Nist SP 1800-8

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8
Securing Wireless
Infusion Pumps
in Healthcare Delivery Organizations
Includes Executive Summary (A); Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics (B),
and How-To Guides (C)
Gavin O’Brien
Sallie Edwards
Kevin Littlefield
Neil McNab
Sue Wang
Kangmin Zheng
This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-8
The first draft of this publication is available free of charge from:

https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/sp1800/hit-infusion-pump-nist-sp1800-8-
draft.pdf
NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8
Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps

Includes Executive Summary (A); Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics (B);
and How-To Guides (C)
Gavin O’Brien
National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
Information Technology Laboratory
Sallie Edwards
Kevin Littlefield
Neil McNab
Sue Wang
Kangmin Zheng
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, VA
August 2018
U.S. Department of Commerce

Wilbur Ross, Secretary
National Institute of Standards and Technology

Walter G. Copan, Undersecretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director
NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8A
Securing Wireless
Infusion Pumps
Volume A:
Executive Summary
Gavin O’Brien
Sallie Edwards
Kevin Littlefield
Neil McNab
Sue Wang
Kangmin Zheng
McLean, VA
August 2018

draft.pdf
Executive Summary
▪ Broad technological advancements have contributed to the Internet of Things (IoT)
phenomenon, where physical devices now have technology that allow them to connect to the
internet and communicate with other devices or systems. With billions of devices being
connected to the internet, many industries, including healthcare, have leveraged, or are
beginning to leverage, IoT devices to improve operational efficiency and enhance innovation.
▪ Medical devices, such as infusion pumps, were once standalone instruments that interacted
only with the patient or medical provider. With technological improvements designed to
enhance patient care, these devices now connect wirelessly to a variety of systems, networks,
and other tools within a healthcare delivery organization (HDO)—ultimately contributing to the
Internet of Medical Things (IoMT).
▪ As IoMT grows, cybersecurity risks have risen. According to the Association for the
Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) Technical Information Report 57 (TIR57), “this
has created a new source of risk for [the] safe operation [of medical devices].” In particular, the
wireless infusion pump ecosystem (the pump, the network, and the data stored in and on a
pump) faces a range of threats, including unauthorized access to protected health information
(PHI), changes to prescribed drug doses, and interference with a pump’s function.
▪ In addition to managing interconnected medical devices, HDOs oversee complex, highly
technical environments, from back-office applications for billing and insurance services, supply
chain and inventory management, and staff scheduling, to clinical systems, such as radiological
and pharmaceutical support. In this intricate healthcare environment, HDOs and medical device
manufacturers that share responsibility and take a collaborative, holistic approach to reducing
cybersecurity risks of the infusion pump ecosystem can better protect healthcare systems,
patients, PHI, and enterprise information.
▪ The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) analyzed risk factors in and around the infusion pump ecosystem by using
a questionnaire-based risk assessment. With the results of that assessment, the NCCoE then
developed an example implementation that demonstrates how HDOs can use standards-based,
commercially available cybersecurity technologies to better protect the infusion pump
ecosystem, including patient information and drug library dosing limits.
CHALLENGE
Technology improvements happen rapidly across all sectors. For organizations focused on streamlining
operations and delivering high-quality patient care, it can be difficult to take advantage of the latest
technological advances, while also ensuring that new medical devices or applications are secure. For
many HDOs, this can result in improperly configured information technology networks and components
that increase cybersecurity risks.
Unlike prior medical devices that were once standalone instruments, today’s wireless infusion pumps
connect to a variety of healthcare systems, networks, and other devices. Although connecting infusion
pumps to point-of-care medication systems and electronic health records (EHRs) can improve healthcare
delivery processes, using a medical device’s connectivity capabilities can create significant cybersecurity
risk, which could lead to operational or safety risks. Tampering, intentional or otherwise, with the
NIST SP 1800-8A: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps 1

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-8.
wireless infusion pump ecosystem can expose a healthcare provider’s enterprise to serious risks, such as
the following examples:
▪ access by malicious actors

▪ loss or corruption of enterprise information and patient data and health records
▪ a breach of PHI
▪ loss or disruption of healthcare services
▪ damage to an organization’s reputation, productivity, and bottom-line revenue
As IoMT grows, with an increasing number of infusion pumps connecting to networks, the vulnerabilities
and risk factors become more critical, as they can expose the pump ecosystem to external attacks,
compromises, or interference.
SOLUTION
The NCCoE has developed cybersecurity guidance, NIST Special Publication (SP) 1800-8: Securing
Wireless Infusion Pumps, by using standards-based commercially available technologies and industry
best practices to help HDOs strengthen the security of the wireless infusion pump ecosystem within
healthcare facilities.
This NIST cybersecurity publication provides best practices and detailed guidance on how to manage
assets, protect against threats, and mitigate vulnerabilities by performing a questionnaire-based risk
assessment. In addition, the security characteristics of the wireless infusion pump ecosystem are
mapped to currently available cybersecurity standards and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule. Based on our risk assessment findings, we apply security
controls to the pump’s ecosystem to create a “defense-in-depth” solution for protecting infusion pumps
and their surrounding systems against various risk factors. Ultimately, we show how biomedical,
networking, and cybersecurity engineers and IT professionals can securely configure and deploy wireless
infusion pumps to reduce cybersecurity risk.
While the NCCoE used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not
endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee compliance with any regulatory initiatives. Your
organization's information security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with
your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that
adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and
implementing parts of a solution.
BENEFITS
The NCCoE’s practice guide to securing wireless infusion pumps in HDOs can help your organization:
▪ reduce cybersecurity risk, and potentially reduce impact to safety and operational risk, such as
the loss of patient information or interference with the standard operation of a medical device
▪ develop and execute a defense-in-depth strategy that protects the enterprise with layers of
security to avoid a single point of failure and provide strong support for availability

▪ implement current cybersecurity standards and best practices, while maintaining the
performance and usability of wireless infusion pumps
SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK

You can view or download the guide at https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/use-cases/medical-devices.
Help the NCCoE make this guide better by sharing your thoughts with us as you read the guide. If you
adopt this solution for your own organization, please share your experience and advice with us. We
recognize that technical solutions alone will not fully enable the benefits of our solution, so we
encourage organizations to share lessons learned and best practices for transforming the processes
associated with implementing this guide.
To provide comments or to learn more by arranging a demonstration of this example implementation,

contact the NCCoE at hit_nccoe@nist.gov.
TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS/COLLABORATORS
Organizations participating in this project submitted their capabilities in response to an open call in the
Federal Register for all sources of relevant security capabilities from academia and industry (vendors
and integrators). The following respondents with relevant capabilities or product components (identified
as “Technology Partners/Collaborators” herein) signed a Cooperative Research and Development
Agreement (CRADA) to collaborate with NIST in a consortium to build this example solution.
Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified by name or company
logo or other insignia in order to acknowledge their participation in this collaboration or to describe an
experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply special
status or relationship with NIST or recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE; neither is it
intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available
for the purpose.
The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the LEARN MORE
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is a Visit https://www.nccoe.nist.gov
collaborative hub where industry organizations, government agencies, nccoe@nist.gov
and academic institutions work together to address businesses’ most 301-975-0200
pressing cybersecurity challenges. Through this collaboration, the
NCCoE develops modular, easily adaptable example cybersecurity
solutions demonstrating how to apply standards and best practices
using commercially available technology.

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8B
Securing Wireless
Infusion Pumps
Volume B:
Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics
Gavin O’Brien
Sallie Edwards
Kevin Littlefield
Neil McNab
Sue Wang
Kangmin Zheng
McLean, VA
August 2018

draft.pdf
DISCLAIMER
Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified in this document in
order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended
to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE, nor is it intended to imply that the
entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1800-8B, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.
Spec. Publ. 1800-8B, 89 pages, (July 2018), CODEN: NSPUE2
FEEDBACK
As a private-public partnership, we are always seeking feedback on our Practice Guides. We are
particularly interested in seeing how businesses apply NCCoE reference designs in the real world. If you
have implemented the reference design, or have questions about applying it in your environment,
please email us at hit_nccoe@nist.gov.

100 Bureau Drive
Mailstop 2002
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Email: nccoe@nist.gov
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps i

NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), is a collaborative hub where industry organizations, government agencies, and
academic institutions work together to address businesses’ most pressing cybersecurity issues. This
public-private partnership enables the creation of practical cybersecurity solutions for specific
industries, as well as for broad, cross-sector technology challenges. Through consortia under
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), including technology partners—from
Fortune 50 market leaders to smaller companies specializing in IT security—the NCCoE applies standards
and best practices to develop modular, easily adaptable example cybersecurity solutions using
commercially available technology. The NCCoE documents these example solutions in the NIST Special
Publication 1800 series, which maps capabilities to the NIST Cyber Security Framework and details the
steps needed for another entity to recreate the example solution. The NCCoE was established in 2012 by
NIST in partnership with the State of Maryland and Montgomery County, Md.
To learn more about the NCCoE, visit https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/. To learn more about NIST, visit
https://www.nist.gov.
NIST CYBERSECURITY PRACTICE GUIDES

NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication Series 1800) target specific cybersecurity
challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the
adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information
security community how to implement example solutions that help them align more easily with relevant
standards and best practices and provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other
information they need to implement a similar approach.
The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that
businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. These documents do not describe regulations
or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.
ABSTRACT
Medical devices, such as infusion pumps, were once standalone instruments that interacted only with
the patient or medical provider. However, today’s medical devices connect to a variety of healthcare
systems, networks, and other tools within a healthcare delivery organization (HDO). Connecting devices
to point-of-care medication systems and electronic health records can improve healthcare delivery
processes; however, increasing connectivity capabilities also creates cybersecurity risks. Potential
threats include unauthorized access to patient health information, changes to prescribed drug doses,
and interference with a pump’s function.
The NCCoE at NIST analyzed risk factors in and around the infusion pump ecosystem by using a
questionnaire-based risk assessment to develop an example implementation that demonstrates how
HDOs can use standards-based, commercially available cybersecurity technologies to better protect the
infusion pump ecosystem, including patient information and drug library dosing limits.
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps ii

This practice guide will help HDOs implement current cybersecurity standards and best practices to
reduce their cybersecurity risk, while maintaining the performance and usability of wireless infusion
pumps.
KEYWORDS
authentication; authorization; digital certificates; encryption; infusion pumps; Internet of Things (IoT);
medical devices; network zoning; pump servers; questionnaire-based risk assessment; segmentation;
virtual private network (VPN); Wi-Fi; wireless medical devices
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to the following individuals for their generous contributions of expertise and time.
Name Organization
Arnab Ray Baxter Healthcare Corporation

Pavel Slavin Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Phillip Fisk Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Raymond Kan Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Tom Kowalczyk B. Braun Medical Inc.
David Suarez Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Robert Canfield Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Rob Suarez Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Robert Skelton Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Peter Romness Cisco
Kevin McFadden Cisco
Rich Curtiss Clearwater Compliance
Darin Andrew DigiCert
Kris Singh DigiCert
Mike Nelson DigiCert
Chaitanya Srinivasamurthy Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU Medical)
Joseph Sener Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU Medical)
Chris Edwards Intercede
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps iii

Name Organization
Won Jun Intercede
Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Security Consortium

Dale Nordenberg
(MDISS)

Jay Stevens
(MDISS)
Carlos Aguayo Gonzalez PFP Cybersecurity
Thurston Brooks PFP Cybersecurity
Colin Bowers Ramparts
Bill Hagestad Smiths Medical
Axel Wirth Symantec Corporation
Bryan Jacobs Symantec Corporation
Bill Johnson TDi Technologies, Inc.
Barbara De Pompa Reimers The MITRE Corporation
Sarah Kinling The MITRE Corporation
Marilyn Kupetz The MITRE Corporation
David Weitzel The MITRE Corporation
Mary Yang The MITRE Corporation
The Technology Partners/Collaborators who participated in this build submitted their capabilities in
response to a notice in the Federal Register. Respondents with relevant capabilities or product
components were invited to sign a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with
NIST, allowing them to participate in a consortium to build this example solution. We worked with:
Technology Partner/Collaborator Build Involvement
Baxter Healthcare Corporation • Sigma Spectrum™ Large Volume Pump (LVP) Version 8
• Sigma Spectrum Wireless Battery Module Version 8
• Sigma Spectrum Master Drug Library Version 8
• Care Everywhere Gateway Server Version 14
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps iv

B. Braun Medical Inc. • Infusomat® Space Infusion System / Large-Volume

Pumps
• DoseTrac® Infusion Management Software / Infusion
Pump Software
Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) • Alaris® 8015 Patient Care Unit (PCU) Version 9.19.2
• Alaris Syringe Module 8110

• Alaris LVP Module 8100
• Alaris Systems Manager Version 4.2
• Alaris System Maintenance (ASM) Version 10.19
Cisco • Aironet 1600 Series Access Point (AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9)

• Wireless LAN [Local Area Network] (WLC) Controller
8.2.111.0
• Identity Services Engine (ISE)
• Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA)
• Catalyst 3650 Switch
Clearwater Compliance • IRM|Pro™

• IRM|Analysis™
DigiCert CertCentral® management account / Certificate Authority
Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU • Plum 360™ Infusion System Version 15.10
Medical)
• LifeCare PCA™ Infusion System Version 7.02
• Hospira MedNet™ Version 6.2
Intercede MyID®
Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Medical Device Risk Assessment Platform (MDRAP™)
Security Consortium (MDISS)
PFP Cybersecurity Device Monitor
Ramparts Risk Assessment
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps v

Smiths Medical • Medfusion® 3500 Version 5 Syringe Infusion System

• PharmGuard® Toolbox Version 1.5
• Medfusion 4000 Wireless Syringe Infusion Pump
• PharmGuard Toolbox 2 Version 3.0 use with Medfusion
4000 and 3500 Version 6 (US)
• PharmGuard Server Licenses, PharmGuard Server
Enterprise Edition Version 1.1

• CADD®-Solis Ambulatory Infusion Pump
• CADD-Solis Medication Safety Software
Symantec Corporation • Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP)

• Advanced Threat Protection: Network (ATP:N)
• Data Center Security: Server Advanced (DCS:SA)
TDi Technologies, Inc. ConsoleWorks®
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps vi

Contents
4.1.1 Industry Analysis of Risk ............................................................................................ 12

4.1.2 Questionnaire-Based Risk Assessment ...................................................................... 12
4.1.3 Assets ......................................................................................................................... 13
4.1.4 Threats ....................................................................................................................... 13
4.1.5 Vulnerabilities ............................................................................................................ 13
4.1.6 Risks ........................................................................................................................... 15
4.1.7 Recommendations and Best Practices ....................................................................... 17
4.2.1 Risk Mitigation ........................................................................................................... 17
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps vii

5.3.1 Network Controls ....................................................................................................... 38
5.3.2 Pump Controls ........................................................................................................... 52
5.3.3 Pump Server Controls ................................................................................................ 53
5.3.4 Enterprise-Level Controls........................................................................................... 56
7.2.1 Supported NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories ........................................ 62
8.1.1 Test Case WIP-1 ......................................................................................................... 67

8.1.2 Test Case WIP-2 ......................................................................................................... 68
8.1.3 Test Case WIP-3 ......................................................................................................... 69
8.1.4 Test Case WIP-4 ......................................................................................................... 70
8.1.5 Test Case WIP-5 ......................................................................................................... 70
8.1.6 Test Case WIP-6 ......................................................................................................... 71
8.1.7 Test Case WIP-7 ......................................................................................................... 72
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps viii

ix
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps
List of Figures
Figure 4-1 Tiered Risk Management Approach [12] ............................................................................10
Figure 4-2 Relationship Between Security and Safety Risks [9] ...........................................................11
Figure 5-1 Basic System ......................................................................................................................37
Figure 5-2 Network Architecture with Segmentation..........................................................................42
Figure 5-3 Wi-Fi Management ............................................................................................................43
Figure 5-4 Wi-Fi Authentication .........................................................................................................44

Figure 5-5 Wi-Fi Device Access ...........................................................................................................45
Figure 5-6 Network Access Control .....................................................................................................47
Figure 5-7 Remote Access VPN ...........................................................................................................49
Figure 5-8 Remote Access ..................................................................................................................50
Figure 5-9 External .............................................................................................................................51
Figure 5-10 Pump Server Protection ...................................................................................................56
Figure 5-11 Target Architecture ..........................................................................................................58
Figure 6-1 Asset Life Cycle [53] ...........................................................................................................59
List of Tables
Table 4-1 Security Characteristics and Controls Mapping –- NIST Cyber Security Framework ..............20
Table 4-2 Products and Technologies .................................................................................................29
Table 8-1 Functional Test Plan............................................................................................................66
Table 8-2 Test Case WIP-1 ..................................................................................................................67
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps x

1 Summary
Broad technological advancements have contributed to the Internet of Things (IoT) phenomenon, where
physical devices now have technology that allow them to connect to the internet and communicate with
other devices or systems. With billions of devices being connected to the internet, many industries,
including healthcare, have or are beginning to leverage IoT devices to improve operational efficiency
and enhance innovation.
the patient or medical provider [1]. With technological improvements designed to enhance patient care,
these devices now connect wirelessly to a variety of systems, networks, and other tools within a
healthcare delivery organization (HDO)—ultimately contributing to the Internet of Medical Things
(IoMT). The wireless infusion pump ecosystem (the pump, the network, and the data stored in and on a
pump) faces a range of threats, including unauthorized access to protected health information (PHI),
changes to prescribed drug doses, and interference with a pump’s function.
In addition to managing interconnected medical devices, HDOs oversee complex, highly technical
environments, from back-office applications for billing and insurance services, supply chain and
inventory management, and staff scheduling, to clinical systems, such as radiological and
pharmaceutical support. In this intricate healthcare environment, HDOs and medical device
manufacturers that share responsibility and take a collaborative, holistic approach to reducing
cybersecurity risks of the wireless infusion pump ecosystem can better protect healthcare systems,
patients, protected health information (PHI), and enterprise information.
The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) developed an example implementation that demonstrates how HDOs can use
standards-based, commercially available cybersecurity technologies to better protect the wireless
The NCCoE’s project has resulted in a NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide, Securing Wireless Infusion
Pumps in Healthcare Delivery Organizations, that addresses how to manage this challenge in clinical
settings, with a reference design and example implementation. Our example solution starts with two
types of risk assessments: an industry analysis of risk and a questionnaire-based-risk assessment. With
the results of that assessment, we then used a “defense-in-depth” strategy to secure the pump, server
components, and surrounding network to create a better-protected environment for wireless infusion
pumps.
The solution and architecture presented in this guide are built upon standards-based, commercially
available products and represent one of many possible solutions and architectures. The example
implementation can be used by any organization that is deploying wireless infusion pump systems and
that is willing to perform its own risk assessment and implement controls based on its risk posture.
NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps 1

For ease of use of this volume, the following paragraphs provide a short description of each section of
this volume.
Section 1, Summary, presents the challenge addressed by the NCCoE project, with an in-depth look at
our approach, the architecture, and the security characteristics that we used; the solution demonstrated
to address the challenge; benefits of the solution; and the technology partners that participated in
building, demonstrating, and documenting the solution. The Summary also explains how to provide
feedback on this guide.
Section 2, How to Use This Guide, explains how readers like you—business decision makers, program
managers, information technology (IT) professionals (e.g., systems administrators), and biomedical
engineers—might use each volume of the guide.
Section 3, Approach, offers a detailed treatment of the scope of the project, and describes the
assumptions on which the security platform development was based, the risk assessment that informed
platform development, and the technologies and components that industry collaborators gave us to
enable platform development.
Section 4, Risk Assessment and Mitigation, highlights the risks that we found, along with the potential
response and mitigation efforts that can help lower risks for HDOs.
Section 5, Architecture, describes the usage scenarios supported by project security platforms, including
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions supported by each component contributed by our
collaborators.
Section 6, Life Cycle Cybersecurity Issues, discusses cybersecurity considerations from a product-life-
cycle perspective, including procurement, maintenance, and end of life.
Section 7, Security Characteristics Analysis, provides details about the tools and techniques that we used
to perform risk assessments pertaining to wireless infusion pumps.
Section 8, Functional Evaluation, summarizes the test sequences that we employed to demonstrate
security platform services, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions to which each test sequence is
relevant, and the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Revision 4 controls that applied to the functions
being demonstrated.
Section 9, Future Considerations, is a brief treatment of other applications that NIST might explore in
the future to further support wireless infusion pump cybersecurity.
The appendices provide acronym translations, references, a mapping of the wireless infusion pump
project to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core (CFC), and a list of additional informative security
references cited in the CFC.

1.1 Challenge
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) defines an external infusion pump as a medical device that
delivers fluids into a patient’s body in a controlled manner, using interconnected servers or via a
standalone drug library-based medication delivery system [1]. In the past, infusion pumps were
standalone instruments that interacted only with the patient and the medical provider. Now, connecting
infusion pumps to point-of-care medication systems and electronic health records (EHRs) can help
improve healthcare delivery processes, but using a medical device’s connectivity capabilities can also
create cybersecurity risk, which could lead to operational or safety risks.
Wireless infusion pumps are challenging to protect, for several reasons. They can be infected by
malware, which can cause them to malfunction or operate differently than originally intended, and
traditional malware protection could negatively impact the pump’s ability to operate efficiently. In
addition, most wireless infusion pumps contain a maintenance default passcode. If HDOs do not change
the default passcodes when provisioning pumps, and do not periodically change the passwords after
pumps are deployed, this creates a vulnerability. This can make it difficult to revoke access codes
(e.g., when a hospital employee resigns from the job). Furthermore, information stored inside infusion
pumps must be properly secured, including data from drug library systems, infusion rates and dosages,
or PHI [2], [3], [4], [5], [6].
Additionally, like other devices with operating systems and software that connect to a network, the
wireless infusion pump ecosystem creates a large attack surface (i.e., the different points where an
attacker could get into a system, and where they could exfiltrate data out), primarily due to
vulnerabilities in operating systems, subsystems, networks, or default configuration settings that allow
for possible unauthorized access [6], [7], [8]. Because many infusion pump models can be accessed and
programmed remotely through a healthcare facility’s wireless network, this vulnerability could be
exploited to allow an unauthorized user to interfere with the pump’s function, harming a patient
through incorrect drug dosing or the compromise of that patient’s PHI.
These risk factors are real, exposing the wireless pump ecosystem to external attacks, compromise, or
interference [6], [8], [9]. Digital tampering, intentional or otherwise, with a wireless infusion pump’s
ecosystem (the pump, the network, and data in and on the pump) can expose an HDO to critical risk
factors, such as malicious actors; loss of data; a breach of PHI; loss of services; loss of health records; the
potential for downtime; and damage to an HDO’s reputation, productivity, and bottom-line revenue.
This practice guide helps you address your assets, threats, and vulnerabilities by demonstrating how to
perform a questionnaire-based risk assessment survey. After you complete the assessment, you can
apply security controls to the infusion pumps in your area of responsibility to create a defense-in-depth
solution to protect them from cybersecurity risks.

1.2 Solution
The NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps in Healthcare Delivery
Organizations shows how biomedical engineers, networking engineers, security engineers, and IT
professionals, using commercially available and open-source tools and technologies that are consistent
with cybersecurity standards, can help securely configure and deploy wireless infusion pumps within
HDOs.
In addition, the security characteristics of the wireless infusion pump ecosystem are mapped to
currently available cybersecurity standards and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Security Rule. In developing our solution, we used standards and guidance from the following
sources:
▪ NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [10]

▪ NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) [11], [12], [13]
▪ NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and
Organizations [14]
▪ Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) Technical Information
Report (TIR)57 [9]
▪ International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Report (IEC/TR) 80001-2: Application of risk
management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]
▪ FDA’s Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices [3]
Ultimately, this practice guide:
▪ maps security characteristics to standards and best practices from NIST and other standards
organizations, as well as to the HIPAA Security Rule [10], [14], [20], [21], [22]
▪ provides a detailed architecture and capabilities that address security controls
▪ provides a how-to for implementers and security engineers to recreate the reference design
▪ is modular and uses products that are readily available and interoperable with existing IT
infrastructure and investments

1.3 Benefits
The NCCoE’s practice guide to securing wireless infusion pumps in HDOs can help your organization:
▪ illustrate cybersecurity standards and best-practice guidelines to better secure the wireless
infusion pump ecosystem, such as the hardening of operating systems, segmenting the network,
file and program whitelisting, code-signing, and using certificates for both authorization and
encryption, maintaining the performance and usability of wireless infusion pumps
▪ reduce risks from the compromise of information, including the potential for a breach or loss of
PHI, as well as not allowing these medical devices to be used for anything other than the
intended purposes
▪ document a defense-in-depth strategy to introduce layers of cybersecurity controls that avoid a
single point of failure and provide strong support for availability. This strategy may include a
variety of tactics: using network segmentation to isolate business units and user access; applying
firewalls to manage and control network traffic; hardening and enabling device security features
to reduce zero-day exploits; and implementing strong network authentication protocols and
proper network encryption, monitoring, auditing, and intrusion detection systems (IDS) and
intrusion prevention systems (IPS)
▪ highlight best practices for the procurement of wireless infusion pumps, by including the need
for cybersecurity features at the point of purchase
▪ call upon industry to create new best practices for healthcare providers to consider when on-
boarding medical devices, with a focus on elements such as asset inventory, certificate
management, device hardening and configuration, and a clean-room environment to limit the
possibility of zero-day vulnerabilities
2 How to Use This Guide

This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a standards-based reference design and provides
users with the information they need to replicate NCCoE’s questionnaire-based risk assessment and the
deployment of a defense-in-depth strategy. This reference design is modular and can be deployed in
whole or in parts.
This guide contains three volumes:
▪ NIST SP 1800-8A: Executive Summary

▪ NIST SP 1800-8B: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics – what we built and why
(you are here)
▪ NIST SP 1800-8C: How-To Guides – instructions for building the example solution

Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:
Business decision makers, including chief security and technology officers, will be interested in the
Executive Summary (NIST SP 1800-8A), which describes the:
▪ challenges enterprises face in securing the wireless infusion pump ecosystem

▪ example solution built at the NCCoE
▪ benefits of adopting the example solution
Technology or security program managers concerned with how to identify, understand, assess, and
mitigate risk will be interested in this part of the guide, NIST SP 1800-8b, which describes what we did
and why. The following sections will be of particular interest:
▪ Section 4, Risk Assessment and Mitigation, provides a description of the risk analysis we
performed
▪ Section 4.3, Security Characteristics and Controls Mapping, maps the security characteristics of
this example solution to cybersecurity standards and best practices
You might share the Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-8A, with your leadership team member to help
them understand the significant risk of unsecured IoMT and the importance of adopting standards-
based, commercially available technologies that can help secure the wireless infusion pump ecosystem.
IT professionals who want to implement an approach like this will find the whole practice guide useful.
You can use the How-To portion of the guide, NIST SP 1800-8C, to replicate all or parts of the build
created in our lab. The How-To guide provides specific product installation, configuration, and
integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not recreate the product
manufacturers’ documentation, which is generally widely available. Rather, we show how we
incorporated the products together in our environment to create an example solution.
This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products within the
enterprise. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does
not endorse these particular products. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that adheres to
these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing
parts of NCCoE’s questionnaire-based risk assessment and the deployment of a defense-in-depth
strategy. Your organization’s security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with
your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. We hope you will seek products that are congruent with
applicable standards and best practices. Section 4.4, Technologies, lists the products we used and maps
them to the cybersecurity controls provided by this reference solution.

2.1 Typographic Conventions
The following table presents typographic conventions used in this volume.
Typeface/Symbol Meaning Example
Italics filenames and pathnames For detailed definitions of terms, see

references to documents that the NCCoE Glossary.
are not hyperlinks, new terms,
and placeholders
Bold names of menus, options, Choose File > Edit.

command buttons and fields
Monospace command-line input, on-screen mkdir

computer output, sample code
examples, status codes
Monospace Bold command-line user input service sshd start

contrasted with computer
output
blue text link to other parts of the All publications from NIST’s National
document, a web URL, or an Cybersecurity Center of Excellence are
email address available at https://nccoe.nist.gov.
3 Approach
Medical devices have grown increasingly powerful, offering patients improved, safer healthcare options
with less physical effort for providers. To accomplish this, medical devices now contain operating
systems and communication hardware that allow them to connect to networks and other devices. The
connected functionality responsible for much of the improvement of medical devices poses challenges
not formerly seen with standalone instruments.
Clinicians and patients rely on infusion pumps for a safe and accurate administration of fluids and
medications. However, the FDA has identified problems that can compromise the safe use of external
infusion pumps [2], [3], [7]. These issues can lead to over-infusion or under-infusion, missed treatments,
or delayed therapy. The NCCoE initiated this project to help healthcare providers develop a more secure
wireless infusion pump ecosystem, which can be applied to similarly connected medical devices. The
wireless infusion pump was selected as a representative medical device. Throughout the remainder of
this guide, the focus will be on the secure operation of the wireless infusion pump ecosystem. Both the

architecture and security controls may be applied to increase the security posture for other types of
medical devices. However, any application should be reviewed and tailored to the specific environment
in which the medical device will operate.
Throughout the wireless infusion pump project, we collaborated with our healthcare Community of
Interest (COI) and cybersecurity vendors to identify infusion pump threat actors, define interactions
between the actors and systems, review risk factors, develop an architecture and reference design,
identify applicable mitigating security technologies, and design an example implementation. This
practice guide highlights the approach used to develop the NCCoE reference solution. Elements include
risk assessment and analysis, logical design, build development, test and evaluation, and security control
mapping. This practice guide seeks to help the healthcare community evaluate the security environment
surrounding infusion pumps deployed in a clinical setting.
3.1 Audience
This guide is primarily intended for professionals implementing security solutions within an HDO. It may
also be of interest to anyone responsible for securing non-traditional computing devices (i.e., the
Internet of Things [IoT]).
More specifically, Volume B of the practice guide (NIST SP 1800-8B) is designed to appeal to a wide
range of job functions. This volume provides cybersecurity or technology decision makers within HDOs
with a view into how they can make the medical device environment more secure to help improve their
enterprise’s security posture and help reduce enterprise risk. Additionally, this volume offers technical
staff guidance on architecting a more secure medical device network and instituting compensating
controls.
3.2 Scope
The NCCoE project focused on securing the environment of the medical device and not re-engineering
the device itself. To do this, we reviewed known vulnerabilities in wireless infusion pumps and examined
how the architecture and component integration could be designed to increase the security of the
device. The approach considered the life cycle of a wireless infusion pump, from planning the purchase
to decommissioning, with a concentration on the configuration, use, and maintenance phases.
3.3 Assumptions
Considerable research, investigation, and collaboration went into the development of the reference
design in this guide. The actual build and example implementation of this architecture occurred in a lab
environment at the NCCoE. Although the lab is based on a clinical environment, it does not mirror the
complexity of an actual hospital network. It is assumed that any actual clinical environment would
represent additional complexity.

3.4 Security
We assume that those of you who plan to adopt this solution, or any of its components, have some
degree of network security already in place. As a result, we focused primarily on new vulnerabilities that
may be introduced if organizations implement the example solution. Section 4, Risk Assessment and
Mitigation, contains detailed recommendations on how to secure the core components highlighted in
this practice guide.
3.5 Existing Infrastructure

This guide may help you design an entirely new infrastructure; however, this guide is geared toward
those with an established infrastructure, as that represents the largest portion of readers. Hospitals and
clinics are likely to have some combination of the capabilities described in this reference solution.
Before applying any measures addressed in this guide, we recommend that you review and test them
for applicability to your existing environment. No two hospitals or clinics are the same, and the impact
of applying security controls will differ.
3.6 Technical Implementation

The guide is written from a how-to perspective. Its foremost purpose is to provide details on how to
install, configure, and integrate components, and how to construct correlated alerts based on the
capabilities that we selected.
3.7 Capability Variation

We fully understand that the capabilities presented here are not the only security options available to
the healthcare industry. Desired security capabilities may vary considerably from one provider to the
next.
4 Risk Assessment and Mitigation

NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, states that risk is “a
measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and
typically a function of (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs and
(ii) the likelihood of occurrence” [11]. The guide further defines risk assessment as “the process of
identifying, estimating, and prioritizing risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions,
image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting
from the operation of an information system. Part of risk management incorporates threat and
vulnerability analyses, and considers mitigations provided by security controls planned or in place.”
The NCCoE recommends that any discussion of risk management, particularly at the enterprise level,
begins with a comprehensive review of NIST SP 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management

Framework to Federal Information Systems—material that is available to the public [12]. The risk
management framework (RMF) guidance, as a whole, proved to be invaluable in giving us a baseline to
assess risks, from which we developed the project, the security characteristics of the build, and this
guide.
It is important to understand what constitutes the definition of risk, as it relates to non-traditional

information systems, such as wireless infusion pumps. NIST SP 800-37 presents three tiers in the risk
management hierarchy (Figure 4-1):
▪ Tier 1: Organization
▪ Tier 2: Mission/Business Process

▪ Tier 3: Information System
Figure 4-1 Tiered Risk Management Approach [12]
This guide focuses on the Tier 3 application of risk management, but incorporates other industry
risk-management and risk-assessment standards and best practices for the context of networked
medical devices in HDOs:
▪ American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/AAMI/IEC 80001-1:2010: Application of risk

management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices – Part 1: Roles, responsibilities and
activities [23]

▪ IEC/TR 80001-2: Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19]
▪ ANSI/AAMI/International Standards Organization (ISO) 14971:2007: Medical devices –
Application of risk management to medical devices [24]
▪ AAMI TIR57: 2016: Principles for medical device security – Risk management [9]
▪ FDA’s Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices [3]
For this NCCoE project, it was extremely important to understand the complexity of networked medical
devices in a system-of-systems environment. Additionally, we felt that it is necessary to understand
where security risks may have safety implications. AAMI TIR57 [9] was particularly useful in this regard,
as it specified elements of medical device security using NIST’s RMF, ANSI/AAMI/IEC 80001-1, IEC/TR
80001-2, and ANSI/AAMI/ISO 14971:2007 [11], [12], [13], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [23], [24]. Also, the
Venn diagram in Figure 4-2 illustrates the relationship between security and safety risks (AAMI TIR57).
As seen in this diagram, there are cybersecurity risks that may have safety impacts. For HDOs, these risks
should receive special attention from both security and safety personnel.
Figure 4-2 Relationship Between Security and Safety Risks [9]
4.1 Risk Assessments

For this NCCoE project, we performed two types of risk assessments: an industry analysis of risk and a
questionnaire-based risk assessment.

4.1.1 Industry Analysis of Risk
The first assessment was an industry analysis of risk performed while developing the initial use case.
This industry analysis provided insight into the challenges of integrating medical devices into a clinical
environment containing a standard IT network. Completion of the industry analysis narrowed the
objective of our use case to helping HDOs secure medical devices on an enterprise network, with a
specific focus on wireless infusion pumps.
Activities involved in our industry analysis included reaching out to our COI and other industry experts
through workshops and focus group discussions. After receiving feedback on the NCCoE’s use case
publication through a period of public comment, the NCCoE adjudicated the comments and clarified a
project description. These activities were instrumental to identifying primary risk factors as well as
educating our team on the uniqueness of cybersecurity risks involved in protecting medical devices in
healthcare environments.
4.1.2 Questionnaire-Based Risk Assessment

For the second type of risk assessment, we conducted a formal questionnaire-based risk assessment by
using tools from two NCCoE Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) collaborators.
We conducted this questionnaire-based risk assessment to gain a greater understanding of the risks
surrounding the wireless infusion pump ecosystem. The tool identifies the risks and maps them to the
security controls. This type of risk assessment is considered appropriate for Tier 3: Information System,
per NIST’s RMF. One tool focuses on medical devices and the surrounding ecosystem, and the other tool
focuses on the HDO enterprise. Both questionnaire-based risk assessment tools leverage guidance and
best practices, including the NIST RMF and Cybersecurity Framework, and focus on built-in threats,
vulnerabilities, and controls [10], [11], [12], [13]. The assessment results measure the likelihood,
severity, and impact of potential threats.
All risk assessment activities provide an understanding of the challenges and risks involved when
integrating medical devices—in this case, wireless infusion pumps—into a typical IT network. Based on
this analysis, this project has two fundamental objectives:
▪ protect the wireless infusion pumps from cyber attacks

▪ protect the healthcare ecosystem, should a wireless infusion pump be compromised
Per AAMI TIR57, “To assess security risk, several factors need to be identified and documented” [9].
Based on our risk assessments and additional research, we identified primary threats, vulnerabilities,
and risks that should be addressed when using wireless infusion pumps in HDOs.

4.1.3 Assets
Defining the asset is the first step in establishing the asset-threat-vulnerability construct necessary to
properly evaluate or measure risks, per NIST’s RMF [11], [12], [13]. An information asset is typically
defined as a software application or information system that uses devices or third-party vendors for
support and maintenance. For the NCCoE’s purposes, the information asset selected is a wireless
infusion pump system. A risk assessment of this asset would include an evaluation of the cybersecurity
controls for the pump, pump server, endpoint connections, network controls, data storage, remote
access, vendor support, inventory control, and any other associated elements.
4.1.4 Threats
Some potential known threats in HDOs that use network-connected medical devices, such as wireless
infusion pumps, are listed below. Refer to Appendix A for a description of each threat.
▪ targeted attacks
▪ advanced persistent threats (APTs)
▪ disruption of service: denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
▪ malware infections
▪ theft or loss of assets
▪ unintentional misuse
▪ vulnerable systems or devices directly connected to the device (e.g., via Universal-Serial-Bus
[USB] or other hardwired, non-network connections)
It is important to understand that the threat landscape is constantly evolving, and that unknown threats
exist and may be unavoidable. These unknown threats need to be identified and remediated as soon as
possible after they are found.
4.1.5 Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities afflict wireless infusion pump devices, pump management applications, network
applications, and even the physical environment and personnel using the device or associated systems.
Within a complex system-of-systems environment, vulnerabilities may be exploited at all levels. There
are multiple information resources available to keep you informed about potential vulnerabilities. This
guide recommends that security professionals turn to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The
NVD is the United States (U.S.) government repository of standards-based vulnerability management
data (https://nvd.nist.gov).
Some typical vulnerabilities that may arise when using wireless infusion pumps are listed below. Refer to
Appendix B for a description of each vulnerability.

▪ lack of asset inventory
▪ long useful life
▪ information/data vulnerabilities
• lack of encryption on private/sensitive data at rest
• lack of encryption on transmitted data
• unauthorized changes to device calibration or configuration data
• insufficient data backup
• lack of capability to de-identify private/sensitive data

• lack of data validation
▪ device/endpoint (infusion pump) vulnerabilities
• debug-enabled interfaces
• use of removable media
• lack of physical tamper detection and response
• misconfiguration
• poorly protected and unpatched devices
▪ user or administrator accounts vulnerabilities
• hard-coded or factory default passcodes
• lack of role-based access and/or use of principles of least privilege
• dormant accounts
• weak remote access controls
▪ IT network infrastructure vulnerabilities
• lack of malware protection
• lack of system hardening
• insecure network configuration
• system complexity
To mitigate risk factors, HDOs should also strive to work closely with medical device manufacturers and
to follow FDA’s postmarket guidance, as well as instructions from the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security’s Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).

