Tupaz V Ombudsman

G.R. Nos.
212491-92, March 06, 2019

MARIA SHIELA HUBAHIB TUPAZ, PETITIONER, v. THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS; ATTY. FERNANDO ABELLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS;
AND MACRINA ESPINA, RESPONDENTS.
Summary : Public prosecutors must address the different dimensions of complaints raised before
them. When they provide well-reasoned resolutions on one (1) dimension, but overlook palpable
indications that another crime has been committed, they fail to responsibly discharge the
functions entrusted to them. This amounts to an evasion of positive duty, an act of grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.
FACTS : Tupaz stated that her mother, Sol Espiña Hubahib, was the registered owner of a
100,691-square meter property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 15609. Since its
issuance in 1971, she added, a duplicate has always been in the possession of their family—
initially by Hubahib and, upon her demise, by her heirs.
On April 17, 2011, Atty. Abella canceled Original Certificate of Title No. 15609 and, in its stead,
issued Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 116-2011000073 and 116-2011000074 in favor of Genaro
Espiña (Genaro), represented by his attorney-in-fact, Macrina. According to Tupaz, this
cancellation was anchored on the following:
1 A document labeled as the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 15609
but which Tupaz argued was "materially and essentially different" from the copy on file
with the Register of Deeds and the genuine owner's duplicate copy in her family's
custody;
2 A Certificate Authorizing Registration supposedly issued by the Bureau of Internal

Revenue, which indicated that no capital gains tax was paid despite the property being
a more than 100,000- square meter commercial land with zonal valuation of P400.00
per square meter as of 2002. The same certificate indicated that only P2,655.00 in
documentary stamp taxes and P100.00 for the certification fee were paid;
3 A 1972 Deed of Conveyance, which was never annotated onto Original Certificate of
Title No. 15609, and which had surfaced only in 2011, bearing a forgery of Hubahib's
signature; and
4 A subdivision plan that was made without the participation of or notice to Tupaz or her
co-heirs/owners.
Tupaz maintained that Atty. Abella: (1) issued a spurious owner's duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 15609; (2) tolerated the use of an equally spurious Certificate Authorizing
Registration and Deed of Conveyance; and (3) enabled the issuance of specious transfer
certificates of titles, with Genaro as beneficiary. Hence, she filed her Complaint, asserting that
Atty. Abella, along with Macrina, were liable for falsification, graft and corrupt practices,
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
ISSUE : Whether or not public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding
probable cause to charge private respondent Fernando M. Abella, along with private respondent
Macrina Espiña, with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
HELD : Probable cause for the filing of an information is a matter which rests on likelihood rather
than on certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on clear and convincing evidence
reflected in Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court stresses that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for
a crime. As the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not
absolute or even moral certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is
sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
As a general rule, a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause — that is, one made for
the purpose of filing an Information in court — is essentially an executive function and, therefore,
generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of
separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of
indicting a suspect is properly an executive function, while the exception hinges on the limiting
principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari,
has been tasked by the present Constitution to determine whether or not grave abuse of
discretion has been committed amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of
discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration.
To note, the underlying principle behind the courts' power to review a public prosecutor's
determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the permissible bounds of
his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a
constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our system
of government.
From the evidence adduced by petitioner, there is basis to maintain a reasonable belief that
private respondent Abella enabled the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title and issuance
of new transfer certificates of title. This was despite manifest and unequivocal deficiencies, most
notably in the owner's duplicate copy, the Certificate Authorizing Registration, and the Deed of
Conveyance that had been presented to him.
Public respondent, in its Comment, merely reiterated that determining first the lawful owner of the
subject property is necessary before the Office of the Ombudsman could act on the complaint.
As things stand, the evidence weighs far more heavily in favor of petitioner's cause. Even
granting that he did not act with a deliberately malevolent design, he still appears to have acted
with grossly inexcusable negligence that he practically evaded his duties as a registrar of deeds.
Private respondent Abella was equipped with skills and training to identify irregularities in property
registration. More important, it was his solemn duty to not facilitate registrations attended by
manifest aberrations. The palpable defects of the documents presented to him should have
prompted him to desist with the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title. Instead, he went so
far as to issue new transfer certificates of title. In so doing, he caused undue injury to Hubahib's
heirs and extended unwarranted benefits to Genaro. He, with Macrina, must rightly stand trial for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Public respondent Office of the Ombudsman is directed to file before the proper court the
necessary information for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against private respondents.

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G.R. Nos.

212491-92, March 06, 2019

2 A Certificate Authorizing Registration supposedly issued by the Bureau of Internal

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