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09 Lepanto Vs Dumapis

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584 Phil. 100

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 163210, August 13, 2008 ]

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS.


MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI AND FRANCIS LIAGAO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the November 7, 2003 Decision[1] and April 15, 2004 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a domestic juridical entity


engaged in mining, employed Moreno Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and
Francis Liagao, as load, haul and dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents).[3] All
three were assigned at the 850 level, underground, Victoria Area in Lepanto,
Mankayan, Benguet. This is a known "highgrade" area where most of the ores mined
are considered of high grade content.[4]

In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers),
one of its foreign consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the
Mine, went underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the
workers and the working conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the
said level, he was surprised to see that nobody was there. However, when he went to
the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed
to be "highgrade." Realizing that "highgrading"[5] was being committed, Chambers
shouted. Upon hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of
the stope.[6] Chambers then reported the incident to the security investigation office.[7]

After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security
Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows:

xxxx

At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto


Security Investigation office, we received a report that the LMD Asst.
Resident Manager, Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several
unidentified miners at 8K Stope, 850 level committing Highgrading

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activities therein;

Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their supervisor


and SG Ceasarion Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security Patrol
posted therein as stationary guard were called to this office for interrogation
regarding this effect;

In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the


highgrading event really transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope,
850 level at about 2:00 o'clock PM of September 15, 2000. That the
involved participants were all miners assigned to work at 7K Stope, 8K
Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located at 850 mine level.
Likewise, the detailed stationary guard assigned thereat and some mine
supervisors were also directly involved in this activity;

Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct


participation then claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel
Gumatin, one of the miners assigned at Panel No.1-est-North, 8K Stope, 850
level to cooperate with them to commit Highgrading. He revealed his
companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K stope, namely, Joel
Gumatin, Brent Suyam, Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and Daniel Fegsar.
He also included those who were assigned to work at 240 E, XCS, namely:
Thomas Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno Dumapis,
and Marolito Cativo. He enumerated also messrs. Benedict Arocod, Samson
Damian, and Dionisio Bandoc, 7K Stope, 850 level assigned miners and
shiftboss, respectively;

Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also positively
confirmed the Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came
upon the group and even dispersed them when he went therein prior to the
arrival of Mr. Chambers;

Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao


that its was messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued
rock drilling machine then drilled holes and blasted the same at the 8K
Stope roadway with the assistance of Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan,
Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar and Francisco Liagao.
That SG Ceasarion Damoslog was present on the area standing and
watching the group during the incident;

That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and
to support any complaint that may be filed against respondents;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our
signature this 28th day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet.
[8](Emphasis supplied)

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On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-
accused guilty of the offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their
employment.[9]

On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No.
11-0607-00 against petitioner.[10] On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit.

On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a
Decision, declaring the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the
dismissal of the nine other complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC
Decision insofar as respondents are concerned, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21, 2001 is


hereby MODIFIED declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein
respondents] Moreno Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui and Francis Liagao illegal and
ordering respondent to pay them backwages in the total amount of four
hundred eighty thousand one hundred eighty two pesos and 63/100 (P480,
182.63) and separation pay in the total amount of four hundred seventeen
thousand two hundred thirty pesos and 32/100 (P417,230.32) as computed
in the body of the decision.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[11]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated on November 22, 2002.[12]

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
CA assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed
the decision of the NLRC[13] and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND


REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION'S DECISION DATED AUGUST 30, 2002
WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF
HEREIN RESPONDENTS.[14]

A. The Court of Appeal's strict application of the hearsay rule


under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present
case is uncalled for.

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B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof


beyond doubt is not required, it being sufficient that the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employees
are responsible for the misconduct which renders them
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by their
position.[15]

The petition is devoid of merit.

In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering
the Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and
therefore inadmissible, to wit:

We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of


Security Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and
thus, inadmissible. Their narration of factual events was not based on their
personal knowledge but on disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court defined the nature of hearsay:

Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.[16]

Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides:

Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable
settlement. In any proceeding before the Commission or any Labor
Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that
the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the petitioner.

Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or
in a suppletory character and effect.[17]

In a number of cases,[18] this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as
permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and
other documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence
as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed
in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC.[19]

In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.[20] the Court ruled that although the
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affiants had not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-
examined, their affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such
affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[21] this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the
technical rules of evidence.

Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for
being hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it
is, an investigation report.

However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.[22] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the rules of evidence.[23] The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.[24] In finding that the Report of the Chief
Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso,
this Court ruled:

According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent


was dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter,
however, refused to give credence to the Report. They are one in ruling
that the Report cannot be given any probative value as it is
uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay,
having come from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not have
any personal knowledge of the events reported therein.

xxxx

The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:

Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative


value. It is not verified by an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of
trusthworthiness. It is furthermore, and this is crucial, not sourced
from the personal knowledge of Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather
based on the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY
OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH REGARDS TO
OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON
DISCIPLINE" who " NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT
CARING OF HIS JOB AND DUTIES x x x." Accordingly, the report is plain
hearsay. It is not backed up by the affidavit of any of the "Supt."
Engineers who purportedly had first-hand knowledge of private
respondents supposed "lack of discipline," "irresponsibility" and
"lack of diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x x

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The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.[25] (Emphasis


supplied)

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound
by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule
should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.
The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value.[26] Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla.[27] It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.[28] Thus, even though technical rules of evidence
are not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based
on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.[29]

Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of the
Joint Affidavit.