4.1.6 Risks
NIST SP 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, defines risk as, “a measure of the extent to
which an entity is threatened by potential circumstance or event, and is typically a function of: (i) the
adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of
occurrence” [11].
NIST SP 800-30 further notes, within a definition of risk assessment, that, “assessing risk requires careful
analysis of threat and vulnerability information to determine the extent to which circumstances or
events could adversely impact an organization and the likelihood that such circumstances or events will
occur.”
Based on the above guidance from NIST SP 800-30, several risks endanger medical devices:
▪ Infusion pumps and server components may be leveraged for APTs and may serve as pivot
points to cause adverse conditions throughout a hospital’s infrastructure.
▪ Infusion pumps may be manipulated to prevent the effective implementation of safety
measures, such as the drug library.
▪ Infusion pump interfaces may be used for unintended or unexpected purposes, with those
conditions leading to degraded performance of the pump.
▪ PHI may be accessed remotely by unauthorized individuals.
▪ PHI may be disclosed to unauthorized individuals if the device is lost, stolen, or improperly
decommissioned.
▪ Hospital’s network may have improper third-party vendor connections
Although these risks may persist in infusion pumps and server components, HDOs should perform
appropriate due diligence in determining the extent of the business impact and the likelihood of each
risk factor.
Vulnerabilities may be present in infusion pumps and their server components, as these devices often
include embedded operating systems on the endpoints. Infusion pumps are designed to maintain a
prolonged period of useful life, and, as such, may include system components (e.g., an embedded
operating system) that may reach either their end of life, or a period of degraded updates prior to the
infusion pump being retired from service. Patching and updating may become difficult over the course
of time.
Infusion pumps may not allow for the addition of third-party mechanisms, such as antivirus or anti-
malware controls. Infusion pumps are validated medical devices, with set configuration and deployment
specifications, and therefore may not accept third-party security controls or third-party-provided
endpoint mitigation on the pump itself. Validation supports a manufacturer’s capabilities regarding the
intended purpose of the device (i.e., infusing patients with medication, analgesics, or nutrients), and

requirements around the validation and approval process for medical devices fall under the auspices of
the FDA. If limitations are identified in embedded operating systems used by an infusion pump, then
vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and deficiencies may become known to malicious actors who may seek to
leverage those deficiencies to install malicious or unauthorized software on those devices.
Malicious software, or malware, may cause adverse conditions on the pump, degrading the
performance of the pump or rendering the device unable to perform its function (e.g., ransomware;
trojans that may allow for remote access to use the device as a pivot point; backdoors; malicious
software that may allow for data exfiltration or may inappropriately consume system resources,
preventing the pump from rendering patient care functionality). Additionally, malware may be used to
convert the infusion pump into an access point for malicious actors to subsequently access or disrupt
the operations of other hospital systems.
As noted above, infusion pumps may allow for the manipulation of configurations or safety measures
implemented through the drug library (e.g., adjusting dosage or flow rates). This risk may be instantiated
through local access, such as an interface or port on the device with either no or weak authentication or
access control in place. Further, infusion pumps may be reachable across a hospital’s network, which
provides an avenue for a malicious actor to cause an adverse event.
Pumps may implement local ports, such as USB ports serial interfaces, Bluetooth, radio frequency, or
other mechanisms that allow for close proximity connection to the pump. These ports may be
implemented with the intent to facilitate technical support; however, they also pose a risk by providing
a pathway for malicious actors to cause adverse conditions to the pump.
Modern infusion pumps and server components may include PHI, such as a patient’s name, medical
record number (MRN), procedure coding, and medication or treatment. Through similar deficiencies
that would allow configuration or use manipulation as noted above, this PHI may then be viewed,
accessed, or removed by unauthorized individuals. Also, individuals who have direct access to the
infusion pump may be able to extract information through unsecured ports or interfaces [2], [3], [7],
[17], [25].
The following common vulnerabilities and control deficiencies may enable these risks:
▪ Implementation of default credentials and passwords: Weak authentication and default

passwords, or not implementing authentication or access control, may be discovered by
malicious actors who would seek to cause adverse conditions. Malicious actors may leverage
this control deficiency for risk factors that span from installing malware on the infusion pump, to
manipulating configuration settings, to extracting information, such as PHI, from the device.
▪ Use of unsecured network ports, such as Telnet or File Transfer Protocol (FTP): Telnet and FTP
are internet protocols that do not secure or encrypt network sessions. Telnet and FTP may be
used nominally for technical support interfaces; however, malicious actors may attempt to
leverage these protocols to access the infusion pump. Telnet and FTP may include deficiencies

that allow for the protocol itself to be compromised, and, because the network session is not
encrypted, malicious actors may implement mechanisms to capture network sessions, including
any authentication traffic, or to identify sensitive information, such as credentials, configuration
information, or any PHI stored on the device.
▪ Local interfaces with limited security controls: Local interfaces, such as USB ports, serial ports,
Bluetooth, radio frequency, or other ports may be used for device technical support. These
ports, however, allow for malicious actors within close proximity to the device to access the
device, to manipulate configuration settings, to access or remove data from the device, or to
install malware on the device. These ports may exist on the pump for support purposes;
however, use of the ports for unauthorized or unexpected purposes, such as recharging a
mobile device (e.g., smart phone, tablet), may cause a disruption to the pump’s standard
operation.
4.1.7 Recommendations and Best Practices

The recommendations provided in Appendix C address additional security concerns that, although not as
pressing as those listed above, are worthy of consideration. If applied, these additional
recommendations will likely reduce risk factors or prevent them from becoming greater risks. Associated
best practices for reducing the overall risk posture of infusion pumps are also included in Appendix C.
4.2 Risk Response Strategy

Risk mitigation is often confused with risk response. Per NIST SP 800-30, risk mitigation is defined as
“prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-reducing controls/countermeasures
recommended from the risk management process.”
Risk mitigation is a subset of risk response. Risk response is defined by NIST SP 800-30 as accepting;
avoiding; mitigating; sharing, or transferring risks. When considering risk response, your organization
should recommend, to a corporate risk management board, ways that the Information Risk Manager (or
equivalent) should treat risk.
4.2.1 Risk Mitigation

Organizations must determine their tolerance or appetite for risk—the response to which will drive risk
remediation or risk mitigation for identified risks. This tolerance should be codified in a Risk
Management Plan, which will include regulatory requirements and guidance, industry best practices,
and security controls. Organizations should set an appropriate risk tolerance based on the factors noted
above, with the intent to remediate those risks above the established risk tolerance (i.e., critical or high
risks.)
These remediation responses can take the form of administrative, physical, and technical controls, or an
appropriate mix. As previously mentioned, Appendix C identifies several mitigation recommendations

regarding specific risk. Additional compensating safeguards, countermeasures, or controls are noted
below:
▪ physical security controls, including standard tamper-evident physical seals, which can be
applied to hardware to indicate unauthorized physical access [10], [14]
▪ ensuring the implementation of a physical asset management program that manages and tracks
unique, mobile media, such as removable flash memory devices (e.g., Secure Digital [SD] cards,
thumb drives) used by pump software hosted on an endpoint client. Consider the encryption of
all portable media used in such a fashion [10], [14], [26], [27].
▪ following procedures for clearing wireless network authentication credentials on the endpoint
client if the pump is to be removed or transported from the facility. These procedures can be
found in pump user manuals, but should be referenced in official HDO policies and procedures
[28], [29], [30], [31].
▪ changing wireless network authentication credentials regularly and, if there is evidence of
unauthorized access to a pump system, immediately changing network authentication
credentials [10], [14]
▪ ensuring that all wireless network access is minimally configured for Wi-Fi Protected Access II
(WPA2) Pre-Shared Key (PSK) encryption and authentication. All pumps should be set to WPA2
encryption [32], [33], [34], [35].
▪ ensuring that all patching has been applied, including those components that will use WPA2
▪ All pumps and pump systems should include cryptographic modules that have been validated as
meeting NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2 [36].
▪ All ports are disabled, except when in use, and the device has no listening ports [3], [9], [10],
[14], [25].
▪ employing mutual transport layer security (TLS) encryption in transit between the client and
server [37]
▪ employing individual pump authentication with no shared key for all pumps [10], [14]
▪ certificate-based authentication for a pump server [28], [29], [30], [31]
During the course of this project, several vulnerabilities were published in the NVD (https://nvd.nist.gov)
that identified means by which malicious actors may remotely compromise WPA2-secured sessions
through the use of “key reinstallation attacks” (KRACKs). Individuals should review noted WPA2
vulnerabilities, refer to vendor/manufacturer patching and updates, and apply those patches and
updates as soon as possible.
4.3 Security Characteristics and Controls Mapping

As described in the previous sections, we derived the security characteristics by analyzing risk in
collaboration with our healthcare-sector stakeholders as well as our participating vendor partners. In

the risk analysis process, we used IEC/TR 80001-2-2 as our basis for wireless infusion pump capabilities
in healthcare environments [16]. Table 4-1 presents the desired security characteristics of the use case,
in terms of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories [10], [14]. Each subcategory is mapped to
relevant NIST standards, industry standards, controls, and best practices. In our example
implementation, we did not observe any security characteristics that mapped to the Respond or Recover
Subcategories of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

Table 4-1 Security Characteristics and Controls Mapping –- NIST Cyber Security Framework
NIST Cybersecurity Framework v1.1 Sector-Specific Standards & Best Practices

NIST SP
HIPAA Security ISO/IEC
Function Category Subcategory 800-53 IEC/TR 80001-2-2
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
ID.AM-1: Physical devices and
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A),
systems within the CM-8 CNFS A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2
164.310(a)(2)(ii),
organization are inventoried

164.310(d)
Asset
Management ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g.,
(ID.AM) hardware, devices, data,
time, and software) are CP-2, RA-2, 45 C.F.R. §§
DTBK A.8.2.1
prioritized based on their SA-14, SC-6 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E)
IDENTIFY (ID) classification, criticality, and
business value
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(7)(i),
ID.BE-4: Dependencies and CP-8, PE-9,
Business 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E), A.11.2.2,
critical functions for delivery PE-11,
Environment DTBK 164.310(a)(2)(i), A.11.2.3,
of critical services are PM-8,
(ID.BE) 164.312(a)(2)(ii), A.12.1.3
established SA-14
164.314(a)(1),
164.314(b)(2)(i)

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
CA-2, CA-7, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A),
Risk ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities CA-8, RA-3, 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E),
A.12.6.1,
Assessment are identified and RA-5, SA-5, RDMP 164.308(a)(8),
A.18.2.3
(ID.RA) documented SA-11, SI-2, 164.310(a)(1),
SI-4, SI-5 164.312(a)(1),

164.316(b)(2)(iii)
(Note: not directly mapped in AC-1,
the NIST Cybersecurity AC-11, ALOF None None
Framework) AC-12
45 C.F.R. §§
Identity 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B),
Management AC-1, AC-2,
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C),
PROTECT (PR) and Access PR.AC-1: Identities and IA-1, IA-2,
164.308(a)(4)(i),
Control credentials are issued, IA-3, IA-4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2,
AUTH, CNFS, 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B),
(PR.AC) managed, verified, revoked, IA-5, IA-6, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1,
EMRG, PAUT 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C),
and audited for authorized IA-7, IA-8, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
164.312(a)(2)(i),
devices, users and processes IA-9, IA-10,
164.312(a)(2)(ii),
IA-11
164.312(a)(2)(iii),
164.312(d)

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B),
164.308(a)(7)(i),
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A),
A.11.1.1,
164.310(a)(1),
PR.AC-2: Physical access to PE-2, PE-3, A.11.1.2,

164.310(a)(2)(i),
assets is managed and PE-4, PE-5, PLOK, TXCF, TXIG A.11.1.4,
164.310(a)(2)(ii),
protected PE-6, PE-9 A.11.1.6,
164.310(a)(2)(iii),
A.11.2.3
164.310(b),
164.310(c),
164.310(d)(1),
164.310(d)(2)(iii)
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(4)(i),
C-1, AC-17, 164.308(b)(1),
PR.AC-3: Remote access is A.6.2.2, A.13.1.1,
AC-19, AC- NAUT, PAUT 164.308(b)(3),
managed A.13.2.1
20, SC-15 164.310(b),
164.312(e)(1),
164.312(e)(2)(ii)

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(3),
PR.AC-4: Access permissions AC-1, AC-2,
164.308(a)(4),
and authorizations are AC-3, AC-5, AUTH, CNFS, A.6.1.2, A.9.1.2,
164.310(a)(2)(iii),
managed, incorporating the AC-6, AC- EMRG, NAUT, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1,
164.310(b),
principles of least privilege 14, AC-16, PAUT A.9.4.4

164.312(a)(1),
and separation of duties AC-24
164.312(a)(2)(i),
164.312(a)(2)(ii)
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B),
PR.AC-5: Network integrity is 164.310(a)(1),
A.13.1.1,
protected (e.g., network AC-4, AC- 164.310(b),
NAUT A.13.1.3,
segregation, network 10, SC-7 164.312(a)(1),
A.13.2.1
segmentation) 164.312(b),
164.312(c),
164.312(e)

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D),
164.308(b)(1),
164.310(d),
164.312(a)(1),
PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is MP-8, SC-

IGAU, STCF 164.312(a)(2)(iii), A.8.2.3
protected 12, SC-28
164.312(a)(2)(iv),
164.312(b),
Data Security 164.312(c),
(PR.DS) 164.314(b)(2)(i),
164.312(d)
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(b)(1), A.8.2.3, A.13.1.1,
164.308(b)(2), A.13.2.1,
PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is SC-8, SC-11,
IGAU, TXCF 164.312(e)(1), A.13.2.3,
protected SC-12
164.312(e)(2)(i), A.14.1.2,
164.312(e)(2)(ii), A.14.1.3
164.314(b)(2)(i)

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Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A),
PR.DS-4: Adequate capacity 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B),
AU-4, CP-2,
to ensure availability is AUDT, DTBK 164.308(a)(7), A.12.3.1
SC-5
maintained 164.310(a)(2)(i),
164.310(d)(2)(iv),
164.312(a)(2)(ii)
45 C.F.R. §§
PR.DS-6: Integrity checking 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), A.12.2.1,
mechanisms are used to 164.312(b), A.12.5.1,
SC-16, SI-7 IGAU
verify software, firmware, 164.312(c)(1), A.14.1.2,
and information integrity 164.312(c)(2), A.14.1.3
164.312(e)(2)(i)
PR.IP-1: A baseline CM-2,
configuration of information CM-3, A.12.1.2,
Information
technology/industrial control CM-4, 45 C.F.R. §§ A.12.5.1,
Protection
systems is created and CM-5, CNFS, CSUP, 164.308(a)(8), A.12.6.2,
Processes and
maintained incorporating CM-6, SAHD, RDMP 164.308(a)(7)(i), A.14.2.2,
Procedures
security principles (e.g. CM-7, 164.308(a)(7)(ii) A.14.2.3,
(PR.IP)
concept of least CM-9, A.14.2.4
functionality) SA-10

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), A.12.3.1,
PR.IP-4: Backups of
CP-4, CP-6, 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B), A.17.1.2,
information are conducted, DTBK
CP-9 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D), A.17.1.3,
maintained, and tested
164.310(a)(2)(i), A.18.1.3
164.310(d)(2)(iv)
45 C.F.R. §§
PR.IP-6: Data is destroyed A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1,
MP-6 DIDT 164.310(d)(2)(i),
according to policy A.8.3.2, A.11.2.7
164.310(d)(2)(ii)
45 C.F.R. §§
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A),
164.310(d)(1),
PR.MA-2: Remote 164.310(d)(2)(ii),
maintenance of 164.310(d)(2)(iii),
A.11.2.4,
organizational assets is 164.312(a),
MA-4 CSUP A.15.1.1,
approved, logged, and 164.312(a)(2)(ii),
A.15.2.1
performed in a manner that 164.312(a)(2)(iv),
prevents unauthorized access 164.312(b),
164.312(d),
164.312(e),
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D)

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
DE.AE-1: A baseline of
network operations and 45 C.F.R. §§
Anomalies and AC-4, CA-3,
expected data flows for users AUTH, CNFS 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), None
Events (DE.AE) CM-2, SI-4
and systems is established 164.312(b)
and managed
45 C.F.R. §§
AC-2, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D),
DE.CM-1: The network is
AU-12, 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B),
monitored to detect AUTH, CNFS,
CA-7, CM-3, 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), None
potential cybersecurity EMRG, MLDP
SC-5, SC-7, 164.308(a)(8),
events
SI-4 164.312(b),
DETECT (DE) 164.312(e)(2)(i)
Security 45 C.F.R. §§
Continuous AC-2, 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D),
Monitoring DE.CM-3: Personnel activity AU-12, 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A),
(DE.CM) is monitored to detect AU-13, AUTH, CNFS, 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C),
A.12.4.1
potential cybersecurity CA-7, EMRG, MLDP 164.312(a)(2)(i),
events CM-10, 164.312(b),
CM-11 164.312(d),
164.312(e)
45 C.F.R. §§
DE.CM-4: Malicious code is
SI-3, SI-8 IGAU, MLDP, TXIG 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), A.12.2.1
detected
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B)

NIST SP
Rule [38] 27001:2013 [39]
Revision 4
DE.CM-6: External service
CA-7, PS-7,
provider activity is monitored 45 C.F.R. §§ A.14.2.7,
SA-4, SA-9, RDMP
to detect potential 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) A.15.2.1
SI-4
cybersecurity events
CA-2, CA-7,
Detection
DE.DP-3: Detection processes PE-3, 45 C.F.R. §§
Processes IGAU A.14.2.8
are tested PM-14, SI- 164.306(e)
(DE.DP)
3, SI-4
RESPOND (RS) None None None None None None
RECOVER (RC) None None None None None None
4.4 Technologies
Table 4-2 lists all of the technologies used in this project, and maps the generic application term to the specific product that we used and the
security control(s) that we deployed. Refer to Table 4-1 for an explanation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory codes [10].
The reference architecture design in Section 5 is vendor-agnostic, such that any wireless infusion pump system can be integrated safely and
securely into a hospital’s IT infrastructure. Therefore, for the infusion pump device, infusion pump server, and wireless infusion pump
ecosystem, we captured the most-common security features among all the products that we tested in this use case. A normalized view of the list
of Functions and NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories are presented in Table 4-2.

Please note that some of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory codes require people, and process controls, not solely technical
controls.
Table 4-2 Products and Technologies
NIST Cybersecurity
Component Specific Product Function Framework
Subcategory
Infusion Pump Baxter: Sigma • requires a passcode to access the biomedical engineering mode PR.AC-1, PR.AC-2,
Device Spectrum™ LVP (on device or connect to device) for configuring and setting up PR.DS-2, PR.DS-6,
Version 8 the devices PR.IP-1, PR.IP-6

Baxter: Sigma • provides the capability to change the manufacture default
Spectrum Wireless passcode
Battery Module • supports Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Version 8 802.11i enterprise wireless encryption/authentication
B. Braun: Space standards, including WPA2 with Extensible Authentication
Infusomat Infusion Protocol (EAP)-TLS for protecting data exchange
Pump (LVP) • restricted access to the server, application, and stored data
BD: Alaris® 8015 • closes/disables all communication ports that are not required for
Patient Care Unit (PCU) the intended use
Version 9.19.2
• closes/disables all services that are not required for the intended
BD: Alaris Syringe use
Module 8110 • provides an integrity-checking mechanism to verify information
BD: Alaris LVP Module • supports the baseline configuration
8100
• supports removing/destroying data from the device
Hospira: Plum 360™
Version 15.10

NIST Cybersecurity
Subcategory
Hospira: LifeCare PCA™ • few models have a tamper-resist switch, with tamper-evident
Version 7.02 seals
Smiths Medical:
Medfusion® 3500
Version 5
Syringe Infusion System
Smiths Medical:
Medfusion 4000
Wireless Syringe
Infusion Pump
Smiths Medical:
CADD®-Solis
Ambulatory Infusion
Pump
Infusion Pump Baxter: Care • with appropriate configuration, discovers and identifies devices ID.AM-1, PR.AC-1,
Server Everywhere Gateway connected to the pump server via wired networks, wireless PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4,
Server Version 14 networks, and virtual private networks (VPNs), to aid in building PR.DS-1, PR.DS-2,
B. Braun: Space and maintaining accurate physical device inventories PR.MA-2
OnlineSuite Software • supports role-based authentication and password rules and
Version Application policies
Package 2.0.1 • supports the use of an HDO’s Active Directory / Lightweight
BD: Alaris Systems Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) solution
Manager Version 4.2

NIST Cybersecurity
Subcategory
Hospira: MedNet™ 6.2 • supports auto-logoff, data encryption/obscuration
Smiths Medical: • can be accessed remotely via VPN (or similar) tools
PharmGuard® Server • few models support FIPS Publication 140-2
Enterprise Edition • operates on a manufacturer-supported operating system,
Version 1.1 database server, and web server (allows software patches)
Infusion Pump Baxter: Sigma • supports secure protocols, such as TLS

Ecosystem Spectrum Master Drug
• supports co-existence with firewall, antivirus, backup software,
Library Version 8
and other types of security safeguard products
B. Braun: Space
• maintains different types of audit/log records for preventing
DoseTrac® and Space
unauthorized access
DoseLink™ software –
Engineering version
available for testing
BD: Alaris System
Maintenance (ASM)
Version 10.19
Smiths Medical:
PharmGuard Toolbox
Version 1.5
Smiths Medical: CADD-
Solis Medication Safety
Software

NIST Cybersecurity
Subcategory
Access Point (AP) Cisco: Aironet 1600 • authenticates and connects infusion pumps to the Wi-Fi PR.AC-5, PR.DS-1,
Series AP (AIR- • supports wireless network standards: IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n/ac PR.DS-2, DE.CM-1,
CAP1602I-A-K9 DE.CM-3
• supports security protocols: IEEE 802.11i (WPA2), EAP-TLS
Wireless LAN [Local Cisco: WLC 8.2.111.0
• AP joins a WLC to form a Control and Provisioning of Wireless
Area Network]
Access Points protocol (CAPWAP) tunnel
Controller (WLC)
• uses Identity Services Engine (ISE) as the authentication service

• provides message authentication and encryption in data
transmission
Identity Services Cisco: ISE • discovers and identifies devices connected to wired networks, ID.AM-1, PR.AC-1,
Engine (ISE) wireless networks, and VPNs. It gathers this information based PR.AC-4, PR.DS-1,
on what’s actually connecting to the network, a key step PR.DS-2, DE.CM-1,
toward building and maintaining accurate physical device DE.CM-3
inventories
• provides advanced network access controls by connecting user
identity with device profiling and access policy
• provides a log audit of events, which can be monitored for the
network traffic
Firewall/Router Cisco: Adaptive • delivers network integrity protection PR.AC-5, PR.DS-1,
Security Appliance • is used as an external firewall for connecting to the internet for PR.DS-2, DE.CM-1,
(ASA) guest network DE.CM-3
• is used as internal firewall for all other network zones with rules
and policies

NIST Cybersecurity
Subcategory
Switch Cisco: Catalyst 3650 • provides port-level controls, port blocking, and virtual local area PR.AC-5, PR.DS-1,
Switch network (VLAN) segmentation PR.DS-2, DE.CM-1,
DE.CM-3
Endpoint Symantec: Symantec • provides intrusion prevention, uniform resource locator (URL), DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3,
Protection Endpoint Protection and firewall policies DE.CM-4, PR.DS-1,
(SEP) • provides application behavioral controls PR.DS-2, DE.AE-1
• provides device control to restrict access

• provides antivirus file protection
• provides behavioral monitoring
• provides file reputation analysis
Network Advanced Symantec: Advanced • monitors internal inbound and outbound internet traffic DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4,
Threat Protection Threat Protection: • uncovers advanced attacks PR.DS-1, PR.DS-2,
Network (ATP:N) DE.AE-1
• automatically prioritizes critical events
• searches for known indicators of compromise (IoCs) across the
entire environment
• blacklists or whitelists files and URLs once they are identified as
malicious
• can be integrated with a third-party security information and
events management (SIEM) tool

NIST Cybersecurity
Subcategory
Data Center Symantec: Data Center • out-of-the-box host intrusion detection system (HIDS) and host DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4,
Security Security: Server intrusion prevention system (HIPS) policies PR.DS-1, PR.DS-2,
Advanced (DCS:SA) • provides sandboxing and Process Access Control (PAC) to DE.AE-1
prevent a new class of threats
• hosts firewall to control inbound and outbound network traffic
to and from servers

• compensating HIPS controls restrict application and operating
system behavior by using policy-based least-privilege access
control
• prevents file and system tampering
• provides application and device control by locking down
“configuration” settings, file systems, and the use of removable
media
Secure Remote TDi Technologies: • authenticates system managers PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4,
Management and ConsoleWorks® • provides role-based access control of system management PR.MA-2, PR.PT-1,
Monitoring functions PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1,
DE.CM-3, DE.CM-4,
• implements a protocol break between the system manager and DE.CM-6
the managed assets
• records all system management actions
• performs remote configuration management and monitoring of
devices

NIST Cybersecurity
Subcategory
Physics-Based PFP: pMon 751 and • baselines the device execution behavior DE.AE-1, DE.CM-4
Integrity P2Scan • detects cyber attacks in hardware and software
Assessment
• detects tiny anomalies in analog side-channel patterns
(e.g., power consumption, electromagnetic emissions) to
instantly catch attacks, thereby providing an early warning that
a device has been tampered with

• integrity assessment uses side channel
Certificate DigiCert: Certificate • provides a certificate authority service Access Control
Authority Service Authority (PR.AC)
PR.DS-2
Certificate Intercede: MyID® • serves as a device provisioner ID.AM-1, ID.AM-5
Management /
Provisioning
Risk Assessment Clearwater: IRM|Pro™ • provides a tool for conducting risk assessments that focus on ID.RA-1
IRM|Analysis™ healthcare compliance and cyber risk management
Medical Device • provides a tool for conducting risk assessments that focus on
Innovation, Safety & medical devices
Security Consortium
(MDISS): Medical
Device Risk Assessment
Platform (MDRAP™)

5 Architecture
Wireless infusion pumps are no longer standalone devices; they now include pump servers for managing
the pumps, drug libraries, networks allowing for interoperability with other hospital systems, and VPN
tunnels to outside organizations for maintenance. While interconnectivity, enhanced communications,
and safety measures on the pump have added complexity to infusion pumps, these components can
help improve patient outcomes and safety.
As infusion pumps have evolved, one safety mechanism development was the invention of the “drug
library.” The drug library is a mechanism that is applied to an infusion pump and that catalogs
medications, fluids, dosage, and flow rates. While hospital pharmacists may be involved in the
maintenance of the drug library, continuous application of the drug library to the infusion pump
environment tends to be managed through a team of biomedical engineers. Initially, the drug library file
may be loaded onto the pump through a communication port. When the drug library file is updated, all
infusion pumps need to be updated to ensure that they adhere to the current rendition of that drug
library. Drug library distribution, which may require that staff manually adjust individual pumps, may
become onerous for the biomedical staff in HDOs that use thousands of pumps [1], [40].
Manufacturers provide wireless communications on some pumps, and use a pump server to manage the
drug library file, capture usage information on the pumps, and provide pump updates.
Medical device manufacturers are subject to regulatory practices by the FDA, and may tend to focus on
the primary function of the pump (i.e., assurance that the pump delivers fluids of a certain volume and
defined flow rates, consistent with needs that providers may have to ensure safe and appropriate
patient care). Technology considerations, such as cybersecurity controls, may not be primarily addressed
in the device design and approval process. As such, infusion pumps may include technology that does
not lend itself to the same controls that an HDO may implement on standard desktops, laptops, or
workstations used for productivity [9], [18].
As technology has evolved, cybersecurity risk has expanded, both in visibility and in the number of
threats and vulnerabilities. This expansion has led to a heightened concern, from manufacturers and the
FDA, and work has been established to identify measures to better respond to cybersecurity risk [7], [9],
[25]. In Section 5.1, we describe the wireless infusion pump ecosystem by defining the components.
Section 5.2 discusses the data flow, and Section 5.3 explains the set of controls that we use in our
example implementation, including those for networks, pumps, pump servers, and enterprise.
Section 5.4 describes the target architecture for our example implementation.

5.1 Basic System
A basic wireless infusion pump ecosystem includes a wireless infusion pump, a pump server, a network
consisting of an AP, a firewall, and a VPN to a manufacturer (Figure 5-1).
Figure 5-1 Basic System

5.2 Data Flow

The flow of data between a wireless infusion pump and its corresponding server falls into the following
transaction categories:
▪ modifying the drug library

▪ performing software updates
▪ remotely managing the devices
▪ auditing the data flow processes
Infusion pumps may also include other advanced features, such as auto-programming to receive patient
prescription information and to record patient treatment information to the patient’s EHR.

5.3 Cybersecurity Controls
This section discusses security controls by their location, either on the network, pump, or pump server.
We also describe controls implemented in the NCCoE lab, and depict the controls implemented in our
final architecture.
In general, we recommend that a clinically focused network be designed to protect the information used
in HDOs, whether that information is at-rest or in-transit. As described in Cisco Medical-Grade Network
(MGN) 2.0-Security Architectures, no single architecture can be designed to meet the security
requirements of all organizations [41]. However, many cybersecurity best practices can be applied by
HDOs to meet regulatory compliance standards.
Our reference architecture uses Cisco’s solution architecture as the baseline. This baseline demonstrates
how the network can be used to provide multi-tiered protection for medical devices when exchanging
information via a network connection. The goal of our reference architecture is to provide
countermeasures to deal with challenges identified in the assessment process. For our use-case
solution, we use segmentation and defense-in-depth as security models to build and maintain a secure
device infrastructure. This section provides additional details on how to employ security strategies to
achieve specific targeted protections when securing wireless infusion pumps.
We used the following cybersecurity controls:
▪ network controls
▪ pump controls
▪ pump server controls
▪ enterprise-level controls
5.3.1 Network Controls

Proper network segmentation or network zoning is essential to developing a strong cybersecurity
posture [32], [33], [34], [35], [42]. Segmentation uses network devices, such as switches and firewalls, to
split a large computer network into subnetworks, each referred to as a network segment [41]. Network
segmentation not only enhances network management, but also improves cybersecurity, allowing for
the separation of networks based on network security requirements driven by business needs or asset
value.

The architecture designed for this build uses Cisco’s solution architecture as the baseline for
demonstrating how the network can be used to provide multi-tiered protection for medical devices
when exchanging information with the outside world during the operation involving network
communication. The goal of this architecture design is to provide countermeasures to mitigate challenge
areas identified in the assessment process. In our use-case solution, segmentation and defense-in-depth
are the security models that we used as security measures to build and maintain secure device
infrastructure. This section provides additional details on how to employ security strategies to achieve
the target security characteristics for securing wireless infusion pumps.
5.3.1.1 Segmentation/Zoning
Our network architecture uses a zone-based security approach. By using different local networks for
designated purposes, networked equipment identified for a specific purpose can be put together on the
same network segment and protected with an internal firewall. The implication is that there is no
inherent trust between network zones and that trust limitations are enforced by properly configuring
firewalls to protect equipment in one zone from other, less-trusted zones. By limiting access from other,
less-trusted areas, firewalls can more effectively protect the enterprise network.
For discussion purposes, we include some generic components of a typical HDO in our network
architecture examples. A given healthcare facility may be simpler or more complex and may contain
different subcomponents. The generic architecture contains several functional segments, including the
following elements:
▪ core network
▪ guest network
▪ business office
▪ database server
▪ enterprise services
▪ clinical services
▪ biomedical engineering
▪ medical devices with wireless LAN
▪ remote access for external vendor support
At a high level, each zone is implemented as a VLAN with a combination firewall/router Cisco ASA device
connecting it to the rest of the enterprise through a backbone network, referred to as the core network
[43], [44], [45]. Segments may consist of physical or virtual networks. For simplicity and convenience, we
implemented subnets that correspond exactly to VLANs. The routing configuration is the same for each
subnet, but the firewall configuration may vary depending on each zone’s specific purpose. An external
router/firewall device is used to connect the enterprise and guest network to the internet.

Segmentation is implemented via a VLAN by using Cisco switches. The following subsections provide a
short description of each segment and the final network architecture.
5.3.1.1.1 Core Network Zone

Our reference architecture implements a core network zone that consists of the equipment and systems
used to establish the backbone network infrastructure. The external firewall/router also has an interface
connected to the core enterprise network, just like other firewall/router devices in the other zones. This
zone serves as the backbone of the enterprise network and consists only of routers connected by
switches. The routers automatically share internal route information with each other via authenticated
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) to mitigate configuration errors as zones are added or removed.
5.3.1.1.2 Guest Network Zone

Hospitals often implement a guest network that allows visitors or patients to access internet services
during their visit. As shown in Figure 5-2 (Section 5.3.1.1.10), network traffic here tends not to be clinical
in nature, but is offered as a courtesy to hospital visitors and patients to access the internet. Refer to
Section 5.3.1.5, External Access, for additional technical details.
5.3.1.1.3 Business Office Zone

A business office zone is established for systems dedicated to hospital office productivity and does not
include direct patient-facing systems. This zone consists of traditional clients on an enterprise network,
such as workstations, laptops, and possibly mobile devices. Within the enterprise, the business office
zone will primarily interact with the enterprise services zone. This zone may also include Wi-Fi access.
5.3.1.1.4 Database Server Zone

A database server zone is established to house server components that support data persistence. The
database server zone may include data stores that aggregate potentially sensitive information, and,
given the volume, require safeguards. Because databases may include PHI, HIPAA privacy and security
controls are applicable. This zone consists of servers with databases. Ideally, applications in the
enterprise services zone and biomedical engineering zone use these databases, instead of storing
information on application servers. This type of centralization allows for a simplified management of
security controls to protect the information stored in databases.
5.3.1.1.5 Enterprise Services Zone

The enterprise services zone consists of systems that support hospital staff productivity. Enterprise
services may not be directly patient-specific systems, but rather support core office functions found in a
hospital. This zone consists of traditional enterprise services, such as the domain name system (DNS),
Active Directory, Identity Service System, and asset inventory that probably lives in a server room or
data center. These services must be accessible from various other zones in the enterprise.

5.3.1.1.6 Clinical Services Zone
The clinical services zone consists of systems that pertain to providing patient care. Examples of systems
that would be hosted in this zone include the EHR system, pharmacy systems, health information
systems, and other clinical systems to support patient care.
5.3.1.1.7 Biomedical Engineering Zone

The biomedical engineering zone establishes a separate area that enables a biomedical engineering
team to manage and maintain systems, such as medical devices, as shown in Figure 5-2
(Section 5.3.1.1.10). This zone consists of all equipment needed to provision and maintain medical
devices. In the case of wireless infusion pumps, this is where the pump management servers are hosted
on the network.
5.3.1.1.8 Medical Device Zone

The medical device zone provides a network space where medical devices may be hosted. Infusion
pumps would be deployed in this zone. Infusion pump systems are designed so that all external
connections to EHR systems or vendor maintenance operations can be completed through an associated
pump server that resides in the biomedical engineering zone. Access to the rest of the network and
internet is blocked. This zone contains a dedicated wireless network to support the wireless infusion
pumps, as explained in Section 5.3.1.2, Medical Device Zone’s Wireless LAN.
5.3.1.1.9 Remote Access Zone

The remote access zone provides a network segment that extends external privileged access so that
vendors may access their manufactured components and systems on the broader HDO network. Refer
to Section 5.3.1.4, Remote Access, for additional technical details.
5.3.1.1.10 Final Network Architecture

Figure 5-2 shows the interconnection of all components and zones previously described. It also
illustrates the connection to vendor and cloud services via the internet. The VLAN numbers that are
shown in Figure 5-2 are the VLAN identifiers used in the lab; however, these numbers may vary on
actual healthcare enterprise networks.

Figure 5-2 Network Architecture with Segmentation
5.3.1.2 Medical Device Zone’s Wireless LAN

The Wi-Fi management network is different, in that it does not have a firewall/router that connects
directly to the core network, as shown in Figure 5-3. This is a completely closed network used for the
management and communication between the Cisco Aironet wireless AP and the Cisco WLC. The WLC is
the central point where wireless Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs), VLANs, and WPA2 security settings are
managed for the entire enterprise [8], [17], [32], [33], [34], [35], [42], [46], [47], [48].
Two SSIDs were defined: IP_Dev and IP_Dev Cert. IP_Dev uses WPA2-PSK, and IP_Dev Cert uses WPA2-
Enterprise protocols. In an actual HDO, two WLCs should be configured for redundancy. Initially, the
wireless APs configure themselves for network connectivity, like any other device using Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) from the switch DHCP server (see the green line in Figure 5-3). The switch
also sends DHCP Option 43, which provides the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the WLC. The AP then
connects to the WLC to automatically download firmware updates and wireless configuration
information. Finally, the CAPWAP tunnel is formed to encrypt wireless traffic (see the black line in Figure
5-3). The traffic is then routed to the enterprise network via the WLC [27], [36], [44], [49].

Figure 5-3 Wi-Fi Management
When a device first connects to the Wi-Fi network, it needs to authenticate with either the agreed-upon
PSK or certificate. The authentication process is tunneled from the AP back to the WLC, as shown in
Figure 5-4. In the case of a PSK, the WLC verifies that the client key matches (see the green line in
Figure 5-4). In the case of a certificate, the authentication process is passed from the WLC to the Cisco
ISE for validation by using remote authentication dial-in user service (RADIUS) protocol (see the yellow
line in Figure 5-4). Upon successful authentication, the device negotiates an encryption key and is
granted link layer network access.

Figure 5-4 Wi-Fi Authentication
Once authentication is complete, typical network client activity is allowed. Figure 5-5 shows how DHCP
is used to contact the router to obtain network configuration information for the device (see the red line
in Figure 5-5). Once the network is configured, the infusion pump will attempt to connect to its
provisioned pump server address on the enterprise network in the biomedical engineering zone (see the
green line in Figure 5-5).

Figure 5-5 Wi-Fi Device Access
Using an enterprise-grade Wi-Fi system can simplify transitions to more secure protocols by decoupling
Wi-Fi SSIDs and security parameters from the Wi-Fi spectrum and physical Ethernet connections. First,
every AP only needs to broadcast on a single Wi-Fi channel (in each band) and can broadcast multiple
SSIDs. This helps avoid interference due to multiple independent wireless systems trying to use the
same frequencies. Second, each SSID can be tied to its own VLAN. This means that logical network
separation can be maintained in Wi-Fi without having to use additional spectrum. Third, multiple SSIDs
can be tied to the same VLAN or standard Ethernet network. Each SSID can have its own security
configuration as well. For example, in our use case, we have two different authentication mechanisms
for granting access to the same network: one configured for WPA2-PSK, and the other for so-called
enterprise certificates. This can be particularly useful for gradual transitions from old security
mechanisms (e.g., Wireless Encryption Protocol [WEP], Wi-Fi Protected Access [WPA]) or old PSKs to
newer ones, instead of needing to transition all devices at one time. In our case, to determine which
devices may need reconfiguration to use certificates, we used the WLC to identify exactly which devices
are using old PSK SSIDs. Once this number is reduced to an acceptable level, the old PSK SSID can be
turned off, and only certificate-based authentication will be allowed.

5.3.1.3 Network Access Control
This section describes how network access control using a wireless LAN, as shown above, is applied to
the wireless infusion pumps.
Before we describe network access controls, it is important to discuss each pump’s wireless protection
protocol. There are three available wireless protection protocols (WEP, WPA, and WPA2). We also
describe in-depth options for WPA2-PSK. Finally, we describe options for WPA2 across the HDO
enterprise. Many of the infusion pumps used in this NCCoE project are newer models, capable of
supporting various wireless protocols. For HDOs, WPA2 is the recommended wireless protocol to use.
WEP and WPA are considered insufficient for appropriately securing wireless network sessions. Our
architecture is designed to support multiple levels of access control for different groups of users. The
architecture is configured to use WPA2-PSK and WPA2-Enterprise security protocols for secure wireless
connections to accommodate the best available security mechanisms, depending on which vendor
products your organization uses. Please note that a wireless infusion pump manufactured prior to 2004
may not be able to support these newer wireless security protocols [41].
The WPA2-PSK is often referred to as PSK mode. This protocol is designed for small office networks and
does not require an external authentication server. Each wireless network device encrypts the network
traffic by using a 256-bit key. All pumps used in our example implementation support this wireless
security mode, and each pump performed properly when using this mode. However, because all devices
share the same key in a PSK mode using WPA2-PSK, if credentials are compromised, then significant
manual reconfiguration and change management will be required.
WPA2 enterprise security uses 802.1x/EAP. By using 802.1x, an HDO can leverage the existing network
infrastructure’s centralized authentication services, such as a RADIUS authentication server, to provide a
strong client authentication. Cisco recommends that WPA2 Enterprise, which uses the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) cypher for optimum encryption, be used for wireless medical devices, if
available. We implemented WPA2 Enterprise with EAP-TLS security mode on several of our pumps to
demonstrate that these pumps can leverage the public key infrastructure (PKI) to offer strong endpoint
authentication and the strongest encryption possible for highly secure wireless transmissions. In this
mode, pumps were authenticated to the wireless network with a client certificate issued by DigiCert
Certificate Authority. During the authentication process, the pump’s certificates are validated against a
RADIUS authentication server using Cisco ISE. Automatic logoff features allow the system to terminate
the endpoints from the network after a predetermined time of inactivity. Organizations manage and
control the client certificates via the certificate authority. With this capability, organizations may revoke
and renew certificates as needed.
Once WPA2 is selected as the appropriate wireless protection protocol, certificates may be issued to
authenticate infusion pumps by using 802.1x/EAP-TLS mode, as illustrated in Figure 5-6 [27], [28], [29],
[30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [42], [46], [47], [48], [49].

Figure 5-6 Network Access Control
Certificate issuance involves the following three stages, which are outlined by the green and orange
shaded objects in Figure 5-6:
1. Certificate Registration
Step 1: Request a certificate from the DigiCert Certificate Authority, which is a Certificate
Register Manager. Request pump certificates through a standalone computer connected to the
internet by using DigiCertUtil, a certificate request tool, on behalf of a pump.
Step 2: The approved certificates are exported to the pumps by using the specific tools provided
by pump vendors. Typically, this activity is performed by a biomedical engineer.
Step 3: Install the certificate into the Cisco ISE application.

2. Authentication
Authentication is performed by the Cisco ISE application to validate the pump certificate under
the 802.1x/EAP-TLS. During the network access authentication procedure, the AP will pass the
certification information to the ISE server for validation. Once passed, the connection between
the pump and the pump server will be established, and the data transmitted between the pump
and the AP is encrypted.
3. Certificate Management
Certificate management will provide services to revoke certificates when they are no longer in
use, and will also manage the certificate revocation list, along with any related processes for
renewing old certificates.
The detailed process for setting up the 802.1x network authentication for pump and pump server
communication is documented in the How-To portion of the guide (NIST SP 1800-8C).
5.3.1.4 Remote Access

Many medical devices and their backend management systems require access by manufacturers for
device repairs, configuration, software, and firmware patching and updates, or maintenance. A vendor
network segment (VendorNet) is designed to provide vendors with external privileged access to their
manufactured components and systems that reside within an HDO’s architecture. In the NCCoE lab, a
VendorNet is implemented using TDi ConsoleWorks as a security proxy. ConsoleWorks is a vendor-
agnostic interface that gives organizations the ability to manage, monitor, and record virtually any
activities in the IT infrastructure that come from external vendors.
Communication using TDi ConsoleWorks for vendor access to products does not require the installation
of software agents to establish connections for managing and monitoring targeted components.
Established connections are persistent to facilitate IT operations, enforce security, and maintain
comprehensive audit trails. All information collected by ConsoleWorks is time-stamped and digitally
signed to ensure information accuracy, empower oversight, and meet compliance requirements.
Through a standard web browser, ConsoleWorks can be securely accessed from any geographical
location, eliminating the need for administrators and engineers to be locally present to perform their
work.
Remote access is only allowed through a specific set of security mechanisms. This includes using a VPN
client at the network layer, as shown in Figure 5-7, for vendors to authenticate to the VPN server [43],
[44], [50].

Figure 5-7 Remote Access VPN
After the VPN connection is established at the application layer, the security proxy will restrict who can
access certain resources within the enterprise network, as depicted in Figure 5-8. Vendors also
authenticate to the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)-based security proxy (see the red line in
Figure 5-7). Based on the vendor’s role, the security proxy will facilitate a Remote Desktop Protocol
(RDP) connection to equipment in the biomedical engineering zone via the vendor support network (see
the green line in Figure 5-7). The credentials that are used to authenticate the RDP connection are
stored by the security proxy and are not disclosed to the vendor.

The remote access firewall/router is configured so that direct access between the VPN and vendor
support is denied and the only allowed path is through the security proxy (see the stop sign in
Figure 5-7). Additionally, the firewall/router can further restrict what is accessible at the network layer
from the security proxy. The security proxy is granted access to the internet to support patching and to
email alerts. The public IP address of the external firewall is configured to forward VPN traffic to the IP
address of the VPN server [35], [43], [44], [45], [46], [48], [50], [51].
Figure 5-8 Remote Access

5.3.1.5 External Access

A guest network allows visitors or patients to access internet services during their visit. As explained in
Section 5.3.1.1.2, the work traffic tends not to be of a clinical nature, but is offered as a courtesy to
hospital visitors and patients to access the internet. The external firewall marks the boundary between

the enterprise and the internet. As shown in Figure 5-9, this is the only point in the network where
network address translation (NAT) is used. Additionally, the guest network for personal devices connects
to the internet though the external firewall. The guest network is configured such that traffic cannot go
between the enterprise and guest networks—only out to the internet. This is denoted by the stop sign in
Figure 5-9. The external firewall is configured to provide the necessary services for guest users to use
the internet, such as DHCP, which allows dynamic addressing for anyone. Typically, consumer
equipment is connected here, such as smart phones, tablets, and personal entertainment systems
(Figure 5-9) [45].
Figure 5-9 External

5.3.2 Pump Controls
Wireless infusion pumps have the following controls:
▪ endpoint protection
▪ hardening
▪ data protection
5.3.2.1 Endpoint Protection

Traditional security relies on the network border to provide security protection to its internal nodes,
using security technologies, such as application firewalls, proxy gateways, centralized virus scan, and
network IDS and IPS. The challenge faced here, however, is that medical devices, such as wireless
infusion pumps, may not have the capability to have third-party tools installed or deployed to effectively
provide control. As such, endpoint protection is applied to that equipment where possible. This may
limit endpoint protection controls to servers or workstations that may operate in the hospital
infrastructure. Nodes, such as networked medical devices, should participate in their own security.
Otherwise, the device may become the weakest element in the enterprise and present a risk to the
entire HDO network.
To avoid the single point of failure caused by an unsecured node, every system should have an
appropriate combination of local protections applied to it. These protections include code signing, anti-
tampering, encryption, access control, whitelisting, and others. Controls are layered across a technology
stack, with the intent to improve the overall cybersecurity posture, recognizing that there may be
limitations to applying a full set of controls for each node.
5.3.2.2 Hardening
Wireless infusion pumps and their servers are considered computing endpoints, when it comes to
hardening the software contained within these devices. Medical devices may contain third-party
products, including proprietary or commercial embedded operating systems, network communication
modules, runtime environments, web services, or databases. Because these products can contain
vulnerabilities, medical devices may also inherit these vulnerabilities just by using the products [2], [3],
[7], [9], [25]. Therefore, it is important to identify all software applications used on medical devices,
implement securing and hardening procedures recommended by the manufacturers, and apply timely
patches and updates to guard against any newly discovered threats.
Hardening may include the following actions:
▪ disabling unused or unnecessary communication ports and services

▪ changing manufacturer default administrative passwords
▪ securing remote APs, if there are any

▪ confirming that the firmware version is up-to-date
▪ ensuring that hashes or digital signatures are valid
However, please note that most infusion pumps do not have the same level of storage resources and
Central Processing Unit (CPU) processing capability as those provided for personal computers and
servers.
Hardening or modifying devices, configurations, or settings should be performed based on guidance

from the manufacturer. Wireless infusion pumps are medical devices that adhere to FDA regulation,
where the manufacturer has validated appropriate functionality based on a defined configuration.
Identified vulnerabilities should be disclosed to the manufacturer, who may advise on appropriate
mitigation approaches and provide patches, fixes, and updates where appropriate.
5.3.2.3 Data Protection

The two primary reasons for data protection are confidentiality and integrity. Medical devices may
contain patient data, such as the patient’s name, MRN, gender, age, height, weight, procedure number,
medication and treatment information, or other identifiers that may constitute PHI. PHI must be
appropriately protected (e.g., through encryption or other safeguard measures that would prevent
unauthorized disclosure of such information).
Infusion pumps may also contain configuration data, such as drug libraries specifying dosage and
threshold limits. This data must be protected against compromises as well. Our defense-in-depth
approach for data integrity involves sandboxing the critical system files stored in pump servers by using
DCS:SA and by encrypting messages when communicating between a medical infusion pump and the
backend infusion management system, via Internet Protocol Security or secure-sockets-layer encryption
(e.g., HTTPS, TLS).
5.3.3 Pump Server Controls

Pump server features vary. Usually, a pump server can be used to distribute firmware, the drug library,
or other software updates used inside the devices, or as a tool for providing services, such as reporting
and device asset management. Data collected by the infusion pump server is valuable for further
analysis to provide reports on trends, compliance checking, and to measure infusion safety.
Because pump servers connect to infusion pumps to deliver and receive infusion-related information, it
is also important to secure the infusion pump server and its associated applications, databases, and
communication channels.

