1.

2. Yes. Liable
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delicto) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person
commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. But there are cases
where the consequences of the felonious act of the offender are not intended by him. In those cases,
"the wrongful act done" is "different from that which he intended."

"Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The causes which
may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the identity of
the victim; (2) mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater
than that intended.

Under paragraph 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony is still criminally liable even if — a.
There is a mistake in the identity of the victim — error in personae. (See the case of People vs. Oanis, 74
Phil. 257) In a case, defendant went out of the house with the intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the
darkness of the evening, defendant mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted upon him a mortal wound
with a bolo. In this case, the defendant is criminally liable for the death of Mapudul. (People vs. Gona, 54
Phil. 605)

3. Yes. Liable
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delicto) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person
commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. But there are cases
where the consequences of the felonious act of the offender are not intended by him. In those cases,
"the wrongful act done" is "different from that which he intended."
 "Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The causes which
may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the identity of
the victim; (2) mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater
than that intended.

Under paragraph 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony is still criminally liable even if- There is a
mistake in the blow — aberratio ictus. Example: People vs. Mabugat, 51 Phil. 967, where the accused,
having discharged his firearm at Juana Buralo but because of lack of precision, hit and seriously
wounded Perfecta Buralo, it was held that the accused was liable for the injury caused to the latter.

Requisites of paragraph 1 of Art. 4. In order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony
different from that which he intended to commit, the following requisites must be present: a. That an
intentional felony has been committed; and b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310,
319; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14, 19)

4. Yes. Liable
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delicto) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person
commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. But there are cases
where the consequences of the felonious act of the offender are not intended by him. In those cases,
"the wrongful act done" is "different from that which he intended."

"Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The causes which
may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the identity of
the victim; (2) mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater
than that intended.

Under paragraph 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony is still criminally liable even if- The injurious
result is greater than that intended — praeter intentionem. Example: People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524,
where the accused, without intent to kill, struck the victim with his fist on the back part of the head
from behind, causing the victim to fall down with his head hitting the asphalt pavement and resulting in
the fracture of his head, it was held that the accused was liable for the death of the victim, although he
had no intent to kill said victim.
Requisites of paragraph 1 of Art. 4. In order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony
different from that which he intended to commit, the following requisites must be present: a. That an
intentional felony has been committed; and b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310,
319; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14, 19)

5. not liable in attempted robbery but liable for attempted trespass to dwelling
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies, as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable. There is an attempt when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Development of crime. From the
moment the culprit conceives the idea of committing a crime up to the realization of the same, his act
passes through certain stages. These stages are: (1) internal acts; and (2) external acts. 1. Internal acts,
such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are not punishable even if, had they been carried out, they
would constitute a crime. Intention and effect must concur. Mere intention producing no effect is no
more a crime than a mere effect without the intention is a crime. 2. External acts cover (a) preparatory
acts; and (b) acts of execution. a. Preparatory acts — ordinarily they are not punishable. Ordinarily,
preparatory acts are not punishable. Hence, proposal and conspiracy to commit a felony, which are only
preparatory acts, are not punishable, except when the law provides for their punishment in certain
felonies. Attempted felony. There is an attempt when the offender begins the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts. He has not performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony.
Elements of attempted felony:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

3. The offender's act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.

IMPORTANT WORD S AN D PHRASES IN ART. 6 . 1. "Commences the commission of a felony directly by

overt acts." When is the commission of a felony deemed commenced directly by overt acts? When the
following two requisites are present: (1) That there be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct
connection with the crime intended to be committed.

The external acts must have a direct connection with the crime intended to be committed by the
offender. At an early dawn, A was surprised by a policeman while in the act of making an opening
with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. At that time the owner of the store was
sleeping inside with another Chinaman. A had only succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall. Is there an attempted robbery in this case? No, because while it is
 true that the 1st requisite is present, that is, there were external acts of breaking one board and
unfastening another from the wall of the store to make an opening through which A could enter the
store, yet the 2nd requisite is not present, for such acts had no direct connection with the crime of
robbery by the use of force upon things. In case of robbery by the use of force upon things, in order
that the simple act of entering by means of force another person's dwelling may be considered an
attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. The crime
committed was attempted trespass to dwelling, because the intention of the accused was obviously
disclosed by his act of making an opening through the wall, and that was to enter the store against the
will of its owner who was then living there. (People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703) It is only an attempt,
because A was not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony of
trespass to dwelling. Had A commenced entering the dwelling through the opening, he would have
performed all the acts of execution.

