Kosovo Crisis
Kosovo Crisis
Kosovo Crisis
How far is it possible to create a balanced understanding of the causes and meaning
of the events in Kosovo in 1999 from British news media reportage and commentary
given its cultural and ideological position?
On the 22nd March 1999 NATO started a bombing campaign across the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Ostensibly this campaign was to force Serb forces from Kosovo and allow a
return of citizens displaced by belligerent Serb forces. What the press related was a British
and American humanitarian conflict, an attempt to stop a new holocaust. This essay will
examine the media reaction to the Kosovo Crisis and will focus specifically on the British
reaction. The essay will examine coverage by both print and televisual journalists and in
doing so will examine the root of British news bias in regards to the Kosovo Crisis. The
essay will not discount British commentary due to this bias, but will seek to understand
whether this bias is innately ideological or if it is an effect of limited information gathering at
the time. This essay will cross reference the British Media reaction with several key
commentators and in doing so will properly surmise whether it is possible to create a
balanced view with certain caveats in place.
In the run up to the air war there was a historical reference which dominated British news
reporting. The reporters would skirt around the issue, not reference it by name, but the
continued meme of ‘worst human rights crisis in Europe for fifty years’1 laid out the parallels
with the Holocaust all too clearly. In doing so the British Media betrayed their bias, turning
their reportage from objective to subjective. Whilst this would be expected from print
journalist (Newspapers had practically marketed themselves on their respective biases for a
century) it would be a change of tact for the reporters from the BBC and ITN.
At this point it would be wise to look at the differences between American and British media
systems to better understand why there was a need to separate them into two distinct
categorises. It is unwise to use American reportage due to the very different institutions in
play in the American press. For one thing the British media is far more fragmented than the
American Media, with national newspapers allowing a gamut of political opinions and biases.
American Print Media is largely dominated by smaller city based papers. Given the
respective size and population differences between the United States and the United
Kingdom it is natural that that this insulated media model would exist. It is also worth bearing
in mind that the United States has no equivalent to our British Broadcasting Corporation
which means that ALL news sources in the United States are private enterprises. Similarly
the second biggest provider of news content in the UK, ITN, is owned by various other news
1
Alex Thomson, ITN News Report, 29th March 1999
Reporting Crisis
corporations2 which mean that it has no determinable ownership. In comparison the two
biggest national news outlets in the United States are Fox News and CNN have one single
corporate owner (News Corporation and Time Warner respectively).
There is also a key difference in the narratives of the United Kingdom and the United States.
The United States in 1999 had been a dominant superpower for almost a decade, 1999 in
Britain was defined by a continuing erosion of the historical notion of empire. In 1997 the
Empire gave up one of its last colonies whilst in 1998 the Good Friday Agreement marked a
loosening of British control in Ireland. It is also worth pointing out that the Kosovo Crisis was
a chance for the British military to showcase their might. The Gulf War had been dominated
by American coverage of their new weapons, with camera attached smart bombs flying
down chimneys and showcasing a new military might. As such this was the first chance
since 1982’s ‘Gotcha!’3 for a demonstration of military prowess. As such despite the usual
clichés about the United States being warmongers in this case it was the, still very new,
British Government who had more to gain from a ‘just war’ than America.
As such during the Kosovo Crisis and subsequent air war both ITN and the BBC were very
willing to go along with the official narrative of the events being fed to them by NATO’s
communication department. Mark Laity was the lead journalist for the BBC’s coverage of the
war. Despite discussing his role as ‘unspinning the spin’ Laity seemed to be comfortable with
the fact that his primary information source was NATO. Whilst it could be easy to take this as
a sign of arrogance by Laity, he’s smart enough to be able to pick out the truth from the spin;
it suggests that the good vs. evil narrative that the media was attempting to propagate was
something they believed themselves. His belief was that any information from the people
was undesirable because it was coming from ‘the enemy’. Even when Laity clashed with
NATO and their spokesperson Jamie Shea it was about the effectiveness of the campaign
rather than the ‘morality’ of the campaign. For example a morning briefing by Shea on 30th
May 1999 has Laity asking Shea if NATO is in direct contact with the KLA after Shea
asserted that damage to civilian property throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
in fact assisting the Kosovo Liberation Army. 4 Laity would also demonstrate this viewpoint in
a briefing with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder when he asked the reticent Schröder
“If the choice was between losing the war and sending in ground troops, would not the latter
2
Currently owned by ITV PLC (40%), Daily Mail and General Trust (20%), Thomson Reuters (20%), and United
Business Media (20%), information retrieved from http://corporate.itn.co.uk/about-itn/board-of-
directors.aspx
3
The Sinking of the Belgrano, The Sun, 4th May 1982, retrieved from
http://www.sterlingtimes.co.uk/gotcha1.htm
4
Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999, pp.315-
317, Cambridge University Press, 2001
Reporting Crisis
be preferable”.5 Schröder’s response to this “I will not take part in this specifically British
debate on war theories…” suggests that the global view was that the British media, and
potentially populace, were working towards an open conflict in Kosovo.6 The fact that Laity
would become a NATO spokesperson in the following years, proving to be a key advisor
during the 2001 Crisis in Macedonia, suggests that despite his tenacity he was largely ‘on
board’ with NATO’s vision in Kosovo.7 If Laity, and by association the BBC, is tenaciously on
board with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, what of ITN who supplied news reportage for
both ITV and Channel 4 (which politically skew right and left of centre respectively)?