An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the
Security Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to
the facts allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus,
there is a need to individually scrutinize the statements and testimonies of the four
sources of the Joint Affidavit in order to determine the latter's probative weight.

The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several
unidentified miners x x x."[30] Chambers simply narrated to the Security
Investigators what he saw but did not indicate herein respondents.

Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he
named respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading
.[31]

Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first statement,
[32] Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any

involvement therein. However, in his second statement,[33] Damoslog claimed to have


personally witnessed the act of highgrading and named the miners involved to wit:

07. Ques - Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?


Ans - On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at
about 0800hrs, while we were at the 8K stope, 850
level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me that he could
not procure some needed amount of money and if
possible we will commit highgrading for that effect to
settle his problem. That because I pity him, I just
answered that if they could manage to do it then they
could do it.

08. Ques - Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he


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approached you?
Ans - He was alone.

09. Ques Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his


problem?
Ans I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that
he needed an amount of money badly as I earlier said.

10. Ques So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the
highgrading activity?
Ans No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.

11. Ques - How did it started [sic]?


Ans - They started after they all finished their respective
drilling assignment. That while I was near the panel 2-
West located at the inner portion of 8K Stope, I
observed the LHD unit coming from the roadway near
the 8K Eating station which was previously parked
thereat proceeded to the roadway of panel 1-West
then started cleaning and scraping said roadway. That
after cleaning he parked it at the inner portion of the
roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner who
was not assigned therein and I failed to identify his
name shove two shovels on the roadway recently
cleaned by the LHD then handed it to us with another
man whom I don't know his name but could recognize
and identify him if I will meet him again then we
washed the same in the inner area of panel 2-West
which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting the
same, we placed it atop of an spread cartoon [sic]
sheet. That while we were busy washing and sorting,
Mr. Gumatin also was fixing and spreading the airhose
for rockdrilling machine. That few moments thereafter,
I heard the running engine of the drilling machine but I
can not identify the operator as my line of view was
obstructed by the curbed angle of the panel where we
are washing the ores. That afterwhich I heard
somebody that they are now going to blast the drilled
holes but we remained in our place continuing washing
the stones. That after the blast Mr. Garcia and one
other companion whom I failed to identify due to foggy
condition caused by the explosive blasting then handed
us the additional newly unearth ores for washing. That
while were still busy washing, Gumatin approached us
then told us that he will collect what was already
washed and sorted and start to process the same. That
Gumatin took the items then started to pound the ores
atop of an LHD unit parked near the entrance of panel
2-East which was not used during the shift. That after
that, I stood up then subsequently proceeded to panel
2-West then observed messrs. Maximo Madao,
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Benedict Arocod, Brent Suyam, Daniel Fegsar,


Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo, John Kitoyna
and Samson Damian who acted as the look out at
the junction of 240 E, XCS and 8K Stope. The
enumerated miners except Damian were in squatting
position in scattered adjacent places busy sorting ores.
Moments later Shift boss Dionisio Bandoc arrived
then went to the place of Gumatin then told us that he
will get a portion of the already proceeded ores for the
operator to handcarry so that he will not need to come
to 8K Stope, 850 level then after taking some of the
loot he proceeded out simultaneously uttering that he
will check the look out at the outer area of the
mainline posted away from the 7K Stope.[34]
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the
miners involved in the act of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao.

The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading.
However, in his sworn statement,[35] Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he
identify any of the miners, to wit:

11. Ques - In your own honest observation, what could be the


estimate [sic] number of this group of miners doing
highgrading activities?
Ans - I don't know but obviously they were several as
manifested by their number of cap lamplights. I also
speculated that some of them were hidden at the
curved inner access of the roadway enroute to the
inner area.

12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?
Ans - Honestly, no.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly
named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.

Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement[37] dated
September 16, 2000, Madao claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the
respondents. However, in his second sworn statement[38] dated September 20, 2000,
Madao claimed to have knowledge of the act of highgrading and specifically named
respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved, to wit:

09. Ques - Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and


had drilled first the flooring of that roadway before
blasting it?
Ans - Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred
[sic] their assigned drilling machine at the said
roadway and drilled the area with the company of

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Garcia, Kitoyan, Arocod, Damian, Fegsar and Liagao.


