public_key

Copyright © 2008-2021 Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved

public_key 1.11
May 31, 2021
Copyright © 2008-2021 Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 Unless
required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is distributed on an
"AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License. The Initial Developer
of the Original Code is Ericsson AB. Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved.

May 31, 2021

 1.1  Introduction

1    public_key User's Guide

This application provides an API to public-key infrastructure from RFC 5280 (X.509 certificates) and public-key
formats defined by the PKCS standard.

1.1  Introduction
1.1.1  Purpose
The Public Key application deals with public-key related file formats, digital signatures, and X-509 certificates. It is
a library application that provides encode/decode, sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt, and similar functionality. It does not
read or write files, it expects or returns file contents or partial file contents as binaries.

1.1.2  Prerequisites
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the Erlang programming language and has a basic understanding of the
concepts of using public-keys and digital certificates.

1.1.3  Performance Tips

The Public Key decode- and encode-functions try to use the NIFs in the ASN.1 compilers runtime modules, if they
can be found. Thus, to have the ASN1 application in the path of your system gives the best performance.

1.2  Public-Key Records
This chapter briefly describes Erlang records derived from ASN.1 specifications used to handle public key
infrastructure. The scope is to describe the data types of each component, not the semantics. For information on the
semantics, refer to the relevant standards and RFCs linked in the sections below.
Use the following include directive to get access to the records and constant macros described in the following sections:

-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").

1.2.1  Data Types

Common non-standard Erlang data types used to describe the record fields in the following sections and which are not
defined in the Public Key Reference Manual follows here:
time() =
utc_time() | general_time()
utc_time() =
{utcTime, "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ"}
general_time() =
{generalTime, "YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ"}
general_name() =
{rfc822Name, string()}

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1.2  Public-Key Records

| {dNSName, string()}
| {x400Address, string()}
| {directoryName, {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}}
| {ediPartyName, special_string()}
| {ediPartyName, special_string(), special_string()}
| {uniformResourceIdentifier, string()}
| {iPAddress, string()}
| {registeredId, oid()}
| {otherName, term()}
special_string() =
{teletexString, string()}
| {printableString, string()}
| {universalString, string()}
| {utf8String, binary()}
| {bmpString, string()}
dist_reason() =
unused
| keyCompromise
| cACompromise
| affiliationChanged
| superseded
| cessationOfOperation
| certificateHold
| privilegeWithdrawn
| aACompromise
OID_macro() =
?OID_name()
OID_name() =
atom()

1.2.2  RSA
Erlang representation of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman cryptosystem (RSA) keys follows:

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 1.2  Public-Key Records

#'RSAPublicKey'{
modulus, % integer()
publicExponent % integer()
}.

#'RSAPrivateKey'{
version, % two-prime | multi
modulus, % integer()
publicExponent, % integer()
privateExponent, % integer()
prime1, % integer()
prime2, % integer()
exponent1, % integer()
exponent2, % integer()
coefficient, % integer()
otherPrimeInfos % [#OtherPrimeInfo{}] | asn1_NOVALUE
}.

#'OtherPrimeInfo'{
prime, % integer()
exponent, % integer()
coefficient % integer()
}.

#'RSASSA-PSS-params'{hashAlgorithm, % #'HashAlgorithm'{}},
maskGenAlgorithm, % #'MaskGenAlgorithm'{}},
saltLength, % integer(),
trailerField, % integer()
}.

#'HashAlgorithm'{algorithm, % oid()
parameters % defaults to asn1_NOVALUE
}.

#'MaskGenAlgorithm'{algorithm, % oid()
parameters, % defaults to asn1_NOVALUE
}.

1.2.3  DSA
Erlang representation of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) keys

#'DSAPrivateKey',{
version, % integer()
p, % integer()
q, % integer()
g, % integer()
y, % integer()
x % integer()
}.

#'Dss-Parms',{
p, % integer()
q, % integer()
g % integer()
}.

1.2.4  ECDSA and EDDSA

Erlang representation of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EDDSA) where parameters in the private key will be {namedCurve, ?'id-Ed25519'
| ?'id-Ed448'}.

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1.2  Public-Key Records

#'ECPrivateKey'{
version, % integer()
privateKey, % binary()
parameters, % {ecParameters, #'ECParameters'{}} |
% {namedCurve, Oid::tuple()} |
% {implicitlyCA, 'NULL'}
publicKey % bitstring()
}.

#'ECParameters'{
version, % integer()
fieldID, % #'FieldID'{}
curve, % #'Curve'{}
base, % binary()
order, % integer()
cofactor % integer()
}.

#'Curve'{
a, % binary()
b, % binary()
seed % bitstring() - optional

}.

#'FieldID'{
fieldType, % oid()
parameters % Depending on fieldType
}.

#'ECPoint'{
point % binary() - the public key
}.

1.2.5  PKIX Certificates

Erlang representation of PKIX certificates derived from ASN.1 specifications see also X509 certificates (RFC 5280),
also referred to as plain type, are as follows:

#'Certificate'{
tbsCertificate, % #'TBSCertificate'{}
signatureAlgorithm, % #'AlgorithmIdentifier'{}
signature % bitstring()
}.

#'TBSCertificate'{
version, % v1 | v2 | v3
serialNumber, % integer()
signature, % #'AlgorithmIdentifier'{}
issuer, % {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
validity, % #'Validity'{}
subject, % {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
subjectPublicKeyInfo, % #'SubjectPublicKeyInfo'{}
issuerUniqueID, % binary() | asn1_novalue
subjectUniqueID, % binary() | asn1_novalue
extensions % [#'Extension'{}]
}.

#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm, % oid()
parameters % der_encoded()
}.

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 1.2  Public-Key Records

Erlang alternate representation of PKIX certificate, also referred to as otp type

#'OTPCertificate'{
tbsCertificate, % #'OTPTBSCertificate'{}
signatureAlgorithm, % #'SignatureAlgorithm'
signature % bitstring()
}.

#'OTPTBSCertificate'{
version, % v1 | v2 | v3
serialNumber, % integer()
signature, % #'SignatureAlgorithm'
issuer, % {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
validity, % #'Validity'{}
subject, % {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
subjectPublicKeyInfo, % #'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{}
issuerUniqueID, % binary() | asn1_novalue
subjectUniqueID, % binary() | asn1_novalue
extensions % [#'Extension'{}]
}.

#'SignatureAlgorithm'{
algorithm, % id_signature_algorithm()
parameters % asn1_novalue | #'Dss-Parms'{}
}.

id_signature_algorithm() = OID_macro()
The available OID names are as follows:

OID Name

id-dsa-with-sha1

id-dsaWithSHA1 (ISO or OID to above)

md2WithRSAEncryption

md5WithRSAEncryption

sha1WithRSAEncryption

sha-1WithRSAEncryption (ISO or OID to above)

sha224WithRSAEncryption

sha256WithRSAEncryption

sha512WithRSAEncryption

ecdsa-with-SHA1

Table 2.1:   Signature Algorithm OIDs

The data type 'AttributeTypeAndValue', is represented as the following erlang record:

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1.2  Public-Key Records

#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type, % id_attributes()
value % term()
}.

The attribute OID name atoms and their corresponding value types are as follows:

OID Name Value Type

id-at-name special_string()

id-at-surname special_string()

id-at-givenName special_string()

id-at-initials special_string()

id-at-generationQualifier special_string()

id-at-commonName special_string()

id-at-localityName special_string()

id-at-stateOrProvinceName special_string()

id-at-organizationName special_string()

id-at-title special_string()

id-at-dnQualifier {printableString, string()}

id-at-countryName {printableString, string()}

id-at-serialNumber {printableString, string()}

id-at-pseudonym special_string()

Table 2.2:   Attribute OIDs

The data types 'Validity', 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo', and 'SubjectPublicKeyInfoAlgorithm'

are represented as the following Erlang records:

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 1.2  Public-Key Records

#'Validity'{
notBefore, % time()
notAfter % time()
}.

#'SubjectPublicKeyInfo'{
algorithm, % #AlgorithmIdentifier{}
subjectPublicKey % binary()
}.

#'SubjectPublicKeyInfoAlgorithm'{
algorithm, % id_public_key_algorithm()
parameters % public_key_params()
}.

The public-key algorithm OID name atoms are as follows:

OID Name

rsaEncryption

id-dsa

dhpublicnumber

id-keyExchangeAlgorithm

id-ecPublicKey

Table 2.3:   Public-Key Algorithm OIDs

#'Extension'{
extnID, % id_extensions() | oid()
critical, % boolean()
extnValue % der_encoded()
}.

id_extensions() Standard Certificate Extensions, Private Internet Extensions, CRL Extensions and CRL Entry
Extensions.

