FILED

May 19 2021, 9:55 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR NON-PARTY

James P. Buchholz APPELLEE
Tourkow, Crell, Rosenblatt & Johnston L. JEAN CAMP:
Fort Wayne, Indiana Ann O’Connor McCready
Margaret E. Krawiec Vivek R. Hadley
Michael A. McIntosh Donald E. Morgan
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP
LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
Washington, DC Mark A. Lemley
Aditya V. Kamdar
Durie Tangri LLP
San Francisco, California
ATTORNEYS FOR FRIEND OF
THE COURT
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION:
D. Michael Allen
Colleen M. Newbill
Joseph A. Tomain
Mallor Grodner LLP
Bloomington, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 1 of 11

 AO Alfa-Bank, May 19, 2021
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-MI-2352
v. Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Court
John Doe, et al. The Honorable Frank M. Nardi,
Appellees-Defendants, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
and
53C04-2009-MI-1613
L. Jean Camp,
Non-Party Appellee.

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] AO Alfa-Bank (“Bank”) appeals the trial court’s grant of a motion to quash a

subpoena duces tecum issued to a non-party, L. Jean Camp (“Camp”), by a

Florida trial court. Without following the procedures outlined in the Uniform

Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, see Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1

(“the Act”), the Bank issued a Florida non-party subpoena duces tecum to

Camp related to litigation filed in a Florida trial court (“Florida Subpoena”).

Camp filed a motion to quash the Florida Subpoena in the Monroe Circuit

Court. The Monroe Circuit Court considered the merits of the issue and

granted Camp’s motion. The Bank appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by

granting the motion to quash. We conclude, however, that the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the motion to quash. Accordingly,

we vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 2 of 11

 Issues
[2] The Bank raises two issues 1, but we sua sponte address one dispositive issue,

which we restate as whether the Indiana trial court had subject matter

jurisdiction to consider the motion to quash the Florida Subpoena.

Facts
[3] The Bank is “one of Russia’s largest privately owned commercial banks.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 33. Camp is a security researcher and professor at

Indiana University, Bloomington Campus, where she is the director of the

Center for Security and Privacy in Informatics, Computing, and Engineering.

[4] In response to June 2016 reports that Russian hackers infiltrated the

Democratic National Committee’s servers, a group of anonymous researchers

(“Anonymous Researchers”) “worked together to uncover evidence of other

network intrusions related to the upcoming U.S. Presidential election.” Id. at

48. The Anonymous Researchers discovered that Domain Name System

(“DNS”) 2 records showed repeated interactions between the Trump

Organization and the Bank. Camp spoke with media organizations about the

DNS data and posted the DNS logs to her website.

1
The Bank argues that: (1) the trial court erred by granting the motion to quash because Camp did not have
standing to assert the rights of absent third parties; and (2) the trial court erred by granting the motion to
quash because the subpoena was overly broad, unreasonable, and unduly burdensome.
2
According to Camp, “DNS records show the history of computer communications between servers on the
Internet.” Appellee’s Br. p. 11 n.1.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 3 of 11

[5] In June 2020, the Bank filed a complaint in a Florida trial court against John

Doe Defendants. The Bank alleges that the John Doe Defendants conspired to

commit cyberattacks against the Bank in 2016 and 2017 in order to create DNS

records that would “create the illusion of secret communications” between the

Bank and the Trump Organization. Id. at 35. The Bank does not allege that

Camp or the Anonymous Researchers participated in these alleged

cyberattacks. The complaint theorized that the John Doe Defendants

“pointed” the Anonymous Researchers “in the direction of the planted [DNS]

evidence.” Id. at 50.

[6] In June 2020, the Bank unsuccessfully attempted service of the Florida

Subpoena, which was issued by a Florida trial court under a Florida cause

number, to Camp in Indiana through the Monroe County Sheriff’s

Department. 3 The Bank then emailed the Florida Subpoena to Camp’s attorney

and asked if the attorney “would be willing to accept service of the subpoena.”

Id. at 187. Camp’s attorney agreed to accept service on Camp’s behalf “in

exchange for an extension of time to respond to the subpoena.” Id. at 227. The

Bank then agreed to an extension of time to respond to the Florida Subpoena

until September 7, 2020, which was a holiday. There is no indication in the

record provided to us that the Bank submitted the Florida Subpoena to the

3
The return of service noted that Camp was “[n]ot expected to return to I.U. Bloomington until Aug/Sept
2020.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 66.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 4 of 11

 Monroe County Clerk or that the Monroe County Clerk issued an Indiana

subpoena for service.

