie and Benigno filed a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal
partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, to avoid further “disagreeable proceedings”.
This was also consolidated with the civil case. This petition was signed by both parties and
reached a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the
conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said civil case. These were also
approved by RTC. The CA appealed for this.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the signed compromise agreement sufficient in the dissolution and
partition of the conjugal partnership property.

No, the compromise agreement is insufficient in the dissolution of a conjugal property.
Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, “In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place save in virtue of a judicial order.” Thus, the separation of the conjugal property in
question cannot be effected by the compromise agreement, only a decree of court or upon
judicial approval.
Topic: Exclusive Cohabitation of Capacitated Persons without Marriage; Cohabitation under a
Void Marriage
Case 73
Belcodero v. CA, 227 SCRA 303
Facts:
Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927, with which he had 3 children with. He
abandoned his first family and lived with Josefa Rivera and acknowledged her as his common-
law wife, to which he had a daughter, Josephine Belcodero. Thus, Alayo married Josefa while
still having a subsisting marriage with Juliana. When Alayo died, the land that he purchased in
1949 was under the name of Josefa Bosing. Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extra
judicial partition and sale of the lot, which was described as conjugal property. Josefa’s share
went to Josephine for P 10,000 and Josephine Belcodero had full ownership. Upon discovery of
this, Juliana, the first wife, and her children filed for reconveyance of property. The RTC and CA
ruled in favor of Juliana.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the conjugal property is owned by Josepha and Josephine, which is the
second family of Alayo.

No, the property in question is the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife,
Juliana. Since the marriage between Alayo and Josefa was void, it is then understood that it is
not their conjugal property.
Case 74
Valdez vs RTC of Quezon City, GR No. 122749, July 31, 1996, 260 SCRA 221
Facts:
Antonio Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of his wife, Consuelo Gomez. The RTC declared their
marriage null and void and directed both parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code. Consuelo then asserted that
the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common
property in "unions without marriage”, and thus the RTC made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties
owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the
Civil Code shall apply." Antonio then filed for a motion for reconsideration of the Order, which
was denied. He argued that: (a) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where
the parties are psychological incapacitated; (b) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102
and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses; (c) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to
marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the
same may be read consistently with Article 129.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property regime of a union without marriage be based on co-
ownership.

Yes, the property regime of a union without marriage is based in co-ownership, even on
unions without marriage. Regardless of the cause, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation are governed by the rules on co-ownership of the Family Code, even
when it is now a void marriage. Any property acquired during their union is presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts, and thus, the fruits of the couple’s separate property
are not included in the co-ownership.
Case 75
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, GR No. 132529, February 2, 2001; 351 SCRA 127
Facts:
SPO 4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages. First, he married Susan Nicdao Carino
in 1969 and had two children, while his second marriage was with Susan Yee Carino, while
Santiago was already bedridden. Santiago then died 13 days after his marriage with Susan Yee
Carino, and both spouses claimed benefits of Santiago. Susan Nicdao Cariono was able to claim
140,000 pesos while Susan Yee Carino was able to collect 21,000 pesos, thus Susan Yee Carino
filed an action for the collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao Carino. She alleged that
Santiago and Susan Nicdao’s marriage was null and void due to the absence of a marriage
license and that it was only upon Santiago’s death that she learned of Santiago’s first marriage.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked in favor of the
legitimes’ claim.
The Supreme Court ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman as their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties and money
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. According to Art.
148 of Family Code, wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her
exclusively. On the other hand, Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop
even if their marriage is void because both were capacitated to marry each other, but only lacks
a marriage license. According to Art. 147 of the Family Code, everything that they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party.
Case 76
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr, GR No. 1527716, October 23, 2003
Facts:
Elna Mercado-Fehr and Bruno Fehr moved in together and purchased a condominium
unit in 1983. In 1985, they got married, but soon the marriage turned sour. The RTC declared
the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab intio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A
dissolution of their conjugal properties was also ordered and divided to Elna, Bruno and their
children. Being the innocent spouse, custody of the children were awarded to her and the court
court directed Elna to the transfer of ownership of the condominium unit because it was
declared to have been the exclusive property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior to their marriage.
She filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order to which RTC dismissed. Thus, Elna filed
a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, to which CA dismissed for lack of
merit.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the condominium unit is an exclusive property of Bruno.

No, the condominium unit is a common property of Elna and Bruno and should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership, as it was acquired during their
cohabitation, as accorded in Art. 147 of the Family Code. First, they are capacitated to marry
each other, second, they lived exclusively as husband and wife, and third, the ground of the
void marriage was under Art. 36.
Case 77
Joaquino v. Reyes, GR No. 154645, July 13, 2004
Facts:
Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes were husband and wife, and begot four children.
Rodoldo had illicit relations with Milagros Joaquino, to which he sired three children. Rodolfo
and Milagros bought a property under Milagros name. When Rodolfo died, Lourdes alleged that
the money used to buy the said property were from conjugal funds and earnings of Rodolfo,
and added that the deceased also “put into custody” some of their conjugal properties
(retirement benefits, two cars) under Milagros name. Milagros contends that these were
purchased in her exclusive capacity, and further alleges that she had no knowledge of Rodolfo’s
first marriage. When Lourdes died, her children represented her as the RTC granted her
complaint. The CA affirmed the ruling.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is a conjugal partnership of gains or should be
subject to co-ownership.

The property in question is a conjugal partnership of gains. Thus, the ownership of the
property will be given to the spouse and children of the first marriage. Under Art. 148 of the
family code, the property regime will only apply on cases where partners have a legal
impediment to marry each other and that only the property acquired by them through actual
contribution of money can be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions.
Case 78
Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, GR No. 168698, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts:
Lupo Atienza hired Yolanda de Castro as accountant for the former’s two corporations,
but their relationship became intimate and despite being a married man, Lupo and Yolanda
lived together and produced two children. Thereafter, their relationship became sour and Lupo
filed a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition of a parcel of land registered under
the name of Yolanda. He alleged that the property was under co-ownership and acquired it
using his exclusive funds. He did have any objections to the registration of the said property as
at that time their affair and relationship was still good. Yolanda contended that the property is
hers alone and that she acquired it from her own savings as an accountant and through her
businesses. The RTC ruled in favor of Lupo and declared the property has co-owned, but the CA
reversed this decision. Lupo appealed that under Art. 484 of the Family Code, for as long as
they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be legally
owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is governed by the rule of co-ownership.

No, the property in question is under the sole ownership of Yolanda de Castro. Since
they are under a bigamous relationship, their property regime is governed by Art. 148 of the
Family Code, where only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. However, Yolanda has sufficiently established the
purchase of the said property came from her earnings not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman who is engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail,
complete with her bank account statements and bank transactions, which proved her financial
capacity to pay for the said property.
Case 79
Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp., GR No. 151967, Feb. 16, 2005
Facts:
Josefina Castillo married Eduardo G. Francisco, the vice president in a private
corporation. Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale, covering two parcels of
residential land with a house, in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, and the Register of Deeds
annotated an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo wherein he was waived whatever claims
he had over the property. When Eduardo became the General Manager and President of Reach
Out Trading International, he bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works &
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay it. MIWCC then filed a complaint for
recovery and the RTC rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of
execution and the sherrif issued a notice of levy on execution over the property of Josefina for
the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Josefina
then filed a third party claim over the two parcels of land as she claimed that it was her
paraphernal property, and not a conjugal partnership. She also filed a complaint for damages
against MIWCC and the sheriff and filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo on the
ground that Eduardo was already married to Carmelita Carpio before their union. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the two parcels of land, which Josefina claims to be a paraphernal
property, and thus it cannot be held liable for Eduardo’s obligations to MIWCC.

No, it is a conjugal property since Josefina was not able to establish that she acquired
the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was
the sole owner of the property. Under Art. 148, in the absence of proof that Jeosefina has
actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such their
cohabitation, the presumption of co-ownership will not stand. Thus, the petition was denied for
lack of merit.
Case 80
Gonzales v. Gonzales, 478 SCRA, Dec 16, 2005
Facts:
Erminda Gonzales filed for the declaration of nullity of marriage with her husband,
Francisco Gonzales on the ground of psychological incapacity (beats Erminda for no justifiable
reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, etc.) and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. On the time they were living together, they have amassed properties and
Erminda managed their pizza business, to which Francisco denied and claimed that he
exclusively owns the properties existing during the time of their marriage. The RTC ordered the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and divided the conjugal properties between
Francisco and Erminda. However, Francisco was not satisfied with the division of their
properties, though declared their marriage as void ab initio, so upon CA’s decision, affirmed the
assailed RTC’s ruling.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the properties in question is only exclusively owned by Francisco, and
not a conjugal partnership.

No, the properties in question are under the co-ownership of both parties, even when
their marriage was declared void ab initio, and thus shall be governed by the provisions in Art.
147. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Case 81
Alain M. Diño v. Ma. Caridad L. Diño, GR. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Facts:
Alain Diño filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Caridad,
on the ground of psychological incapacity (failed to support the family, abandoned her
responsibility to the family, chose to go on shopping sprees thus depleting the family assets,
unfaithful and violent). Extrajudicial summons was served upon Caridad, but she was already
living in the US and failed to file an answer to the complaint within the reglementary period.
Later on, a clinical psychologist diagnosed her for to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. The RTC granted the nullification of the marriage and the dissolution of the absolute
community of property pursuant with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Alain questioned
this and RTC issued a modified ruling stating that the decree of absolute nullity shall be issued
after liquidation, pursuant to Art. 147 of the Family Code.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC erred in the decree of absolute nullity of marriage, which shall
only be issued after the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties under Art. 147
of the Family Code.

Yes, the RTC has erred in its ruling as pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage will be governed by the rules of co-ownership. Thus, there is no need for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of properties before the declaration of the nullity of
marriage can be issued.
Case 82
Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr., G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013
Facts:
Benjamin Bangayan filed a Petition for the Declaration of a Non-existent marriage
and/or Declaration of nullity of marriage against his wife, Sally Bangayan, on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Prior to this, Benjamin was married to Azucena Alegre and had three children with her, to
which Sally knew of his marital status but brought him to an office in Pasig City to sign a
marriage contract anyway. Benjamin was assured by Sally that the marriage contract would not
be registered, but when their relationship ended, Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their alleged unregistered marriage
contract as evidence. Thus, Benjamin, filed the petitions and asked the RTC for the partition of
the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Art. 148 of the Family Code. He alleged
that he is sole administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case. The RTC ruled
that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar as Benjamin’s still has a
subsisting marriage with Azucena, and ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
not bigamous, because of the lack of a marriage license.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations as co-
ownership.

Yes, the property relations between them is governed by Art. 148 of the Family Code,
and as they have cohabitated without the benefit of a legal marriage, the properties acquired
by them, through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the RTC and CA
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. But as to the 7 remaining properties, it cannot be
under the status of co-ownership as there was no actual proof of contribution of either
spouses.
Case 83
Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. v. Eden Villena Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013
Facts:
Eden Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against her husband,
Juan Salas, under the ground of psychological incapacity (abandonment of conjugal dwelling, no
communication). In 2003, Aguila stated that they had no conjugal properties together within
the time of their union. Thus, the RTC nullified their marriage and ordered the dissolution of
their conjugal property if there are any. Upon Aguila’s discovery of three properties registered
to Juan Salas, she filed a manifestation and motion for the properties to be divided between
them. But Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favor of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. The RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by
proper instruments of conveyance on the discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the discovered properties acquired during marriage of Salas and Aguila,
are conjugal properties and can be subject for equal partition and distribution between both
parties.

Yes, the discovered properties are of conjugal partnership of gains and acquired during
their marriage, thus they are subject for partition between them. Art. 147 of the Family Code
applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Under
this property regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.
Topic: Other Kinds of Cohabitation
Case 84
Uy v. CA, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 581, 51 SCRA 248
- Cannot find the full case
Case 85
Agapay v. Palang, GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
Facts:
Miguel and Carlina Palang were married in Pangasinan, but shortly after, Miguel left for
Hawaii to work, leaving his spouse and their child in the Philippines. In Hawaii, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina, and when he returned in the Philippines, he refused to lived with
his family. Miguel then contracted another marriage with Erlinda Agapay, only 19 years old, and
prior to their marriage, jointly purchased an agricultural land and a house and lot in Pangasinan.
Consequently, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia. Soon after, Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher and upon learning of this,
Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage to both Miguel and Erlinda, which they were convicted
to. When Miguel died, Carlina and her daughter filed a case for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against Erlinda, which sought to get back the land and the house and
lot that was purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The RTC dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the properties in question should be awarded to Erlinda on basis of co-
ownership.

No, the said properties (agricultural land, house and lot) cannot be granted to Erlinda as
under Art. 148 of the Family Code, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision. And since Erlinda was only 19 or 20 years old at that
time of the purchase of these properties, she has not established on how she could have
contributed for the payment of the properties in question. Thus, these are reverted to conjugal
partnership of property in favor of Carlina.
Case 86
Villanueva et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Facts:
Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint for reconveyance of several properties, from Nicolas
Retuya and Pacita Villanueva, claiming that those were her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
Eusebia is the legal wife of Nicolas, and the properties in question are acquired real properties
of the both of them in Cebu. Nicolas is also the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City, which is an inheritance from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as
well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of eight parcels of land in Mandaue City. Since
Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita, Nicolas then, was
the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started
living in with Nicolas, has no occupation and had no properties of her own. From the time
Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son with Pacita is the one who has
been receiving the income of his properties. The RTC was in favor of Eusebia Retuya, to which
Pacita appealed. When Eusebia died, she was substituted by her heirs.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the properties in question, and all its income, are conjugal partnership
of gains.

Yes, they are conjugal properties as their acquisition was within the marriage between
Eusebia and Nicholas. Since Pacita had no income or properties when the properties in question
was bought, she has failed to prove that she contributed to its acquisition. Thus, the properties
in question shall be awarded to Eusebia.
Case 87
Jacinto Saguid v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003; 403 SCRA 679
Facts:
Gina Rey and Jacinto Saguid cohabited after Gina separated de facto from her husband.
Soon after, the couple decided to separate and end up cohabitation. Gina then filed a complaint
for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the Jacinto, alleging
that from her salary of $1,500 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute
P70,000 in the completion of their unfinished house with Jacinto along with the appliances,
furniture and household items. She asks that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and thus representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her. Jacinto then claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house
were from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel and averred that Gina’s income as fish
dealer is not sufficient to contribute in the construction of said house and further contended
that Gina did not work continuously in Japan, but only during a 6-month contractual
employment each year, which was only spent on the needs of her business and her parents.
The RTC ruled in favor of Gina.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the alleged contributions of Gina to the properties be reimbursed to
her.

No, as pursuant to Art. 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of their
contributions, the share shall be presumed equal. Since their cohabitation, their property
regime is governed by this Article.
Case 88
Tumlos v. Sps. Mario Fernandez, GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Facts:
Spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez filed an action for ejectment against the
Guillerma, Toto and Gina Tumlos. In the case, the spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and that they allowed
the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building since 1989, without any payment of any rent. It
was agreed that Guillerma Tumlos would pay a rent of P1,600 per month, while Toto and Gina
will pay P1,000 per month. These rental arrangements were not fulfilled, thus when the
spouses Fernandez demanded the payment from the Tumlos of P84,000 and P143,600 from
them (which built up for 7 years), the Tumlos refused to do so. They prayed that the Tumlos be
ordered to vacate the property in question and pay the unpaid rentals, with the attorney fees.
Guillerma filed an answer to the complaint, claiming that she is also the co-owner and co-
vendee of the apartment in question together with Mario Fernandez, as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell. Upon an appeal to the RTC, Guillerma alleged that Mario Fernandez and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that the property was their love nest. They lived
together in the property with their 2 children and that Guillerma administered the property by
collecting rentals, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his
marriage.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Guillerma Tumlos is a co-owner of the property in question.

No, Guillerma is not a co-owner of the property as there is no actual proof of her
contribution as co-owner to the property in question. Her basis of co-ownership banks on her
cohabitation with Mario and under Art. 148 of the Family Code, this dies not warrant co-
ownership.
Case 89
Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009
Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, fell in love and lived
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names
but when presented for registration, it cannot be exeuted under Jambrich’s name as he was an
alien. Thus, his name was erased from the document but his signature remained and the
property was issued under Antonietta’s name. But the broke up, and Jambrich became
indebted to Camilo Borromeo for purchasing an engine and some accessories for his boat. To
pay for the debt, he sold some of his properties to Borromeo and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. But when the Borromeo sought to register the deed of
assignment, it found out that said land was registered not in Jambrich’s name, but under
Antoinetta’s name. Borromeo then filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real
property. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed its decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Borromeo can use the property signed under Antoinetta’s name to
cover for Jambruch’s debt.

There must be a proof first of whether the parties involved had actual contributions to
be able to lay claim on it. The evidence shows between Antoinetta and Jambrich, it was
Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties. He was the source of
funds used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the
owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale
because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he
signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has authority to transfer all his rights, interest and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Case 90
Betty B. Lacbayan v. Bayani Samoy, JR., G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011
Facts:
Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy had an illicit relationship, and during the duration of
that relationship, they were able to establish a manpower company, acquired five parcels of
land, registered their names and became husband and wife. But they broke up after and both
agreed to divide the properties they have acquire executing a Partition Agreement. At first,
Samoy agreed to the proposal but Lacbayan wanted more, to which he eventually disagreed.
This led to the filing of a complaint for the judicial partition of the said properties, to which
Samoy denied the cohabitation claim of Lacbayan and claimed that the properties were solely
from his own funds and no contribution came from her.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the said Partition Agreement precludes a settlement on the issue of
ownership.

No, the Partition Agreement cannot preclude the settlement, as without evidence that
Lacbayan has contributed to the acquisition of the properties, co-ownership will remain non-
existent.
Case 91
Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. v. Eiji Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012
Facts:
Eiji Yanagisawa, a Japanese, married Evelyn Castañeda. After some time, Evelyn
purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse Parañaque, Metro Manila with a Registry of Deeds
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to “Evelyn P. Castañeda, Filipino, married to
Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen, both of legal age.” In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the
Declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency
of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an
Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from
disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the
said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties
registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application and
motion moot. In 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P 500,000 from Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
(PAFIN) and executed a mortgage using the Parañaque townhouse unit. At the time of the
mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA. The Makati
RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the liquidation of their registered
properties, including the Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between
the parties. Upon learning on Evelyn’s mortgage, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of the
mortgage against Evelyn and PAFIN. PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996
Order against Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title
with the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City and maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek
the annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties located
within the Philippines. Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order.
Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property with her own funds and that she has exclusive
ownership of it.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is only registered solely in the name of Evelyn
and not a conjugal property of both, since Eiji is a foreigner.

No, since Eiji, having the means and financial capability to purchase the property, is still
co-owner of the said property. Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the
property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or encumbrance of the property.
Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as
to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. Eiji, in whose favor the
injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the offending actions.
Case 92
Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Paulino & Evangeline Abuda, G.R. No. 202932, October
23, 2013
Facts:
Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married, though did not have common
children, they had children from their prior marriages. Esteban had a daughter, Evangeline
Abuda, and Socorro had a son, the father of Edilberto Ventura, Jr. Socorro was still in a
subsisting marriage with her previous husband when she married Esteban, and when Esteban
purchased a property in Tondo, Manila, the remaining of it was purchased by Evangeline on her
father’s behalf. When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the
properties to Evangeline, to which Evangeline paid its amortizations.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Socorro and Esteban.

No, since there is no evidence that the property was acquired through the parties’
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry. In the title of the Deed, it is shown that
the property is entitled to Esteban alone. Also, Esteban’s daughter, Evangeline, has paid the
amortizations in behalf of his father, which shows that the property is owned and registered
under Esteban’s name only.
Case 93
Sally Go-Bangayan v. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr., GR No. 201061, July 3, 2013
Facts:
Benjamin Bangayan filed a Petition for the Declaration of a Non-existent marriage
and/or Declaration of nullity of marriage against his wife, Sally Bangayan, on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Prior to this, Benjamin was married to Azucena Alegre and had three children with her, to
which Sally knew of his marital status but brought him to an office in Pasig City to sign a
marriage contract anyway. Benjamin was assured by Sally that the marriage contract would not
be registered, but when their relationship ended, Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their alleged unregistered marriage
contract as evidence. Thus, Benjamin, filed the petitions and asked the RTC for the partition of
the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Art. 148 of the Family Code. He alleged
that he is sole administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case. The RTC ruled
that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar as Benjamin’s still has a
subsisting marriage with Azucena, and ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
not bigamous, because of the lack of a marriage license.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations as co-
ownership.

Yes, the property relations between them is governed by Art. 148 of the Family Code,
and as they have cohabitated without the benefit of a legal marriage, the properties acquired
by them, through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the RTC and CA
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. But as to the 7 remaining properties, it cannot be
under the status of co-ownership as there was no actual proof of contribution of either
spouses.
Case 94
Banguis-Tambuyat v. Balcom-Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Facts:
During the marriage of Adriano Tambuyat and Wenifreda Balcom, Adriano have
acquired several real properties and a Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee, and
as witness, Rosario Banguis who signed as “Rosario Tambuyat”, but remains married to
Eduardo Nolasco. Thus, the TCT that was issued was under “Adriano Tambuyat married to
Rosario Banguis”. When Adriano died, Wenifreda filed for a petition for cancellation of the TCT
and alleged that she is the true spouse of Adriano. But Banguis claimed that she and Adriano
were married, cohabited and produced a son, thus rightly owned by their illegitimate son.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by court.