1.2.6  Standard Certificate Extensions

The standard certificate extensions OID name atoms and their corresponding value types are as follows:

OID Name Value Type

id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier #'AuthorityKeyIdentifier'{}

id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier oid()

id-ce-keyUsage [key_usage()]

id-ce-privateKeyUsagePeriod #'PrivateKeyUsagePeriod'{}

id-ce-certificatePolicies #'PolicyInformation'{}

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1.2  Public-Key Records

id-ce-policyMappings #'PolicyMappings_SEQOF'{}

id-ce-subjectAltName general_name()

id-ce-issuerAltName general_name()

id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes [#'Attribute'{}]

id-ce-basicConstraints #'BasicConstraints'{}

id-ce-nameConstraints #'NameConstraints'{}

id-ce-policyConstraints #'PolicyConstraints'{}

id-ce-extKeyUsage [id_key_purpose()]

id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints [#'DistributionPoint'{}]

id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy integer()

id-ce-freshestCRL [#'DistributionPoint'{}]

Table 2.4:   Standard Certificate Extensions

Here:
key_usage()
=
digitalSignature
| nonRepudiation
| keyEncipherment
| dataEncipherment
| keyAgreement
| keyCertSign
| cRLSign
| encipherOnly
| decipherOnly
And for id_key_purpose():

OID Name

id-kp-serverAuth

id-kp-clientAuth

id-kp-codeSigning

id-kp-emailProtection

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 1.2  Public-Key Records

id-kp-timeStamping

id-kp-OCSPSigning

Table 2.5:   Key Purpose OIDs

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1.2  Public-Key Records

#'AuthorityKeyIdentifier'{
keyIdentifier, % oid()
authorityCertIssuer, % general_name()
authorityCertSerialNumber % integer()
}.

#'PrivateKeyUsagePeriod'{
notBefore, % general_time()
notAfter % general_time()
}.

#'PolicyInformation'{
policyIdentifier, % oid()
policyQualifiers % [#PolicyQualifierInfo{}]
}.

#'PolicyQualifierInfo'{
policyQualifierId, % oid()
qualifier % string() | #'UserNotice'{}
}.

#'UserNotice'{
noticeRef, % #'NoticeReference'{}
explicitText % string()
}.

#'NoticeReference'{
organization, % string()
noticeNumbers % [integer()]
}.

#'PolicyMappings_SEQOF'{
issuerDomainPolicy, % oid()
subjectDomainPolicy % oid()
}.

#'Attribute'{
type, % oid()
values % [der_encoded()]
}).

#'BasicConstraints'{
cA, % boolean()
pathLenConstraint % integer()
}).

#'NameConstraints'{
permittedSubtrees, % [#'GeneralSubtree'{}]
excludedSubtrees % [#'GeneralSubtree'{}]
}).

#'GeneralSubtree'{
base, % general_name()
minimum, % integer()
maximum % integer()
}).

#'PolicyConstraints'{
requireExplicitPolicy, % integer()
inhibitPolicyMapping % integer()
}).

#'DistributionPoint'{
distributionPoint, % {fullName, [general_name()]} | {nameRelativeToCRLIssuer,
[#AttributeTypeAndValue{}]}

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 1.2  Public-Key Records

reasons, % [dist_reason()]
cRLIssuer % [general_name()]
}).

1.2.7  Private Internet Extensions

The private internet extensions OID name atoms and their corresponding value types are as follows:

OID Name Value Type

id-pe-authorityInfoAccess [#'AccessDescription'{}]

id-pe-subjectInfoAccess [#'AccessDescription'{}]

Table 2.6:   Private Internet Extensions

#'AccessDescription'{
accessMethod, % oid()
accessLocation % general_name()
}).

1.2.8  CRL and CRL Extensions Profile

Erlang representation of CRL and CRL extensions profile derived from ASN.1 specifications and RFC 5280 are as
follows:

#'CertificateList'{
tbsCertList, % #'TBSCertList{}
signatureAlgorithm, % #'AlgorithmIdentifier'{}
signature % bitstring()
}).

#'TBSCertList'{
version, % v2 (if defined)
signature, % #AlgorithmIdentifier{}
issuer, % {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
thisUpdate, % time()
nextUpdate, % time()
revokedCertificates, % [#'TBSCertList_revokedCertificates_SEQOF'{}]
crlExtensions % [#'Extension'{}]
}).

#'TBSCertList_revokedCertificates_SEQOF'{
userCertificate, % integer()
revocationDate, % timer()
crlEntryExtensions % [#'Extension'{}]
}).

CRL Extensions
The CRL extensions OID name atoms and their corresponding value types are as follows:

OID Name Value Type

id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier #'AuthorityKeyIdentifier{}

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1.2  Public-Key Records

id-ce-issuerAltName {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}

id-ce-cRLNumber integer()

id-ce-deltaCRLIndicator integer()

id-ce-issuingDistributionPoint #'IssuingDistributionPoint'{}

id-ce-freshestCRL [#'Distributionpoint'{}]

Table 2.7:   CRL Extensions

Here, the data type 'IssuingDistributionPoint' is represented as the following Erlang record:

#'IssuingDistributionPoint'{
distributionPoint, % {fullName, [general_name()]} | {nameRelativeToCRLIssuer,
[#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}
onlyContainsUserCerts, % boolean()
onlyContainsCACerts, % boolean()
onlySomeReasons, % [dist_reason()]
indirectCRL, % boolean()
onlyContainsAttributeCerts % boolean()
}).

CRL Entry Extensions

The CRL entry extensions OID name atoms and their corresponding value types are as follows:

OID Name Value Type

id-ce-cRLReason crl_reason()

id-ce-holdInstructionCode oid()

id-ce-invalidityDate general_time()

id-ce-certificateIssuer general_name()

Table 2.8:   CRL Entry Extensions

Here:
crl_reason()
=
unspecified
| keyCompromise
| cACompromise
| affiliationChanged
| superseded
| cessationOfOperation

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 1.3  Getting Started

| certificateHold
| removeFromCRL
| privilegeWithdrawn
| aACompromise

PKCS#10 Certification Request

Erlang representation of a PKCS#10 certification request derived from ASN.1 specifications and RFC 5280 are as
follows:

#'CertificationRequest'{
certificationRequestInfo #'CertificationRequestInfo'{},
signatureAlgorithm #'CertificationRequest_signatureAlgorithm'{}}.
signature bitstring()
}

#'CertificationRequestInfo'{
version atom(),
subject {rdnSequence, [#AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]} ,
subjectPKInfo #'CertificationRequestInfo_subjectPKInfo'{},
attributes [#'AttributePKCS-10' {}]
}

#'CertificationRequestInfo_subjectPKInfo'{
algorithm #'CertificationRequestInfo_subjectPKInfo_algorithm'{}
subjectPublicKey bitstring()
}

#'CertificationRequestInfo_subjectPKInfo_algorithm'{
algorithm = oid(),
parameters = der_encoded()
}

#'CertificationRequest_signatureAlgorithm'{
algorithm = oid(),
parameters = der_encoded()
}

#'AttributePKCS-10'{
type = oid(),
values = [der_encoded()]
}

1.3  Getting Started
This section describes examples of how to use the Public Key API. Keys and certificates used in the following sections
are generated only for testing the Public Key application.
Some shell printouts in the following examples are abbreviated for increased readability.

1.3.1  PEM Files

Public-key data (keys, certificates, and so on) can be stored in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format. The PEM files
have the following structure:

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1.3  Getting Started

<text>
-----BEGIN <SOMETHING>-----
<Attribute> : <Value>
<Base64 encoded DER data>
-----END <SOMETHING>-----
<text>

A file can contain several BEGIN/END blocks. Text lines between blocks are ignored. Attributes, if present, are
ignored except for Proc-Type and DEK-Info, which are used when DER data is encrypted.

DSA Private Key

A DSA private key can look as follows:

Note:
File handling is not done by the Public Key application.

1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("dsa.pem").

{ok,<<"-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIBuw"...>>}

The following PEM file has only one entry, a private DSA key:

2> [DSAEntry] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).

[{'DSAPrivateKey',<<48,130,1,187,2,1,0,2,129,129,0,183,
179,230,217,37,99,144,157,21,228,204,
162,207,61,246,...>>,
not_encrypted}]

3> Key = public_key:pem_entry_decode(DSAEntry).