5.3.3.1 User Account Controls
Access to the pump server typically implements username/password authentication. After the pump
server is installed, an initial step is to define the password policy that applies to users accessing the
pump server. When managing user accounts for a pump server, common cybersecurity hygiene should
include the following actions:
▪ changing factory default passwords

▪ enforcing password policies
▪ assigning each user’s access level by using the least-privilege principle

▪ if supported, using centralized access management, such as LDAP, for user account
management at the enterprise level APT:
▪ configuring automatic logoff
5.3.3.2 Communication Controls

Pump servers interface with many other systems or components, such as databases, web services, and
web portals. Communications between different systems can be configured. Pump servers might
provide choices for selecting unsecure or secure Transport Control Protocol (TCP)/IP ports for
communication. We recommend using secure (e.g., stateful, encrypted network sessions) ports for
message communication or for package download.
There may be a default setting for the communication interval, in number of seconds, for
communication attempts between the server and the pump. Be sure to properly set this idle timeout
setting.
5.3.3.3 Application Protection

Application protection refers to software applications running on the pump servers. Most of the
software application security concerns and security controls that are used on traditional personal
computers and servers may also be applied to pump servers to protect data integrity and confidentiality.
These control measures may include those listed below:
▪ trusted applications
▪ stronger access control mechanisms for pumps and pump servers
▪ better key management
▪ application whitelisting
▪ sandboxing applications
▪ performing code-signing verification for newly installed software

▪ applying the latest patches and software updates
▪ encrypting message data in transit or data at rest
Server security baseline integrity is achieved via the use of three Symantec cybersecurity products on an
enterprise network with a specific focus on wireless infusion pumps:
▪ DCS:SA
▪ SEP
▪ APT:N
Each of these Symantec products provides protections for components in the enterprise systems in
different levels. With pre-built policies, the DCS:SA server that is installed can provide out-of-the-box
HIDS and HIPS by monitoring and preventing suspicious server activities on pump servers. The use of
DCS:SA also provides the host firewall service for controlling inbound and outbound network traffic to
and from a protected server. Using DCS:SA, the configuration settings, files, and file systems in the pump
server can be locked down using policy-based least-privilege access controls to restrict application and
operating-system behavior and to prevent file and system tampering.
Like DCS:SA, SEP provides similar protection for endpoint devices and servers. SEP features in-memory
exploit mitigation and antivirus file protection to block malware from infecting protected endpoint
servers. This will reduce the possibility of zero-day exploits on popular software that may not have been
properly patched or updated. To protect endpoint servers, an SEP agent must be installed on servers.
ATP:N can provide network-based protection of medical device subnets by monitoring internal inbound
and outbound internet traffic. It can also be used as a dashboard to gain visibility to all devices and all
network protocols. In addition, if ATP:N is integrated with the SEP, ATP:N can then monitor and manage
all network traffic from the endpoints and provide threat assessments for dangerous activity to secure
medical devices on an enterprise network. The use of these Symantec security products is depicted in
Figure 5-10. As depicted, the ATP:N will inspect all traffic going through the core network switch via port
mirroring between the enterprise services, biomedical engineering, and medical device zones. Wired
traffic within each zone is also inspected via port mirroring on the switches used in those zones.

Figure 5-10 Pump Server Protection
5.3.4 Enterprise-Level Controls

5.3.4.1 Asset Tracking and Inventory Control
Medical asset management includes asset tracking and asset inventory control. Asset tracking is a
management process used to maintain oversight of the equipment, using anything from simple methods
(such as pen and paper), to record equipment, to more-sophisticated information technology asset
management (ITAM) platforms. HDOs can use asset tracking to verify that a device is still in the
possession of the assigned, authorized users. Some more-advanced tracking solutions may provide
service for locating missing or stolen devices.
Inventory management is also important throughout a medical device’s life cycle. Inventory tracking
should not be limited to hardware inventory management. It should also be expanded to include
software, software versions, and data stored and accessed in the devices, for security purposes. HDOs

can use this type of inventory information to verify compliance with security guidelines and to check for
exposure of confidential information to unauthorized entities.
5.3.4.2 Monitoring and Audit Controls

Logging, monitoring, and auditing procedures are essential security measures that can be used to help
HDOs prevent incidents and provide an effective response when a security breach occurs. The activities
can include:
▪ logging - recording events to appropriate logs

▪ monitoring - overseeing the events for abnormal activities, such as scanning, compromises,
malicious code, and DoSs in real time
▪ auditing - reviewing and checking these recorded events to find abnormal situations or to
evaluate if the applied security measures are effective.
By combining the logging, monitoring, and auditing features, an organization will be able to track,
record, review, and respond to abnormal activities, and provide historical records when needed.
Many malware and virus infections can be almost completely avoided by using properly configured
firewalls or proxies with regularly updated knowledge databases and filters to prevent connections to
known malicious domains. It is also important to review your firewall logs for blocked connection
attempts so that you can identify the attached source and remedy infected devices if needed.
In our example implementation, user audit controls—simple audits—are in place. Although additional
SIEM tools and centralized log aggregation tools are recommended to maximize security event analysis
capabilities, aggregation and analytics tools like these are considered out of scope for this project
iteration.
Each system is monitored for compliance with a secure configuration baseline. Each system is also
monitored for risks to known good, secure configurations by vulnerability scanning tools. In our project,
the Cisco AP, the Cisco ISE as the RADIUS authentication server, the TDi VendorNet, and the pump
servers from each vendor, are all equipped with proper monitoring and logging capabilities. Real-time
monitoring for events happening within these systems can be analyzed and compared to the baseline. If
any abnormal behavior occurs, it can be detected. The auditing of data was considered out of scope for
this reference design because the absence of an actual data center made auditing behavior impractical.
5.4 Final Architecture

The target architecture, depicted in Figure 5-11, indicates the implementation of network segmentation
and controls as described by this practice guide. Segmentation identified nine zones, ranging from the
guest network zone to the medical device zone, and includes zones for the Wi-Fi infrastructure and the
core network infrastructure. The zoned concept implements firewall/router devices to enforce
segmentation, with the firewall enforcing limited trust relationships between each zone. For example,

access between the biomedical engineering zone and the medical device zone is limited to only the
ports identified by the vendor and the associated pump server. Noted in the diagram (Figure 5-11) are
processes that have impact on the overall architecture. Security controls are implemented to enforce
encryption on network sessions. For Wi-Fi, leveraging standard protocols, such as WPA2-PSK and WPA2
Enterprise, created a secure channel for the pumps to communicate with the APs, and to use TLS to
secure the communication channel from the pumps to the server.
Figure 5-11 Target Architecture


6 Life-Cycle Cybersecurity Issues
Configuration management throughout a device’s life cycle is a key process that is necessary for the
support and maintenance of medical devices [3]. NIST SP 1800-5: IT Asset Management discusses ITAM,
and, although the focus of the document pertains to financial services, similar challenges exist in
healthcare [52]. Establishing a product-life-cycle management program addresses a few of the risks
noted in previous sections of this guide, and should be considered as part of a holistic program for
managing risks associated with infusion pump deployments.
Figure 6-1 illustrates a typical life cycle for an asset, and this model can be applied to medical devices.
The subsections below discuss the essential cybersecurity activities that should occur during specific
phases of the asset life cycle.
Figure 6-1 Asset Life Cycle [53]

6.1 Procurement
Asset life-cycle management typically begins with Strategy, Plan, and Design phases, which lead into
procurement (the Procure phase). These phases are opportunities for hospitals to define requirements
and to identify where security controls may be implemented on infusion pumps or other devices that
the hospital intends to acquire.
Phases leading into procurement enable the HDO, reseller, or manufacturer to ensure that the
equipment that the HDO will deploy offers the appropriate combination of security and functionality
required to render patient care. These phases also enable the hospital to implement appropriate
security controls to safeguard the device and the information that it may store or process.
Purchasers at HDOs may request manifests or architectural guidance on secure deployment of the
equipment, and may perform research on products and the manufacturers that they have selected.
While performing the research, HDOs may begin a risk assessment process to ensure that risks are
mitigated.
Manufacturers maintain a document referred to as the MDS2 (Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for
Medical Devices) that an HDO may review, enabling the HDO to determine possible vulnerabilities and
risks [54]. Hospital purchasers may also determine if vulnerabilities exist in the proposed equipment by
reviewing the FDA-hosted MAUDE (Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience) database.
Hospitals should also obtain any necessary training, education, and awareness material from the
manufacturer, and should educate staff about the deployment, operation, maintenance, and security
features available on their equipment. HDOs might consider writing user-friendly documentation to
ensure that staff can use the equipment with confidence and competence.
Performing research and risk analysis during the phases leading into procurement will allow HDOs to
make informed decisions. For further reference, we note that the Mayo Clinic has produced a
best-practice document that discusses procurement [55].
6.2 Operation
After hospitals procure their equipment, they onboard it during the Operate and Maintain phases.
Equipment purchasers should apply asset management processes (e.g., asset tagging and entry into a
configuration management database or some other form of inventory tracking), and should have
standard baseline configurations implemented. Wireless infusion pumps may need to be configured to
connect to a hospital’s Wi-Fi network (medical device zone, as depicted in Section 5.3.1.2, Medical
Device Zone’s Wireless LAN) and implement digital certificates to allow for device authentication.
As noted above, hospitals should implement some type of configuration management database or asset
inventory that captures granular information about the device. Implementing an ITAM mechanism
enables the hospital to have visibility into their infusion pump deployment, with captured information

that describes the make/model, firmware, operating system, software versions, the applied
configuration along with change history, and the physical location within the hospital. Regular
maintenance of the ITAM would reduce risks, for example, that may emerge based on loss/theft, as well
as provide a central knowledge repository that allows the hospital to coordinate any required
maintenance or refresh.
As part of deployment, hospitals should apply practices noted by the manufacturer (e.g., regarding
access control and authentication). As noted above, digital certificates should be installed to allow for
device authentication to Wi-Fi, but engineers should implement access control and auditing mechanisms
where applicable.
6.3 Maintenance
Pump manufacturers have two types of systems that require updating: the pumps and the pump
servers. Pumps may implement control systems in firmware (writeable, non-volatile storage that may
include an embedded operating or other control system). Control systems may be maintained through
an update process that involves replacing all or parts of the operating or control system. Server
components may be implemented on more-conventional IT systems, using commercial operating
systems (e.g., Windows or Linux variants).
Another aspect of configuration management that HDOs will want to pursue is patching. Patching,
known colloquially as bug fixing, does not require a full replacement of software and is generally
performed on pump servers. The patch frequency to which manufacturers generally adhere is monthly
for patches and yearly for updates. This observation on timing comes from industry, not NIST—and is
considered standard practice, rather than advice.
In addition to identifying patch frequency, organizations must be aware of likely vulnerabilities and the
risks that they introduce into the enterprise, and then decide whether a patch should be applied. NIST
SP 800-40, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies [56], discusses the importance of patch
management, as well as the challenges.
6.4 Disposal
The Dispose phase of the ITAM life cycle comes into play when products reach their end of life and are
removed from hospital service. Wireless infusion pumps have increased in sophistication and in the
information that each device may use, process, or store. The information found on pumps and related
equipment may include sensitive information or information that may be regarded as PHI. As such,
hospitals should seek to implement mechanisms to ensure that any sensitive information and PHI are
removed from all storage areas that a pump or its system components may maintain. Practices to
remove that information may be found in NIST SP 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitation [26].

7 Security Characteristics Analysis
We identified the security benefits of the reference design, how they map to NIST Cybersecurity
Framework Subcategories, and the mitigating steps to secure the reference design against potential new
vulnerabilities [10], [14].
7.1 Assumptions and Limitations

Our security analysts reviewed the reference architecture and considered if the integration described in
this guide would meet security objectives. The analysts purposely avoided testing products, and readers
should not assume any endorsement or diminution of the value of any vendor products. Although we
have aimed to be thorough, we counsel those who are following this guide to evaluate their own
implementation to adequately gauge risks specific to their organizations.
7.2 Application of Security Characteristics

Using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories to organize our analysis allowed us to
systematically consider how well the reference design supports specific security activities, and provided
additional confidence that the reference design addresses our use-case security objectives. The
remainder of this subsection discusses how the reference design supports each of the identified
Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories [10].
7.2.1 Supported NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories

The reference design focuses primarily on the Identify and Protect Function areas (their Subcategories)
of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Specifically, the reference design supports the following
Subcategories:
▪ three Subcategories in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Identify Function area, under the
Categories of Asset Management, Business Environment, and Risk Assessment
▪ Subcategories from each Category of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Protect Function area,
except for the Awareness and Training Categories
We discuss these NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories in the following subsections.
7.2.1.1 ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., Hardware, Devices, Data, Time, and Software) Are
Prioritized Based on Their Classification, Criticality, and Business Value
To address this Subcategory of the Identify Function, we conducted an asset inventory as part of the risk
management process. For this project, we identified assets and entered them into the Clearwater
Compliance IRM|Analysis™ tool. This risk analysis tool categorized project resources into types of assets.
Additionally, it characterized the system, enabling us to address the criticality of our resources. Our

project only partially satisfies the Resources subcategory, as we focused on technical solutions and did
not write a business impact assessment or business continuity plan.
7.2.1.2 ID.BE-1: The Organization’s Role in the Supply Chain Is Identified and
Communicated
Organizations who may be using this guide are the end users of medical devices. NIST SP 800-53, control
SA-12, most directly applies to such end users because it directs users to define which security
safeguards to employ to protect against supply chain threats [14]. Our implementation uses network
segmentation to limit exposure to the wireless infusion pump from other areas within a hospital
network. This is done because, if a vulnerability is identified in a device, segmentation and access
control will help safeguard the medical device until the vulnerability can be properly addressed.
7.2.1.3 ID.RA-1: Asset Vulnerabilities Are Identified and Documented

Given a reasonably long life cycle, even the best-designed electronic asset will eventually be impacted
by a vulnerability. Medical devices can have a long product life cycle, per AAMI TIR57, “Device or
platform used for decades” [9], [25]. Identifying vulnerabilities in an asset may occur via various means.
Some vulnerabilities may be identified through onsite testing; however, it is often the manufacturer or a
researcher who will find the vulnerability. An effective risk management program is essential to reduce
the likelihood that an identified vulnerability will be exploited. This implementation uses a combination
of risk analysis tools and methods to help reduce the impact that a vulnerability may have on the build.
7.2.1.4 PR.AC-1: Identities and Credentials Are Issued, Managed, Revoked, and Audited
for Authorized Devices, Users, and Processes
Following the segmentation approach used to separate hospital networks into zones, our
implementation employs role-based security, which limits access based on who actually need to access
the pump. HDO users with no business need are not permitted access to pumps, pump servers, or
related components. Most users, including biomedical staff, are granted access via Active Directory.
Although our NCCoE lab did not use single sign-on (SSO), using SSO can make pump access seamless to
an end user. How to manage credentials of clinicians who directly operate the pump is beyond the scope
of this guide.
Remote access is necessary to maintain proper functionality of infusion pumps, but the mechanism for
gaining and controlling remote access varies depending on the user type. Hospital staff, such as
biomedical engineers, remotely access pumps through a VPN and hardened gateway at the application
layer. Such users are considered trusted HDO staff with access to other network resources throughout
the enterprise.
Pump manufacturers who may need to reach a device for maintenance or troubleshooting can gain
access only into a VendorNet zone, from which they can access pumps and pump servers, but not other

zones in the enterprise. Our example implementation uses ConsoleWorks for authentication, role-based
access control, and recording system management actions of remote vendor activity.
7.2.1.5 PR.AC-4: Access Permissions and Authorizations Are Managed, Incorporating the
Principles of Least Privilege and Separation of Duties
This NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory is supported for the pumps and pump servers with
DCS:SA. The configuration settings, files, and file systems in the pump server are restricted, thereby
implementing policy-based least-privilege access control. DCS:SA restricts application and operating-
system behavior and prevents unauthorized users from tampering with files and systems.
Least privilege is also addressed via the network design itself. By limiting user access to only the zones
where a user has a business need for access, the architecture seeks to enforce the concepts of least
privilege and separation of duties.
7.2.1.6 PR.AC-5: Network Integrity Is Protected (e.g., network segregation, network

segmentation)
Network segmentation is a key function of this reference design. Segregating the core network, guest
network, business office, database server, enterprise services, clinical services, and biomedical
engineering zones from the medical device zone reduces the risk of medical devices being negatively
impacted from malware or an exploit in another zone. Using a combination firewall/router device to
segregate the zones also limits risk to the enterprise, should a vulnerability be exploited within the
medical device zone.
7.2.1.7 PR.DS-2: Data-in-Transit Is Protected

Data in transit occurs when data travels from the drug library on a pump server to an infusion pump.
The information being passed most frequently will be the types of drugs and dosage range. This
information is not PHI; however, the availability and integrity of this information are important. This
project uses WPA2-AES, which authenticates pumps to the wireless network, with the client certificate
issued by DigiCert Certificate Authority.
7.2.1.8 PR.DS-6: Integrity Checking Mechanisms Are Used to Verify Software, Firmware,
and Information Integrity
This NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory is supported with server and agent products to monitor
and lock-down configuration settings, files, and file systems in the pump server by using the policy-
based least-privilege access control. This limits the applications and operating system to the expected
behavior, and reduces the likelihood of digital tampering with the system.

7.2.1.9 PR.IP-1: A Baseline Configuration of Information Technology/Industrial Control
Systems Is Created and Maintained Incorporating Security Principles (e.g.,
Concept of Least Functionality)
A mature cybersecurity program follows a documented secure baseline for traditional information
technology components and medical devices. This NCCoE project has implemented hardening for each
component used in the build, and has documented the steps taken. This initial step produces a secure
baseline configuration. Because this project uses five different types of wireless infusion pumps, the
baseline is of limited use; however, in a healthcare organization with many medical devices and multiple
biomedical and IT professionals, it is essential to develop and implement a baseline configuration for
vulnerability management.
7.2.1.10 PR.MA-2: Remote Maintenance of Organizational Assets Is Approved, Logged, and

Performed in a Manner that Prevents Unauthorized Access
We controlled remote access to pump vendors by implementing ConsoleWorks, a software tool that
records all of the actions performed over a connection, thereby providing an audit trail that documents
vendor activity.
7.2.1.11 PR.PT-1: Audit/Log Records Are Determined, Documented, Implemented, and

Reviewed in Accordance with Policy
Our example implementation supports this NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory by enabling
logging on all devices in two ways: with a logging capability and with a process of identifying which
events the log will record. Although our project employs auditing, and recognizes its importance in a
cybersecurity program, log aggregation and implementing a log review process, albeit vital activities, are
beyond this project’s scope.
7.2.1.12 DE.AE-1: A Baseline of Network Operations and Expected Data Flows for Users
and Systems Is Established and Managed
As we did with systems and medical devices, we took a least-functionality approach when configuring
the network. We followed best practices for configuring firewalls based on a default deny, restricted
SSID broadcast, and for limiting the power of wireless signals.
This NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory is supported by the Symantec IDS component of the
reference design. This tool identifies, monitors, and reports anomalous network traffic that may indicate
a potential intrusion. Endpoint protection implements policies for the expected behavior, and alerts
when activities occur outside the usual patterns.

7.3 Security Analysis Summary
Our reference design’s implementation of security surrounding wireless infusion pumps helps reduce
risk from a pump, even if a vulnerability is identified in a pump, by creating a more secure environment
for medical devices. The key feature is network segmentation. Supporting this zone approach, our
project build follows security best practices to harden devices, monitor traffic, and limit access via the
wireless network to only authorized users. Any organization following this guide must conduct its own
analysis of how to employ the elements, in their own environment, that were discussed here. It is
essential that organizations follow security best practices to address potential vulnerabilities and to
minimize any risk to the operational network.
8 Functional Evaluation
We conducted a functional evaluation of our example implementation to verify that several common
provisioning functions used in our laboratory test worked as expected. We also needed to ensure that
the example solution would not alter normal pump and pump-server functions. The functional test plan
provided in Section 8.1 outlines our test cases, the purposes, and the desired outcomes.
The subsequent subsections explain the functional tests in more detail, and list the procedures for each
of the functional tests.
8.1 Functional Test Plan

Table 8-1 Functional Test Plan
Test Case Purpose Desired Outcomes

WIP-1: Network Segmentation Test the effectiveness of All firewall rules for each
network segmentation segment are implemented
correctly, as designed.
WIP-2: Data Center Security Test the effectiveness of the The inbound and outbound
DCS:SA to see that it follows network traffic to and from
defined policies servers is controlled per host
firewall rules.
WIP-3: Endpoint Protection Test the effectiveness of the A bad file is detected, and the
SEP to ensure that it follows planned installation action is
defined policies blocked.
WIP-4: Advanced Threat Test the effectiveness of the The URLs in the blacklist are
Protection ATP:N to ensure that it follows blocked. The URLs in the
defined policies whitelist are allowed.

Test Case Purpose Desired Outcomes
WIP-5: Protected Remote Test the effectiveness of the The vendor can access only
Access remote access controls what has been granted for
access with the correct
privileges.
WIP-6: Pump and Pump Server Confirm that the installation Pumps and pump servers are
Network Connection and configuration of pumps and connected to the network, and
pump servers are fully pumps communicate to the
completed corresponding pump servers.
WIP-7: Pump and Pump Server Test a set of operational events Pumps are connected to the
Basic Functions between pumps and pump corresponding pump server,
servers able to perform a set of
operational events.
8.1.1 Test Case WIP-1

Table 8-2 Test Case WIP-1
Test Case Name Network Segmentation

Description • Show that the WIP solution allows the inbound and outbound traffic of a
given zone as per its design.
• Show that the WIP solution blocks the inbound and outbound traffic of a
given zone as per its design.
Preconditions • WIP network segmentation is implemented.
• Internal firewall rules of each zone are defined and implemented.
• The ASAs are configured to use stateful filtering, so return traffic is
automatically allowed if the initial connection is allowed. Everything not
explicitly allowed in a rule is denied.
Procedure 1. Use the medical device zone and the biomedical engineering zone as a test
example.
2. Review the port and communication protocol requirements from each
tested pump vendor, for the pump and the corresponding pump server.
3. Configure the ASA firewall access list to open only the needed ports and to
allow access only to necessary protocols.
4. Everything not explicitly allowed in a rule is denied.

Test Case Name Network Segmentation
Result 1. Review the ASA configuration file to verify that the ASA firewall is configured
to only allow communication with a specific protocol and port as specified
by the pump vendors. All other communication between these two
segments will be denied and blocked using a command, such as “show
access-list | include eq,” to see the opened ports.
2. Use network discovery scanning tools, such as nmap, to check the open,
closed, or filtered ports.

Test Case Name Data Center Security

Description Show that the WIP solution detects files that are defined in policy and that apply
the file and system tampering prevention methods by locking down files
Preconditions • DCS:SA is installed and configured.
• The File and System Tamper Prevention policy is set.
• Windows_Baseline_detect_TEST is used as the baseline for server hardening.
Procedure There are two admin applications for the DCS:SA, the console admin and the
portal admin. The console admin is the thick client, and the portal admin is the
thin client. The console is used to create and modify the policy, and the portal is
used to publish the policy. The portal URL is http://<portal IP Address>
1. Log into the DCS Console.
2. Select the Policy > Work Space > Pump Server folder.
3. Select the Detection tab to show the detection polices.
4. You should see a preinstalled policy: Windows_Baseline_detect_Test.
Double-click it to open a detailed policy editing window for
configuration.
5. Create a policy for hardening the server, such as “do not allow any file to
be installed on the server.”
6. Enable the policy.
7. Publish the policy.
Result Test to verify that no file is allowed to be installed on the protected server.

Test Case Name Endpoint Protection / Advance Threat Protection

Description Show that the WIP solution has the capability to detect a “bad” file and to act
(i.e., stop installing that bad file).
Preconditions • SEP is installed and configured.
• Define the antivirus signature rule.
• Create a bad file that is part of the antivirus signature rule.

Procedure 1. Make sure that the test server has a SEP agent installed and enabled.
2. From the server machine, open an Internet Explorer browser, and then type
this URL in the browser: http://test.symantecatp.com. This is a test site
provided by Symantec, containing some unharmful links for testing
purposes.
3. Click some links, such as antivirus test, from the list to install some
suspicious software on the test server.
4. The installation should be blocked by the server’s SEP, and the violation
incident should be reported in the ATP.
5. To view the violation in ATP, log into the ATP server from a browser in a
server that can access that sub network, such as the Active Directory server.
6. Type this URL in the browser: http://<hostname>.
7. View any violation incidents from the ATP to verify that the bad link is
blocked.
a. If wanted, one can dive into the details to see to which bad sites it
tried to connect.
b. Close the open incident report after the review.
Result To verify that the ATP:N and Symantec deployment and configuration offer the
needed security protection to prevent malware installed in a server, and to view
the violation, in ATP, log into the ATP server from a browser in a server that can
access the network, where the tested server is located.
1. View any violation incidents from the ATP to verify that the bad link is
blocked.
2. Check the details to see to which bad sites it tried to connect.
3. Close open incident report after the review.

Test Case Name Advanced Threat Protection

Description Show that the WIP solution has effective network threat protection based on
network intrusion prevention, URL, and firewall policies.
Preconditions • The ATP:N is installed and configured.
• Firewall and browser protection rules are defined.
Procedure 1. Log onto a server with ATP:N installed.

2. Access a malicious website.
3. Check the results.
Result See Test Case WIP-3.

Test Case Name Protected Remote Access

Description Show that the WIP solution has the protected remote access capability. The
VendorNet concept was created out of a need to give vendors more-restricted
remote access, compared to NIST/NCCoE/MITRE staff, to a lab. VendorNet is an
NCCoE network created for each lab that is tied to an Active Directory group.
This group of vendors is then allowed to access the lab through VendorNet.
VendorNet hosts controlled access mechanisms, such as ConsoleWorks, file
transfer servers, or other remote access proxy services.
Preconditions • VendorNet is created.
• TDi ConsoleWorks is installed and configured.
• The ConsoleWorks profile and user are created.
Procedure 1. Using public internet, remotely log onto the NCCoE VPN.
2. Log onto ConsoleWorks by using the following URL:
https://consoleworks.nccoe.nist.gov.
3. From the graphical menu, select View to view graphical connections. (Note:
Each external vendor can only view the resources assigned to them.)
4. Access the granted hosts.
5. Perform the allowed operations as specified.
6. Check the results.

Test Case Name Protected Remote Access
Result 1. Verify that the vendor can access the associated pump server by using
VendorNet and ConsoleWorks.
2. Verify that the vendor can perform the preassigned operational activities.
3. Verify that the vendor cannot perform unauthorized operations, such as
some administration task (e.g., adding a new user account).
4. Verify that all activities performed by the external vendor are logged and
can be audited as needed.

Test Case Name Pump and Pump Server Network Connection

Description Show that the WIP solution establishes the wireless network connection
between each vendor’s pumps and their corresponding pump server.
Preconditions • The wireless router with the pre-shared password SSID has been set up.
• Infusion pump servers have been installed and configured.
• Infusion pumps have been installed and configured using WPA2-PSK or WPA2
Enterprise / EAP-TLS for a secure wireless network connection.
• Cisco ISE is installed and configured with root Certificate Authority installed.
Procedure 1. Turn on the pump.
2. Check the wireless indicator.
3. Check the AP and ISE administration portals for device connection and
authentication status.
4. Check the infusion pump server management tool for discovered pumps.
Result • Both the AP and ISE portal should indicate that the pumps are successfully
connected to the network.
• The pump server admin portal should indicate that the pump is online and in
use. (Note: The way that the pump server portal displays these messages is
vendor-dependent.)
• In the case of WPA2 Enterprise / EAP-TLS wireless access mode, the Cisco ISE
should display that the pumps are successfully authenticated.

Test Case Name Pump and Pump Server Basic Functions

Description Show that the WIP solution supports the basic operational events for each
vendor’s pumps and their corresponding pump server.
Preconditions • The test results of WIP-6 are successful.
• The drug library for a specific pump has been created by a pharmacist, and
validation has been performed.

• The drug library has been successfully published or loaded to the infusion
pump server to be tested.
Procedure 1. From the pump server, send the new version of the drug library to its
pumps. Listed below is an example procedure used by Hospira to send the
drug library to its pump by using the MedNet software server:
a. Log into a MedNet software server.
b. Request the download of the drug library to one or more pumps.
c. MedNet displays the drug library download status as “Pending.”
d. MedNet, using MedNet Server, forwards the drug library to the
infusion pump selected.
e. The pump infuser downloads the drug library from the MedNet
server.
f. The pump infuser sends a download status update to the MedNet
server to indicate that the drug library is successfully downloaded.
Wait for installation.
g. The pump server displays the download status as “On Pump.”
h. The operator of the pump powers-down the pump. Choose to install
the new drug library when prompted by the infuser.
i. The pump sends the update status to MedNet to indicate that the
drug library was successfully installed, and a “Completed” download
status is displayed.
2. From the pump server, send the new version of software updates to its
pumps (using a Smiths Medical pump as an example). Using the PharmGuard
pump server, packages containing data, such as device configuration data or
firmware, specific to an installed Smiths Medical device model, can be
installed. The package tested is provided by Smiths Medical.
a. Log into a PharmGuard server.

Test Case Name Pump and Pump Server Basic Functions
b. Select Package Deployment from the Asset Management drop-
down menu. All previously-deployed packages, if any, are listed.
c. Click Add Package.
d. Click Browse to navigate to and select the package file.
e. Click Upload to upload the package. After the package file is read,
information about the package is displayed in the package table.
f. Select the package that you would like to deploy, and then click
View/Deploy. The package detailed information is displayed.

g. Click Deploy to deploy the new package.
h. Enter the name for the deployment, and specify a start deploy.
i. Enter the required password, and then click Continue.
j. After you confirm the package deployment, the name of the newly
deployed package displays in the Deployment list with the status of
“Active.”
k. To check if a package has been received by the individual pump
associated with the package deployment, you need to check the
device itself.
Result Use the device or the corresponding pump server portal to verify that the
intended package has been successfully deployed. How this information is
displayed is device-specific and manufacturer-specific. For more information,
please consult documentation for specific devices.
9 Future Considerations
During our development of this project and practice guide, we did not implement several components;
however, these omitted components should be considered. We did not implement a commercially
available EHR system. EHRs are often regarded as central within a hospital. Additionally, we did not
implement a central asset inventory management tool, or mechanisms to perform malware detection or
network monitoring in the medical device zone.
Limitations on control implementation exist based on endpoint capabilities. As infusion pumps continue
to evolve as part of an IoMT ecosystem, capabilities, including endpoint encryption and identity and
access management may become available, thus further enhancing automated management of the
medical device zone. Over the course of time, manufacturers may consider the application of future
technologies, or may need to address unanticipated threats in a novel fashion. An update to this
practice guide could evaluate these components and other control mechanisms that may become
available in the future.

Appendix A Threats
Some potential known threats in the healthcare environments that use network-connected medical
devices, such as wireless infusion pumps, are listed below.
▪ Targeted attacks: Targeted attacks are threats involving actors that attempt to compromise the
pump and system components directly affecting pump operations, including the pump, pump
server, drug library, or drug library management systems. Actors who perform such targeted
attacks may be external; in other words, those who attempt to access the pump system through
the public internet, or via vendor support networks or virtual private networks (VPNs). There
may also be internal actors, such as those on staff, who may be involved in accidental
misconfiguration or who possess provisioned access and abuse their granted privileges, or
patients or other visitors who attempt to modify the behavior of a pump.
▪ Advanced persistent threats (APTs): APTs occur when the sophisticated threat actor attempts
to place malicious software on the pump or pump system components, which may enable that
threat actor to perform unauthorized actions, either on the pump system itself, or as a pivot
point to cause adverse conditions for hospital internal systems that may have reachability from
the pump network environment. Placement of malicious software may or may not cause
adverse scenarios on the pump or its system components.
▪ Disruption of service – denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks: DoS or DDoS attacks may be components found in a broader APT scenario. Such attacks
are intended to cause the unavailability of the pump or pump system components, thus
rendering providers with a degraded capability to fulfill patient care.
▪ Malware infections: In this type of attack, a threat actor places malicious software on the pump,
likely as part of an APT campaign, or to cause an adverse situation on the pump or pump
systems. One example of a malware infection is that of ransomware, in which malicious
software would cause a disruption of the availability of the pump for standard operations, and
may affect patient safety by preventing providers from leveraging system functionality (e.g., the
ability to associate the pump with a patient and deliver medications), or by preventing the pump
from effectively using safety measures, such as the drug library.
▪ Theft or loss of assets: This threat type applies when the pump or pump system components
are not accounted for in an inventory, thereby leading to a degraded availability of equipment,
and a possible breach of protected health information (PHI).
▪ Unintentional misuse: This threat considers the possibility that the pump or its components
may be unintentionally misconfigured or used for unintended purposes, including errors
introduced through the misapplication of updates to operating systems or firmware,
misconfiguration of settings that allow the pump to achieve network connectivity or
communication to the pump server, misapplication or errors found in the drug library, or errors
associated with fluids applied to pumps.

▪ Vulnerable systems or devices directly connected to the device (e.g., via Universal Serial Bus
[USB], or other hardwired non-network connections): Extending from the unintentional misuse
of the device, this threat considers scenarios in which individuals may expose devices or server
components by using external ports or interfaces for purposes outside the device’s intended use
(e.g., to extract data to portable storage media, to connect a mobile device to recharge that
device’s battery). In leveraging ports for unintended purposes, threat actors may enable
malicious software to migrate to the pump or server components, or to create adverse
conditions based on unexpected connections.

Appendix B Vulnerabilities
Some typical vulnerabilities that may arise when using wireless infusion pumps are listed below.
▪ Lack of asset inventory: Deficient or out-of-date inventories represent a cybersecurity control

deficiency that may lead to the loss/theft of devices or equipment, with little chance for the
hospital to recover or take recourse against losses. Deficient asset inventory controls, when
paired with a credible threat, such as the loss or theft of a device or equipment, raise risks
associated with a provider’s ability to render patient care, and may expose protected health
information (PHI) to unauthorized individuals.
▪ Long useful life: Infusion pumps are designed to perform clinical functions for several years, and
they tend to have long-term refresh rates. One vulnerability associated with infrequent refresh
is that each device’s technological attributes may become obsolete or insufficient to support
patching or updating, or cybersecurity controls that may become available in the future.
▪ Information/data vulnerabilities:
• Lack of encryption on private/sensitive data at rest: Pump devices may have local
persistent storage, but they may not have a means to encrypt data stored on the device.
Locally stored data may include sensitive configuration information, or patient information,
including possible PHI.
• Lack of encryption on transmitted data: Sensitive data should be safeguarded in transit as
well as at rest. Where capabilities exist, pumps and server components should employ
encryption on the network or when transmitting sensitive information. An inability to
safeguard data in transit, by using appropriate encryption capabilities, may expose
sensitive information or allow malicious actors to determine how to connect to a pump or
server to perform unauthorized activities.
• Unauthorized changes to device calibration or configuration data: Modifications made to
pump or server components that are not accurately approved, deployed, or tracked may
lead to adverse operation of the equipment. Hospitals should ensure that changes to the
device calibration or configuration, or the modification of safeguard measures, such as the
drug library, are performed and managed using appropriate measures.
• Insufficient data backup: Providing backup and recovery capability is a common
cybersecurity control to ensure that healthcare delivery organizations (HDOs) can restore
services in a timely fashion after an adverse event. Hospitals should perform appropriate
pump system backup and restore functions.
• Lack of capability to de-identify private/sensitive data: As a secondary cybersecurity
control to data encryption, hospitals may wish to consider the ability to de-identify or
obfuscate sensitive information or PHI.
• Lack of data validation: Data used and captured by infusion pumps and associated server
components may require data integrity assurance to support proper functioning and

patient safety. Mechanisms should be used to provide assurance that data cannot be
altered inappropriately.
▪ Device/endpoint (infusion pump) vulnerabilities:
• Debug-enabled interfaces: Interfaces required to support or troubleshoot infusion pump
functions should be identified, with procedures noted to indicate when interfaces are
available, and how interfaces may be disabled when not required for troubleshooting or
system updates/fixes.
• Use of removable media: Infusion pumps that include external or removable storage
should be identified. Cybersecurity precautions are necessary because the use of

removable media may lead to inappropriate information disclosure, and may provide a
viable avenue for malicious software to migrate to the pump or server components.
• Lack of physical tamper detection and response: Infusion pumps may involve physical
interaction, including access to interfaces used for debugging. HDOs should enable
mechanisms to prevent physical tampering with infusion pump devices, including alerting
appropriate personnel whenever a pump or its server components are manipulated or
altered.
• Misconfiguration: Mechanisms should be used to ensure that pump configurations are
well-managed and may not be configured to produce adverse conditions.
• Poorly protected and patched devices: Like the misconfiguration vulnerability, HDOs
should implement processes to protect/patch/update pumps and server components. This
may involve including controls on the device, or provisions that allow for external controls
that would prevent exposure to flaws or weaknesses.
▪ User or administrator accounts vulnerabilities:
• Hard-coded or factory-default passcodes: Processes or mechanisms should be added to
prevent the use of so-called hard-coded or factory-default passcodes. This would overcome
a common information-technology (IT) systems deficiency in the use of authentication
mechanisms for privileged access to devices, in terms of using weak passwords or
passcodes protection. Weak authentication mechanisms that are well-known or published
degrade the effectiveness of authentication control measures. HDOs should implement a
means to update and manage passwords.
• Lack of role-based access and/or use of principles of least privilege: When access
management roles and principles of least privilege are poorly designed, they may allow the
use of a generic identity (e.g., a so-called admin account) that enables a greater access
capability than necessary. HDOs should implement processes to limit access to privileged
accounts, infusion pumps, and server components, and should use accounts or identities
that tie to specific functions, rather than providing/enabling the use of super user, root, or
admin privileges.

• Dormant accounts: Accounts or identities that are not used may be described as dormant.
Dormant account information should be disabled or removed from pumps and server
components.
• Weak remote access controls: When remote access to a pump and/or server components
is required, access controls should be appropriately enforced to safeguard each network
session and to ensure appropriate authentication and authorization.
▪ IT network infrastructure vulnerabilities:
• Lack of malware protection: Pumps and server components should be protected using
processes or mechanisms to prevent malware distribution. When malware protection

cannot be implemented on endpoint devices, malware detection should be implemented to
protect network traffic.
• Lack of system hardening: Pumps and server components should incorporate protective
measures that limit functionality only to the specific capabilities necessary for infusion
pump operations.
• Insecure network configuration: HDOs should employ a least-privilege principle when
configuring networks that include pumps and server components, limiting network traffic
capabilities, and enforcing limited trust between zones identified in hospital environments.
• System complexity: When implementing network infrastructure controls, hospitals should
seek device models and communications paths/patterns that limit complexity where
possible.

Appendix C Recommendations and Best Practices
The recommendations listed below address additional security concerns that are worthy of
consideration. If applied, these additional recommendations will likely reduce risk factors or prevent
them from becoming greater risks. Associated best practices for reducing the overall risk posture of
infusion pumps are also included in the following list.
▪ Consider forming a Medical Device Security Committee composed of staff members from
biomedical services, information technology (IT), and InfoSec that would report to C-suite
governance.
• Enable this committee to manage the security of all network-connected medical devices.
Too often, for example, the biomedical services team is solely responsible for cradle-to-
grave maintenance of all aspects of medical devices, including cybersecurity, leaving IT and
InfoSec staff out of the loop.
• Develop a committee charter with roles and responsibilities and reporting requirements to
the C-suite and Board of Directors.
▪ Consider the physical security of mobile medical devices, including wireless infusion pumps.
• Designate a secure and lockable space for storing these devices when they are not in use.
• Ensure that only personnel with a valid need have access to these spaces. Ideally, a
proximity system with logging should be used and frequently audited.
▪ Create a comprehensive inventory of medical devices, and actively manage it.
• Consider the use of radio-frequency identification (RFID) or real-time locating systems
(RTLS) technologies to assist with inventory processes and to help staff locate devices that
have been moved without documentation.
▪ Ensure that any Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan includes medical devices.
• Recently, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Industrial Control Systems Cyber
Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) have both issued cybersecurity vulnerability
advisories for medical devices. This was the first major warning to covered entities
regarding medical device vulnerabilities. Most covered entities have not incorporated
medical device response into their planning.
▪ Ensure that pumps cannot step down to a Wireless Encryption Protocol (WEP) encrypted
network.
• WEP is a compromised encryption protocol that should NEVER be used in operational
wireless networks.
• Operating any form of IT equipment, including medical devices, over a WEP network will
result in the potential for data compromise and a regulatory breach.

• Any wireless network should be using, at a minimum, Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2).
This protocol implements the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)-recommended Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
▪ Put in place an Information Security department, and functionally separate it from the IT
department. This is necessary to ensure that operational IT personnel are not responsible for
any information security measures, which may otherwise lead to a fox-guarding-the-hen-house
situation.
• Enable a separate InfoSec department to report to the Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO), rather than to the Chief Information Officer (CIO).
• Make this organization part of the Medical Device Security Committee.

▪ Create an operational information security program. This can take the form of an in-house
Security Operations Center (SOC) to monitor information systems and initiate cybersecurity
incident response, including monitoring potential exploits of medical devices, as necessary.
Alternatively, organizations may wish to consider a Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP) to
perform these duties.
▪ Ensure that vendor management includes the evaluation of information security during the due
diligence phase of any related procurement processes. Too often, the Information Security team
is not brought in until after contracts have been signed.
• When purchasing medical devices, ensure that devices incorporate the latest cybersecurity
controls and capabilities.
• Understand roles and responsibilities related to upgrades, patching, password
management, remote access, etc., to ensure the cybersecurity of products or services.
▪ Consider media access control (MAC) address filtering to limit the exposure of unauthorized
devices attempting to access the network. This would identify a bad actor attempting to access
a medical device from within the network through an exposed wired Ethernet port.
▪ Develop or update policies and procedures to ensure a holistic approach to deployment,
sanitization, and reuse of medical devices; include the Medical Device Security Committee.

Appendix D Acronyms
AAMI Advancement of Medical Instrumentation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AP Access Point
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
ASA Adaptive Security Appliance
ASM Alaris System Maintenance

ATP:N Advanced Threat Protection: Network
BD Becton, Dickinson and Company
CAPWAP Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
CFC NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CIO Chief Information Officer
CISO Chief Information Security Officer
COI Community of Interest
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
DCS:SA Data Center Security: Server Advanced
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EHR Electronic Health Record
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HDO Healthcare Delivery Organization
HIDS Host Intrusion Detection System
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HIPS Host Intrusion Prevention System
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure

ICS-CERT Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IoC Indicator of Compromise
IoMT Internet of Medical Things
IoT Internet of Things
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System

ISE Identity Services Engine
ISO International Standards Organization
IT Information Technology
ITAM Information Technology Asset Management
KRACK Key Reinstallation Attack
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LVP Large Volume Pump
MAC Medium Access Control
MAUDE Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience
MDISS Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Security Consortium
MDRAP Medical Device Risk Assessment Platform
MSSP Managed Security Service Provider
NAT Network Address Translation
NCCoE National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVD National Vulnerability Database
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
PAC Process Access Control
PCU Patient Care Unit
PHI Protected Health Information
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PSK Pre-Shared Key

RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
RMF Risk Management Framework
RTLS Real-Time Locating Systems
SD Secure Digital
SEP Symantec Endpoint Protection
SIEM Security Information and Events Management
SOC Security Operations Center

SP Special Publication
SSID Service Set Identifier
SSO Single Sign-On
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TIR Technical Information Report
TLS Transport Layer Security
U.S. United States
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VPN Virtual Private Network
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
WLC Wireless LAN Controller
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access II

Appendix E References
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NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8C
Securing Wireless
Infusion Pumps
Volume C:
How-to Guides
Gavin O’Brien
Sallie Edwards
Kevin Littlefield
Neil McNab
Sue Wang
Kangmin Zheng
McLean, VA
August 2018

draft.pdf
DISCLAIMER
Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified in this document in
order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended
to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE, nor is it intended to imply that the
entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1800-8C, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.
Spec. Publ. 1800-8C, 257 pages, (July 2018), CODEN: NSPUE2
FEEDBACK
As a private-public partnership, we are always seeking feedback on our Practice Guides. We are
particularly interested in seeing how businesses apply NCCoE reference designs in the real world. If you
have implemented the reference design, or have questions about applying it in your environment,
please email us at hit_nccoe@nist.gov.

