ility or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.
o   Petitioners’ repeated failure to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a
failure to comply with the Rules and their non-presentation of evidence
before the trial court was essentially due to their fault.
 
Dispositive: Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated October 18, 2007 and January 22, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 78676, are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is DELETED.
 
 Case # 324 MANOLO P. FULE, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 79094 June 22,
1988
Facts:              
During the pre-trial, the stipulation of fact was made but it was not signed by the accused and his counsel.
At the hearing, only the prosecution presented its evidence while appellant waived the right to present
evidence and, in lieu thereof, the counsel submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts.
The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the Stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference without the signature of the
accused and counsel can be used as basis in convicting the accused?
Held.
No. SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed
by the accused and counsel.
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel,
as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact
that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the
defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What
the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts,
as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying
solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable
doubt.
 
 
 
 
 
G.R. No. 123263                           December 16, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32,  and ISAH V. RED
FACTS:
  Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Thereafter, Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion and remanded the case to the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
  The prosecution, citing the provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code filed a manifestation and motion to
remand praying that the case be returned to the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
         Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
  Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
                  Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that:
“The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense…”
  Republic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of offenses punishable by not more than six years of
imprisonment under the Municipal Trial Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as there is no
manifest legislative purpose to do so or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between them.
G.R. No. 115115                           July 18, 1995 CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC.  
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and  VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC.
FACTS:
  Private respondents, FITRITE Inc. and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., are engaged in the business of manufacturing,
selling and distributing biscuits and cookies bearing the trademark “SUNSHINE” in the Philippines. Petitioner,
CONRAD AND COMPANU, Inc. is engaged in the business of importing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies
in the Philippines.
  Private respondents were granted the trademark “SUNSHINE” to be used on biscuits and cookies by the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). For quite some time, the trademark “SUNSHINE” has been
used by the private respondents in the concept of an owner on its biscuits and cookies.
  Meanwhile, petitioner was designated as the exclusive importer and dealer of the products of “Sunshine Biscuits,
Inc.” for sale in the Philippines.
  Private respondents then filed a case before the Regional Trial Court, seeking for remedies against infringement
under Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, as well as of the remedies against unfair competition under Sec.
29 of the same statue.
  Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint invoking, among others, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
         Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
                  No, the doctrine finds no merit in the case at bar.
  While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered trademark falls under the exclusive
cognizance of BPTTT, an action, however, for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy for injunction
and relief for damages, is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
   An application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a registered trade mark cannot per se have the
effect of restraining or preventing the courts from the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary rule
would unduly expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which, simply expressed, would merely behoove regular
courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to defer to the findings of resolutions of administrative
tribunals on certain technical matters.  
 
