09 Lepanto Vs Dumapis
09 Lepanto Vs Dumapis
09 Lepanto Vs Dumapis
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the November 7, 2003 Decision[1] and April 15, 2004 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860.
In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers),
one of its foreign consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the
Mine, went underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the
workers and the working conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the
said level, he was surprised to see that nobody was there. However, when he went to
the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed
to be "highgrade." Realizing that "highgrading"[5] was being committed, Chambers
shouted. Upon hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of
the stope.[6] Chambers then reported the incident to the security investigation office.[7]
After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security
Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows:
xxxx
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activities therein;
Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also positively
confirmed the Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came
upon the group and even dispersed them when he went therein prior to the
arrival of Mr. Chambers;
That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and
to support any complaint that may be filed against respondents;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our
signature this 28th day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet.
[8](Emphasis supplied)
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On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-
accused guilty of the offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their
employment.[9]
On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No.
11-0607-00 against petitioner.[10] On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit.
On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a
Decision, declaring the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the
dismissal of the nine other complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC
Decision insofar as respondents are concerned, reads:
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated on November 22, 2002.[12]
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
CA assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed
the decision of the NLRC[13] and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
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In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering
the Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and
therefore inadmissible, to wit:
Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.[16]
Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the
Labor Code, as amended, which provides:
Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable
settlement. In any proceeding before the Commission or any Labor
Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that
the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or
in a suppletory character and effect.[17]
In a number of cases,[18] this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as
permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and
other documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence
as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed
in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC.[19]
In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.[20] the Court ruled that although the
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affiants had not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-
examined, their affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such
affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[21] this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the
technical rules of evidence.
Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for
being hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it
is, an investigation report.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.[22] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the rules of evidence.[23] The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.[24] In finding that the Report of the Chief
Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso,
this Court ruled:
xxxx
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While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound
by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule
should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.
The evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value.[26] Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla.[27] It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.[28] Thus, even though technical rules of evidence
are not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based
on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.[29]
Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of the
Joint Affidavit.
An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the
Security Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to
the facts allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus,
there is a need to individually scrutinize the statements and testimonies of the four
sources of the Joint Affidavit in order to determine the latter's probative weight.
The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several
unidentified miners x x x."[30] Chambers simply narrated to the Security
Investigators what he saw but did not indicate herein respondents.
Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he
named respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading
.[31]
Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first statement,
[32] Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any
approached you?
Ans - He was alone.
10. Ques So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the
highgrading activity?
Ans No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.
The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading.
However, in his sworn statement,[35] Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he
identify any of the miners, to wit:
12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?
Ans - Honestly, no.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly
named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.
Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement[37] dated
September 16, 2000, Madao claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the
respondents. However, in his second sworn statement[38] dated September 20, 2000,
Madao claimed to have knowledge of the act of highgrading and specifically named
respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved, to wit:
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Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty
of highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit[40] which he executed with respondent Tundagui,
Madao made the following declarations:
In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the
result would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added
importance in the absence of any evidence on record explicitly showing that the
dismissed employee committed the act which caused the dismissal.[42] Accordingly, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madao's recantation, as it serves to cast
doubt as to the guilt of respondent Liagao.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced
from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support
evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not
identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslog's first and
second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his
statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements
and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the
veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.
While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally
described as menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount
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of trust and confidence on the part of petitioner,[43] the rule that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of
confidence, and that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of confidence,
is not absolute.[44]
The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust
and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.[45] In
order that loss of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an
employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.[46]
In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold
respondents guilty of highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 7, 2003 and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with the concurrence of Justices Andres
[5] Presidential Decree No. 581, Section 1: Any person who shall take gold-bearing ores
or rocks from a mining claim or mining camp or shall remove, collect or gather gold-
bearing ores or rocks in place or shall extract or remove the gold from such ores or
rocks, or shall prepare and treat such ores or rocks to recover or extract the gold
contents thereof, without the consent of the operator of the mining claim, shall be
guilty of "highgrading" or theft of gold x x x.
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[17] Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA
699, 704.
[18] Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. v. Gorobalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5, 1989,
175 SCRA 93; Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 408 Phil. 570 (2001).
[21] G.R. No. 110637, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 534.
[22] PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).
[23] PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, at 59.
[24] G.R. No. 148893, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 661.
[25] Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 666.
[26] Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 251 (1997).
[27] Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September 14,
[28] Gelmart Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 70544, November 5,
[31] Id.
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[39] Id.
[42] Oania v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1, 1995,
[43] Mina v. National Labor Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 286 (1995).
[44] Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 27, at 199.
[46] See Pilipinas Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101372,
November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 750; China City Restaurant Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97196, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 443; Marcelo v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 310 Phil. 891 (1995).
[47] Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission, 356 Phil. 936 (1998).
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