100 Bureau Drive
Mailstop 2002
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Email: nccoe@nist.gov
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps i

NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), is a collaborative hub where industry organizations, government agencies, and
academic institutions work together to address businesses’ most pressing cybersecurity issues. This
public-private partnership enables the creation of practical cybersecurity solutions for specific
industries, as well as for broad, cross-sector technology challenges. Through consortia under
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), including technology partners—from
Fortune 50 market leaders to smaller companies specializing in IT security—the NCCoE applies standards
and best practices to develop modular, easily adaptable example cybersecurity solutions using
commercially available technology. The NCCoE documents these example solutions in the NIST Special
Publication 1800 series, which maps capabilities to the NIST Cyber Security Framework and details the
steps needed for another entity to recreate the example solution. The NCCoE was established in 2012 by
NIST in partnership with the State of Maryland and Montgomery County, Md.
To learn more about the NCCoE, visit https://nccoe.nist.gov. To learn more about NIST, visit
https://nist.gov.
NIST CYBERSECURITY PRACTICE GUIDES

NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication Series 1800) target specific cybersecurity
challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the
adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information
security community how to implement example solutions that help them align more easily with relevant
standards and best practices and provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other
information they need to implement a similar approach.
The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that
businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. These documents do not describe regulations
or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.
ABSTRACT
the patient or medical provider. However, today’s medical devices connect to a variety of health care
systems, networks, and other tools within a healthcare delivery organization (HDO). Connecting devices
to point-of-care medication systems and electronic health records can improve healthcare delivery
processes; however, increasing connectivity capabilities also creates cybersecurity risks. Potential
threats include unauthorized access to patient health information, changes to prescribed drug doses,
and interference with a pump’s function.
The NCCoE at NIST analyzed risk factors in and around the infusion pump ecosystem by using a
questionnaire-based risk assessment to develop an example implementation that demonstrates how
HDOs can use standards-based, commercially available cybersecurity technologies to better protect the
This practice guide will help HDOs implement current cybersecurity standards and best practices to
reduce their cybersecurity risk, while maintaining the performance and usability of wireless infusion
pumps.
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps ii

KEYWORDS
authentication; authorization; digital certificates; encryption; infusion pumps; Internet of Things (IoT);
medical devices; network zoning; pump servers; questionnaire-based risk assessment; segmentation;
virtual private network (VPN); Wi-Fi; wireless medical devices
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to the following individuals for their generous contributions of expertise and time.
Name Organization
Arnab Ray Baxter Healthcare Corporation

Pavel Slavin Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Phillip Fisk Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Raymond Kan Baxter Healthcare Corporation
Tom Kowalczyk B. Braun Medical Inc.
David Suarez Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Robert Canfield Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Rob Suarez Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Robert Skelton Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)
Peter Romness Cisco
Kevin McFadden Cisco
Rich Curtiss Clearwater Compliance
Darin Andrew DigiCert
Kris Singh DigiCert
Mike Nelson DigiCert
Chaitanya Srinivasamurthy Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU Medical)
Joseph Sener Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU Medical)
Chris Edwards Intercede
Won Jun Intercede

Dale Nordenberg
(MDISS)
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps iii

Name Organization

Jay Stevens
(MDISS)
Carlos Aguayo Gonzalez PFP Cybersecurity
Thurston Brooks PFP Cybersecurity
Colin Bowers Ramparts

Bill Hagestad Smiths Medical
Axel Wirth Symantec Corporation
Bryan Jacobs Symantec Corporation
Bill Johnson TDi Technologies, Inc.
Barbara De Pompa Reimers The MITRE Corporation
Sarah Kinling The MITRE Corporation
Marilyn Kupetz The MITRE Corporation
David Weitzel The MITRE Corporation
Mary Yang The MITRE Corporation
The Technology Partners/Collaborators who participated in this build submitted their capabilities in
response to a notice in the Federal Register. Respondents with relevant capabilities or product
components were invited to sign a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with
NIST, allowing them to participate in a consortium to build this example solution. We worked with:
Baxter Healthcare Corporation • Sigma Spectrum™ Large Volume Pump (LVP) Version 8
• Sigma Spectrum Wireless Battery Module Version 8
• Sigma Spectrum Master Drug Library Version 8
• Care Everywhere Gateway Server Version 14
B. Braun Medical Inc. • Infusomat® Space Infusion System / Large-Volume

Pumps
• DoseTrac® Infusion Management Software / Infusion
Pump Software
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps iv

Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) • Alaris® 8015 Patient Care Unit (PCU) Version 9.19.2
• Alaris Syringe Module 8110
• Alaris LVP Module 8100
• Alaris Systems Manager Version 4.2
• Alaris System Maintenance (ASM) Version 10.19
Cisco • Aironet 1600 Series Access Point (AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9)

• Wireless LAN [Local Area Network] (WLC) Controller
8.2.111.0
• Identity Services Engine (ISE)
• Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA)
• Catalyst 3650 Switch
Clearwater Compliance • IRM|Pro™

• IRM|Analysis™
DigiCert CertCentral® management account / Certificate Authority
Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU • Plum 360™ Infusion System Version 15.10
Medical)
• LifeCare PCA™ Infusion System Version 7.02
• MedNet™ Version 6.2
Intercede MyID®
Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Medical Device Risk Assessment Platform (MDRAP™)
Security Consortium (MDISS)
PFP Cybersecurity Device Monitor
Ramparts Risk Assessment
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps v

Smiths Medical • Medfusion® 3500 Version 5 Syringe Infusion System

• PharmGuard® Toolbox Version 1.5
• Medfusion 4000 Wireless Syringe Infusion Pump
• PharmGuard Toolbox 2 Version 3.0 use with Medfusion
4000 and 3500 Version 6 (US)
• PharmGuard Server Licenses, PharmGuard Server
Enterprise Edition Version 1.1

• CADD®-Solis Ambulatory Infusion Pump
• CADD-Solis Medication Safety Software
Symantec Corporation • Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP)

• Advanced Threat Protection: Network (ATP:N)
• Data Center Security: Server Advanced (DCS:SA)
TDi Technologies, Inc. ConsoleWorks®
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps vi

Contents
1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
1.1 Practice Guide Structure ............................................................................................... 1
1.2 Typographical Conventions ........................................................................................... 2
1.3 How-To Overview .......................................................................................................... 3
1.4 Logical Architecture Summary ...................................................................................... 3
2 Product Installation Guides .................................................................. 4

2.1 The Core Network ......................................................................................................... 4
2.1.1 Cisco ASA Baseline Configuration .................................................................................4
2.1.2 External Firewall and Guest Network ...........................................................................5
2.1.3 Enterprise Services ........................................................................................................5
2.1.4 Biomedical Engineering Network..................................................................................5
2.1.5 Medical Devices ............................................................................................................6
2.1.6 Cisco Catalyst Switch Configuration..............................................................................6
2.1.7 Cisco Enterprise Wi-Fi Infrastructure ............................................................................7
2.1.8 TDi ConsoleWorks External Remote Access ...............................................................14
2.2 Infusion Pump and Pump Server ................................................................................. 25
2.2.1 Infusion Pumps ...........................................................................................................25
2.2.2 Infusion Pumps Server Systems ..................................................................................31
2.3 Identity Services .......................................................................................................... 32
2.3.1 Cisco Identity Service Engine ......................................................................................32
2.3.2 DigiCert Certificate Authority .....................................................................................38
2.4 Symantec Endpoint Protection and Intrusion Detection ............................................ 44
2.4.1 Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced .....................................................44
2.4.2 Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager ....................................................................49
2.4.3 Symantec Advanced Threat Protection: Network ......................................................50
2.5 Risk Assessment Tools ................................................................................................. 52
2.5.1 PFP Device Monitoring System: pMon 751 and P2Scan .............................................52
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps vii

2.5.2 Clearwater IRM|Analysis™ Software ..........................................................................61
2.5.3 MDISS MDRAP.............................................................................................................71
Appendix A Baseline Configuration File ................................................ 81

A.1 Baseline Configuration File .......................................................................................... 81
A.2 External Firewall and Guest Network ASA Configuration File .................................... 84
A.3 Enterprise Services ASA Configuration File ................................................................. 93
A.4 Biomedical Engineering ............................................................................................. 101

A.5 Medical Devices Zone ASA Configuration File........................................................... 110
A.6 Switch Configuration File .......................................................................................... 115
A.7 Wireless Configuration .............................................................................................. 122
Appendix B Sample Pump Configuration Parameters......................... 246
Appendix C Acronyms ........................................................................ 253
Appendix D References ...................................................................... 256
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps viii

List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Logical Architecture Summary ........................................................................................... 3
Figure 2-1 Importing Server Certificate ............................................................................................ 36
Figure 2-2 DCS:SA Environment ....................................................................................................... 45
Figure 2-3 PFP Monitoring System Reference Setup ......................................................................... 53
Figure 2-4 P2Scan Home Page.......................................................................................................... 54
Figure 2-5 New Project Creation ...................................................................................................... 55

Figure 2-6 P2Scan Main Screen ........................................................................................................ 55
Figure 2-7 P2Scan Configuration Parameters .................................................................................... 56
Figure 2-8 Data Collection Screen During Capture ............................................................................ 57
Figure 2-9 Completed Baseline Extraction Screen ............................................................................. 58
Figure 2-10 Runtime Monitoring Showing the Execution of Four Different States.............................. 59
Figure 2-11 Runtime Monitoring Showing an Anomalous State ........................................................ 60
Figure 2-12 Sample Contents Saved in the Runtime Results File ........................................................ 61
Figure 2-13 IRM|Analysis Login Page ............................................................................................... 62
Figure 2-14 Asset Inventory List ....................................................................................................... 63
Figure 2-15 New Asset..................................................................................................................... 63
Figure 2-16 Media/Asset Groups ..................................................................................................... 64
Figure 2-17 Edit Media/Asset Group ................................................................................................ 65
Figure 2-18 Controls – Global/Media ............................................................................................... 66
Figure 2-19 Risk Questionnaire List .................................................................................................. 67
Figure 2-20 Risk Questionnaire Form (Part 1) ................................................................................... 67
Figure 2-21 Risk Questionnaire Form (Part 2) ................................................................................... 68
Figure 2-22 Risk Response List – Risk Registry .................................................................................. 69
Figure 2-23 Risk Treat and Evaluate Form ........................................................................................ 69
Figure 2-24 Dashboard Example ...................................................................................................... 70
Figure 2-25 Report Example ............................................................................................................ 71
Figure 2-26 MDRAP Login Page ........................................................................................................ 72
Figure 2-27 MDRAP Welcome Page.................................................................................................. 73
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps ix

Figure 2-28 Device Inventory List ..................................................................................................... 73
Figure 2-29 Add Device.................................................................................................................... 74
Figure 2-30 Edit Device .................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 2-31 Inventory Bulk Import ................................................................................................... 76
Figure 2-32 Device Inventory Template Sample ................................................................................ 76
Figure 2-33 Create Assessment (Part 1) ............................................................................................ 77
Figure 2-34 Create Assessment (Part 2) ............................................................................................ 78
Figure 2-35 Assessment Step (Example 1) ........................................................................................ 78

Figure 2-36 Assessment Step (Example 2) ........................................................................................ 79
Figure 2-37 Assessment Result (Dashboard Example) ....................................................................... 79
Figure 2-38 Assessment Result (Report Example) ............................................................................. 80
List of Tables
Table 2-1 Infusion Pump List............................................................................................................ 25
Table 2-2 Summary of Infusion Pump Configuration Methods .......................................................... 27
Table 2-3 Pump Servers Used in this Example Implementation ......................................................... 31
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps x

1 Introduction
The following guides show information technology (IT) professionals and security engineers how we
implemented this example solution. We cover all of the products employed in this reference design. We
do not recreate the product manufacturers’ documentation, which is presumed to be widely available.
Rather, these guides show how we incorporated the products together in our environment.
Note: These are not comprehensive tutorials. There are many possible service and security configurations
for these products that are out of scope for this reference design.
1.1 Practice Guide Structure

This National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a
standards-based reference design and provides users with the information they need to replicate
commercially available technologies that can help secure the wireless infusion pump ecosystem. This
reference design is modular and can be deployed in whole or in parts.
This guide contains three volumes:
▪ NIST Special Publication (SP) 1800-8a: Executive Summary
▪ NIST SP 1800-8b: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics – what we built and why
▪ NIST SP 1800-8c: How-To Guides – instructions for building the example solution (you are here)
Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:
Business decision makers, including chief security and technology officers, will be interested in the
Executive Summary (NIST SP 1800-8a), which describes the:
▪ challenges enterprises face in securing the wireless infusion pump ecosystem
▪ example solution built at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE)
▪ benefits of adopting the example solution
Technology or security program managers who are concerned with how to identify, understand, assess,
and mitigate risk will be interested in NIST SP 1800-8b, which describes what we did and why. The
following sections will be of particular interest:
▪ Section 4, Risk Assessment and Mitigation, describes the risk analysis we performed
▪ Section 4.3, Security Characteristics and Control Mapping, maps the security characteristics of
this example solution to cybersecurity standards and best practices
You might share the Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-8a, with your leadership team members to help
them understand the importance of adopting standards-based, commercially available technologies that
can help secure the wireless infusion pump ecosystem.
NIST SP 1800-8C: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps 1

IT professionals who want to implement an approach like this will find the whole practice guide useful.
You can use the How-To portion of the guide, NIST SP 1800-8c, to replicate all or parts of the build
created in our lab. The How-To guide provides specific product installation, configuration, and
integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not recreate the product
manufacturers’ documentation, which is generally widely available. Rather, we show how we
incorporated the products in our environment to create an example solution.
This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products within the
enterprise. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does
not endorse these particular products. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that adheres to
these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing
parts of commercially available technologies that can help secure the wireless infusion pump ecosystem.
Your organization’s security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with your
existing tools and IT system infrastructure. We hope you will seek products that are congruent with
applicable standards and best practices. In NIST SP 1800-8b, Section 4.4, Technologies, lists the products
we used and maps them to the cybersecurity controls provided by this reference solution.
1.2 Typographical Conventions

The following table presents typographic conventions used in this volume.
Typeface/Symbol Meaning Example
Italics filenames and pathnames For detailed definitions of terms, see

references to documents that the NCCoE Glossary.
are not hyperlinks, new terms,
and placeholders
Bold names of menus, options, Choose File > Edit.

command buttons and fields
Monospace command-line input, on-screen mkdir

computer output, sample code
examples, status codes
Monospace Bold command-line user input service sshd start

contrasted with computer
output
blue text link to other parts of the All publications from NIST’s National
document, a web URL, or an Cybersecurity Center of Excellence are
email address available at https://nccoe.nist.gov.

1.3 How-To Overview
Refer to NIST SP 1800-8b: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics for an explanation of why
we used each technology.
1.4 Logical Architecture Summary

Figure 1-1 depicts a reference network architecture that performs groupings that would translate to
network segments or zones. The rationale behind segmentation and zoning is to limit trust between
areas of the network. In considering a hospital infrastructure, NCCoE identified devices and usage, and
grouped them by usage. The grouping facilitated the identification of network zones. Once zones are
defined, infrastructure components may be configured such that those zones do not inherently have
network access to other zones within the hospital network infrastructure. Segmenting the network in
this fashion limits the overall attack surface posed to the infusion pump environment, and considers the
network infrastructure configuration as part of an overall defense in depth strategy.
Figure 1-1 Logical Architecture Summary

2 Product Installation Guides
This section of the practice guide contains detailed instructions for installing and configuring all of the
products used to build an instance of the example solution.
2.1 The Core Network

The NCCoE’s example architecture implements a core network zone, which is used to establish the
backbone network infrastructure. The external firewall/router also has an interface connected to the
core enterprise network, just like other firewall/router devices in the other zones. The core network
zone serves as the backbone of the enterprise network and consists only of routers connected by
switches. The routers automatically share internal route information with each other via authenticated
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [1] to mitigate configuration errors as zones are added or removed.
Several functional segments may be part of this core network:
▪ guest network
▪ business office (example only)
▪ database server (example only)
▪ enterprise services
▪ clinical services (example only)
▪ biomedical engineering
▪ medical devices with wireless LAN
▪ remote access for external vendor support
The NCCoE build uses Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances (ASA) as virtual router and firewall devices
within the network. Each defined zone in the hospital network that we built has its own ASA, with two
interfaces to protect each zone. As we considered how many ASAs to use, we opted for a tradeoff
between the complexity of the configuration and the number of interfaces on a single ASA.
2.1.1 Cisco ASA Baseline Configuration

In our environment, all ASAs are virtualized and are based on Cisco’s Adaptive Security Virtual Appliance
(ASAv) product. In your environment, the responsible person would complete installation by following
the Cisco Adaptive Security Virtual Appliance (ASAv) Quick Start Guide, 9.6 [2].
We imported the virtual appliance called asav-vi.ovf, assigning the first interface to the management
network, the second interface to the wide area network (WAN), and the third interface to the local area
network (LAN). For an unknown reason, the show version command did not work in the console; as a
workaround, we configured Secure Shell (SSH) [3] access and ran the command via SSH instead.

Next, we configured the ASA with a baseline-configuration template that allows all outbound traffic, as
well as only related inbound traffic as allowed by the stateful firewall. Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) [4] enables troubleshooting with ping and traceroute tools. Authenticated OSPF automated
routing tables as we added or removed ASAs in the network. In your production environment, you may
wish to make different decisions in your baseline configuration. All ASAs have an additional
management interface on 192.168.29.0/24. We opted to configure Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) [5] and SSH for management use on this interface, but not on the other interfaces.
See Section A.1 of Appendix A for the ASA configuration for this zone.
2.1.2 External Firewall and Guest Network

We configured the build network to use network address translation (NAT) at the external firewall. This
is the only point in the network where NAT is used. The upstream provider uses 10.0.0.0/8 addresses on
the WAN interface. We also defined a LAN interface on 192.168.100.0/24 as the core network where
other ASAs connect. Another interface is defined as GUEST on 192.168.170.0/24. We assigned the
GUEST and LAN interfaces equal security levels, higher than those for the WAN interface. When ASA
interfaces are configured with equal security levels, they, by default, cannot communicate with each
other, but they will both have WAN access. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [6] is enabled
on the GUEST interface for addressing.
2.1.3 Enterprise Services

We defined a LAN interface on 192.168.120.0/24 as the LAN for all enterprise services. Ports are open
for the domain name system (DNS) from the biomedical engineering network to the DNS servers.
Port 8114 is open for all hosts to the Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP) server. Several ports are open
for any host to the Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced (DCS:SA).
2.1.4 Biomedical Engineering Network

This zone contains a dedicated wireless network to support the wireless infusion pumps. We defined a
LAN interface on 192.168.140.0/24 for all biomedical equipment, including infusion pump servers. Each
manufacturer has a custom set of ports opened to their server. These ports are only accessible from the
medical device network.
Generally, the firewall is configured in this way:
▪ all pump servers > internet/intranet (all destinations)
▪ all intranet > all pump servers Ping and Traceroute (primarily for debugging)
▪ all pumps > Smiths Medical Pump Server on Port 1588

▪ all pumps > Carefusion Pump Server on Port 3613
▪ all pumps > Baxter Pump Server on Port 51244
▪ all pumps > Hospira Pump server on Ports 443, 8443, 8100, 9292, 11443, and 11444
▪ all pumps > B. Braun Pump server on Ports 443, 80, 8080, 1500, and 4080
2.1.5 Medical Devices

We defined a LAN interface on 192.168.150.0/24 as the LAN for all medical devices. The infusion pump
systems are designed such that all external connections to the pumps, such as an electronic health
record (EHR) system or vendor maintenance, are completed with the associated pump server on the
biomedical engineering network. This enables us to deny all outbound traffic not destined for the
biomedical engineering network. In addition, because some pump servers initiate connections to open
ports on the pumps, we added vendor-specific rules to allow this. A DNS server is not useful in this case;
however, if you need one, we recommend that the ASA act as a forwarder. The DHCP server on the ASA
is enabled for LAN addressing. In our lab, we discovered that at least one brand of infusion pump would
not recognize network setup as complete, unless at least one DNS server address was set. In this case,
the DNS server address only needed to be included in the configuration; a DNS server did not actually
need to be present at that address.
Generally, the firewall is configured in this way:
▪ all pumps > all pumps servers
▪ all intranet > all pumps Ping and Traceroute (primarily for debugging)
▪ Hospira Pump Server > all pumps on Ports 8100, 9292, 443, and 8443
▪ Baxter Pump Server > all pumps on Port 51243
▪ B. Braun Pump Server > all pumps on Ports 80, 443, 8080, and 1500
2.1.6 Cisco Catalyst Switch Configuration

The Catalyst 3650 switch is configured with four virtual local area networks (VLANs) [7]. One port is
assigned to a management VLAN, with Subnet 192.168.20.0/24. Wireless access points (APs) are
connected to a Wi-Fi management VLAN, which is also trunked back to the virtual wireless LAN
controller (WLC) software. Additionally, the biomedical engineering network and the medical device
network have some physical ports configured for testing, both of which are also trunked back to the
virtualization hardware and ASAs. DHCP is enabled for the wireless APs. SNMP and SSH are enabled for
management. The switch also supports Power over Ethernet (PoE), allowing for a single Ethernet cable,
with both data and power for the APs.

To set up your organization’s configuration, follow the instructions in Cisco’s Catalyst 3650 Switch
Getting Started Guide [8].
See Section A.6 of Appendix A for the switch configuration.
2.1.7 Cisco Enterprise Wi-Fi Infrastructure

The Wi-Fi management network is different, in that it does not have a firewall/router that connects
directly to the core network. As a completely closed network, the Wi-Fi management network is used
for management and communication between the Cisco Aironet wireless APs and the Cisco WLC. The
WLC is the central point where wireless service set identifiers (SSIDs), VLANs, and Wi-Fi Protected
Access II (WPA2) [9] security settings are managed for the entire enterprise. We defined two SSIDs:
IP_Dev and IP_Dev_Cert. IP_Dev uses WPA2-PSK (Pre-Shared Key), and IP_Dev_Cert uses
WPA2-Enterprise protocols.
2.1.7.1 Installation
In our environment, the Cisco WLC is virtualized. In your environment, the responsible person would
complete installation by following Cisco’s Virtual Wireless LAN Controller Deployment Guide 8.2 [10].
We imported the virtual appliance called AIR_CTVM_K9_8_2_111_0.ova, assigning the first interface to
the management network, referred to as service-port in the web interface. The second interface is used
as a trunk port, with VLAN tags for all user and Wi-Fi management traffic. In the web interface, the built-
in management interface refers to the wireless system control traffic network to which the APs are
connected.
The primary management mechanism for the WLC is the web interface. To configure an Internet
Protocol (IP) address for the web interface, we first needed to use the console and complete the setup
wizard that sets the service-port address. What follows is our process, which your organization can
adapt to your needs.
2.1.7.2 Controller Configuration

Follow these steps to configure network interfaces:
1. Configure the interface for AP management traffic at Controller > Interfaces > Management.

2. Configure interfaces for user Wi-Fi traffic by first mapping the interface to an Ethernet port and
setting the VLAN and IP address, and then mapping to wireless SSIDs.
Create the new interface at Controller > Interfaces > New.
Configure the new interface by using the form shown below. Refer to the completed
interface for the values that we used in the lab.

Our completed list of interfaces looks as shown below.
3. Configure the Network Time Protocol (NTP) server [11] at Controller > NTP > Server > New.

4. To configure the DHCP server, disable the DHCP Proxy at Controller > Advanced > DHCP.
2.1.7.3 Wireless AP Connection and Setup

Connect the APs to the Ethernet ports configured for untagged VLAN 1520. The APs will automatically
obtain their addresses and the WLC address via DHCP from the switch (see Section 2.1.6). No other
VLANs should to be configured for the APs because we are using a centralized switching model where
Wi-Fi traffic VLANs are connected to the enterprise network through the WLC.
As each AP is connected, it should show up in the Wireless tab on the WLC. For each AP, the AP Mode
needs to be set to FlexConnect, as shown below.
2.1.7.4 Authentication Configuration

To use certificate-based authentication, the WLC must consult a remote authentication dial-in user
service (RADIUS) server. Configure the Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) RADIUS server IP address and
shared secret at Security > RADIUS > Authentication > New.

2.1.7.5 WLANs Configuration
At this point, we configured two SSIDs for medical devices: IP_Dev and IP_Dev_Cert. IP_Dev is
configured for WPA2-PSK (Advanced Encryption Standard [AES] [12]), and IP_Dev_Cert is configured for
WPA2-Enterprise (AES). Both SSIDs use the same interface, and therefore connect to the same network
VLAN; the only difference is the Wi-Fi security.
To create a new SSID, follow these steps:
1. Use the WLANS tab, select Create New from the dropdown list and click Go.
2. Enter your new SSID information.
3. In WLANs > WLANs > WLANs, select the WLAN identification (ID) number of the newly created
SSID. For the Status, select the checkbox for Enabled. Set the Interface/Interface Group(G) to
ip_dev.

4. On the Security tab, on the Layer 2 sub-tab, under Authentication Key Management, de-select
the Enable checkbox for 802.1X, select the Enable checkbox for PSK, and set the PSK Format.

5. For the SSID IP_Dev_Cert, repeat Steps 1 through 4 above (replacing IP_Dev with IP_Dev_Cert in
the instructions), but do not change the security settings for Authentication Key Management
(leave 802.1X checked, and leave PSK unchecked).
6. On the Security tab, on the AAA Servers sub-tab, select the RADIUS server to authenticate with
(Server 1).
2.1.7.6 Monitoring
By using Monitor > Clients, you will find the list of currently connected clients, to which SSID they are
connected, and the username used to authenticate (Common Name from Certificate).

2.1.7.7 Final Configuration

See Section A.7 of Appendix A for the WLC configuration. You can access details about additional
configuration options in the Cisco Wireless Controller Configuration Guide, Release 8.0 [13].
2.1.8 TDi ConsoleWorks External Remote Access

The NCCoE lab implemented a VendorNet using TDi ConsoleWorks, which is a browser interface that
enables healthcare delivery organizations (HDOs) to manage, monitor, and record activities from
external vendors in the IT infrastructure.
2.1.8.1 System Environment

The NCCoE lab set up a fully updated (as of April 20, 2016) CentOS 7 operating system, with the
following hardware specifications:
▪ 8 gigabytes (GB) of random access memory (RAM)
▪ 40 GB hard disk drive
▪ one network interface
2.1.8.2 Other Requirements

▪ ConsoleWorks install media (we built from a CD)
▪ ConsoleWorksSSL-<version>.rpm
▪ ConsoleWorks_gui_gateway-<version>.rpm
▪ ConsoleWorks license keys (TDI_Licenses.tar.gz)
▪ software installation command
▪ yum install uuid libbpng12 libvncserver

2.1.8.3 Installation
As Root:
1. Place ConsoleWorks media into the system.
2. mount /dev/sr0 /mnt/cdrom

3. mkdir /tmp/consoleworks
4. cp /mnt/cdrom/consolew.rpm /tmp/consoleworks/consolew.rpm
5. rpm -ivh /tmp/consoleworks/ConsoleWorksSSL-<version>.rpm

6. mkdir /tmp/consoleworkskeys/
7. Copy ConsoleWorks keys to /tmp/consoleworkskeys/.
cd /tmp/consoleworkskeys/
tar xzf TDI_Licenses.tar.gz
cp /tmp/consoleworkskeys* /etc/TDI_licenses/
/opt/ConsoleWorks/bin/cw_add_invo
8. Accept the License Terms.
9. Press the Enter key to continue.
10. Name the instance of ConsoleWorks.
11. Press the Enter key to accept the default port (Port 5176).
12. Press the N key to deny syslog listening.
13. Press the Enter key to accept the parameters entered.
14. Press the Enter key to return to /opt/ConsoleWorks/bin/cw_add_invo.
15. rpm -ivh /tmp/consoleworks/ConsoleWorks_gui_gateway-version>.rpm

16. /opt/gui_gateway/install_local.sh
17. /opt/ConsoleWorks/bin/cw_start <invocation name created early>
18. service gui_gatewayd start

2.1.8.4 Usage
1. Open a browser, and navigate to https://<ConsoleWorksIP>:5176.
2. Log in with Username: console_manager, Password: Setup.
3. Change the default password.
4. Choose Register Now.
NCCoE chose ConsoleWorks to segregate and limit vendor access to our labs. Our data model groups
consoles and graphical connections together into a tag. The tag is a collection of equipment to which
you need to connect, although a vendor typically owns the equipment. This tag allows us to operate on
a group of consoles and graphical connections. We group users from the same vendor into a profile that
allows us to operate on the users. An Access Control Rule associates a profile with a tag and defines
permissions for a particular component type (typically consoles or graphical connections).
2.1.8.5 Initial Configuration of Graphical Gateway

This section is only required for graphical connections, such as virtual network computing (VNC) and
remote desktop protocol (RDP).
Use the menu in the sidebar to access all instructions provided in Section 2.1.8.5 through
Section 2.1.8.12.
1. Click Graphical > Gateways > Add.
2. Set the Name as LOCAL, set the Host as localhost, and set the Port as 5172.
3. Select the Enabled checkbox, and then click Save.
4. Verify that it works by clicking Test in the top-left corner.

2.1.8.6 Create One Tag for Each Vendor Company
1. Click Security > Tags > Add.
2. Set the Name (usually the company name).
3. Click Save.
2.1.8.7 Create One Profile for Each Vendor Company

1. Click Users > Profiles > Add.
3. Click Save.
2.1.8.8 Establish Graphical Access Controls

Repeat this section for each vendor company.
1. Click Security > Access Control > Add.
2. Set the Name to [VENDOR_COMPANY_NAME]_GRAPHICAL.
3. Select the Enabled checkbox.
4. Set the Order.

5. Set the Allow or Deny field to ALLOW.
6. Set the Component Type to Graphical Connection.
7. Look under Profile Selection; you should see:
on the Basic tab, Property Profile Equals [vendor company profile name] <join>
the vendor company profile in the box on the right

8. Look under Resource Selection; you should see:
on the Basic tab, Associated With a Tag that

Property Tag Equals [vendor company tag name] <join>
matching graphical connections in the box on the right
9. Under Privileges, under Resource Level, select the following checkboxes:
Aware
View
Connect

2.1.8.9 Console Access Controls

Repeat this section for each vendor company.
1. Click Security > Access Control > Add.
2. Set the Name to [VENDOR_COMPANY_NAME]_CONSOLE.
3. Select the Enabled checkbox.
4. Set the Order.
5. Set the Allow or Deny field to ALLOW.
6. Set the Component Type to Console.
7. Look under Profile Selection; you should see:
on the Basic tab, Property Profile Equals [vendor company profile name] <join>
the vendor company profile in the box on the right

8. Look under Resource Selection; you should see:
on the Basic tab, Associated With a Tag that

Property Tag Equals [vendor company tag name] <join>
matching consoles in the box on the right
9. Under Privileges, under Resource Level, select the following checkboxes:
Aware
View
Connect

2.1.8.10 Users
1. Click Users > Add.
3. Set the Description.
4. Set the Password, and then retype the password to confirm (Retype Password).
5. Fill in contact information (under Contact Info).
6. Set the profile to the one defined for this user’s company (under PROFILES).
7. Click Save.

2.1.8.11 Add an RDP Graphical Connection

1. Click Graphical > Add.
2. Set the Name for the device to which you are connecting.
3. Set the Type to RDP.
4. Set the Host for the device to which you are connecting.
5. Set the following Authentication fields:
Username
Password
Domain (optional)
6. Add the Graphical Gateway named LOCAL (under GATEWAYS).

7. Add tags for all vendor companies that should have access (under TAGS).
8. Click Save.
2.1.8.12 Add an SSH Console Connection

1. Click Consoles > Add.
2. Set the Name for the device to which you are connecting.
3. Set the Connector to SSH with Password.
4. Set the Host IP for the device to which you are connecting, by doing the following:
Set the Port to 22.
Set the Username.
Set the Password.

Retype the password (Retype Password).
5. Add tags for all vendor companies that should have access (under TAGS).
6. Click Save.

2.2 Infusion Pump and Pump Server
2.2.1 Infusion Pumps
Vendors collaborating with the NCCoE in this use case donated the pump products listed in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1 Infusion Pump List
Vendor Name Product Name Product Type Description

B. Braun Space Station Station for hosting Provides centralized
individual pump power and network

connection for pumps
stacked on the station
Infusomat® Space Wireless infusion pump Designed for acute-
Large-Volume Infusion care facilities for adults
Pump and children
Perfusor® Space Syringe infusion pump Can be stacked in
Syringe Pump Space Station and uses
Space Station for
network
communication
Baxter Baxter Sigma Spectrum Wireless infusion pump Provides a large-
volume infusion
capability for patients
BD Alaris Patient Care Unit Infusion pump core Provides a common
(PCU) 8015 system user interface for
programming infusion,
network connection,
and monitoring
modules. The Alaris
8015 PCU is the core of
the Alaris system and
provides a common
user interface for
programming infusion
and monitoring
modules.
Alaris Syringe 8110 Syringe infusion pump Provides a syringe
infusion capability for
patients, and works
with the Alaris PCU

Vendor Name Product Name Product Type Description
Alaris Pump 8100 Large-volume infusion Provides a large-
pump volume infusion
capability for patients,
and works with the
Alaris PCU
Hospira Plum 360 Infusion system Builds on the air
management and
secondary delivery
features of Plum A+,

while expanding its
drug library and
wireless capability to
enable streamlined
electronic medical
record integration
Hospira PCA PCA syringe infusion Complements the
system infusion pump to
manage pain
Smiths Medical Medfusion 4000 Syringe infusion pump Delivers medication to
patients in critical care
units
CADD-Solis 2000 Ambulatory infusion Delivers medication to
pump patients in hospital,
home care, and
alternative care
facilities
2.2.1.1 Infusion Pump Setup

In our example solution, we generalized the infusion-pump vendors’ products and systems as infusion
pump devices, infusion pump servers, and infusion pump ecosystems. Our first goal was to connect each
vendor’s infusion pump(s) to their corresponding pump server for performing the basic operational
events, such as registering the devices to the server; pushing/installing the new drug library to the
pumps; pushing/updating the new version of software to the pumps; and keeping the log of the pump
usage.
Each pump vendor has a basic setup that includes configuring the pump to connect to the network and
the pump server wirelessly. We used WPA2 security with AES for encryption. In the case of WPA2-PSK
mode, we assigned all infusion pumps the same access password for wireless network authentication. In
the case of WPA2-Enterprise with Extensible Authentication Protocol – Transport Layer Security

(EAP-TLS) [14], we configured the pumps to use an individual certificate issued by DigiCert for wireless
network authentication, using the Cisco ISE, the enterprise authentication server.
Because each pump vendor has its own way of connecting, configuring, and setting up its pumps, we
describe high-level steps in a generic way. Table 2-2 summarizes these key configuration steps. See
Appendix B for the sample configuration files.
Table 2-2 Summary of Infusion Pump Configuration Methods
Vendor Name Infusion Pump Model Configuration Tool Connection Method

Baxter Sigma Spectrum • uses a PC with an • uses the IrDA Serial

Infrared Data Infrared
Association (IrDA) • links to a PC under
interface to the IrDA Serial
program multiple Infrared Link
pumps with the Management
same configuration Protocol Version
• edits the network 1.1
configuration file (a
simple text file) on
a PC, and sends it
via the IrDA to a
pump
B. Braun Space Station • connects a PC with • uses a special
the HiBaSeD B. Braun interface
service program to cable
the Space Station
by using a B. Braun
interface cable for
pump
configuration
setting
Infusomat Space • connects a PC with • uses a special
Large-Volume Infusion the HiBaSeD B. Braun interface
Pump service program to cable
the Space Station
by using a B. Braun
interface cable for
pump
configuration
setting

Perfusor Space Syringe • connects a PC with • uses a special
Pump the HiBaSeD B. Braun interface
service program to cable
the Space Station
by using a B. Braun
interface cable for
pump
configuration
setting
BD Alaris 8015 PC • uses a management • uses a series cable
system to do the to connect the
configuration pump to a local
• is the core of the computer
Alaris system and
provides a
common user
interface for
programming
infusion and
monitoring
modules
Hospira Hospira PCA • accesses Web • uses the pump’s
Configuration Ethernet jack to
Utility on the pump connect to a LAN
through a web or to interface with
browser using the the host computer
local IP address of
the pump
Plum 360 • accesses Web • uses the pump’s
Configuration Ethernet jack to
Utility on the pump connect to a LAN
through a web or to interface with
browser using the the host computer
local IP address of
the pump

Smiths Medical Medfusion 4000 • pushes a • connects a PC to
configuration text pump using micro
file to the pump by Universal Serial Bus
using the Telnet (USB)-USB cable
from a PC that is
connected to the
pump with the
known IP address
CADD-Solis 2000 • uses Smiths Medical • connects a PC to the

Network pump by using a
Configuration micro USB-USB
Utility to update cable
the pump’s
configuration
parameters
2.2.1.2 Infusion Pump Configuration

Pre-Conditions:
▪ You have set up a wireless AP with the pre-shared password SSID.
▪ You have installed and configured infusion pump servers.
▪ You have made available the infusion pump configuration and the setup manual.
Post-Conditions:
▪ You have connected the infusion pumps to the AP.
▪ You have established the pump server to discover the pumps to the corresponding pump server.
NCCoE followed the pump vendors’ instructions to access to the pump in the maintenance/biomedical
model. We configured the pump as follows:
▪ For wireless properties:
• enable wireless.
• use DHCP.
• set the SSID (IP_Dev or IP_Dev_Cert).

▪ For wireless security properties:
• set the Security Mode (WPA2-PSK or WPA2-Enterprise).
• set the Encryption Protocol to AES/CCMP.
• enter the PSK password or install a PKI certificate.
▪ For pump server properties:
• set the Server IP/port.
• set the Device Name or ID.
• set the Device Type.

▪ To verify connectivity for each infusion pump and the corresponding pump server:
• connect the pumps to the AP (IP_Dev with PSK, or IP_Dev_Cert with EAP-TLS).
• confirm that the pump receives an IP address from the DHCP server from the AP.
• confirm that the pump server can discover the pumps and can display the pump status,
such as connected, in use, or offline.
2.2.1.3 Infusion Pump Hardening

Hardening may include the following actions:
▪ disabling unused or unnecessary communication ports and services
▪ changing manufacture default administrative passwords
▪ securing the remote APs, if there are any
▪ confirming that the firmware version is up-to-date

2.2.2 Infusion Pumps Server Systems
The summary of the infusion pump server systems that are used in this example implementation is listed
in Table 2-3 below.
Table 2-3 Pump Servers Used in this Example Implementation
Vendor Name Product Name Operating Platform Description

B. Braun DoseTrac Infusion Microsoft® Windows® A drug library and
Management infusion management
system that provides

real-time, infusion data
reporting and analysis
to add safety,
efficiency, and value
Baxter Care Everywhere Microsoft Windows Provides an interface
Infusion Pump capability to help the
Management System hospital biomedical
engineering
department effectively
manage their infusion
pump fleet. The drug
library publishing
module helps the
hospital pharmacy
effectively distribute
and enforce
medication safety
rules.
BD Alaris Systems Compatible with A virtual server
Manager VMware® ESX® and platform that provides
VMware vSphere® two-way wireless
environment communication with
Alaris PC units
Hospira Hospira MedNet Server Microsoft Windows Manages drug libraries,
firmware updates, and
configurations of
intravenous pumps

Vendor Name Product Name Operating Platform Description
Smiths Medical PharmGuard Server Microsoft Windows Manages drug libraries,
firmware updates, and
configurations of
Hospira intravenous
pumps for Smiths
Medical Pumps
NCCoE installed the pump servers in the network in the VLAN 1400. To do so, we prepared a virtual
machine in the VMware with the operating system and network, as specified in the vendor installation
manual. Because one or more database is associated with the infusion pump server for storing the data,
the installation and configuration of the database are parts of the pump server installation procedure.
After the installation, we implemented a basic configuration: the user account setup, reporting template
configuration, security hardening, license installation, pump metadata installation.
We have not included the pump server setup because the vendor performs this activity.
2.3 Identity Services

2.3.1 Cisco Identity Service Engine
The Cisco ISE enables your organization to:
▪ centralize and unify identity and access policy management
▪ have visibility and more-assured device identification during certificate challenges
▪ use business rules to segment access to sections of the network
▪ make the user experience seamless during the challenge process, even with more-assured and
stronger authentication
System requirements:
▪ Virtual Hypervisor (VH) capable of housing virtual machines (VMs)
▪ VM with Central Processing Unit (CPU): single quad core, 2.0 gigahertz (GHz) or faster
▪ VM with a minimum 4 GB RAM
▪ VM with a minimum 200 GB disk space
NCCoE installed the Cisco ISE 2.1 on a VM by using the Open Virtual Appliance (OVA) image provided by
Cisco.
For your organization, follow the guidance from your VM vendor to import the OVA and to start the
install process. Once the system boots up, follow the console display to select one of the installation
options. The configuration parameter selected for this use case is shown below.
! hostname

ise
!ip domain-name
nccoe.lab
! ipv6
enable
!interface
GigabitEthernet 0 ip address 192.168.29.159 255.255.255.0 ipv6 address autoconfig ipv6

enable
! interface
GigabitEthernet 1 ip address 192.168.120.159 255.255.255.0 ipv6 address autoconfig

ipv6 enable
!interface
GigabitEthernet 2 shutdown ipv6 address autoconfig ipv6 enable
! interface
GigabitEthernet 3 shutdown ipv6 address autoconfig ipv6 enable
! ip name-server
8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
! ip default-gateway
192.168.120.1
! clock timezone
EST
! ntp server
time.nist.gov
! username [******] password [******]
$5$jNPleEb4$YxDZH6oDF2Y4.02OqE/jBWxXFumRvtpe8JdNNZm1yj0 role admin
! max-ssh-sessions
! service sshd
enable
! password-policy
lower-case-required

upper-case-required
digit-required
no-username
no-previous-password
password-expiration-enabled
password-expiration-days 45
password-expiration-warning 30
min-password-length 4
password-lock-enabled
password-lock-timeout 15
password-lock-retry-count 3
! logging loglevel
! conn-limit 10
port 9060
! cdp timer
60 cdp holdtime 180 cdp run GigabitEthernet 0
! icmp echo
on
2.3.1.1 Configure ISE to Support EAP-TLS Authentication

Execute your management of the Cisco ISE with a web browser, unless you intend to administer via
command line. Using a web browser and the Cisco ISE host address, log into the Cisco ISE Administration
Portal. You will use the credentials (username and password) that you created during the installation
procedure.
2.3.1.2 Set ISE to Support RADIUS Authentication

Use the following steps to set up a communication connection from the Cisco ISE to the network device
(AP) that you use as the authentication server during RADIUS [15] authentication:
1. Add a Network Resource.
a. From the ISE Administration Portal, navigate to the following path: Administration >
Network Resources > Network Devices. Select Add. Fill out the required parameters as
indicated in the form:

i. the name of the network device
ii. the IP Address of the device with its subnet mask
2. Select the RADIUS protocol as the selected protocol, and enter the shared secret that is
configured on the network device.
3. Populate the system certificate with certificate-authority (CA)-signed certificates. We replaced

the Cisco ISE default self-signed certificate with the CA-signed certificate issued through DigiCert
Certificate Authority. The steps for acquiring the signing certificate from DigiCert are described
in Section 2.3.2.
4. Once the CA-signed certificate for the ISE and the Root CA are issued, use the following steps to
install the certificates to the system.
5. From the ISE Administration Portal, use the following navigation path to show the installed
certificates: Administration > System > Certificates > System Certificates. Select Import to open
a screen for importing a server certificate. Fill in the required information as shown in Figure
2-1.