Yess, as Wenifreda is the lawful spouse of Adriano. Thus, she will have a share in the
properties left by Adriano.
Topic: The Family as an Institution – As Basic Social Institution, Art. XV, 1987 Constitution, RA
8369 (Creation of the Family Courts)
Case 95
Arroyo, Jr. v CA, 203 SCRA 761
Facts:
Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Neri and Eduardo
Arroyo, to which the RTC convicted both under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code, based on
Ruby’s admission that she had sex with Arroyo. But Ruby later on countered and filed for a
motion for reconsideration alleging that Jorge Neri contracted another marriage to another
woman and is cohabiting with her. Neri then filed a manifestation to dismiss this as he had
“tacitly consented” to Ruby’s infidelity.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Jorge Neri’s extra-marital affair does not warrant him from filing the
criminal complaint.

No, Neri’s affair does not affect his testimonies or the act of filing the criminal
complaint. He is not precluded under the Rules of Court to testify against his wife in criminal
cases for a crime committed by one against the other.
Topic: Family Relations, Earnest Efforts of Compromise
Case 96
Guerrero v. RTC of Ilocos Norte, 229 SCRA 27
Facts:
Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are married to half-sisters, and thus they are
brothers in law. In a pre-trial, Judge Bello noted that they are brothers in law and gave the
Guerrero 5 days to file his motion and amended complaint. Pedro Hernando filed the motion
for reconsideration and stressed that brothers by affinity are not members of the same family,
thus he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise.
Issue/s:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.

No, in a previous case of Gayon v. Gayon, the court ruled that the enumeration of
brother and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend in-laws. Art. 151 of
the Family Code also stipulates with a negative word, “No”.
Case 97
Hontiveros v. RTC, 309 SCRA 340 (1999)
Facts:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson, alleging that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz
and that they were deprived of income from the said land as a result of the filing of the land
registration case. Gregorio and Teodora denied that the two were married and alleged that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They further alleged that they are the one
deprived by the spouses for possession of the land and its income thereof. The possession of
the property in question had already been transferred to the spouses by virtue of the writ of
possession. The RTC denied the spouses’ motion that while in the amended complaint, they
alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided
in Article 151 of the Family Code.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies in the case.

No, it cannot be applied. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of Teodora Ayson as
defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.
Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife,
parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or
half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in
this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to
the Hontiveros family under Article 151.
Case 98
Magbaleta v. Gonong, 76 SCRA 511 (1977)
Facts:
Gonong is the brother of Rufino Magbaleta, the husband of Romana Magbaleta. A
Petition for certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus were filed to recover a parcel of land,
covered by the Free Parent Title under the name of Rufino. It was declared to be the property
of Gonong who claims that a certain Susana Baldovi is trying to take the land from his
representative, as she was asserting that she had bought it from Ruffino and Romana.This is in
violation of Art. 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 and 16 of the Rules of Court, as it is a suit
between members of the same family, thus earned efforts towards a compromise must be
made first.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the judge is correct in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that Susan Baldovi, the buyer of the land, is a stranger.

Yes, the judge is correct. While indeed, as pointed out by the Code Commission "it is
difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of
the same family" hence, "it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise
before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family" and "it is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers" (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 18), these considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make
it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a
necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be
willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that
wranglings between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither
practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed
among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their
differences among themselves. We find no cause in the reason for being of the provisions
relied upon by petitioners to give it broader scope than the literal import thereof warrants.
Case 99
April Martinez, et. al. v. Rodolfo Martinez, GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
Facts:
Spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were owners of a
parcel of land as well as the house constructed on it. Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and
Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots, namely, Lots 18-B-2-A, 18-B-
2-B and 18-B-2-C. He then handed down the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo,
Manolo and Daniel, Jr., designating Manolo as the administrator of the estate. After the death
of the spouses, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15,
1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila along with
the discovery that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said deed of sale.
Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No.
237936 against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law as well as a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against
Manolo, which was elevated to the Department of Justice.
The spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the
property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo and alleged that they were the owners of the
property covered by TCT No. 237936. In Rodolfo’s answer, he alleged that earnest efforts for an
amicable settlement of the matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none was
reached. He also pointed out that the dispute had not been referred to the barangay before the
complaint was filed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art. 151 of the
Family Code.

Yes, the petitioners have complied with the requirement provided in Art. 151 of the
Family Code, as Lucila Martines, had no familial relations with the respondent, only a sister-in-
law. Thus, there was no need to comply with Art. 151. According to Art. 151 of the Family Code,
“No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same
have failed. If it is shown no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.”
Case 100
Tribiana v. Tribiana, GR No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004
Facts:
Lourdes Tribiana has filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that her husband has
left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza, which was found out later that she was
with her mother Rosalina. Edwin then filed for the dismissal of the petition saying that no
earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing in accordance to Art. 151 of the
Family Code, to which Lourdes opposed, stating that there were prior efforts to reach at a
compromise and attached a copy of Certification to File Action from their barangay.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court should have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
Lourdes’ failure to comply with the condition under Art. 151 of the Family Code.

No, the courts were correct for denying Edwin’s motion to dismiss the petition as
Loudes had proof that she tried to make a compromise through the Certification to File Action
in the barangay. Thus, Lourdes has complied with the precedent required in Art. 151 of the
Family Code.
Case 101
Pilar Vda de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 129242, Jan. 16, 2001
Facts:
The decedent Troadic Manila died intestate and was survived by his wife Pilar and
eleven (11) children. He left several heirs and several real properties in Manila and a business
(Machine shop) in Tarlac. After his death, eight (8) of his children (respondents) filed a petition
for the judicial settlement of his estate and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as
administrator. On the date set for hearing of the petition the trial court issued an order
“declaring the whole world in default, except the government”. However, the trial court set
aside the order of general default of the petitioners (the remaining children of Troadic who did
not join the 8) and they were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the
position The petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion. Some of the heirs including his surviving
spouse moved to dismiss the petition contending that there was failure to comply with a
condition precedent due to the absence of an allegation of earnest efforts toward a
compromise among members of the same family. The motion was denied, hence, they raised
before the Supreme Court in a Petition for Certiorari the denial of the said motion. They
claimed that the petition for judicial settlement was actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family, which requires an allegation of earnest efforts to compromise.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts
toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

No. Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the family absent a
compromise, is not applicable in the case at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an
ordinary civil action. It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an
action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the
complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance
of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’
claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is
applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action
by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a
right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as
such a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for
any cause of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein. Private respondents
herein merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right
to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with
the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
Case 102
Hiyas Savings and Loans v. Acua, G.R. No. 154132, Aug. 31, 2006
Facts:
Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint
against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe
and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any
contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses
Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the
contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent
failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike
Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases where one of the parties is
not a member of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure
to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the
plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss.
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the Motion to Strike and to
Declare Defendants in Default. Private respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. The RTC issued
the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. Private respondent filed his Comment, after which petitioner filed its
Reply. Thereafter, private respondent filed his Rejoinder. RTC issued the second assailed Order
denying petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, the instant Petition for
Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to the family of the
litigants could not invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint.

In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its
failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant
petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should
be dismissed. And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, the
instant petition likewise fails for lack of merit. Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled
that the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are
exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the same
may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family. WHEREFORE, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Case 103
Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, Jan. 15, 2015
Facts:
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was married to Capitolian Aguilar with whom he had seven
children (the petitioners herein). When Capitolina died in March 1944, Dr. Favis took Juana
Gonzalez as his common-law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano Favis. When Dr. Favis
and Juana eventually married in 1974, he executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one
of his legitimate children. Mariano is married to Larcelita Favis, with whom he has four children.
Dr. Favis died intestate in 1995, but prior to his death, he executed a Deed of Donation
transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana. Dr. Favis'
children with his first marriage filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation,
inventory, liquidation, and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Sps Mariano and
Larcelita, and their children. They were claiming that the donation prejudiced their legitime.
The RTC ruled for the children of Dr. Favis from his first marriage, nullifying the Deed of
Donation. It found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92 and plagued with illness (Parkinson's disease
and Hiatal Hernia among other things), could not have full control of his mental capacities to
execute a valid Deed of Donation. However, it also declared that Juana and Mariano are also
compulsory heirs of Dr. Favis, owing to Dr. Favis and Juana's subsequent marriage that
legitimated the status of Mariano. Juana, Mariano, and Dr. Favis' heirs by his 1st marriage shall
inherit equal shares in Dr. Favis' estate as his compulsory heirs. The CA, on the other hand,
ordered the dismissal of the nullification case brought by the children of the first marriage. It
motu proprio ordered its dismissal for their failure to make an averment that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made, as mandated by Art. 152 of the Family Code. Art. 151.
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code. Spouses Mariano and Larcelita filed an instant petition to the SC.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA may dismiss the order of dismissal of the complaint for failure to
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
The CA committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate court
hinged its decision on Art. 151 of the Family Code and correlated it with Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, saying that failure to allege earnest effort is a ground for a motion to
dismiss.
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filling the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following
grounds:
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
The CA erred in ruling that may moto proprio dismiss the complaint, as among 10 grounds
provided under Rule 16, there are only 4 instances when the court can moto proprio dismiss
the case. As provided for under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they are:
(1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata, and (4) prescription of action.
Rule 16 itself requires that a motion to dismiss should be filed before the filing of an answer or
a pleading in the trial court. Upon failure to do such, the defense is deemed waived.
In the case at hand, no motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with a condition precedent
as filed in the trial court; neither was such assigned as an error in the appeal brought before the
RTC.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is

wholly applicable to the respondents. The CA thus did not have any authority or basis to motu
proprio order the dismissal of the complaint filed by the children of the first marriage.
CA's decision was reversed and the RTC decision is affirmed.
Case 104
Romero v. Singson, G.R. No. 200969, Aug. 3, 2015
Facts:
The parties herein - petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo
and respondent Engracia Domingo Singson - are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad
Domingo, own a 223-square meter piece of property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(32600) (23937) 845-R5 (TCT 845-R) which was issued in 1953. On February 22, 1981, Macario
passed away, while Felicidad died on September 14, 1997. TCT 845-R was cancelled and a new
certificate of title - TCT 12575 - was issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a notarized
"Absolute Deed of Sale" executed by and between Macario and Felicidad - as sellers, and
respondent - as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad were then already
deceased. Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate
the subject property, under pain of litigation. Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon
filed a Complaint against respondent and the Register of Deeds of San Juan City for annulment
and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages,
on the claim that the deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario and Felicidad, the
true owners of the subject property, they were entitled to a reconveyance of the same.
The MeTC rendered a Decision, decreeing as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the
subject property known as No. 127 F. Sevilla St., San Juan, Metro Manila and to surrender
peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff in this case;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00 per month for the
actual use and occupation of the subject property reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand
which is August 7, 2006, until defendants shall have finally vacated the premises;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees; and
4. The costs of suit.
In an appeal before the RTC, the RTC rendered decision affirming in toto in [sic] the
decision of the lower court dated September 17, 2007. On motion for reconsideration,
however, the RTC reversed itself. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC
denied in a subsequent Order dated May 17, 2010. Respondent filed a Petition for Review with
the CA. The CA held that the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Decision dated April 29, 2009 affirming the Decision
dated September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial Court is REINSTATED. Hence, this instant
petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court of appeals obviously erred in failing to dismiss the complaint
because it did not comply with the jurisdictional element required by law.

The Court grants the Petition. This Court has always recognized the general rule that in
appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on appeal is binding only on the parties in
the appealed case and does not affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were
not made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists, however, where a judgment
cannot be reversed as to the party appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or
where the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and dependent on each other as
to be inseparable, in which case a reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This
exception, which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is recognized in this
jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Topic: The Family Home, Concept and Applicability
Case 105
Gomez v. Sta. Ines, GR No. 132537, Oct. 14, 2005
Facts:
On 17 June 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez (Mary Josephine) and Eugenia Socorro C.
Gomez-Salcedo (Socorro) led a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta
dela Cruz Sta. Ines (Marietta) alleging that they are the children of the deceased Puricacion dela
Cruz Gomez who, during her lifetime, entrusted Marietta with her rice land to manage and
supervise. Mary Josephine and Socorro further alleged that they have demanded for an
accounting of the produce of said rice land while under the management of Marietta, and for
the return of the TCT to the property, but the latter refused, thus compelling the sisters to file a
civil case 3 before the Pasig RTC. On 24 January 1989, the trial court rendered judgment against
Marietta ordering her to deliver to Mary Josephine and Socorro the owner's copy of TCT and to
pay moral damages, actual or compensatory damages exemplar damages, and attorney's fees.
After said judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig
RTC, by virtue of which, a parcel of land (with improvements) located in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya registered in the name of Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by the Sheriff to
satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction on 25
August 1992 to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder. Shortly after, a complaint for annulment
of said sale was led before the RTC by Hinahon Sta. Ines together with Noel, Roel, and Jannette,
all named Sta. Ines, husband and children of Marietta, respectively, against Mary Josephine
(petitioner) and the sheriff on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction
is their family residence, and is thus exempt from execution under Section 12(a), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the Family Code. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint but the RTC denied the motion stating that under Article 154 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the petitioner Hinahon Sta. Ines and the other petitioners are beneficiaries of
the Family home. Any one or all of them can, therefore, legally question the execution, forced
sale or attachment which is prohibited under Article 155 thereof. It should be noted that, as
already pointed out, the right of the petitioners as beneficiaries of the family home has been
violated when the said family home was levied upon on execution and sold in violation of the
law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the levied property of the respondent is considered a family home, and
as such, is exempt from from execution, forced sale, or attachment. At the time, the case was
instituted and when Marietta incurred her debts, it was not considered a family home.

The levied property is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against the 3rd party or the respondent
herein was instituted in 1986 for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years
before the levied property was constituted as the family home in 1988. According to
respondents, the house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family
home from the time they occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under
Section 153 of the Family Code, there is no longer any need to constitute the said property as
family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, because it became such by operation of law.
Furthermore, respondents assert that the money judgment against Marietta was rendered by
the trial court in January 1989 long after the constitution of the said family home. Such
contentions are erroneous. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of
respondents was not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the
time Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as
such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were
incurred before the constitution of the family home. Neither is it correct to say that the
obligation sought to be satisfied by the levy of the property was incurred only upon the
issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of 1989. As stated by herein petitioners,
the complaint against Marietta was instituted on 17 June 1986 to seek redress for damages
suffered by them due to acts and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she
assumed management and supervision of their deceased mother's rice land. This means to say
that Marietta's liability, which was the basis of the judgment, arose long before the levied
property was constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Under the
circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred by Marietta falls squarely under one of the
instances when a family home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as
provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to answer for debts incurred prior
to the constitution of the family home.
Case 106
Versola v. CA, GR No. 164740, July 31, 2006
Facts:
Dolores Ledesma secured a Php1,000,000 loan from Dra Oh. Ledesma sold the house
and lot to petitioners Eduardo and Elsa Versola for Php2.5M with a Php1M down payment.
Ledesma followed up the remaining balance but the petitioners were only able to give Php 50K
Petitioners then got a loan from Asiatrust Bank to pay for their remaining balance. The bank
settled an agreement between the parties that Dr. Oh will give another 450k to Ledesma
making her debt up to Php 1.45M. The spouses Versola need to execute a mortgage to secure
the Php2M loan. When Asiatrust tried to register the mortgage of the spouses, however, they
discovered that a notice of levy of execution on the title in connection with another of
Ledesma’s to Miladay’s Jewels Inc. Asiatrust denied the Php2M loan to the spouses. Dra. Oh
filed a case against Asiatrust, petitioners, and Ledesma. RTC ruled in favor of Dra. Oh and the
sheriff auctioned the house. Petitioners objected to this auction saying that the house is their
family home and should not be subject to execution.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the house is exempt from execution.

NO, the house is not exempt from execution. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. The claim must be proved to the
Sheriff. The records in this case do not disclose that petitioners proved that the property to be
sold was the Family Home. They simply alleged it and presupposed that the sheriff knew of this.
They only asserted that said lot is exempted from execution 2 years after the date of the
auction sale. Therefore, their assertion is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive
private respondents of the fruits of the verdict of her case.
Case 107
Patricio v. Dario III, GR No. 170829, Nov. 30, 2006
Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario
III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a... pre-school
building built thereon petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled
the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised
private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and
Marcelino Marc instituted an action for... partition before the Regional Trial Court the trial
court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio,
4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered
the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids.
In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated
manner upon a motion for reconsideration filed by... private respondent... the appellate court
partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the
family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a
minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of
private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was
a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners
refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said
home.

The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual, something real, or actually existing, as
opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive.
the property may be occupied by the "beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family
Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a
family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship
be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head
of the family for legal support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must
concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family. If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home
will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are
beneficiaries who survive living in the family home,it will continue for ten years, unless at the
expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may
thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family
home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who
constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home.
Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V.
Dario satisfies the first requisite. The son of the private respondent and grandson of the
decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home within 10 years from the death
of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is
the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not
from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his
being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered
as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154.
Case 108
Ramos v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010
Facts:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric,
Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decision of
April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the aggregate amount of ₱1,661,490.30 representing their back wages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The Decision having become
final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter
issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name covered by
TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property). Alleging that the Pandacan
property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award,
Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. The Labor Arbiter denied the
motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s Order. The Ramos husband died during the appeal in CA and is replaced by the
Petitioners. The CA then held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution
hence this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the levy on the property is valid.
Ruling:
Yes, the exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts
for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be
shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must
remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain special cases. But, for the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be
made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two
sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 which is the case herein, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233
of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition
before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the
area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which
must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these
two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved. In the present case, there being
absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
the Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.
Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment
but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were already closed while other properties in his or
the company’s name had already been transferred, and the only property left was the
Pandacan property.
Topic: The Family Home, When Deemed Constituted
Case 109
Modequillo v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766
Facts:
A judgement by the CA was rendered against Jose Modequillo. The judgement being
final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City.
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel of agricultural land registered in
the name of Jose Modequillo. A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed
by Modequillo alleging that the residential land located is where the family home is built since
1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof; that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the
family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be
still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant
who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency.
The trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed but this was denied.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a Family Home.
2. Whether or not it falls from the exemption of the execution.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code so it became a family
home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as
a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The contention of
petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is
provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar
as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have
a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident
on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate
court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy
to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
Case 110
De Mesa v. Acer, Jr., G.R. No. 185064, Jan. 16, 2012
Facts:
Husband and Wife jointly purchased a subject lot prior to their marriage. A house was
then later constructed in the subject lot which they later occupied as their family home after
they got married. The wife obtained a loan from Acero Jr. which was secured by a mortgage
over the property. As payment, the wife issued a check in which it was later dishonored as the
account from which it was drawn had already been closed. Acero Jr. filed a complaint against
the spouses for violation of B.P 22. The RTC rendered a Decision acquitting the spouses but
ordering them to pay Acero Jr. the amount of ₱100,000.00 with legal interest from date of
demand until fully paid. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued and levied upon the subject
property. It was eventually sold to Acero Jr. as he was the highest bidder. The subject property
was later leased to the spouses and a certain Oliva. However, the spouses failed to pay the
rentals, so they were sued for ejectment in which a decision was rendered in favor of Acero Jr.
ordering the spouses to vacate the premises. In the execution, the spouses invoked the
exemption of the family home from levy but Acero Jr. contended that the spouses did not
assert and prove that their house and lot was a family home prior to the public auction
conducted by the sheriff.
Issue/s:
What is the effect of the spouses' failure to assert and prove that their house and lot
was a family home prior to the public auction conducted by the sheriff?

Their failure to invoke and prove that the house and lot was a family home is a waiver of
such defense or right. In once case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that at no other
time can the status of a residential house as a family home can be set up and proved and its
exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction. The Court
further explained: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party
from later claiming the exemption.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject
property before the sale thereof at public action, they now are barred from raising the same.
Failure to do so estops them from later claiming the said exemption.
Topic: The Family Home, No Retroactive Effect for Art. 153
Case 111
Manacop vs CA,GR No. 97898, Aug. 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 57
Facts:
Husband and Wife purchased a residential lot with a Bungalow. Respondents filed a
complaint against the spouses before the RTC to collect an amount of indebtedness amounting
to P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a
compromise agreement with private respondent in which the trial court granted. Respondents
filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However, the execution of the
judgment was delayed. Eventually the sheriff levied on the properties of the spouses in which
were sold at the public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the
sheriff. The spouses filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff
from enforcing them saying that the judgment was not yet executory. Respondents opposed
the motion saying that it was too late to question the order since 2 years have already elapsed.
The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution finding that the spouses had
not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting to
P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also
ruled that spouse’s residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as
a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court,
hence this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Article 153 has retroactive effects.

Article 153 has no retroactive effect. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in
holding that his residence was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the
property involved "has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law." He
asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require simply the occupancy of the property by
the petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a family home.7
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988,8 the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied in
Article 153 of said code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family
Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure
mandated by the Civil Code9 had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such.
There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that the law's protective mantle cannot be availed of by
petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the assailed orders of the trial court
issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions
of the Family Code.
Topic: Paternity and Filiation, Legitimate Children (Arts. 163-182), Presumption of Legitimacy
Case 112
Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764
Facts:
Tan, who was an owner and directress of a vocational school, was allegedly
overpowered by Trocio one night and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her the result
of which Tan had a child with Trocio. Eight years after the incident, Tan filed a complaint that
seeks for the disbarment of Trocio for immorality.
Issue/s:
1. Whether of not Jewel is the legitimate child of Trocio.
2. Whether of not Trocio should be disbarred.