6.
No. Not liable
Indeterminate offense- It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain.
Its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous. The overt acts leading to the commission of the
offense are not punishable except when they are aimed directly at its execution, and therefore they
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. "Other than his own spontaneous
desistance." If the actor does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his own spontaneous
desistance, there is no attempted felony. The law does not punish him. It is a sort of reward granted by
law to those who, having one foot on the verge of crime, heed the call of their conscience and return to
the path of righteousness. One who takes part in planning a criminal act but desists in its actual
commission is exempt from criminal liability. For after taking part in the planning, he could have desisted
from taking part in the actual commission of the crime by listening to the call of his conscience. It is not
necessary that it be actuated by a good motive. The Code requires only that the discontinuance of the
crime comes from the person who has begun it, and that he stops of his own free will. The desistance
should be made before all the acts of execution are performed.

7. A.
No. As a general rule, Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are not punishable.
Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are
punishable only in the case s in which the law specially provides a penalty therefore. A conspiracy exists
when two or more persons com e t o an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its
execution to some other person or persons.

The Revised Penal Code specially provides a penalty for mere conspiracy in Arts. 115,136, and 141.
 Art. 115. Conspiracy xxxto commit treason — Penalty. — The conspiracy x x x to commit the crime of
treason shall be punished x x x by prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos x x x.

Art. 136. Conspiracy x x x to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy x x x to
commit coup d'etat shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine which shall not
exceed 8,000 pesos. The conspiracy x x x to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished x x x by
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos xxx. (As
amended by Rep. Act No. 6968)

Art. 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition. — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of sedition shall be
punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos. (As amended by
P.D. No. 942)

Treason, coup d'etat rebellion or sedition should not be actually committed. The conspirators should not
actually commit treason, coup d'etat rebellion or sedition. It is sufficient that two or more persons agree
and decide to commit treason, rebellion or sedition. If they commit, say, treason, they will be held liable
for treason, and the conspiracy which they had before committing treason is only a manner of incurring
criminal liability. It is not a separate offense. When the conspiracy relates to a crime actually committed,
it is not a felony but only a manner of incurring criminal liability, that is, when there is conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.

Requisites of conspiracy:

1. That two or more persons came to an agreement;

2. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and

3. That the execution of the felony be decided upon.

1st element — agreement presupposes meeting of the minds of two or more persons. Thus, the fact
that a document is discovered purporting to be a commission appointing the defendant an officer of
armed forces against the Government does not prove conspiracy, because it was not shown that
defendant received or accepted that commission. (U.S. vs. Villarino, 5 Phil. 697)

2nd element — the agreement must refer to the commission of a crime. It must be an agreement to act,
to effect, to bring about what has already been conceived and determined. Thus, the mere fact that the
defendant met and aired some complaints, showing discontent with the Government over some real or
fancied evils, is not sufficient. (U.S. vs. Figueras, 2 Phil. 491

3rd element — the conspirators have made up their minds to commit the crime. There must be a
determination to commit the crime of treason, rebellion or sedition.

7B.

Entrapment and instigation

There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, in instigation, the instigator practically
induces the would be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal, in
entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker
 in the execution of his criminal plan. Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the
lawbreaker. But when there is instigation, the accused must be acquitted. In entrapment, the entrapper
resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into committing the offense, and
himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. In
instigation, a public officer or a private detective induces an innocent person to commit a crime and
would arrest him upon or after the commission of the crime by the latter. It is an absolutory cause. In
entrapment, a person has planned, or is about to commit, a crime and ways and means are resorted to
by a public officer to trap and catch the criminal. Entrapment is not a defense.

8.