#'DSAPrivateKey'{version = 0,
p = 12900045185019966618...6593,
q = 1216700114794736143432235288305776850295620488937,
g = 10442040227452349332...47213,
y = 87256807980030509074...403143,
x = 510968529856012146351317363807366575075645839654}

RSA Private Key with Password

An RSA private key encrypted with a password can look as follows:

1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("rsa.pem").

{ok,<<"Bag Attribut"...>>}

The following PEM file has only one entry, a private RSA key:

2>[RSAEntry] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).
[{'RSAPrivateKey',<<224,108,117,203,152,40,15,77,128,126,
221,195,154,249,85,208,202,251,109,
119,120,57,29,89,19,9,...>>,
{"DES-EDE3-CBC",<<"kÙeø¼pµL">>}}]

In this following example, the password is "abcd1234":

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 1.3  Getting Started

3> Key = public_key:pem_entry_decode(RSAEntry, "abcd1234").

#'RSAPrivateKey'{version = 'two-prime',
modulus = 1112355156729921663373...2737107,
publicExponent = 65537,
privateExponent = 58064406231183...2239766033,
prime1 = 11034766614656598484098...7326883017,
prime2 = 10080459293561036618240...77738643771,
exponent1 = 77928819327425934607...22152984217,
exponent2 = 36287623121853605733...20588523793,
coefficient = 924840412626098444...41820968343,
otherPrimeInfos = asn1_NOVALUE}

X509 Certificates
The following is an example of X509 certificates:

1> {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("cacerts.pem").

{ok,<<"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIC7jCCAl"...>>}

The following file includes two certificates:

2> [CertEntry1, CertEntry2] = public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).

[{'Certificate',<<48,130,2,238,48,130,2,87,160,3,2,1,2,2,
9,0,230,145,97,214,191,2,120,150,48,13,
...>>,
not_encrypted},
{'Certificate',<<48,130,3,200,48,130,3,49,160,3,2,1,2,2,1,
1,48,13,6,9,42,134,72,134,247,...>>,
not_encrypted}]

Certificates can be decoded as usual:

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1.3  Getting Started

2> Cert = public_key:pem_entry_decode(CertEntry1).

#'Certificate'{
tbsCertificate =
#'TBSCertificate'{
version = v3,serialNumber = 16614168075301976214,
signature =
#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = <<5,0>>},
issuer =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = <<19,8,101,114,108,97,110,103,67,65>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = <<19,10,69,114,108,97,110,103,32,79,84,80>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = <<19,11,69,114,105,99,115,115,111,110,32,65,66>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = <<19,9,83,116,111,99,107,104,111,108,109>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,6},
value = <<19,2,83,69>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = <<22,22,112,101,116,101,114,64,101,114,...>>}]]},
validity =
#'Validity'{
notBefore = {utcTime,"080109082929Z"},
notAfter = {utcTime,"080208082929Z"}},
subject =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = <<19,8,101,114,108,97,110,103,67,65>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = <<19,10,69,114,108,97,110,103,32,79,84,80>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = <<19,11,69,114,105,99,115,115,111,110,32,...>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = <<19,9,83,116,111,99,107,104,111,108,...>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,6},
value = <<19,2,83,69>>}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = <<22,22,112,101,116,101,114,64,...>>}]]},
subjectPublicKeyInfo =
#'SubjectPublicKeyInfo'{
algorithm =
#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,1},
parameters = <<5,0>>},
subjectPublicKey =
{0,<<48,129,137,2,129,129,0,203,209,187,77,73,231,90,...>>}},
issuerUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
subjectUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
extensions =
[#'Extension'{

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extnID = {2,5,29,19},
critical = true,
extnValue = [48,3,1,1,255]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,15},
critical = false,
extnValue = [3,2,1,6]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,14},
critical = false,
extnValue = [4,20,27,217,65,152,6,30,142|...]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,17},
critical = false,
extnValue = [48,24,129,22,112,101,116,101|...]}]},
signatureAlgorithm =
#'AlgorithmIdentifier'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = <<5,0>>},
signature =
<<163,186,7,163,216,152,63,47,154,234,139,73,154,96,120,
165,2,52,196,195,109,167,192,...>>}

Parts of certificates can be decoded with public_key:der_decode/2, using the ASN.1 type of that part.
However, an application-specific certificate extension requires application-specific ASN.1 decode/encode-functions.
In the recent example, the first value of rdnSequence is of ASN.1 type 'X520CommonName'. ({2,5,4,3}
= ?id-at-commonName):

public_key:der_decode('X520CommonName', <<19,8,101,114,108,97,110,103,67,65>>).
{printableString,"erlangCA"}

However, certificates can also be decoded using pkix_decode_cert/2, which can customize and recursively
decode standard parts of a certificate:

3>{_, DerCert, _} = CertEntry1.

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1.3  Getting Started

4> public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DerCert, otp).

#'OTPCertificate'{
tbsCertificate =
#'OTPTBSCertificate'{
version = v3,serialNumber = 16614168075301976214,
signature =
#'SignatureAlgorithm'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = 'NULL'},
issuer =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = {printableString,"erlangCA"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = {printableString,"Erlang OTP"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = {printableString,"Ericsson AB"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = {printableString,"Stockholm"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{type = {2,5,4,6},value = "SE"}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = "peter@erix.ericsson.se"}]]},
validity =
#'Validity'{
notBefore = {utcTime,"080109082929Z"},
notAfter = {utcTime,"080208082929Z"}},
subject =
{rdnSequence,
[[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,3},
value = {printableString,"erlangCA"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,11},
value = {printableString,"Erlang OTP"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,10},
value = {printableString,"Ericsson AB"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {2,5,4,7},
value = {printableString,"Stockholm"}}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{type = {2,5,4,6},value = "SE"}],
[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{
type = {1,2,840,113549,1,9,1},
value = "peter@erix.ericsson.se"}]]},
subjectPublicKeyInfo =
#'OTPSubjectPublicKeyInfo'{
algorithm =
#'PublicKeyAlgorithm'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,1},
parameters = 'NULL'},
subjectPublicKey =
#'RSAPublicKey'{
modulus =
1431267547247997...37419,
publicExponent = 65537}},
issuerUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
subjectUniqueID = asn1_NOVALUE,
extensions =
[#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,19},

18 | Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key

 1.3  Getting Started

critical = true,
extnValue =
#'BasicConstraints'{
cA = true,pathLenConstraint = asn1_NOVALUE}},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,15},
critical = false,
extnValue = [keyCertSign,cRLSign]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,14},
critical = false,
extnValue = [27,217,65,152,6,30,142,132,245|...]},
#'Extension'{
extnID = {2,5,29,17},
critical = false,
extnValue = [{rfc822Name,"peter@erix.ericsson.se"}]}]},
signatureAlgorithm =
#'SignatureAlgorithm'{
algorithm = {1,2,840,113549,1,1,5},
parameters = 'NULL'},
signature =
<<163,186,7,163,216,152,63,47,154,234,139,73,154,96,120,
165,2,52,196,195,109,167,192,...>>}

This call is equivalent to public_key:pem_entry_decode(CertEntry1):

5> public_key:pkix_decode_cert(DerCert, plain).

#'Certificate'{ ...}

Encoding Public-Key Data to PEM Format

If you have public-key data and want to create a PEM file this can be done by calling functions
public_key:pem_entry_encode/2 and pem_encode/1 and saving the result to a file. For example, assume
that you have PubKey = 'RSAPublicKey'{}. Then you can create a PEM-"RSA PUBLIC KEY" file (ASN.1
type 'RSAPublicKey') or a PEM-"PUBLIC KEY" file ('SubjectPublicKeyInfo' ASN.1 type).
The second element of the PEM-entry is the ASN.1 DER encoded key data:

1> PemEntry = public_key:pem_entry_encode('RSAPublicKey', RSAPubKey).

{'RSAPublicKey', <<48,72,...>>, not_encrypted}

2> PemBin = public_key:pem_encode([PemEntry]).

<<"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\nMEgC...>>

3> file:write_file("rsa_pub_key.pem", PemBin).

ok

or:

1> PemEntry = public_key:pem_entry_encode('SubjectPublicKeyInfo', RSAPubKey).

{'SubjectPublicKeyInfo', <<48,92...>>, not_encrypted}

2> PemBin = public_key:pem_encode([PemEntry]).