The court found insufficient basis to sustain Tan’s claims. Because after the incident she
continued to have dealings with Trocio and her claim that the reason why she desisted from
filing the complaint for such a long time because Trocio allegedly threatened her that, should
she report the incident he would make her Alien husband deported, cannot also be sustained
because at that time when Trocio’s transgression to her took place, it was admitted by her that
she no longer have contact with her lawful husband. The fear that she speaks of, therefore,
became inexistent. The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,
another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him
and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity, as complainant would want
us to believe. The same must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of Jewel
and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Such evidence is
inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of Complainant’s person
and honor. More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and
her husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been
overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate
the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok. WHEREFORE, this
Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of convincing
substantiation.
Case 113
Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129163, April 22, 2003
Facts:
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan, had 5 children. Everyone mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was
survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio
Colinco predeceased his three daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all
surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their
union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a
spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of
Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario
Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as
‘Arbolarios’) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda
(first child), by virtue of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was
executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian,
who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo
and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot
in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other
half. Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed
parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985. Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate
or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irene’s)
late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining half (1/2). On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against
Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion
of the aforesaid lot occupied by respondent spouses (‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970. The
Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion
Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed
portion of Lot from the deceased lessor sometime in September 1978. On May 9, 1988 before
the case was tried the Arbolarios and spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (all
respondents in the case) filed another case ‘[f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages’. The
Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’ executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were
excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their
alleged halfsister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the
distribution of the aforesaid lot. The RTC rendered judgment in the consolidated cases in favor
of the Arbolarios and against the Colincos. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Arbolarios are illegitimate children.

YES, they are illegitimate. There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that
Juan Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his
first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children.
A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage
as an undisputable fact. Since they failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of
marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot
invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a
relationship that must be judicially established. Whether the Salhays had purchased the portion
of land in issue, the Court also ruled that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the same.
Finally, on the issue of partition, the Court ruled that petitioners were not able to establish any
right thereto. The Petition for Review was denied.
Case 114
Cabatania v. CA, G.R. No. 124814, Oct. 21, 2004
Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. During the trial,
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September
9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband
left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and
was eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was while working there as a maid that,
on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan
Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on
suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But petitioner instead
brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982,
assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child,
private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different. He
testified that sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and
return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's wife, hence she was told to
look for another job. In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home
and spend New Year's Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for
San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was
hard up and petitioner offered to lend her some money. Later, they spent the night in San
Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he
asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went
home the following day. In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household,
went to petitioner's house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife
was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was
bulging and inquired about the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the
baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they
did not see each other anymore. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served
on him by Florencia's counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo
Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already
pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the
Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a
house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City. After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight
to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow
when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court
declared: :The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case,
based on the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the
plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos.”
The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court can compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.

NO. The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private
respondent was based on the testimony of the child's mother and "the personal appearance of
the child. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of
which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there
is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information
of a third person. Further, the fact that Florencia's husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of
a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Private respondent's
petition for recognition and support is dismissed.
Case 115
Gerardo Concepcion v. CA, GR No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December
29, 1989. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma.
Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with
Mario Gopiao on December 10, 1980 was never annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny
marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a sham and that she has never lived with
Mario at all. The trial court said otherwise and ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was
valid and subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reversal of the court’s decisions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the
beginning. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is the child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao. Gerardo Concepcion moved for
the reconsideration of the decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate
child of Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.

YES. Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in
the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa
and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.
Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas
husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right
to impugn the legitimacy of her child. During the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in
Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart. Considering
these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was
certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should
be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario, stands. First, the import of Ma. Therese as statement is that Jose Gerardo is
not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an
avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed
by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage. Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does
not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with
Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she
never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them. Telling is
the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos
conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to
each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access
was never established beyond reasonable doubt. Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s
statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or
in a proper case, his heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had
no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of
the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. The Court upholds the presumption of his
legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his
father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on
surnames. A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is
passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo
who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way. The petition was denied. CA
decision is affirmed.
Case 116
Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363
Facts:
The legal dispute between the parties started when in the RTC at Caloocan City,
respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. Petitioner opposed the basic petition and
prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco's estate.
Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as
possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate. In her reply to opposition,
respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to
December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply,
respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having
interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC at Caloocan. Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo,
commenced the presentation of her evidence by taking the witness stand. After respondent
rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a 'Motion to Dismiss
under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for letters of administration. To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an
opposition, followed by petitioner's reply, to which respondent countered with a rejoinder.
Eventually, in an Order, the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation
as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition. Respondent then moved for
reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order. Therefrom,
respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the threshold hereof, the
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, reversed and set aside the trial court's order of
dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.
Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Mercado.

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is
nothing in the record to support petitioner's claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the
late Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was
never married before or at any time prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim
of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938. Having
failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings,
as her consent thereto is not essential or required. Further, it should be noted that on the
matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of 'next of kin', the
reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's
property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed,
or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to
determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity
of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and
pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. WHEREFORE,
the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED 'and SET ASIDE, and
the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.
Case 117
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007
Facts:
Jinky Diaz, while married to a Japanese national--Hasegawa Katsuo, had an affair with
Rogelio Ong and lived together from January 1994- September 1998 at Tarlac City. From their
live-in relationship, Joan Diaz was conceived and born on February 1998.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. He also
paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of Joanne's needs —
recognizing the child as his. However, months after, he stopped supporting them and alleged
that he is not the father of the child. Jinky then filed an Action for support in behalf of the
minor child. The RTC ruled in favor of Jinkee because it was established by evidence that Katsuo
—the husband, was outside the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne. Also,
Rogelio himself admitted that he shouldered the hospital bills, he fetched Jinky after giving birth
and that he still used to see Jinky even after the birth of Joanne. Rogelio appealed to the CA but
during the pendency of the case, he died and was substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. The
CA remanded the case to the RTC, ordering the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis
to determine the paternity of Joanne. The Estate of Rogelio Ong questioned the
appropriateness of the order given that Rogelio is already dead.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred when it remanded the case to the RTC for DNA Analysis
despite the fact that the person (Rogelio) subject to the DNA is already dead.

The CA’s decision is affirmed. The Court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA such as blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus,
even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility
of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA
testing.
Topic: Legitimate Children (Arts. 163-182), Who can Impugn Legitimacy
Case 118
De Jesus v. Dizon, GR No. 142877, October 2, 2001
Facts:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus got married and had 2 children Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus. Upon the death of a Juan Dizon, Jacqueline and Jinkie were recognized in a notarized
document as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina de Jesus. Juan Dizon died intestate
and left behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and
some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that Jacqueline
and Jinkie led a complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate
with the Quezon City RTC. However, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations where he was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The RTC denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration and the CA upheld the decision of the RTC and
remanded the case back to the RTC for further proceedings. The trial court dismissed the
complaint of the two sisters for lack of cause of action and for being improper. It decreed that
the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners
were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon
entitled to inherit from him.

A scrutiny of the records showed that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There
is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. In an attempt to establish their
illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, the sisters, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status
as being children of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the
law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate
action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child
has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. Whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy
as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically
brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
having been an adulteress. Thus, the instant petition is denied.
Case 119
Liyao v. Liyao, GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002
Facts:
William Liyao, Jr. represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia filed an action for
compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao. Corazon G.
Garcia stated that is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than
ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the
late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's death. They lived together in the
company of Corazon's two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely: Enrique and
Bernadette. Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr and during her three day stay at the
hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, paid all the medical,
hospital expenses, food and clothing, asked his secretary to secure a copy of Billy's birth
certificate and instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy and gave weekly amounts to
be deposited therein. William Liyao would also bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his
good-looking son and had their pictures taken together. However, Linda Liyao-Ortiga stated
that her dad William Liyao and mom were legally married and that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact. Also, she testified that Corazon Garcia is still married Ramon Yulo
and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that they obtained annulment.
The RTC favored the son, William Liyao Jr., but the CA reversed this ruling.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
Ruling:
The SC affirms the CA. It is clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia
as guardian ad litem of William Liyao Jr., to compel recognition by William Liyao, Jr, as the
illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a
valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. It is mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born
in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged
paramour. Also, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
Topic: Legitimate Children (Arts. 163-182), Periods
Case 120
Babiero vs. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
Facts:
Presentacion (respondent) led with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte a
petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan
City. Respondent asserted that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Carinosa who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively. She
asserted that the birth certificate of Teofista is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
the signature of informant forged, and contained false entries;
(1) That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa ( born on September 20, 1996 and was delivered by 'hilot')
(2) Hermogena’s signature is falsified
(3) Teofista's correct family name is Guinto
(4) Teofista’s real mother was Flora Guinto ( housemaid of the Spouses Babiera), and
her status is an illegitimate child - her father, a Carpenter did not sign the birth certificate
(5) That it was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54
years of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion was born (1941)
(6) That Eugenio was already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate
of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of
cancelled and declared void.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein
her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a
motion on the grounds that;
(1) The petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child
of Hermogena and Eugenio
(2) Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the
Family Code
(3) The petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family
Code.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the birth certificate
of petitioner null and void and ordering the local civil registrar to cancel from the registry the
questioned birth certificate. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to
order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of
Presentacion who inherited the estate.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171.
2. Whether or not the special proceeding is improper and barred by the statute of
limitation
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral testimony
of Presentacion.

The Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies
to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn
Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the
first place. The reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the
former's successional rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's
Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate
does not prescribe because it was allegedly declared void ab initio.
3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate. First,
the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was
different from other signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that
provide as evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at
54 years of age. Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give birth to
Teofista and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
Topic: Legitimate Children (Arts. 163-182), Legitimacy Assailable only in Direct Action
Case 121
Tison v. CA, GR No. 121027, July 31, 1997
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased
Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller .
The present action for reconveyance involves a parcel of land with a house and apartment
which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and
survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners’ father,
Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero by right of representation. The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse Martin, executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the
lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter. Martin Guerrero died.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled
to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners's filiation to their father and their
aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certicates of Teodora and Hermogenes ; certificates of
destroyed records of birth of Teodora and Hermogenes ; death certificates of Hermogenes and
Teodora ; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint
affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to
the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage
certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Subsequently, private respondent led a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground

that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in
accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of
petitioner Corazon Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-
serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof
required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. The respondent contended
that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants
were never presented for cross-examination. The trial court issued an order granting the
demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. In upholding the
dismissal, Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172
of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation.
No. The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. Only the
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir is allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to
an insult to his memory. The questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-
owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourth (3/4) share
therein, respectively.
Case 122
De Jesus and De Jesus v. Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001
Facts:
Issue/s:

parents. The certificates of live birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
Case 123
Spouses Fidel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168263, July 21, 2008
Facts:
Respondents (all surnamed Espineli) filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the
abovementioned parcel of land against petitioners Edgardo and Natividad Fidel and Guadalupe
Espineli – Cruz. Respondents alleged they are the compulsory heirs of Primitivo Espineli, the
only child of Vicente Espineli (owner of the land) and his first wife, Juliana Asas. Respondents
further alleged that the parcel of land owned by Vicente was sold on October 1994 to the
petitioners despite the fact that Vicente died intestate. Even argued the sale is void because
Vicente’s signature appearing on the deed of sale is a forgery. In her answer, Guadalupe, the
only surviving child of Vicente and his second wife Pacencia, denied any knowledge of the deed
of sale allegedly signed by her father. She admitted selling the property by another deed of sale
signed by her as heir of Vicente. Guadalupe denied knowledge of Vicente’s alleged first
marriage with Juliana and argued further that the heirs of Primitivo must first establish filiation
from Vicente, prior to instituting the complaint for annulment of sale. Guadalupe stresses that
petitioners Fidel have been able to register the sale of the property. The RTC ruled in
respondents’ (first family) favour. CA affirmed with modification following that the subject
property should be reconveyed to the estate of the late Vicente Espineli but the proper
proceedings should be instituted to determine the latter’s heirs. Hence, the instant petition of
petitioners Fidel. Issues raised were the private respondents’ legal personality to institute the
action, the validity of the baptismal certificate of Primitivo as proof of filiation that Vicente is his
father, among others.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the respondents have legal personality to file the complaint for
annulment of title.
2. Whether or not the baptismal certificate of Primitivo is valid and competent to prove
his filiation by Vicente.
3. Whether or not the petitioners / buyers are in good faith.

As for the first question, yes. Initially, there are two deeds of sale. The first deed of sale,
allegedly signed by Vicente, is void because his signature therein is a patent forgery. Records
show he died in 1941; the deed of sale was allegedly signed in October 7, 1994. (Void as stated
in Article
1409, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code). The second deed of sale, signed by Guadalupe as heir of
Vicente and in representation of her nephews and nieces, petitioners insist that the sale is valid
because respondents have no legal personality to file the complaint, the latter not having
established their filiation by Vicente. Petitioners argue that respondents first need to establish
their filiation by Vicente prior to instituting a complaint in a separate action, and not in the
present action. On the other hand, respondents contend that their filiation was established by
the baptismal certificate of their father, Primitivo, showing that Primitivo is the son of Vicente.
On this point, SC ruled in favor of respondents (first family – compulsory heirs).
Ratio: While respondents’ principal action was for the annulment of the sale and not an
action to impugn one’s legitimacy and that one’s legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of
respondents to the deceased Vicente for the purpose of determining what legal rights
respondents have in the property.
As for the second question, yes. The baptismal certificate of Primitivo is valid and
competent evidence to prove his filiation by Vicente. Records show that Primitivo (the only son
of Vicente with first wife) was born in 1895. At that time, the only records of birth are those
which appear in parochial records. This Court has held that as to the nature and character of
the entries contained in the parochial books and the certificates thereof issued by a parish
priest, the same have not lost their character of being public documents for the purpose of
proving acts referred to therein. To the present day, no law has been enacted abolishing the
official and public character of parochial books and entries made therein.
As for the third question, no. SC ruled that the petitioners cannot be considered buyers
in good faith. For Supreme Court has found that petitioners were only able to register the sale
of the property and Tax Declaration No. 16304 in their name; they did not have a Torrens title.
Unlike a title registered under the Torrens System, a tax declaration does not constitute
constructive notice to the whole world. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is
relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is an
unregistered land.
Case 124
Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himaymaylan City, Negros, G.R. No. 181174, Dec. 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Abraza married Pablo Braza Jr. on January 4, 1978. The
union bore 3 children (co-petitioners). Pablo died in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During
the wake, following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular
began introducing her corespondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and
Pablo's son. The legal wife, Ma. Cristina, then inquired with the local civil registrar of Negros
Occidental on the status of the child with the following entries: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick
having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by
virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married in 1998. Ma. Cristina and her children (co-petitioners) filed before the RTC
of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the civil
registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account
of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo.
The petitioner prayed for the: (1) correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with
respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the
last name “Braza;” (2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians
of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;
and (3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate
and, (4) the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. The RTC
dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to
annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to
be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary
adversarial action.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations. [Even if petitioners maintain that the court a
quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in action to
correct entries in the civil registrar, while citing Cariño v. Cariño, Lee v. CA, and Republic v. Kho.]
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only
in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
properly observed.
Although the petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and
Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March
15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity
of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.
Topic: Proof of Filiation, Record of Birth
Case 125
People v Tumimpad, 235 SCRA 483
Facts:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C.
Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in
a complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother. Accusedappellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Due trial ensued. At the time of the incident, the victim Sandra Salcedo
was 15 years old but has a mind of a 5-year old child. She was the daufhter of Lt. Col. Teofisto
Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. Col. Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Oriental.
He had four security men assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Prieto and
accused-appellant Tumimpad. In the two-storey officer’s quarters the Salcedo family resides,
the upper storey was occupied by the family while the lower storey was occupied by the
security men. On August 7, 1989, Sandra complained of constipation to which her mother
brought her to a doctor for a check-up. The minor was given medication, but she only became
irritable and moody in the next few days. The next day, she saw Tumimpad coming out of the
kitchen. Sandra told her mother, “Mama, patayin mo ‘yan, bastos.” Sandra was brought to a
doctor for a second check-up. The urinalysis result revealed she was pregnant. Further
examinations in different hospitals were done, all confirming Sandra’s pregnancy. The fetus
gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 week. Sandra gave birth to a baby boy named Jacob
Salcedo on January 11, 1990. During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major
Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, Sandra’s
child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center
showed that the baby, Jacob Salcedo, has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B," accused
Ruel Prieto type "A" and accusedappellant type "O.” Mrs. Salcedo then filed the complaint.
Testimonies of the victim, the mother and relatives were brought about. The RTC convicted
Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on
reasonable doubt, stating he has a different blood type from that of the child. Tumimpad
contended that the court erred in convicting the accused-appellant based on major blood
grouping test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA
test.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting Tumimpad based on the result of the
blood test.

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by
the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that
the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father
of the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals: Paternity — Science
has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the
alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular
child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states,
and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the
decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of nonpaternity where the results of the
test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one
of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate,
and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on
oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not
admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father
or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
Whereby, the accused-appellant’s guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
Case 126
Mariategui v. CA, 205 SCRA 337
Facts:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime he contracted 3 marriages: With
Eusebia Montellano (1st wife) who eventually died, with whom he begot 4 children with. Two
of the children from the 1st wife died and survived by their children. For Flaviana Montellano
(second wife), he begot 1 daughter; Lastly, he got married with Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third
Wife) and had 3 children (private respondents, Jacinto, Julian, and Paulina Mariategui). At the
time of his death, Lupo left certain properties (Muntinglupa Estate) which he acquired when he
was still unmarried. Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, registration of the lot was issued in the name of the heirs of
the 1st and 2nd marriage. The registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots
Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties. Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together
with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 164 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and
that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage)
were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition. The heirs of the 1st
and 2nd marriage was against this and contended that the complaint was one for recognition of
natural children. The 1st and 2nd marriage heirs filed a motion to dismiss and eventually a
complaint but the RTC dismissed it for lack of evidence. They elevated it to the CA, but it
declared all the children including the ones in the 3rd marriage entitled to equal shares in the
estate of Lupo.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui.
2. Whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for
recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate.

Yes. The Private respondents (children of the 3rd marriage) were able to prove their
successional rights over said estate. They are to be considered legitimate children based on the
evidences established and the fact that they were de-fraud by the registration of names by the
heirs of the 1st and 2nd marriage, in deprivation of their share, they are not barred by
prescription to file such action for recognition. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the
filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the
case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in
evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the
status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. The nagging
fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private
respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. Even the trial court mentioned
in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the
petitioners herein, that ". . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama. Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co heirs,
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation. Hence, prescription definitely may not be
invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two
months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
Petition DENIED; CA decision AFFIRMED.
Case 127
Rosalina P. Eceta v. Ma. Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta, GR No. 157037, May 20, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926.
During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente, and acquired several
properties, among which is the disputed property located in Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City.
Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. Vicente sired
and illegitimate daughter named Maria Theresa, herein respondent. In 1977, Vicente died, and
his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. Maria
Theresa then filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City for “Partition and Accounting with
Damages” against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s
co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property
is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. During the pre-trial, the parties
entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they both admitted their relationship to one another.
After the trial on merits, the RTC rendered a decision. Rosalina appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a mere certificate of birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged
filiation of the respondent as an “illegitimate daughter” of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.

Yes. The respondent, successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a
duly authenticated birth certificate, signed by him, thereby acknowledging that she is his
daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity, thus:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. WHEREFORE, the
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
Topic: Proof of Filiation, Open and Continuous Possession and Status of a Child
Case 128
Quismundo v. WCC, 132 SCRA 590
Facts:
Paciencia and Virginia Venta were minors when their mother, Jovita Quismundo, filed
on their behalf a claim for benefits due to the death of Francisco Venta. They alleged that the
deceased was their natural father. Francisco Venta was employed by the private respondent
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., Inc. On May 17, 1967, Francisco died due to chronic hemorrhagic
ulcerative enteritis. Paciencia and Virginia, represented by their mother, entered into an Extra-
Judicial Settlement and Release with AG&P on October 17, 1967, wherein they received the
sum of P1,500.00 as death benefits presumably on account of the Disability, Death and
Retirement Plan of said entity. Earlier on August 15, 1967, Paciencia and Virginia filed a claim
for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. However, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission denied the claim based on the ground that although Paciencia and
Virginia were dependent on the deceased, they failed to show that they had been
acknowledged by him as his illegitimate children. The petition prays that Paciencia and Virginia
be adjudged as having been acknowledged and, therefore, entitled to be paid benefits under
the Workmen's Compensation Law. Citing Article 278 of the Civil Code, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission held that the deceased had not recognized the two claimants
absent recognition in a record of birth, in a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic document. The petitioners agree but cite instead Art. 283 of the same Code which
provides, inter alia that: Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the deceased acknowledged the petitioners as his children, in
accordance with the law.