NO.

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression in defense of other rights.

2. Defense of property. Defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is
coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property.

Defense of property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as
a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said
property. Had the accused, who wanted to stop the thief then approaching him, been attacked, say with
a bolo, by that thief, he would have been justified in shooting him, if the shotgun was the only available
weapon for his defense. In such case, there would be unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased,
which is required even in defense of one's property. It will be noted that in paragraph 1 of Article 11, the
opening clause, which is followed by the enumeration of the three requisites, states: "anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights." The word "rights" includes right to property. Hence, all the three
requisites of self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression, must also concur in defense of property. In
the case of People vs. Goya, CA-G.R. No. 16373-R, Sept. 29, 1956, the guard in a bodega surprised the
injured party in the act of going out through the door with a sack of palay. To prevent the latter from
taking away a sack of palay, the guard fired a shot at the injured party, inflicting less serious physical
injuries. Held: Since the injured party did not lay hands on the guard or make any attempt to attack the
latter, the guard cannot properly and legally claim defense of property. There must be an attack by the
one stealing the property on the person defending it.
 9.
No.
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.

Passion or obfuscation may constitute a mitigating circumstance only when the same arose from
lawful sentiments. For this reason, even if there is actually passion or obfuscation on the part of the
offender, there is no mitigating circumstance, when: (1) The act is committed in a spirit of lawlessness;
or (2) The act is committed in a spirit of revenge.

Requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation: 1. That there be an act,

both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and 2. That said act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. (People vs. Alanguilang, 52
Phil. 663, 665, citing earlier cases; People vs. Ulita, 108 Phil. 730, 743; People vs. Gravino, Nos. L-31327-
29, May 16, 1983,122 SCRA 123, 134) Why passion or obfuscation is mitigating. When there are causes
naturally producing in a person powerful excitement, he loses his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power. (U.S. vs. Salandanan, 1 Phil. 464, 465) The crime committed by
the accused must be provoked by prior unjust or improper acts of the injured party. (U.S. vs. Taylor, 6
Phil. 162, 163)

Thus, a common-law wife, who, having left the common home, refused to go home with the
accused, was acting within her rights, and the accused (the common-law husband) had no legitimate
right to compel her to go with him. The act of the deceased in refusing to go home with the accused,
while provocative, nevertheless was insufficient to produce the passion and obfuscation that the law
contemplates. (People vs. Quijano, C.A., 50 O.G. 5819)

10.

YES.

Under Republic Act 9262 otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004, which took effect on March 27, 2004, it is provided that –

"Sec. 26. Battered Women Syndrome as a Defense. — Victimsurvivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code. In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman
syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrist/
psychiatrists/psychologists."
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

All the elements of self-defense are present in this case. (1) The deceased husband of the accused was
kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck when she pulled
out the knife tucked on the left side of her husband's belt and plunged it at his body. (2) A woman being
strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong pressure on
her throat, she had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself
from impending death. Reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense does not depend
upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (3) She did not give sufficient
provocation to warrant the aggression or attack on her person by her husband. While it was
understandable for the latter to be angry at his wife for finding her on the road in the middle of the
night, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with an intent to kill by choking his wife's
throat. All that she did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband,
which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. (People vs. Boholst-Caballero, No. L-
23249, Nov. 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180, 189, 195-196)

11.

No..

Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: 2. That the crime be
committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.

Requisites of this circumstance: 1. That the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions. 2.
That he who is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person against whom the crime
is committed. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150,156; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307, 317) 3. The offender
knows him to be a public authority. 4. His presence has not prevented the offender from committing the
criminal act.

The crime should not be committed against the public authority. If the crime is committed against a
public authority while he is in the performance of his official duty, the offender commits direct assault
(Art. 148) without this aggravating circumstance, because it is not a crime committed "in contempt of or
with insult" to him, but a crime directly committed against him.

Knowledge that a public authority is present is essential. Lack of knowledge on the part of the offender
that a public authority is present indicates lack of intention to insult the public authority.