Figure 2-1 Importing Server Certificate
6. Under Usage, select the EAP Authentication checkbox to enable the imported certificate to be
used for EAP authentication. Next, click the Submit button to complete the certificate importing.
7. Import the DigiCert Root CA and signing CA to ISE Trusted Certificates. From the ISE
Administration Portal, use the following navigation path to show the installed certificates:
Administration > System > Certificates > Trusted Certificates. Select Import to open a screen
for importing the DigiCert Root CA and signing the CA individually.
After importing, make sure that the certificate status is Enabled.
Establish the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [16] client profile from the OCSP
Client Profile page (Administration > System > Certificates > OCSP Client Profile).
If OCSP is used for Certificate Status Validation, check Validate against the OCSP
Service, and enter the OCSP service name.

8. Set the Identity Source for Client Certificate Authentication. When using the trusted certificate
for EAP-TLS certificate-based authentication validation, set up the Certificate Authentication
Profile in the ISE as the external identity source. Instead of authenticating via the traditional
username and password, the Cisco ISE compares the client certificate received from the AP to
verify the authenticity of a device—in this case, the infusion pump.
a. Create a Certificate Authentication Profile:
i. Use the Administration Portal to navigate to the following path: Administration

> Identity Management > External Identity Sources > Certificate
Authentication Profile. Click Add.
ii. Name the profile as, for example, Cert_Auth_Profile, and then fill out the form
with proper parameters. Be sure to select Subject Name as the Principal
Username X509 attribute because it is the field that will be used to validate the
authenticity of the client.
Select the Identity Resource Sequences tab. In the Certificate Based Authentication,
select the Select Certificate Authentication Profile checkbox, and then choose
Cert_Auth_Profile from the drop-down list.
9. Set Authentication Protocols. The Cisco ISE uses authentication protocols to communicate with
external identity sources. The Cisco ISE supports many authentication protocols, such as the
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP), Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP),
and the EAP-TLS. For this build, we used the EAP-TLS protocol for user and machine
authentication. To specify the allowed protocols services in the Cisco ISE, follow these steps:
From the Administration Portal, navigate to the following path: Policy > Policy Elements
> Results > Authentication > Allowed Protocols > Add.
Select the preferred protocol or list of protocols. In this build, the EAP_TLS is selected as
the allowed authentication protocol.
10. Set up Authentication Policy. Define the authentication policy by selecting the protocols that the
ISE should use to communicate with the network devices, and the identity sources that it should
use for authentication. To specify the authentication policy, follow these steps:
From the Administration Portal, navigate to the following path: Policy > Authentication
Policy > Type > Rule Based.
If Protocol is Wireless 802.1x, set the policy to use the Network Device as defined in
Step 1 and the Identity Sequences as defined in Step 8 above.

2.3.2 DigiCert Certificate Authority
DigiCert is a cloud-based platform designed to provide a full line of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
certificates, tools, and platforms for optimal certificate life-cycle management. After you set up an
account with DigiCert, you can use a DigiCert dashboard and its built-in certificate management tools to
issue public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates for network authentication and encryption for data at
rest or data in transition, if needed.
The following instruction describes the process that we used to request a PKI certificate on behalf a
wireless infusion pump using the DigiCert PKI services.
2.3.2.1 Create a Certificate Signing Request

A Certificate Signing Request (CSR) can be represented as a Base64 encoded PKCS#10 binary format.
Many tools and utilities are available to help generate a CSR, and the key pair containing the private key
and public key is generated at the same time. The CSR identifies the applicant’s distinguished name,
which must be digitally signed using the applicant’s private key and the information for the public key
chosen for the applicant. In this build, Certificate Utility for Windows (DigiCertUtil.exe) provided by
DigiCert is used to generate CSRs for infusion pumps.
Download and save the DigiCertUtil.exe from https://www.digicert.com/util/csr-creation-microsoft-
servers-using-digicert-utility.htm.
1. Double-click DigiCertUtil.exe to start the utility.
2. Click the Create CSR link to open a CSR request window.

3. On the Create CSR window, fill in the key information (some of the information is optional).
Certificate Type: Select SSL.
Common Name: Enter the entity name.
Organization: Enter your company’s legally registered name.
City: Enter the city where your company is legally located.
State: Select the state where your company is legally located.
Country: Select the country where your company is legally located.
Key Size: Select 2048.
Provider: Select Microsoft RSA SChannel Cryptographic Provider (unless you

have a specific cryptographic provider).
4. Click Generate to generate a CSR.

This will also generate a corresponding private key in the Windows computer from which the
CSR is requested. The Certificate Enrollment Request is stored under Console
Root\Certificates(Local Computer)\Certificate Enrollment Requests\Certificates.
2.3.2.2 Issue Signed Certificates

1. With a created applicant CSR, request a signed certificate using DigiCert CertCentral portal.
Log into a DigiCert Dashboard (https://www.digicert.com/account/login.php) with your

account username and password.
Once in the portal, go to Request a Certificate, and then select Private SSL to open a
certificate request form. Fill in the certificate settings in the fields shown in the form,
which includes pasting the CSR information to the area called Paste your CSR.
2. After filling in all of the required information, scroll down to the bottom of the page, and select
the I agree to the Certificate Services Agreement above checkbox. Next, click the Submit
Certificate Request button at the bottom of the form to submit the certificate for signing
approval. The administrator of the CA authority will use the same portal with different privileges

to approve the request after reviewing and verifying the submitted request information if
needed.
3. To download the signed certificate, go to CERTIFICATES > Orders to list the ordered signed
certificates.
4. Click a specific order number to display the certificate details with a list of actions for you to
perform. Click Download Certificate As to download certificates with signed CA and Root CA
certificates. A variety of certificate formats can be downloaded, such as .crt, .p7b, .pem, etc.
5. Save the downloaded certificate in a location where it can be used for further processing if
needed.
2.3.2.3 Import and Export the Signed Certificate

Using DigiCert Utility and the OpenSSL tool, you can further manipulate the certificates to combine with
the private key and export the signed certificate, or you can convert certificates or keys into the formats
specified for your organization’s devices.
1. To import a signed certificate, use DigiCert Utility to click the Import button to load a
downloaded file to the utility. The downloaded file was saved in Step 5 of Section 2.3.2.2. Click
the Next button to import.

2. From the DigiCert Certificate Utility for Windows, click SSL to list all of the imported files.
3. To export the certificate, select the certificate that you want to export as a combined certificate
file and key file in a .pfx file, or separated as a certificate file and key file, and then click Export
Certificate.

4. Click the Next button, and then follow the wizard instructions to save the certificate file and
private key file to a desired location.

2.3.2.4 Certificate and Key File Format Conversion
PKI certificates and key files can be in different formats. When PKI certificates are used in medical
devices, device manufacturer user guides specify which formats are acceptable in their devices.
Fortunately, many tools can perform format conversion. One utility tool that NCCoE used is the OpenSSL
for Windows. It is an open-source tool and can be downloaded from
https://www.openssl.org/community/binaries.html.
Here are some of the useful convert commands:
▪ To convert a .crt file to a .pem file:
• openssl x509 -in mycert.crt -outform PEM -out mycert.pem
▪ To convert a private key into .pem format:

• openssl rsa -in yourdomain.key -outform PEM -out yourdomain_pem.key
▪ Separate a .pfx file into two different .key/.crt files:

• For a key file: openssl pkcs12 -in yourfile.pfx -nocerts -out keyfile-
encrypted.key
• For a cert file: openssl pkcs12 -in [yourfile.pfx] -clcerts -nokeys -out
[certificate.crt]
▪ To convert a certificate .pem file to a .der file:

• openssl x509 -outform der -inform DEM -in certificate.pem -out
certificate.der
▪ To convert a key .pem file to a .der file:

• openssl rsa -inform DEM -in infile.key -out outfile.der-outform DER
2.4 Symantec Endpoint Protection and Intrusion Detection

NCCoE protected the pump server application in the notional biomedical engineering network by using
three Symantec cybersecurity products on an enterprise network, with a specific focus on wireless
infusion pumps:
1. DCS:SA
2. SEP Manager Server
3. Advanced Threat Protection: Network (ATP:N)
Each of these Symantec products protects components in the enterprise systems, at different levels.
2.4.1 Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced

For data center security, DCS:SA provides a policy-based approach to endpoint security and compliance.
DCS:SA includes the management server, the agents, the unified management console, the database,

and DCS Security Virtual Appliance (SVA). The agent components working with the server management
provide intrusion prevention and detection on endpoint devices; the database is used for storing the
policies, agent information, and real-time actionable events; and the SVA provides agentless anti-
malware protection for VMware guest VMs running Windows.
The management server and the console can be installed on one system, and the agents are generally
deployed to every supported host or endpoint device. Figure 2-2 displays the DCS:SA environment.
Figure 2-2 DCS:SA Environment
2.4.1.1 Installing DCS:SA Manager

Minimum hardware requirements:
▪ hardware support x86, EM64T, and AMD64, with 60 GB free disk space (all platforms)
▪ 8 GB RAM
▪ four CPUs
Minimum software requirements:
▪ Windows Installer 2.0 or higher
▪ Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2008
▪ .NET Framework 4.0 or 4.5.1
▪ PowerShell 2.0
▪ Windows 2008 or later
Operating the Symantec DCS:SA installation requires to link to an instance of SQL Server locally or
remotely. All installations allocate approximately 60 GB of space for the database on SQL Server
Enterprise edition. We first installed a new instance of SQL Server that conforms to the Symantec

installation requirements. The SQL Server was installed on the same machine as that for the DCS:SA
Manager.
Follow these steps to install the SQL Server software.
1. Use SCSP as the default instance name.
2. Set the authentication configuration to Mixed Mode (Windows authentication and SQL Server
authentication).
3. Set the sa with a password when you set Mixed Mode authentication. You will need this
password when you install Data Center.
4. After installing the instance of SQL Server, select to authenticate by using SQL Server
credentials.
5. Register the instance. Registering the instance also starts the instance.
Follow these steps to install DCS:SA:

1. Double-click server.exe. Next, in the Welcome panel, click Next, and accept the license
agreement.
2. In the Installation Type panel, click Evaluation Installation, click Use an Existing MSSQL
Instance, and then click Next.
3. Follow the instructions, and select the parameters suitable for your organization, to complete
the installation.
See the Symantec™ Data Center Security: Server, Monitoring Edition, and Server Advanced 6.7 MP1
Planning and Deployment Guide [17] for further details.
2.4.1.2 Configuration of DCS:SA Manager

After you install the Management Server, the Server Configuration Wizard lets you configure various
parameters of the installation.
One purpose of these configuration settings is to use the policy-based least-privilege access control
provided by DCS to lock-down the configuration settings, files, and file systems in the pump for
restricting application and operating system behavior and protecting the files and systems from
tampering.
To enable a policy in DCS Management Server, follow these steps:
1. Log into the DCS console.
2. Create a policy folder.

3. In the Java console, click Policies.
4. Under the Policies tab, click Prevention or Detection.
5. On the Policies page, in the Workspace Folders, select the Workspace folder, and then right-
click Add Folder. Look for a new policy folder with the name New Folder. Rename this folder as
Pump Server.
6. Copy an existing policy to the Pump Server folder.
7. From the default Symantec folder, find a proper policy example, and copy it to the Pump Server
folder.
8. In the Workspace pane, select a policy (e.g., “windows-baseline-detection” policy in Symantec

folder for Detection), and then right-click Move To. In the MoveFolder dialog box, select Pump
Server to receive the policy, and then click MoveTo.
9. To edit a policy, right-click a policy, and then click Edit Policy. Configure the setting based on
your security protection needs.
DCS:SA provides a variety of configurable protection from application data protection, to application
protection, to network protection. For example, the Windows prevention policies have a Protected
Whitelisting strategy that lets you specify an application to which you always want to allow access or
give permission to run. When you whitelist a process or an application, all of the other processes and
applications that are not included in the list are denied access.
To allow a program to run by using the Protected Whitelisting strategy, follow these steps:
1. In the management console, click the Policies tab, and then click Prevention.
2. In the Policies workspace, click Add.
3. In the Select a Prevention Policy Builder wizard, in the New Policy Builder section, click Launch.
4. In the Policy Name panel, from the Policy Pack drop-down list, select the policy pack that you
want to use as the baseline for the new custom policy.
5. In the Name textbox, enter a name for the policy that you create. In this build, we use the
following name: Windows Prevention Policy 6.0 Reference 31 Protected Whitelisting strategy.
6. Select the Create a custom prevention policy checkbox, and then click Next.
7. In the Protection Strategy panel, use the slider to select Protected Whitelisting.
8. In the Trusted Updaters panel, click Add. In the Select Type dialog box, select the type of
updater that you want to add. The Trusted Updaters list is populated through the agent data
retriever. You can edit or delete an updater that you have already added to the list.

9. Click Next.
10. In the Application Rules panel, click Add. In the Select Type dialog box, select the type of rules
that you want to add. You can edit or delete a rule that you have already added to the list.
11. In the Global Policy Options panel, click Configure to configure the global policy settings, and
then click Next.
12. In the Summary panel, click Save.
2.4.1.3 Installing DCS:SA Agent

Use agent.exe to install the agent software on computers that run supported Windows operating
systems. To install the Windows agent software, follow these steps:
1. On the installation package, double-click agent.exe.
2. In the Welcome panel, click Next.
3. In the License Agreement panel, select the I accept the terms in the license agreement
checkbox, and then click Next.
4. In the Destination Folder panel, change the folders if necessary, and then click Next.
5. In the Agent Configuration panel, accept or change the default settings, and then click Next.
Ensure that the Enable Intrusion Prevention checkbox is selected.
6. In the Management Server Configuration panel, in the Primary Management Server box, type
the fully qualified host name or IP address of the primary server that is used to manage this
agent. If you changed the Agent Port setting during management server installation, in the
Agent Port box, type a port number that matches.
7. (Optional) In the Management Server Configuration panel, in the Alternate Management

Servers box, type the fully qualified host name or IP address of the alternate servers that are
used for failover for this agent. Type the servers in a comma-separated list.
8. In the Management Server Configuration panel, accept the directory for the SSL certificate
Agent-cert.ssl, or click Browse to browse to and locate Agent-cert.ssl. Access to a copy of the SSL
certificate Agent-cert.ssl is required to connect to the management server. All primary and
alternate management servers must use the same certificate.
9. In the Management Server Configuration panel, click Next.
10. (Optional) In the Agent Group Configuration panel, in the group boxes, type the group names
that you created with the Java console. You may add multiple detection policy group names

separated with commas. You may include the name of an existing detection policy domain in the
group path/name.
11. In the Agent Group Configuration panel, click Next.
12. In the Service User Configuration panel, accept the default Local System account, and then click
Next.
13. In the Ready to Install the Program panel, confirm the installation parameters, and then click
Install.
14. When the installation completes, click Finish.
Agent installation configures the appropriate networking for the environment. The agent installation
configuration includes which Data Center Security: Server Advanced Management Servers to
communicate with, which ports to use, and how often to poll for changes. The initial Data Center
Security: Server Advanced installation also determines whether key product features are enabled or not.
Particular key agent features can be installed, and each provides different protection:
▪ enabling the intrusion prevention feature
▪ enabling the real-time file integrity monitoring feature in intrusion detection
▪ creating agent registration groups
See the Symantec™ Data Center Security: Server, Monitoring Edition, and Server Advanced 6.7 MP1
Planning and Deployment Guide [17] for details.
2.4.2 Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager

▪ 2 GB RAM (minimum 8 GB or more recommended)
▪ 40 GB hard drive (minimum, 200 GB recommended) for the management server and database
with a remote SQL Server database
Minimum software requirements:
▪ Windows Installer 2.0 or higher
▪ Microsoft SQL Server 2008
▪ .NET Framework 4.0 or 4.5.1
▪ PowerShell 2.0
▪ Windows 2008 Server or later
Intel Pentium Dual-Core or equivalent (minimum, 8-core or greater recommended)

SEP Manager includes an embedded database. You may instead choose to use a database from one of
the following versions of Microsoft SQL Server: SQL Server 2008, SP4 up to SQL Server 2016.
2.4.2.1 Installing SEP Manager

1. Download the product, and extract the entire installation file to a physical disk, such as a hard
disk. Run Setup.exe. The installation should start automatically.
2. Follow the screen instructions, and accept the license agreement.
3. Continue the installation until it is finished. After the initial installation completes, configure the
server and database.
4. Click Next. The Management Server Configuration Wizard starts.
5. Select Default Configuration, and then click Next.
6. Enter company name, a password for the default administrator admin, and an email address.
7. If you run LiveUpdate as part of a new installation, content is more readily available for the
clients that you deploy.
8. If you want Symantec to receive anonymous data, click Next to begin the database creation.
9. When the database creation completes, click Finish to complete the SEP Manager configuration.
2.4.2.2 Installing the Client

After installing SEP Manager, install the SEP client to the endpoint host with the Client Deployment
Wizard. Of the several installation methods, we recommend using the Save package. This installation
option creates an executable installation package that you save on the management server and then
distribute to the client computers. To install the SEP client, follow these steps:
1. Make your configuration selections as you install SEP Manager, and then create the client
installation packages.
2. Save the installation package to a folder on the computer that runs SEP Manager.
3. Copy this package to a client machine where you have an administrator privilege.
4. The installation package comprises one setup.exe file. Click the executable file to start the
installation. Follow the wizards to complete the installation.
2.4.3 Symantec Advanced Threat Protection: Network

With ATP:N installed on the network, it can provide network-based protection of medical device subnets
via monitor internal inbound and outbound internet traffic. Integrating Symantec ATP:N with SEP will

allow ATP:N to monitor and manage all network traffic from the endpoints and to provide threat
assessment for dangerous activity to secure the medical devices on an enterprise network.
▪ 32 GB RAM
▪ four CPUs
▪ 500 GB hard drive (minimum)
Minimum software requirements: ESXi 5.5 and 6.0, ATP:N virtual appliance includes an Integrated Dell
Remote Access Controller (iDRAC). The iDRAC console requires the latest version of the Java Runtime
Environment (JRE) installed on the administrative client.
2.4.3.1 ATP:N Installation

The installation of the ATP:N involves the deployment of the OVA template on the VMware ESXi Server.
Sample installation steps are listed below.
1. Deploy the OVA. During the deploying procedure, the Deploy OVA Template wizard prompts you
to map the Source Network adapters, which are built into the ATP:N OVA with Destination
Networks that you already configured on your network.
2. In VMware vSphere Client, start the newly created virtual appliance.
3. Open a console to the appliance, and log on with the username admin and the proper password
to start the bootstrap.
4. From a computer that is on the same subnet as the appliance management port, use a browser
to connect to the ATP:N Manager using the ATP:N IP address. The username is setup, and the
password is Symantec.
2.4.3.2 Integrating ATP:N with SEP

Integrating Symantec ATP:N with SEP allows for the correlation of event data from SEP Manager to
ATP:N. To do the integration, follow these steps:
1. On SEP Manager, prepare the database for log collection to allow ATP:N to access the database
using DB administrator (sa) credentials.
2. Enable the Symantec Endpoint Protection Correlation option by selecting the checkbox the
Settings > Global > Synapse area of ATP:N Manager.
3. In ATP:N Manager, configure the connection to SEP Manager instances.
4. In SEP Manager, configure host integrity and quarantine firewall policies, if not already enabled.
5. In SEP Manager, configure endpoints to send information to the ATP:N management node.

6. In ATP:N Manager, add SSL certificates for secure communication between endpoints and
ATP:N, if needed.
More detail about integrating Symantec ATP:N and SEP can be found from the following reference:
http://help.symantec.com/cs/ATP_2.2/ATP/v102658999_v117970559/About-integrating-ATP-with-
Symantec-Endpoint-Protection?locale=EN_US.
2.5 Risk Assessment Tools

2.5.1 PFP Device Monitoring System: pMon 751 and P2Scan
The NCCoE lab deployed a PFP Monitoring System consisting of a pMon 751 appliance and the P2Scan
analytics tool. The PFP system provides integrity assessment and intrusion detection by utilizing an
external out-of-band channel (i.e., electromagnetic radiation or instantaneous power consumption),
which are unintended emissions also known as side-channels. PFP takes fine-grained measurements of
the device’s side-channels to identify unique patterns created by the specific logic execution.
The pMon 751 appliance captures the side-channel signals by using a physical sensor, and sends them to
P2Scan to be processed.
The P2Scan analysis tool collects data during controlled execution and uses it to build a baseline of
authorized execution during a tool training phase. Once tool training is completed, P2Scan continuously
monitors the device for deviations from the baseline to determine whether unauthorized execution,
such as a malicious intrusion, has occurred.
Hardware requirements:
▪ pMon 751 data acquisition module
▪ Electromagnetic (EM) probe (Aaronia Magnetic Direction Finder [MDF])
▪ 12 Volts Direct Current (VDC) Power Supply
▪ SMA (SubMiniature version A) cables to connect probe
▪ Secure Digital (SD) card
Host computer requirements:
▪ Operating system: Windows 10 Professional x64
▪ RAM: 16 GB or higher strongly recommended
▪ Hard drive: 1 GB of free space
▪ Ethernet connection
▪ hardware setup

The EM loop probe is sensitive to changes in the magnetic fields produced by the pump or the
device under test (DUT). The intensity and signal structure of radiated magnetic fields from a device
are typically spatially dependent. The probes must also be stationary during all tests, as P2Scan is
highly sensitive in detecting changes in the radiated fields emitted from a device, which could alter
data capture and analysis during the Data Collection and Baseline Extraction phases. A consistent
EM probe placement using a cradle or harness is critical for the correct operation of the system.
The reference setup of the PFP Monitoring System is shown in Figure 2-3.
Figure 2-3 PFP Monitoring System Reference Setup
The following connections on the pMon 751 are required:

▪ 12 to 24 Volt DC on Terminal 1 of power block
▪ GND on Terminal 2 of power block
▪ EM probe on the Signal input SMA connector
▪ connection to Ethernet network to reach host computer running P2Scan (By default, pMon is set
with the static IP address 172.16.1.93.)
▪ (optional) trigger signal on the trigger input

2.5.1.1 P2Scan Setup
The P2Scan installer will install P2Scan as well as the required dependencies. Launch the setup.exe file
from the installation media (typically USB drive).
P2Scan uses a single project file to control the operation of P2Scan. As the user makes changes to the
configuration parameters they will have the options to save the changes to the project file.
The project file is in the .ini (initialization) file format.
2.5.1.2 Operating P2Scan

1. Launch P2Scan. This will open the application home page, where it allows you to create a new
monitoring project or to load an existing project (Figure 2-4).
Figure 2-4 P2Scan Home Page
a. To create a new project, click the New Project button on the home page (Figure 2-4).
This will open the Create New Project window (Figure 2-5). You can change the Project
Name (alters .ini name), the Project Template (select an .ini template to use), and the
Project Root (creates a new directory to store the project). Once you have completed
these fields, click Create Project.

Figure 2-5 New Project Creation
2. Once a project (new or existing) has been created, click Load Project on the home page
(Figure 2-4). Navigate to the directory specified in Project Root, and select the .ini file that you
created, which holds default values for guiding P2Scan.
3. Once the configuration file is loaded, P2Scan shows the main screen (Figure 2-6). The user
should see the path of their project file in the Active Project File dialogue box. To select a
different file, click the Change button.
Figure 2-6 P2Scan Main Screen

4. Once the .ini file is selected, click Config to open the Configure Project screen with default
parameters provided by the .ini file (Figure 2-7). The user can proceed to test their setup
through pMon or modify the settings before entering the main program. For a detailed
description of the different analysis parameters and their impact on the final result, please refer
to the P2Scan User Manual.
Figure 2-7 P2Scan Configuration Parameters


2.5.1.3 Collection Process
The initial step in the PFP analysis process is to repetitively sample waveforms for each of the execution
paths that are of interest to the user. These waveforms will ultimately form a bank of trusted references
from which all unknown traces will be compared against to determine their validity during runtime
monitoring.
P2Scan interfaces with the pMon digitizing hardware. P2Scan provides a Capture interface (under
Settings in Figure 2-8), which allows the user to configure the sampling parameters used by P2Scan.
This graphical user interface provides the user with the sampling parameters that may be adjusted for
the collection system being used. Once the settings have been entered, click the Acquire Trace button
to collect a sample trace and to view the results. The current data buffer will be displayed as shown in
Figure 2-8, but will not be saved for analysis.
After the capture parameters have been configured, select the Start Capture button to begin the data
capture process. As data collection executes, the raw waveforms will be displayed on the screen, along
with the percentage-complete indicator, as shown in Figure 2-8.
Figure 2-8 Data Collection Screen During Capture

Data collection will enable a supervised tool training approach and will pause between run states. Each
run state becomes a label during the tool training process. An example run state could be a specific
configuration on the infusion pump or a specific version of firmware. The number of pause(s) is
dependent on the number of paths in the capture settings prior to collecting data. Change to the next
state, and click OK to continue collecting data. Repeat the process until Data Collection is 100%
complete.
2.5.1.4 Baseline Extraction (Tool Training)

Once the data for all of the states has been collected, the next step is to train the system, for baseline
extraction. The user has control over several analysis parameters during the Baseline Extraction phase.
Several operational characteristics of the device being monitored can affect how to adjust the analysis
parameter in order to achieve the desired results. For a detailed description of the different analysis
parameters and their impact on the final system, please refer to the P2Scan User Manual.
The baseline analysis is launched by pressing the Start button. The status window will be updated with
the current status. Depending on the complexity of the DUT, and the processing power of the host
machine, the baseline extraction may take time to run.
After the Baseline Extraction phase has been completed, P2Scan will display the Percentage of correct
Detection (PD) (Figure 2-9), which is calculated by comparing the sets of evaluation data to their
respective baseline. The closer that the value is to 1, the better the ability of the system to discriminate
that set of data. The detection statistics will be shown in the status bar, and, once complete, the user
can click Launch Monitoring to enable runtime monitoring.
Figure 2-9 Completed Baseline Extraction Screen

2.5.1.5 Runtime Monitoring
Once the necessary baselines have been calculated during tool training, P2Scan is able perform runtime
monitoring of devices that have been previously characterized. The runtime monitor compares the test
signals captured by the appliance, and compares them against the baselines. If the test device is
executing one of the states used during training, P2Scan will classify the signal and provide a visual
indication, using distinct colors to signify different device execution paths, as shown in Figure 2-10. The
straight, thick black line signifies the threshold created from the Baseline Extraction phase.
Figure 2-10 Runtime Monitoring Showing the Execution of Four Different States
If the software on the DUT changes to an unrecognized state, P2Scan will not be able to classify the test
trace with the required confidence level, and will determine that an anomaly has occurred. In this case,
P2Scan will show test results above the threshold, in a separate color from the successful states, as
shown in Figure 2-11.

Figure 2-11 Runtime Monitoring Showing an Anomalous State
If the Save Data checkbox is selected (under Runtime), then the monitoring outputs shall be saved in a
file in the directory specified by “Monitoring Output.” This file displays the date/time of the monitoring,
and the TestStat, which shows statistical error distances between analyzed data and the DUT. Sample
file output is shown in Figure 2-12. If desired, the monitoring outputs can be sent to a Security
Information and Events Management (a SIEM tool) via syslog.

Figure 2-12 Sample Contents Saved in the Runtime Results File
2.5.2 Clearwater IRM|Analysis™ Software

We used the Clearwater IRM|Analysis™ Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) application, a control-based risk
tool for conducting a risk assessment focused on the HDO enterprise. In our environment, we built the
enterprise network to simulate a typical HDO environment. Clearwater Compliance created an account
for NCCoE under their cloud-based tool IRM|Analysis. The software is based on the construct of an
“Information Asset” that creates, maintains, receives, or transmits electronic Protected Health
Information (ePHI.) This can be a software application, information system, medical device system, etc.
This section does not show you how to conduct a risk assessment. Instead, we present some basic steps
for using the IRM|Analysis tool to conduct the risk assessment:
1. Log into IRM|Analysis.
2. Import Inventory of Information Assets, or enter the data through the Asset Inventory Form.
3. Establish conformance with the NIST-based Security Controls.
4. Determine the Risk Rating of the likelihood and impact.
5. Identify those risks that exceed the established Risk Threshold.

6. Document the Risk Response and associated tasks necessary to mitigate, transfer, avoid, or
accept the risk in the IRM|Analysis software.
7. Leverage Dashboard and Reporting functionality to provide documentation and evidence of a

credible and bona fide risk analysis.
2.5.2.1 Login to IRM|Analysis

1. Open a browser, and navigate to https://software.clearwatercompliance.com/login.
2. On the login page (Figure 2-13), enter the appropriate Email Address and Password.
3. Click the Sign In button.
Figure 2-13 IRM|Analysis Login Page
2.5.2.2 Enter Asset Inventory

We used the New Asset page to add the assets to the system, and the Edit Asset page to update the
record. After all assets are entered, an analysis is conducted to determine if media (i.e., devices)
associated with different assets can be grouped together based on a similar risk profile. For instance, all
servers are VMs using the same Storage Area Network and identical operating systems. If 10 assets are
similarly configured using the same server, then the 10 assets can be grouped and evaluated as one
asset. The Media/Asset Group is the logic group for organizing media into classes to reduce the number
of identical security control assessments.
Follow these steps to add a new asset:
1. On the IRM|Analysis tool, expand Assets on the left menu bar.
2. Under Assets, click Asset Inventory List.
3. On the Asset Inventory List page (Figure 2-14), click the New button.

4. On the New Asset form (Figure 2-15), enter the required information, and then click Save.
Figure 2-14 Asset Inventory List

Figure 2-15 New Asset

Follow these steps to update an asset:
2. Under Assets, click Asset Inventory List.
3. On the Asset Inventory List page (Figure 2-14), select the asset that you want to edit by clicking
the checkbox next to that asset, and then click Edit.
4. On the Edit Media/Asset Groups page (see Figure 2-17 below), enter the necessary information,
and then click Save.
Follow these steps to view and manage media/asset groups:

2. Under Assets, click Media/Asset Groups.
3. On the Media/Asset Groups page (Figure 2-16), scroll up and down to view the groups, and edit
a group by clicking the Edit button next to that group.
4. On the Edit Media/Asset Groups page (Figure 2-17), enter the necessary information, and then
click Save.
Figure 2-16 Media/Asset Groups

Figure 2-17 Edit Media/Asset Group
2.5.2.3 Risk Determination

The IRM|Analysis tool uses different methods to determine risk. In this section, we show two ways to
use the tool: the Controls – Global/Media screen to document the status of a control; and the Risk
Questionnaire List to select a given Media/Asset Group.
Follow these steps to use the Risk Determination at the Global/Media level:
1. On the IRM|Analysis tool, expand Risk Determination on the left menu bar.
2. Under Risk Determination, click Controls – Global/Media.
3. On the Controls – Global/Media page (Figure 2-18), scroll up and down to view the controls. For
each control, select one of the responses (i.e., Yes, In Progress, No, or N/A) to indicate the
response status.

Figure 2-18 Controls – Global/Media
Follow these steps to use the Risk Determination at the Media/Asset Group level:
1. On the IRM|Analysis tool, expand Risk Determination on the left menu bar.
2. Under Risk Determination, click Risk Questionnaire List.
3. On the Risk Questionnaire List page (Figure 2-19), scroll up and down to view the media/asset
groups.
4. For each relevant Media/Asset Group, select the Risk Analyst, fill in the Due Date, and then
click the Continue button to access the Risk Questionnaire Form (Part 1: Figure 2-20, and
Part 2: Figure 2-21).
5. For each control, select one of the responses (i.e., Yes, In Progress, No, or N/A) to indicate the
response status (example shown in Part 1: Figure 2-20), if it was already noted on the Controls –
Global/Media page.
6. Controls can be set globally or for individual Media/Asset Groups. The plus sign (+) will expand
the control to reveal the Media/Asset Groups so that the control can be set individually. To
illustrate, a global control can be set for Training for the Security Workforce, but an individual
control would be set for each of the Media/Asset Groups associated with the User Activity
Review, as only a subset of assets may undergo a user activity review.
7. Determine and select the Risk Likelihood and Risk Impact for the selected risk scenario
(example shown in Part 2: Figure 2-21) to populate the Risk Rating.

8. You may select the question mark (?) for more information on the control, and the NIST button
for a quick reference to NIST SP 800-53: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
Systems and Organizations.
Figure 2-19 Risk Questionnaire List

Figure 2-20 Risk Questionnaire Form (Part 1)

Figure 2-21 Risk Questionnaire Form (Part 2)
2.5.2.4 Risk Response

The IRM|Analysis tool enables users to try different methods of reviewing risk scenarios, acquiring a risk
rating, and seeing progress in a risk response workflow. This section provides the basics of using the
tool.
Consider following these risk response steps:
1. In the IRM|Analysis tool, expand Risk Response in the left menu bar.
2. Under Risk Response, click Risk Response List.
3. Only the risks that exceed the risk threshold established under Framing/Governance (in the left
menu bar) will move to the Risk Response portion of the software.
4. On the Risk Response List – Risk Registry page (Figure 2-22), scroll up and down to view the
Medial/Asset Groups, along with the associated Threat Source/Event, Vulnerability, and Risk
Rating.
5. For each relevant risk response, click the associated button in the Treatment column to access
the Risk Treat and Evaluate Form page of that risk (Figure 2-23).
6. On the Risk Treat and Evaluate Form page (Figure 2-23), perform the risk response analysis by
selecting the Risk Treatment Type; evaluate the control or recommendation; Select a Risk
Owner; enter Risk Notes; etc.

Figure 2-22 Risk Response List – Risk Registry
Figure 2-23 Risk Treat and Evaluate Form

2.5.2.5 Dashboard and Report
The IRM|Analysis tool enables users to review their risk analyses with a dashboard or report format. To
access the dashboard views, follow these steps:
1. On the IRM|Analysis tool, expand Dashboard on the left menu bar.
2. Under Dashboard, click Rating Distribution By Asset.
3. See the example dashboard on the Rating Distribution By Asset page shown in Figure 2-24.
You can also view other types of dashboards, such as Risk Rating Trends and Risk Rating Averages.
Figure 2-24 Dashboard Example
For report views, follow these steps:

1. On the IRM|Analysis tool, expand Reports on the left menu bar.
2. Under Reports, click Risk Rating Report.
3. See the example report on the Risk Rating Report page shown in Figure 2-25.
You can also view other types of dashboards, such as Risk Rating Trends and Risk Rating Averages.

Figure 2-25 Report Example
2.5.3 MDISS MDRAP

We used the Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Security Consortium’s (MDISS’s) cloud-based Medical
Device Risk Assessment Platform (MDRAP), a questionnaire-based risk assessment tool, to conduct the
assessment on the medical devices. In our environment, we set up and configured wireless infusion
pump systems from five manufactures, and built the enterprise network to simulate a typical HDO
environment.
Please note that this section does not show you how to conduct a risk assessment. Instead, we show
these basic steps for using the MDRAP tool:
▪ login to MDRAP
▪ conduct device inventory
▪ risk assessment
▪ dashboard and reports
2.5.3.1 Login to MDRAP

1. Within a browser, type https://mdrap.mdiss.org/,and then click Log In.
2. On the login page (Figure 2-26), enter the appropriate Email and Password.
3. Click Submit.

Figure 2-26 MDRAP Login Page
2.5.3.2 Conduct Device Inventory

We use the Device Inventory module of MDRAP to keep track of all of the infusion pumps and servers in
our sample implementation. Add Device enables us to add individual devices, while Bulk Import enables
us to add a group of devices. Steps for using both methods follow.
1. On the Welcome to MDRAP page (Figure 2-27), click Device Inventory on the menu bar, or click
the View Device Inventory link on the page.
2. On the Device Inventory page (Figure 2-28), add an individual device, edit a device, or bulk
import a group of devices.

Figure 2-27 MDRAP Welcome Page
Figure 2-28 Device Inventory List
To add a device:
i. On the Device Inventory page (see Figure 2-28 above), click ADD DEVICE.

ii. On the Add Device page (Figure 2-29), locate the device from the category list,
and then click ADD.
Figure 2-29 Add Device

To edit a device:
i. On the Device Inventory page (see Figure 2-28 above), locate the device from
the list, and then click the product name link or the edit icon.
ii. On the Edit Inventory page (Figure 2-30), update the data, and then click Save.

Figure 2-30 Edit Device
To bulk import a group of devices:
i. On the Device Inventory page (Figure 2-28 above), click the BULK IMPORT
button.
ii. On the Inventory Bulk Import page (Figure 2-31), download the template, and
then fill-in the data into the template.
iii. Follow the instruction to upload and import the devices by using the template
(Figure 2-32).

Figure 2-31 Inventory Bulk Import
Figure 2-32 Device Inventory Template Sample
2.5.3.3 Risk Assessment

We created a risk assessment for each device by responding to the MDRAP’s built-in questionnaire. The
basic steps of creating a risk assessment for a given device are listed below.
1. On the Welcome to MDRAP page (Figure 2-27 above), click Assessments on the menu bar, or
click the Go to Assessments link on the page.
2. On the Create Assessment page (Part 1: Figure 2-33), select a device.
3. On the Create Assessment page (Part 2: Figure 2-34), select the questionnaire type (i.e., MDISS
Questionnaire).

4. Answer the questions, and then click Next (see example questionnaire pages in
Figure 2-35 and Figure 2-36).
Figure 2-33 Create Assessment (Part 1)


Figure 2-34 Create Assessment (Part 2)
Figure 2-35 Assessment Step (Example 1)

Figure 2-36 Assessment Step (Example 2)
2.5.3.4 Dashboard and Reports

MDRAP computes assessment results based on the responses to the questionnaires. For a given
assessment (complete or partially complete), the assessment result is available for view as a dashboard
(Figure 2-37) or report (Figure 2-38).
Figure 2-37 Assessment Result (Dashboard Example)

Figure 2-38 Assessment Result (Report Example)

Appendix A Baseline Configuration File
A.1 Baseline Configuration File
ASA Version 9.6(1)
interface Management0/0
ip address 192.168.29.149 255.255.255.0

! optional, SSH, version is important as v1 is insecure and on by default, also set

your own password!
username [********] password [******]
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
! set to network and interface you want to manage from, can be WAN
ssh 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
ssh version 2
hostname internal-kmcfadde
! Configure network interfaces
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
nameif WAN
security-level 50
ip address 192.168.100.149 255.255.255.0
no shutdown
! optional, authenticated OSPF for excellence
ospf authentication-key [L}N]@Uv
ospf authentication message-digest
nameif LAN
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.150.1 255.255.255.0

no shutdown
! optional, DHCP Server
dhcpd address 192.168.150.220-192.168.150.250 LAN
dhcpd dns 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
dhcpd option 3 ip 192.168.150.1
dhcpd enable LAN

! optional, OSPFv2
router ospf 1
network 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 area 0
redistribute connected subnets
redistribute static subnets
! Configure DNS resolution here, required for license activation
dns domain-lookup WAN
dns server-group DefaultDNS
name-server 8.8.8.8
name-server 8.8.4.4
license smart
feature tier standard
throughput level 1G
names
! optional, Configure time zone and NTP here
clock timezone EST -5
clock summer-time EDT recurring
ntp server 10.97.74.8
! Allow ping through LAN to WAN
policy-map global_policy

class inspection_default
inspect icmp
inspect icmp error
! Show up in traceroute
class class-default
set connection decrement-ttl
! Make ICMP/UDP traceroute work from LAN to WAN
object-group icmp-type PING-REPLIES
icmp-object echo-reply
object-group icmp-type TRACEROUTE-REPLIES
icmp-object time-exceeded
icmp-object unreachable
group-object PING-REPLIES
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any object-group TRACEROUTE-REPLIES
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any object-group PING-REPLIES
! Allow ICMP ping/traceroute from WAN to LAN
object-group icmp-type PING
icmp-object echo
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any object-group PING
! Allow UDP traceroute from WAN to LAN
object-group service TRACEROUTEUDP
service-object udp destination gt 33434
access-list 101 extended permit object-group TRACEROUTEUDP any any
! example, allow a specific port on a host
! access-list 101 extended permit tcp any host 192.168.140.XXX eq www

! Add firewall rules we created to WAN interface
access-group 101 in interface WAN
! Example, set a static route
! route WAN 192.168.140.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.100.111
! SNMP
object network SNMPHOSTS
subnet 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0
snmp-server enable
snmp-server community public
snmp-server host-group management SNMPHOSTS
A.2 External Firewall and Guest Network ASA Configuration File

: Saved
: Serial Number: 9AK64JT2D2M
: Hardware: ASAv, 2048 MB RAM, CPU Xeon E5 series 2200 MHz
ASA Version 9.6(1)
hostname border-kmcfadde
enable password [******] encrypted
xlate per-session deny tcp any4 any4
xlate per-session deny udp any4 any4 eq domain

license smart
throughput level 1G
names
nameif WAN
security-level 0
ip address 10.32.3.10 255.255.255.0
nameif LAN
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.100.101 255.255.255.0
ospf authentication-key *****
nameif GUEST
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.170.1 255.255.255.0
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif

no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
management-only
nameif management
security-level 0
ip address 192.168.29.147 255.255.255.0

!
ftp mode passive
name-server 8.8.8.8
name-server 8.8.4.4
object network LAN-SUBNETS
subnet 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0
subnet 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0
icmp-object echo
pager lines 23
mtu WAN 1500
mtu LAN 1500
mtu management 1500
mtu GUEST 1500
no failover
no monitor-interface service-module
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1
no asdm history enable

arp timeout 14400
no arp permit-nonconnected
object network LAN-SUBNETS
nat (LAN,WAN) dynamic interface
!
route-map DEFAULT permit 10
match interface WAN
router ospf 1
network 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 area 0
log-adj-changes
default-information originate
route WAN 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.32.3.1 1
timeout xlate 3:00:00
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 sctp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01:00
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00
user-identity default-domain LOCAL
snmp-server host-group management SNMPHOSTS poll community *****
no snmp-server location
no snmp-server contact

snmp-server community *****
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite
crypto ca trustpoint _SmartCallHome_ServerCA
no validation-usage
crl configure
crypto ca trustpool policy
auto-import
crypto ca certificate chain _SmartCallHome_ServerCA
certificate ca 6ecc7aa5a7032009b8cebcf4e952d491
308205ec 308204d4 a0030201 0202106e cc7aa5a7 032009b8 cebcf4e9 52d49130
0d06092a 864886f7 0d010105 05003081 ca310b30 09060355 04061302 55533117
30150603 55040a13 0e566572 69536967 6e2c2049 6e632e31 1f301d06 0355040b
13165665 72695369 676e2054 72757374 204e6574 776f726b 313a3038 06035504
0b133128 63292032 30303620 56657269 5369676e 2c20496e 632e202d 20466f72
20617574 686f7269 7a656420 75736520 6f6e6c79 31453043 06035504 03133c56
65726953 69676e20 436c6173 73203320 5075626c 69632050 72696d61 72792043
65727469 66696361 74696f6e 20417574 686f7269 7479202d 20473530 1e170d31
30303230 38303030 3030305a 170d3230 30323037 32333539 35395a30 81b5310b
30090603 55040613 02555331 17301506 0355040a 130e5665 72695369 676e2c20
496e632e 311f301d 06035504 0b131656 65726953 69676e20 54727573 74204e65
74776f72 6b313b30 39060355 040b1332 5465726d 73206f66 20757365 20617420
68747470 733a2f2f 7777772e 76657269 7369676e 2e636f6d 2f727061 20286329
3130312f 302d0603 55040313 26566572 69536967 6e20436c 61737320 33205365
63757265 20536572 76657220 4341202d 20473330 82012230 0d06092a 864886f7
0d010101 05000382 010f0030 82010a02 82010100 b187841f c20c45f5 bcab2597
a7ada23e 9cbaf6c1 39b88bca c2ac56c6 e5bb658e 444f4dce 6fed094a d4af4e10
9c688b2e 957b899b 13cae234 34c1f35b f3497b62 83488174 d188786c 0253f9bc
7f432657 5833833b 330a17b0 d04e9124 ad867d64 12dc744a 34a11d0a ea961d0b
15fca34b 3bce6388 d0f82d0c 948610ca b69a3dca eb379c00 48358629 5078e845
63cd1941 4ff595ec 7b98d4c4 71b350be 28b38fa0 b9539cf5 ca2c23a9 fd1406e8
18b49ae8 3c6e81fd e4cd3536 b351d369 ec12ba56 6e6f9b57 c58b14e7 0ec79ced
4a546ac9 4dc5bf11 b1ae1c67 81cb4455 33997f24 9b3f5345 7f861af3 3cfa6d7f