[7] On September 8, 2020, in the Monroe Circuit Court, Camp filed a motion to

quash the Florida Subpoena. 4 The Bank filed an objection to Camp’s motion to

quash, and after a hearing, the trial court entered an order on the merits

granting Camp’s motion to quash the Florida Subpoena. Neither the parties

nor the trial court substantively addressed the Uniform Interstate Depositions

and Discovery Act, see Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1, or raised the Bank’s

failure to comply with the Act. Regarding the Act, the trial court’s order merely

provides:

1. On or about June l7, 2020, the plaintiff issued a Subpoena

Duces Tecum Without Deposition to L. Jean Camp, School of
Informatics & Computing, Office #300, 901 E. 10th St., Indiana
University, Bloomington, IN 47405 in cause number 50-2020-
CA-006304-XXX-MB in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit In and For Palm Beach, Florida, Circuit Civil
Division, which cause is entitled AO Alfa-Bank, Plaintiff, vs.
John Doe, et al, Defendants. L. Jean Camp is not a party to the
described cause of action.

2. Under the Uniform Interstate Depositions And Discovery Act,

I.C. 34-44.5-1-1 et seq. compliance with this subpoena shall be
determined by Indiana law.

4
Amicus curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc., (“EFF”) filed a brief in support of Camp with the trial
court and in this appeal. EFF describes itself as “a member-supported, nonprofit organization that works to
protect civil liberties and human rights in the digital world.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 81.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 5 of 11

 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 9. The Bank now appeals. 5

Analysis
[8] The Bank appeals the trial court’s grant of Camp’s motion to quash the Florida

Subpoena. We sua sponte, however, consider whether the trial court had

subject matter jurisdiction to address the Florida Subpoena and the motion to

quash. Our Supreme Court has clarified that subject matter jurisdiction

involves a “determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over the general

class of actions to which a particular case belongs.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d

538, 542 (Ind. 2006). “[I]n determining whether a court has subject-matter

jurisdiction, the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner’s claim ‘falls

within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the

constitution or by statute.’” State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711-12 (Ind.

2018) (quoting State ex rel. Young v. Noble Cir. Ct., 263 Ind. 353, 356, 332 N.E.2d

99, 101 (1975)); Blanck v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 829 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ind. 2005)

(“Resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue involves determining

whether the claim advanced falls within the general scope of authority

conferred upon the court by constitution or statute.”).

[9] “‘If a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, any judgment it renders is

void.’” Vic’s Antiques & Uniques, Inc. v. J. Elra Holdingz, LLC, 143 N.E.3d 300,

5
There was disagreement regarding whether the trial court’s November 20, 2020 order was an interlocutory
order or a final judgment. On February 12, 2021, this Court held that the trial court’s order is a final
judgment under Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 6 of 11

 308-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Hoang v. Jamestown Homes, Inc., 768

N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied), trans. denied. “Because

void judgments may be attacked directly or collaterally at any time, the issue of

subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any point by

a party or by the court sua sponte.” Id.; see also Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24,

32 n.8 (Ind. 2012) (holding that the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction “can be

raised at any point during the proceeding and by the court sua sponte”).

“Because the authority granted by a statute is a question of law, we review the

question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Id.

[10] Foreign subpoenas 6 are governed by the Uniform Interstate Depositions and

Discovery Act, see Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1. Indiana Code Section 34-

44.5-1-6 provides:

(a) To request issuance of a subpoena under this chapter that is

based on a foreign subpoena, a party must submit the foreign
subpoena to the clerk of the court in the county in which discovery is
sought to be conducted in Indiana. A request for the issuance of a

6
The Act defines “foreign subpoena” as “a subpoena issued under authority of a court of record of a foreign
jurisdiction.” Ind. Code § 34-44.5-1-2. A “foreign jurisdiction” is “a state other than Indiana.” I.C. § 34-
44.5-1-1. Further, a “state” is defined as:
(1) A state of the United States.
(2) The District of Columbia.
(3) Puerto Rico.
(4) The United States Virgin Islands.
(5) A federally recognized Indian tribe.
(6) Any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
I.C. § 34-44.5-1-4.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 7 of 11

 subpoena under this chapter does not constitute an appearance in
a court of this state.

(b) When a party submits a foreign subpoena to the clerk of a court in

Indiana, the clerk, in accordance with the court’s procedure, shall
promptly issue a subpoena for service upon the person to which the
foreign subpoena is directed.

(c) A subpoena issued under subsection (b) must:

(1) incorporate the terms used in the foreign subpoena; and

(2) contain or be accompanied by the names, addresses,

and telephone numbers of the following:

(A) All counsel of record in the proceeding to which

the subpoena relates.

(B) Any party not represented by counsel.

