9 Reyes V Ombudsman

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 212593-94. March 15, 2016.]
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

OMBUDSMAN, respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 213163-78. March 15, 2016.]
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 213540-41. March 15, 2016.]
JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-

MORALES in her official capacity as OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 213542-43. March 15, 2016.]
JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES and JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES,

petitioners, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES in her capacity
as OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 215880-94. March 15, 2016.]
JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES and JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES,

petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 213475-76. March 15, 2016.]
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS , petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-

MORALES in her official capacity as OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) ,
respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J : p
"In dealing with probable cause[,] as the very name implies, we

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deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved." 1
Before this Court are consolidated 2 petitions 3 which commonly assail
the Joint Resolution 4 dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order 5 dated June
4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0318
and OMB-C-C-13-0396 finding probable cause for the crimes of Plunder 6
and/or violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 7 against
petitioners Jessica Lucila "Gigi" G. Reyes (Reyes), Janet Lim Napoles (Janet
Napoles), Jo Christine L. Napoles (Jo Christine Napoles) and James
Christopher L. Napoles (James Napoles; collectively, the Napoles siblings),
and John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), together with several others. Further
assailed are: by Reyes, 8 the Resolution 9 dated July 3, 2014 of the
Sandiganbayan, which directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against
her, and several others, as well as the Resolution 10 dated July 4, 2014
issued by the same tribunal, which denied her Urgent Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings; 11 and by the Napoles siblings, 12 the Resolution 13 dated
September 29, 2014 and the Resolution 14 dated November 14, 2014 of the
Sandiganbayan, which found the existence of probable cause against them,
and several others, and consequently, set their arraignment.
The Facts
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective
participations in the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) scam, involving, as reported 15 by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy),
Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal utilization and
pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of
P172,834,500.00. 16 The charges are contained in two (2) complaints,
namely: (1) a Complaint 17 for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318
(NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint 18 for Plunder and violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO)
on November 18, 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0396 (FIO Complaint).
Tersely put, petitioners were charged for the following acts:
(a) Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times
material to this case, for fraudulently processing the release of Senator
Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements — through: (1) project identification and
cost projection; 19 (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, 20
project reports, 21 and pertinent documents addressed to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) and the Implementing Agencies (IAs); 22 and
(3) endorsement of the preferred JLN 23 —controlled Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) 24 to undertake the PDAF-funded project — and for
personally 25 receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds
representing Senator Enrile's "share," "commissions," or "kickbacks"
therefrom, 26 as well as her own; 27
(b) Janet Napoles, as the alleged mastermind of the entire PDAF
scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of
Senator Enrile's PDAF — through: (1) the commencement via "business
propositions" 28 with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; 29 (2) the
creation and operation of the JLN-controlled NGOs purposely to serve as
"conduits" of government funds, in this case, Senator Enrile's PDAF; 30 (3)
the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear
that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; 31 (4) the falsification and
machinations used in securing the funds from the IAs and liquidating
disbursements; 32 and (5) the remittance of the PDAF funds to Janet Napoles
from her JLN controlled-NGOs to the JLN Corporation 33 to be
misappropriated by her and Senator Enrile; 34
(c) the Napoles siblings, 35 as high ranking officers of the JLN
Corporation, 36 for continuously diverting the sums sourced from Senator
Enrile's PDAF to Janet Napoles's control 37 — through: (1) falsification and
forgery of the signatures of the supposed recipients on the Certificates of
Acceptance and Delivery Reports, as well as the documents submitted in the
liquidation of PDAF funds; 38 and (2) handling of the PDAF proceeds after
being deposited in the accounts of the JLN-controlled NGOs; and 39 CAIHTE
(d) De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger, 40