<<"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMFw...>>

3> file:write_file("pub_key.pem", PemBin).

ok

1.3.2  RSA Public-Key Cryptography

Suppose you have the following private key and a corresponding public key:
• PrivateKey = #'RSAPrivateKey{}' and the plaintext Msg = binary()

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1.3  Getting Started

• PublicKey = #'RSAPublicKey'{}
Then you can proceed as follows:
Encrypt with the private key:

RsaEncrypted = public_key:encrypt_private(Msg, PrivateKey),

Msg = public_key:decrypt_public(RsaEncrypted, PublicKey),

Encrypt with the public key:

RsaEncrypted = public_key:encrypt_public(Msg, PublicKey),

Msg = public_key:decrypt_private(RsaEncrypted, PrivateKey),

Note:
You normally do only one of the encrypt or decrypt operations, and the peer does the other. This normaly used in
legacy applications as a primitive digital signature.

1.3.3  Digital Signatures

Suppose you have the following private key and a corresponding public key:
• PrivateKey = #'RSAPrivateKey{}' or #'DSAPrivateKey'{} and the plaintext Msg =
binary()
• PublicKey = #'RSAPublicKey'{} or {integer(), #'DssParams'{}}
Then you can proceed as follows:

Signature = public_key:sign(Msg, sha, PrivateKey),

true = public_key:verify(Msg, sha, Signature, PublicKey),

Note:
You normally do only one of the sign or verify operations, and the peer does the other.

It can be appropriate to calculate the message digest before calling sign or verify, and then use none as second
argument:

Digest = crypto:sha(Msg),
Signature = public_key:sign(Digest, none, PrivateKey),
true = public_key:verify(Digest, none, Signature, PublicKey),

1.3.4  Verifying a certificate hostname

Background
When a client checks a server certificate there are a number of checks available like checks that the certificate is not
revoked, not forged or not out-of-date.
There are however attacks that are not detected by those checks. Suppose a bad guy has succeded with a DNS infection.
Then the client could belive it is connecting to one host but ends up at another but evil one. Though it is evil, it could
have a perfectly legal certificate! The certificate has a valid signature, it is not revoked, the certificate chain is not
faked and has a trusted root and so on.
To detect that the server is not the intended one, the client must additionaly perform a hostname verification. This
procedure is described in RFC 6125. The idea is that the certificate lists the hostnames it could be fetched from. This

20 | Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key

 1.3  Getting Started

is checked by the certificate issuer when the certificate is signed. So if the certificate is issued by a trusted root the
client could trust the host names signed in it.
There is a default hostname matching procedure defined in RFC 6125, section 6 as well as protocol
dependent variations defined in RFC 6125 appendix B. The default procedure is implemented in
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/2,3. It is possible for a client to hook in modified rules using the options list.
Some terminology is needed: the certificate presents hostname(s) on which it is valid. Those are called Presented IDs.
The hostname(s) the client belives it connects to are called Reference IDs. The matching rules aims to verify that there
is at least one of the Reference IDs that matches one of the Presented IDs. If not, the verification fails.
The IDs contains normal fully qualified domain names like e.g foo.example.com, but IP addresses are not
recommended. The rfc describes why this is not recommended as well as security considerations about how to aquire
the Reference IDs.
Internationalized domain names are not supported.

The verification process

Traditionally the Presented IDs were found in the Subject certificate field as CN names. This is still quite common.
When printing a certificate they show up as:

$ openssl x509 -text < cert.pem

...
Subject: C=SE, CN=example.com, CN=*.example.com, O=erlang.org
...

The example Subject field has one C, two CN and one O part. It is only the CN (Common Name) that is used by
hostname verification. The two other (C and O) is not used here even when they contain a domain name like the O
part. The C and O parts are defined elsewhere and meaningful only for other functions.
In the example the Presented IDs are example.com as well as hostnames matching *.example.com. For
example foo.example.com and bar.example.com both matches but not foo.bar.example.com. The
name erlang.org matches neither since it is not a CN.
In case where the Presented IDs are fetched from the Subject certificate field, the names may contain wildcard
characters. The function handles this as defined in chapter 6.4.3 in RFC 6125.
There may only be one wildcard character and that is in the first label, for example: *.example.com. This matches
foo.example.com but neither example.com nor foo.bar.example.com.
There may be label characters before or/and after the wildcard. For example: a*d.example.com matches
abcd.example.com and ad.example.com, but not ab.cd.example.com.
In the previous example there is no indication of which protocols are expected. So a client has no indication of whether
it is a web server, an ldap server or maybe a sip server it is connected to. There are fields in the certificate that can
indicate this. To be more exact, the rfc introduces the usage of the X509v3 Subject Alternative Name in
the X509v3 extensions field:

$ openssl x509 -text < cert.pem

...
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:kb.example.org, URI:https://www.example.org
...

Here kb.example.org serves any protocol while www.example.org presents a secure web server.
The next example has both Subject and Subject Alternate Name present:

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1.3  Getting Started

$ openssl x509 -text < cert.pem

...
Subject: C=SE, CN=example.com, CN=*.example.com, O=erlang.org
...
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:kb.example.org, URI:https://www.example.org
...

The RFC states that if a certificate defines Reference IDs in a Subject Alternate Name field, the Subject field
MUST NOT be used for host name checking, even if it contains valid CN names. Therefore only kb.example.org
and https://www.example.org matches. The match fails both for example.com and foo.example.com
becuase they are in the Subject field which is not checked because the Subject Alternate Name field is
present.

Function call examples

Note:
Other applications like ssl/tls or https might have options that are passed down to the
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname. You will probably not have to call it directly

Suppose our client expects to connect to the web server https://www.example.net. This URI is therefore the Reference
IDs of the client. The call will be:

public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost,
[{uri_id, "https://www.example.net"}
]).

The call will return true or false depending on the check. The caller do not need to handle the matching rules in
the rfc. The matching will proceed as:
• If there is a Subject Alternate Name field, the {uri_id,string()} in the function call will be
compared to any {uniformResourceIdentifier,string()} in the Certificate field. If the two
strings() are equal (case insensitive), there is a match. The same applies for any {dns_id,string()}
in the call which is compared with all {dNSName,string()} in the Certificate field.
• If there is NO Subject Alternate Name field, the Subject field will be checked. All CN names will be
compared to all hostnames extracted from {uri_id,string()} and from {dns_id,string()}.

Extending the search mechanism

The caller can use own extraction and matching rules. This is done with the two options fqdn_fun and match_fun.
Hostname extraction
The fqdn_fun extracts hostnames (Fully Qualified Domain Names) from uri_id or other ReferenceIDs that
are not pre-defined in the public_key function. Suppose you have some URI with a very special protocol-part:
myspecial://example.com". Since this a non-standard URI there will be no hostname extracted for matching
CN-names in the Subject.
To "teach" the function how to extract, you can give a fun which replaces the default extraction function. The
fqdn_fun takes one argument and returns either a string() to be matched to each CN-name or the atom default
which will invoke the default fqdn extraction function. The return value undefined removes the current URI from
the fqdn extraction.

22 | Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key

 1.3  Getting Started

...
Extract = fun({uri_id, "myspecial://"++HostName}) -> HostName;
(_Else) -> default
end,
...
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost, RefIDs,
[{fqdn_fun, Extract}])
...

Re-defining the match operation

The default matching handles dns_id and uri_id. In an uri_id the value is tested for equality with a value from the
Subject Alternate Name. If som other kind of matching is needed, use the match_fun option.
The match_fun takes two arguments and returns either true, false or default. The value default will
invoke the default match function.

...
Match = fun({uri_id,"myspecial://"++A},
{uniformResourceIdentifier,"myspecial://"++B}) ->
my_match(A,B);
(_RefID, _PresentedID) ->
default
end,
...
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost, RefIDs,
[{match_fun, Match}]),
...

In case of a match operation between a ReferenceID and a CN value from the Subject field, the first argument to
the fun is the extracted hostname from the ReferenceID, and the second argument is the tuple {cn, string()}
taken from the Subject field. That makes it possible to have separate matching rules for Presented IDs from the
Subject field and from the Subject Alternate Name field.
The default matching transformes the ascii values in strings to lowercase before comparing. The match_fun is
however called without any transfomation applied to the strings. The reason is to enable the user to do unforseen
handling of the strings where the original format is needed.

"Pinning" a Certificate
The RFC 6125 defines pinning as:
"The act of establishing a cached name association between the application service's certificate and one of the client's
reference identifiers, despite the fact that none of the presented identifiers matches the given reference identifier. ..."
The purpose is to have a mechanism for a human to accept an otherwise faulty Certificate. In for example a web
browser, you could get a question like
Warning: you wanted to visit the site www.example.com, but the certificate is for shop.example.com. Accept anyway
(yes/no)?"
This could be accomplished with the option fail_callback which will be called if the hostname verification fails:

Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key | 23

1.3  Getting Started

-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl"). % Record def

...
Fail = fun(#'OTPCertificate'{}=C) ->
case in_my_cache(C) orelse my_accept(C) of
true ->
enter_my_cache(C),
true;
false ->
false
end,
...
public_key:pkix_verify_hostname(CertFromHost, RefIDs,
[{fail_callback, Fail}]),
...