        G.R. No. 169004                           September 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary
grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the
Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received.
                  Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he should not fall under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by
law to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27.
ISSUE:
  Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines
committed by a public official below salary grade 27.
HELD:
                  Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed
by a public official below salary grade 27.
  The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at
the time of the commission of the offense. The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8249 shall govern.  
Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided
that they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the
Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
        G.R. No. L-14595                           May 31, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance,
Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE
JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO
LACERNA aliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL
POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN
HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES
FACTS:
A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S. Brown in sitio Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan,
City of Basilan. Said substation was composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power
guns. It was alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and that defendant Joaquin R.
Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their
detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court.
On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint
filed in court. Tebag was allegedly maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-
station, said torture resulted to Tebag’s death.
The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of the cities of
Zamboanga and Basilan.
Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The prosecution is questioning said
appearance due to the constitutional prohibition for senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear
as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation of his office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private respondents.
HELD:
Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said
amended information that "Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him
with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ...
supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of
law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in
consequence thereof.
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract,
as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is
intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.  
        G.R. Nos. 118013-14                   October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/
INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE
PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSONDUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS,
DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y
MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA,  and EDGAR HILADO
FACTS:
Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City
against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the Philippine National Police. The two cases was
consolidated.
While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a motion for the transmittal of the case to the Sandiganbayan on the
ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offense charged were committed in relation
to the office of the accused PNP officers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
                  No, the case is no longer cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in
another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the
courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975.
They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.
In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the
informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing
assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed
in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that
the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the
Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975.
That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been
commenced in the Sandiganbayan.
It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be
transferred again to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.  
        G.R. No. L-64548                           July 7, 1986
ROLANDO P. BARTOLOME vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
        G.R. No. L-64559                           July 7, 1986
ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOS vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Rolando P. Bartolome and Elino Coronel Y Santon were charged with the crime of Falsification of Official document
as defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the two
conspired to make it appear on the CS Personal Data Sheet that Bartolome has taken and passed the Career Service
Professional Qualifying Examination with a rating of 73.35% and that he was a 4th year AB student at the Far Eastern
University.
The charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
                  No, the offense is not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
         Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crime committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379 will reveal that nowhere in either statute is
falsification of an official document mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.
Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a wide range of offenses committed by public
officers, from knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but
falsification of an official document is not included. This is punished in Article 171 under Title IV, Book Two, on
Crimes against Public Interest.
        G.R. No. 85328                           July 4, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  
vs.
BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN,"  
FACTS:
Bienvenido Leoparte was charged and convicted with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape by the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena. It was alleged in the information that the accused, Leoparte, pulled the victim,
Marinel Idea, while she was on her way home and traversing the railroad tracks. The accused then dragged her to the
nearby banana plantation where the accused satisfied his carnal desires against the victim’s will. Thereafter, the
accused brought the victim to his sister’s home where he again had carnal knowledge with the victim.
         
The following day, the accused brought the victim to his uncle’s home and again succeeded to have carnal knowledge
with the victim against her will. After two day, the accused the brought the victim to the house of his parents where he
again successfully satisfied his lascivious desires against the victim. All the incidents took place with the accused
purporting that he and the victim had eloped and were planning to get married.
         
Issues:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, The Regional Trial Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in
Article 344 that a complaint of the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the
complaint that starts the prosecutor proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try
the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law. Such condition has been imposed out of
consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial.  
The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed in Article
344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.  In
the case at bar, the active cooperation of the offended party in the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates
said intent.  
G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS  
vs.  
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.  It was
alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and
Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have jurisdiction
over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar.
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in
the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material
statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is
the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
        G.R. No. 158763                           March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO
FACTS:
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time,
being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the
accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the
persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint
for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2
Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners
and SPO2 Maderal.  
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to
recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.  
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a
Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under
the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an
information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.  
        G.R. No. 113630         May 5, 1994
DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the
kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist.  
An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by
Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of
the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was
recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their
arrests.  
ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners.
HELD:  
No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners.
 For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its
inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More
importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated
petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the
whole affair. While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from
the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the
evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For
them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much
more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the
belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
 
        G.R. No. L-4567          May 30, 1983
EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners, Francisco and Bernardino on February 6, 1966
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The acts constituting the complaint was allegedly perpetrated
against Dr. Patrocinio Angeles on December 26, 1965.
On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime of grave oral defamation was filed before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. The information was amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966
amending the offense charged to slander.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the offense charged, the Court of Appeals modified
the conviction finding the petitioners only guilty of simple slander.
On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:         
         
HELD:         Whether or not the crime has prescribed.
                  No, the crime has not prescribed.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him."
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco  held that the complaint or information referred to
in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party
in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall
commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end
there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
        G.R. No. 125066         July 8, 1998
ISABELITA REODICA  vs.  
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property and slight physical injuries was filed before the Fiscal’s office on October 20, 1987.
On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging the petitioner for
the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
                  On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.
ISSUE:
                  Whether or not prescription has set in.
HELD:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, “the prosecution commences by
the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary
examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information.”  However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.  Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this
Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised
P e n a l C o d e , A r t i c l e 9 1 t h e r e o f a n d t h e r u l i n g s in Francisco and Cuaresma apply.  Thus, the
prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case.  We cannot,
therefore, uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.