Presence of public authority has not prevented offender from committing the crime. An offense may be
said to have been committed in contempt of a public authority when his presence, made known to the
offender, has not prevented the latter from committing the criminal act.
 12.

NO. NIGHTTIME IN THE CASE IS MERELY INCIDENTAL

Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: Par. 6. — That the
crime be committed (1) in the nighttime, or (2) in an uninhabited place, or (3) by a band, whenever such
circumstance may facilitate the commission of the offense.

When aggravating. Nighttime, uninhabited place or band is aggravating —

(1) When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or

(2) When especially sought for by the offender to insure the commission of the crime or for the purpose
of impunity (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568, 578); or

(3) When the offender took advantage thereof for the purpose of impunity. (U.S. vs. Billedo, 32 Phil. 574,
579; People vs. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887, 893)

Although nocturnity should not be estimated as an aggravating circumstance, since the time for the
commission of the crime was not deliberately chosen by the accused; yet, if it appears that the accused
took advantage of the darkness for the more successful consummation of his plans, to prevent his being
recognized, and that the crime might be perpetrated unmolested, the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity should be applied.

Nighttime is not especially sought for, when the notion to commit the crime was conceived only shortly
before its commission (People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568, 578-579), or when the crime was committed at
night upon a mere casual encounter

Nocturnity is not aggravating where there is no evidence that the accused had purposely sought the
cover of the darkness of the night to commit the crime; nor is there evidence that nighttime facilitated
the commission of the crime, aside from the fact that the scene of the crime was illuminated. By and of
itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes so only when it is especially sought by
the offender, or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to insure his
immunity from capture. In the instant case, other than the time of the crime, nothing else whatsoever
suggests that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was deliberately availed of by appellants. In
view of this deficiency, said circumstance should be disallowed

13.

No. Not aggravated by recidivism.

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs.
Lagarto, G.R. No. 65833, May 6,1991 , 196 SCRA 611, 619)

Requisites:
 1. That the offender is on trial for an offense;

2. That he was previously convicted by final judgment of another crime;

3. That both the first and the second offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code;

4. That the offender is convicted of the new offense.

No recidivism if the subsequent conviction is for an offense committed before the offense involved in
the prior conviction.

Sec. 7 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment in a criminal case becomes final (1) after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or (2) when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or (3) the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or (4) the accused has applied for probation. Sec. 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]n appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from."

The appeal of A on his first offense was still pending. The judgment is not yet final. Hence the requisites
recidivism is not met. Thus, the commission of the crime of Theft is not aggravated by recidivism.

14.

YES (Reiteracion or Recidivism?)

Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: Par. 10. — That the
offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.

Requisites: 1. That the accused is on trial for an offense; 2. That he previously served sentence for
another offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or for two or more crimes to
which it attaches lighter penalty than that for the new offense; and 3. That he is convicted of the new
offense.

In reiteracion or habituality, it is essential that the offender be previously punished, that is, he has
served sentence, for an offense in which the law attaches, or provides for an equal or greater penalty
than that attached by law to the second offense, or for two or more offenses, in which the law attaches
a lighter penalty.

15.

NO.

Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances: Par. 21. — That the
wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not
necessary for its commission.
 There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually,
causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. For cruelty to be
aggravating, it is essential that the wrong done was intended to prolong the suffering of the victim,
causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain. Requisites of cruelty: 1. That the injury caused be
deliberately increased by causing other wrong; 2. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the
execution of the purpose of the offender

No cruelty when other wrong was done after victim was dead. For cruelty to be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance, there must be positive proof that the wounds found on the body of the victim
were inflicted while he was still alive in order unnecessarily to prolong physical suffering. (People vs.
Pacris, G.R. No. 69986, March 5,1991 , 194 SCRA 654, 663)

16.

YES

Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who , having knowledge of the commission of the crime ,
and without having participated therein, either a s principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners:

3 . By harboring , concealing , or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime , provide d the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilt y o f
treason, parricide , murder , or an attempt to take the life o f the Chie f Executive , or is known to be
habitually guilt y o f some other crime

b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime — guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime. Requisites: (1) The accessory is a private person. (2) He harbors,
conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime. (3) The crime committed by the principal is
either: (a) treason, (b) parricide, (c) murder, (d) an attempt against the life of the President, or (e) that
the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

An accessory must have knowledge of the commission of the crime, and having that knowledge, he took
part subsequent to its commission without having participated therein either as principals or
accomplices and the accessory takes part after the crime has been committed.

