International Journal of Trendy Research in Engineering and Technology

Volume 4 Issue 4 August 2020

ISSN NO 2582-0958

DATA INTEGRITY AUDITING WITHOUT PRIVATE KEY STORAGE

FOR SECURE CLOUD STORAGE
1
R.Rajesh,2 T.A.Vinayagam
1
Student, 2Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science & Engineering,
Sri Venkateswara College of Engineering and Technology,
Thiruvallur, Thirupachur, Tamil Nadu 631203

ABSTRACT
Utilizing distributed storage administrations, clients can store their Information in the cloud to maintain a strategic distance from
the consumption of neighborhood information stockpiling support. To guarantee the uprightness of the information put away in
the Cloud, numerous information, honesty examining plans have been proposed. A client needs to Utilize his private key to
produce the information authenticators for Understanding the information respectability reviewing. In this way, the client needs to
have an equipment token to store his private Key and retain a secret phrase to enact this private key. In the event that this
Equipment token is lost or this secret phrase is overlooked, the majority of the Current information, trustworthiness inspecting
plans would be notable work. We propose another worldview Called information uprightness inspecting without private key
stockpiling and Plan such a plan. In this plan, we use biometric informationas the client's fluffy private key to Abstain from
utilizing the equipment token. In the interim, the plan can at present Successfully complete the information respectability
auditing. We use a direct Sketch with coding and blunder revision procedures to affirm The personality of the client. We use
another mark Conspire which supports blacklist certainty. The security evidence and the Execution examination demonstrates that
our proposed plan accomplishes Attractive security andeffectiveness.

Keywords: Cloud storage, Data integrity auditing, Data security, Biometric data.

1.INTRODUCTION for different secure applications in practical scenarios,

which is not user friendly. In addition, the hardware token
Cloud storage can provide powerful and on- that contains the private key might be lost. Once the
demand data storage services for users. By using the cloud password is forgotten or the hardware token is lost, the user
service, users can outsource their data to the cloud without would no longer be able to generate the authenticator for
wasting substantial maintenance expenditure of hardware any new data block. The data integrity auditing will not be
and software, which brings great benefits to users. functioning as usual. Therefore, it is very interesting and
However, once the users upload their data to the cloud, they appealing to find a method to realize data integrity auditing
will lose the physical control of their data since they no without storing the privatekey.
longer keep their data in local. Thus, the integrity of the
cloud data is hard to be guaranteed, due to the inevitable
2.EXISTINGSYSTEM
hardware/software failures and human errors in
thecloud.Many data integrity auditing schemes have been
In Existing system, users can store their data in the
proposed to allow either the data owner or the Third Party
cloud to avoid the expenditure of local data storage and
Auditor (TPA) to check whether the data stored in the cloud
maintenance. To ensure the integrity of the data stored in
is intact or not. These schemes focus on different aspects of
the cloud, many data integrity auditing schemes have been
data integrity auditing, such as data dynamic operation [3–
proposed. In most, if not all, of the existing schemes, a user
5], the privacy protection of data and user identities [6–8],
needs to employ his private key to generate the data
key exposure resilience [9–11], the simplification of
authenticators for realizing the data integrity auditing. Thus,
certificate management [12, 13] and privacy-preserving
the user has to possess a hardware token (e.g. USB token,
authenticators [14], etc. In the above data integrity auditing
smart card) to store his private key and memorize a
schemes, the user needs to generate authenticators for data
password to activate this private key.
blocks with his private key. It means that the user has to
store and manage his private key in a secure manner [15]. In
general, the user needs a portable secure hardware token
(e.g. USB token, smart card) to store his private key and
memorizes a password that is used to activate this private
key. The user might need to remember multiple passwords
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 International Journal of Trendy Research in Engineering and Technology
Volume 4 Issue 4 August 2020
ISSN NO 2582-0958