for assisting in the fraudulent releases of the PDAF funds to the JLN-
controlled NGOs and eventually remitting the funds to Janet Napoles's
control — through: (1) preparation and use of spurious documents to obtain
checks from the IAs; 41 (2) picking up and receiving 42 the checks
representing the PDAF "commissions" or "kickbacks," and depositing them to
bank accounts in the name of the JLN-controlled NGOs concerned; 43 and (3)
withdrawing and delivering the same to their respective recipients 44 — also,
for having been appointed as member/incorporator 45 and President 46 of
certain JLN-controlled NGOs.
As alleged, the systemic pillaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF commences
with Janet Napoles meeting with a legislator — in this case, Senator Enrile
himself or through his Chief of Staff, Reyes, or Ruby Tuason (Tuason) 47 —
with the former rendering an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in
exchange for a "rebate," "commission," or "kickback" amounting to a certain
percentage of the PDAF. 48 Upon their agreement on the conditions of the
"PDAF acquisition," including the "project" for which the PDAF will be utilized,
the corresponding IA tasked to "implement" the same, and the legislator's
"rebate," "commission," or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the
"project" cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO), 49 the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate
President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse
such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO. 50 By this time, the
initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Janet
Napoles to the legislator. 51 Upon release of the SARO, Janet Napoles would
then direct her staff — including whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas — to
prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled
NGO that will be used for the implementation of the "project," the project
proposals of the identified NGO, and the indorsement letters to be signed by
the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the legislator; 52 and
would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the
legislator, 53 which is usually delivered by her staff, De Asis and Ronald John
Lim. 54 Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to
the IA which will handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.
55 Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to
the IA concerned, the head of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction
and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF
disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost.
56 Among those tasked by Janet Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit
them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, De Asis,
and the Napoles siblings. 57 Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-
controlled NGO, Janet Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the
withdrawal thereof. 58 Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Janet Napoles's
staff, the latter will bring the proceeds to the office of the JLN Corporation
where it will be accounted. Janet Napoles will then decide how much will be
left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig
City. 59 De Asis, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the
money to Janet Napoles's residence. 60 Finally, to liquidate the
disbursements, Janet Napoles and her staff, i.e., the Napoles siblings and De
Asis, would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports,
inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would
make it appear that the PDAF-related project was implemented. 61 Under
this modus operandi, Senator Enrile, with the help of petitioners, among
others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P345,000,000.00 62
to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "rebates," "commissions,"
or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P172,834,500.00. 63
In her defense, Reyes filed her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit 64 on
January 3, 2014, contending that the letters and documents which she
purportedly signed in connection with the allocation of the PDAF of Senator
Enrile were all forged, and that none of the three (3) witnesses — Luy, Suñas,
and Nova Kay B. Macalintal — who mentioned her name in their respective
affidavits, directly and positively declared that she received money from the
PDAF in question. 65
For their part, the Napoles siblings filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit 66
on February 24, 2014, opposing their inclusion as respondents in the FIO
Complaint. They claimed that the said Complaint: (a) is insufficient in form
and substance as it failed to state in unequivocal terms the specific acts of
their involvement in the commission of the offenses charged, as required in
Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; 67 and (b) failed
to allege and substantiate the elements of the crime of Plunder and violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. 68 They likewise argued that the affidavits and
statements of the whistleblowers contain nothing more than mere hearsay
and self-serving declarations, which are, therefore, inadmissible evidence
unworthy of credence. 69
On the other hand, while De Asis admitted 70 that he was an employee
of the JLN Corporation from 2006-2010 in various capacities as driver,
bodyguard or messenger, and that he received a salary of P10,000.00 a
month for serving as the personal driver and "errand boy" of Janet Napoles,
he denied the allegations against him, and maintained that he was merely
following instructions from Janet Napoles when he picked-up checks for the
JLN-controlled NGOs; that he had no knowledge in setting up or managing
the corporations which he supposedly helped incorporate (namely,
Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. [KPMFI], as President, 71
and Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development Foundation, Inc.
[CARED], as Member/Incorporator); 72 and that he did not personally benefit
from the alleged misuse of the PDAF. 73
Meanwhile, despite due notice, Janet Napoles failed to file her counter-
affidavits to the foregoing Complaints. Thus, the Ombudsman considered her
to have waived her right to file the same. 74
DETACa
While preliminary investigation proceedings were ongoing before the