The decision is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The reliance by the petitioners on Art.
283 of the Civil Code is misplaced. This provision contemplates compulsory recognition as
distinguished from voluntary recognition provided in Art. 278. The possession of status of a
child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel
recognition by his assumed parent. The provision provides the grounds for compulsory
recognition in an action which may be brought by the child. Neither the proceedings before the
Commission nor in this Court can be regarded as the appropriate action to compel recognition.
Topic: Proof of Filiation, Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Law
Case 129
Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18
Facts:
Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support and
damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. In her complaint, Amelita alleges that
sometime in the month of August 1974 she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting,
Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining,
Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's
proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to
which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside
his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man;
that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974
whenever Ivan is in Manila. As a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help
and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except
Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that
because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a
prosperous businessman of Davao City. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual
knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
cause of action. The trial court ruled in favor of Amelita. Both parties filed their separate motion
for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of
damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the
recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
The trial court favored again Amelita. The CA reversed the previous decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the
decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint.
2. Whether or not Amelita’s claim for damages based in Article 19 and 21 should be
granted.

As for the first question, no. It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the
evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence
her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based
on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is
supported by the evidence on record. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had
sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November 1974 is inconsistent
with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in
November 1974. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November
1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely
testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and
November 1974. As correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, to the effect that
"the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to
267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before
August 3, 1375 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified
that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November 1974, nevertheless said testimony is
contradicted by her own evidence. The petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only
boyfriend is belied, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason
for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She
also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work.
An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an
irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
As for the second question, no. As regards for Amelita's claim for damages which is
based on Articles 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of
marriage, she surrendered her virginity, the Court cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals
that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time
she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood.
Topic: Proof of Filiation, Filiation not established
Case 130
Labangala v. Santiago, GR No. 132305, December 4, 2001
Facts:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it
in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein), sued Jose for
recovery of 2/3 share of the property. The trial court decided in favor of the sisters. Later on,
Jose died intestate. Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Labagala to recover from her the 1/3 portion of said
property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue.
They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner
sometime in March 1979 5 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious
intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title in petitioner's
name alone. Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The deed showed that
Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to
graduate from college, Jose never put his thumbmark on documents he executed but always
signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his
"poor and unschooled sisters who sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare." Respondents
also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was
unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They
also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of
sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale. On the
other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his
share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever
since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation
to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of
sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged
respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions
thereof.
The RTC decided in favor of the petitioner and ruled that, while there was indeed no
consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed constitutes
a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of
the property as Jose's daughter. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decision of the trial court. Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted
that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of
different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement made by Jose in
a previous civil case that he did not have any child. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the respondents may impugn petitioner's fililiation in this action for
recovery of title and possession.
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-
owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.

As for the first question, yes. Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is of
no merit. It contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by
his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not
refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article
263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is
not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of
Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of
title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are, instead,
asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate presented by
respondents supports this allegation. At the pre-trial, petitioner's counsel admitted that
petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she had
been using this name all her life. Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove
her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. However, a
baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. It is conclusive
only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest
who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized.
As for the second question, no. Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not
have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof
belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a
minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a
contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover,
petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Even assuming that the
deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the eone required by
Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have
been made by her father or mother, or any legal representative.
Case 131
Fernandez v. Fernandez, GR No. 143256, August 28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered
owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and
the two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is
undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when he was only
twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that
the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for
P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to
school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and
disabled. Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo
Fernandez and an estate. Appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez

74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son. After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco,
Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being
nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, filed an action to declare the Extra-
Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. Significantly, in their answer,
defendants alleged that the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband and
wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they
acknowledged during their lifetime. Further, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez
which are now in question were all made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the
parties thereto and for value. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants
Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
court's judgment in its assailed decision. Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion
for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution. Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant
petition for review.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the
parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment of Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed with modification, as follows:
(1) Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the ¼ share of
the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died
childless and intestate;
(2) The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner
Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued pursuant thereto in the name of
Rodolfo Fernandez;
(3) Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the ¾ share of Generosa sold to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new title should be issued in the
names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the ¾ and ¼ shares
respectively in the conjugal building.
(4) The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
Case 132
Locsin v. Locsin, GR No. 146737, December 10, 2001
Facts:
Eleven months after Juan “Johnny” Locsin, Sr. died intestate, respondent Juan Locsin, Jr.
filed with the RTC of Iloilo City a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that he be
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others:
1. That he is an acknowledged natural born child of the Late Juan C. Locsin (implying
that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin entitled to letters
of administration);
2. That during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include
undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the
undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his 5 siblings (petitioners herein);
3. That he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
The 5 siblings of the late Juan Locsin, Sr. (some represented through their heirs)
opposed the respondent’s petition contending that:
1. Respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name;
2. Respondent’s claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of
limitations;
3. There is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
To support his claim, respondent submitted the following:

1. Machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of
birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (Exhibit D) This contains the
information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the
facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3");
2. Testimony of Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City who produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
A photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin’s dead body. (Exhibit C) He claims that the photograph shows that he and
his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased. In their oppositions,
petitioners claim that Exhibit D is falsified and spurious, submitting the following:
1. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the
Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila (Exhibit 8) indicating that the birth of respondent was
reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of
the late Juan C. Locsin;
2. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22,
1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No.
447 (Exhibit D) was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form;
3. On the other hand, Exhibit 8 appears on a July,1956 form, already used before
respondent's birth;
4. They presented the testimony of Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified
that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City)
appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit D) are forgeries.
In 1996, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Juan C. Locsin, Jr and appointed him as
sole administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased, finding Exhibit D and C as sufficient
proofs of respondent’s illegitimate filiation with the deceased. The Court of Appeals affirmed
RTC’s decision and denied petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration and respondent’s
motion for execution pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan Locsin, Jr. has established his filiation (i.e., as an acknowledged
natural son) with the deceased Juan Locsin, Sr.

The focal issue of the resolution of this case is which of the two documents – Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit D) and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit 8) is genuine.
On the Establishment of Filiation. The Court, through Justice Vitug, previously held that the
filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement

before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
child's acknowledgment. The records of births from all cities and municipalities in the
Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila
by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all
parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To
locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be
engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to
falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City. Access
to Local Civil Registries is easier. The trial court held that doubts to the genuine nature of
Exhibit D are dispelled by the testimonies of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event which she testified was the birth of the respondent on October 22, 1956 (37-38 years
ago) when the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, her
knowledge of respondent’s birth was based merely on her general impressions of the existing
records of that Office. When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General,
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and
rational manner. The SC does not find Vencer’s explanations convincing since the same if full of
infirmities which highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding the existence of Exhibit
D.
Several irregularities were found in Exhibit D:

1. Respondent’s Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit D) was recorded using a December 1,
1958 form but was entered into the records on January 30, 1957 (almost 2 years earlier).
2. Vencer answered that during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already
exhausted so the new form was requested by the former civil registrar. Vencer’s answer was
merely a supposition (maybe) and does not satisfactorily explain the use of such forms almost 2
years earlier than its date.
On the other hand, exhibit 8 of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in
Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in July of 1956. We find no irregularity
here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several
years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely. The back-cover of 1957
bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Vencer merely stated that she is not
aware of this since she is not a bookbinder. Exhibit D is merely pasted with the bound volume,
not sewn like the other entries. Vencer answered that they sometimes paste some of the leaves
to replace the record when the leaves are taken or detached. There is no explanation why out
of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the
alleged original and the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other
certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does
not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation,
address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank.
On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the
blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
The SC supports a finding that Exhibit 8 of the petitioners, NOT respondent’s Exhibit D, should
be given more faith and credence.
The Civil Registry Law requires the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable
certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, during
the first 10 days of each month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding month.
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by
the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
Such circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same
Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry
that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not
appear. In Roces vs Local Civil Registrar, it was held that Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article
280 of the Civil Code explicitly prohibits, the naming of the father and statement of any
information or circumstances which could identify him when the birth certificate, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him.

Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate
of the deceased. Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. since his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. As such, he is not
an interested person and is not entitled to letters of administration. Thus, the Petition is
GRANTED and CA’s decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Case 133
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, Sept. 28, 2015
Facts:
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took
possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the possession
against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents,
the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy. The
defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward
Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as
confirmed by an NSO representative. They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to
register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that
place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the
period of her service, as supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court
found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was
presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was tampered. It
further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation
of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was
born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed
gave birth to respondent on a specific date.
It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the
valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what
the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her
filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by
secondary evidence presented. The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was
allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her
and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the
beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino,
Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of
the deceased.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary
evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth
certificate.

No, the CA has not erred in its ruling. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a
direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a
separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case
which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue. In the case at
bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the
deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted
secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the Family Code. However,
the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate
child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of facts. The
irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of
the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity
attached to the respondent’s birth. With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or
falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit
from the estate.
Topic: Proof of Filiation, Imprescriptibility of Action to claim Legitimacy
Case 134
Dela Rosa v. CA, 280 SCRA 444
Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, Vda. de Danao filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Dr.
Guillermo Rustia. The petition was filed by Luisa Delgado on behalf of the surviving sisters,
brothers, nephews, nieces and grand-nephews and grand-nieces of Josefa Delgado. In due
course, the petition was opposed by Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
(sisters of the deceased Dr. Guillermo Rustia); Josefina Albano, Virginia Rustia-Paraiso, Roman
Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia, Leticia Rustia Miranda, (children of the late Roman
Rustia, brother of the deceased Dr. Guillermo Rustia); and Guillermina Rustia Rustia (de facto
adopted daughter of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia). With the permission of the trial
court, Guillerma S. Rustia-(Alaras) was allowed to intervene in the proceedings upon her
assertion of the status of an acknowledged natural child, and thus, the only surviving child and
sole heir, of Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia. Luisa Delgado filed an Amended Petition for Letters of
Administration, this time alleging that the deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had
been living continuously as husband and wife, but without the benefit of marriage.
RTC- Manila Branch 55 rendered its decision appointing petitioner Carlota Vda. De Dela Rosa as
administrator of the estates of the two deceased. Private respondents filed a notice of appeal
notifying the court of their intention to appeal the decision. The Record on Appeal was filed 31
days from the time private respondents received the court's decision. It was then denied and
dismissed on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed a day late, pursuant to Batas
Pambansa 129 and the Interim Rules for thirty days. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
the private respondents, where the appellate court reversed itself, and ruled that the latters'
appeal should be given due course. The CA, through its resolution, held that the trial court
should have proceeded with caution in considering the private respondents' appeal, as every
party-litigant should be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Thus, the decision by RTC was reconsidered.
Private respondents' petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. Hence, petitioner Carlota
Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa is now before us
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the deceased Josefa Delgado was legally married to Dr. Guillermo
Rustia.
2. Whether or not the petitioner and the other claimants to the estate of the late Josefa
Delgado are entitled to her estate, if any.
3. Whether or not the intervenor was acknowledged as a natural or illegitimate child by
the deceased Dr. Guillerma Rustia in his lifetime.
Ruling:
As for the first issue, in the inception of this action for issuance of letters of
administration, petitioner's predecessor alleged that Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia
were legally married, only to withdraw such submission later by a belated amended petition,
advancing that the two were never actually married, but were only living together as husband
and wife. Such change of stance was accepted by the trial court, upon the justification that no
record of marriage of Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia could be found, and that it was
highly irregular that the two could celebrate important occasions in grand fashion, when no
whiff was made of their own marriage. In corroboration, the testimonies of certain "close
friends" of Josefa Delgado disclose that the marriage between Josefa and Guillermo, allegedly,
never occurred. It bears mentioning that the records likewise disclose testimonies pointing out
the existence of marriage between the decedents. Needless to state, it is presumed in our
jurisdiction that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. This is the common order of society, and can only be
rebutted by sufficient contrary evidence.
As for the second issue, the propriety of the appointment of Carlota Vda. de Damian as
sole administrator of the estates of the decedents is put to question, especially in light of the
trial court's finding that Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia were not married to each
other. It has been observed that the estates of deceased spouses may be settled in a single
proceeding,11 but in all other instances, even if the deceased persons are related as ascendants
and descendants, their separate estates must be settled in different proceedings.12 The reason
for this is the avoidance of opportunity of encroachment into the estate left by one decedent
by the heirs of another, especially in instances, such as this petition, were different heirs are
determined for different decedents.
As for the third issue, the status of Guillerma Rustia-Alaras as an acknowledged child of
Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Article 175, in conjunction with Article 173 and 172 of the Family Code
provides for the means for proving filiation:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation is a public document or a private handwritten
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which
to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties. The cases relied upon in the trial court's decision, pointing to a
child's action for establishing filiation even beyond the putative parent's death are modified by
the enactment of the above-cited provisions of the Family Code, which cite definite periods
within which such actions must be interposed. The acknowledgment of Guillerma Alaras as an
acknowledged (illegitimate) child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, represents a crucial bar in the claim of
the private respondents, as under Articles 988 and 1003 of the Civil Code. A review of the trial
court's decision is needed, in view of the above-demonstrated divergence of the evidence and
arguments presented.
Topic: Proof of Filiation, Rights of Legitimate Children

Case 135
Tolentino v. CA, 162 SCRA 66
Facts:
Private respondent Consuelo David (first wife) married Arturo Tolentino married in
1931. Their marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the
Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and
abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years. Arturo then married another woman
(Pilar Adorable) but she died soon after the marriage after that he then married for a 3rd time
(with Constancia) and they had 3 children. Constancia is the present legal wife of Arturo
Consuelo continued using the husband’s surname after the divorce. Her usage of the surname
was authorized by the family of the husband (brothers and sisters). The current wife filed a case
against the first wife’s continued use of her husband’s last name. The RTC ruled that the 1st
wife should discontinue her usage of the husband’s surname. The CA decision reversed that of
the RTC’s.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed.
2. Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injuction Consuelo David from using the
surname of her former husband from who she was divorced.

As for the first issue, yes. In Art 1150 Civil Code the time of prescription of all kinds of
actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the
day they may be brought. Art 1149 Civil Code period of prescription is 5years from the right of
action accrues. The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April
21, 1945 while the Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950. She acquired knowledge that
Consuelo was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. Hence, the current wife’s action has
already prescribed. She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that the 1st
wife was still using the surname Tolentino, not 20 years later.
As for the second issue, no. Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman
may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce
under Philippine law. On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the Civil Code. The
wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname. She cannot be prevented
from using it, but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art. 371 is not applicable
because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where
there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the spouse
where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he
has remarried. If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems
because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired
properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed
to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There was no usurpation of
the petitioner’s name and surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of
the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity. The elements of usurpation
were 1. Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to
designate personality or identity of a person. None of these elements were present in the case
because public knowledge referred to the 3rd wife as the legal wife, and the 1st wife did not
represent herself as the legal wife. The Supreme Court find it just and equitable to leave things
as they are, there being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings
which is not a basis for injunctive relief.
Case 136
Alfon vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-51201, May 29, 1980
Facts:
This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied
petitioner’s prayer for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no
controversy over the facts which are well-stated in the questioned Order as follows:
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her
friends and acquaintances know her by his name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle
who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for
change of name. WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with
respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in its decision for denying the petition.

The lower court should have fully granted the petition. The only reason why the lower
court denied the petitioner’s prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of
Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father
invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is
not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated
child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. In the case
at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon
although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the
schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by
this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma
under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is
therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the
contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion. WHEREFORE, the
Order appealed from is hereby modified in that the petitioner is allowed to change not only her
first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON.
Topic: Illegitimate Children (Arts. 175-176), How Filiation Established
Case 137
Tayag v. CA, GR No. 95229, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 730
Facts:
Private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D.
Cuyugan, filed a complaint denominated “Claim for Inheritance” against herein petitioner as the
administratix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo who died intestate. Private respond
alleged that:
1. Plaintiff is the mother of Chad Cuyugan.
2. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for years, plaintiff and
Atty. Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other and as a consequence,
begot a chill named Chad Cuyugan.
3. Chad Cuyugan was loved by his father, Atty. Ocampo as evidenced by the letters Atty.
Ocampo has been sending to plaintiff.
4. The minor, although illegitimate is entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by
Atty. Ocampo as one of his surviving heirs
5. The deceased owns a property in Baguio which worth millions of pesos.
6. The estate of the deceased has not yet been inventoried.
7. The only known heirs of Atty. Ocampo are his children namely: Corito Tayag, Rivina
Tayag, Evita Florendo, Felina Ocampo and said minor, Chad.
8. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and only depends on the charity of friends and r
elatives.
9. Several demands have been made for defendant to grant Chad’s lawful inheritance
but defendant failed and refused to satisfy the claim.
Private respondent prays, among other, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant
to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ocampo;
to determine and deliver the share of the minor; and to give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner filed an answer stating that the complaint has no cause of action that the action is
premature; that the suit is barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and
judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of
the action and there is improper joinder of causes of action. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint merely alleged that the minor is an illegitimate child of the
deceased and actually asking for the claim of inheritance. Also, the letters and documents are
not sufficient evidence, the father can no longer testify that he really made it and to establish
such filiation child must brought the action during the lifetime of the father. RTC denied the
motion to dismiss which was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Chad has the right to claim over his share of inheritance in the estate of
the deceased.

Yes. According to the SC, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final
judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a
private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of
the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent. Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent
died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from
the attainment of majority of the minor child. The TC is therefore correct in applying the
provision of Art. 285 of the Civil Code and in holding the private respondent’s cause of action
has not prescribed. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right
of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Art. 285 of the Civil
Code. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
“Art. 175 of the Family Code. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be
brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent."
Case 138
Uyguanco v. CA, GR No. 76873, October 26, 1989 178 SCRA 684
Facts:
During the pendency of the case, the Family Code was adopted. Thus, the provisions
mentioned in the case will make use of similar articles both from the Civil Code and the Family
Code. Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate
children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among
themselves. Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario and having been left
out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco, herein
respondent) filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners. Graciano alleged that he
was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he
moved to his father's hometown. He received support from his father while he was studying
and was even assigned by his father as a storekeeper at the Uyguangco store. In the course of
his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano
that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 (counterpart of Art. 172 in the
Family Code) to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The
petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private
respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the
Civil Code. Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278
to prove the private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted.
Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult
when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions.
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents, he insists that
he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation under the Family Code. Respondent
claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during
that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father
and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in
his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in
the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he
was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a
family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded
by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate
child of his claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence?

No, he cannot as his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975.
The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent”
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove
his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation. In her book, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the
rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly
recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their filiation but the
parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain
person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is
already dead." Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child
of Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no
longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said
complaint, where the issue of Graciano's filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint
is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation
under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Case 139
Pe Lim v. CA, GR No. 112229, March 18, 1997
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a complaint filed by Maribel Cruz for
child support on behalf of her daughter, private respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim, against
petitioner Raymond Pe Lim who, Maribel claims, is Joanna’s father.
MARIBEL’S STORY: Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She
also worked as a receptionist at Tonight’s Club and Resthouse along. She met petitioner during
her first night on the job. Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon
lived together with petitioner paying the rentals in succession of apartments. Maribel left for
Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same year. The
couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not financially stable. On January
17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The
bills for Maribel’s three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he also
caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child’s birth certificate. After
Joanna Rose’s birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner continued. Towards the
latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner’s feelings toward her started to wane. He
subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting
various jobs and with occasional help from relatives. She asked petitioner for support but,
despite promises to do so, it was never given. Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for support.
RAYMOND LIM’S STORY: He claims that in 1978, he went to Tonight’s Club and
Resthouse along Roxas Boulevard, Manila to relax after a hard day’s work. There he met
Maribel. Raymond observed that while she had a pleasing personality, she seemed to be quite
experienced because she started to kiss him on the cheeks and neck, whispering to him that
they could go anywhere and rest. Raymond declined to take Maribel up on her offer saying that
he only wanted someone to talk to. They became friends after that first meeting, and while he
often saw her, there was no intimacy between them.
Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel’s only customer at the club. In 1980, she left
for Japan to work as an entertainer. In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to
Raymond for help because she claimed that she could not face her relatives in her condition.
Raymond got her an apartment and paid its rentals until she gave birth to a baby girl on January
17, 1982. Raymond admits paying the hospital bills but claims that Maribel was supposed to
pay him back for it. When she failed to do so, Raymond stopped seeing her. Raymond denies
being the father of Maribel’s child, claiming that they were only friends and nothing more.
RTC – Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter, Joanna Rose Pe Lim in the
amount of ten thousand pesos per month for support. The CA affirmed the trial court’s findings.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence on record to show that there was
actual cohabitation and that Joanna is his child.