user in the phase of registration. In the phase of

3.SYSTEM DESIGN authentication, biometric data y 0= (y 0 1 , ..., y0 n ) ∈ Y is
extracted from a user. If y 0 is sufficiently close to y, we
can conclude that the user who generated the biometric data
y 0 and the user who generated the biometric data y are the
same user; otherwise, they are different users. A fuzzy key
setting FKS includes ((d, Y), γ, ε, Ω, θ) [37]. These symbols
are defined asfollows:
a) (d, Y): This is a metric space, where Y (Y := [0,
1)n ⊂ Rn, R is the set of all real numbers) is the
vector space including all possible biometric data y
: (y1, ..., yn) ∈ Y, and d : Y × Y → Rn is the
corresponding distance function. We define d(y, y
Fig. 1. System model of our data integrity auditing
0 ) = maxi∈{1,...,n}|yi − y 0 i | for vectors y = (y1,
..., yn), y 0 = (y 0 1 , ..., y0 n ) ∈Y.
BilinearMaps
b) γ: This is a uniform distribution of biometric data
Assume G1 and G2 are two multiplicative cyclic
overY.
groups which have the same prime order p. A map e : G1 ×
c) ε: This is the threshold value which belongs to R
G1 → G2 is called bilinear map if it satisfies the following
and is determined by a security parameter k (k =
properties: a) Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z ∗ p ,
b−nlog2 (2ε)c). We set that p1 is the probability
e u a , vb = e(u, v) ab . b) Non-degeneracy: e (g, g) 6= 1,
that two different users are accepted in the phase of
where g is a generator of G1. c) Computability: there exists
identity authentication, it means that two different
an efficiently computable algorithm for computing map e :
users are considered to be the same user. We
G1 × G1 → G2. Let PPGen be a bilinear groups generation
require that this probability p1 is negligible in k
algorithm (referred to as a bilinear group generator) which
based on ε. In other words, if the distance between
takes 1 k (k is a security parameter) as input, and generates
two different biometric data y and y 0 is less than ε
a description of bilinear groups P P = (p, G1, G2, g,e).
(that is d(y, y 0 ) < ε), the probability p1 is
SecurityAssumption negligible ink.
The security of our proposed scheme is based on d) Ω: This is an error distribution. If a user extracts
the following security assumptions: Computational Diffie- biometric data y in the phase of
Hellman (CDH) Problem. Given g, g x and h ∈ G1, where x registration,andextractsbiometricdatay0nexttime,y0
∈ Z ∗ p is unknown, compute h x ∈G1. Definition 1: followsthedistribution{e←RΩ; y 0 ← y + e : y 0}.
(Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption) The We can know that e is the “noise” of the biometric
advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in data extracted from the same user and the error
solving the CDH problem in G1 iAdvCDHA = P r[A(g, gx , distribution Ω is independent of individual. e) θ:
h)= h x : x R ← Z ∗ p , h R ← G1]. The probability is taken This is an error parameter within [0, 1].
over the choice of x and h, and the coin tosses of A. The
CDH assumption means, for any polynomial time algorithm We can know that if y is the biometric data
A, the advantage that A solves the CDH problem in G1 is extracted from a user and e←RΩ is the “noise” of the
negligible. Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem. Given g, g x biometric data extracted from the same user, y+e should be
∈ G1, where x ∈ Z ∗ p are unknown, compute x. Definition the biometric data extracted from the same user. We assume
2: (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption) The advantage of p2 is the probability that the same user is rejected in the
a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A in solving the phase of identity authentication, it means that a user is
DL problem in G1 is defined as AdvDLA = P r[A(g, gx ) = considered to be two different users. We require that the
x : x R ← Z ∗ p ]. The probability is taken over the choice probability p2 is less than or equal to θ. That is, if d(y, y+e)
of x, and the coin tosses of A. The DL assumption means, ≥ ε, the probability p2.
for any polynomial time algorithm A, the advantage that A
solves the DL problem in G1 is negligible. Linearsketch
Let FKS = ((d, Y), γ, ε, Ω, θ) be a fuzzy key setting
Formalization of Fuzzy KeySetting defined previously. We design a linear sketch scheme which
In a typical biometric authentication scheme [39], is used to code and correct the error. This scheme is similar
biometric data y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ Y (Y is the metric space to the one-time pad encryption scheme. In a one-time pad
including all possible biometric data y) is extracted from a encryption scheme, a plaintext m’s ciphertext c with a key
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 International Journal of Trendy Research in Engineering and Technology
Volume 4 Issue 4 August 2020
ISSN NO 2582-0958

sk is calculated as c = m + sk. The one-time pad encryption for cloud computing,” Journal of Network & Computer
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c = m + sk and c 0 = m0 + sk with the same key sk, the
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