1.3.5  SSH Files

SSH typically uses PEM files for private keys but has its own file format for storing public keys. The public_key
application can be used to parse the content of SSH public-key files.

RFC 4716 SSH Public-Key Files

RFC 4716 SSH files looks confusingly like PEM files, but there are some differences:

1> {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file("ssh2_rsa_pub").

{ok, <<"---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\nAAAA"...>>}

This is equivalent to calling public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, rfc4716_public_key):

2> public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, public_key).

[{#'RSAPublicKey'{modulus = 794430685...91663,
publicExponent = 35}, []}]

OpenSSH Public-Key Format

OpenSSH public-key format looks as follows:

1> {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file("openssh_dsa_pub").

{ok,<<"ssh-dss AAAAB3Nza"...>>}

This is equivalent to calling public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, openssh_public_key):

2> public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, public_key).

[{{15642692...694280725,
#'Dss-Parms'{p = 17291273936...696123221,
q = 1255626590179665817295475654204371833735706001853,
g = 10454211196...480338645}},
[{comment,"dhopson@VMUbuntu-DSH"}]}]

Known Hosts - OpenSSH Format

Known hosts - OpenSSH format looks as follows:

1> {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file("known_hosts").

{ok,<<"hostname.domain.com,192.168.0.1 ssh-rsa AAAAB...>>}

Returns a list of public keys and their related attributes. Each pair of key and attribute corresponds to one entry in
the known hosts file:

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 1.3  Getting Started

2> public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, known_hosts).

[{#'RSAPublicKey'{modulus = 1498979460408...72721699,
publicExponent = 35},
[{hostnames,["hostname.domain.com","192.168.0.1"]}]},
{#'RSAPublicKey'{modulus = 14989794604088...2721699,
publicExponent = 35},
[{comment,"foo@bar.com"},
{hostnames,["|1|BWO5qDxk/cFH0wa05JLdHn+j6xQ=|rXQvIxh5cDD3C43k5DPDamawVNA="]}]}]

Authorized Keys - OpenSSH Format

Authorized keys - OpenSSH format looks as follows:

1> {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file("auth_keys").

{ok, <<"command=\"dump /home\",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa AAA...>>}

Returns a list of public keys and their related attributes. Each pair of key and attribute corresponds to one entry in
the authorized key file:

2> public_key:ssh_decode(SshBin, auth_keys).

[{#'RSAPublicKey'{modulus = 794430685...691663,
publicExponent = 35},
[{comment,"dhopson@VMUbuntu-DSH"},
{options,["command=\"dump/home\"","no-pty",
"no-port-forwarding"]}]},
{{1564269258491...607694280725,
#'Dss-Parms'{p = 17291273936185...763696123221,
q = 1255626590179665817295475654204371833735706001853,
g = 10454211195705...60511039590076780999046480338645}},
[{comment,"dhopson@VMUbuntu-DSH"}]}]

Creating an SSH File from Public-Key Data

If you got a public key PubKey and a related list of attributes Attributes as returned by ssh_decode/2, you
can create a new SSH file, for example:

N> SshBin = public_key:ssh_encode([{PubKey, Attributes}], openssh_public_key),

<<"ssh-rsa "...>>
N+1> file:write_file("id_rsa.pub", SshBin).
ok

Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key | 25

1.3  Getting Started

2    Reference Manual

The public_key application provides functions to handle public-key infrastructure from RFC 3280 (X.509
certificates) and parts of the PKCS standard.

26 | Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key

 public_key

public_key
Application

Provides encode/decode of different file formats (PEM, OpenSSH), digital signature and verification functions,
validation of certificate paths and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and other functions for handling of certificates,
keys and CRLs.
• Supports RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile. Certificate policies are currently not supported.
• Supports PKCS-1 - RSA Cryptography Standard
• Supports DSS - Digital Signature Standard (DSA - Digital Signature Algorithm)
• Supports PKCS-3 - Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard
• Supports PKCS-5 - Password-Based Cryptography Standard
• Supports AES - Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS)
• Supports PKCS-8 - Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
• Supports PKCS-10 - Certification Request Syntax Standard

DEPENDENCIES
The public_key application uses the Crypto application to perform cryptographic operations and the ASN-1
application to handle PKIX-ASN-1 specifications, hence these applications must be loaded for the public_key
application to work. In an embedded environment this means they must be started with application:start/
[1,2] before the public_key application is started.

ERROR LOGGER AND EVENT HANDLERS

The public_key application is a library application and does not use the error logger. The functions will either
succeed or fail with a runtime error.

SEE ALSO
application(3)

Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key | 27

public_key

public_key
Erlang module

Provides functions to handle public-key infrastructure, for details see public_key(6).

Common Records and ASN.1 Types

Note:
All records used in this Reference Manual are generated from ASN.1 specifications and are documented in the
User's Guide. See Public-key Records.

Use the following include directive to get access to the records and constant macros described here and in the User's
Guide:

-include_lib("public_key/include/public_key.hrl").

Data Types
oid() = tuple()
Object identifier, a tuple of integers as generated by the ASN.1 compiler.
der_encoded() = binary()
pki_asn1_type() =
    'Certificate' | 'RSAPrivateKey' | 'RSAPublicKey' |
    'DSAPrivateKey' | 'DSAPublicKey' | 'DHParameter' |
    'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' | 'PrivateKeyInfo' |
    'CertificationRequest' | 'CertificateList' | 'ECPrivateKey' |
    'EcpkParameters'
asn1_type() = atom()
ASN.1 type present in the Public Key applications ASN.1 specifications.
pem_entry() =
    {pki_asn1_type(),
     der_or_encrypted_der(),
     not_encrypted | cipher_info()}
der_or_encrypted_der() = binary()
cipher_info() = {cipher(), cipher_info_params()}
cipher() = string()
salt() = binary()
cipher_info_params() =
    salt() |
    {#'PBEParameter'{}, digest_type()} |
    #'PBES2-params'{}
Cipher = "RC2-CBC" | "DES-CBC" | "DES-EDE3-CBC"

Salt could be generated with crypto:strong_rand_bytes(8).

public_key() =

28 | Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key

 public_key

    rsa_public_key() |
    rsa_pss_public_key() |
    dsa_public_key() |
    ec_public_key() |
    ed_public_key()
rsa_public_key() = #'RSAPublicKey'{}
rsa_pss_public_key() =
    {#'RSAPublicKey'{}, #'RSASSA-PSS-params'{}}
dsa_public_key() = {integer(), #'Dss-Parms'{}}
ec_public_key() = {#'ECPoint'{}, ecpk_parameters_api()}
ecpk_parameters() =
    {ecParameters, #'ECParameters'{}} |
    {namedCurve, Oid :: tuple()}
ecpk_parameters_api() =
    ecpk_parameters() |
    #'ECParameters'{} |
    {namedCurve, Name :: crypto:ec_named_curve()}
ed_public_key() =
    {#'ECPoint'{}, ed_params()} |
    {ed_pub, ed25519 | ed448, Key :: binary()}

Warning:
The tagged ed_pub format will not be returned from any public_key functions but can be used as input, should
be considered deprecated.

ed_params() = {namedCurve, {1, 3, 101, 112} | {1, 3, 101, 113}}

private_key() =
    rsa_private_key() |
    rsa_pss_private_key() |
    dsa_private_key() |
    ec_private_key() |
    ed_private_key()
rsa_private_key() = #'RSAPrivateKey'{}
rsa_pss_private_key() =
    {#'RSAPrivateKey'{}, #'RSASSA-PSS-params'{}}
dsa_private_key() = #'DSAPrivateKey'{}
ec_private_key() = #'ECPrivateKey'{}
ed_private_key() =
    #'ECPrivateKey'{parameters = ed_params()} |
    {ed_pri, ed25519 | ed448, Pub :: binary(), Priv :: binary()}

Warning:
The tagged ed_pri format will not be returned from any public_key functions but can be used as input, should be
considered deprecated.