Yes, the evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered himself to be the
father of Joanna Rose as shown by the handwritten letter he wrote to Maribel. In the letter,
Raymond is explaining why he cannot marry Maribel. Raymond also stated in the later that he
promises to be a loving and caring husband and father to both Maribel and Joanna. In another
letter sent by Raymond to Maribel while she is in Japan, Raymond told her to take care of
herself because of her situation, obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel. It was
only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose.
Until he got married to another woman, he did not object to being identified as Joanna Rose’s
father as disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even
got a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as shown by a receipt in
his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of
the cogent evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the
father of Joanna Rose.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
"The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a).
This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by "any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel
vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling
Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
Case 140
Jison v. CA, GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
Facts:
I n her complaint filed with the RTC, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married
to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar. As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946,
and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly
recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not
have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as
she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944; further, he never recognized MONINA,
expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO
contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was
barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint
and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint. After MONINA filed her
reply, pre-trial was conducted. At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11)
witnesses. On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was
40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates, she was born on 6 August 1946
in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar and FRANCISCO. MONINA claimed that
she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr., and
Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on
her dealings with Junior and the two (2) occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time
MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the
RTC of Manila. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla,
Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. The reception of evidence
having been concluded, the parties filed their respective memoranda. In its decision, the trial
court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. The RTC
denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the complaint with
malice, she having been propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause.
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals and sought reversal of the trial court’s
decision. In its decision, Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and
another one is hereby entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the
illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and privileges
granted by law.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution, FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article
172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which
MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph,
a high standard of proof is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but
also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by
Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother
was employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
The Supreme Court ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the
documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by
Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the
position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for
him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina’s
evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish
one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.
Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence. Since the
instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.
Case 141
Baluyot v. Baluyot, 186 SCRA 506
Facts:
Petitioners Victoria, Ma. Theresa, and Ma Flordeliza Baluyot filed a petition for
intervention in Special Proceedings No. entitled “Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,.’
The petition alleged that petitioners have a legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique
M. Baluyut being the illegitimate children of the deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said
deceased and petitioners’ mother and guardian ad litem Norma Urbano. They were conceived
and born at the time when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased while the latter was
already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut and that they were in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his lifetime by having supported and
maintained them. Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed administratrix of his
estate, opposed the petition for intervention. The Trial Court declared Victoria, Ma Theresa and
Ma Flordeliza Baluyot as forced heirs of the deceased Enrique Balutur and ordered
administratix Felicidad Vda. de Baluyut to pay 150php monthly support to Norma Urbano,
guardian ad litem for the three minor children. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and
dismissed the petition in intervention.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as
his illegitimate spurious children.

There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in the New Civil Code; one, by the
voluntary recognition by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before
the court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two, by
compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the same law. There is no evidence as required by
Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his
lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners’ records of birth, although in the name of
Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was neither authentic writing presented
nor any statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized
by the deceased.
In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, the acts
must be of such a nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously’. The grounds relied upon by petitioners were the alleged
possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized illegitimate spurious children and that
they were conceived at the time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. The evidence
presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of proof required for the success of
their action for compulsory recognition. The CA’s decision is affirmed.
Case 142
Ilano v. CA, GR No. 104376, February 23, 1994
Facts:
Leoncia de los Santos first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while the former was working
as a secretary to Atty. Mariano Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of Atty. Virata. Leoncia,
then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was
engaged in the same business. Later, Artemio courted Leoncia for more than four (4) years,
became intimate, and with Artemio’s promise of marriage, they eloped to Pampanga in April
1962. They stayed at an apartment to which Artemio comes home to Leoncia three to four
times a week. In October 1962, Leoncia delivered a still-born female child. It was unfortunate.
The death certificate was signed by petitioner. However, after a year, while living in Makati,
Leoncia gave birth to another baby, private respondent Merciditas S. Ilano on December 30,
1963. Her birth was recorded as Merciditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de
los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. During the day of the birth, December 30, 1963, petitioner
arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child,
Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the information.
Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the
following morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give the birth certificate
to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning. The support given
by petitioner Artemio for both mother and child was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered or through checks. During the time petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and
wife, he showed concern as the father of Merciditas (signing the child’s report cards, taking her
for a drive, cuddle her to sleep, etc.).
Artemio’s defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and
Merciditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite the death certificate
of a female child surnamed Ilano, the notes, the signing of Merciditas report cards, etc. He
contended he was sick on December 30, 1963 (on the day of Merciditas’ birth) and was
hospitalized on January 7, 1964. He does not understand why this case is filed against him.
Testimonies were brought about. Melencio (officer-in-charge where Artemio worked) admitted
he procured the apartment for Leoncia, paid the rentals, etc. He said he lived together with
Leoncia and shared the same bed, etc. Nida Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner alleged she
does know Leoncia and said her father was at home on December 30, 1963 because he got sick
and was advised to have bed rest. Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner’s wife, further corroborated the
previous testimonies regarding the petitioner’s sickness. The RTC dismissed the complaint as it
was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merciditas on the basis of the following:
(1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merciditas' conception,
(2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living, took
care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her, (3) the birth certificate of Merciditas was
not signed by petitioner, (4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of
Merciditas, (5) there is no clear and sufficient in showing that support was given by petitioner
to Merciditas. The CA did not share the same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial
and documentary evidence adduced by private respondent led respondent court to the
conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to support.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Merciditas Ilano is an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.
2. Whether or not an adulterous child can file an action for recognition and support.

As for the first issue, yes. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code,
illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of
lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code)
and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit. Since petitioner had a subsisting
marriage to another at the time Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. The court a
quo did not likewise consider the evidence as sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in
continuous possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and
there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother.
The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is not
the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already been recognized by
defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition
once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be
incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects
public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the revocation of
such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate
of Live Birth that Leonica and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that
Merciditas is not appellee’s daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment. Also, Merciditas bore the surname of 'Ilano' since
birth without any objection of the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merciditas had her
discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her 'Daddy'. The natural, logical and
coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and
appellee, their living together as husband and wife in several places, the birth of the first still-
born child, the circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which
leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated
denials.
As for the second issue, yes, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate
offspring to sue his father for recognition and support. Since petitioner had a subsisting
marriage to another at the time Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child.
In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural
in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to
support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given
these rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents
should not be visited upon them.
However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of
paternity either voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an
unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate
because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from his
acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not
because he was the true or real child of his parents but because under the law, he had been
recognized or acknowledged as such a child. Private respondent’s evidence to establish her
filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside
by the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak
denials of petitioner.
Case 143
Trinidad v. CA, GR No. 118904, April 20, 1998; 289 SCRA 188
Facts:
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones are parents to Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. It is
stated that Patricio died and was survived by his 3 children. Upon his death were 4 parcels of
land which was qualified as usufruct. Years passed and the children grew old in which that
Inocentes the oldest died. Now, Arturio claiming to be the real and only legitimate child of
Inocentes is claiming for the ⅓ of the estate. The same was contradicted by his alleged uncle
Felix and aunt Lourdes saying that he is not a child of their late brother and that their brother
was never married. Upon trial of the case filed by the plaintiff-petitioner evidence were
admitted by him Exhibits A, B and C. That first evidence are pictures of him with the
defendants-private respondents and Exhibit C was his baptismal certificate indicating that his
parents are Inocente and Felicidad Trinidad. It was also supported by testimonies.
The defendants countered the case filed only with testimonies. RTC ruled in favor of the
plaintiff-petitioner which grants his right for the ⅓ of the estate of his grandfather as legal heir
of his father. CA, reversed the decision dismissing the case and said that no concrete evidence
was admitted and declared that although demand to partition does not prescribe but as to the
fact that the defendants had lived within the property for more than 10 years they already
acquired ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and
of his filiation.
2. Whether or not was his claim time barred under rules on acquisitive prescription.

As for the first issue, yes. Despite the fact that no concrete evidence was presented by
the petitioner he obtained from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of
births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation which is the reason for failing to provide concrete evidence, the absence of
marriage contract does not mean that there was no marriage. It further gives rise to the
disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As to his filiation, Art. 267. In the absence of a
record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation
may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws in which it
supports the baptismal certificate as one of those others means allowed as evidence.
As for the second issue, no. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all
the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, no prescription runs
in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she
expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.
In light of the case, preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by
one side outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly
written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his
legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision is
REINSTATED. No costs.
Case 144
Rodriguez v. CA 245 SCRA 150, 61 SCAD 896
Facts:
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by respondent Alarito (Clarito)
Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his
mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she
was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel
raised a timely objection which the court sustained.
Issue/s:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order and allowing the
admission of said testimony.

We find that had the appellate court sanctioned the trial court's disallowance of the
testimony of plaintiff's mother, private respondent would have been deprived of a speedy and
adequate remedy considering the importance of said testimony and the erroneous resolution
of the trial court. On the merits of his petition, petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos
Haber should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private respondent because
such revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article
provided:
When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not
reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state
any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified.
On the other hand, private respondent argued that his mother should be allowed to
testify on the identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Article 283 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines provided:
In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father
by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
The prohibition in Article 280 against the identification of the father or mother of a child
applied only in voluntary and not in compulsory recognition. This conclusion becomes
abundantly clear if we consider the relative position of the progenitor of Article 280, which was
Article 132 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, with the other provisions on the
acknowledgement of natural children of the same Code. Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is of the
view that the prohibition in Article 280 does not apply in an action for compulsory recognition.
According to him:
The prohibition to reveal the name or circumstance of the parent who does not
intervene in the separate recognition is limited only to the very act of making such separate
recognition. It does not extend to any other act or to cases allowed by law. Thus, when a
recognition has been made by one parent, the name of the other parent may be revealed in an
action by the child to compel such other parent to recognize him also (I Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 590 [1985]).
Justice Eduardo Caguioa also opines that the said prohibition refers merely to the act of
recognition. "It does prevent inquiry into the identity of the other party in case an action is
brought in court to contest recognition on the ground that the child is not really natural
because the other parent had no legal capacity to contract marriage" (I Comments and Cases
on Civil Law 380 [1967] citing In re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167 [1915]). The action filed by
private respondent herein was brought under Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which added new grounds for filing an action for recognition: namely,
A.) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
B.) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Worth noting is the fact that no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This undoubtedly discloses
the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize
the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children. Articles 276, 277, 278, 279
and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were repealed by the Family Code, which now
allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children (Art. 175). WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the action for
compulsory recognition.
Case 145
Potenciano v. Reynoso, G.R. No. 140707. April 22, 2003; 401SCRA391
Facts:
The former Cebu City Treasurer, Felipe Pareja was convicted of the crime of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment with the accessory penalties attendant thereto including civil
interdiction. Felipe Pareja was granted a conditional pardon by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on. In 1979, the late Felipe Pareja, allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
a certain parcel of land in favor of his illegitimate son, appellant Manuel Jayme who later
claimed that the said sale was made to cover the payments he had made for the hospitalization
expenses of his father, he having been constrained to borrow money from several people for
the purpose. Before Felipe died, he executed a Last Will and Testament wherein he bequeathed
to herein appellees (Reynosos) and appellant Manuel Jayme the lot in question while at the
same time recognizing them as his illegitimate children. Thereafter, The Jayme and his spouse
sold the land to Potenciano, who then filed an ejectment case against appellees Reynosos.
The Reynosos, who claim that they are likewise illegitimate children of Felipe, they also
raised that assailed the sale made by their father contending that the latter was already senile
and still suffering from the accessory penalty of civil interdiction at the time of the sale and
forgery of Felipe's signature in the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the RTC that the signature of Felipe on the Deed of Sale had been forged. Both courts gave
more weight to the scientific examination of the expert witness as opposed to the testimony of
the Deed's notary public who is counsel to petitioner Potenciano and was an interested party.
The CA also agreed with the RTC that Potenciano was a buyer in bad faith for not having
sufficiently investigated the property at the time he bought it, when it was then in the
possession of people other than the seller. Accepted by the appellate court as sufficient proof
of filiation was the will, in which respondents were recognized by their father, even if it had not
yet been probated. The CA also ruled that petitioners were bound by a Joint Affidavit executed
by Manuel Jayme and Dwight Reynoso (one of the illegitimate children) declaring that, together
with the other parties, they were recognized illegitimate children of Pareja.
Issue/s:
Whether ot not the private respondents have the personality to demand the
reconveyance of the property in question.
Ruling:
Yes. They have the personality to demand reconveyance of the property in question.
Petitioners argue that the suit against them cannot be maintained by privaterespondents,
because the latter have not established their filiation to Pareja as their father. Petitioners
further contend that Felipe B. Pareja's unprobated Last Will and Testament cannot be used to
establish respondents' filiation. The court disagrees. The way to prove the filiation of
illegitimate children is provided by the Family Code thus:
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
In turn, Article 172 of the Family Code states:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
Justice Jose C. Vitug clarifies in unequivocal terms the process of proving filiation:
"under this Family Code, filiation may likewise be established by holographic as well as notarial
wills, except that they no longer need to be probated or to be strictly in conformity with the
formalities thereof for purposes of establishing filiation. In probate proceedings, all that the law
requires is the court's declaration that the external formalities have been complied with. The
will is then deemed valid and effective in the eyes of the law. Thus, probate proceedings merely
determine the extrinsic validity of the will and do not affect its contents. Petitioners are
mistaken in assuming that this Joint Affidavit is being used by private respondents to prove the
latter's filiation as illegitimate children of Pareja. The document cannot be used for that
purpose, because the children were the ones who recognized their father and not the other
way around. However, its importance lies in the fact that it prevents petitioners from denying
private respondents' standing to institute the case against them. Having admitted that Private
Respondent Reynoso was indeed an illegitimate son of Pareja just like him, Manuel Jayme
cannot now claim otherwise. This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the two lower courts'
finding of fact.
Case 146
De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001; 366
SCRA 499
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:
parents. The certificates of live birth also identified Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There
is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
Case 147
Solinap v. Locsin, 371 SCRA 711
Facts:
Eleven months after Juan “Jhonny” Locsin, Sr. died intestate, respondent Juan E. Locsin,
Jr. filed with the RTC of Iloilo City a “Petition for Letters of Administration” praying that he be
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged, among others, (a)
that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime,
the deceased owned personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time
deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real properties owned by
him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin
and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing, which order was duly published,
thereby giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition. Before the
scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and
Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to
respondent’s petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child
or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never
affixed “Sr.” in his name.
Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop, Manuel Locsin and the
successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent’s claim as a natural child is
barred by prescription or the statute of limitations. The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin,
Jr. also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This
was followed by an appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla, likewise stating that
there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased. Thereupon, the trial
court conducted hearings. To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate,
respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the
bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. In their
oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is spurious. They
submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar
General, Metro Manila, indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin.
After hearing, the trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 and the photograph
are sufficient proofs of respondent’s illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and the
petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the late Juan “Johnny” Locsin, Sr.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision affirming in toto the
order of the trial court. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however, denied by the Appellate
Court in its Resolution. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the certificate of live birth (Exhibit D) as presented by the respondent,
including the photograph showing that he and his mother attended the deceased funeral, is
sufficient to proof filiation of petitioner to the deceased.

The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit “8” for the
petitioners, not respondent’s Exhibit “D”, should have been given more faith and credence by
the courts below.
Exhibit “8” shows that respondent’s record of birth was made by his mother. In the
same Exhibit “8”, the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent’s father
and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November
28, 1954 do not appear.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court that “documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” In this case, the
glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits “D” and “8”) have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit “D” entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic
is Exhibit “8” recorded in the Civil Registry General. Incidentally, respondent’s photograph with
his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of
filiation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction
fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others
and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased. Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr.
failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit “D”) is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration.
Case 148
Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129163, April 22, 2003; 401 SCRA 360
Facts:
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria
Lirazan, had 5 children. Everyone mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was
survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio
Colinco predeceased his three daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all
surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario and their
union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a
spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of
Francisca Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario
Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as
‘Arbolarios’) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda
(first child), by virtue of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was
executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian,
who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo
and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot
in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other
half. Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed
parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985. Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco,
Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition
Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate
or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irene’s)
late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal
proportions to the remaining half (1/2).
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay
and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by
respondent spouses (‘Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that
they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and
that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot from the deceased lessor
sometime in September 1978. On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and
spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (all respondents in the case) filed another
case ‘[f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages’. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend
that the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by the Colincos was
defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim
that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged halfsister, Purificacion
Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot.
The RTC rendered judgment in the consolidated cases in favor of the Arbolarios and against the
Colincos. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Arbolarios are illegitimate children.

YES, they are illegitimate. There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that
Juan Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not follow that just because his
first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children.
A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage
as an undisputable fact. Since they failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of
marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot
invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a
relationship that must be judicially established. Whether the Salhays had purchased the portion
of land in issue, the Court also ruled that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the same.
Finally, on the issue of partition, the Court ruled that petitioners were not able to establish any
right thereto. The Petition for Review was denied.
Case 149
Carmelo Cabatana v. CA, et. al., GR No. 124814, October 21, 2004
Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. During the trial,
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September
9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband
left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and
was eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was while working there as a maid that,
on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan
Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their
sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later,
on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But petitioner
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September
9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her
child, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different.
He testified that sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During
the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and
return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's wife, hence she was told to
look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend
New Year's Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos
City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and
petitioner offered to lend her some money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and
had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about
it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following
day. In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner's
house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife was in need of one,
she was re-hired. However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired
about the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by her
husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go home and they did not see each
other anymore. Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by
Florencia's counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when
they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City. After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony
of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality,
her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared: :The
child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the
personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the
child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos.” The CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court can compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter.

NO. The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private
respondent was based on the testimony of the child's mother and "the personal appearance of
the child. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of
which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there
is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information
of a third person. Further, the fact that Florencia's husband is living and there is a valid
subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of
a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is reversed and set aside. Private respondent's
petition for recognition and support is dismissed.
Case 150
Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Aguilar spouses) died intestate
and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Titles. Petitioner filed with RTC a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving her of the Aguilar spouses,
that he discovered that the TCTs were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the
Siasat clan could have stolen it. Respondent claimed that petitioner is not the sole surviving heir
nor the son of the Aguilar spouses but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses
out of generosity and kindness of heart, that the petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of
the Aguilar spouses, and that the subject titles were not stolen but entrusted to her for
safekeeping. During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented his school records showing Alfred as his
father, his ITR which indicated Candelaria as his mother, Alfredo’s SSS form E-1 with signature
and thumbmark showing petitioner as his son and dependent, Alfredo’s information sheet of
employment indicating petitioner as his son, petitioner’s certificate of marriage indicating
Aguilar Spouses as his parents, a letter from BMMC introducing petitioner as Alfredo’s husband,
and a certification indicating petitioner’s birth certificate could not be found as they were
destroyed by nature. Petitioner also offered testimonies from his wife and aunt (Alfredo’s
sister) that he is indeed the only son of the Aguilar Spouses. Respondent testified that she does
not know the petitioner and doesn’t know him to be the son of the Aguilar Spouses, that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that she
is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilar's estate; that she did not steal the subject titles,
but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria SiasatAguilar. She also offered the
testimony of Candelaria’s sister claiming that petitioner is not the son of the Aguilar Spouses.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent Siasat stating that the evidence presented by petitioner was
not solid enough. CA later affirmed ruling of RTC stating that the documents presented were
not strong evidence to prove filiation with the Aguilar Spouses, sighting Reyes vs CA that
student records not signed by the father do not constitute evidence of filiation, and Labagala vs
Santiago that the ITR only shows that income tax has been paid.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar Spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar. Citing De Jesus vs. Estate
of Dizon, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
Thus, it must be concluded that petitioner, ho was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths —
has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As petitioner
correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar's SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation
and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Topic: Illegitimate Children (Arts. 175-176), DNA Testing
Case 151
Arnel Agustin vs. CA, GR No. 162571, June 15, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Arnel Agustin, allegedly Martin’s biological father, is being sued by
respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante for support and support pendente lite
before the Quezon City RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in
1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe
on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel's insistence on abortion, Fe, decided
otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the
Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The baby's birth certificate was purportedly signed by
Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe's
repeated requests for Martin's support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child. On January 19, 2001 while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf
and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe's leg.
This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has,
since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed
said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court.
Issue/s:
 Whether the court gravely erred in exercising discretion in denying the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss.
 Whether the court erred in directing parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing.
The foregoing considered, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioner's
motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available "when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The petitioner has in no way
shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely
within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would
have only been an error in judgment. It has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures, 37 and the infringement of privacy of communication 38 where the constitutional
right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner's case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His
hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that
they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at
stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
Case 152
Rosendo Herrera vs. Alba, GR No. 148220, June 15, 2005
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by
his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support
and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with respondent's mother. Respondent filed a motion to direct the
taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. Petitioner opposed DNA
paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued
that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the DNA paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against self-
incrimination.

No. Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent
in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in
essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis,154 SCRA 513, 1987).The Supreme Court has ruled
that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion
of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required
to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra);the
substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng,23 Phil. 145);morphine forced out of the mouth was received as
proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong,36 Phil. 735);an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of
pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora,86 Phil. 244);and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers,41 Phil. 62),since the
gist of the privilege is the restriction on "testimonial compulsion."
Case 153
Estate of Ong vs. Diaz, GR No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 480
Facts:
This is a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation
was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky
C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac
City. As alleged by Jinky, she and Rogelio got acquainted in November 1993 in Tarlac City and
their friendship later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese
national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal
Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. Jinky and Reogelio cohabitated. Soon after, minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz was conceived and born on 25 February 1998. Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital
and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the
baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne's needs — recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child. Rogelio, despite Jinky's
remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the
child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore
adverted complaint. The RTC held that Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of
defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz and awarded support pendente lite dated June
15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall
have reached majority age. Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, during the
pendency of the case, Rogelio's counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio
died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that
Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, 14 which motion was
accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court remanded the case to the
court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA
analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz,
upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA
analysis.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a DNA analysis can still be done even if the person whose DNA is of
interest is already dead.