81f5b84a d3f58537 1cb5a6d0 09e4187b 384efa0f 02030100 01a38201 df308201
db303406 082b0601 05050701 01042830 26302406 082b0601 05050730 01861868
7474703a 2f2f6f63 73702e76 65726973 69676e2e 636f6d30 12060355 1d130101
ff040830 060101ff 02010030 70060355 1d200469 30673065 060b6086 480186f8
45010717 03305630 2806082b 06010505 07020116 1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777
2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f6370 73302a06 082b0601 05050702 02301e1a
1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777 2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f7270 61303406

03551d1f 042d302b 3029a027 a0258623 68747470 3a2f2f63 726c2e76 65726973
69676e2e 636f6d2f 70636133 2d67352e 63726c30 0e060355 1d0f0101 ff040403
02010630 6d06082b 06010505 07010c04 61305fa1 5da05b30 59305730 55160969
6d616765 2f676966 3021301f 30070605 2b0e0302 1a04148f e5d31a86 ac8d8e6b
c3cf806a d448182c 7b192e30 25162368 7474703a 2f2f6c6f 676f2e76 65726973
69676e2e 636f6d2f 76736c6f 676f2e67 69663028 0603551d 11042130 1fa41d30
1b311930 17060355 04031310 56657269 5369676e 4d504b49 2d322d36 301d0603
551d0e04 1604140d 445c1653 44c1827e 1d20ab25 f40163d8 be79a530 1f060355
1d230418 30168014 7fd365a7 c2ddecbb f03009f3 4339fa02 af333133 300d0609
2a864886 f70d0101 05050003 82010100 0c8324ef ddc30cd9 589cfe36 b6eb8a80
4bd1a3f7 9df3cc53 ef829ea3 a1e697c1 589d756c e01d1b4c fad1c12d 05c0ea6e
b2227055 d9203340 3307c265 83fa8f43 379bea0e 9a6c70ee f69c803b d937f47a
6decd018 7d494aca 99c71928 a2bed877 24f78526 866d8705 404167d1 273aeddc
481d22cd 0b0b8bbc f4b17bfd b499a8e9 762ae11a 2d876e74 d388dd1e 22c6df16
b62b8214 0a945cf2 50ecafce ff62370d ad65d306 4153ed02 14c8b558 28a1ace0
5becb37f 954afb03 c8ad26db e6667812 4ad99f42 fbe198e6 42839b8f 8f6724e8
6119b5dd cdb50b26 058ec36e c4c875b8 46cfe218 065ea9ae a8819a47 16de0c28
6c2527b9 deb78458 c61f381e a4c4cb66
quit
telnet timeout 5
ssh stricthostkeycheck
ssh 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
ssh timeout 5
ssh version 2
console timeout 0

dhcpd dns 8.8.8.8 8.8.4.4
dhcpd address 192.168.170.220-192.168.170.250 GUEST
dhcpd enable GUEST
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicy
username [******] password [******] encrypted
class-map inspection_default
match default-inspection-traffic
policy-map type inspect dns migrated_dns_map_1
parameters
message-length maximum client auto
message-length maximum 512
inspect dns migrated_dns_map_1
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect ip-options
inspect netbios
inspect rsh
inspect rtsp
inspect skinny
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp

inspect sip
inspect xdmcp
inspect icmp
inspect icmp error
class class-default
!
service-policy global_policy global
prompt hostname context
no call-home reporting anonymous
call-home
profile CiscoTAC-1
no active
destination address http

https://tools.cisco.com/its/service/oddce/services/DDCEService
destination address email callhome@cisco.com
destination transport-method http
subscribe-to-alert-group diagnostic
subscribe-to-alert-group environment
subscribe-to-alert-group inventory periodic monthly
subscribe-to-alert-group configuration periodic monthly
subscribe-to-alert-group telemetry periodic daily
profile License

Cryptochecksum:9ffa4947d875e0c501e036c54e80ee93
: end

A.3 Enterprise Services ASA Configuration File
: Saved
: Serial Number: 9AEHKLC171M
ASA Version 9.6(1)

hostname enterprise-services-kmcfadde
license smart
throughput level 1G
names
nameif WAN
security-level 50
ip address 192.168.100.154 255.255.255.0

nameif LAN
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.120.1 255.255.255.0
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif

no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
management-only
nameif management
security-level 0
ip address 192.168.29.154 255.255.255.0
ftp mode passive
name-server 8.8.8.8
name-server 8.8.4.4
subnet 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0
object-group service DNS
service-object tcp-udp destination eq domain

object-group service SYMANTEC-DCS
service-object tcp destination eq 4443
service-object tcp destination eq https
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any time-exceeded
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any unreachable

access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any echo-reply
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any echo
access-list 101 extended permit udp any any gt 33434
access-list 101 extended permit object-group DNS 192.168.140.0 255.255.255.0 host

192.168.120.162
access-list 101 extended permit object-group DNS 192.168.140.0 255.255.255.0 host

192.168.120.163
access-list 101 extended permit tcp any host 192.168.120.166 eq 8114
access-list 101 extended permit object-group SYMANTEC-DCS any host 192.168.120.167
pager lines 23
mtu management 1500
mtu WAN 1500
mtu LAN 1500
no failover
arp timeout 14400
router ospf 1
network 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 area 0
log-adj-changes


no validation-usage
crl configure
auto-import
0d06092a 864886f7 0d010105 05003081 ca310b30 09060355 04061302 55533117
30150603 55040a13 0e566572 69536967 6e2c2049 6e632e31 1f301d06 0355040b
13165665 72695369 676e2054 72757374 204e6574 776f726b 313a3038 06035504
0b133128 63292032 30303620 56657269 5369676e 2c20496e 632e202d 20466f72
20617574 686f7269 7a656420 75736520 6f6e6c79 31453043 06035504 03133c56
65726953 69676e20 436c6173 73203320 5075626c 69632050 72696d61 72792043
65727469 66696361 74696f6e 20417574 686f7269 7479202d 20473530 1e170d31
30303230 38303030 3030305a 170d3230 30323037 32333539 35395a30 81b5310b
30090603 55040613 02555331 17301506 0355040a 130e5665 72695369 676e2c20

496e632e 311f301d 06035504 0b131656 65726953 69676e20 54727573 74204e65
74776f72 6b313b30 39060355 040b1332 5465726d 73206f66 20757365 20617420
68747470 733a2f2f 7777772e 76657269 7369676e 2e636f6d 2f727061 20286329
3130312f 302d0603 55040313 26566572 69536967 6e20436c 61737320 33205365
63757265 20536572 76657220 4341202d 20473330 82012230 0d06092a 864886f7
0d010101 05000382 010f0030 82010a02 82010100 b187841f c20c45f5 bcab2597

db303406 082b0601 05050701 01042830 26302406 082b0601 05050730 01861868
7474703a 2f2f6f63 73702e76 65726973 69676e2e 636f6d30 12060355 1d130101
ff040830 060101ff 02010030 70060355 1d200469 30673065 060b6086 480186f8
45010717 03305630 2806082b 06010505 07020116 1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777
2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f6370 73302a06 082b0601 05050702 02301e1a
1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777 2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f7270 61303406
03551d1f 042d302b 3029a027 a0258623 68747470 3a2f2f63 726c2e76 65726973
69676e2e 636f6d2f 70636133 2d67352e 63726c30 0e060355 1d0f0101 ff040403
02010630 6d06082b 06010505 07010c04 61305fa1 5da05b30 59305730 55160969
69676e2e 636f6d2f 76736c6f 676f2e67 69663028 0603551d 11042130 1fa41d30
1b311930 17060355 04031310 56657269 5369676e 4d504b49 2d322d36 301d0603

6c2527b9 deb78458 c61f381e a4c4cb66
quit
telnet timeout 5
ssh 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
ssh timeout 5
ssh version 2
console timeout 0
parameters
inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect ip-options
inspect netbios

inspect rsh
inspect rtsp
inspect skinny
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect sip
inspect xdmcp
inspect icmp
inspect icmp error
class class-default
call-home
profile License

profile CiscoTAC-1
no active


Cryptochecksum:e57e00145eb4fd26d97b4b0109308140
: end
A.4 Biomedical Engineering

: Saved
: Serial Number: 9A3RHJVFPQS

ASA Version 9.6(1)
hostname biomedical-kmcfadde
license smart
throughput level 1G
names
nameif WAN
security-level 50
ip address 192.168.100.152 255.255.255.0

nameif LAN
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.140.1 255.255.255.0

shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address

shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
management-only
nameif management
security-level 0
ip address 192.168.29.152 255.255.255.0
ftp mode passive
name-server 8.8.8.8
name-server 8.8.4.4

subnet 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0
object network PUMPS
subnet 192.168.150.0 255.255.255.0
icmp-object echo
object-group service BAXTERPORTS
service-object tcp-udp destination eq 51244
object-group service SMITHSPORTS
object-group service CAREFUSIONPORTS
object-group service PCAPORTS
object-group service PLUM360PORTS
object-group service HOSPIRAPUMPSIMPORTS
object-group service BBRAUNPORTS
service-object tcp destination eq www

access-list 101 extended permit object-group TRACEROUTEUDP any any
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any object-group PING
access-list 101 extended permit icmp any any object-group PING-REPLIES

access-list 101 extended permit object-group SMITHSPORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.150
access-list 101 extended permit object-group CAREFUSIONPORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.158
access-list 101 extended permit object-group PCAPORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.160
access-list 101 extended permit object-group PLUM360PORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.160
access-list 101 extended permit object-group HOSPIRAPUMPSIMPORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.160
access-list 101 extended permit object-group BAXTERPORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.165
access-list 101 extended permit object-group BBRAUNPORTS object PUMPS host

192.168.140.169
pager lines 23
mtu WAN 1500
mtu LAN 1500
mtu management 1500
no failover
arp timeout 14400
router ospf 1
network 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 area 0
log-adj-changes

no validation-usage
crl configure
auto-import
0d06092a 864886f7 0d010105 05003081 ca310b30 09060355 04061302 55533117
30150603 55040a13 0e566572 69536967 6e2c2049 6e632e31 1f301d06 0355040b
13165665 72695369 676e2054 72757374 204e6574 776f726b 313a3038 06035504
0b133128 63292032 30303620 56657269 5369676e 2c20496e 632e202d 20466f72
20617574 686f7269 7a656420 75736520 6f6e6c79 31453043 06035504 03133c56
65726953 69676e20 436c6173 73203320 5075626c 69632050 72696d61 72792043

65727469 66696361 74696f6e 20417574 686f7269 7479202d 20473530 1e170d31
30303230 38303030 3030305a 170d3230 30323037 32333539 35395a30 81b5310b
30090603 55040613 02555331 17301506 0355040a 130e5665 72695369 676e2c20
496e632e 311f301d 06035504 0b131656 65726953 69676e20 54727573 74204e65
74776f72 6b313b30 39060355 040b1332 5465726d 73206f66 20757365 20617420
68747470 733a2f2f 7777772e 76657269 7369676e 2e636f6d 2f727061 20286329
3130312f 302d0603 55040313 26566572 69536967 6e20436c 61737320 33205365

63757265 20536572 76657220 4341202d 20473330 82012230 0d06092a 864886f7
0d010101 05000382 010f0030 82010a02 82010100 b187841f c20c45f5 bcab2597
db303406 082b0601 05050701 01042830 26302406 082b0601 05050730 01861868
7474703a 2f2f6f63 73702e76 65726973 69676e2e 636f6d30 12060355 1d130101
ff040830 060101ff 02010030 70060355 1d200469 30673065 060b6086 480186f8
45010717 03305630 2806082b 06010505 07020116 1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777
2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f6370 73302a06 082b0601 05050702 02301e1a
1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777 2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f7270 61303406
03551d1f 042d302b 3029a027 a0258623 68747470 3a2f2f63 726c2e76 65726973
69676e2e 636f6d2f 70636133 2d67352e 63726c30 0e060355 1d0f0101 ff040403
02010630 6d06082b 06010505 07010c04 61305fa1 5da05b30 59305730 55160969
69676e2e 636f6d2f 76736c6f 676f2e67 69663028 0603551d 11042130 1fa41d30
1b311930 17060355 04031310 56657269 5369676e 4d504b49 2d322d36 301d0603


6c2527b9 deb78458 c61f381e a4c4cb66
quit
telnet timeout 5
ssh 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
ssh timeout 5
ssh version 2
console timeout 0
dhcpd dns 192.168.120.163 192.168.120.162
dhcpd enable LAN
parameters

inspect ftp
inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras

inspect ip-options
inspect netbios
inspect rsh
inspect rtsp
inspect skinny
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect sip
inspect xdmcp
inspect icmp
inspect icmp error
class class-default
call-home
profile CiscoTAC-1
no active


profile License

Cryptochecksum:627e549de0a7dd97cd1379bbf37bc168
: end
A.5 Medical Devices Zone ASA Configuration File

: Saved
:
: Serial Number: 9AEWS2E5JRA
:
ASA Version 9.6(1)
!
hostname medical-devices-kmcfadde
!
license smart
throughput level 1G
names
!
nameif WAN
security-level 50
ip address 192.168.100.149 255.255.255.0
!

nameif LAN
security-level 100
ip address 192.168.150.1 255.255.255.0
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
shutdown
no nameif
no security-level
no ip address
!
management-only
nameif management
security-level 0
ip address 192.168.29.149 255.255.255.0
!
ftp mode passive

name-server 8.8.8.8
name-server 8.8.4.4
subnet 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0
object network PUMPSERVERS
subnet 192.168.140.0 255.255.255.0
object network PUMPS
subnet 192.168.150.0 255.255.255.0
object-group service PCAPORTS

icmp-object echo
object-group service PLUM360PORTS
object-group service HOSPIRAPUMPSIMPORTS
object-group service BAXTERPUMPPORTS
service-object tcp-udp destination eq 51243
object-group service BBRAUNPORTS
service-object tcp destination eq www
access-list LAN2WAN extended permit ip object PUMPS object PUMPSERVERS
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit object-group PCAPORTS host 192.168.140.160 o
bject PUMPS
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit icmp any any object-group PING
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit object-group TRACEROUTEUDP any any
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit icmp any any object-group TRACEROUTE-REPLIES
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit icmp any any object-group PING-REPLIES
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit object-group PLUM360PORTS host 192.168.140.1
60 object PUMPS
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit object-group HOSPIRAPUMPSIMPORTS host 192.16
8.140.160 object PUMPS
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit object-group BAXTERPUMPPORTS host 192.168.14
0.165 object PUMPS
access-list WAN2LAN extended permit object-group BBRAUNPORTS host 192.168.140.16
9 object PUMPS
pager lines 23
mtu WAN 1500
mtu LAN 1500
mtu management 1500

no failover
arp timeout 14400
access-group WAN2LAN in interface WAN
access-group LAN2WAN in interface LAN
router ospf 1
network 192.168.100.0 255.255.255.0 area 0
log-adj-changes
!
no validation-usage
crl configure
auto-import
0d06092a 864886f7 0d010105 05003081 ca310b30 09060355 04061302 55533117
30150603 55040a13 0e566572 69536967 6e2c2049 6e632e31 1f301d06 0355040b
13165665 72695369 676e2054 72757374 204e6574 776f726b 313a3038 06035504
0b133128 63292032 30303620 56657269 5369676e 2c20496e 632e202d 20466f72
20617574 686f7269 7a656420 75736520 6f6e6c79 31453043 06035504 03133c56
65726953 69676e20 436c6173 73203320 5075626c 69632050 72696d61 72792043
65727469 66696361 74696f6e 20417574 686f7269 7479202d 20473530 1e170d31
30303230 38303030 3030305a 170d3230 30323037 32333539 35395a30 81b5310b
30090603 55040613 02555331 17301506 0355040a 130e5665 72695369 676e2c20
496e632e 311f301d 06035504 0b131656 65726953 69676e20 54727573 74204e65
74776f72 6b313b30 39060355 040b1332 5465726d 73206f66 20757365 20617420
68747470 733a2f2f 7777772e 76657269 7369676e 2e636f6d 2f727061 20286329
3130312f 302d0603 55040313 26566572 69536967 6e20436c 61737320 33205365
63757265 20536572 76657220 4341202d 20473330 82012230 0d06092a 864886f7
0d010101 05000382 010f0030 82010a02 82010100 b187841f c20c45f5 bcab2597

db303406 082b0601 05050701 01042830 26302406 082b0601 05050730 01861868
7474703a 2f2f6f63 73702e76 65726973 69676e2e 636f6d30 12060355 1d130101
ff040830 060101ff 02010030 70060355 1d200469 30673065 060b6086 480186f8
45010717 03305630 2806082b 06010505 07020116 1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777
2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f6370 73302a06 082b0601 05050702 02301e1a
1c687474 70733a2f 2f777777 2e766572 69736967 6e2e636f 6d2f7270 61303406
03551d1f 042d302b 3029a027 a0258623 68747470 3a2f2f63 726c2e76 65726973
69676e2e 636f6d2f 70636133 2d67352e 63726c30 0e060355 1d0f0101 ff040403
02010630 6d06082b 06010505 07010c04 61305fa1 5da05b30 59305730 55160969

69676e2e 636f6d2f 76736c6f 676f2e67 69663028 0603551d 11042130 1fa41d30
1b311930 17060355 04031310 56657269 5369676e 4d504b49 2d322d36 301d0603
6c2527b9 deb78458 c61f381e a4c4cb66
quit
telnet timeout 5
ssh 192.168.29.0 255.255.255.0 management
ssh timeout 5
ssh version 2
console timeout 0
dhcpd dns 192.168.150.1
!
dhcpd enable LAN
!
username [******]password [******] encrypted
!
!
!
parameters
inspect ftp

inspect h323 h225
inspect h323 ras
inspect ip-options
inspect netbios
inspect rsh
inspect rtsp
inspect skinny
inspect esmtp
inspect sqlnet
inspect sunrpc
inspect tftp
inspect sip
inspect xdmcp
inspect icmp
inspect icmp error
class class-default
!
call-home
profile CiscoTAC-1
no active
destination address http https://tools.cisco.com/its/service/oddce/services/DD
CEService
profile License
destination address http https://tools.cisco.com/its/service/oddce/services/DD
CEService
Cryptochecksum:b2e10eb9d982ddbe5330e964af80d2d3
: end
A.6 Switch Configuration File

!
! Last configuration change at 22:21:08 UTC Wed Feb 22 2017 by cisco
! NVRAM config last updated at 23:22:47 UTC Wed Feb 22 2017 by cisco
!
version 15.0
no service pad
service timestamps debug datetime msec
service timestamps log datetime msec
service password-encryption
service compress-config
!
hostname Cisco3650-01
!

boot-start-marker
boot-end-marker
!
!
vrf definition Mgmt-vrf
!
address-family ipv4
exit-address-family
!
address-family ipv6
exit-address-family
!
logging console emergencies
enable secret [******]

enable password [******]
!
username [******]privilege [**] password [******]
user-name [******]
creation-time 1469560730
privilege [**]
password [******]
type mgmt-user
no aaa new-model
switch 1 provision ws-c3650-48ps
!
ip domain-name [******]
ip device tracking
ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.250.1 192.168.250.9
!
ip dhcp pool WLAN
network 192.168.250.0 255.255.255.0
default-router 192.168.250.1
option 43 hex c0a8.fa02
!
!
vtp mode transparent
!
crypto pki trustpoint TP-self-signed-2035642131
enrollment selfsigned
subject-name cn=IOS-Self-Signed-Certificate-2035642131
revocation-check none
rsakeypair TP-self-signed-2035642131
!
!
crypto pki certificate chain TP-self-signed-2035642131
certificate self-signed 01
3082024D 308201B6 A0030201 02020101 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 04050030
31312F30 2D060355 04031326 494F532D 53656C66 2D536967 6E65642D 43657274
69666963 6174652D 32303335 36343231 3331301E 170D3136 30373236 32303436
32355A17 0D323030 31303130 30303030 305A3031 312F302D 06035504 03132649
4F532D53 656C662D 5369676E 65642D43 65727469 66696361 74652D32 30333536
34323133 3130819F 300D0609 2A864886 F70D0101 01050003 818D0030 81890281
8100F1C4 010AE138 9BD9BBCC 2E563180 698979B5 51F7B46B D122595E E7033DCA
D80C9432 0728E47F 8CAC2629 40CEC617 5CDFFBD9 19744025 CB62CA75 8F6F0A9A
34F790DD 07DA9D60 737196C1 FDD9E764 6D22EDA3 8D9E7DF5 6CD934E3 D89FA9D5
C165F3EE E9E0EA9F 37742B00 2C4CFA0B C262E61B 95565B42 302B23E7 A1C85D9F

5FDB0203 010001A3 75307330 0F060355 1D130101 FF040530 030101FF 30200603
551D1104 19301782 15436973 636F3336 35302D30 312E6E69 73742E67 6F76301F
0603551D 23041830 1680148F 3A1CDEB7 502DACB7 DF4E96E4 EA1470F1 CFD1F730
1D060355 1D0E0416 04148F3A 1CDEB750 2DACB7DF 4E96E4EA 1470F1CF D1F7300D
06092A86 4886F70D 01010405 00038181 004FE025 9B72B4D2 5391B847 F443B481
4493F8BD 69D2FF3A 3C2E6D96 D7D83B92 91DBB84D DD47E242 9B2F45AC CA7C7CBC
D7CB9660 2B07AE9B 0376D5A1 15CBA04B B326AADE AB213EB1 D625FBFF B2F54CCD
40B1EB91 C6DD5E33 DEA8EEB3 20ECDE96 F42527D6 AD1F6A5D A261D394 FE358B8F
317FAFD0 E853785D 777E1E1D 6F561A2A 07
quit
!
!
!
!
!
diagnostic bootup level minimal
spanning-tree mode pvst
spanning-tree extend system-id
!
redundancy
mode sso
!
!
vlan 20
!
vlan 1400
name IP_DEV_BIOMEDICAL
!
vlan 1500
name IP_DEV
!
vlan 1520
name WIFI_MGMT
!
ip ssh version 2
!
class-map match-any non-client-nrt-class
match non-client-nrt
!
policy-map port_child_policy
class non-client-nrt-class
bandwidth remaining ratio 10
!
!
!
!
!
!
vrf forwarding Mgmt-vrf
ip address 192.168.20.13 255.255.255.0
negotiation auto
!
interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1
switchport access vlan 1520
switchport mode access

spanning-tree portfast
!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
description Set to 10/Half for Hospira
speed 10
duplex half
!
!
description VLAN trunk
switchport trunk allowed vlan 1400,1500,1520
switchport mode trunk
!
description management connection on VL20
!
!
!

!
!
interface Vlan1
no ip address
shutdown
!
interface Vlan20
ip address 192.168.20.13 255.255.255.0
!
interface Vlan1520
description Wireless-MGMT
ip address 192.168.250.1 255.255.255.0
!
no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.20.254
!
ip access-list extended SSH-Access
permit tcp 192.168.20.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 22
deny ip any any log
!
access-list 10 permit 192.168.20.0 0.0.0.255
!
snmp-server community public RO 10
snmp-server location NCCoE
snmp-server contact <email-address>
!
!
line con 0
exec-timeout 0 0
stopbits 1
line aux 0
stopbits 1
line vty 0 4
access-class SSH-Access in
exec-timeout 300 0
password [******]
login local
transport input ssh
line vty 5 15
access-class SSH-Access in
exec-timeout 300 0
password [******]
login local
transport input ssh
!
ntp server 10.97.74.8
wsma agent exec
profile httplistener
profile httpslistener
wsma agent config
wsma agent filesys

wsma agent notify
!
wsma profile listener httplistener
transport http
!
wsma profile listener httpslistener
transport https
ap group default-group
end
A.7 Wireless Configuration

System Inventory
NAME: "Chassis" , DESCR: "Cisco Wireless Controller"
PID: AIR-CTVM-K9, VID: V01, SN: 96NTPERK0A6
Burned-in MAC Address............................ 00:50:56:AC:6D:08
Maximum number of APs supported.................. 200
System Information
Manufacturer's Name.............................. Cisco Systems Inc.
Product Name..................................... Cisco Controller
Product Version.................................. 8.2.111.0
RTOS Version..................................... 8.2.111.0
Bootloader Version............................... 8.2.111.0
Emergency Image Version.......................... 8.2.111.0
Build Type....................................... DATA + WPS
System Name...................................... wlc
System Location..................................
System Contact...................................
System ObjectID.................................. 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.1.1631
IP Address....................................... 192.168.250.2
IPv6 Address..................................... ::

System Up Time................................... 6 days 3 hrs 48 mins 20 secs
System Timezone Location.........................
System Stats Realtime Interval................... 5
System Stats Normal Interval..................... 180
Configured Country............................... US - United States

State of 802.11b Network......................... Enabled
State of 802.11a Network......................... Enabled
Number of WLANs.................................. 2
Number of Active Clients......................... 2
Burned-in MAC Address............................ 00:50:56:AC:6D:08
Maximum number of APs supported.................. 200
System Nas-Id....................................
Licensing Type................................... RTU
vWLC config...................................... Small
Backup Controller Configuration
AP primary Backup Controller ....................
AP secondary Backup Controller ..................
System Time Information:
Time............................................. Thu Aug 18 20:05:16 2016
Timezone delta................................... 0:0
Timezone location................................
NTP Servers

NTP Polling Interval......................... 3600
Index NTP Key Index NTP Server Status

NTP Msg Auth Status
------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------
1 0 192.168.250.1 Not Synched

AUTH DISABLED
Redundancy Information
Redundancy Mode ................................. SSO DISABLED
Local State...................................... ACTIVE
Peer State....................................... N/A
Unit............................................. Primary
Unit ID.......................................... 00:50:56:AC:6D:08
Redunadancy State................................ N/A
Mobility MAC..................................... 00:50:56:AC:6D:08
Redundancy Management IP Address................. 0.0.0.0
Peer Redundancy Management IP Address............ 0.0.0.0
Redundancy Port IP Address....................... 0.0.0.0
Peer Redundancy Port IP Address.................. 169.254.0.0
AP Bundle Information
Primary AP Image Size
---------------- ----
ap1g1 12660
ap1g2 11748
ap1g3 13672
ap1g4 19256
ap3g1 9736
ap3g2 13480
ap3g3 18696

ap801 8064
ap802 9536
c1140 8636
c1520 7344
c1550 10628
c1570 11536
c602i 3864
version.info 4
Secondary AP Image Size
------------------ ----
ap1g1 12660
ap1g2 11748
ap1g3 13672
ap1g4 19256
ap3g1 9736
ap3g2 13480
ap3g3 18696
ap801 8064
ap802 9536
c1140 8636
c1520 7344
c1550 10628
c1570 11536
c602i 3864
version.info 4
Switch Configuration
802.3x Flow Control Mode......................... Disable
FIPS prerequisite features....................... Disabled
WLANCC prerequisite features..................... Disabled
UCAPL prerequisite features...................... Disabled

secret obfuscation............................... Enabled
Strong Password Check Features
case-check.................................... Enabled
consecutive-check............................. Enabled
default-check................................. Enabled
username-check................................ Enabled
position-check................................ Disabled
case-digit-check.............................. Disabled
Min. Password length.......................... 3
Min. Upper case chars......................... 0
Min. Lower case chars......................... 0
Min. Digits chars............................. 0
Min. Special chars............................ 0
Mgmt User
Password Lifetime [days]...................... 0
Password Lockout.............................. Disabled
Lockout Attempts.............................. 3
Lockout Timeout [mins]........................ 5
SNMPv3 User
Password Lifetime [days]...................... 0
Password Lockout.............................. Disabled
Lockout Attempts.............................. 3
Lockout Timeout [mins]........................ 5
Network Information
RF-Network Name............................. WLAN
DNS Server IP...............................
Web Mode.................................... Disable
Secure Web Mode............................. Enable
Secure Web Mode Cipher-Option High.......... Disable
Secure Web Mode Cipher-Option SSLv2......... Disable
Secure Web Mode RC4 Cipher Preference....... Disable

Secure Web Mode SSL Protocol................ Disable
OCSP........................................ Disabled
OCSP responder URL..........................
Secure Shell (ssh).......................... Enable
Secure Shell (ssh) Cipher-Option High....... Disable
Telnet...................................... Disable
Ethernet Multicast Forwarding............... Disable

Ethernet Broadcast Forwarding............... Disable
IPv4 AP Multicast/Broadcast Mode............ Unicast
IPv6 AP Multicast/Broadcast Mode............ Unicast
IGMP snooping............................... Disabled
IGMP timeout................................ 60 seconds
IGMP Query Interval......................... 20 seconds
MLD snooping................................ Disabled
MLD timeout................................. 60 seconds
MLD query interval.......................... 20 seconds
User Idle Timeout........................... 300 seconds
ARP Idle Timeout............................ 300 seconds
Cisco AP Default Master..................... Disable
AP Join Priority............................ Disable
Mgmt Via Wireless Interface................. Disable
Mgmt Via Dynamic Interface.................. Disable
Bridge MAC filter Config.................... Enable
Bridge Security Mode........................ EAP
Mesh Full Sector DFS........................ Enable
Mesh Backhaul RRM........................... Disable
AP Fallback ................................ Enable
Web Auth CMCC Support ...................... Disabled
Web Auth Redirect Ports .................... 80
Web Auth Proxy Redirect ................... Disable
Web Auth Captive-Bypass .................. Disable
Web Auth Secure Web ....................... Enable

Web Auth Secure Redirection ............... Disable
Fast SSID Change ........................... Disabled
AP Discovery - NAT IP Only ................. Enabled
IP/MAC Addr Binding Check .................. Enabled
Link Local Bridging Status ................. Disabled
CCX-lite status ............................ Disable
oeap-600 dual-rlan-ports ................... Disable

oeap-600 local-network ..................... Enable
oeap-600 Split Tunneling (Printers)......... Disable
WebPortal Online Client .................... 0
WebPortal NTF_LOGOUT Client ................ 0
mDNS snooping............................... Disabled
mDNS Query Interval......................... 15 minutes
Web Color Theme............................. Default
Capwap Prefer Mode.......................... IPv4
Network Profile............................. Disabled
Client ip conflict detection (DHCP) ........ Disabled
Mesh BH RRM ................................ Disable
Mesh Aggressive DCA......................... Disable
Mesh Auto RF................................ Disable
HTTP Profiling Port......................... 80
Port Summary
STP Admin Physical Physical Link Link
Pr Type Stat Mode Mode Status Status Trap POE
-- ------- ---- ------- ---------- ---------- ------ ------- ---------
1 Normal Forw Enable Auto 1000 Full Up Enable N/A
AP Summary
Number of APs.................................... 2
Global AP User Name.............................. Not Configured
Global AP Dot1x User Name........................ Not Configured

AP Name Slots AP Model Ethernet MAC Location
Country IP Address Clients DSE Location
------------------ ----- -------------------- ----------------- ----------------

---------- --------------- -------- --------------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec 2 AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9 78:da:6e:e0:08:ec default location

US 192.168.250.10 0 [0 ,0 ,0 ]
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed 2 AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9 24:e9:b3:4b:f1:ed default location

US 192.168.250.11 1 [0 ,0 ,0 ]
AP Tcp-Mss-Adjust Info
AP Name TCP State MSS Size
------------------ -------- -------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec disabled -
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed disabled -
AP Location
Total Number of AP Groups........................ 1
Site Name........................................ default-group
Site Description................................. <none>
NAS-identifier................................... none
Client Traffic QinQ Enable....................... FALSE
DHCPv4 QinQ Enable............................... FALSE
AP Operating Class............................... Not-configured
Capwap Prefer Mode............................... Not-configured
RF Profile
----------
2.4 GHz band..................................... <none>
5 GHz band....................................... <none>
WLAN ID Interface Network Admission Control Radio Policy

------- ----------- -------------------------- ------------
1 ip_dev Disabled None
2 ip_dev Disabled None
*AP3600 with 802.11ac Module will only advertise first 8 WLANs on 5GHz radios.
Lan Port configs

----------------
LAN Status POE RLAN
--- ------- ---- -----
1 Disabled Disabled None
2 Disabled None
3 Disabled None
External 3G/4G module configs
-----------------------------
LAN Status POE RLAN
--- ------- ---- -----
1 Disabled None
AP Name Slots AP Model Ethernet MAC Location

Port Country Priority
------------------ ----- ------------------- ----------------- ---------------- -

--- ------- --------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec 2 AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9 78:da:6e:e0:08:ec default location 1

US 1
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed 2 AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9 24:e9:b3:4b:f1:ed default location 1

US 1
RF Profile

Number of RF Profiles............................ 6
Out Of Box State................................. Disabled
Out Of Box Persistence........................... Disabled
RF Profile Name Band Description 11n-

client-only Applied
--------------------------------- ------- ----------------------------------- -----

------------- ----------
High-Client-Density-802.11a 5 GHz <none>

disable No
High-Client-Density-802.11bg 2.4 GHz <none>

disable No
Low-Client-Density-802.11a 5 GHz <none>

disable No
Low-Client-Density-802.11bg 2.4 GHz <none>

disable No
Typical-Client-Density-802.11a 5 GHz <none>

disable No
Typical-Client-Density-802.11bg 2.4 GHz <none>

disable No
RF Profile name................................ High-Client-Density-802.11a
Description...................................... <none>
AP Group Name.................................... <none>
Radio policy..................................... 5 GHz
11n-client-only.................................. disabled
Transmit Power Threshold v1...................... -65 dBm
Min Transmit Power............................... 7 dBm
Max Transmit Power............................... 30 dBm
802.11a Operational Rates
802.11a 6M Rate.............................. Disabled

802.11a 9M Rate.............................. Disabled
802.11a 12M Rate............................. Mandatory
802.11a 18M Rate............................. Supported

Max Clients...................................... 200
WLAN ID Max Clients
------- -------
1 600
2 600
Trap Threshold
Clients...................................... 12 clients
Interference................................. 10 %
Noise........................................ -70 dBm
Utilization.................................. 80 %
Multicast Data Rate.............................. 0
Rx Sop Threshold................................. -78 dBm
Cca Threshold.................................... 0 dBm
Slot Admin State:................................ Enabled
Band Select
Probe Response............................... Disabled
Cycle Count.................................. 2 cycles
Cycle Threshold.............................. 200 milliseconds
Expire Suppression........................... 20 seconds
Expire Dual Band............................. 60 seconds
Client Rssi.................................. -80 dBm
Client Mid Rssi.............................. -80 dBm

Load Balancing
Denial....................................... 3 count
Window....................................... 5 clients
Coverage Data
Data......................................... -80 dBm

Voice........................................ -80 dBm
Minimum Client Level......................... 3 clients
Exception Level.............................. 25 %
DCA Channel List................................. 36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,100,
104,108,112,116,120,124,128,
132,136,140,144,149,153,157,
161
DCA Bandwidth.................................... 20
DCA Foreign AP Contribution...................... enabled
802.11n MCS Rates
MCS-00 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-01 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-02 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-03 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-04 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-05 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-06 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-07 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-08 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-09 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-10 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-11 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-12 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-13 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-14 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-15 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-16 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-17 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-18 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-19 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-20 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-21 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-22 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-23 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-24 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-25 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-26 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-27 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-28 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-29 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-30 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-31 Rate.................................. enabled
Client Network Preference....................... default
RF Profile name................................ High-Client-Density-802.11bg
Radio policy..................................... 2.4 GHz
Min Transmit Power............................... 7 dBm
802.11b/g Operational Rates
802.11b/g 1M Rate............................ Disabled

802.11b/g 5.5M Rate.......................... Disabled
802.11b/g 11M Rate........................... Disabled
802.11g 6M Rate.............................. Disabled
802.11g 9M Rate.............................. Supported
802.11g 12M Rate............................. Mandatory
802.11g 18M Rate............................. Supported

Max Clients...................................... 200
WLAN ID Max Clients
------- -------
1 600
2 600
Trap Threshold
Clients...................................... 12 clients
Interference................................. 10 %
Noise........................................ -70 dBm
Utilization.................................. 80 %
Band Select

Client Rssi.................................. -80 dBm
Load Balancing
Denial....................................... 3 count
Window....................................... 5 clients
Coverage Data
Data......................................... -80 dBm
Voice........................................ -80 dBm
Exception Level.............................. 25 %
DCA Channel List................................. 1,6,11
DCA Bandwidth.................................... 20
802.11n MCS Rates
MCS-00 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-01 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-02 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-03 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-04 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-05 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-06 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-07 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-08 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-09 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-10 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-11 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-12 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-13 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-14 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-15 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-16 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-17 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-18 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-19 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-20 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-21 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-22 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-23 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-24 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-25 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-26 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-27 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-28 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-29 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-30 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-31 Rate.................................. enabled
RF Profile name................................ Low-Client-Density-802.11a
Radio policy..................................... 5 GHz
Min Transmit Power............................... -10 dBm
802.11a 6M Rate.............................. Mandatory
802.11a 9M Rate.............................. Supported

Max Clients...................................... 200

WLAN ID Max Clients
------- -------
1 600
2 600
Trap Threshold
Clients...................................... 12 clients
Interference................................. 10 %
Noise........................................ -70 dBm
Utilization.................................. 80 %
Slot Admin State................................ Enabled
Band Select
Client Rssi.................................. -80 dBm

Load Balancing
Denial....................................... 3 count
Window....................................... 5 clients
Coverage Data
Data......................................... -90 dBm
Voice........................................ -90 dBm

Exception Level.............................. 25 %
DCA Channel List................................. 36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,100,
104,108,112,116,120,124,128,
132,136,140,144,149,153,157,
161
DCA Bandwidth.................................... 20
802.11n MCS Rates
MCS-00 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-01 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-02 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-03 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-04 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-05 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-06 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-07 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-08 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-09 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-10 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-11 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-12 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-13 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-14 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-15 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-16 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-17 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-18 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-19 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-20 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-21 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-22 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-23 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-24 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-25 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-26 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-27 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-28 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-29 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-30 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-31 Rate.................................. enabled
RF Profile name................................ Low-Client-Density-802.11bg
Radio policy..................................... 2.4 GHz
802.11b/g 1M Rate............................ Mandatory
802.11b/g 5.5M Rate.......................... Mandatory

802.11b/g 11M Rate........................... Mandatory

Max Clients...................................... 200
WLAN ID Max Clients
------- -------
1 600
2 600
Trap Threshold
Clients...................................... 12 clients
Interference................................. 10 %
Noise........................................ -70 dBm
Utilization.................................. 80 %
Band Select

Client Rssi.................................. -80 dBm
Load Balancing
Denial....................................... 3 count
Window....................................... 5 clients
Coverage Data
Data......................................... -90 dBm
Voice........................................ -90 dBm
Exception Level.............................. 25 %
DCA Channel List................................. 1,6,11
DCA Bandwidth.................................... 20
802.11n MCS Rates
MCS-00 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-01 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-02 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-03 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-04 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-05 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-06 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-07 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-08 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-09 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-10 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-11 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-12 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-13 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-14 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-15 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-16 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-17 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-18 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-19 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-20 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-21 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-22 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-23 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-24 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-25 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-26 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-27 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-28 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-29 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-30 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-31 Rate.................................. enabled
RF Profile name................................ Typical-Client-Density-802.11a
Radio policy..................................... 5 GHz

Max Clients...................................... 200

WLAN ID Max Clients
------- -------
1 600
2 600
Trap Threshold
Clients...................................... 12 clients
Interference................................. 10 %
Noise........................................ -70 dBm
Utilization.................................. 80 %
Rx Sop Threshold................................. AUTO
Band Select
Client Rssi.................................. -80 dBm
Load Balancing

Denial....................................... 3 count
Window....................................... 5 clients
Coverage Data
Data......................................... -80 dBm
Voice........................................ -80 dBm

Exception Level.............................. 25 %
DCA Channel List................................. 36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,100,
104,108,112,116,120,124,128,
132,136,140,144,149,153,157,
161
DCA Bandwidth.................................... 20
802.11n MCS Rates
MCS-00 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-01 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-02 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-03 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-04 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-05 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-06 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-07 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-08 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-09 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-10 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-11 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-12 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-13 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-14 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-15 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-16 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-17 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-18 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-19 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-20 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-21 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-22 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-23 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-24 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-25 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-26 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-27 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-28 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-29 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-30 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-31 Rate.................................. enabled
RF Profile name................................ Typical-Client-Density-802.11bg
Radio policy..................................... 2.4 GHz
802.11b/g 5.5M Rate.......................... Disabled
802.11b/g 11M Rate........................... Disabled

802.11g 6M Rate.............................. Disabled
802.11g 12M Rate............................. Mandatory

Max Clients...................................... 200
WLAN ID Max Clients
------- -------
1 600
2 600
Trap Threshold
Clients...................................... 12 clients
Interference................................. 10 %
Noise........................................ -70 dBm
Utilization.................................. 80 %
Rx Sop Threshold................................. AUTO
Band Select
Client Rssi.................................. -80 dBm

Load Balancing
Denial....................................... 3 count
Window....................................... 5 clients
Coverage Data
Data......................................... -80 dBm
Voice........................................ -80 dBm
Exception Level.............................. 25 %
DCA Channel List................................. 1,6,11
DCA Bandwidth.................................... 20
802.11n MCS Rates
MCS-00 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-01 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-02 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-03 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-04 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-05 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-06 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-07 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-08 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-09 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-10 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-11 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-12 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-13 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-14 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-15 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-16 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-17 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-18 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-19 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-20 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-21 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-22 Rate.................................. enabled

MCS-23 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-24 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-25 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-26 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-27 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-28 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-29 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-30 Rate.................................. enabled
MCS-31 Rate.................................. enabled
AP Config
Cisco AP Identifier.............................. 3
Cisco AP Name.................................... AP78da.6ee0.08ec
Country code..................................... US - United States
Regulatory Domain allowed by Country............. 802.11bg:-A 802.11a:-AB
AP Country code.................................. US - United States
AP Regulatory Domain............................. -A
Switch Port Number .............................. 1
MAC Address...................................... 78:da:6e:e0:08:ec
IP Address Configuration......................... DHCP
IP Address....................................... 192.168.250.10
IP NetMask....................................... 255.255.255.0
Gateway IP Addr.................................. 192.168.250.1
NAT External IP Address.......................... None

CAPWAP Path MTU.................................. 1485
DHCP Release Override............................ Disabled
Telnet State..................................... Globally Disabled
Ssh State........................................ Globally Disabled
Cisco AP Location................................ default location
Cisco AP Floor Label............................. 0
Cisco AP Group Name.............................. default-group

Primary Cisco Switch Name........................
Primary Cisco Switch IP Address.................. Not Configured
Secondary Cisco Switch Name......................
Secondary Cisco Switch IP Address................ Not Configured
Tertiary Cisco Switch Name.......................
Tertiary Cisco Switch IP Address................. Not Configured
Administrative State ............................ ADMIN_ENABLED
Operation State ................................. REGISTERED
Mirroring Mode .................................. Disabled
AP Mode ......................................... FlexConnect
Public Safety ................................... Disabled
ATF Mode: ....................................... Disable
AP SubMode ...................................... Not Configured
Rogue Detection ................................. Enabled
AP Vlan Trunking ................................ Disabled
Remote AP Debug ................................. Disabled
Logging trap severity level ..................... informational
Logging syslog facility ......................... kern
S/W Version .................................... 8.2.111.0
Boot Version ................................... 15.2.2.0
Mini IOS Version ................................ 7.5.1.73
Stats Reporting Period .......................... 180
Stats Collection Mode ........................... normal
LED State........................................ Enabled
PoE Pre-Standard Switch.......................... Disabled

PoE Power Injector MAC Addr...................... Disabled
Power Type/Mode.................................. PoE/Full Power
Number Of Slots.................................. 2
AP Model......................................... AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9
AP Image......................................... C1600-K9W8-M
IOS Version...................................... 15.3(3)JC2$
Reset Button..................................... Enabled

AP Serial Number................................. FGL1748W52Y
AP Certificate Type.............................. Manufacture Installed
AP Lag Status ................................... Disable
Native Vlan Inheritance: ........................ AP
FlexConnect Vlan mode :.......................... Disabled
FlexConnect Group................................ Not a member of any group
Group VLAN ACL Mappings
Group VLAN Name to Id Mappings
Template in Modified State - apply it to see mappings
AP-Specific FlexConnect Policy ACLs :
L2Acl Configuration ............................. Not Available
FlexConnect Local-Split ACLs :
WLAN ID PROFILE NAME ACL TYPE
------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------- ------

-
Flexconnect Central-Dhcp Values :
WLAN ID PROFILE NAME Central-Dhcp DNS Override