Ombudsman, Tuason, who was likewise charged under OMB-C-C-13-0318
and OMB-C-C-13-0396, surfaced as an additional witness and offered her
affidavit 75 implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam. This prompted Reyes to file
before the Ombudsman an Omnibus Motion 76 dated March 27, 2014,
requesting that:(a) she be furnished copies of: (1) Tuason's affidavit, which
supposedly contained vital information that was described by Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima as "slam dunk evidence"; 77 (2) the
transcript of the alleged 12-hour clarificatory hearing on February 11, 2014
78 where Tuason was said to have substantiated the allegations in her
affidavit; and (3) the additional documents the latter submitted thereat; and
(b) she be given a period of time to comment on Tuason's affidavit or to file
a supplemental counter-affidavit, if deemed necessary. 79 On even date, the
Ombudsman denied 80 Reyes's Omnibus Motion on the ground that "there is
no provision under [the said office's Rules of Procedure] which entitles
[Reyes] to be furnished filings by the other parties, including the other
respondents." 81
The following day, the Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint
Resolution 82 dated March 28, 2014 finding probable cause against, inter
alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and
against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen
(15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly, separate
motions for reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, 83 Janet Napoles, 84
the Napoles siblings, 85 and De Asis. 86
Pending the resolution of the aforesaid motions, the Ombudsman
issued a Joint Order 87 dated May 7, 2014 granting Reyes's request for
copies of the respective Counter-Affidavits of Tuason and Dennis Cunanan
(Cunanan), and directing her to file a comment thereon. Among the
documents allegedly attached to the said Joint Order were copies of the
Supplemental Sworn Statement 88 of Tuason dated February 21, 2014 and
the Sworn Statement 89 of Cunanan dated February 20, 2014, 90 to which
Reyes submitted separate Comments 91 on May 13, 2014. However,
Tuason's earlier Sworn Statement dated February 4, 2014 92 and the
transcripts of the clarificatory hearing 93 — both of which were requested by
Reyes — were not included. Hence, Reyes filed another Motion 94 on May 9,
2014 requesting copies of said documents. Subsequently, on May 13, 2014,
she filed a Reiterative Motion 95 for the same purpose. The Ombudsman
denied the aforesaid motions on the ground that "the Affidavit dated 4
February 2014 does not form part of the records of the preliminary
investigation and neither was [it] mentioned/referred to in the Joint
Resolution dated 28 March 2014." 96 It was further stated that the Special
Panel of Investigators "did not conduct clarificatory hearings at any stage
during the preliminary investigation." 97
Due to reports 98 that Tuason was officially declared a state witness
and granted immunity 99 from criminal prosecution for the PDAF scam-
related cases, Reyes wrote a letter 100 dated May 7, 2014 to the
Ombudsman, requesting a copy of the immunity agreement that it entered
into with Tuason. Again, the Ombudsman denied Reyes's request for the
reason that the immunity agreement is a "privileged communication which is
considered confidential under Section 3, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing [RA] 6713," 101 otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees." 102
On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order 103 denying,
among others, the motions for reconsideration filed by herein petitioners.
This led to the filing of the petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos.
212593-94, 104 G.R. Nos. 213540-41, 105 G.R. Nos. 213542-43, 106 and
G.R. Nos. 213475-76, 107 commonly assailing the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution 108 and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order 109 of the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396.
Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations 110 were filed by the
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan, charging, inter alia, Reyes, Janet
Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder, docketed as Criminal
Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238; 111 and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles
siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0241 to 0255, 112
which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third Division. 113
To forestall the service of a warrant of arrest against her, on June 13,
2014, Reyes filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings 114 before the
Sandiganbayan until after this Court shall have resolved her application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94. On July 1, 2014, she filed a Manifestation
and Reiterative Motion to Suspend Proceedings Against Accused Reyes. 115
Similarly, the Napoles siblings filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with Urgent Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest and Suspend Proceedings 116 dated June 13, 2014 before the
Sandiganbayan.
On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, "along
with several other related cases," the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 117
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the
accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause was a mere superfluity given that it was its
bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and
the supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence
of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. 118 In view, however, of the