It can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person's
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died,
any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA
testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
Further, citing their ruling in Agustin v. Court of Appeals, the Court explain that:
[F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have
long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
Topic: Rights of Illegitimate Children, R.A. 9255: Allowing Illegitimate Children to use the
surname of their father, amending Art. 176, Family Code
Case 154
Mossessgeld v. CA, G.R. No. 111455, Dec. 23, 1998
Facts:
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31 years of age,
gave birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.3 It
was the third time that she delivered a child. The presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan,
42 years old, a lawyer, married, and a resident of 8632 San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati,
Metro Manila, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
child's first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Both the
presumed father, Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the
dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were
true and correct. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the
child. On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing
the presumed father's surname as the child's surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for
registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge of

the office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4,
dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use
the surname of their mother. Lawyer Eleazar S. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig, Branch 69, a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his
surname. RTC denied the petition. Eleazar then filed a motion for reconsideration. He filed a
motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the child's
mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed said decision.
Issues/s:
Whether or not the mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father's surname where the
latter admitted paternity.

Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines13 provides that "illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether or not
the father admits paternity.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the
surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate
and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction.
Case 155
Republic v. Abadilla, 302 SCRA 358 (1999)
Facts:
Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children Emerson and Rafael
filed a Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries in the Birth Certificates of the children,
specifically, the entries in the date and place of marriage of Gerson and Luzviminda who both
testified that they are not yet married to each other. The Petition was granted, but the trial
court failed to order the change of the minors' surname from Abadilla to Celestino.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion of
the "date and place of marriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C.
Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors' surname from
"Abadilla" to "Celestino."

The petition was granted. There was no dispute that Emerson and Rafael are illegitimate
children. Then, the Family Code was already the governing law when they were born. Under
Art. 176 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother.
Resultingly, with the deletion of the entry in the date and place of marriage of the parents, the
corresponding correction with respect to the surname of the children should also be made and
changed to Celestino, the mother's surname.
Case 156
Leonardo v. CA, GR No. 125329, September 10, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-law-
spouses Eddie B. Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo. In her birth certificate, her given surname
is that of her mother, Leonardo. As petitioner's parents later wanted her to carry the
surname of her father, the latter executed an affidavit of July 29, 1994 to this effect and wrote a
letter of August 1, 1994 to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila requesting for the
change of petitioner's registered surname. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila Lucena D. Dacuan
denied the request of petitioner's parents on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate,
should carry her mother's surname as provided under Article 176 of the Family Code 5 which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Dacuan also cited Article 412 of the New Civil Code which
provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Petitioner's parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioner's surname to
the Civil Registrar General, they citing, among others, the following provision of Title XIII
(Use of Surnames), Book I of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners appealed to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) to

review the the denial of the Civil Registrar General’s decision. But NEDA said that they have no
power or authority to do so. Petitioners appealed to the Office of the President, but upheld the
decision of the Civil Registrar General and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that the
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry must be brought directly before courts
of law. The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for reviews. The appellate
court held that Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code on the Use of Surnames was not repealed
by the Family Code, citing its repealing clause or Article 254. It held, however, that the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila is not allowed to administratively correct the entry in the Civil
Registry of the City by deleting and changing petitioner's family name LEONARDO to
FERNANDEZ upon the submission of an affidavit of her father recognizing her. It went on to
declare that petitioner could change her surname by judicial action pursuant to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision was also denied.
Issue/s:
Whether or not an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code, has the
right to use her father's surname

Ruling in the negative, the Supreme Court held that Article 176 of the Family Code
provides that "Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity.
Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly denied the request for the change of
petitioner's registered surname to that of the surname of the alleged father, even with the
latter's consent. Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took
effect, she has no right to use her father's surname.
Topic: Rights of Illegitimate Children, Illegitimate Child has no Middle Name; exceptions
Case 157
Grace M. Grande v. Patricio T. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else. 3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on
February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
The parties' relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United
States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition
for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the
children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of
[respondent Antonio]." Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave
error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children. the appellate
court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father's recognition of his children, the mother
cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of
reasons. 10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act
that adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children. The appellate
court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent
Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected
"best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CA's Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the
minors' surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via
the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code — as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language — may not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their
mother.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion 17 upon the
illegitimate children. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate father's surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate
children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. The Court has
taken note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15)
years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."
However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do
not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner. A proper
inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial
court is necessary.
Case 158
In Re Petition for Change of Name of Julian Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, GR No. 155966,
March 30, 2005
Facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna
Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who
was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name.
Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have
different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's Mandarin language since they do
not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial court found that the
reason given for the change of name sought in the petition — that is, that petitioner Julian may
be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name — did not fall
within the grounds recognized by law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision but this was denied.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court erred in denying the petition to change the name of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The touchstone for the grant
of a change of name is that there be 'proper and reasonable cause' for which the change is
sought. 15 To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper
or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
The Court observed that the petititon does not simply seek to change the name of the minor
petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of
his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. It is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority.
As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
Topic: Period to Prove Filiation
Case 159
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato Catindig,
Petitioner, GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be
changed to "Catindig," his surname. The trial court granted the adoption. Petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted
child to use the same of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue/s:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Yes, the Court found merit in the petition. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide
that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Topic: Legitimated Children (Arts.177-182), Concept, Requisites
Case 160
Uyguangco v. CA 178 SCRA 684 (1989)
Facts:
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four
legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided
among themselves. Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having
been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a
complaint for partition against all the petitioners. Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to
Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's
hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-
brothers. Here he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High
School, where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father, without objection
from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to
1973.
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an
admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show
that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. These are "the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer
prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. Specifically, the
petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to prove the private
respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted. Neither could he now
resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult when his alleged father
died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. The RTC said that respondent
could still be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child despite the death of the claimed
father and in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code. The Court of
Appeals sustained this decision.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a person should be allowed to prove that s/he is an illegitimate
child of his claimed parent, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence
required by the Civil Code.

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove
his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation. In her Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that
unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten
and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who
then can be sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to
be the illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he
or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."
The problem of the private respondent is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his
alleged father's death in 1975.
Case 161
Bernabe v. Alejo, GR No. 140500, January 21, 2002; 374 SCRA 180
Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, on behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian)
be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir. On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,
the complaint is now barred.
Orders of the Trial Court

In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have
been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm
or deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born
in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The
subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Family Code should be applied to the case.
2. Whether or not Adrian has a right to be recognized.

The petitioner, the natural child, persists that Adrian Bernabe does not have the right to
be recognized or to seek recognition because Article 175 of the Family Code. (the father must
have already recognized Adrian during his lifetime to give him the opportunity to either affirm
or deny his affiliation with the child.
However, the right to seek recognition was already granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect. Thus, this right cannot
be impaired or taken away. Under Article 285 of the Civil Code, the minor must be given the
chance to exercise his right to recognition for up to 4 years from attaining majority age.
Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because
the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows
an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of
majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Case 162
Alejandra Arado Heirs v. Alcoran, G.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015
Facts:
Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado , and their marriage produced a son
named Nicolas Alcoran . In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan, but their union had no
offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca
Sarita, who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on July 13, 1951 during the subsistence
of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco. Raymundo died in
1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan. Joaquina had
four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. Nemesio
had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was
married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria; 11 and (6)Felicisima. During
the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1)
Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil
and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed a complaint for recovery of
property and damages (w/ application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against
Anacleto and Elenette. Such complaint involves 10 properties in which the parties later
stipulated that the first 8 of such properties belongs to Raymundo previously, and last 2 are
paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
The plaintiffs alleged they were the rightful heirs of the properties. And it was unknown
if Anacleto was the spurious son of Nicolas since Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his
spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime, hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas.
However, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of
the will executed by Joaquina but the will was void for not having been executed according to
the formalities of the law because she did not acknowledge the will which was not submitted
for probable. The defendants however counters that Anacleto was expressly recognized by
Nicolas as his son evidenced by a birth certificate. They also claim that he has the right to
inherit Nicolas' properties but he was just too young when Nicolas died that’s why the
administration of the properties went to Joaquina, his grandmother. Eventually, Joaquina made
a will in favor of Anacleto.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. CA likewise sustained the ruling of RTC to the effect
that Anacleto was an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas based on Articles 172, 173, and
175 of the Family Code. The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas'
illegitimate son and if there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the period to claim
recognition already prescribed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran.
2. Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.
As for the first issue, yes. He is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran. Art. 175 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within
the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. Also, Art. 173 of the Family Code also provides that the action to claim
legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall
have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced
by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. Considering
that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate,
reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully warranted.
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence
notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question
in view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his
illegitimate son.
As for the second issue, Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose
estate included the first eight of the subject properties that had previously belonged to
Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner of said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in
1954. But he has not inherited Joaquina's properties because the right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent.
Topic: Legitimated Children (Arts.177-182), Rights of Legitimated Children, Retroactive Effect

of Legitimation
Case 163
De Santos v. Hon. Angeles, GR No. 105619, Dec. 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 206
Facts:
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, and they were blessed
with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship
became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with another woman,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a court in Nevada. Obviously aware that said
decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which does not recognize divorce,
Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had
been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, Antonio and
private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On
March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of
P15,000,000.00. On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of
letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's
estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate
heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition,
her petition was granted. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however,
petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she
argued inter alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were
born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her

administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of
Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, declared private respondent's ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order
but this was denied. Hence, she filed this instant petition for certiorari on contending that since
only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her
half brothers and sisters.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the children of the second marriage, who are natural children by legal
fiction, can be legitimated.

According to Art. 269 (Art 177 of the Family Code), only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents, who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other
words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a "natural child." In the case at bench, there is no question that
all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived
and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That
private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,
US a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted
abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of
this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo
marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another
marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's

half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they
failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children
within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that
they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural
children. In summary, the second marriage is void, and the children born of such marriage are
illegitimate. There being a legal impediment for Dr. Santos to marry Conchita, said children
cannot be considered “natural children proper”, and therefore cannot be legitimated.
Wherefore, SC grants the petition.

(Supplementary) Through this case, Art. 89, in relation with Art. 269, creates another category
of illegitimate children (the children of the 2nd marriage in this case).The marriage under
question in this case is considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous. It follows that
the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time
of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. To distinguish them from natural children proper
(those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other"), a legal fiction had to be
resorted to. In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving
rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural
children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged
natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter.
However, in this case, SC ruled that: Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a
child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269.
Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural
children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the
right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally
existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife effectively barred a
"subsequent marriage" between their parents.
Case 164
Abadilla v. Tagbiliran, Jr. 249 SCRA 462, 65 SCAD 197, October 25, 1995
Facts:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against respondent, Judge Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming
of a judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge
scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage
with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla contracted marriage on May 1986. Furthermore,
respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract and dispensed with
the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be
registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these
children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Respondent, in his comment, dated
December 25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is not and was neither
bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla only after his first wife had
already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her
whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in
order to show the legality of his acts:
After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those of succession. (Rule 131,
Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he
denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, he preferred to choose
the word "single", it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint
affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged. It was also found out
that Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran,
Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before their marriage.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the 3 children can be legitimated.

No. The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since
the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita.
It appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla
Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus
was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently,
therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while
respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. As stated in Article 269 of
the Civil Code, “Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural.”
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations. The Family Code: which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-
mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth
of the child.
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the
deceitful actuations of the respondent. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently,
orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in
the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability
Case 165
“BBB” v. “AAA”, G.R. No. 193225, Feb. 9, 2015
Facts:
BBB and AAA started dating in 1996. They bore two children, DDD and EEE. BBB and
AAA married in civil rights in 2002. Due to their frequent arguments, AAA decided to leave the
conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. While living
separately from [BBB], AAA discovered that BBB was stalking her and/or their children. Thus,
[AAA] filed an application for the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order before the RTC. The
trial court granted the TPO. The CA affirmed the RTC. BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a MOA. BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA had entered
into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD
and EEE. AAA’s counsel filed a Comment to the MOA pointing out that AAA signed the MOA
while emotionally distressed and sans the former’s advice and guidance. BBB counters that AAA
should be presumed to have acted with due care and full knowledge of the contents of the
MOA which she signed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not BBB’s acknowledgment of CCC as his legitimate son is binding upon him.

Yes. In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC's biological
father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of
BBB and AAA's marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB
voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code
provides:
“Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.”
The principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility
arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process.
CCC remains to be BBB's son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is
entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father's
support.
Topic: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (R.A. 8552), Consent to Adoption
Case 166
Republic v. CA, GR No. 92326, Jan. 24, 1992
Facts:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed before the RTC of Legaspi City a petition to adopt Jason
Condat, a 6-year old who had been living with their family since he was 4 months old. Finding
the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the court set the petition for hearing. The
order was duly published and a copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court
and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the
petition. During the hearing, the jurisdictional requirements were complied and proved, and
the testimonies of the respondent (Mrs. Bobiles), her husband (Dioscoro Bobiles) and one Ma.
Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted
in the proceedings. The trial court rendered judgement that Jason Condat be freed from all
obligations with respect to his natural parents, be the child of the spouses Dioscoro and
Zenaida Bobiles, and change his surname to Bobiles. The petitioner (Republic of the PH)
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. The petitioner
contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed as it was filed solely by the
respondent (Mrs.Bobiles) without her husband which is a violation of Article 185 of the Family
Code that requires joint adoption by the spouses. The petitioner also argues that the Family
Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by the respondent (Mrs. Bobiles).
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering that only the
wife filed the petition for adoption.

Yes. The petition for adoption was filed by the respondent (Mrs. Bobiles) when the law
applicable was PD No. 63, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. This code states that a petition for
adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial
court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the CA, the Family
Code took effect. Under the new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Under
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by
herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right
to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance
with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by
the enactment of a new law. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with
a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was
sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was
filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for
adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and
expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in
adopting the child. The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. In the case at bar, the rights concomitant
to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His
adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for
adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory
reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy.
Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
Case 167
Herbert Cang v. CA & Spouses Clavano; G.R. No. 105308, Sept. 25, 1998; 296 SCRA 128
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three (3) children, namely: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony. During the early
years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed until Anna Marie
learned of the petitioner’s extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendent lite with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to “live separately and apart or
from bed and board.” They further agreed:
(1)That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of P1,000.00
effective from the date of the filing of the complaint.
(2)That the plaintiff (Anna) shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement
with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the
husband.
Petitioner left for the US where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie and the court
issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three children to Anna,
reserving “rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he
divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in the US, petitioner worked and a
portion of his earnings was remitted to the Philippines for his children’s expenses and another,
deposited in the bank in the name of his children. Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie, files for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the RTC of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna
Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had “evaded his legal
obligation to support” his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the US to
attend to a family business, “leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally
hamper her job seeking venture abroad;” and that her husband had “long forfeited his parental
rights” over the children.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents were
financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to
theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children. The lower court concluded that oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his
children. And the CA affirmed the decree of adoption issued by the RTC stating that Art. 199 of
the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted.
However, the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is NOT necessary. The
question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered as having abandoned the
children. In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to
forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, OR the neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their children (Santos v.
Ananzanso), OR the withholding of the parents’ presence, his care and the opportunity to
display voluntary affection. Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide
support comes from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra,
obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce
decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly support of
US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show compliance with
the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45)
drawn in the children’s names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6, 1987
(Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support commenced under the divorce decree on May 5,
1982 so that as of October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or
a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to have been made after October 6,
1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce
decree. And since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable
conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary to his
protestations. The 3 bank accounts he opened were in his name as trustee for each of his 3
children. In other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts withdrawable by the
oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they belong to the minors. Petitioner is now before
the SC alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Art. 31(2) of PD No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, and Art. 188(2) of the Family Code.
Issue/s:
1. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent
on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
2. Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the
adoption unnecessary.
On the first Issue:

YES. Despite the amendments to the law [Art. 31(2) of PD 603, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code as amended by EO 91 was the applicable law at the time when the private
respondents filed the petition for adoption in 1987. During the pendency of the petition for
adoption or on Aug. 3, 1988, Art. 188(2) of the Family Code amended PD 603], the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably,
such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court which provides that: “There
shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed x x x by each of its
known living parents who is not insane, OR hopelessly intemperate, OR has not abandoned the
child x x x.” As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the
natural child is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with IF PARENT HAS ABANDONED THE CHILD
or that such parent is INSANE or HOPELESSLY INTEMPERATE. The court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents PROVIDED
that the petition for adoption ALLEGES FACTS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT EXEMPTION FROM
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. In the instant case, only affidavit of consent of the natural mother
was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the natural father is lacking.
Nonetheless, the petition SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED THE FACT OF ABANDONMENT OF THE
MINORS FOR ADOPTION BY THE NATURAL FATHER as follows:
That the children’s mother, sister of petitioner Ronald Clavano, has given her express
consent to this adoption, as shown by the Affidavit of Consent. Likewise, the written consent of
Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on this petition; However, the father of the children,
Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as
evidenced by the copy of the Decree of Divorce issued by the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, USA which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his
family to live in the US as an illegal immigrant.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of
the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper
issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may
the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
On the second Issue:

NO. In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s
rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to
perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he
was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their
whims. Petitioner’s testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting
of the handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children. Aside from these letters,
petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the
filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children.
Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards
the bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below
attached a high premium to the prospective adopters’ financial status but totally brushed aside
the possible repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the
children.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to
a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother. The Court said: “Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that
private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is
earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.”
Thus, the said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of
their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Case 168
Landigin v. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Facts:
Assailed in this petition is CA’s decision reversing RTC’s decision granting the Petition for
Adoption to the petitioners herein.
Diwata Ramos Landingin, petitioner, a citizen of USA, of Filipino parentage and a

resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of her minor neices and nephews
namely, Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos.
She alleged in her petition that:
1.) When her brother Manuel Ramos (father of the minors) died, the children were left
to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos.
2.) The children’s biological mother, Amelia Ramos, is already in Italy with her 2 nd family
and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-
laws.
3.) The minors are being financially supported by Diwata and her children and relatives
abroad.
4.) As Maria already passed away, Diwata desires to adopt the children.
5.) The minors gave their written consent to the adoption.
6.) She is qualified to adopt since she is a 57-year old widow, has children of her own
who are already married and gainfully employed.
7.) She lives alone in her home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server.
8.) She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors.
9.) Her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
10.) Her brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified willingness
and commitment to support minors while in petitioner’s custody.
Petitioner prayed that she would be allowed to adopt the minors and the latter would
follow her family name. The petitioner presented the following as evidence:
1.) Her testimony
2.) Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the minors, to testify on the written consent executed by
her and her siblings
3.) Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis, and
Ricfel Branitley, and notarized in Guam, USA
The DSWD was ordered by the court to conduct a case study. The report of DSWD
recommended that the adoption be granted considering the willingness expressed by the
minors and the voluntary consent of their mother based on the personal interview conducted
by the Social Welfare Officer, Pagbilao. However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as
witness and any documentary evidence to prove Amelia’s assent to the adoption.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption. However, the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed the decision to the CA, and the latter reversed RTC’s decision. Subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother.
2. Whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law.
3. Whether or not the petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
On the lack of written consent of their biological mother:

The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on the best
interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the
child.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the
written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
e) The adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter's souse, if any;
f) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that
his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
The SC noted that in DSWD’s report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son for a vacation. If so, it is incredible
that Pagbilao would not require Amelia to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her
children . Neither did the petitioner presented Amelia as witness. Petitioner argues that the
written consent of Amelia is no longer necessary since she already abandoned her children.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the RTC, RA 8552
was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
To justify adoption of his child with his consent, abandonment by the parent should mean that
she forego all parental duties. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
However, in this case, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or
relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased
mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for
serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.
It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over
his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the
children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
On the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children:

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao's Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioner's children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam,
USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this
country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, 4466 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country
shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in
accordance with the following requirements:
a.) The acknowledgment shall be made before:
1. an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which
he is accredited, or
2. a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
b.) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed
it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate
shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to
which he is accredited.
The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who
took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he
was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as
such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in
the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine. As the alleged written consent of petitioner's legitimate children did not comply
with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document
whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
On Diwata’s financial capability to support the minors:

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a
part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial
support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to
support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support
petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are
willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on
this issue.
Topic: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (R.A. 8552), Effects of Adoption
Case 169
Sayson v CA, 205 SCRA 321
Facts:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro,
who had married Isabel Bautista, died on Mar. 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on Mar.
26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa
and Remedios and Juana, Isabel’s mother, filed a complaint for partition of the intestate estate
of Teodoro and Isabel. Subsequently, Delia and Edmundo, both legally adopted, and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter, filed their own complaint for the partition of the intestate estate of
Eleno and Rafaela claiming that they are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’
estate by right of representation. Both cases were decided by the trial court in favor of the
herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence. Judge Rafael
Santelices declared that Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted children of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson and Doribel is their legitimate daughter evidenced by her birth certificate. Judge
Santilices ruled that the 3 children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation. Judge Jose Sanez held that the defendants, being legitimate heirs of Teodoro
and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing
in their estate.
The CA consolidated the cases and affirmed the lower court’s decision. However, it
modified the trial court’s decision stating that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson.
Thus, the present petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners contending that Delia and
Edmundo were not legally adopted and that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabl but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship
of the child that she was her natural mother.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petitoiners could challenge the validitiy of the adoption decree of
Delia and Edmundo.
2. Whether or not Delia and Edmundo have a claim in the estate of Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson.
3. Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel, thus giving her
the right to claim a share in the estate.