key_params() =
    #'DHParameter'{} |

Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key | 29

public_key

    {namedCurve, oid()} |
    #'ECParameters'{} |
    {rsa, Size :: integer(), PubExp :: integer()}
digest_type() =
    none | sha1 |
    crypto:rsa_digest_type() |
    crypto:dss_digest_type() |
    crypto:ecdsa_digest_type()
crl_reason() =
    unspecified | keyCompromise | cACompromise |
    affiliationChanged | superseded | cessationOfOperation |
    certificateHold | privilegeWithdrawn | aACompromise
cert_id() = {SerialNr :: integer(), issuer_name()}
issuer_name() = {rdnSequence, [[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]]}
ssh_file() =
    openssh_public_key | rfc4716_public_key | known_hosts |
    auth_keys

Exports

compute_key(OthersECDHkey, MyECDHkey) -> SharedSecret

Types:
OthersECDHkey = #'ECPoint'{}
MyECDHkey = #'ECPrivateKey'{}
SharedSecret = binary()
Computes shared secret.

compute_key(OthersDHkey, MyDHkey, DHparms) -> SharedSecret

Types:
OthersDHkey = crypto:dh_public()
MyDHkey = crypto:dh_private()
DHparms = #'DHParameter'{}
SharedSecret = binary()
Computes shared secret.

decrypt_private(CipherText, Key) -> PlainText

decrypt_private(CipherText, Key, Options) -> PlainText
Types:
CipherText = binary()
Key = rsa_private_key()
Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
PlainText = binary()
Public-key decryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_decrypt/4

30 | Ericsson AB, All Rights Reserved: public_key

 public_key

decrypt_public(CipherText, Key) -> PlainText

decrypt_public(CipherText, Key, Options) -> PlainText
Types:
CipherText = binary()
Key = rsa_public_key()
Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
PlainText = binary()
Public-key decryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_decrypt/4

der_decode(Asn1Type, Der) -> Entity

Types:
Asn1Type = asn1_type()
Der = binary()
Entity = term()
Decodes a public-key ASN.1 DER encoded entity.

der_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> Der

Types:
Asn1Type = asn1_type()
Entity = term()
Der = binary()
Encodes a public-key entity with ASN.1 DER encoding.

dh_gex_group(MinSize, SuggestedSize, MaxSize, Groups) ->

                {ok, {Size, Group}} | {error, term()}
Types:
MinSize = SuggestedSize = MaxSize = integer() >= 1
Groups = undefined | [{Size, [Group]}]
Size = integer() >= 1
Group = {G, P}
G = P = integer() >= 1
Selects a group for Diffie-Hellman key exchange with the key size in the range MinSize...MaxSize and as close
to SuggestedSize as possible. If Groups == undefined a default set will be used, otherwise the group is
selected from Groups.
First a size, as close as possible to SuggestedSize, is selected. Then one group with that key size is randomly
selected from the specified set of groups. If no size within the limits of MinSize and MaxSize is available,
{error,no_group_found} is returned.
The default set of groups is listed in lib/public_key/priv/moduli. This file may be regenerated like this:

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public_key

$> cd $ERL_TOP/lib/public_key/priv/
$> generate
---- wait until all background jobs has finished. It may take several days !
$> cat moduli-* > moduli
$> cd ..; make

encrypt_private(PlainText, Key) -> CipherText

encrypt_private(PlainText, Key, Options) -> CipherText
Types:
PlainText = binary()
Key = rsa_private_key()
Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
CipherText = binary()
Public-key encryption using the private key. See also crypto:private_encrypt/4.

encrypt_public(PlainText, Key) -> CipherText

encrypt_public(PlainText, Key, Options) -> CipherText
Types:
PlainText = binary()
Key = rsa_public_key()
Options = crypto:pk_encrypt_decrypt_opts()
CipherText = binary()
Public-key encryption using the public key. See also crypto:public_encrypt/4.

generate_key(Params :: DHparams | ECparams | RSAparams) ->

                DHkeys | ECkey | RSAkey
Types:
DHparams = #'DHParameter'{}
DHkeys = {PublicDH :: binary(), PrivateDH :: binary()}
ECparams = ecpk_parameters_api()
ECkey = #'ECPrivateKey'{}
RSAparams = {rsa, Size, PubExp}
Size = PubExp = integer() >= 1
RSAkey = #'RSAPrivateKey'{}
Generates a new keypair. Note that except for Diffie-Hellman the public key is included in the private key structure.
See also crypto:generate_key/2

pem_decode(PemBin :: binary()) -> [pem_entry()]

Decodes PEM binary data and returns entries as ASN.1 DER encoded entities.
Example {ok, PemBin} = file:read_file("cert.pem"). PemEntries =
public_key:pem_decode(PemBin).

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pem_encode(PemEntries :: [pem_entry()]) -> binary()

Creates a PEM binary.

pem_entry_decode(PemEntry) -> term()

pem_entry_decode(PemEntry, Password) -> term()
Types:
PemEntry = pem_entry()
Password = string()
Decodes a PEM entry. pem_decode/1 returns a list of PEM entries. Notice that if the PEM entry is of type
'SubjectPublickeyInfo', it is further decoded to an rsa_public_key() or dsa_public_key().

pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity) -> pem_entry()

pem_entry_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, InfoPwd) -> pem_entry()
Types:
Asn1Type = pki_asn1_type()
Entity = term()
InfoPwd = {CipherInfo, Password}
CipherInfo = cipher_info()
Password = string()
Creates a PEM entry that can be feed to pem_encode/1.
If Asn1Type is 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo', Entity must be either an rsa_public_key(),
dsa_public_key() or an ec_public_key() and this function creates the appropriate
'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' entry.

pkix_decode_cert(Cert, Type) ->

                    #'Certificate'{} | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Types:
Cert = der_encoded()
Type = plain | otp
Decodes an ASN.1 DER-encoded PKIX certificate. Option otp uses the customized ASN.1 specification OTP-
PKIX.asn1 for decoding and also recursively decode most of the standard parts.

pkix_encode(Asn1Type, Entity, Type) -> Der

Types:
Asn1Type = asn1_type()
Entity = term()
Type = otp | plain
Der = der_encoded()
DER encodes a PKIX x509 certificate or part of such a certificate. This function must be used for encoding certificates
or parts of certificates that are decoded/created in the otp format, whereas for the plain format this function directly
calls der_encode/2.

pkix_is_issuer(Cert, IssuerCert) -> boolean()

Types:

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public_key

Cert =
    der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{} | #'CertificateList'{}
IssuerCert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Checks if IssuerCert issued Cert.

pkix_is_fixed_dh_cert(Cert) -> boolean()

Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Checks if a certificate is a fixed Diffie-Hellman certificate.

pkix_is_self_signed(Cert) -> boolean()

Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Checks if a certificate is self-signed.

pkix_issuer_id(Cert, IssuedBy) ->

                  {ok, ID :: cert_id()} | {error, Reason}
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
IssuedBy = self | other
Reason = term()
Returns the x509 certificater issuer id, if it can be determined.

pkix_normalize_name(Issuer) -> Normalized

Types:
Issuer = Normalized = issuer_name()
Normalizes an issuer name so that it can be easily compared to another issuer name.

pkix_path_validation(TrustedCert, CertChain, Options) -> {ok, {PublicKeyInfo,

PolicyTree}} | {error, {bad_cert, Reason}}
Types:
TrustedCert = #'OTPCertificate'{} | der_encoded() | atom()
Normally a trusted certificate, but it can also be a path-validation error that can be discovered while
constructing the input to this function and that is to be run through the verify_fun. Examples are
unknown_ca and selfsigned_peer.
CertChain = [der_encoded()]
A list of DER-encoded certificates in trust order ending with the peer certificate.
Options = proplists:proplist()
PublicKeyInfo = {?'rsaEncryption' | ?'id-RSASSA-PSS'| ?'id-dsa',
rsa_public_key() | integer(), 'NULL' | 'RSASSA-PSS-params'{} | 'Dss-
Parms'{}}
PolicyTree = term()
At the moment this is always an empty list as policies are not currently supported.

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Reason = cert_expired | invalid_issuer | invalid_signature |

name_not_permitted | missing_basic_constraint | invalid_key_usage |
{revoked, crl_reason()} | atom()
Performs a basic path validation according to RFC 5280. However, CRL validation is done separately by
pkix_crls_validate/3 and is to be called from the supplied verify_fun.
Available options:
{verify_fun, {fun(), InitialUserState::term()}
The fun must be defined as:

fun(OtpCert :: #'OTPCertificate'{},
Event :: {bad_cert, Reason :: atom() | {revoked, atom()}} |
{extension, #'Extension'{}},
InitialUserState :: term()) ->
{valid, UserState :: term()} |
{valid_peer, UserState :: term()} |
{fail, Reason :: term()} |
{unknown, UserState :: term()}.