[39] (Emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty
of highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit[40] which he executed with respondent Tundagui,
Madao made the following declarations:

When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000, I am


being required to appear at the security investigation office. After quitting
time I went to the security office and was surprised to learn that my name is
among those listed persons who were seen by Mr. Chambers committing
acts of highgrading on September 15, 2000. However, when I quit work on
September 20, 2000 I was again called through telephone to appear at the
security office. Investigator Felimon Ringor told me that I will give another
statement and convinced to tell me all the names of the persons assigned
thereat with the promise that I will report for work. With my limited
education having not finished grade 1, I was made to give my statement
on questions and answers which are self-incriminating and
knowingly mentioned names of persons who are innocent. Worst,
when I got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by our legal
counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth
after I gave my statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-
Raffols for swearing. With this circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my
statement dated September 20, 2000 for being self incriminatory
unassisted by my counsel or union representative and hereby ADAPTS
[sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated September 16, 2000.[41]
(Emphasis supplied)

In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the
result would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added
importance in the absence of any evidence on record explicitly showing that the
dismissed employee committed the act which caused the dismissal.[42] Accordingly, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madao's recantation, as it serves to cast
doubt as to the guilt of respondent Liagao.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced
from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support
evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not
identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslog's first and
second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his
statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements
and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the
veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.

The second ground is not plausible.

While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally
described as menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount

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of trust and confidence on the part of petitioner,[43] the rule that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of
confidence, and that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of confidence,
is not absolute.[44]

The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust
and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.[45] In
order that loss of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an
employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.[46]

In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold
respondents guilty of highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence


presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to
extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the
benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to
give maximum aid and protection to labor.[47]

Lastly, respondents' prayer in their Comment[48] and Memorandum,[49] that the CA


Decision be modified by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights and with payment of full backwages from their alleged dismissal
up to date of reinstatement, deserves scant consideration. Respondents are estopped
from claiming their right to reinstatement. Records show that respondents along with
their co-accused, filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457
questioning the decision of the NLRC. The said appeal was denied by the CA. The case
was then elevated to this Court through a petition for review, entitled Thomas Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 162554. However, the same was denied with
finality for having been filed out of time.[50] In effect, it serves to estop the
respondents from praying for their reinstatement in the present case. Under the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "reclusion of issues" or
"collateral estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.[51] Applied to the present case, the "former suit" refers to CA-G.R. SP No.
75457 wherein the CA ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No.
162554 wherein this Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together
with other dismissed workers. The "future case" is the present case in which the
petitioner is Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company assailing the validity of the CA
Decision declaring the dismissal of respondents to be illegal. Reinstatement was not an
issue raised by herein petitioner. Respondents cannot now be allowed to raise the same
in the petition filed by petitioner, for that would circumvent the finality of judgment as
to separation pay insofar as respondents are concerned.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 7, 2003 and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860 are
AFFIRMED.

Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with the concurrence of Justices Andres

B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong; rollo, pp. 9-19.

[2] Id. at 20-21.

[3] Id. at 10.

[4] Rollo, p. 27.

[5] Presidential Decree No. 581, Section 1: Any person who shall take gold-bearing ores

or rocks from a mining claim or mining camp or shall remove, collect or gather gold-
bearing ores or rocks in place or shall extract or remove the gold from such ores or
rocks, or shall prepare and treat such ores or rocks to recover or extract the gold
contents thereof, without the consent of the operator of the mining claim, shall be
guilty of "highgrading" or theft of gold x x x.

[6] Rollo, p.10.

[7] Id. at 27.

[8] Rollo, p. 177.

[9] Id. at 183-185.

[10] Id. at 210-221.

[11] Rollo, p. 67.

[12] Id. at 70.

[13] Id. at 9-19.

[14] Id. at 31.

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[15] Rollo, p. 31.

[16] Id. at 52.

[17] Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA

699, 704.

[18] Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. v. Gorobalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989,

175 SCRA 93; Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 408 Phil. 570 (2001).

[19] Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., supra note 17, at 703.

[20] Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., id.

[21] G.R. No. 110637, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 534.

[22] PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).

[23] PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, at 59.

[24] G.R. No. 148893, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 661.

[25] Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 666.

[26] Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 251 (1997).

[27] Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September 14,

1995, 248 SCRA 183, 200.

[28] Gelmart Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 70544, November 5,

1987, 155 SCRA 403.

[29] Ang Tibay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

[30] Rollo, p. 177 (emphasis supplied).

[31] Id.

[32] Id. at 142-143.

[33] Rollo, pp. 144-147.

[34] Rollo, pp. 144-145.

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[35] Id. at 140-141.

[36] Id. at 141.

[37] Rollo, pp. 132-133.

[38] Id. at 134.

[39] Id.

[40] Id. at 136-138.

[41] Id. at 137.

[42] Oania v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1, 1995,

244 SCRA 668.

[43] Mina v. National Labor Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 286 (1995).

[44] Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 27, at 199.

[45] Supra note 27, id.

[46] See Pilipinas Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101372,

November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 750; China City Restaurant Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97196, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 443; Marcelo v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 310 Phil. 891 (1995).

[47] Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission, 356 Phil. 936 (1998).

[48] Rollo, p. 291.

[49] Id. at 391.

[50] Rollo, pp. 309-340, 341-342, 343, 344-345, 346-347.

[51] Tan v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 675, 681 (2001).

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