Nat-Pat Type
------- --------------------------------- -------------- -------------- ----

----- ------

1 IP_Dev No Encryption False False
False Wlan
Flex AVC visibility Configurations..............
WlanId PROFILE NAME Inherit-level Visibility Flex Avc-

profile
------- -------------------------------- ------------- ---------- --------------------

------------
1 IP_Dev No Encryption wlan-spec disable none
FlexConnect Backup Auth Radius Servers :
Primary Radius Server........................... Disabled
Secondary Radius Server......................... Disabled
AP User Mode..................................... AUTOMATIC
AP User Name..................................... Cisco
AP Dot1x User Mode............................... Not Configured
AP Dot1x User Name............................... Not Configured
Cisco AP system logging host..................... 255.255.255.255
AP Core Dump Config.............................. Disabled
AP Up Time....................................... 2 days, 22 h 22 m 20 s
AP LWAPP Up Time................................. 2 days, 22 h 18 m 20 s
Join Date and Time............................... Mon Aug 15 21:47:06 2016
Join Taken Time.................................. 0 days, 00 h 03 m 59 s
Attributes for Slot 0
Radio Type................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211n-2.4
Administrative State ........................ ADMIN_ENABLED
Operation State ............................. UP
Mesh Radio Role ............................. ACCESS
Radio Role .................................. Client Serving (Remote)
CellId ...................................... 0

Station Configuration
Configuration ............................. AUTOMATIC
Number Of WLANs ........................... 1
Medium Occupancy Limit .................... 100
CFP Period ................................ 4
CFP MaxDuration ........................... 60
BSSID ..................................... 5c:a4:8a:be:ca:90

Operation Rate Set
1000 Kilo Bits........................... MANDATORY
11000 Kilo Bits.......................... MANDATORY
6000 Kilo Bits........................... SUPPORTED
12000 Kilo Bits.......................... SUPPORTED
MCS Set
MCS 0.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 1.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 2.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 3.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 4.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 5.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 6.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 7.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 8.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 9.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 10................................... SUPPORTED

MCS 11................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 12................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 13................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 14................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 15................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 16................................... DISABLED
MCS 17................................... DISABLED

MCS 18................................... DISABLED
MCS 19................................... DISABLED
MCS 20................................... DISABLED
MCS 21................................... DISABLED
MCS 22................................... DISABLED
MCS 23................................... DISABLED
MCS 24................................... DISABLED
MCS 25................................... DISABLED
MCS 26................................... DISABLED
MCS 27................................... DISABLED
MCS 28................................... DISABLED
MCS 29................................... DISABLED
MCS 30................................... DISABLED
MCS 31................................... DISABLED
Beacon Period ............................. 100
Fragmentation Threshold ................... 2346
Multi Domain Capability Implemented ....... TRUE
Multi Domain Capability Enabled ........... TRUE
Country String ............................ US
Multi Domain Capability
First Chan Num ............................ 1
Number Of Channels ........................ 11

MAC Operation Parameters
Packet Retry Limit ........................ 64
Tx Power
Num Of Supported Power Levels ............. 6

Tx Power Level 1 .......................... 22 dBm
Tx Power Configuration .................... AUTOMATIC
Current Tx Power Level .................... 1
Tx Power Assigned By ...................... DTPC
Phy OFDM parameters
Current Channel ........................... 11
Channel Assigned By ....................... DCA
Extension Channel ......................... NONE
Channel Width.............................. 20 Mhz
Allowed Channel List....................... 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
TI Threshold .............................. -50
DCA Channel List........................... Global
Legacy Tx Beamforming Configuration ....... CUSTOMIZED
Legacy Tx Beamforming ..................... ENABLED
Antenna Type............................... INTERNAL_ANTENNA
Internal Antenna Gain (in .5 dBi units).... 8
Diversity.................................. DIVERSITY_ENABLED
802.11n Antennas

A....................................... ENABLED
B....................................... ENABLED
C....................................... ENABLED
Performance Profile Parameters
Interference threshold..................... 10 %
Noise threshold............................ -70 dBm
RF utilization threshold................... 80 %
Data-rate threshold........................ 1000000 bps
Client threshold........................... 12 clients
Coverage SNR threshold..................... 12 dB
Coverage exception level................... 25 %
Client minimum exception level............. 3 clients
Rogue Containment Information
Containment Count............................ 0
CleanAir Management Information
CleanAir Capable......................... Yes
CleanAir Management Administration St.... Enabled
CleanAir Management Operation State...... Down
Rapid Update Mode........................ Off
Spectrum Expert connection............... Enabled
CleanAir NSI Key....................... C44B365F4CFF338BE94B85633D98944B
Spectrum Expert Connections counter.... 0
CleanAir Sensor State.................... Configured
Radio Extended Configurations
Beacon period.............................. 100 milliseconds
Beacon range............................... AUTO
Multicast buffer........................... AUTO
Multicast data-rate........................ AUTO

RX SOP threshold........................... AUTO
CCA threshold.............................. AUTO
Radio Type................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211n-5
Radio Subband................................ RADIO_SUBBAND_ALL

CellId ...................................... 0
Number Of WLANs ........................... 1
CFP Period ................................ 4
CFP MaxDuration ........................... 60
BSSID ..................................... 5c:a4:8a:be:ca:90
Operation Rate Set
MCS Set
MCS 0.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 1.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 2.................................... SUPPORTED

MCS 3.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 4.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 5.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 6.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 7.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 8.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 9.................................... SUPPORTED

MCS 10................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 11................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 12................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 13................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 14................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 15................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 16................................... DISABLED
MCS 17................................... DISABLED
MCS 18................................... DISABLED
MCS 19................................... DISABLED
MCS 20................................... DISABLED
MCS 21................................... DISABLED
MCS 22................................... DISABLED
MCS 23................................... DISABLED
MCS 24................................... DISABLED
MCS 25................................... DISABLED
MCS 26................................... DISABLED
MCS 27................................... DISABLED
MCS 28................................... DISABLED
MCS 29................................... DISABLED
MCS 30................................... DISABLED
MCS 31................................... DISABLED
Beacon Period ............................. 100

First Chan Num ............................ 36

Tx Power
Phy OFDM parameters
Current Channel ........................... 149
Allowed Channel List....................... 36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,100,
......................................... 104,108,112,116,132,136,140,

......................................... 149,153,157,161,165
TI Threshold .............................. -50

802.11n Antennas
A....................................... ENABLED
B....................................... ENABLED
C....................................... ENABLED
CleanAir Management Administration St.... Enabled

CleanAir NSI Key....................... C44B365F4CFF338BE94B85633D98944B

Cisco AP Identifier.............................. 4
Cisco AP Name.................................... AP24e9.b34b.f1ed
Country code..................................... US - United States
Regulatory Domain allowed by Country............. 802.11bg:-A 802.11a:-AB
AP Country code.................................. US - United States
AP Regulatory Domain............................. -A
Switch Port Number .............................. 1
MAC Address...................................... 24:e9:b3:4b:f1:ed
IP Address Configuration......................... DHCP
IP Address....................................... 192.168.250.11
IP NetMask....................................... 255.255.255.0
Gateway IP Addr.................................. 192.168.250.1
NAT External IP Address.......................... None
CAPWAP Path MTU.................................. 1485
DHCP Release Override............................ Disabled
Telnet State..................................... Globally Disabled
Ssh State........................................ Globally Disabled
Cisco AP Location................................ default location
Cisco AP Floor Label............................. 0
Cisco AP Group Name.............................. default-group

Primary Cisco Switch Name........................
Primary Cisco Switch IP Address.................. Not Configured
Secondary Cisco Switch Name......................
Secondary Cisco Switch IP Address................ Not Configured
Tertiary Cisco Switch Name.......................
Tertiary Cisco Switch IP Address................. Not Configured
Administrative State ............................ ADMIN_ENABLED

Operation State ................................. REGISTERED
Mirroring Mode .................................. Disabled
AP Mode ......................................... FlexConnect
Public Safety ................................... Disabled
ATF Mode: ....................................... Disable
AP SubMode ...................................... Not Configured
Rogue Detection ................................. Enabled
AP Vlan Trunking ................................ Disabled
Remote AP Debug ................................. Disabled
Logging trap severity level ..................... emergencies
Logging syslog facility ......................... system
S/W Version .................................... 8.2.111.0
Boot Version ................................... 15.2.2.0
Mini IOS Version ................................ 7.5.1.73
Stats Reporting Period .......................... 180
Stats Collection Mode ........................... normal
LED State........................................ Enabled
PoE Pre-Standard Switch.......................... Disabled
PoE Power Injector MAC Addr...................... Disabled
Power Type/Mode.................................. PoE/Full Power
Number Of Slots.................................. 2
AP Model......................................... AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9
AP Image......................................... C1600-K9W8-M
IOS Version...................................... 15.3(3)JC2$
Reset Button..................................... Enabled

AP Serial Number................................. FGL1748W52S
AP Certificate Type.............................. Manufacture Installed
AP Lag Status ................................... Disable
Native Vlan Inheritance: ........................ Group
FlexConnect Vlan mode :.......................... Disabled
FlexConnect Group................................ Not a member of any group
Group VLAN ACL Mappings

Group VLAN Name to Id Mappings
Template in Modified State - apply it to see mappings
AP-Specific FlexConnect Policy ACLs :
L2Acl Configuration ............................. Not Available
FlexConnect Local-Split ACLs :
WLAN ID PROFILE NAME ACL TYPE
------- -------------------------------- --------------------------------- ------

-
Flexconnect Central-Dhcp Values :
WLAN ID PROFILE NAME Central-Dhcp DNS Override

Nat-Pat Type
------- --------------------------------- -------------- -------------- ----

----- ------
1 IP_Dev No Encryption False False

False Wlan
Flex AVC visibility Configurations..............
WlanId PROFILE NAME Inherit-level Visibility Flex Avc-

profile
------- -------------------------------- ------------- ---------- --------------------

------------

1 IP_Dev No Encryption wlan-spec disable none
FlexConnect Backup Auth Radius Servers :
Primary Radius Server........................... Disabled
Secondary Radius Server......................... Disabled
AP User Mode..................................... AUTOMATIC
AP User Name..................................... Cisco

AP Dot1x User Mode............................... Not Configured
AP Dot1x User Name............................... Not Configured
Cisco AP system logging host..................... 255.255.255.255
AP Core Dump Config.............................. Disabled
AP Up Time....................................... 2 days, 22 h 22 m 16 s
AP LWAPP Up Time................................. 2 days, 22 h 18 m 14 s
Join Date and Time............................... Mon Aug 15 21:47:12 2016
Join Taken Time.................................. 0 days, 00 h 04 m 01 s
Radio Type................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211n-2.4
CellId ...................................... 0
Number Of WLANs ........................... 1
CFP Period ................................ 4
CFP MaxDuration ........................... 60
BSSID ..................................... 1c:1d:86:31:e5:50
Operation Rate Set


MCS Set
MCS 0.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 1.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 2.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 3.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 4.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 5.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 6.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 7.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 8.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 9.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 10................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 11................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 12................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 13................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 14................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 15................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 16................................... DISABLED
MCS 17................................... DISABLED
MCS 18................................... DISABLED

MCS 19................................... DISABLED
MCS 20................................... DISABLED
MCS 21................................... DISABLED
MCS 22................................... DISABLED
MCS 23................................... DISABLED
MCS 24................................... DISABLED
MCS 25................................... DISABLED

MCS 26................................... DISABLED
MCS 27................................... DISABLED
MCS 28................................... DISABLED
MCS 29................................... DISABLED
MCS 30................................... DISABLED
MCS 31................................... DISABLED
Beacon Period ............................. 100
First Chan Num ............................ 1
Tx Power


Phy OFDM parameters
Current Channel ........................... 11
Allowed Channel List....................... 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11
TI Threshold .............................. -50
802.11n Antennas
A....................................... ENABLED
B....................................... ENABLED
C....................................... ENABLED


CleanAir Management Administration St.... Disabled
CleanAir NSI Key....................... 8994C2313910BF9588C6693603B8F970
Radio Type................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211n-5
Radio Subband................................ RADIO_SUBBAND_ALL

CellId ...................................... 0
Number Of WLANs ........................... 1

CFP Period ................................ 4
CFP MaxDuration ........................... 60
BSSID ..................................... 1c:1d:86:31:e5:50
Operation Rate Set
MCS Set
MCS 0.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 1.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 2.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 3.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 4.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 5.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 6.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 7.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 8.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 9.................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 10................................... SUPPORTED

MCS 11................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 12................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 13................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 14................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 15................................... SUPPORTED
MCS 16................................... DISABLED
MCS 17................................... DISABLED

MCS 18................................... DISABLED
MCS 19................................... DISABLED
MCS 20................................... DISABLED
MCS 21................................... DISABLED
MCS 22................................... DISABLED
MCS 23................................... DISABLED
MCS 24................................... DISABLED
MCS 25................................... DISABLED
MCS 26................................... DISABLED
MCS 27................................... DISABLED
MCS 28................................... DISABLED
MCS 29................................... DISABLED
MCS 30................................... DISABLED
MCS 31................................... DISABLED
Beacon Period ............................. 100
First Chan Num ............................ 36

Tx Power

Phy OFDM parameters
Current Channel ........................... 48
Allowed Channel List....................... 36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,100,
......................................... 104,108,112,116,132,136,140,
......................................... 149,153,157,161,165
TI Threshold .............................. -50

802.11n Antennas
A....................................... ENABLED
B....................................... ENABLED
C....................................... ENABLED

CleanAir Management Administration St.... Disabled
CleanAir NSI Key....................... 8994C2313910BF9588C6693603B8F970

AP Airewave Director Configuration
AP does not have the 802.11-abgn radio.

Number Of Slots.................................. 2
AP Name.......................................... AP78da.6ee0.08ec
Slot ID........................................ 0
Radio Type..................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211b/g
Sub-band Type.................................. All
Noise Information
Noise Profile................................ PASSED
Interference Information
Interference Profile......................... PASSED
Rogue Histogram (20)
.............................................
Load Information
Load Profile................................. PASSED
Receive Utilization.......................... 0 %
Transmit Utilization......................... 0 %
Channel Utilization.......................... 38 %
Attached Clients............................. 0 clients
Coverage Information
Coverage Profile............................. PASSED
Failed Clients............................... 0 clients
Client Signal Strengths
RSSI -100 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -92 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -84 dbm................................ 0 clients

RSSI -76 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -68 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -60 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -52 dbm................................ 0 clients
Client Signal To Noise Ratios
SNR 0 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 5 dB.................................. 0 clients

SNR 10 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 15 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 20 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 25 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 30 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 35 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 40 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 45 dB.................................. 0 clients
Nearby APs
Radar Information
Channel Assignment Information
Current Channel Average Energy............... -127 dBm
Previous Channel Average Energy.............. -127 dBm
Channel Change Count......................... 415
Last Channel Change Time..................... Thu Aug 18 20:01:53 2016
Recommended Best Channel..................... 11
RF Parameter Recommendations
Power Level.................................. 1
RTS/CTS Threshold............................ 2347
Fragmentation Threshold...................... 2346
Antenna Pattern.............................. 0
Persistent Interference Devices
Class Type Channel DC (%%) RSSI (dBm) Last Update Time
------------------------- ------- ------ ---------- ------------------------

All third party trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
Number Of Slots.................................. 2
AP Name.......................................... AP78da.6ee0.08ec
Slot ID........................................ 1
Radio Type..................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211a
Sub-band Type.................................. All

Noise Information
Rogue Histogram (20/40/80/160)
.............................................
Load Information
RSSI -100 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -92 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -84 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -76 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -68 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -60 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -52 dbm................................ 0 clients
SNR 0 dB.................................. 0 clients

SNR 5 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 10 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 15 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 20 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 25 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 30 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 35 dB.................................. 0 clients

SNR 40 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 45 dB.................................. 0 clients
Nearby APs
Radar Information
Power Level.................................. 1
Antenna Pattern.............................. 0
------------------------- ------- ------ ---------- ------------------------
AP does not have the 802.11-abgn radio.
Number Of Slots.................................. 2
AP Name.......................................... AP24e9.b34b.f1ed

Slot ID........................................ 0
Radio Type..................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211b/g
Sub-band Type.................................. All
Noise Information

Rogue Histogram (20)
.............................................
Load Information
RSSI -100 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -92 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -84 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -76 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -68 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -60 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -52 dbm................................ 1 clients
SNR 0 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 5 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 10 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 15 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 20 dB.................................. 0 clients

SNR 25 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 30 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 35 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 40 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 45 dB.................................. 1 clients
Nearby APs
Radar Information
Power Level.................................. 1
Antenna Pattern.............................. 0
------------------------- ------- ------ ---------- ------------------------
Number Of Slots.................................. 2
AP Name.......................................... AP24e9.b34b.f1ed
Slot ID........................................ 1
Radio Type..................................... RADIO_TYPE_80211a
Sub-band Type.................................. All
Noise Information

Rogue Histogram (20/40/80/160)
.............................................
Load Information
RSSI -100 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -92 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -84 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -76 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -68 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -60 dbm................................ 0 clients
RSSI -52 dbm................................ 0 clients
SNR 0 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 5 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 10 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 15 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 20 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 25 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 30 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 35 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 40 dB.................................. 0 clients
SNR 45 dB.................................. 0 clients
Nearby APs

Radar Information

Power Level.................................. 1
Antenna Pattern.............................. 0
------------------------- ------- ------ ---------- ------------------------
802.11a Configuration
802.11a Network.................................. Enabled
11acSupport...................................... Enabled
11nSupport....................................... Enabled
802.11a Low Band........................... Enabled
802.11a Mid Band........................... Enabled
802.11a High Band.......................... Enabled

802.11n MCS Settings:
MCS 0........................................ Supported
MCS 1........................................ Supported
MCS 2........................................ Supported
MCS 3........................................ Supported

MCS 4........................................ Supported
MCS 5........................................ Supported
MCS 6........................................ Supported
MCS 7........................................ Supported
MCS 8........................................ Supported
MCS 9........................................ Supported
MCS 10....................................... Supported
MCS 11....................................... Supported
MCS 12....................................... Supported
MCS 13....................................... Supported
MCS 14....................................... Supported
MCS 15....................................... Supported
MCS 16....................................... Supported
MCS 17....................................... Supported
MCS 18....................................... Supported
MCS 19....................................... Supported
MCS 20....................................... Supported
MCS 21....................................... Supported
MCS 22....................................... Supported
MCS 23....................................... Supported
MCS 24....................................... Supported
MCS 25....................................... Supported
MCS 26....................................... Supported
MCS 27....................................... Supported
MCS 28....................................... Supported

MCS 29....................................... Supported
MCS 30....................................... Supported
MCS 31....................................... Supported
802.11ac MCS Settings:
Nss=1: MCS 0-9 .............................. Supported

802.11n Status:
A-MPDU Tx:
Priority 0............................... Enabled
Priority 6............................... Disabled
Aggregation scheduler.................... Enabled
Frame Burst.............................. Automatic
Realtime Timeout..................... 10
Non Realtime Timeout................. 200
A-MSDU Tx:
A-MSDU Max Subframes ........................ 3

A-MSDU MAX Length ........................... 8k
Rifs Rx ..................................... Enabled
Guard Interval .............................. Any
Beacon Interval.................................. 100
CF Pollable mandatory............................ Disabled
CF Poll Request mandatory........................ Disabled
CFP Period....................................... 4
CFP Maximum Duration............................. 60
Default Channel.................................. 36
Default Tx Power Level........................... 0
DTPC Status..................................... Enabled
Fragmentation Threshold.......................... 2346
RSSI Low Check................................... Disabled
RSSI Threshold................................... -80
TI Threshold..................................... -50
Legacy Tx Beamforming setting.................... Disabled
Traffic Stream Metrics Status.................... Disabled
Expedited BW Request Status...................... Disabled
World Mode....................................... Enabled
dfs-peakdetect................................... Enabled
EDCA profile type................................ default-wmm
Voice MAC optimization status.................... Disabled
Call Admission Control (CAC) configuration
Voice AC:
Voice AC - Admission control (ACM)............ Disabled
Voice Stream-Size............................. 84000
Voice Max-Streams............................. 2
Voice max RF bandwidth........................ 75
Voice reserved roaming bandwidth.............. 6
Voice CAC Method ............................. Load-Based
Voice tspec inactivity timeout................ Disabled
CAC SIP-Voice configuration

SIP based CAC ................................ Disabled
SIP Codec Type ............................... CODEC_TYPE_G711
SIP call bandwidth ........................... 64
SIP call bandwith sample-size ................ 20
Video AC:
Video AC - Admission control (ACM)............ Disabled
Video max RF bandwidth........................ Infinite

Video reserved roaming bandwidth.............. 0
Video load-based CAC mode..................... Disabled
Video CAC Method ............................. Static
CAC SIP-Video Configuration
Best-effort AC - Admission control (ACM)...... Disabled
Background AC - Admission control (ACM)....... Disabled
Maximum Number of Clients per AP Radio........... 200
802.11a Advanced Configuration
Member RRM Information
AP Name MAC Address Slot Admin Oper Channel

TxPower
-------------------------------- ----------------- ---- -------- ----------- ---------

--------- -------------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec 5c:a4:8a:be:ca:90 1 ENABLED UP 149*

*1/6 (22 dBm)
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed 1c:1d:86:31:e5:50 1 ENABLED UP 48*

*1/6 (22 dBm)
802.11a Airewave Director Configuration
RF Event and Performance Logging
Channel Update Logging......................... Off
Coverage Profile Logging....................... Off
Foreign Profile Logging........................ Off
Load Profile Logging........................... Off
Noise Profile Logging.......................... Off

Performance Profile Logging.................... Off
TxPower Update Logging......................... Off
Default 802.11a AP performance profiles
802.11a Global Interference threshold.......... 10 %
802.11a Global noise threshold................. -70 dBm
802.11a Global RF utilization threshold........ 80 %
802.11a Global throughput threshold............ 1000000 bps

802.11a Global clients threshold............... 12 clients
Default 802.11a AP monitoring
802.11a Monitor Mode........................... enable
802.11a Monitor Mode for Mesh AP Backhaul...... disable
802.11a Monitor Channels....................... Country channels
802.11a RRM Neighbor Discover Type............. Transparent
802.11a RRM Neighbor RSSI Normalization........ Enabled
802.11a AP Coverage Interval................... 90 seconds
802.11a AP Load Interval....................... 60 seconds
802.11a AP Monitor Measurement Interval........ 180 seconds
802.11a AP Neighbor Timeout Factor............. 5
802.11a AP Report Measurement Interval......... 180 seconds
Leader Automatic Transmit Power Assignment
Transmit Power Assignment Mode................. AUTO
Transmit Power Update Interval................. 600 seconds
Transmit Power Threshold....................... -70 dBm
Transmit Power Neighbor Count.................. 3 APs
Min Transmit Power............................. -10 dBm
Max Transmit Power............................. 30 dBm
Update Contribution
Noise........................................ Enable
Interference................................. Enable
Load......................................... Disable
Device Aware................................. Disable
Transmit Power Assignment Leader............... wlc (192.168.250.2) (::)

Last Run....................................... 21 seconds ago
Last Run Time.................................. 0 seconds
TPC Mode....................................... Version 1
TPCv2 Target RSSI.............................. -67 dBm
TPCv2 VoWLAN Guide RSSI........................ -67.0 dBm
TPCv2 SOP...................................... -85.0 dBm
TPCv2 Default Client Ant Gain.................. 0.0 dBi

TPCv2 Path Loss Decay Factor................... 3.6
TPCv2 Search Intensity......................... 10 Iterations
AP Name Channel TxPower Allowed Power Levels
-------------------------------- ---------- ------------- ------------------------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec 149* *1/6 (22 dBm) [22/19/16/13/10/7/7/7]
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed 48* *1/6 (22 dBm) [22/19/16/13/10/7/7/7]
Coverage Hole Detection
802.11a Coverage Hole Detection Mode........... Enabled
802.11a Coverage Voice Packet Count............ 100 packets
802.11a Coverage Voice Packet Percentage....... 50%
802.11a Coverage Voice RSSI Threshold.......... -80 dBm
802.11a Coverage Data Packet Count............. 50 packets
802.11a Coverage Data Packet Percentage........ 50%
802.11a Coverage Data RSSI Threshold........... -80 dBm
802.11a Global coverage exception level........ 25 %
802.11a Global client minimum exception lev.... 3 clients
OptimizedRoaming
802.11a OptimizedRoaming Mode.................. Disabled
802.11a OptimizedRoaming Reporting Interval.... 90 seconds
802.11a OptimizedRoaming Rate Threshold........ disabled
802.11a OptimizedRoaming Hysteresis............ 6 dB
OptimizedRoaming Stats
802.11a OptimizedRoaming Disassociations....... 0
802.11a OptimizedRoaming Rejections............ 0

Leader Automatic Channel Assignment
Channel Assignment Mode........................ AUTO
Channel Update Interval........................ 600 seconds
Anchor time (Hour of the day).................. 0
Update Contribution
Noise........................................ Enable
Load......................................... Disable
CleanAir Event-driven RRM option............... Disabled
Channel Assignment Leader...................... wlc (192.168.250.2) (::)
DCA Sensitivity Level.......................... MEDIUM (15 dB)
DCA 802.11n/ac Channel Width................... 20 MHz
DCA Minimum Energy Limit....................... -95 dBm
Channel Energy Levels
Minimum...................................... -127 dBm
Average...................................... -127 dBm
Maximum...................................... -127 dBm
Channel Dwell Times
Minimum...................................... 0 days, 00 h 00 m 19 s
Average...................................... 0 days, 00 h 00 m 19 s
Maximum...................................... 0 days, 00 h 00 m 19 s
802.11a 5 GHz Auto-RF Channel List
Allowed Channel List......................... 36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64,100,
104,108,112,116,120,124,128,
132,136,140,144,149,153,157,
161
Unused Channel List.......................... 165
802.11a 4.9 GHz Auto-RF Channel List
Allowed Channel List.........................

Unused Channel List.......................... 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,
13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,
22,23,24,25,26
DCA Outdoor AP option.......................... Disabled
802.11a Radio RF Grouping
RF Group Name.................................. WLAN
RF Protocol Version(MIN)....................... 101(30)

RF Packet Header Version....................... 2
Group Role(Mode)............................... LEADER(AUTO)
Group State.................................... Idle
Group Update Interval.......................... 600 seconds
Group Leader................................... wlc (192.168.250.2) (::)
Group Member
................................. wlc (192.168.250.2)
Maximum/Current number of Group Member......... 20/1
Maximum/Current number of AP................... 500/2
802.11a CleanAir Configuration
Clean Air Solution............................... Disabled
Air Quality Settings:
Air Quality Reporting........................ Enabled
Air Quality Reporting Period (min)........... 15
Air Quality Alarms........................... Enabled
Air Quality Alarm Threshold................ 35
Unclassified Interference.................. Disabled
Unclassified Severity Threshold............ 20
Interference Device Settings:
Interference Device Reporting................ Enabled
Interference Device Types:
TDD Transmitter.......................... Enabled
Jammer................................... Enabled

Continuous Transmitter................... Enabled
DECT-like Phone.......................... Enabled
Video Camera............................. Enabled
WiFi Inverted............................ Enabled
WiFi Invalid Channel..................... Enabled
SuperAG.................................. Enabled
Canopy................................... Enabled
WiMax Mobile............................. Enabled
WiMax Fixed.............................. Enabled
Interference Device Alarms................... Enabled
Interference Device Types Triggering Alarms:
TDD Transmitter.......................... Disabled
Jammer................................... Enabled
Continuous Transmitter................... Disabled
DECT-like Phone.......................... Disabled
Video Camera............................. Disabled
SuperAG.................................. Disabled
Canopy................................... Disabled
WiMax Mobile............................. Disabled
WiMax Fixed.............................. Disabled
Additional Clean Air Settings:
CleanAir ED-RRM State........................ Disabled
CleanAir ED-RRM Sensitivity.................. Medium
CleanAir ED-RRM Custom Threshold............. 50
CleanAir Rogue Contribution.................. Disabled
CleanAir Rogue Duty-Cycle Threshold.......... 80
CleanAir Persistent Devices state............ Disabled
CleanAir Persistent Device Propagation....... Disabled
802.11a CleanAir AirQuality Summary

AQ = Air Quality
DFS = Dynamic Frequency Selection
AP Name Channel Avg AQ Min AQ Interferers DFS
------------------ ------- ------ ------ ----------- ---
802.11b Configuration
802.11b Network.................................. Enabled
11gSupport....................................... Enabled
11nSupport....................................... Enabled
802.11b/g 5.5M Rate.......................... Mandatory
802.11b/g 11M Rate........................... Mandatory
802.11n MCS Settings:
MCS 0........................................ Supported
MCS 1........................................ Supported
MCS 2........................................ Supported
MCS 3........................................ Supported
MCS 4........................................ Supported
MCS 5........................................ Supported
MCS 6........................................ Supported
MCS 7........................................ Supported

MCS 8........................................ Supported
MCS 9........................................ Supported
MCS 10....................................... Supported
MCS 11....................................... Supported
MCS 12....................................... Supported
MCS 13....................................... Supported
MCS 14....................................... Supported

MCS 15....................................... Supported
MCS 16....................................... Supported
MCS 17....................................... Supported
MCS 18....................................... Supported
MCS 19....................................... Supported
MCS 20....................................... Supported
MCS 21....................................... Supported
MCS 22....................................... Supported
MCS 23....................................... Supported
MCS 24....................................... Supported
MCS 25....................................... Supported
MCS 26....................................... Supported
MCS 27....................................... Supported
MCS 28....................................... Supported
MCS 29....................................... Supported
MCS 30....................................... Supported
MCS 31....................................... Supported
802.11n Status:
A-MPDU Tx:

Aggregation scheduler.................... Enabled
Realtime Timeout..................... 10
Non Realtime Timeout................. 200
A-MSDU Tx:

A-MSDU Max Subframes ........................ 3
A-MSDU MAX Length ........................... 8k
Rifs Rx ..................................... Enabled
Guard Interval .............................. Any
Beacon Interval.................................. 100
CF Pollable mode................................. Disabled
CF Poll Request mandatory........................ Disabled
CFP Period....................................... 4
CFP Maximum Duration............................. 60
Default Channel.................................. 1
Default Tx Power Level........................... 0
DTPC Status..................................... Enabled
RSSI Low Check................................... Disabled
RSSI Threshold................................... -80
Call Admission Limit ........................... 105
G711 CU Quantum ................................. 15
ED Threshold..................................... -50
Fragmentation Threshold.......................... 2346

PBCC mandatory................................... Disabled
RTS Threshold.................................... 2347
Short Preamble mandatory......................... Enabled
Short Retry Limit................................ 7
Legacy Tx Beamforming setting.................... Disabled
Traffic Stream Metrics Status.................... Disabled
Expedited BW Request Status...................... Disabled

World Mode....................................... Enabled
Faster Carrier Tracking Loop..................... Disabled
EDCA profile type................................ default-wmm
Voice MAC optimization status.................... Disabled
Call Admission Control (CAC) configuration
Voice AC - Admission control (ACM)............ Disabled
Voice Stream-Size............................. 84000
Voice Max-Streams............................. 2
Voice max RF bandwidth........................ 75
Voice reserved roaming bandwidth.............. 6
Voice CAC Method.............................. Load-Based
Voice tspec inactivity timeout................ Disabled
CAC SIP-Voice configuration
SIP Codec Type ............................... CODEC_TYPE_G711
SIP call bandwidth: .......................... 64
SIP call bandwidth sample-size ............... 20
Video AC - Admission control (ACM)............ Disabled
Video max RF bandwidth........................ Infinite
Video reserved roaming bandwidth.............. 0
Video load-based CAC mode..................... Disabled
Video CAC Method ............................. Static
CAC SIP-Video configuration
Best-effort AC - Admission control (ACM)...... Disabled

Background AC - Admission control (ACM)....... Disabled
Maximum Number of Clients per AP................. 200
802.11b Advanced Configuration
Member RRM Information

AP Name MAC Address Admin Oper Channel

TxPower
-------------------------------- ----------------- -------- ----------- ---------- ---

----------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec 5c:a4:8a:be:ca:90 ENABLED UP 11*

*1/6 (22 dBm)
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed 1c:1d:86:31:e5:50 ENABLED UP 11*

*1/6 (22 dBm)
802.11b Airewave Director Configuration
RF Event and Performance Logging
Channel Update Logging......................... Off
Coverage Profile Logging....................... Off
Foreign Profile Logging........................ Off
Load Profile Logging........................... Off
Noise Profile Logging.......................... Off
Performance Profile Logging.................... Off
Transmit Power Update Logging.................. Off
Default 802.11b AP performance profiles
802.11b Global Interference threshold.......... 10 %
802.11b Global noise threshold................. -70 dBm
802.11b Global RF utilization threshold........ 80 %
802.11b Global throughput threshold............ 1000000 bps
802.11b Global clients threshold............... 12 clients

Default 802.11b AP monitoring
802.11b Monitor Mode........................... enable
802.11b Monitor Channels....................... Country channels
802.11b RRM Neighbor Discovery Type............ Transparent
802.11b RRM Neighbor RSSI Normalization........ Enabled
802.11b AP Coverage Interval................... 90 seconds
802.11b AP Load Interval....................... 60 seconds

802.11b AP Monitor Measurement Interval........ 180 seconds
802.11b AP Neighbor Timeout Factor............. 5
802.11b AP Report Measurement Interval......... 180 seconds
Leader Automatic Transmit Power Assignment
Transmit Power Assignment Mode................. AUTO
Transmit Power Update Interval................. 600 seconds
Transmit Power Threshold....................... -70 dBm
Transmit Power Neighbor Count.................. 3 APs
Min Transmit Power............................. -10 dBm
Max Transmit Power............................. 30 dBm
Update Contribution
Noise........................................ Enable
Load......................................... Disable
Transmit Power Assignment Leader............... wlc (192.168.250.2) (::)
TPC Mode....................................... Version 1
TPCv2 Target RSSI.............................. -67 dBm
TPCv2 VoWLAN Guide RSSI........................ -67.0 dBm
TPCv2 SOP...................................... -85.0 dBm
TPCv2 Default Client Ant Gain.................. 0.0 dBi
TPCv2 Path Loss Decay Factor................... 3.6
TPCv2 Search Intensity......................... 10 Iterations

AP Name Channel TxPower Allowed Power Levels
-------------------------------- ---------- ------------- ------------------------
AP78da.6ee0.08ec *11 *1/6 (22 dBm) [22/19/16/13/10/7/7/7]
AP24e9.b34b.f1ed *11 *1/6 (22 dBm) [22/19/16/13/10/7/7/7]

Coverage Hole Detection
802.11b Coverage Hole Detection Mode........... Enabled
802.11b Coverage Voice Packet Count............ 100 packets
802.11b Coverage Voice Packet Percentage....... 50%
802.11b Coverage Voice RSSI Threshold.......... -80 dBm
802.11b Coverage Data Packet Count............. 50 packets
802.11b Coverage Data Packet Percentage........ 50%
802.11b Coverage Data RSSI Threshold........... -80 dBm
802.11b Global coverage exception level........ 25 %
802.11b Global client minimum exception lev.... 3 clients
OptimizedRoaming
802.11b OptimizedRoaming Mode.................. Disabled
802.11b OptimizedRoaming Reporting Interval.... 90 seconds
802.11b OptimizedRoaming Rate Threshold........ disabled
802.11b OptimizedRoaming Hysteresis............ 6 dB
OptimizedRoaming Stats
802.11b OptimizedRoaming Disassociations....... 0
802.11b OptimizedRoaming Rejections............ 0
Leader Automatic Channel Assignment
Channel Assignment Mode........................ AUTO
Channel Update Interval........................ 600 seconds
Anchor time (Hour of the day).................. 0
Update Contribution
Noise........................................ Enable

Load......................................... Disable
CleanAir Event-driven RRM option............... Disabled
Channel Assignment Leader...................... wlc (192.168.250.2) (::)

DCA Sensitivity Level: ...................... MEDIUM (10 dB)
DCA Minimum Energy Limit....................... -95 dBm
Channel Energy Levels
Minimum...................................... -127 dBm
Average...................................... -127 dBm
Maximum...................................... -127 dBm
Channel Dwell Times
Minimum...................................... 0 days, 00 h 03 m 43 s
Average...................................... 0 days, 00 h 03 m 43 s
Maximum...................................... 0 days, 00 h 03 m 43 s
802.11b Auto-RF Allowed Channel List........... 1,6,11
Auto-RF Unused Channel List.................... 2,3,4,5,7,8,9,10
802.11b Radio RF Grouping
RF Group Name.................................. WLAN
RF Protocol Version(MIN)....................... 101(30)
RF Packet Header Version....................... 2
Group Role(Mode)............................... LEADER(AUTO)
Group State.................................... Idle
Group Update Interval.......................... 600 seconds
Group Leader................................... wlc (192.168.250.2) (::)
Group Member
................................. wlc (192.168.250.2)
Maximum/Current number of Group Member......... 20/1
Maximum/Current number of AP................... 500/2

802.11b CleanAir Configuration
Clean Air Solution............................... Disabled
Air Quality Settings:
Air Quality Reporting........................ Enabled
Air Quality Reporting Period (min)........... 15
Air Quality Alarms........................... Enabled

Air Quality Alarm Threshold................ 35
Unclassified Interference.................. Disabled
Unclassified Severity Threshold............ 20
Interference Device Settings:
Interference Device Reporting................ Enabled
Interference Device Types:
Bluetooth Link........................... Enabled
Microwave Oven........................... Enabled
802.11 FH................................ Enabled
Bluetooth Discovery...................... Enabled
TDD Transmitter.......................... Enabled
Jammer................................... Enabled
Continuous Transmitter................... Enabled
DECT-like Phone.......................... Enabled
Video Camera............................. Enabled
802.15.4................................. Enabled
SuperAG.................................. Enabled
Canopy................................... Enabled
Microsoft Device......................... Enabled
WiMax Mobile............................. Enabled
WiMax Fixed.............................. Enabled
BLE Beacon............................... Enabled
Interference Device Alarms................... Enabled

Interference Device Types Triggering Alarms:
Bluetooth Link........................... Disabled
Microwave Oven........................... Disabled
802.11 FH................................ Disabled
Bluetooth Discovery...................... Disabled
TDD Transmitter.......................... Disabled
Jammer................................... Enabled
Continuous Transmitter................... Disabled
DECT-like Phone.......................... Disabled
Video Camera............................. Disabled
802.15.4................................. Disabled
SuperAG.................................. Disabled
Canopy................................... Disabled
Microsoft Device......................... Disabled
WiMax Mobile............................. Disabled
WiMax Fixed.............................. Disabled
BLE Beacon............................... Disabled
Additional Clean Air Settings:
CleanAir ED-RRM State........................ Disabled
CleanAir ED-RRM Sensitivity.................. Medium
CleanAir ED-RRM Custom Threshold............. 50
CleanAir Rogue Contribution.................. Disabled
CleanAir Rogue Duty-Cycle Threshold.......... 80
CleanAir Persistent Devices state............ Disabled
CleanAir Persistent Device Propagation....... Disabled
802.11a CleanAir AirQuality Summary
AQ = Air Quality
DFS = Dynamic Frequency Selection

AP Name Channel Avg AQ Min AQ Interferers DFS
------------------ ------- ------ ------ ----------- ---
RF Density Optimization Configurations

FRA State........................................ Disabled
FRA Sensitivity.................................. low (100)
FAR Interval..................................... 1 Hour(s)
AP Name MAC Address Slot Current Band COF %

Suggested Mode
-------------------------------- ----------------- ---- -------------- ---------------

----- -------------------------
COF : Coverage Overlap Factor
RF Client Steering Configurations
Client Steering Configuration Information
Macro to micro transition threshold............ -55 dBm
micro to Macro transition threshold............ -65 dBm
micro-Macro transition minimum client count.... 3
micro-Macro transition client balancing win.... 3
Probe suppression mode......................... disabled

Probe suppression validity window.............. 100 s
Probe suppression aggregate window............. 200 ms
Probe suppression transition aggressiveness.... 3
Probe suppression hysteresis................... -6 dBm

Mobility Configuration
Mobility Protocol Port........................... 16666
Default Mobility Domain.......................... WLAN
Multicast Mode .................................. Disabled
Mobility Domain ID for 802.11r................... 0xf6a2
Mobility Keepalive Interval...................... 10
Mobility Keepalive Count......................... 3
Mobility Group Members Configured................ 1
Mobility Control Message DSCP Value.............. 0
Controllers configured in the Mobility Group
MAC Address IP Address Group Name

Multicast IP Status
00:50:56:ac:6d:08 192.168.250.2 WLAN

0.0.0.0 Up
Mobility Hash Configuration
Default Mobility Domain.......................... WLAN
IP Address Hash Key
---------------------------------------------------------

192.168.250.2 7a9b864fa2922672949cf9a66fd012a0ce8cc7b0
Self Signed Certificate details
SSC Hash validation.............................. Enabled.