If the verify callback fun returns {fail, Reason}, the verification process is immediately stopped. If
the verify callback fun returns {valid, UserState}, the verification process is continued. This can be
used to accept specific path validation errors, such as selfsigned_peer, as well as verifying application-
specific extensions. If called with an extension unknown to the user application, the return value {unknown,
UserState} is to be used.

Warning:
Note that user defined custom verify_fun may alter original path validation error (e.g
selfsigned_peer). Use with caution.

{max_path_length, integer()}
The max_path_length is the maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that can follow
the peer certificate in a valid certification path. So, if max_path_length is 0, the PEER must be signed
by the trusted ROOT-CA directly, if it is 1, the path can be PEER, CA, ROOT-CA, if it is 2, the path can be
PEER, CA, CA, ROOT-CA, and so on.
Possible reasons for a bad certificate:
cert_expired
Certificate is no longer valid as its expiration date has passed.
invalid_issuer
Certificate issuer name does not match the name of the issuer certificate in the chain.
invalid_signature
Certificate was not signed by its issuer certificate in the chain.
name_not_permitted
Invalid Subject Alternative Name extension.
missing_basic_constraint
Certificate, required to have the basic constraints extension, does not have a basic constraints extension.
invalid_key_usage
Certificate key is used in an invalid way according to the key-usage extension.

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public_key

{revoked, crl_reason()}
Certificate has been revoked.
atom()
Application-specific error reason that is to be checked by the verify_fun.

pkix_crl_issuer(CRL :: CRL | #'CertificateList'{}) -> Issuer

Types:
CRL = der_encoded()
Issuer = issuer_name()
Returns the issuer of the CRL.

pkix_crls_validate(OTPcertificate, DPandCRLs, Options) ->

                      CRLstatus
Types:
OTPcertificate = #'OTPCertificate'{}
DPandCRLs = [DPandCRL]
DPandCRL = {DP, {DerCRL, CRL}}
DP = #'DistributionPoint'{}
DerCRL = der_encoded()
CRL = #'CertificateList'{}
Options = [{atom(), term()}]
CRLstatus = valid | {bad_cert, BadCertReason}
BadCertReason =
    revocation_status_undetermined |
    {revocation_status_undetermined, Reason :: term()} |
    {revoked, crl_reason()}
Performs CRL validation. It is intended to be called from the verify fun of pkix_path_validation/3 .
Available options:
{update_crl, fun()}
The fun has the following type specification:

fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{}) ->

#'CertificateList'{}

The fun uses the information in the distribution point to access the latest possible version of the CRL. If this fun
is not specified, Public Key uses the default implementation:

fun(_DP, CRL) -> CRL end

{issuer_fun, fun()}
The fun has the following type specification:

fun(#'DistributionPoint'{}, #'CertificateList'{},
{rdnSequence,[#'AttributeTypeAndValue'{}]}, term()) ->
{ok, #'OTPCertificate'{}, [der_encoded]}

The fun returns the root certificate and certificate chain that has signed the CRL.

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 public_key

fun(DP, CRL, Issuer, UserState) -> {ok, RootCert, CertChain}

{undetermined_details, boolean()}
Defaults to false. When revocation status cannot be determined, and this option is set to true, details of why no
CRLs where accepted are included in the return value.

pkix_crl_verify(CRL, Cert) -> boolean()

Types:
CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
Verify that Cert is the CRL signer.

pkix_dist_point(Cert) -> DistPoint

Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
DistPoint = #'DistributionPoint'{}
Creates a distribution point for CRLs issued by the same issuer as Cert. Can be used as input to pkix_crls_validate/3

pkix_dist_points(Cert) -> DistPoints

Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
DistPoints = [#'DistributionPoint'{}]
Extracts distribution points from the certificates extensions.

pkix_hash_type(HashOid :: oid()) ->

                  DigestType ::
                      md5 | crypto:sha1() | crypto:sha2()
Translates OID to Erlang digest type

pkix_match_dist_point(CRL, DistPoint) -> boolean()

Types:
CRL = der_encoded() | #'CertificateList'{}
DistPoint = #'DistributionPoint'{}
Checks whether the given distribution point matches the Issuing Distribution Point of the CRL, as described in RFC
5280. If the CRL doesn't have an Issuing Distribution Point extension, the distribution point always matches.

pkix_sign(Cert, Key) -> Der

Types:
Cert = #'OTPTBSCertificate'{}
Key = private_key()
Der = der_encoded()
Signs an 'OTPTBSCertificate'. Returns the corresponding DER-encoded certificate.

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public_key

pkix_sign_types(AlgorithmId) -> {DigestType, SignatureType}

Types:
AlgorithmId = oid()
DigestType = crypto:rsa_digest_type() | none
SignatureType = rsa | dsa | ecdsa
Translates signature algorithm OID to Erlang digest and signature types.
The AlgorithmId is the signature OID from a certificate or a certificate revocation list.

pkix_test_data(Options) -> Config

pkix_test_data([chain_opts()]) -> [conf_opt()]
Types:
Options = #{chain_type() := chain_opts()}
Options for ROOT, Intermediate and Peer certs
chain_type() = server_chain | client_chain
chain_opts() = #{root := [cert_opt()] | root_cert(), peer := [cert_opt()],
intermediates => [[cert_opt()]]}
A valid chain must have at least a ROOT and a peer cert. The root cert can be given either as a cert pre-
generated by pkix_test_root_cert/2 , or as root cert generation options.
root_cert() = #{cert := der_encoded(), key := Key}
A root certificate generated by pkix_test_root_cert/2 .
cert_opt() = {Key, Value}
For available options see cert_opt() below.
Config = #{server_config := [conf_opt()], client_config := [conf_opt()]}
conf_opt() = {cert, der_encoded()} | {key, PrivateKey} |{cacerts,
[der_encoded()]}
This is a subset of the type ssl:tls_option(). PrivateKey is what generate_key/1 returns.
Creates certificate configuration(s) consisting of certificate and its private key plus CA certificate bundle, for a client
and a server, intended to facilitate automated testing of applications using X509-certificates, often through SSL/TLS.
The test data can be used when you have control over both the client and the server in a test scenario.
When this function is called with a map containing client and server chain specifications; it generates both a client and
a server certificate chain where the cacerts returned for the server contains the root cert the server should trust and
the intermediate certificates the server should present to connecting clients. The root cert the server should trust is the
one used as root of the client certificate chain. Vice versa applies to the cacerts returned for the client. The root
cert(s) can either be pre-generated with pkix_test_root_cert/2 , or if options are specified; it is (they are) generated.
When this function is called with a list of certificate options; it generates a configuration with just one node certificate
where cacerts contains the root cert and the intermediate certs that should be presented to a peer. In this case
the same root cert must be used for all peers. This is useful in for example an Erlang distributed cluster where any
node, towards another node, acts either as a server or as a client depending on who connects to whom. The generated
certificate contains a subject altname, which is not needed in a client certificate, but makes the certificate useful for
both roles.
The cert_opt() type consists of the following options:
{digest, digest_type()}
Hash algorithm to be used for signing the certificate together with the key option. Defaults to sha that is sha1.

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 public_key

{key, key_params() | private_key()}

Parameters to be used to call public_key:generate_key/1, to generate a key, or an existing key. Defaults to
generating an ECDSA key. Note this could fail if Erlang/OTP is compiled with a very old cryptolib.
{validity, {From::erlang:timestamp(), To::erlang:timestamp()}}
The validity period of the certificate.
{extensions, [#'Extension'{}]}
Extensions to include in the certificate.
Default extensions included in CA certificates if not otherwise specified are:

[#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
extnValue = [keyCertSign, cRLSign],
critical = false},
#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-basicConstraints',
extnValue = #'BasicConstraints'{cA = true},
critical = true}]

Default extensions included in the server peer cert if not otherwise specified are:

[#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-keyUsage',
extnValue = [digitalSignature, keyAgreement],
critical = false},
#'Extension'{extnID = ?'id-ce-subjectAltName',
extnValue = [{dNSName, Hostname}],
critical = false}]

Hostname is the result of calling net_adm:localhost() in the Erlang node where this funcion is called.

Note:
Note that the generated certificates and keys does not provide a formally correct PKIX-trust-chain and they cannot
be used to achieve real security. This function is provided for testing purposes only.

pkix_test_root_cert(Name, Options) -> RootCert

Types:
Name = string()
The root certificate name.
Options = [cert_opt()]
For available options see cert_opt() under pkix_test_data/1.
RootCert = #{cert := der_encoded(), key := Key}
A root certificate and key. The Key is generated by generate_key/1.
Generates a root certificate that can be used in multiple calls to pkix_test_data/1 when you want the same root certificate
for several generated certificates.

pkix_subject_id(Cert) -> ID
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
ID = cert_id()
Returns the X509 certificate subject id.