17.

NO.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other , the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No.
4000.) At least two crimes must be committed. Art. 48 requires the commission of at least two crimes.
But the two or more grave or less grave felonies must be the result of a single act, or an offense must be
a necessary means for committing the other. A complex crime is only one crime. In complex crime,
although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the
case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is
only one. (People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515) Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime. Two kinds of complex crimes: 1. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies. 2. When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The first is otherwise known as compound crime. The second is the complex crime proper. But
ordinarily, both are referred to as complex crimes.

No complex crime, when one offense is committed to conceal the other. But when one of the offenses
was committed for the purpose of concealing the commission of the other, there is no complex crime.
Examples: (a) After committing homicide, the accused, in order to conceal the crime, set fire to the
house where it had been perpetrated. (People vs. Bersabal, 48 Phil. 439, 442) Note: Setting fire to the
house is arson. (Art. 321) But in this case, neither homicide nor arson was necessary to commit the
other.

18.

NO.

There is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery, or other common crimes. Murder,
arson and robbery are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion, as means "necessary" for the
perpetration of the offense. (Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217, 229) Such
common offenses are absorbed or inherent in the crime of rebellion. (People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515) But a rebel who, for some independent or personal motives, commits murder or other common
offenses in addition to rebellion, may be prosecuted for and convicted of such common offenses.
(People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 99)

19.

No.

Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all case s in whic h the law prescribe s a
singl e indivisibl e penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless o f any mitigating o r aggravating
circumstance s tha t ma y hav e attende d the commissio n o f the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. When in the commission of the deed there is
present only one aggravating circumstance , the greater penalty shall be applied. 2 . When there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. 3 . When the commission of the act is attended by som e mitigating circumstanc e and ther e
is no aggravating circumstance , the lesse r penalt y shall be applied. 4 . When both mitigating and
aggravating circumstance s attended the commissio n o f the act, the courts shall reasonabl y allow the
 m t o offse t one anothe r i n consideratio n o f thei r numbe r and importance , fo r the purpos e o f
applying the penalt y i n accordanc e wit h the preceding rules, according t o t he result o f suc h
compensation.

two indivisible penalties. Reclusion perpetua to death. This penalty is imposed for parricide (Art. 246),
robbery with homicide (Art. 294, par. 1), kidnapping and serious illegal detention without intention to
extort ransom (Art. 267), and rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons. (Art. 266-B) When the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be
lowered by one degree, no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present. When there are two
or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the court cannot proceed by
analogy to the provisions of subsection 5 of Art. 64 and impose the penalty lower by one degree. (U.S.
vs. Guevara, 10 Phil. 37, 38; U.S. vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593, 603-604; People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658,
663-664) Exceptio n — When a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68 or Art. 69 is present. But
if the circumstance present is a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68 or Art. 69, since a
penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed upon the offender, he may yet get a penalty one
or two degrees lower.

20.

Indeterminate penalty, when there is one ordinary mitigating circumstance. (Art. 64, par. 2) In the
preceding example, if A pleaded guilty before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, there
being no aggravating circumstance to offset it, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty, which
is reclusidn temporal, should be imposed in the minimum period. (Art. 64, par. 2) The minimum term of
the indeterminate penalty is also anywhere within the range of prisidn mayor, the penalty next lower
from reclusidn temporal, with or without reference to the period into which it may be subdivided. His
plea of guilty is required to be considered (by way of mitigation) only in the imposition of the maximum
term of his sentence. (People vs. De Joya, 98 Phil. 238, 240)

SECTION 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or
life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to
those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year, nor to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
provided in Section five hereof.

MINIMUM — prisidn correccional, in any of its periods or anywhere within the range of prision
correccional without reference to any of its periods.