Title: NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION and PRICE STABILIZATION CORPORATION

(BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS), petitioners, vs. COURT O INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and PRISCO

UNION, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-17804, January 31, 1963

REYES, J.B.L., J.

Facts of the case:

On 18 March 1953, fifty-eight (58) workers, represented by the respondent Union, filed
a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations to enforce certain demands on the employer
Price Stabilization Corporation, known as PRISCO (Case 840-V). The Court rendered a partial
decision ordering the employer to pay 25% additional compensation for unpaid overtime and
for Sundays and legal holidays services rendered since 8 June 1951. On 20 March 1958, 202
other employees and workers of the former PRISCO, among them 45 employees of the General
Auditing Office (GAO) assigned thereto, filed a petition for payment of overtime, Sundays and
legal holidays work rendered from 8 June 1951 to 30 June 1953.

Issue of the case:

 Whether or not the claim for payment of overtime and Sundays and legal holidays work
prescribed.
 Whether or not employees of the GAO assigned to, and working in, the government-
controlled PRISCO and NAMARCO be deemed employees of said corporation in matters
of compensation for overtime and other benefits.

Ruling:

As prescribed in the Rules of Court, final and conclusive judgments may be executed by
motion within five years from the date of entry thereof, or by ordinary action filed after the
lapse of five years but before the action has prescribed (within 10 years from the date the
judgment becomes final). The present petition having been filed on 20 March 1958, or only
about four years and seven months from the partial decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
of 25 August 1953, the same has not prescribed. The original petition filed on 18 March 1953
should be deemed a class suit, and "the benefits of an award may be extended to laborers and
employees who are similarly situated and more or less of the same category". It is claimed for
petitioners that there is no employer-employee relationship between them and the 45
claimants belonging to the GAO, and, therefore, they are not entitled to overtime
compensation, first, since the employees of the GAO working in the PRISCO were appointed by
the Auditor General, and were subject to his control and supervision (Section 7, Executive Order
No. 350, 3 October 1950); and second, because being officers and employees of the National
Government, the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to them, and their overtime services, if
at all, should be paid at rates fixed by the Budget Act (General Appropriation Act, C.A., 2246,
Par. 32).

In support thereof, petitioners invoke the Opinion of the Secretary of Justice of 27 July
1949 referred to in Batungbacal vs. NDC (49 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2290), which holds that the
auditors of government-controlled corporations (referring to the National Development
Company) as well as their subordinates are not corporate employees but agents of the
government, and, therefore, are embraced in the civil service (49 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2290). The
appellee Union maintains that the 45 employees of the auditing office should enjoy the status
of employees of PRISCO by pointing out that their salaries are included in the budget of PRISCO
and not in that of the National Government, in accordance with section 7 of Executive Order
No. 350 of 3 October 1960.

The Union also relies on the Opinion No. 228 of the Secretary of Justice ruling that
persons appointed by the Auditor General to work in the Auditing Department of the NARIC (a
government-controlled corporation like the PRISCO) are entitled to the same retirement
gratuities granted to other NARIC employees. Thus, the Court of Industrial Relations erred in
regarding these employees of the General Auditing Office as standing on an equal footing with
other employees and covered by the previous award of 25 August 1953, when it should have
declared them governed by the general civil service laws and regulation applicable to regular
government employees.
 TItle: C. PLANAS COMMERCIAL and MARCIAL COHU, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and RAMIL DE LOS REYES, Respondents

G.R. No. 121696, February 11, 1999

Bellosillo, J.

Facts of the Case:

C. PLANAS COMMERCIAL, a business entity engaged in merchandising and retailing of

plastic products and fruits, was charged by respondent Ramil de los Reyes with illegal dismissal
and non-payment of basic wages and certain monetary benefits.

Petitioners alleged that they did not dismiss Ramil de los Reyes who was only their
helper assigned to sell fruits in front of their stall in Divisoria; on the contrary, they claimed he
abandoned his work after PLANAS' manager, petitioner Marcial Cohu, confronted him regarding
reports that whenever the former was not around he would sell the fruits at their stall at a
higher price then pocket the difference.

Petitioners also denied in their Position Paper any liability for the wages and benefits
claimed by de los Reyes. They argued that in their business of merchandising and retailing fruits
and plastic products they were leasing a stall in Divisoria with less than ten (10) persons under
their employ, hence, exempted from giving holiday pay and service incentive leave pay.
Considering that their store hours were from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. only, de los Reyes could
not be entitled to overtime pay, much less to any night shift differential. Neither could he claim
any rest day since he worked only for six (6) days a week.

Issue of the Case:

 Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed and entitled to

backwages and other benefits
Ruling:

Petitioners claim exemption under the aforestated law. However, the best proof that
they could have adduced was their approved application for exemption in accordance with
applicable guidelines issued by the Commission. Section 4, subpar. (c) of RA 6727 categorically
provides:
 Retail/service establish establishments regularly employing not more than ten (10)
workers may be exempted from the applicability of this Act upon application with and
as determined by the appropriate Regional Board in accordance with the applicable
rules and regulations issued by the Commission. Whenever an application for exemption
has been duly filed with the appropriate Regional Board, action on any complaint for
alleged non-compliance with this Act shall be deferred pending resolution of the
application for exemption by the appropriate Regional Board. In the event that
applications for exemptions are not granted, employees shall receive the appropriate
compensation due them as provided for by this Act plus interest of one percent (1%) per
month retroactive to the effectivity of this Act.

