G.R. No.

L-33006 December 8, 1982

NICANOR NACAR, petitioner,

vs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL as Municipal Judge of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF of Agusan del Sur, ILDEFONSO JAPITANA and ANTONIO DOLORICON, respondents.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner.

Ildefonso Japitana and Antonio Boloricon for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Nicanor Nacar filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction
to annul an order of the respondent judge of the municipal court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur
directing the attachment of seven (7) carabaos, to effect the return of four (4) carabaos seized under
the questioned order, and to stop the respondent judge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 65.

Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 65 and entitled it "Claim Against
the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar With Preliminary Attachment:" On the basis of this complaint,
including an allegation "that defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above-named
property (seven carabaos) with intent to defraud plaintiff herein", and considering that Mr. Japitana
had given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the
provincial sheriff to attach the seven (7) heads of cattle in the possession of petitioner Nicanor
Nacar. Actually only four (4) carabaos were attached because three (3) carabaos had earlier been
slaughtered during the rites preceding the burial of the late Isabelo Nacar.

Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of preliminary attachment, and to order the
return of the carabaos. Private respondent Japitana filed an opposition to this motion while
intervenor Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention asserting that he was the owner of the
attached carabaos and that the certificates of ownership of large cattle were in his name.

The respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss prompting Mr. Nacar to come to the Supreme
Court.

In a resolution dated January 12, 1971, this Court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were
enjoined from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. The judge
was restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.

We find the petition meritorious.

The pertinent portions of the complaint filed by Mr. Japitana with the municipal court read as follows:

ILDEFONSO JAPITANA Civil Case No. 65 Plaintiff,

FOR:

— Versus —
 CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE NICANOR NACAR THE LATE ISABELO NACAR
WITH Defendant. PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT x ---------------------------------x

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW the undersigned plaintiff and before this Honorable Court, respectfully
avers:

xxx xxx xxx

That at various dates since the year 1968, the defendant have (sic) incurred
indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY ONE (P2,791.00) PESOS, which said amount had long been
overdue for payment, and which the defendant up to this date have (sic) not been
able to pay, despite repeated demands from the plaintiff;

That the defendant Isabelo Nacar died last April, 1970 leaving among other things
personal property consisting seven (7) heads of carabaos now in the possession of
the defendant Nicanor Nacar;

That plaintiff herein file a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover
the aforementioned sum of P2,791.99;

That defendant are (sic) about to remove and dispose the above mentioned property
with intent to defraud plaintiff herein;

That plaintiff is willing to put up a bond for the issuance of a preliminary attachment in
an amount to be fixed by the Court, not exceeding the sum of P 2,791.00 which is the
plaintiff's claim herein;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that pending the hearing of this case, a writ of
preliminary attachment be issued against the properties of the defendant to serve as
security for the payment or satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered
herein; and that after due hearing on the principal against the defendant for the sum
of P 2,791,00 with legal interest from September 15, 1970 plus costs of this suit.
(Annex "A", p. 7 rollo).

In his motion to dismiss, the petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause
of action. Mr. Nacar averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have
been incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause
of action against him. The petitioner also stated that a municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain
an action involving a claim filed against the estate of a deceased person.

The same grounds have been raised in this petition. Mr. Nacar contends:

xxx xxx xxx

9. That the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction.The municipal courts or

inferior courts have NO jurisdiction to settle the estate of deceased persons. The
proper remedy is for the creditor to file the proper proceedings in the court of first
instance and file the corresponding claim. But assuming without admitting that the
 respondent judge had jurisdiction, it is very patent that he committed a very grave
abuse of discretion and totally disregarded the provisions of the Rules of Court and
decisions of this honorable Court when he issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary
attachment, when there is no showing that the plaintiff therein has a sufficient cause
of action, that there is no other security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
plaintiff; or that the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the
order is prayed for above all legal counterclaims; There was no bond to answer for
whatever damages that herein petitioner may suffer; (Rollo, pp. 3- 4).

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent judge tried to avoid the consequences of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss
by stating that although the title of the complaint styled it a claim against the estate of the late
Isabelo Nacar, the allegations showed that the nature of the action was really for the recovery of an
indebtedness in the amount of P2,791.99.