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public_key

pkix_verify(Cert, Key) -> boolean()

Types:
Cert = der_encoded()
Key = public_key()
Verifies PKIX x.509 certificate signature.

pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs) -> boolean()

pkix_verify_hostname(Cert, ReferenceIDs, Opts) -> boolean()
Types:
Cert = der_encoded() | #'OTPCertificate'{}
ReferenceIDs = [ RefID ]
RefID = {dns_id,string()} | {srv_id,string()} | {uri_id,string()} |
{ip,inet:ip_address()|string()} | {OtherRefID,term()}}
OtherRefID = atom()
Opts = [ PvhOpt() ]
PvhOpt = [MatchOpt | FailCallBackOpt | FqdnExtractOpt]
MatchOpt = {match_fun, fun(RefId | FQDN::string(), PresentedID) ->
boolean() | default}
PresentedID = {dNSName,string()} | {uniformResourceIdentifier,string() |
{iPAddress,list(byte())} | {OtherPresId,term()}}
OtherPresID = atom()
FailCallBackOpt = {fail_callback, fun(#'OTPCertificate'{}) -> boolean()}
FqdnExtractOpt = {fqdn_fun, fun(RefID) -> FQDN::string() | default |
undefined}
This function checks that the Presented Identifier (e.g hostname) in a peer certificate is in agreement with at least one
of the Reference Identifier that the client expects to be connected to. The function is intended to be added as an extra
client check of the peer certificate when performing public_key:pkix_path_validation/3
See RFC 6125 for detailed information about hostname verification. The User's Guide and code examples describes
this function more detailed.
The {OtherRefId,term()} is defined by the user and is passed to the match_fun, if defined. If the term in
OtherRefId is a binary, it will be converted to a string.
The ip Reference ID takes an inet:ip_address() or an ip address in string format (E.g "10.0.1.1" or "1234::5678:9012")
as second element.
The options are:
match_fun
The fun/2 in this option replaces the default host name matching rules. The fun should return a boolean to tell
if the Reference ID and Presented ID matches or not. The fun can also return a third value, the atom default,
if the default matching rules shall apply. This makes it possible to augment the tests with a special case:
fun(....) -> true; % My special case
(_, _) -> default % all others falls back to the inherit tests
end

See pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun/1 for a function that takes a protocol name as argument and returns a
fun/2 suitable for this option and Re-defining the match operation in the User's Guide for an example.

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fail_callback
If a matching fails, there could be circumstances when the certificate should be accepted anyway. Think
for example of a web browser where you choose to accept an outdated certificate. This option enables
implementation of such a function. This fun/1 is called when no ReferenceID matches. The return value
of the fun (a boolean()) decides the outcome. If true the the certificate is accepted otherwise it is rejected.
See "Pinning" a Certificate in the User's Guide.
fqdn_fun
This option augments the host name extraction from URIs and other Reference IDs. It could for example be a
very special URI that is not standardised. The fun takes a Reference ID as argument and returns one of:
• the hostname
• the atom default: the default host name extract function will be used
• the atom undefined: a host name could not be extracted. The pkix_verify_hostname/3 will return
false.
For an example, see Hostname extraction in the User's Guide.

pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(Protcol) -> fun(RefId | FQDN::string(),

PresentedID) -> boolean() | default
Types:
Protocol = https
The algorithm for wich the fun should implement the special matching rules
RefId
See pkix_verify_hostname/3.
FQDN
See pkix_verify_hostname/3.
PresentedID
See pkix_verify_hostname/3.
The return value of calling this function is intended to be used in the match_fun option in pkix_verify_hostname/3.
The returned fun augments the verify hostname matching according to the specific rules for the protocol in the
argument.

sign(Msg, DigestType, Key) -> Signature

sign(Msg, DigestType, Key, Options) -> Signature
Types:
Msg = binary() | {digest, binary()}
DigestType = digest_type()
Key = private_key()
Options = crypto:pk_sign_verify_opts()
Signature = binary()
Creates a digital signature.
The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data to be signed or it is the hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest.

ssh_decode(SshBin, Type) -> Decoded

Types:

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public_key

SshBin = binary()
Type = ssh2_pubkey | OtherType | InternalType
OtherType = public_key | ssh_file()
InternalType = new_openssh
Decoded = Decoded_ssh2_pubkey | Decoded_OtherType
Decoded_ssh2_pubkey = public_key()
Decoded_OtherType = [{public_key(), Attributes}]
Attributes = [{atom(), term()}]

Note:
This function is deprecated and should not be used in new programs. Use ssh_file:decode/2 instead.

Decodes an SSH file-binary. In the case of known_hosts or auth_keys, the binary can include one or more
lines of the file. Returns a list of public keys and their attributes, possible attribute values depends on the file type
represented by the binary.
If the Type is ssh2_pubkey, the result will be Decoded_ssh2_pubkey. Otherwise it will be
Decoded_OtherType.
RFC4716 attributes - see RFC 4716.
{headers, [{string(), utf8_string()}]}
auth_key attributes - see manual page for sshd.
{comment, string()}
{options, [string()]}
{bits, integer()} - In SSH version 1 files.
known_host attributes - see manual page for sshd.
{hostnames, [string()]}
{comment, string()}
{bits, integer()} - In SSH version 1 files.
Example: {ok, SshBin} = file:read_file("known_hosts").
If Type is public_key the binary can be either an RFC4716 public key or an OpenSSH public key.

ssh_encode(InData, Type) -> binary()

Types:
Type = ssh2_pubkey | OtherType
OtherType = public_key | ssh_file()
InData = InData_ssh2_pubkey | OtherInData
InData_ssh2_pubkey = public_key()
OtherInData = [{Key, Attributes}]
Key = public_key()
Attributes = [{atom(), term()}]

Note:
This function is deprecated and should not be used in new programs. Use ssh_file:encode/2 instead.

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Encodes a list of SSH file entries (public keys and attributes) to a binary. Possible attributes depend on the file type,
see ssh_decode/2 .
If the Type is ssh2_pubkey, the InData shall be InData_ssh2_pubkey. Otherwise it shall be
OtherInData.

ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(HostKey) -> string()

ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(DigestType, HostKey) -> string()
ssh_hostkey_fingerprint([DigestType], HostKey) -> [string()]
Types:
HostKey = public_key()
DigestType = digest_type()
Calculates a ssh fingerprint from a public host key as openssh does.

Note:
This function is deprecated and should not be used in new programs. Use ssh:hostkey_fingerprint/1 or
ssh:hostkey_fingerprint/2 instead.

The algorithm in ssh_hostkey_fingerprint/1 is md5 to be compatible with older ssh-keygen commands. The
string from the second variant is prepended by the algorithm name in uppercase as in newer ssh-keygen commands.
Examples:

2> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(Key).
"f5:64:a6:c1:5a:cb:9f:0a:10:46:a2:5c:3e:2f:57:84"

3> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(md5,Key).
"MD5:f5:64:a6:c1:5a:cb:9f:0a:10:46:a2:5c:3e:2f:57:84"

4> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(sha,Key).
"SHA1:bSLY/C4QXLDL/Iwmhyg0PGW9UbY"

5> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint(sha256,Key).
"SHA256:aZGXhabfbf4oxglxltItWeHU7ub3Dc31NcNw2cMJePQ"

6> public_key:ssh_hostkey_fingerprint([sha,sha256],Key).
["SHA1:bSLY/C4QXLDL/Iwmhyg0PGW9UbY",
"SHA256:aZGXhabfbf4oxglxltItWeHU7ub3Dc31NcNw2cMJePQ"]

verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key) -> boolean()

verify(Msg, DigestType, Signature, Key, Options) -> boolean()
Types:
Msg = binary() | {digest, binary()}
DigestType = digest_type()
Signature = binary()
Key = public_key()
Options = crypto:pk_sign_verify_opts()
Verifies a digital signature.
The Msg is either the binary "plain text" data or it is the hashed value of "plain text", that is, the digest.

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short_name_hash(Name) -> string()

Types:
Name = issuer_name()
Generates a short hash of an issuer name. The hash is returned as a string containing eight hexadecimal digits.
The return value of this function is the same as the result of the commands openssl crl -hash and openssl
x509 -issuer_hash, when passed the issuer name of a CRL or a certificate, respectively. This hash is used by
the c_rehash tool to maintain a directory of symlinks to CRL files, in order to facilitate looking up a CRL by its
issuer name.

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