Separate Opinion 119 issued by Justice Samuel R. Martires, dissenting to the
issuance of warrants of arrest against the Napoles siblings, along with
several others, upon the premise that the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP) still needs to present additional evidence with respect to the
aforementioned persons, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 120 a Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan,
composed of five (5) members, was created.
A day later, or on July 4, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued another
Resolution 121 dated July 4, 2014 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0238 and
SB-CRM-0241 to 0255, denying Reyes's Motion to Suspend Proceedings for
lack of merit. In view of the foregoing developments, Reyes voluntarily
surrendered to the Sandiganbayan on even date, and accordingly,
underwent the required booking procedure for her arrest and detention. 122
This prompted Reyes to file the petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 213163-78,
123 assailing the July 3, 2014 124 and July 4, 2014 125 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. aDSIHc
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 126 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-
0241 to 0255, finding the existence of probable cause against them, and
several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment. The Napoles
siblings urgently moved for the reconsideration 127 of the judicial finding of
probable cause against them and requested that their arraignment be held
in abeyance pending the resolution of their motion. However, the Napoles
siblings alleged 128 that the Sandiganbayan acted on their motion for
reconsideration through the latter's Resolution 129 dated November 14,
2014, declaring that the presence of probable cause against them had
already been settled in its previous resolutions. 130 Hence, the Napoles
siblings caused the filing of the petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94,
131 assailing the September 29, 2014 132 and November 14, 2014 133
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not the Ombudsman and/or
the Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against petitioners
for the charges against them.
The Court's Ruling
I. The Petitions Assailing the Resolution and Order of the
Ombudsman.
I n G.R. Nos. 212593-94, Reyes imputes grave abuse of discretion
against the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against her for Plunder
and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 on the basis of: (a) Tuason's Sworn
Statement dated February 4, 2014, which was not furnished to Reyes despite
her repeated requests therefor, thereby violating her right to due process;
134 (b) Tuason's Supplemental Sworn Statement dated February 21, 2014
that did not mention Reyes's name at all; 135 (c) documentary evidence that
were forged, falsified, and fictitious; 136 and (d) hearsay declarations of the
whistleblowers who merely mentioned Reyes's name in general terms but
did not positively declare that they saw or talked with her at any time or had
seen her receive money from Janet Napoles or the latter's employees. 137
I n G.R. Nos. 213540-41, Janet Napoles claims that the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict her
for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, notwithstanding the
failure of the NBI and the FIO to allege and establish the elements of
Plunder; 138 and the insufficiency, in form and in substance, of both the NBI
and FIO Complaints as they lacked certain particularities such as the time,
place, and manner of the commission of the crimes charged. 139 Janet
Napoles further contends that as a private individual, she cannot be held
liable for Plunder, considering that the said crime may only be committed by
public officers; and that conspiracy was not established. 140
I n G.R. Nos. 213542-43, the Napoles siblings assert that the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against
them for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, mainly arguing that there is
no evidence to show that they conspired with any public officer to commit
the aforesaid crime. 141 Likewise, the Napoles siblings asseverate that the
whistleblowers' testimonies were bereft of probative value and are, in fact,
inadmissible against them. 142
Finally, in G.R. Nos. 213475-76, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of
gravely abusing its discretion in finding probable cause against him for
Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, contending that he was a
mere driver and messenger of Janet Napoles, and not the "cohort" that the
Ombudsman found him to be; 143 that he did not benefit from the illegal
transactions of Janet Napoles, nor was he ever in full control and possession
of the funds involved therein; and that the whistleblowers admitted to being
the "real cohorts" of Janet Napoles, and as such, should have been the ones
charged for the crimes which were ascribed to him instead. 144
The petitions are bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently
refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an
Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded
from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of
grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law. 145 In Ciron v. Gutierrez, 146 was held
that:
[T]his Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave
abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy
is based not only on respect for the investigators and
prosecutors powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 147 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)ETHIDa
In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of