SSC Device Certificate details:
Subject Name :
C=US, ST=California, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Virtual Wireless LAN

Controller,
CN=DEVICE-vWLC-AIR-CTVM-K9-005056AC6338,
emailAddress=support@vwlc.com
Validity :
Start : Jul 26 20:52:54 2016 GMT
End : Jun 4 20:52:54 2026 GMT
Hash key : 7a9b864fa2922672949cf9a66fd012a0ce8cc7b0
Mobility Foreign Map Configuration
WLAN ID Foreign Mac Address Interface
------- ------------------- ---------
Advanced Configuration

Probe request filtering.......................... Enabled
Probes fwd to controller per client per radio.... 2
Probe request rate-limiting interval............. 500 msec
Aggregate Probe request interval................. 500 msec
Increased backoff parameters for probe respon.... Disabled
EAP-Identity-Request Timeout (seconds)........... 30

EAP-Identity-Request Max Retries................. 2
EAP Key-Index for Dynamic WEP.................... 0
EAP Max-Login Ignore Identity Response........... enable
EAP-Request Timeout (seconds).................... 30
EAP-Request Max Retries.......................... 2
EAPOL-Key Timeout (milliseconds)................. 1000
EAPOL-Key Max Retries............................ 2
EAP-Broadcast Key Interval....................... 3600
dot11-padding.................................... Disabled
padding-size..................................... 0
Advanced Hotspot Commands
ANQP 4-way state................................. Disabled
GARP Broadcast state: ........................... Enabled
GAS request rate limit .......................... Disabled
ANQP comeback delay in TUs(TU=1024usec).......... 1 TUs (=1mSec)
Location Configuration
RFID Tag data Collection......................... Enabled
RFID timeout.................................... 1200 seconds

RFID mobility....................................
Interface Configuration
Interface Name................................... ip_dev
MAC Address...................................... 00:50:56:ac:6d:08

IP Address....................................... 192.168.150.2
IP Netmask....................................... 255.255.255.0
IP Gateway....................................... 192.168.150.1
External NAT IP State............................ Disabled
External NAT IP Address.......................... 0.0.0.0
VLAN............................................. 1500
Quarantine-vlan.................................. 0
NAS-Identifier................................... none
Physical Port.................................... 1
DHCP Proxy Mode.................................. Global
Primary DHCP Server.............................. Unconfigured
Secondary DHCP Server............................ Unconfigured
DHCP Option 82................................... Disabled
DHCP Option 82 bridge mode insertion............. Disabled
IPv4 ACL......................................... Unconfigured
mDNS Profile Name................................ Unconfigured
AP Manager....................................... No
Guest Interface.................................. N/A
3G VLAN.......................................... Disabled
L2 Multicast..................................... Enabled
Interface Name................................... management
MAC Address...................................... 00:50:56:ac:6d:08
IP Address....................................... 192.168.250.2
IP Netmask....................................... 255.255.255.0

IP Gateway....................................... 192.168.250.1
External NAT IP State............................ Disabled
External NAT IP Address.......................... 0.0.0.0
Link Local IPv6 Address.......................... fe80::250:56ff:feac:6d08/64
STATE ........................................... REACHABLE
Primary IPv6 Address............................. ::/128
STATE ........................................... NONE

Primary IPv6 Gateway............................. ::
Primary IPv6 Gateway Mac Address................. 00:00:00:00:00:00
STATE ........................................... INCOMPLETE
VLAN............................................. 1520
Quarantine-vlan.................................. 0
Physical Port.................................... 1
DHCP Proxy Mode.................................. Global
Primary DHCP Server.............................. 192.168.250.1
Secondary DHCP Server............................ Unconfigured
DHCP Option 82................................... Disabled
DHCP Option 82 bridge mode insertion............. Disabled
mDNS Profile Name................................ Unconfigured
AP Manager....................................... Yes
L2 Multicast..................................... Enabled
Interface Name................................... service-port
MAC Address...................................... 00:50:56:ac:63:38
IP Address....................................... 192.168.29.146
IP Netmask....................................... 255.255.255.0
Link Local IPv6 Address.......................... fe80::250:56ff:feac:6338/64
STATE ........................................... NONE
IPv6 Address..................................... ::/128

STATE ........................................... NONE
SLAAC............................................ Disabled
DHCP Protocol.................................... Disabled
AP Manager....................................... No
Speed ........................................... 1Gbps
Duplex .......................................... Full

Auto Negotiation ................................ Enabled
Link Status...................................... Up
Port specific Information:
inet
addr:192.168.29.146 Bcast:192.168.29.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
inet6 addr:
fe80::250:56ff:feac:6338/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1430 Metric:1
RX packets:258830 errors:0 dropped:298 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:95115 errors:0
dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:25069479
(23.9 MiB) TX bytes:55852901 (53.2 MiB)
Interface Name................................... virtual
MAC Address...................................... 00:50:56:ac:6d:08
IP Address....................................... 1.1.1.1
Virtual DNS Host Name............................ Disabled
AP Manager....................................... No

Interface Group Configuration
WLAN Configuration
WLAN Identifier.................................. 1
Profile Name..................................... IP_Dev No Encryption
Network Name (SSID).............................. IP_Dev
Status........................................... Disabled
MAC Filtering.................................... Disabled
Broadcast SSID................................... Enabled
AAA Policy Override.............................. Disabled
Network Admission Control
Client Profiling Status
Radius Profiling ............................ Disabled
DHCP ....................................... Disabled
HTTP ....................................... Disabled
Local Profiling ............................. Disabled
DHCP ....................................... Disabled
HTTP ....................................... Disabled
Radius-NAC State............................... Disabled
SNMP-NAC State................................. Disabled
Quarantine VLAN................................ 0
Maximum number of Associated Clients............. 0
Maximum number of Clients per AP Radio........... 200
ATF Policy....................................... 0
Exclusionlist Timeout............................ 60 seconds
Session Timeout.................................. 86400 seconds
User Idle Timeout................................ Disabled
Sleep Client..................................... disable

Sleep Client Timeout............................. 720 minutes
User Idle Threshold.............................. 0 Bytes
CHD per WLAN..................................... Enabled
Webauth DHCP exclusion........................... Disabled
Interface........................................ ip_dev
Multicast Interface.............................. Not Configured

WLAN IPv4 ACL.................................... unconfigured
WLAN Layer2 ACL.................................. unconfigured
mDNS Status...................................... Disabled
mDNS Profile Name................................ unconfigured
DHCP Server...................................... Default
DHCP Address Assignment Required................. Disabled
Static IP client tunneling....................... Disabled
Tunnel Profile................................... Unconfigured
Quality of Service............................... Silver
Per-SSID Rate Limits............................. Upstream Downstream
Average Data Rate................................ 0 0
Average Realtime Data Rate....................... 0 0
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Burst Realtime Data Rate......................... 0 0
Per-Client Rate Limits........................... Upstream Downstream
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Scan Defer Priority.............................. 4,5,6
Scan Defer Time.................................. 100 milliseconds
WMM.............................................. Allowed
WMM UAPSD Compliant Client Support............... Disabled
Media Stream Multicast-direct.................... Disabled

CCX - AironetIe Support.......................... Enabled
CCX - Gratuitous ProbeResponse (GPR)............. Disabled
CCX - Diagnostics Channel Capability............. Disabled
Dot11-Phone Mode (7920).......................... Disabled
Wired Protocol................................... 802.1P (Tag=0)
Passive Client Feature........................... Disabled
Peer-to-Peer Blocking Action..................... Disabled

Radio Policy..................................... All
DTIM period for 802.11a radio.................... 1
DTIM period for 802.11b radio.................... 1
Radius Servers
Authentication................................ Global Servers
Accounting.................................... Global Servers
Interim Update............................. Enabled
Interim Update Interval.................... 0
Framed IPv6 Acct AVP ...................... Prefix
Dynamic Interface............................. Disabled
Dynamic Interface Priority.................... wlan
Local EAP Authentication......................... Disabled
Radius NAI-Realm................................. Disabled
Mu-Mimo.......................................... Enabled
Security
802.11 Authentication:........................ Open System
FT Support.................................... Disabled
Static WEP Keys............................... Disabled
802.1X........................................ Disabled
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA/WPA2)............. Disabled
Wi-Fi Direct policy configured................ Disabled
EAP-Passthrough............................... Disabled
CKIP ......................................... Disabled
Web Based Authentication...................... Disabled

Web Authentication Timeout.................... 300
Web-Passthrough............................... Disabled
Mac-auth-server............................... 0.0.0.0
Web-portal-server............................. 0.0.0.0
Conditional Web Redirect...................... Disabled
Splash-Page Web Redirect...................... Disabled
Auto Anchor................................... Disabled

FlexConnect Local Switching................... Enabled
FlexConnect Central Association............... Disabled
flexconnect Central Dhcp Flag................. Disabled
flexconnect nat-pat Flag...................... Disabled
flexconnect Dns Override Flag................. Disabled
flexconnect PPPoE pass-through................ Disabled
flexconnect local-switching IP-source-guar.... Disabled
FlexConnect Vlan based Central Switching ..... Disabled
FlexConnect Local Authentication.............. Disabled
FlexConnect Learn IP Address.................. Enabled
Client MFP.................................... Optional but inactive (WPA2 not

configured)
PMF........................................... Disabled
PMF Association Comeback Time................. 1
PMF SA Query RetryTimeout..................... 200
Tkip MIC Countermeasure Hold-down Timer....... 60
Eap-params.................................... Not Applicable
Flex Avc Profile Name............................ None
Flow Monitor Name................................ None
Split Tunnel Configuration
Split Tunnel................................. Disabled
Call Snooping.................................... Disabled
Roamed Call Re-Anchor Policy..................... Disabled
SIP CAC Fail Send-486-Busy Policy................ Enabled
SIP CAC Fail Send Dis-Association Policy......... Disabled

KTS based CAC Policy............................. Disabled
Assisted Roaming Prediction Optimization......... Disabled
802.11k Neighbor List............................ Disabled
802.11k Neighbor List Dual Band.................. Disabled
802.11v Directed Multicast Service............... Disabled
802.11v BSS Max Idle Service..................... Enabled
802.11v BSS Transition Service................... Disabled

802.11v BSS Transition Disassoc Imminent......... Disabled
802.11v BSS Transition Disassoc Timer............ 200
802.11v BSS Transition OpRoam Disassoc Timer..... 40
DMS DB is empty
Band Select...................................... Disabled
Load Balancing................................... Disabled
Multicast Buffer................................. Disabled
Universal Ap Admin............................... Disabled
Mobility Anchor List
WLAN ID IP Address Status Priority
------- --------------- ------ --------
802.11u........................................ Disabled
MSAP Services.................................. Disabled
Local Policy
----------------
Priority Policy Name
-------- ---------------
WLAN Configuration
WLAN Identifier.................................. 2

Profile Name..................................... IP_Dev All WPA/WPA2 PSK
Network Name (SSID).............................. IP_Dev
Status........................................... Enabled
MAC Filtering.................................... Disabled
Broadcast SSID................................... Enabled
AAA Policy Override.............................. Disabled
Network Admission Control

Client Profiling Status
Radius Profiling ............................ Disabled
DHCP ....................................... Disabled
HTTP ....................................... Disabled
Local Profiling ............................. Disabled
DHCP ....................................... Disabled
HTTP ....................................... Disabled
Radius-NAC State............................... Disabled
SNMP-NAC State................................. Disabled
Quarantine VLAN................................ 0
Maximum number of Associated Clients............. 0
Maximum number of Clients per AP Radio........... 200
ATF Policy....................................... 0
Exclusionlist Timeout............................ 60 seconds
Session Timeout.................................. 1800 seconds
User Idle Timeout................................ Disabled
Sleep Client..................................... disable
Sleep Client Timeout............................. 720 minutes
User Idle Threshold.............................. 0 Bytes
CHD per WLAN..................................... Enabled
Webauth DHCP exclusion........................... Disabled
Interface........................................ ip_dev
Multicast Interface.............................. Not Configured

WLAN Layer2 ACL.................................. unconfigured
mDNS Status...................................... Disabled
mDNS Profile Name................................ unconfigured
DHCP Server...................................... Default
DHCP Address Assignment Required................. Disabled

Static IP client tunneling....................... Disabled
Tunnel Profile................................... Unconfigured
Quality of Service............................... Silver
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Scan Defer Priority.............................. 4,5,6
Scan Defer Time.................................. 100 milliseconds
WMM.............................................. Allowed
WMM UAPSD Compliant Client Support............... Disabled
Media Stream Multicast-direct.................... Disabled
CCX - AironetIe Support.......................... Enabled
CCX - Gratuitous ProbeResponse (GPR)............. Disabled
CCX - Diagnostics Channel Capability............. Disabled
Dot11-Phone Mode (7920).......................... Disabled
Wired Protocol................................... 802.1P (Tag=0)
Passive Client Feature........................... Disabled
Peer-to-Peer Blocking Action..................... Disabled

Radio Policy..................................... All
DTIM period for 802.11a radio.................... 1
DTIM period for 802.11b radio.................... 1
Radius Servers
Authentication................................ Global Servers
Accounting.................................... Global Servers
Interim Update............................. Enabled

Interim Update Interval.................... 0
Framed IPv6 Acct AVP ...................... Prefix
Dynamic Interface............................. Disabled
Dynamic Interface Priority.................... wlan
Local EAP Authentication......................... Disabled
Radius NAI-Realm................................. Disabled
Mu-Mimo.......................................... Enabled
Security
802.11 Authentication:........................ Open System
FT Support.................................... Disabled
Static WEP Keys............................... Disabled
802.1X........................................ Disabled
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA/WPA2)............. Enabled
WPA (SSN IE)............................... Enabled
TKIP Cipher............................. Enabled
AES Cipher.............................. Enabled
WPA2 (RSN IE).............................. Enabled
TKIP Cipher............................. Disabled
AES Cipher.............................. Enabled
OSEN IE.................................... Disabled
Auth Key Management
802.1x.................................. Disabled
PSK..................................... Enabled
CCKM.................................... Disabled

FT-1X(802.11r).......................... Disabled
FT-PSK(802.11r)......................... Disabled
PMF-1X(802.11w)......................... Disabled
PMF-PSK(802.11w)........................ Disabled
OSEN-1X................................. Disabled
FT Reassociation Timeout................... 20
FT Over-The-DS mode........................ Disabled

GTK Randomization.......................... Disabled
SKC Cache Support.......................... Disabled
CCKM TSF Tolerance......................... 1000
Wi-Fi Direct policy configured................ Disabled
EAP-Passthrough............................... Disabled
CKIP ......................................... Disabled
Web Based Authentication...................... Disabled
Web Authentication Timeout.................... 300
Web-Passthrough............................... Disabled
Mac-auth-server............................... 0.0.0.0
Web-portal-server............................. 0.0.0.0
Conditional Web Redirect...................... Disabled
Splash-Page Web Redirect...................... Disabled
Auto Anchor................................... Disabled
FlexConnect Local Switching................... Disabled
FlexConnect Central Association............... Disabled
flexconnect Central Dhcp Flag................. Disabled
flexconnect nat-pat Flag...................... Disabled
flexconnect Dns Override Flag................. Disabled
flexconnect PPPoE pass-through................ Disabled
flexconnect local-switching IP-source-guar.... Disabled
FlexConnect Vlan based Central Switching ..... Disabled
FlexConnect Local Authentication.............. Disabled
FlexConnect Learn IP Address.................. Enabled
Client MFP.................................... Optional

PMF........................................... Disabled
PMF Association Comeback Time................. 1
PMF SA Query RetryTimeout..................... 200
Tkip MIC Countermeasure Hold-down Timer....... 60
Eap-params.................................... Disabled
Flex Avc Profile Name............................ None
Flow Monitor Name................................ None

Split Tunnel Configuration
Split Tunnel................................. Disabled
Call Snooping.................................... Disabled
Roamed Call Re-Anchor Policy..................... Disabled
SIP CAC Fail Send-486-Busy Policy................ Enabled
SIP CAC Fail Send Dis-Association Policy......... Disabled
KTS based CAC Policy............................. Disabled
Assisted Roaming Prediction Optimization......... Disabled
802.11k Neighbor List............................ Disabled
802.11k Neighbor List Dual Band.................. Disabled
802.11v Directed Multicast Service............... Disabled
802.11v BSS Max Idle Service..................... Enabled
802.11v BSS Transition Service................... Disabled
802.11v BSS Transition Disassoc Imminent......... Disabled
802.11v BSS Transition Disassoc Timer............ 200
802.11v BSS Transition OpRoam Disassoc Timer..... 40
DMS DB is empty
Band Select...................................... Disabled
Load Balancing................................... Disabled
Multicast Buffer................................. Disabled
Universal Ap Admin............................... Disabled
Mobility Anchor List
WLAN ID IP Address Status Priority
------- --------------- ------ --------

802.11u........................................ Disabled
MSAP Services.................................. Disabled
Local Policy
----------------
Priority Policy Name
-------- ---------------
Policy Configuration
L2ACL Configuration
ACL Configuration
CPU ACL Configuration
CPU Acl Name................................ NOT CONFIGURED
Wireless Traffic............................ Disabled
Wired Traffic............................... Disabled

RADIUS Configuration
Vendor Id Backward Compatibility................. Disabled
Call Station Id Case............................. lower
Accounting Call Station Id Type.................. Mac Address
Auth Call Station Id Type........................ AP's Radio MAC Address:SSID

Extended Source Ports Support.................... Enabled
Aggressive Failover.............................. Enabled
Keywrap.......................................... Disabled
Fallback Test:
Test Mode.................................... Passive
Probe User Name.............................. cisco-probe
Interval (in seconds)........................ 300
MAC Delimiter for Authentication Messages........ hyphen
MAC Delimiter for Accounting Messages............ hyphen
RADIUS Authentication Framed-MTU................. 1300 Bytes
Authentication Servers
Idx Type Server Address Port State Tout MgmtTout RFC3576 IPSec -
AuthMode/Phase1/Group/Lifetime/Auth/Encr/Region
--- ---- ---------------- ------ -------- ---- -------- ------- --------------

-----------------------------------------
Accounting Servers
Idx Type Server Address Port State Tout MgmtTout RFC3576 IPSec -
AuthMode/Phase1/Group/Lifetime/Auth/Encr/Region
--- ---- ---------------- ------ -------- ---- -------- ------- --------------

-----------------------------------------

TACACS Configuration
Fallback Test:
Interval (in seconds)........................ 0
Authentication Servers
Idx Server Address Port State Tout MgmtTout

--- ---------------------- ------ ------- ----- --------
Authorization Servers
--- ---------------------- ------ ------- ----- --------
Accounting Servers
--- ---------------------- ------ ------- ----- --------
LDAP Configuration
Local EAP Configuration
User credentials database search order:
Primary ..................................... Local DB
Timer:
Active timeout .............................. 300

Configured EAP profiles:
EAP Method configuration:
EAP-FAST:
Server key ................................ <hidden>
TTL for the PAC ........................... 10
Anonymous provision allowed ............... Yes

Authority ID .............................. 436973636f0000000000000000000000
Authority Information ..................... Cisco A-ID
Dns Configuration
Radius port......................................
Radius secret....................................
Dns url..........................................
Dns timeout......................................
Dns Serverip.....................................
Dns state........................................ Disable
Dns Auth Retransmit Timeout...................... 2
Dns Acct Retransmit Timeout...................... 2
Dns Auth Mgmt-Retransmit Timeout................. 2
Dns Network Auth................................. Enable
Dns Mgmt Auth.................................... Enable
Dns Network Acct................................. Enable
Dns RFC 3576 Auth................................ Disable
Tacacs port......................................
Tacacs secret.................................... 2
Dns url..........................................
Dns timeout......................................
Dns Serverip.....................................

Dns state........................................ Disable
Fallback Radio Shut configuration:

Fallback Radio Shut: Disabled
Arp-caching: Disabled
Subnet Broadcast Drop: Disabled
FlexConnect Group Summary
FlexConnect Group Summary: Count: 0
Group Name # Aps
FlexConnect Group Detail
FlexConnect Vlan name Summary
Vlan-Name Id Status
-------------------------------- -------

FlexConnect Vlan Name Detail
Route Info
Number of Routes................................. 0
Destination Network Netmask Gateway
------------------- ------------------- -------------------
Peer Route Info
Number of Routes................................. 32555
Destination Network Netmask Gateway
------------------- ------------------- -------------------
Qos Queue Length Info
Platinum queue length............................ 100
Gold queue length................................ 75
Silver queue length.............................. 50
Bronze queue length.............................. 25

Qos Profile Info
Description...................................... For Voice Applications
Maximum Priority................................. voice
Unicast Default Priority......................... voice
Multicast Default Priority....................... voice

Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
protocol......................................... dot1p
dot1p............................................ 5
Description...................................... For Video Applications
Maximum Priority................................. video
Unicast Default Priority......................... video
Multicast Default Priority....................... video
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0

protocol......................................... dot1p
dot1p............................................ 4
Description...................................... For Best Effort
Maximum Priority................................. besteffort
Unicast Default Priority......................... besteffort
Multicast Default Priority....................... besteffort

Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
protocol......................................... dot1p
dot1p............................................ 0
Description...................................... For Background
Maximum Priority................................. background
Unicast Default Priority......................... background
Multicast Default Priority....................... background
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0
Burst Data Rate.................................. 0 0

protocol......................................... dot1p
dot1p............................................ 1
Mac Filter Info

Authorization List
Authorize MIC APs against Auth-list or AAA ...... disabled
Authorize LSC APs against Auth-List ............. disabled
APs Allowed to Join
AP with Manufacturing Installed Certificate.... yes
AP with Self-Signed Certificate................ no
AP with Locally Significant Certificate........ no
Load Balancing Info
Aggressive Load Balancing........................ per WLAN enabling
Aggressive Load Balancing Window................. 5 clients
Aggressive Load Balancing Denial Count........... 3
Aggressive Load Balancing Uplink Threshold....... 50
Statistics (client-count based)
Total Denied Count............................... 0 clients
Total Denial Sent................................ 0 messages
Exceeded Denial Max Limit Count.................. 0 times

None 5G Candidate Count.......................... 0 times
None 2.4G Candidate Count........................ 0 times
Statistics (uplink-usage
based)
Total Denied Count............................... 0 clients
Total Denial Sent................................ 0 messages
Exceeded Denial Max Limit Count.................. 0 times

None 5G Candidate Count.......................... 0 times
None 2.4G Candidate Count........................ 0 times
DHCP Info
DHCP Opt-82 RID Format: <AP radio MAC address>
DHCP Opt-82 Format: binary
DHCP Proxy Behaviour: disabled
Exclusion List ConfigurationUnable to retrieve exclusion-list entry

CDP Configuration
cdp version v2
Country Channels Configuration

Configured Country............................. US - United States
KEY: * = Channel is legal in this country and may be configured manually.
A = Channel is the Auto-RF default in this country.
. = Channel is not legal in this country.
C = Channel has been configured for use by Auto-RF.
x = Channel is available to be configured for use by Auto-RF.
(-,-) = (indoor, outdoor) regulatory domain allowed by this country.
-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
802.11bg :
Channels : 1 1 1 1 1
: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4
-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
US (-A ,-AB ): A * * * * A * * * * A . . .
-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
802.11a : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Channels : 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 7
: 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 2 6 0 4 0 4 8 2 6 0 4 8 2 6 0 4 9 3 7 1 5 9 3
-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
US (-AB ,-AB ): . A . A . A . A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A * . .
-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
4.9GHz 802.11a :
Channels : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
US (-AB ,-AB ): * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * A * * * * * A

-----------------:+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
WPS Configuration Summary
Auto-Immune
Auto-Immune.................................... Disabled
Auto-Immune by aWIPS Prevention................ Disabled
Client Exclusion Policy
Excessive 802.11-association failures.......... Enabled
Excessive 802.11-authentication failures....... Enabled
Excessive 802.1x-authentication................ Enabled
IP-theft....................................... Enabled
Excessive Web authentication failure........... Enabled
Maximum 802.1x-AAA failure attempts............ 3
Signature Policy
Signature Processing........................... Enabled
Management Frame Protection
Global Infrastructure MFP state................ DISABLED (*all infrastructure

settings are overridden)
AP Impersonation detection..................... Disabled
Controller Time Source Valid................... False
WLAN Client
WLAN ID WLAN Name Status Protection
------- ------------------------- --------- ----------

1 IP_Dev No Encryption Disabled Optional but inactive (WPA2 not
configured)
2 IP_Dev All WPA/WPA2 PSK Enabled Optional

Custom Web Configuration
Radius Authentication Method..................... PAP
Cisco Logo....................................... Enabled
CustomLogo....................................... None
Custom Title..................................... None
Custom Message................................... None
Custom Redirect URL.............................. None
Web Authentication Type.......................... Internal Default
Logout-popup..................................... Enabled
External Web Authentication URL.................. None
Configuration Per Profile:
Core dump Configuration
Core Dump upload is disabled

Rogue AP Configuration
Rogue Detection Security Level................... custom
Rogue Pending Time............................... 180 secs
Rogue on wire Auto-Contain....................... Disabled
Rogue using our SSID Auto-Contain................ Disabled
Valid client on rogue AP Auto-Contain............ Disabled

Rogue AP timeout................................. 1200
Rogue Detection Report Interval.................. 10
Rogue Detection Min Rssi......................... -90
Rogue Detection Transient Interval............... 0
Rogue Detection Client Num Thershold............. 0
Validate rogue AP against AAA.................... Disabled
Rogue AP AAA validation interval................. 0 secs
Total Rogues(AP+Ad-hoc) supported................ 800
Total Rogues classified.......................... 41
MAC Address Classification # APs # Clients Last Heard
----------------- ------------------ ----- --------- -----------------------
04:bd:88:b5:2f:40 Friendly 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016
04:bd:88:b5:2f:45 Friendly 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016
04:bd:88:b5:2f:50 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
04:bd:88:b5:2f:55 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
04:bd:88:b5:4e:e0 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
04:bd:88:b5:4e:f0 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
04:bd:88:b5:5a:20 Unclassified 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016
04:bd:88:b5:5a:21 Unclassified 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016
04:bd:88:b6:0d:60 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
04:bd:88:b6:0e:e0 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard

04:bd:88:b6:10:00 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
04:bd:88:b6:10:60 Friendly 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016
04:bd:88:b6:10:65 Unclassified 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016

04:bd:88:b6:10:b5 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
62:6d:c7:27:a6:98 Unclassified 2 0 Thu Aug 18 20:06:04 2016
6c:72:20:3e:af:26 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
6c:72:20:3e:af:28 Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
6c:72:20:3e:af:2a Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
88:dc:96:30:d9:1b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
8a:dc:96:30:d9:1b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
9a:dc:96:30:d9:1b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:b7:ab Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:b7:af Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:bc:2b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:bc:2f Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:f6:6b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:f6:6f Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:f9:4b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:f9:4f Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:fa:4b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:fa:4f Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:ff:1b Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
e0:d1:73:02:ff:1f Friendly 0 0 Not Heard
Rogue AP RLDP Configuration
Rogue Location Discovery Protocol................ Disabled

RLDP Schedule Config............................. Disabled
RLDP Scheduling Operation........................ Disabled
RLDP Retry....................................... 1
RLDP Start Time RLDP End Time Day
--------------- ------------- ---

Rogue Auto Contain Configuration
Containment Level................................ 1
monitor_ap_only.................................. false
Adhoc Rogue Configuration
Detect and report Ad-Hoc Networks................ Enabled
Auto-Contain Ad-Hoc Networks..................... Disabled
Total Rogues(Ad-Hoc+AP) supported ............... 800
Total Ad-Hoc entries ............................ 0
Client MAC Address Adhoc BSSID State # APs Last Heard
------------------ ------------------ ----------------- ------ -------------------

----
Rogue Client Configuration
Validate rogue clients against AAA............... Disabled
Validate rogue clients against MSE............... Disabled
Total Rogue Clients supported.................... 3000
Total Rogue Clients present...................... 0
MAC Address State # APs Last Heard
----------------- ------------------ ----- -----------------------

Ignore List Configuration
MAC Address
-----------------
Rogue Rule Configuration

Priority Rule Name Rule state Class Type Notify State

Match Hit Count
-------- -------------------------------- ----------- ----------- -------- -------- --

---- ---------
Media-Stream Configuration
Multicast-direct State........................... disable
Allowed WLANs....................................
Stream Name Start IP End IP

Operation Status
------------- --------------------------------------- --------------------------------

------- ----------------
URL..............................................
E-mail...........................................
Phone............................................
Note.............................................

State............................................ disable
2.4G Band Media-Stream Configuration
Multicast-direct................................. Enabled
Best Effort...................................... Disabled

Video Re-Direct.................................. Enabled
Max Allowed Streams Per Radio.................... Auto
Max Allowed Streams Per Client................... Auto
Max Video Bandwidth.............................. 0
Max Voice Bandwidth.............................. 75
Max Media Bandwidth.............................. 85
Min PHY Rate..................................... 6000
Max Retry Percentage............................. 80
5G Band Media-Stream Configuration
Multicast-direct................................. Enabled
Best Effort...................................... Disabled
Video Re-Direct.................................. Enabled
Max Allowed Streams Per Radio.................... Auto
Max Allowed Streams Per Client................... Auto
Max Video Bandwidth.............................. 0
Max Voice Bandwidth.............................. 75
Max Media Bandwidth.............................. 85
Min PHY Rate..................................... 6000
Max Retry Percentage............................. 80
Number of Clients................................ 0

Client Mac Stream Name Stream Type Radio WLAN QoS Status
----------------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ------ -------

WLC Voice Call Statistics
WLC Voice Call Statistics for 802.11b Radio
WMM TSPEC CAC Call Stats
Total num of Calls in progress................. 0
Num of Roam Calls in progress.................. 0
Total Num of Calls Admitted.................... 0
Total Num of Roam Calls Admitted............... 0
Total Num of exp bw requests received.......... 0
Total Num of exp bw requests Admitted.......... 0
Total Num of Calls Rejected.................... 0
Total Num of Roam Calls Rejected............... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to insufficent bw.... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to invalid params.... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to PHY rate.......... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to QoS policy........ 0
SIP CAC Call Stats
Total Num of Calls in progress................. 0
Total Num of Preferred Calls Received.......... 0
Total Num of Preferred Calls Admitted.......... 0
Total Num of Ongoing Preferred Calls........... 0
Total Num of Calls Rejected(Insuff BW)......... 0

Total Num of Roam Calls Rejected(Insuff BW).... 0
KTS based CAC Call Stats

WLC Voice Call Statistics for 802.11a Radio
WMM TSPEC CAC Call Stats
Total num of Calls in progress................. 0
Total Num of exp bw requests received.......... 0
Total Num of exp bw requests Admitted.......... 0
Total Num of Calls Rejected.................... 0
Total Num of Roam Calls Rejected............... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to insufficent bw.... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to invalid params.... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to PHY rate.......... 0
Num of Calls Rejected due to QoS policy........ 0
SIP CAC Call Stats
Total Num of Preferred Calls Received.......... 0
Total Num of Preferred Calls Admitted.......... 0
Total Num of Ongoing Preferred Calls........... 0

KTS based CAC Call Stats

WLC IPv6 Summary
Global Config............................... Enabled
Reachable-lifetime value.................... 300
Stale-lifetime value........................ 86400
Down-lifetime value......................... 30
RA Throttling............................... Disabled
RA Throttling allow at-least................ 1
RA Throttling allow at-most................. 1
RA Throttling max-through................... 10
RA Throttling throttle-period............... 600
RA Throttling interval-option............... passthrough
NS Mulitcast CacheMiss Forwarding........... Disabled
NA Mulitcast Forwarding..................... Enabled
IPv6 Capwap UDP Lite........................ Enabled
Operating System IPv6 state................. Enabled

mDNS Service Summary
Number of Services.............................. 10
Mobility learning status ........................ Enabled
Service-Name LSS Origin No SP Service-string
-------------------------------- ---- ---------- ----- ---------------
AirTunes No All 0 _raop._tcp.local.

Airplay No All 0 _airplay._tcp.local.
Googlecast No All 0 _googlecast._tcp.local.
HP_Photosmart_Printer_1 No All 0
_universal._sub._ipp._tcp.local.
HP_Photosmart_Printer_2 No All 0 _cups._sub._ipp._tcp.local.
HomeSharing No All 0 _home-sharing._tcp.local.
Printer-IPP No All 0 _ipp._tcp.local.
Printer-IPPS No All 0 _ipps._tcp.local.
Printer-LPD No All 0 _printer._tcp.local.
Printer-SOCKET No All 0 _pdl-datastream._tcp.local.
* -> If access policy is enabled LSS will be ignored.
mDNS service-group Summary
Access Policy Status............................ Disabled
Total number of mDNS Policies.................... 1
Number of Admin configured Policies.............. 1
Sl No Service Group Name Description

Origin

----- ------------------------------- -------------------------------------
----------
1 default-mdns-policy Default Access Policy created by WLC

WLC
mDNS profile detailed
Profile Name..................................... default-mdns-profile
Profile Id....................................... 1
No of Services................................... 10
Services......................................... AirTunes
Airplay
Googlecast
HP_Photosmart_Printer_1
HP_Photosmart_Printer_2
HomeSharing
Printer-IPP
Printer-IPPS
Printer-LPD
Printer-SOCKET
No. Interfaces Attached.......................... 0
No. Interface Groups Attached.................... 0
No. Wlans........................................ 0
No. Local Policies Attached...................... 0
mDNS AP Summary

Number of mDNS APs............................. 0
PMIPv6 Global Configuration

PMIPv6 Profile Summary
No Profile Created.
PMIPv6 MAG Statistics
PMIPv6 domain has to be configured first
EoGRE Global Configuration
Heartbeat Interval...............60
Max Heartbeat Skip Count.........3
Interface........................management
EoGRE Gateway Configuration
EoGRE Domain Configuration
Domain Name Gateways Active Gateway
-------------- ----------------- --------------------

EoGRE Profile Configuration
WLAN Express Setup Information.
WLAN Express Setup - ............................ False
Flex Avc Profile summary.
Profile-Name Number of Rules status
============ =============== ========
Flex Avc Profile Detailed Configuration.
Certificate Summary.
Web Administration Certificate................... 3rd Party
Web Authentication Certificate................... Locally Generated
Certificate compatibility mode:.................. off
Lifetime Check Ignore for MIC ................... Disable

Lifetime Check Ignore for SSC ................... Disable
Smart-licensing status Summary.

Call-home Summary.
Hotspot Icon Summary.
Unable to find Icon directory in flash.
Coredump Summary
Core Dump upload is disabled
Memory Summary
-------------------------- System Memory Summary -------------------------

System Name:wlc Primary SW Ver:8.2.111.0
Current Time:Thu Aug 18 20:06:33 2016 System UP Time:6 days 3 hrs 49 mins 39 secs
NAME: "Chassis" , DESCR: "Cisco Wireless Controller"
PID: AIR-CTVM-K9, VID: V01, SN: 96NTPERK0A6
Total System Memory.............................. (2057560 KB) 2009 MB
Total System Free Memory......................... (909360 KB) 888 MB (44 %)
Total Memory in Buffers.......................... (1104 KB)

Total Memory in Cache............................ (266564 KB) 260 MB
Total Active Memory.............................. (511540 KB) 499 MB
Total InActive Memory............................ (238112 KB) 232 MB
Total Memory in Anon Pages....................... (481984 KB) 470 MB
Total Memory in Slab............................. (11004 KB) 10 MB
Total Memory in Page Tables...................... (2748 KB) 2 MB
WLC Peak Memory.................................. (1402280 KB) 1369 MB
WLC Virtual Memory Size.......................... (1383912 KB) 1351 MB
WLC Resident Memory.............................. (506340 KB) 494 MB
WLC Data Segment Memory.......................... (1318240 KB) 1287 MB
Total Heap Including Mapped Pages................ (399115 KB) 389 MB
Total Memory in Pmalloc Pools.................... (350174 KB) 341 MB
Total Used Memory in Pmalloc Pools............... (324913 KB) 317 MB
Total Free Memory in Pmalloc Pools............... (16706 KB) 16 MB
------------------------- Pmalloc Pools Information --------------------
Index Pool-Size Chunks-In-Pool Chunks-In-Use Memory(Size/Used/Free)KB
0 16 50000 5351 5468 /4771 /697
1 64 40000 16626 6250 /4789 /1460
2 128 52800 52677 11550 /11534 /15
3 256 9400 9377 3231 /3225 /5
4 384 6000 287 2812 /670 /2142
5 512 16000 15 9500 /1507 /7992
6 1024 13100 12985 14328 /14213 /115
7 2048 1000 712 2093 /1517 /576
8 4096 1000 74 4093 /389 /3704

9 Raw-Pool 0 524 290800 /290800 /0
------------------------- MBUF Information ----------------------------
Maximum number of Mbufs.......................... 24576
Number of Mbufs Free............................. 24560
Number of Mbufs In Use........................... 16

Mesh Configuration
Mesh Range....................................... 12000
Mesh Statistics update period.................... 3 minutes
Backhaul with client access status............... disabled
Backhaul with extended client access status...... disabled
Background Scanning State........................ disabled
Subset Channel Sync State........................ disabled
Backhaul Amsdu State............................. enabled
Backhaul RRM..................................... disabled
Mesh Auto RF..................................... disabled
Mesh Security
Security Mode................................. EAP
External-Auth................................. disabled
Use MAC Filter in External AAA server......... disabled
Force External Authentication................. disabled
LSC Only MAP Authentication................... disabled
Mesh Alarm Criteria
Max Hop Count................................. 4
Recommended Max Children for MAP.............. 10
Recommended Max Children for RAP.............. 20

Low Link SNR.................................. 12
High Link SNR................................. 60
Max Association Number........................ 10
Association Interval.......................... 60 minutes
Parent Change Numbers......................... 3
Parent Change Interval........................ 60 minutes

Mesh Multicast Mode.............................. In-Out
Mesh CAC Mode.................................... enabled
Mesh Full Sector DFS............................. enabled
Mesh Ethernet Bridging VLAN Transparent Mode..... enabled
Mesh DCA channels for serial backhaul APs........ disabled
Outdoor Ext. UNII B Domain channels(for BH)...... disabled
Mesh Advanced LSC................................ disabled
Advanced LSC AP Provisioning .................... disabled
Open Window.................................... disabled
Provision Controller........................... disabled
Mesh Slot Bias................................... enabled
Mesh Convergence Method.......................... standard
Mesh Channel Change Notification................. disabled
Mesh Ethernet Bridging STP BPDU Allowed.......... disabled
Mesh RAP downlink backhaul....................... 802.11Radio-A (Slot 1)

Appendix B Sample Pump Configuration Parameters
SN=2011304
# Pump serial number - must match SN of receiving pump
# SIGMA Spectrum Settings
[NETWORK CONFIGURATION]
# DHCP=0 DHCP disabled - IP, GATEWAY, NETMASK, and DNS must be valid
# DHCP=1 DHCP enabled - IP, GATEWAY, NETMASK, and DNS must be blank
DHCP=1
IP=
GATEWAY=
NETMASK=
DNS=
# Leave either SIGMAGW or MULTICAST blank
# SIGMAGW set to DNS name or IP address of SIGMA gateway server
SIGMAGW=192.168.140.165
# MULTICAST group default is 239.237.12.87
MULTICAST=
# DEVICEID set to device alias
# Limited to 20 alpha-numeric characters (0-1,A-Z,a-z), blank is acceptable
DEVICEID=000345
[WIFI CONFIGURATION]
# BSS=0 Infrastructure mode (Access point)
# BSS=1 Join or Create Ad-Hoc (peer-to-peer)
# BSS=2 Join only Ad-Hoc (peer-to-peer)
# BSS=3 Join any
BSS=0
# SSID= set to wireless network name
SSID=IP_Dev_Cert
# 802.11 Mode - 'b', 'g', and/or 'a'
802.11b=1
802.11g=1

802.11a=1
# CHANNEL=0 search channels
CHANNEL=0
# SECURITY=0 Any available security method
# SECURITY=1 Open system (no-encryption)
# SECURITY=2 WEP shared key
# SECURITY=3 WPA pre-shared key

# SECURITY=4 WPA with 802.1x authentication
# SECURITY=5 WEP with 802.1x authentication
# SECURITY=6 LEAP
# SECURITY=7 EAP-FAST
SECURITY=4
# WEPKEYINDEX=0-3
WEPKEYINDEX=0
# WEPKEY may be blank or 10 (64-bit) or 26 (128-bit) hex (0-1 and a-f)
characters long
WEPKEY=
# WPAENCRYPTION=0 Any
# WPAENCRYPTION=1 WEP
# WPAENCRYPTION=2 TKIP
# WPAENCRYPTION=3 CCMP (AES)
# WPAENCRYPTION=4 Open (no encryption)
WPAENCRYPTION=3
# WPAPSK must be blank if WPA PSK is not used
# WPAPSK may 64 hex (0-1 and a-f) characters long to specify a PSK
# WPAPSK may be 8-63 ascii characters long to specify a passphrase
WPAPSK=
# 802.1X/EAP Authentication method
# Set one, or more, authentication methods to 1 to enable them, all others
should be 0
LEAP=0
PEAP/MSCHAPv2=0

EAP-TLS=1
EAP-FAST=0
# IDENTITY= 802.1X Identity (username)
IDENTITY=BaxterCert
# PASSWORD= 802.1X Password
PASSWORD=
# Certificate information follows, required for authentication modes that use a

certificate.
# All certificates and private keys must be PEM format (base64 encoded).
# Client certificate, both cert and private key are required.
# Certificate and key information is not output for security reasons.
# Certificate information is radio specific, so the MAC address of the Wireless
Battery Module
# of the attached, or soon to be attached module must match.
# If the certs or keys required a password, it should be specified in the 802.1x
PASSWORD field above.
# The MAC address specified below must match the module connected to the pump.
MAC=00:40:9d:66:db:45
CLIENTCERT=
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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gk7LZGECgYEA4vB26UpZNxsOlgzcEQP8fQ82Dk5xNjb9e7qDSD85LUppR6F4xwNs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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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A1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwgZUG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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
# Client certificate expiration date, GMT in the format: MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS.
CLIENTCERTEXPIRE=
# Trusted certificates, maximum of 5.
TRUSTEDCERTS=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GZUwQx23GGcSnypsflr1rBc2yvXaUnwl4DbQMUo10tdZtd1wZNQE3C1L3MXndvn0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MIIDpjCCAo6gAwIBAgIBMzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBkMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEV
MBMGA1UEChMMRGlnaUNlcnQgSW5jMRkwFwYDVQQLExB3d3cuZGlnaWNlcnQuY29t
MSMwIQYDVQQDExpEaWdpQ2VydCBUZXN0IFJvb3QgQ0EgU0hBMjAeFw0wNjExMTAw
MDAwMDBaFw0zMTExMTAwMDAwMDBaMGQxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxE
aWdpQ2VydCBJbmMxGTAXBgNVBAsTEHd3dy5kaWdpY2VydC5jb20xIzAhBgNVBAMT
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Appendix C Acronyms
AAMI Advancement of Medical Instrumentation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AP Access Point
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
ASA Adaptive Security Appliance
ASM Alaris System Maintenance

ATP:N Advanced Threat Protection: Network
BD Becton, Dickinson and Company
CAPWAP Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
CFC Cybersecurity Framework Core
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CIO Chief Information Officer
CISO Chief Information Security Officer
COI Community of Interest
CRADA Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
DCS:SA Data Center Security: Server Advanced
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EHR Electronic Health Record
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HDO Healthcare Delivery Organization
HIDS Host Intrusion Detection System
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HIPS Host Intrusion Prevention System
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure

ICS-CERT Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IoC Indicator of Compromise
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
ISE Identity Services Engine
ISO International Standards Organization

IT Information Technology
ITAM Information Technology Asset Management
KRACK Key Reinstallation Attack
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LVP Large Volume Pump
MAC Media Access Control
MAUDE Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience
MDISS Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Security Consortium
MDRAP Medical Device Risk Assessment Platform
MSSP Managed Security Service Provider
NAT Network Address Translation
NCCoE National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVD National Vulnerability Database
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
PAC Process Access Control
PCU Patient Care Unit
PHI Protected Health Information
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PSK Pre-Shared Key
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol

RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
RMF Risk Management Framework
RTLS Real-Time Locating Systems
SD Secure Digital
SEP Symantec Endpoint Protection
SIEM Security Information and Events Management
SOC Security Operations Center
SP Special Publication
SSID Service Set Identifier

SSO Single Sign-On
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TIR Technical Information Report
TLS Transport Layer Security
U.S. United States
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
WLC Wireless LAN Controller
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access II

Appendix D References
[1] J. Moy, OSPF Version 2, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Network Working Group Request
for Comments (RFC) 2328, April 1998. https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2328.txt [accessed 2/7/18].
[2] Cisco Adaptive Security Virtual Appliance (ASAv) Quick Start Guide, 9.6, Cisco [Web site],
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa96/asav/quick-start/asav-quick/intro-
asav.html [accessed 2/7/18].
[3] D. Bider and M. Baushke, SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 6668, July
2012. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6668 [accessed 2/7/18].
[4] J. Postel, Internet Control Message Protocol: DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification,
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Network Working Group Request for Comments (RFC)
792, September 1981. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc792 [accessed 2/7/18].
[5] J. Case, M. Fedor, M. Schoffstall, and J. Davin, A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP),
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Network Working Group Request for Comments (RFC)
1157, May 1990. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1157 [accessed 2/7/18].
[6] R. Droms, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Network
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802.1Q, 2014. http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1Q-2014.html [accessed 2/7/18].
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NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-8

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-8

The first draft of this publication is available free of charge from:

Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Institute of Standards and Technology

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-8

The first draft of this publication is available free of charge from:

NIST SP 1800-8A: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps 1

▪ access by malicious actors

NIST SP 1800-8A: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps 2

SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK

To provide comments or to learn more by arranging a demonstration of this example implementation,

NIST SP 1800-8A: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps 3

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-8

The first draft of this publication is available free of charge from:

National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps i

NIST CYBERSECURITY PRACTICE GUIDES

NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps ii

Arnab Ray Baxter Healthcare Corporation

Phillip Fisk Baxter Healthcare Corporation

Raymond Kan Baxter Healthcare Corporation

Tom Kowalczyk B. Braun Medical Inc.

David Suarez Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)

Robert Canfield Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)

Rob Suarez Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)

Robert Skelton Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD)

Peter Romness Cisco

Kevin McFadden Cisco

Rich Curtiss Clearwater Compliance

Darin Andrew DigiCert

Kris Singh DigiCert

Mike Nelson DigiCert

Chaitanya Srinivasamurthy Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU Medical)

Joseph Sener Hospira Inc., a Pfizer Company (ICU Medical)

Chris Edwards Intercede

NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps iii

Won Jun Intercede

Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Security Consortium

Medical Device Innovation, Safety & Security Consortium

Carlos Aguayo Gonzalez PFP Cybersecurity

Thurston Brooks PFP Cybersecurity

Colin Bowers Ramparts

Bill Hagestad Smiths Medical

Axel Wirth Symantec Corporation

Bryan Jacobs Symantec Corporation

Bill Johnson TDi Technologies, Inc.

Barbara De Pompa Reimers The MITRE Corporation

Sarah Kinling The MITRE Corporation

Marilyn Kupetz The MITRE Corporation

David Weitzel The MITRE Corporation

Mary Yang The MITRE Corporation

Technology Partner/Collaborator Build Involvement

NIST SP 1800-8B: Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps iv

B. Braun Medical Inc. • Infusomat® Space Infusion System / Large-Volume

• Alaris Syringe Module 8110

Cisco • Aironet 1600 Series Access Point (AIR-CAP1602I-A-K9)

Clearwater Compliance • IRM|Pro™