As for the first issue, no. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption years
after it became final and executory.
As for the second issue, no. Delia and Edmundo are total strangers in relation to Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
As for the third issue, yes. Doribel’s legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
Case 170
Acain vs IAC, 155 SCRA 100
Facts:
Constantino Acain filed in the RTC-Cebu City Branch 13, a petition for the probate of the
late Nemesio Acain's(petitioner's uncle) will and for the issuance of the same petitioner of
letters testamentary docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB. Nemesio died leaving a
will in which petitioner, together with his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will as executed
by Nemeso, was written in Bisaya with an English translation. It contained provisions of burial
rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio Villagonzalo as the
executor of the testament. The testator, in his will provided:
"All my shares that I may receive from our properties, house, lands and money which I
earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO
ACAIN, Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu
City. In case my brother Segundo Acain predeceases me, all the money properties, lands,
houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given by me
to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, Laura, Flores, Antonio and
Jose, all surnamed Acain."
However, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, the oppositors (respondents herein
Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the latter's widow Rosa
Dingson Vda. de Acain) file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
1. the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
2. he is merely a universal heir; and
3. the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
The said motion was denied by the trial judge and after the subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private
respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will of Nemesio Acain. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this
present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision
A Memorandum was raised by the petitioner with the following issues:
A. The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
B. The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic
validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
C. The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The
preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who
are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the
institution of heirs;
D. DICAT TESTATOR ET ERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
E. There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere
institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in
the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at
bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be inviolable.
F. As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition
in Sp. Proc. No. 591-A-CEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain; and
G. Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional
and ineffectual.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the private respondents, Virginia Fernandez (adopted daughter) and
Rosa Diongson (surviving spouse) have been pretirited.
2. Whether or not the petitioner is a party in interest to probate the will.

As to the surviving spouse, there is no preterition. However, as to the surviving
daughter, there is preterition. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code). However, the same
thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by
the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code:
"Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter."
It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and
that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it
be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of
the legally adopted child.
As for the second issue, in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate
like a creditor. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there
being no mention in the testamentary disposition. of any gift of an individual item of personal
or real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the
will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession
either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from
the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is
in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the
will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed. PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of
respondent Court of Appeals and its Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
Case 171
Tamagro v. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
Facts:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. The natural parents of Tamargo
filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living
the time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a
petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982 that is after Adelberto
had shot and killed Jennifer. Adelberto’s parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses
Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them
from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that
since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the
spouses Tamargo’s petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed
by Adelberto.

No. Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the
child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was
still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit
for damages. It follows in accordance with Article 221 of the Family Code which states that:
“Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by
law.” Supreme Court held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Case 172
In the matters of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, GR No. 148311, March 31,
2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be
changed to "Catindig," his surname.On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision granting the adoption. Certain issues arose considering that there is no law regulating
the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Issue/s:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of
her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act
and the Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
The Court holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to
the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from
all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG. Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion."
Case 173
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, G.R. No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim
(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner
and Lim registered the children to make it appear that children they were the children's
parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner while Michael was
11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner's clinic. The spouses reared and cared for
the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used
the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American
citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married while Michael was 18 years old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent. Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael. In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle and Michael were considered as abandoned children and the
whereabouts of their natural parents unknown. However, the RTC the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA
8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision but the motion was since the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of
the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner's argument that mere
consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are
additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

No she cannot. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court's decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
specifically reads:
“Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
i.) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
ii.) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
iii.) If the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.” The use
of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct
in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of
the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
On the effects of adoption:

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable. Parental
authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and
the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.
Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the children. It is true
that when the child reaches the age of emancipation -- that is, when he attains the age age of
majority or 18 years of -- emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2)
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but
not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii)
the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of
the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to
the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect
to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as
support and successional rights.
The petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner. Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that
joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent
to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That
being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling
above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to
Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
Case 174
Velasco v. career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. G.R. No. 214872, February 23, 2015
Facts:
Respondent Velasco was hired by Petitioner Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc.
on behalf of its principal, Atlantic Limited Marine, to work as Able Seaman under a nine-month
contract on board the vessel M/V Spring Dragon. Before completing the contract, however,
respondent was medically repatriated, was treated at the Seaman’s Hospital and was diagnosed
to be suffering from “Nephrolithiasis”, hence, he underwent electro shockwave lithotripsy or
ESWL. The manning agreement between Atlantic Limited Marine with petitioner ended.
Petitioner later entered into a contract with Marine Management International Philippines, Inc.
Respondent subsequently applied for and was again hired by petitioner as Able Seaman for
another nine-month period. In POEA-approved contract, respondent did not reveal that he had
suffered from kidney or bladder trouble, and the company-designated physician declared him
“fit to work.” Respondent soon boarded the vessel Tama Star and completed his contract.
Three weeks later, he reported to petitioner’s office to claim his benefits under the contract
amounting to P67,584.93, for which he signed a “Discharge Receipt and Release of Claim.”
Close to two years later, respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a complain claiming
disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against
petitioner. Petitioner consulted for kidney ailment with Dr. Abarquez and Dr. Entero-Lim who
both declared in their respective medical certificates that he was suffering from the presence of
stones in his kidney and was not fit to work.
By Decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent, holding that, inter alia,
petitioner could not disclaim knowledge of respondent’s kidney ailment when it hired him and
that respondent in fact sought medical assistance from petitioner upon his return after his
contract ended. On petitioner’s appeal, NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling by Decision.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution, it appealed to the
Court of Appeals, at the same time applying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
Meanwhile, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution. Believing that the execution of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision was imminent as its
petition for injunctive relief was denied by the appellate court by Resolution, petitioner filed
before the Labor Arbiter on a pleading entitled “Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award
with Urgent Motion to Cancel Appeal Bond All Without Prejudice to the Pending Petition
for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals and accordingly paid respondent the monetary award as
stated in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter later issued an Order stating that
the case had been amicably settled and was thus dismissed, without prejudice to the pending
petition at the Court of Appeals. By Decision, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s appeal
for being moot and academic, noting that the Decision of the Labor Arbiter had attained finality
with the satisfaction of the judgment award. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied
by Resolution, petitioner interposed the present appeal.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not deciding the case on the merits and
instead dismissing it on the ground of mootness.
2. Whether or not the NLRC Decision had not attained finality because it was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, hence, void; and that the express agreement between it and
respondent as contained in the “Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment” should be
respected.

As a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor
cases. Hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they
coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and are supported by substantial evidence, are
accorded respect and even finality by this Court. As for the “Conditional Satisfaction of
Judgment,” the Court holds that it is valid, hence, the “conditional” settlement of the judgment
award insofar as it operates as a final satisfaction thereof to render the case moot and
academic. While petitioner had the luxury of having other remedies available to it such as its
petition for certiorari pending before the appellate court, and an eventual appeal to this Court,
respondent, on the other hand, could no longer pursue other claims, including for interests that
may accrue during the pendency of the case.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, it could not, at the time respondent moved for the
execution of the Labor Arbiter’s monetary awards, have been compelled to immediately pay
the judgment award, for it had filed with the NLRC an appeal bond, intended to assure
respondent that if he prevailed in the case, he would receive the money judgment in his favor
upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. The Labor Arbiter and the appellate court may not
thus be faulted for interpreting petitioner’s “conditional settlement” to be tantamount to an
amicable settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Case 175
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
Facts:
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took
possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the possession
against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents,
the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their
brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward
Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as
confirmed by an NSO representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta.
Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an
elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service, as
supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial
court found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which
was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of
her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the
Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was
born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded
in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed
gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It further resolved that the birth certificate
presented in this case does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register
because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the
parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the law required. However, the CA ultimately
ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative
parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school
paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial
benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by
Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary
evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth
certificate.

NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article
172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof
of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to
actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.
In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent
is not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the
Family Code. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the
respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on
misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date
of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the
corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself
did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s birth. With the declaration that the
birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and
therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.
Topic: Inter-country Adoption Act 1995 (R.A. 8043)

Case 176
Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn
Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon
Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's younger brother. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was
and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to
the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social
worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of
the petition for adoption. The RTC granted the petition. The Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for
the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt.

NO. Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the Philippines, private
respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,
viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse
a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Filipino children in accordance
with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. There can be no question
that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under
any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place,
Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no
longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of
the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It
reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184. Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child,
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
The Family Code likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted
should be the paramount consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of
the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.
Topic: Support (Arts. 194-208), What Support Comprises
Case 177
Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004
Facts:
The case commenced upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the RTC of Pasay City. Adriana prayed that the marriage
between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support
of their child, John Paul. Summons was duly served on Jose Lam. Despite the lapse of fifteen
days after service of summons, no responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence, the trial court
issued an Order directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for
determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties and to submit his report
thereon. Asst. City Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating that "there seems to be no
collusion between the parties". The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness
was Adriana herself. After her testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary
evidence. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or
the capacity of Jose to give support.
Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re Open on the ground that she was able to secure
additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable. The trial court
granted the motion to re open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional
evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract between Jose and one
Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract between Jose and one Evan Lock, showing that
Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana. The Pasay RTC rendered its Decision
declaring the marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void
for being bigamous by nature. Likewise, respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a
monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P20,000.00.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded
monthly support to his son in the amount of P20,000.00. He argued that there was already a
provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC wherein he
and Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the
child. Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam's motion for reconsideration. Jose then
appealed the Pasay RTC's decision to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision affirming the Pasay RTC's decision in all respects. Jose filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision but in a Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
Hence, Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in deciding legal questions of
substance not in accordance with law and jurisprudence in finding that the trial court's ruling
that the compromise agreement between petitioner and respondent where they bound
themselves to contribute the amount of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (p250,000.00) to a
common fund for the benefit of their child does not bar the trial court in annulment case to
again award support in favor of the child.

The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the
amount of support is by no means permanent. There is no merit to the claim of Jose that the
compromise agreement between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and
embodied in its decision in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is
a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The provision for a
common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul, as embodied in the compromise
agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be
considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to
modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give
support.
We take note of the Compromise Agreement, approved by and embodied in the

decision of the Makati RTC. Finding the agreement to be in order, and not being contrary to
law, morals or public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the conjugal
partnership of gains existing between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete
separation is established in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the conditions of their
Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall, as between the parties, be deemed
to be a decision and/or award in the matters treated in the aforesaid settlement.
Case 178
Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. No. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
Facts:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage
with Cebu City RTC Branch 14, with a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children amounting to P500,000 per month, citing Danilo’s huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited
Article 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff Susan
needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also
granted support pendente lite of P250,000. Danilo is ordered to pay P250,000 within the first
five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to paragraph 3 of Art. 203, Family Code. He
is also made to pay P1,750,000 for retroactive support (seven months since the petition was
filed until decision). The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that Susan is
not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate
dwelling from their children. Further, he said he has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and well- being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. The
husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive
support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent
His motion for reconsideration was denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it
reduced the monthly support to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by both
parties. The controversy between the parties resurfaced when Danilo’s compliance with the
final CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00)
the sum of P2,482,348.16, (and another P946, 465.64). The appellate court said that the RTC
should have not disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase of
two cars, tuition fees, travel and house expenses, which certainly benefited not only of the two
children, but also that of their mother (petitioner), and thus ordered to deduct the amount of
P3,428, 813.80 from the current total support of Danilo to his wife and children.
Issue/s:
Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.

The Supreme Court partly granted the CA’s decision. As a matter of law, the amount of
support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the needs of the
recipient. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to
pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, by law, claim credit on account
of payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
The SC’s decision which was party granted was first to resume payment of his monthly
support of P115,000 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him.
Second, that only the amount of P648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the accrued
support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the
CA).
Topic: Support (Arts. 194-208), Persons Obliged to Support Each Other, When Demandable;
When Payable; Where Claimed; Who is Liable
Case 179
Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, Aug. 3, 2005
Facts:
This is a Petition for disbarment Against Alfredo Castillo by Carmelita Zaguirre for Gross
Immoral Conduct. Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became
officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondent courted complainant and
promised to marry her while representing himself to be single. Soon they had an intimate
relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair,
respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was
admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office
and confronted her about her relationship with respondent.5 On September 10, 1997,
respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. On December 9, 1997,
complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had
started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. Respondent claims
that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but
mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI
that he was already married and with children;9 complainant is almost 10 years older than him
and knew beforehand that he is already married;10 the child borne by complainant it not his,
because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair. 11 He
admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to
save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was
seeing other men. After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo
Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not IBP is correct in its findings and imposition of penalty.

YES. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the same Code. The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way
below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of
respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his
child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. The
rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Case 180
Mangonon v. CA, GR No. 125041, June 30, 2006
Facts:
Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC
Makati. In the said petition, it was alleged that Mangonon and respondent Federico Delgado
were civilly married. At that time, Mangonon was only 21 years old while respondent Federico
was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, it was
annulled by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Seven months after the
annulment of their marriage, Mangonon gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
Mangonon, she, with the assistance of her second husband raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and
Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where Mangonon,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was
admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said
universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education.
Issue/s:
1.Whether or not Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.
2. Whether or not Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

As for the first issue, yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica and
Rina in default of the father. Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more
persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are
the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to
support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation
to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco as the next immediate relative
of Rica and Rina.
As for the second issue, no. Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent
his obligation.cArticle 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support
shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support.
The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. In
this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second
option. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the
relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and
Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having
any familial relationship with them. Given the moral obstacle, the Court could not see Rica and
Rina moving back to the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Case 181
Lacson v. Lacson, GR No. 150644, Aug. 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Moanaa Daban Lacson (respondents) are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson (petitioner) and his wife, Lea Daban
Lacson. Not long after the birth of their second child, petitioner left the conjugal home. The
mother and the sisters was then forced seek financial support and shelter somewhere else.
From 1976 to 19944 (18 years) they lived in one place to another. Apparently, respondent's
mother went to their father's mother to ask for support relying on a note by their father in
1975 containing his promise to support his daughters but he never did. Nevertheless, Lea
(mother) submits that petitioner would occasionally give money for school expenses, as well as
their grandmother. Now, the sisters through their mother filed a complaint alleging their
father's failure in giving support to them despite being employed and owning several lands and
for neglecting them and their mother. Petitioner counters that it was not due to neglect that he
has failed but rather it was his lack of regular income and unproductivity of land he inherited.
The RTC granted the sisters support pende lite and later on ordered their father to pay them
support in arrears. Edward (Father) appealed to the CA but was dismissed.
The petitioner thinks that he should not be made to pay support in arrears since no
previous extrajudicial, or judicial demand have been made by respondents. He then invoked
Article 203 of the Family Code which provides that, "The obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand."
He contends that he is obliged to pay upon the filing of Civil Case in 1995, which served as an
effective demand for him.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the grant of support in arrears from 1976
to 1994.

No. The CA was indeed correct in affirming the grant of support in arrears from 1976 to
1994 by the RTC. The fact that he abandoned the respondent sisters when they were really
young, he cannot expect that at that time, they can go through the motion of demanding
support from him especially when it was difficult for their mother to get in touch with him.
Also, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may
be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and
in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter.
In a note dated in 1975, their father promised to give support. From 1976, respondent's mother
went to their father's mother to ask for support.
Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one
to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a
demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
Topic: Parental Authority (Arts. 209-233), Concept
Case 182
Demsey vs RTC, 164 SCRA 384
Facts:
On January 30, 1986, two separate informations were filed against respondent Joel
Dempsey before the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City charging him with violation of
Article 59 (par. 2) of P.D. 603 and Article 46, par. 8 of P.D. 603; the former being that of
abandoning his child, and the latter for his failure and refusal to give his support to the said
child.
Christina Marie, herein petitioner, was born on October 1, 1984 of her mother, Janalita
Rapada, who cohabited without the benefit of marriage with the accused. Christina’s birth
certificate bears an entry of the name of the accused as the father and the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment duly signed by him. At the present, the child receives a monthly support from
the accused in the sum of $150.00 thru the child's mother. Aside from this monthly support,
Janalita Rapada obtained a promise from the accused to declare Christina Marie as his
dependent and also a commitment to declare the child after his citizenship. This will entitle the
child for all the benefits and privileges extended to dependents of American US Navy
servicemen like free medical check-up. Efforts were made with the Naval Legal Service Office,
US Naval Facilities, Subic Bay, Philippines to compel the accused to fulfill these commitments
but to no avail. To seek redress thru the Court, she engaged the services of Atty. Estanislao L.
Cesa, Jr. Upon arraignment, accused Joel Dempsey freely and voluntarily and spontaneously
entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged against him which was abandonment and
failure to provide adequate support for the child although he had the means to do so.
Municipal Trial Court found him to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered the
payment of $150.00 monthly support to Christina Marie until she reaches the age of majority;
to recognize the child Christina Marie as his natural child; to pay Christina Marie thru Janalita
Rapada the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damage; and to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees. He appealed for the penalty of imprisonment be changed into a fine and not to
be acquitted.
The RTC reversed the earlier decision, stating that “parental authority to which certain
parental obligations are attached pertains only to legitimate and adopted children unlike
petitioner who is an acknowledged illegitimate minor child of private respondent. And a person
cannot be held criminally liable for failure to support a minor child.” Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner, being an illegitimate child, is entitled for support from
her father.

YES. The respondent court committed reversible error.
1. Article 69 of P.D. 603 penalizes abandonment of a minor child by its parent, as
provided in Article 59, with imprisonment from two to six months or a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos or both. Article 210 penalizes a violation of the
obligation to give adequate support found in Article 46 with imprisonment not
exceeding one month or a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or both, unless a
higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
2. The respondent court further ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to the
rights arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate
child. Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603 which defines the joint parental
authority of parents over their legitimate or adopted children. The respondent
court's observations are wrong because the law itself protects even illegitimate
children. Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and
adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3 of PD 603 which provides that all
children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to
legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and
other factors.
The Supreme Court reverses the RTC decision, MTC decision is reinstated with a
modification that for his crime in abandoning Christina, Joel Dempsey is sentenced to
imprisonment of One (1) month and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) while for
his crime for his failure to support Christina, he is ACQUITTED.
Topic: Parental Authority (Arts. 209-233), Concept, Joint Exercise of Parental Authority,
Parental Authority when parents are separated
Case 183
Luna v. IAC, 137 SCRA 7
Facts:
Maria Lourdes Santos, herein private respondent, is an illegitimate child of the
petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Private
respondent is married to her co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley
Santos Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case. It appears that two or four
months after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with
considerable means. The couple doted on Shirley. When she reached the age of four, she was
enrolled at the Maryknoll College. A few months before September 1980, the petitioners
decided to tale Shirley abroad. Shirley looks forward to this trip and was excited about it.
However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents’ written consent for the child’s
application for a US visa, the respondents refused which make Shirley utterly disappointed. As a
result the petitioners had to leave without Shirley. When the petitioners returned, they learned
that the respondents had transferred Shirley, and refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did
respondents allowed Shirley to visit the petitioners.
In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus against the private
respondents to produce Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. A decision was then
rendered declaring the petitioners entitled to the child’s custody. The private respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appealed decision was reversed and set aside and
another entered, ordering petitioners, to turn over Shirley to the private respondents. The
petitioners then filed a petition for review of the decision to the Supreme Court but it was
denied for lack of merit and remanded to the court of origin and assigned to the RTC, who
issued a writ of execution to satisfy and enforce resolution and affirmed the CA’s decision. The
execution of the judgment was opposed by the petitioners who filed a motion for
reconsideration. But the respondent judge denied the motion to set aside the writ of execution.
Issue/s:
Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a
final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the
desire and preference of the child.

NO. The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from
home if she would be taken away from the petitioners and forced to live with the private
respondents, made during the hearings on the motion to set aside the writ of execution and
reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court and during the hearing of the case before
this court, is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment of the Court of
First Instance inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the
best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake
and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less
than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to
live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. The
threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide
her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling and moral and material
security. Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological
parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as
pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered cautious and
dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to
face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed
traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy
her future.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the writ prayed for
issued, setting aside the judgment of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court and
restraining the respondent judge and/or his successors from enforcing the judgment rendered
by the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal granting the herein
petitioners custody of the child Shirley Salumbides should be maintained. Without costs. SO
ORDERED.
Case 184
Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183 (1980)
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that
marriage the child in question, Maria Teresa, was born.. In a decision rendered, they executed
an agreement for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact
been living separately since June 1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. The parties
are agreed that no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the
child because the husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.
Later on, petitioner found out the following information regarding his wife:
1. that she was in a relationship with her brother-in-law and godfather of their child (a
former seminarian at that), Maria Teresa;
2. that the brother-in-law was being treated for manic depressive disorder;
3. the illicit affair produced 2 children; and
1. that Edita and her brother-in-law embraced a Protestant faith.
On the other hand, private respondent affirms in her affidavit that:
1. Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with her, who has reared and
brought up the child to the best of her ability.
2. She was always insistent that petitioner have custody of Maria Teresa every
weekend and half of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child could
establish a healthy and viable relationship with her father.
3. From 1972 to 1978, she had always exercised full custody of Maria Teresa. It was
affiant who voluntarily gave custody of the child to petitioner on weekends and half
of the summer and Christmas vacations. In view of this amicable arrangement, no
specific terms were agreed and stipulated upon by her and petitioner regarding
custody of the child in their petition for separation of property before the lower
court;
4. Even when she started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin, she and petitioner
retained a cordial relationship. In fact, petitioner would visit Maria Teresa at their
home and was always welcome to pick up Maria Teresa at any time.
5. When petitioner left for Australia, petitioner left Maria Teresa to stay with her.
During this time Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit with and to be picked up
at any time by petitioner's parents.
6. She admits that her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if
not morally unacceptable; but in reality this is not so. Maria Teresa has been reared
and brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty to the
import of the situation. Further, the quality and capacity of her of being a good
mother has always remained.
In December 1979, the respondent judge ordered the petitioner to produce the child,
Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N.
Araneta and return her to the custody of the latter, further obliging petitioner to "continue his
support of said daughter by providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued
without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of Section 6 of Rule 99.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be granted to the private respondent
given the immoral relationship the mother entered into.