"There are more children than adults. There are lots of children. We've got to get them out.”
That is the quote that ends an ITN Report broadcast on ITV and Channel 4 News on 1st
March 1999.8 Three days later a report on Yugoslavia closing its borders is lead off by a shot
of a donkey, loaded with supplies, crossing a mountain range.9
“They have little food and the makeshift shelters are no real protection from the elements…
large supplies of food and water had to be brought by donkey because the mountain passes
are so treacherous.”
This is still over a fortnight before the official start of the air campaign in Yugoslavia, but the
angle on the stories is very much ‘human interest’. The first story is actually about a Serbian
police officer who was shot dead, but the majority of the report is about what will happen to
Kosovar-Albanian refugees in retaliation. The second story barely comments on the actions
of the KLA which have forced tighter defences on the Yugoslavian borders but once again
makes mention of the refugee crisis. A report on the 5th March opens with the quote
“German army troops have been performing a series of exercises to train for their likely roles
in Kosovo, should they be required.”10
The use of the word ‘likely’ is of major importance here. By watching clips from ITN pre-22 nd
March 1999 you can see a deliberate narrative taking place. For at least a month before the
5
Michael J. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar, p.65, Routledge, 2009
6
Ibid, pp.65-66
7
Mark Laity, ‘Battling the Media’, NATO Review, Issue 4, 2002, retrieved from
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue4/english/art3.html
8
ITN Clip Archive, Yugoslavia: One Serbian Policeman Killed In Kosovo As Government Forces Battle With Ethnic Albanian
Guerrillas On The First Anniversary Of The War In The Region, 1st March 1999, retrieved from
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/01/902280030/
9
ITN Clip Archive, The Yugoslav Government Says It Has Decided To Strengthen Parts Of Its Boder To "Prevent
The Infiltration Of Terrorists Group Into Kosovo", 4th March 1999, retrieved from
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/04/903030023/
10
ITN Clip Archive, German Army Troops Perform A Series Of Exercises To Train For Their Likely Roles In Kosovo,
5th March 1999, retrieved from http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/05/903040021/
Reporting Crisis
start of hostilities footage is shown of NATO, and predominantly British, troops taking part in
exercises on the Yugoslavian border.
William James once commented on the media that "There's nothing so absurd that if you
repeat it often enough, people will believe it". With this in mind it is important to look at not
what the news clips are reporting, but what key statements they are repeating. In this case
the key statements are that people are suffering and conflict is inevitable. These two memes
converge in a clip from 18th March where the story’s first paragraph is devoted to NATO
Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark visiting Macedonia to inspect troops and have
a conference with the Macedonian government.11 The second paragraph once again returns
to the refugee crisis with images of fleeing families and a voiceover describing 5000 people
fleeing the area. This story also increases the emphasis on the Serb military as oppressors,
with shots of refugees interspersed with shots of Serbian tanks rolling through a mountain
range and Serbian soldiers walking through deserted towns. These shots are completely
without context, but the narrative of the piece reinforces a notion that these Serbian forces
have personally forced people from their homes and then chased them across a mountain,
in a tank.
Adam Curtis in his documentary ‘Oh Dearism’12 described the new nature of news
narratives. His thesis was that news networks were incapable of dealing with truly global
news reportage, that violence and brutality in far off lands was just unknowable to a western
audience.
“Because the news had given up reporting them as political struggles, it meant there was
now no way to understand why these terrible events were happening. And instead, political
conflicts around the world — from Darfur to Gaza — are now portrayed to us as simple
illustrations of the mindless cruelty of the human race, about which nothing can be done”
Curtis would describe the news attempts to capitalise on this, with creations of narratives
designed to make people feel happier about themselves.
Noam Chomsky describes the Media as the perfect tool to serve the elite in states where
bureaucracy prevents standard Oligarchies forming.13 Chomsky furthers this idea in his book
The New Military Humanism by referencing the George Orwell quote ‘it wouldn’t do to
11
ITN Clip Archive, NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark Visits Macedonia As Serb Troops Build Up In The
Kosovo Region, 18th March 1999, retrieved from
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/18/903180012/
12
Adam Curtis, ‘Oh Dearism’, Charlie Brooker’s Newswipe, BBC1, 8th April 2009, retrieved from
http://catastrophist.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/video-oh-dearism-by-adam-curtis/
13
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, p.1,
Vintage Books, 1994
Reporting Crisis
mention that particular fact’ that prefaced Animal Farm.14 Whilst much of Chomsky’s criticism
of the NATO intervention in Kosovo are centred on American foreign policy, his description
of the media coercing the populace applies equally to the United Kingdom and United
States.15 Whilst Chomsky largely railed against the foreign policy issues and potential
hypocrisy of the Kosovo Crisis other left leaning commentators directly attacked the nature
of the war.