The rule cited by the judge is correctly stated but it is hardly relevant to the contents of the complaint
filed by Mr. Japitana.

It is patent from the portions of the complaint earlier cited that the allegations are not only vague and
ambiguous but downright misleading. The second paragraph of the body of the complaint states that
the defendant (herein petitioner Nicanor Nacar) at various dates since the year 1968 incurred debts
to the plaintiff in the sum of P2,791.00. And yet, in the subsequent paragraphs, one clearly gathers
that the debts were actually incurred by the late Isabelo Nacar, who died several months before the
filing of the complaint. The complaint which the respondent judge reads as one for the collection of a
sum of money and all the paragraphs of which are incidentally unnumbered, expressly states as a
material averment:

xxx xxx xxx

That plaintiff herein file (sic) a claim against the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar to recover the
aforementioned sum of P2,791.00;

xxx xxx xxx

Under the circumstances of this case, respondent Japitana has no cause of action against petitioner
Nacar. Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (58 SCRA 559) gives the elements of a
valid cause of action:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of
the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the existence of a legal right in the
plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to the
plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. ( Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666,
667; Ramitere et al. vs. Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966,
16 SCRA 251, 255). On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
provides that the complaint must state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
cause of action. Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the
three essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint states a cause of action;
(Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215, 218) otherwise,
the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that ground.
Indeed, although respondent Japitana may have a legal right to recover an indebtedness due him,
petitioner Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt for the simple reason that there
is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything to do with the creation
of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the petitioner
had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as
would create a cause of action against the former.

It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar
to recover seven (7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted
to recover from the possession of the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo
Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure
a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the recovery of an outstanding debt of the
late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which petitioner Nacar has
nothing to do.

In fact the fatal defect in the complaint was noticed by the respondent court when it advised
respondent Japitana to amend his complaint to conform with his evidence and from the court's
admission that it was inclined to dismiss the case were it not for the complaint in intervention of
respondent Doloricon. Respondent Doloricon filed his complaint for intervention on the ground that
the four carabaos, subject of the writ of attachment, were actually his carabaos. Thus, the
respondent court in its Order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, to dissolve writ of
preliminary attachment and in order the return of the carabaos said:

... Antonio Doloricon manifested before this Court that he is filing a third-party
complaint alleging that he is the true and lawful owner of the carabaos in questions.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court for the interest of both parties will not
for the meantime dismiss this case. Antonio Doloricon is hereby given 10 days from
receipt hereof within which to file his third-party complaint. The plaintiff who in his
opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss pray (sic) for the custody of the
carabaos. This Court further requires plaintiff to put up the additional bond of P
I,000.00 after which the latter may be entitled of (sic) the custody of the carabaos
subject of litigation pending final termination of this case. (Rollo, pp. 18-19)

The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to applicable precedents on
the matter. We ruled in Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, supra:

Section I, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, providing in part that:

Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss may be made on any
of the following grounds; ...

(g) That the complaint states no cause of action. ...

explicitly requires that the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested exclusively on the basis of the
complaint itself and no other should be considered when the ground for motion to dismiss is that the
complaint states no cause of action. Pursuant thereto this Court has ruled that:

As a rule the sufficiency of the complaint, when challenged in a

motion to dismiss, must be determined exclusively on the basis of the
facts alleged therein' (Uy Chao vs. De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc.,
 L-14495, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 69, 72. See also De Jesus, et
al. vs. Belarmino et al., 95 Phil. 365, 371; Dalandan, et at. vs. Julio, et
al., L- 19101, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 400; Ramitere et al. vs.
Montinola Vda. de Yulo, et al., L-19751, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA
250, 254; Acuna vs. Batac Producers Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc., et al., L-20338, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 526, 531)

Hence, it was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because respondent
Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.

Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were in
the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the
recovery of the outstanding debts of the late Isabelo Nacar against his stepfather, the petitioner
Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):

Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in

accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of
litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice
without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity thereof.

Considering the foregoing, the respondent court's denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and
its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper. With this
conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the
issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in issuing the subject writ of
attachment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued on
January 13, 1971 is made permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection
therewith is ordered returned to him.

SO ORDERED.