We are more inclined to uphold the Labor Arbiter's findings on this issue of illegal
dismissal. From the NLRC's point of view, it would seem that the abandonment was triggered
by the employer's charges of overpricing and the unlawful taking of the excess amounts.
However, apart from Cohu's plain allegation that he confronted de los Reyes regarding these
charges, there is no evidence on record to prove the veracity of Cohu's claim. It is more likely
that after de los Reyes complained about his low salary, he was no longer allowed to report for
work, hence, was dismissed without cause and without the requisite written notice. Under the
circumstances, it is more logical to suppose that de los Reyes never abandoned his job. In fact,
he even presented his case before the Labor Arbiter where he sought reinstatement. Our ruling
in Sentinel Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC 36 is relevant —

Abandonment, as a just and valid cause for termination, requires a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of
any intention of returning to his or her work (cited cases omitted; emphasis supplied).

The Labor Arbiter's grant of back wages and order of reinstatement in favor of de los
Reyes. Since de los Reyes was illegally dismissed on 4 June 1993 after the effectivity of RA No.
6715 on 21 March 1989, he is entitled to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits computed from the date of his dismissal until he is actually reinstated. If reinstatement
shall no longer be feasible, he shall be entitled to separation pay in accordance with law.
 Title: REYMAN G. MINSOLA, Petitioner vs. NEW CITY BUILDERS, INC. AND ENGR. ERNEL
FAJARDO, Respondents

G.R. No. 207613, SECOND DIVISION, January 31, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

Facts of the Case:

New City Builders, Inc. (New City) is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the

Philippines engaged in the construction business, specializing in structural and design works.

New City hired Minsola as a laborer for the structural phase of its Avida Tower 3 Project
Subsequently, the structural phase of the Avida 3 was completed. Thus, Minsola received a
notice of termination. New City re-hired Minsola as a mason for the architectural phase of the
Avida 3.

Meanwhile, upon reviewing Minsola's employment record, New City noticed that
Minsola had no appointment paper as a mason for the architectural phase. Consequently, New
City instructed Minsola to update his employment record. However, the latter ignored New
City's instructions, and continued to work without an appointment paper. Minsola was again
summoned to the office of New City to sign his appointment paper. Minsola adamantly refused
to comply with the directive. He stormed out of the office, and never reported back for work.

Minsola filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal, claiming that he was a regular employee
of New City as he rendered work for more than one year and that his work as a laborer/mason
is necessary and desirable to the former's business. He claimed that he was constructively
dismissed by Ne

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA found that
Minsola was a project employee who was hired for specific projects by New City. The NLRC
reversed the LA's ruling. The NLRC found that Minsola was a regular employee. The Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the NLRC's decision. The CA ruled that Minsola was a project employee.

Issue of the Case:

 Was Minsola constructively dismissed by New City?

Ruling:

NO. Minsola is a Project Employee of New City. Essentially, the Labor Code classifies four

(4) kinds of employees, namely:

(i) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;

(ii) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the employees' engagement;

(iii) seasonal employees or those who perform services which are seasonal in nature,
and whose employment lasts during the duration of the season; and

(iv) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal employees.
Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind — fixed-term employees or those hired only for a
definite period of time.

In a project-based employment, the employee is assigned to a particular project or

phase, which begins and ends at a determined or determinable time. Consequently, the
services of the project employee may be lawfully terminated upon the completion of such
project or phase.

For employment to be regarded as project-based, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove

that

(i) the employee was hired to carry out a specific project or undertaking, and

(ii) the employee was notified of the duration and scope of the project.

In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
"project" as a means to prevent employees from attaining regular status, employers must prove
that the duration and scope of the employment were specified at the time the employees were
engaged, and prove the existence of the project.

In the case at bar, Minsola was hired by New City Builders to perform work for two
different phases in the construction of the Avida 3. The records show that he was hired as a
laborer for the structural phase of the Avida 3 from December 16, 2008 until August 24, 2009.
Upon the completion of the structural phase, he was again employed on August 25, 2009, by
New City, this time for the architectural phase of the same project. There is no quibbling that
Minsola was adequately informed of his employment status (as a project employee) at the time
of his engagement. This is clearly substantiated by the latter's employment contracts, stating
that:

(i) he was hired as a project employee; and

(ii) his employment was for the indicated starting dates therein, and will end on the
completion of the project.

The said contract sufficiently apprised Minsola that his security of tenure with New City
would only last as long as the specific phase for which he was assigned.

In Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc., the Court explained that the "projects" wherein the project
employee is hired may consist of:

(i) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the
employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from
the other undertakings of the company; or

(ii) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation."

Accordingly, it is not uncommon for a construction firm to hire project employees to

perform work necessary and vital for its business. Suffice it to say, in William Uy Construction
Corp. and/or Uy, et al. v. Trinidad, the Court acknowledged the unique characteristic of the
construction industry and emphasized that the laborer's performance of work that is necessary
and vital to the employer's construction business, and the former's repeated rehiring, do not
automatically lead to regularization.

Accordingly, it is all too apparent that the employee's length of service and repeated re-
hiring constitutes an unfair yardstick for determining regular employment in the construction
industry. Thus, Minsola's rendition of more than one year of service and his repeated re-hiring
are not badges of regularization.

In labor law, constructive dismissal, also known as a dismissal in disguise, exists "where
there is cessation of work, because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and
other benefits. There must be an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were
not. It may likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any
choice by him except to forego his continued employment."
 In the case at bar, Minsola failed to advert to any particular act showing that he was
actually dismissed or terminated from his employment. Neither was there any single allegation
that he was prevented or barred from returning to work. On the contrary, it was actually
Minsola who stormed out of New City's office and refused to report for work. It cannot be
gainsaid that there is no illegal dismissal to speak of where the employee was not notified that
he had been dismissed from employment nor was he prevented from returning to his work.