Robert Fisk, writing in the Independent, offered criticism of the changing victory parameters
of the air war, noting that whilst the air war had initially started to stop the ethnic cleanings, it
had now changed to a war of punishment.16 One of Fisk’s most interesting points is “But
"paying the price" - punishment - is part of the Serb theme of victimhood.” With this quote
Fisk gets into the Serbian psyche in a way no other British journalist does. Whilst there is a
British narrative in place within the media, there’s also an unreported Serbian narrative
which has them as the continually oppressed. To the Serbian population the NATO bombing
is yet another chapter in an oppression that had taken place for nearly a thousand years.17
No other news reporter in the British press makes note of this fact, choosing to portray the
Serbian military as brutal, uncaring, butchers rather than a people clawing to maintain a
homeland they’d only just secured.18 What many British reporters failed to mention was that
this was just another facet of a cycle of continued oppression and suppression by the Serb
and Albanian populaces. In fact until the fall of the Ottoman Empire the Kosovar Albanians,
due their embracing Islam, had been the dominate force within Yugoslavia. 19
Whilst this in no way excused the ethnic cleansing taking place, it presented a far more
complex view of the situation in Kosovo than what was being presented and once again
showcased the lack of research done amongst the people by British Journalists. This is a
point raised by Michael Parenti who lambasted the BBC for their attempts to cast Serbians
as monstrous villains and Kosovars as victims such as reporting that Serbian snipers were
receiving bonuses for any women or children they killed20. Parenti insists that Western news
sources attempted to appease their audiences by demonising the Serbs and that even
‘independent’ news sources such as the BBC were still held by loyalty to their government
and a desire from the populace to have their viewpoints reinforced.21
14
Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Pluto Press, p.5,1999
15
Ibid. p.81-104
16
Robert Fisk, ‘NATO resorts to a war of Proxy’, The Independent, 22nd April 1999
17
Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p.38, Penguin Books, 1996
18
Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the Break Up 1980-92, p.351, Verso Publishing, 1993
19
Robert Bideleux, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, p.39, Routledge, 1998
20
Michael Parenti, To Kill A Nation, p.85, Verso Books, 2001
21
Ibid. p.4
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In conclusion because the British Press refused to corroborate information from NATO and
held little regard for the underlying history of the conflict it is impossible to build a balanced
understanding of the conflict using reports from the British media. The British media were too
intent on preserving the narrative they had created and giving the audience the story they
wanted to hear to properly demonstrate the complexities of the situation in Kosovo. A failure
to properly question the changing victory parameters of the crisis and an unwillingness to
even speak to Serbian populace also meant that they were parroting the information NATO
wanted people to hear. When evidence was found which corroborated with the traditional
narrative it was reported, when evidence was found which didn’t mesh with the traditional
narrative it was eschewed.
Primary Sources:
Robert Fisk, ‘NATO resorts to a war of Proxy’, The Independent, 22nd April 1999
The Sinking of the Belgrano, The Sun, 4th May 1982, retrieved from
http://www.sterlingtimes.co.uk/gotcha1.htm
ITN Clip Archive, German Army Troops Perform A Series Of Exercises To Train For Their
Likely Roles In Kosovo, 5th March 1999, retrieved from
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/05/903040021/
ITN Clip Archive, NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark Visits Macedonia As Serb
Troops Build Up In The Kosovo Region, 18th March 1999, retrieved from
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/18/903180012/
ITN Clip Archive, Yugoslavia: One Serbian Policeman Killed In Kosovo As Government
Forces Battle With Ethnic Albanian Guerrillas On The First Anniversary Of The War In The
Region, 1st March 1999, retrieved from
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/01/902280030/
ITN Clip Archive, The Yugoslav Government Says It Has Decided To Strengthen Parts Of Its
Boder To "Prevent The Infiltration Of Terrorists Group Into Kosovo", 4th March 1999,
retrieved from http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//RTV/1999/03/04/903030023/
Reporting Crisis
Bibliography
Robert Bideleux, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change , Routledge, 1998
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media, Vintage Books, 1994
Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Pluto Press,1999
Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation
1974-1999, Cambridge University Press, 2001
Mark Laity, ‘Battling the Media’, NATO Review, Issue 4, 2002, retrieved from
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue4/english/art3.html
Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracing the Break Up 1980-92, Verso
Publishing, 1993
Michael J. Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar,
Routledge, 2009