Farinas vs. Executive Secretary 463 Phil. 179 Dec 10, 2003 Callejo SR, J., Facts
Farinas vs. Executive Secretary 463 Phil. 179 Dec 10, 2003 Callejo SR, J., Facts
Farinas vs. Executive Secretary 463 Phil. 179 Dec 10, 2003 Callejo SR, J., Facts
Executive Secretary
463 Phil. 179 Dec 10, 2003
Callejo Sr, J.,
Facts:
Farinas et al, claimed that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional because it violates Section 26(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution, which requires every law to have only one subject
which should be in expressed in its title.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title
rule." This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the
nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators
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and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not
apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and
comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners as members of the House of Representatives expressed their
reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Facts:
Yrasuegui was a former flight attendant of PAL. He was terminated when he
ballooned up in weight, in violation of the company policy, after repeated notice
and warnings. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and among other
things, claimed that PAL was discriminating against “people who are similarly
situated”.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed
Ruling:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bonafide occupational
qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can
show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy
is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.
A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public
policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. The law leaves no
room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only
logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with
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the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common
carrier.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin
attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger
confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes
wrong.
Facts:
The Truth Commission (PTC) was established via an EO by Pres. Aquino. This
is formed to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third level
public officers and employess, along with their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the GMA administration. It has all the powers of an
investigative body but it cannot adjudicate, therefore, it is not a quasi-judicial
body. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the
Court to declare it unconstitutional because, among other things, by targeting
specifically the Arroyo administration violates the equal protection clause, and
to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
Issue:
Whether or not the assailed EO violates the equal protection clause
Ruling:
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined
in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
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a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.