No. The Court ruled it is in the best interest that the child Maria Teresa no longer stay
with her mother given the immoral situation the mother entered into. The Court granted that
the child stay with the petitioner. In controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that criterion. With this premise in
view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child
Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the
situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in
the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable
stage in her life. The fact that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her
mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and
have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her
mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister’s mother, is hardly of any
consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.
Case 185
Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575
Facts:
Common-law spouses(respondents) Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon had a child. They
offered the child for adoption to Gina’s sister Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and brother-in-law
Nelson Cervantes, the herein petitioners who took care and custody of the child when she was
barely two weeks old. An affidavit of consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners
was also executed by respondent Gina. The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by
herein petitioners over the child before the RTC and it rendered a decision granting the
petition.
The court ordered that
 From Angelie Anne Fajardo, the name of the child will be Angelie Anne Cervantes
 She will be freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them
 A child of herein petitoners(Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes) and capable of inheriting their
estate
However, the adoptive parents (Mr. and Mrs. Cervantes) received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid Php 150, 000 otherwise, they would get their child back.
They refused to comply to the demand. While they were at work, respondent Gina took the
child from her yaya at the petitioners’ residence saying that she was instructed by her sister.
She brought the child to her house and sent a word to the petitioners that she will return the
child to them if they will pay Php 150,000. Thus the petitioners filed before the SC a petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus over the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus filed by the adoptive parents against the
natural parents of the adoptee be granted?
Ruling:
YES. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years of age,
will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with Gina is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. Their relationship will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she
can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person.
Respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
married man who eventually left her. For a minor like Angelie to grow up with a sister whose
"father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially
capable of supporting the minor than what the natural mother who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man,can most likely give her. Also, the minor has
been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child.
The Petition is GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are
hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are ordered (if
they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof.
Case 186
Santos, Sr. v. CA, GR No. 113054, March 16, 1995, 242 SCRA 407
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union begot only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place
Leouel, Jr., in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The
latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the
boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work.
Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the
United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter
Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. On September 2, 1990, petitioner
along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel, Jr., was
staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos, Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for a reversal of the
appellate court's decision.
Issue/s:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr?

Custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein
petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor
Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present.
Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no
decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art.
214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when
both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not
been successfully shown by private respondents. The Court of Appeals held that although there
is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he
may nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed
to have custody of minor Leouel Santos, Jr."
Supreme Court finds the aforementioned considerations made by the Court of Appeals
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody
over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable
and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's
wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time,
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to
the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and
for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. Petitioner's
employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Case 187
Espiritu v. CA; 242 SCRA 362 , 59 SCAD 631 (March 15,1995)
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and private respondent Teresita Masauding first met in
Iligan City and thereafter began a common law relationship of husband and wife abroad (when
Teresita was working as a nurse in California and Reynaldo was sent by his employer as liaison
officer in Pennsylvania). On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese was born. The
following year, while on brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married.
Upon their return to US, their 2nd child, a son, Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate in 1990. Teresita
blamed Reynaldo for their break-up stating that he is always nagging her about money while
Reynaldo stated that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelries and antique
furniture instead of attending household expenses.
It was alleged that Reynaldo pleaded second chance for their marriage; however,
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that
she spent a lot of money for long distance calls to keep in touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children to the Philippines, but he had to leave his children with his sister
(co-petitioner) since his assignment at Pittsburgh was not yet completed. Teresita claims that
she did not follow her children immediately because Reynaldo flied a criminal case for bigamy
against her and she was afraid of being arrested. (The judgement of conviction for bigamy was
actually rendered in 1994.) Meanwhile, she decided to return to the Philippines and on
December 8, 1992, she filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein petitioners
to gain custody over the children. The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and
suspended Teresita’s parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to
have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation. CA reversed the decision
giving the custody to Teresita and weekend visitational rights to Reynaldo. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not custody of the minor children should be given to Teresita (mother) or
Reynaldo (father).

In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the
Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of
age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons." If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it
deems fit under the circumstances. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on
the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount."
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind
celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on
January 12, 1985. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent
children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to
live. Once the choice has been made, the burden to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law
applies to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a
decision is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a
child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The
matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody
suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-
examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best
interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either
parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age
and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice. The children are now both
over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the
record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found
in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second
paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that
the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the
age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant
considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her
behavior. Thus, the petition is GRANTED and custody of the minors are awarded to Reynaldo
Espiritu.
Case 188
Sombong v. CA 252 SCRA 663 (1996)
Facts:
Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in
Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. Some time in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six
months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, located at 121 First Avenue, Kaloocan City, for
relief of coughing fits and for treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay
the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of
the petitioner's failure to pay the bill. Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that
she allegedly paid the private respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00,
knowing for a fact that the sum payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the
owners of the clinic, Dra. Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn
over Arabella to her. Petitioner claims that the reason for such a refusal was that she refused to
go out on a date with Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to
be jealous of her, making it difficult for everyone all around.
On the other hand and in contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that
she visited Arabella at the clinic only after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go
beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter,
i.e., in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf
ears. Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged
therein that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned. The petition was denied
due course and summarily dismissed. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against
the spouses Ty.
Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioner's child, Arabella, had for some
time been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in the
presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was properly identified to be the
child's guardian. In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn over Arabella to her, she
had sought the help of Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista of Kalookan City, Mayor Asistio
of the same city, and even Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke of Negros Occidental. Their
efforts to help availed her nothing. Cristina was also brought along by said respondent. At that
confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed petitioner's child, Arabella.
Neither could petitioner with all certainty say that Cristina was her long lost daughter.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus in the present case should be granted.
2. Whether or not the minor child in question is the child of the petitioner, Johanna
Sombong.
3. Whether or not petitioner has the right of custody over minor child Cristina.

As for the first issue, no. While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who has
been separated from her daughter for more than eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she
is seeking, because the evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina,
is in truth and in fact her child, Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence to support the
finding that private respondents' custody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus. The grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the
minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent. Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The
dismissal of this petition is thus warranted.
As for the second issue, no. Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner’s daughter,
Arabella. In a petition for habeas corpus, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of persons.
In the present case, testimonial and circumstantial proof established the individual and
separate existence of petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of respondent’s foster child,
Cristina. Dr. Trono, the witness presented by petitioner, testified that there were several babies
left in the clinic at around the same time Arabella was confined there.
Dra. Ty, petitioner’s witness, testified that Arabella was confined in the clinic from November
1987 to April 1989. Private respondents obtained custody over Cristina in 1988. This leads to
the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella. CA Justice Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros also observed that
there were no signs of endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been deprived
of the embrace of her little child for many years being displayed by Johanna.
As for the third issue, no. It cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding the validity of the mode by which private respondents acquired custodial rights
over the minor, Cristina. Private respondents also have the interest of Cristina at heart. They
are financially, physically, and spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina.
On the other hand, it is not the best interest of the child to be placed in the custody of
petitioner. The Supreme Court ruled that the Habeas Corpus petition does not lie to afford
petitioner the relief she seeks.
Case 189
Perez v. CA; 255 SCRA 661 (1996)
Facts:
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of the boy’s father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court’s decision to grant custody to
Nerissa Z. Perez, the child’s mother. Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine
practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray
Perez II in New York.
Petitioner who began working in the United States, used part of her earnings to build a
modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive
miscarriages in New York and she became a resident alien. Private respondent stayed with her
in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he
had only a tourist visa and was not employed. The couple and their baby arrived in Cebu and
after a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a
five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed
behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to
Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New
York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back
immediately after winding up her affairs there.Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas
corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to
her. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother,
Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and
awarded custody of the boy to his father. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been
denied, she filed the instant petition for review where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez
II, now three years old.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Ray Perez II will be better off with petitioner or with private Respondent.

When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. The Revised Rules of Court, Rule 99, section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors)
also contains a similar provision. The provisions of law clearly mandate that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99,
section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at

having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only
for the infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The mother’s
role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the
depth of a mother’s love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its
justification, not in fantasy but in reality. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated as well as its Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated is hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z.
Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is
immediately executory.
Case 190
Eslao v. CA, GR No. 116773, January 16, 1997; 266 SCRA 317
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married and stayed with
respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila. They begot 2
children namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the
care and custody of petitioner’s mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica stayed with her
parents at respondent’ s house. However, petitioner's husband died then she intended to bring
Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody
of Angelica to her, reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief, she needed the
child's company to at least compensate for the loss of her late son.
Petitioner went back to Pampanga and stayed with her other child, Leslie while
entrusting Angelica to the respondent. Petitioner was later introduced by her auntie to Dr.
James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodentist practicing in the US. Their
acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful relationship and both decided to get married. Less
than ten months thereafter, petitioner migrated to San Francisco to join her new husband.
The petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a
progressive practitioner having his own dental clinic. 5 months later, the petitioner returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and to bring them with her to the US. Upon
knowing, respondent resisted the idea by explaining that the child was entrusted to her when
she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the
adamant attitude of the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, who
wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to her
natural mother and when the demand remained unheeded, the petitioner instituted the
present action.
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision directing the custody
over Angelica to her natural mother, the petitioner. On appeal, the respondent court affirmed
in full the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition by the minor's paternal
grandmother.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the child’s custody should be given to Teresita, the grandmother.

No. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document,
what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
"The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company." Lower court's decision has
been affirmed, and the petition has been dismissed.
Case 191
Artadi v. Bondagjy, GR No. 140817, December 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married on February 3,1988 under Islamic rites.
four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, and Amouaje, born on who
were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner,
respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced. After their
marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the parties
migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Their children lived in the house of the wifes mother. The husband alleged that he could not
see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court order, he could only see
his children in school.
Later the wife had children baptized as Christians and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina
Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at
odd hours in Manila, and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.
Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. And the husband alleged that his
wife let their children sweep their neighbors house for a fee of P40 after the children came
home from school. The wife filed with the RTC an action for nullity of marriage, custody and
support, and ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court.
She filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case since PD No 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. The husband filed an opposition to
the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims
The Shar’a District Court held that PD No 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to
this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari’a District Court found the wife
unworthy to care for her children and that her husband was capable both personally and
financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a
Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws
of Islam in the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?

The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue. The Court also
said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent are:
1. Ability to see to the physical, educational, social, and moral welfare of the children,
and
2. Ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support
taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of
the parents
The burden is upon the husband to prove that the wife is not worthy to have custody of
her children. The Court find that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish her
unfitness according to the Family Code or Muslim Law. Standard in the determination of
sufficiency of proof however is not restricted to Muslim Laws. Family Code shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim is incompetent. What determines her capacity
is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. Article 211 of the
Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children.
Similarly, PD No 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally
separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority
and fulfil their responsibility over their legitimate children. We do not doubt the capacity and
love of both parties for their children, such that they both want to have them in their custody.
Although, we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that
he wife has more capacity and time to see to the children’s needs. The husband is a
businessman whose work requires that the go abroad or be indifferent places most of the time.
Under PD No 603 the custody of the minor children absent a compelling reason to the contrary
is given to the mother. However, award of custody to the wife does not deprive husband of
parental authority. Thus we grant visitorial rights to husband as his Constitutionally protected
natural and primary right
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED...Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY

shall have custody over minors Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children reach
majority age. Both spouses shall have joint responsibility over all expenses of rearing the
children. The father, FOUZI ALl BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and
may take the children out only with the written consent of the mother.
Case 192
Vancil v. Belmes, GR No. 132223, June 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
USA who died in the said country. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named
Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia Vancil commenced
before the RTC of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of
minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year
old child and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits
with a probable value of P100,000.00.
Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-
consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily. Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was
appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent
Vancil Jr. Helen Belmes submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of
Pagadian City. Thereafter, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal
of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual
custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors; that the petition was filed
under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a
resident of U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
After due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove
and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered
petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the
posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise
dismissed in an Order. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing
the RTC order. Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition.
Issue/s:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural
mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This
ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code. Indeed, being the natural mother of
minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much
alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian
of Vincent. Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. WHEREFORE , the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer
be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
Case 193
Laxamana v. Laxamana, G.R. No. 144763, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 296
Facts:
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met
sometime in 1983. Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family was a graduate of Bachelor of
Laws, while respondent was a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank.
After courtship, petitioner, 31 years old and respondent, 33, got married on June 6, 1984.
Respondent quit her job and became a full-time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand,
operated buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant businesses for a living. The union was blessed
with three children. All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. He underwent
psychotherapy and psychopharmacological treatment and was discharged. Upon the petition of
respondent, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordered petitioner's confinement at the
NARCOM-DRC for treatment and rehabilitation. Again, on October 1996, the RTC granted
petitioner's voluntary confinement for treatment and rehabilitation at the National Bureau of
Investigation-TRC. On April 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner "already drug-
free" and directing him to report to a certain Dr. Casimiro "for out-patient counseling for 6
months to one (1) year."
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated.
Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically
assaulted Respondent. Thus, on June 1999, respondent and her 3 children abandoned
petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City the instant petition for habeas
corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the
drug dependence of petitioner. After the parties reached an agreement, RTC issued an order
granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and
psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed
to submit the case for resolution after the trial court’s receipt of the results of their psychiatric
examination.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation shows that he is not yet “completely cured."The
trial court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three children to
respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the
children in awarding their custody to respondent- Yes
2. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning the absence of a trial- No

As for the first issue, the child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose
which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent
so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational,
social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as
well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents. The fundamental policy of the State
to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in
resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history
of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet “completely cured” may
render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that
respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral
and intellectual training and development.
As for the second issue, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding
the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the
psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence
of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court's primary basis in
awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The trial court was remiss
in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the case
for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts. In the instant case, the proceedings before
the trial court leave much to be desired. While a remand of this case would mean further delay,
the children's paramount interest demand that further proceedings be conducted to determine
the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to assume custody of their minor children.
Case 194
Jocelyn Pablo-Gualberto v. Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto, GR No. 154994
Facts:
The case are two consolidated petitions.
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an
ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello whom
Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she decided
to abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002. On April 2, 2002 RTC Judge heard the
ancillary prayer of Crisanto for custody pendente lite. Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear
despite notice while Crisanto, the house helper of the spouses, and the president of a security
agency hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn provided testimonies against the
mother. Some of these testimonies recounted how the mother had a lesbian relationship with
another women and that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house. As a result, on April 3, 2002 the Judge applied Art. 211 of the FC and awarded
custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto.
The hearing of Joycelyn's motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of the child
to Crisanto was set but the former did not allegedly present any evidence to support her
motion. However, the Judge allegedly issued the assailed order reversing her Order of April 3,
2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to Joycelyn. The court decided that the child
subject of this Petition is barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall
not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling reasons. The
father should however be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not appear
compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his child.
Crisanto charged the Regional Trial with grave abuse of discretion for issuing its
aforequoted order. He alleged that this order superseded, without any factual or legal basis,
the still valid and subsisting order awarding him custody pendente lit of his minor son. Partly in
Crisanto's favor the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the trial
court in reversing the latter court's previous Order.
Issue/s:
Who should be awarded the custody of the minor child?
The child should stay with his mother. The mother insists that, based on Article 213 of
the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father
argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be
awarded custody of the child. This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally
or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its
bearing from 32 Article 363 of the Civil Code. The general rule that children under seven years
of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d'etre (most important reason)
in the basic need of minor children for their mother's loving care.
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption,
guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In
these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given,
the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated
to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children's well-
being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations
of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability
to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
The court made us of the rulings in previous cases such as in Unson III v. Navarro,
Espiritu vs CA to further highlight their point. Based on these jurisprudence, it is therefore not
enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that
she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their
son or under circumstances not conducive to the child's proper moral development. Such a fact
has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother's
alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a
result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge ruled in her May 17, 2002, Order, that
she had found the "reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling" as to suffice as a ground for
separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing
the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a
chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique
opportunity to witness the child's behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry more
weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother's custody.
Case 195
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto v. CA, et.al., GR No. 156254, June 28, 2005
Facts:
The case are two consolidated petitions.
On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before the Regional Trial Court
a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an
ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello whom
Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and his school when she decided
to abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002. On April 2, 2002 RTC Judge heard the
ancillary prayer of Crisanto for custody pendente lite. Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear
despite notice while Crisanto, the house helper of the spouses, and the president of a security
agency hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn provided testimonies against the
mother. Some of these testimonies recounted how the mother had a lesbian relationship with
another women and that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house. As a result, on April 3, 2002 the Judge applied Art. 211 of the FC and awarded
custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto.
On April 16, 2002 the hearing of Joycelyn's motion to lift the award of custody pendente
lite of the child to Crisanto was set but the former did not allegedly present any evidence to
support her motion. However, the Judge allegedly issued the assailed order reversing her Order
of April 3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to Joycelyn. The court decided that
the child subject of this Petition is barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code,
he shall not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling reasons. The
father should however be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not appear
compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of his child.
Crisanto charged the Regional Trial with grave abuse of discretion for issuing its
aforequoted order. He alleged that this order superseded, without any factual or legal basis,
the still valid and subsisting order awarding him custody pendente lit of his minor son. Partly in
Crisanto's favor the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the trial
court in reversing the latter court's previous Order.
Issue/s:
Who should be awarded the custody of the minor child?

The child should stay with his mother. The mother insists that, based on Article 213 of
the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father
argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must be
awarded custody of the child. This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally
or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its
bearing from 32 Article 363 of the Civil Code. The general rule that children under seven years
of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d'etre (most important reason)
in the basic need of minor children for their mother's loving care.
The principle of "best interest of the child" pervades Philippine cases involving adoption,
guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In
these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given,
the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated
to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children's well-
being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations
of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability
to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children.
The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or
more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease. Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain
circumstances, the mother's immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive
her of custody. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her
husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect
on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.
The court made us of the rulings in previous cases such as in Unson III v. Navarro,
Espiritu vs CA to further highlight their point. Based on these jurisprudence, it is therefore not
enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that
she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their
son or under circumstances not conducive to the child's proper moral development. Such a fact
has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother's
alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a
result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge ruled in her May 17, 2002,
Order, that she had found the "reason stated by Crisanto not to be compelling" as to suffice as
a ground for separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after
personally observing the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16,
2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand. This assessment,
based on her unique opportunity to witness the child's behavior in the presence of each parent,
should carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason
has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother's custody.
Case 196
Hirsch v. CA, GR No. 174485, July 11, 2007
Facts:
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, and
established their conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December 21,
2002, a child was born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the couple started to have
marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay
in Boracay Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and
asked for money and for Franklin's permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for
a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter discovered that neither Agnes nor
their daughter Simone would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce
Simone in court. On May 19, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of
habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court on May 26, 2006.
After a series of hearings and presentation of evidence, the CA, on June 8, 2006, promulgated
the assailed Decision granting Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child.
Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision, which was denied in the CA's August
3, 2006 Resolution for lack of merit.
Issue/s:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of
the minor child to both parents.

YES. The court ruled in the affirmative. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration (emphasis supplied)." The Child and Youth
Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
The socalled "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has
been adduced to wrench the child from the mother's custody.
Case 197
Dacasin v. Del Mundo-Dacasin, GR. No. 168785, Feb. 5, 2010
Facts:
Herald Dacasin (American) and Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (Filipino) were married in
Manila in 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie. In 1999, Herald obtained a divorce decree
from Illinois. The Illinois court dissolved Herald and Sharon’s marriage, awarded sole custody of
Stephanie to Sharon, and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
In 2002, the ex-husband and wife executed in Manila an agreement for joint custody of
Stephanie. Sharon promised to obtain from Illinois an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to
Philippine courts. In 2004, Herald sued Sharon in Philippine court to enforce the agreement,
alleging that Sharon instead continued exercising sole custody over Stephanie. Sharon sought
for its dismissal, arguing that Philippine courts don’t have jurisdiction over the case. The RTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of Herald’s suit and
enforces the Agreement on joint custody of Stephanie.

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the
Agreement which is void. The trial court’s refusal to entertain the suit was grounded not on its
lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of
jurisdiction. This is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction for the purpose
of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of its Judgement for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s
suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-
divorce Agreement on joint custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s
so-call “retained jurisdiction.”
Notwithstanding this, the trial court cannot enforces the Agreement which is contrary to
law. At the time of the Agreement, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under 7 years
old; and (2) Herald and Sharon were no longer married under the laws of the US. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (Art. 213 of the FC) is also
undisputed: “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.” This
awarding of sole custody sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory. Clearly, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between the ex-husband
and wife over their child seven years old contravenes Philippine Law. Agreement would be valid
if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority.
However, upon separation, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is
below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. to the separated mother.
However, the SC remanded the case for the trial court. Stephanie is now 15 years old, thus
removing the cease outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Art.
213 and bringing it within the coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings –
the best interest of the child. The decision of the trial court was REVERSED. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

Topic: Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67), Grounds (Art. 55)

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Topic: Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67), Grounds (Art. 55)

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Topic: Legal Separation (Arts. 55-67), Grounds (Art. 55)

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Topic: Defenses (Art. 56), Consent

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