(emphasis added). Further, Indiana Code Section 34-44.5-1-7 provides: “A

subpoena issued by a clerk of the court under section 6 of this chapter must be

served in compliance with all applicable laws concerning service of a subpoena

in Indiana.”

[11] The Comments to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act

(“Uniform Act”) provide:

Presenting a subpoena to the clerk of court in the discovery state,

so that a subpoena is then issued in the name of the discovery
state, is the necessary act that invokes the jurisdiction of the discovery

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 8 of 11

 state, which in turn makes the newly issued subpoena both
enforceable and challengeable in the discovery state.

*****

The act of the clerk of court is ministerial, yet is sufficient to invoke

the jurisdiction of the discovery state over the deponent.

Comment to UNIF. INTERSTATE DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY ACT § 3,

Issuance of Subpoena. 7

[12] Our Supreme Court has held “[t]he comments to a uniform act are indicative of

the Legislature’s intent in enacting a statute based on the uniform act.” Basileh

v. Alghusain, 912 N.E.2d 814, 821 (Ind. 2009). Given that the Uniform Act is

substantially similar to Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1, “we consider the

7
The Comments to the Uniform Act also describe the standard procedure as follows:
The committee envisions the standard procedure under this section will become as follows,
using as an example a case filed in Kansas (the trial state) where the witness to be deposed lives
in Florida (the discovery state): A lawyer of record for a party in the action pending in Kansas
will issue a subpoena in Kansas (the same way lawyers in Kansas routinely issue subpoenas in
pending actions). That lawyer will then check with the clerk’s office, in the Florida county or
district in which the witness to be deposed lives, to obtain a copy of its subpoena form (the
clerk’s office will usually have a Web page explaining its forms and procedures). The lawyer
will then prepare a Florida subpoena so that it has the same terms as the Kansas subpoena. The
lawyer will then hire a process server (or local counsel) in Florida, who will take the completed
and executed Kansas subpoena and the completed but not yet executed Florida subpoena to the
clerk's office in Florida. In addition, the lawyer might prepare a short transmittal letter to
accompany the Kansas subpoena, advising the clerk that the Florida subpoena is being sought
pursuant to Florida statute ___ (citing the appropriate statute or rule and quoting Sec. 3). The
clerk of court, upon being given the Kansas subpoena, will then issue the identical Florida
subpoena (“issue” includes signing, stamping, and assigning a case or docket number). The
process server (or other agent of the party) will pay any necessary filing fees, and then serve the
Florida subpoena on the deponent in accordance with Florida law (which includes any
applicable local rules).
Comment to UNIF. INTERSTATE DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY ACT § 3, Issuance of Subpoena.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 9 of 11

 language of the Comment to be a strong indicator of the legislative intent

underlying the statute.” State ex rel. Hill v. Lawson, 128 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2019).

[13] We are faced with the initial issue of whether the claim advanced—the motion

to quash the foreign subpoena—falls within the general scope of authority

conferred upon the court by the constitution or a statute. See Blanck, 829

N.E.2d at 508. There is no indication that the claim falls within the general

scope of authority conferred upon the Monroe Circuit Court by the

constitution, and likewise, there is no statutory authority giving the Monroe

Circuit Court authority to consider a motion to quash a foreign subpoena.

[14] The record provided to us is devoid of any indication that the Bank submitted

the Florida Subpoena to the Monroe County Clerk for the issuance of an

Indiana subpoena, which is the necessary act to invoke the jurisdiction of the

Indiana courts. Indiana courts are not granted general, unqualified jurisdiction

and authority to enforce or quash foreign subpoenas. Rather, Indiana courts

are granted the authority to address foreign subpoenas only where the foreign

subpoena has been domesticated pursuant to Indiana Code Chapter 34-44.5-1.

An Indiana trial court has no authority to enforce a subpoena issued by The

Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County,

Florida, unless properly domesticated as provided under the Act.

[15] The lack of domestication is a jurisdictional threshold, not a procedural error

that can be avoided by waiver or consent of the parties. The parties obviously

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 10 of 11

 waived and/or consented to the trial court’s consideration of the motion to

quash without following the requisite procedure. While we recognize that

parties may consciously waive formalities for convenience purposes, under this

Act, the formalities confer subject matter jurisdiction on Indiana courts, and

subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.

[16] Because the Bank failed to domesticate the Florida Subpoena, the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Camp’s motion to quash.

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is void, and we dismiss this appeal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

Conclusion
[17] The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion to

quash the Florida Subpoena. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s void

order and dismiss this appeal.

[18] Vacated and dismissed.

Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-MI-2352 | May 19, 2021 Page 11 of 11