An EMBODIED SPIRIT (Introduction To The Philosophy of The Human Person)
An EMBODIED SPIRIT (Introduction To The Philosophy of The Human Person)
An EMBODIED SPIRIT (Introduction To The Philosophy of The Human Person)
GUIDE QUESTION
What essentially defines a human person in terms of having a body and a spirit?
The possibility that humans have a spiritual component gives rise to the question
of what essentially makes up a human person, or which component, the body or
the spirit, essentially defines a human person. There are three possible answers:
First is that a human person is essentially just his/her body and nothing more.
This position naturally results from the belief that humans do not have a
spiritual component. Simply, if there is no such thing as a spirit, then a human
person is essentially just his/her body. We shall call this position the unspirited
body view.
Second is that a human person is essentially just his/her spirit. This view
maintains that the human person has both body and spirit but claims that
it is the spirit that essentially defines the human person. The body is here
seen as a nonessential component of the human person. This view results
from the belief that while the body is dependent on the spirit, the spirit is not
dependent on the body. Meaning, the body will die if there is no spirit, but
the spirit will survive even if there is no body. We shall call this position the
disembodied spirit view.
And third is that a human person is essentially the unity of his/her body and
spirit. This view also maintains that the human person has both body and
spirit but claims that the human person is essentially the unity of these two
components. And this view results from the belief that the body and the
spirit cannot exist independently of one another. That is, each will not
survive with the absence of the other. We shall call this position the
embodied spirit view.
Supporters of the unspirited view include those views (in the philosophy of
mind) which claim that what we normally call "mental states," such as our
thoughts and emotions, are actually physical states. One of these views is
called the mind-brain identity theory, which claims that what we call the
“mind” is nothing but the brain, and what we call "mental states" simply are
nothing but the neural states of the brain (see Smart 1991). Thus, on this
view, to the in pain, for instance, is just for the C-fibers in the brain to be
stimulated.
Another is called behaviourism, which claims that what we call mental
states simply refer to one's inclinations or tendencies to show certain
behaviours (see Rule 1965). For instance, to be in pain is to be inclined to
cry, to remove the source of pain, and others. Or to believe that it is raining
is to be inclined to bring an umbrella when one decides to get out of one's
house.
Disembodied Spirit View.
Two strong supporters of the disembodied spirit view are Plato and Rene
Descartes. Both philosophers believe that the spirit (called "soul" by Plato
but "mind" by Descartes) and the body are two different kinds of entities or
substances in that the body is physical while the spirit (soul or mind) is
nonphysical. This view is often called in the philosophy of mind) as
substance dualism. Plato and Descartes also believe that the spirit is
independent of the body in that the spirit can survive without the body while
the body cannot survive without the spirit. This leads both philosophers to
believe in the “immortality of the spirit” (Plato, though, also believes in
reincarnation-that the soul travels from one body to another).
Plato presents several arguments for his belief in the immortality of the soul.
One argument claims that the soul must be immortal otherwise we can
never explain the nature of knowledge as recollection (“to learn is to
remember"). Plato believes that one learns by remembering what one
once knew but have somehow forgotten. For Plato, this can only be
possible if the soul had existed in a state prior to its union with the body
where it acquired knowledge of everything (from the Demiurge, Plato's
version of a God) but which it forgot when it occupied a body. And once
a soul leaves a body, what it has learned through recollection in that
lifetime will again be forgotten the moment it occupies another body.
Another argument simply claims that since souls are immaterial
(nonphysical) then they are not composed of parts. And if they are not
composed of parts, then they cannot decompose and thus cannot die
(see Lorenz 2009).
Descartes views reality as composed of two different types of substances,
namely, mind (the nonphysical kind) and matter (the physical kind) (see
Justin, n.d.). Mind is conscious but no extended in space (meaning, not
observable and quantifiable), while matter is extended in space but not
conscious. Being physical, matter is determined by the laws of nature and
thus is not free or has no free will: while mind, being nonphysical, is not
determined by such laws and thus is free or has free will. Descartes then
classifies various types of entities according to matter and mind. Matter
includes plants, animal’s human bodies, and the rest of nature, whereas
minds include the imperfect minds of humans and the perfect mind of God.
Descartes argues that we can doubt that we have a body, along with the
physical world, but we cannot doubt that we have a mind, for to doubt is
to be conscious and to be conscious is to have a mind. As Descartes
famously remarks, "I think, therefore I am”.
Embodied Spirit View
Two strong supporters of the embodied spirit view are Aristotle and St. Thomas
Aquinas,
Aristotle regards the soul as the principle (or cause) of life. Meaning, the soul
is what gives life to something. Non-living things thus have no souls, while all
living things, consisting of humans, animals, and plants, have souls. The
body and soul, for Aristotle, are two different aspects of the human person.
The body is the person's material aspect or "matter," while the soul is his/her
formal aspect or "form." To illustrate the relation of matter and form,
consider the biography/Aristotle knife. Its material aspect is its metallic
material while its formal aspect is its capacity to cut. But if the knife were
alive, then its metallic material would be its body while its capacity to cut
would be its soul. The form of something, in this light, refers to the natural
capacity, ability, or function of something; while its matter refers to the kind
of material that it is made up of A soul, in this regard, is a set or system of
capacities or abilities that gives life to something (see Hsieh 2002, Lorenz
2009).
Given this, Aristotle distinguishes the souls of plants, animals, and humans in
the following. The soul of plants, called vegetative or nutritive soul, enables
plants to perform activities necessary for nourishment, growth, and
reproduction. The soul of animals, called sensitive soul, enables animals to
perform the activities necessary for nourishment, growth, reproduction,
sensation, and locomotion. And the soul of humans, called rational soul,
enables humans to perform the activities necessary for nourishment,
growth, reproduction, sensation, locomotion, intelligence or rational
thinking, and freedom or free will. Because form cannot exist independently
of matter (the soul needs the body to exist), Aristotle does not believe in the
immortality of the soul (including human souls).
Aquinas agrees with the idea of Aristotle that the human body and soul are
matter and common, respectively, of the same reality that makes up a
human But Aquinas adds something to the idea of the rational soul that
humans has a dual nature. There is a part of it that is dependent on the
body, but there is also a part of it that is not dependent on the body. The
rational soul's vegetative and sensitive abilities (the abilities it shares with
the souls of plants and animals) are all dependent on the body, but its
rational ability to think is not dependent on the body. This is so because the
vegetative and sensitive abilities necessarily need the body to operate; but
the ability of thinking does not need any organ of the body to
Consequently, Aquinas believes that while the vegetative and sensitive
souls are mortal, the rational souls are immortal (see McInerny, R. and
O'Callaghan, J. 2015). Aquinas, however, still maintains that the human
person is the unity of body and soul-which implies that the soul that survives
after the death of the human body is no longer a human person. (Aquinas,
for this reason, calls the human soul “subsistent" rather than a "substance"
to indicate that the human soul, though immortal, is incomplete in nature—
and which can only be complete again once the body is resurrected to
reunite with its soul.)
Of these three views, there are at least three reasons why the embodied
spirit view should be the most preferable. First, it maintains human freedom,
which is negated by the unspirited view (being just a body, all actions of a
human person will be determined by natural laws). Second, as it gives
importance to the soul, it also acknowledges the value of the body, which
the disembodied spirit view neglects. And third, it can accommodate
opposing views, as we saw in the cases Aristotle and Aquinas, on the
immortality of the human soul.