discretion, attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling — that is:
preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it. 148 Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." 149 In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr. ,
150 "[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-

founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual
or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an
inquiry . . . whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged." 151
Thus, in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support a
prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute
certainty. " 152 In this case, petitioners were charged with the crimes of
Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 153 of RA 7080, as
amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public
officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons; ( b ) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in
Section 1 (d) 154 thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of
the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). 155
On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)156 of RA
3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in
the discharge of his functions. 157
Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all
of the foregoing elements need not be definitively established for it is
enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is because
probable cause — the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation —
implies mere probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would
suffice. 158
Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence,
and that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary
in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits. 159 Therefore, "the validity and merits of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level." 160
Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the "technical rules of evidence should not be applied"
in the course of its proceedings, 161 keeping in mind that "the
determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or
merits of a party's accusation or defense or on the admissibility or
veracity of testimonies presented." 162 Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman
163 (Estrada), the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does
not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, "probable cause
can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." 164
Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman
did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Reyes,
Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and Reyes, Janet
Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis of fifteen (15) counts of violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as will be explained hereunder.
First, records reveal that there is substantial basis to believe that
Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile, dealt with the parties involved;
signed documents necessary for the immediate and timely implementation
of the Senator's PDAF-funded projects that, however, turned out to be "ghost
projects"; and repeatedly received "rebates," "commissions," or "kickbacks"
for herself and for Senator Enrile representing portions of the latter's PDAF.
As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, such participation on the part
of Reyes was outlined by whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas as follows:
[O]nce a PDAF allocation becomes available to Senator Enrile, his
staff, in the person of either respondent Reyes or Evangelista, would
inform Tuason of this development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the
information to either Napoles or Luy. Napoles or Luy would then
prepare a listing of the projects available where Luy would specifically
indicate the implementing agencies. This listing would be sent to
Reyes who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as
Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile. After the listing is released by the
Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give Tuason
a down payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes. After
the SARO and/or NCA is released, Napoles would give Tuason the full
payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes. 165
This was corroborated in all respects by Tuason's verified statement,
the pertinent portions of which read: cSEDTC
11. . . . It starts with a call or advise from Atty. Gigi Reyes

or Mr. Jose Antonio Evangelista (also from the Office of Senator
Enrile) informing me that a budget from Senator Enrile's PDAF is
available. I would then relay this information to Janet Napoles/Benhur
Luy.
12. Janet Napoles/Benhur Luy would then prepare a listing
of the projects available indicating the implementing agencies. This
listing would be sent to Atty. Gigi Reyes who will endorse the same
to the DBM under her authority as Chief-of-Staff of Senator Enrile.
13. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator
Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give me a down payment for
delivery for the share of Senator Enrile through Atty. Gigi Reyes .
14. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Janet Napoles
would give me the full payment for delivery to Senator Enrile through
Atty. Gigi Reyes.
15. Sometimes Janet Napoles would have the money for
Senator Enrile delivered to my house by her employees. At other
times, I would get it from her condominium in Pacific Plaza or from
Benhur Luy in Discovery Suites. When Benhur Luy gives me the
money, he would make me scribble on some of their vouchers [or]
even sign under the name "Andrea Reyes," [Napoles's] codename for
me. This is the money that I would deliver to Senator Enrile through
Atty. Gigi Reyes.
16. I don't count the money I receive for delivery to Senator
Enrile. I just receive whatever was given to me. The money was all
wrapped and ready for delivery when I get it from Janet Napoles or
Benhur Luy. For purposes of recording the transactions, I rely on the
accounting records of Benhur Luy for the PDAF of Senator Enrile,
which indicates the date, description and amount of money I received
for delivery to Senator Enrile.
xxx xxx xxx
18. As I have mentioned above, I personally received the
share of Senator Enrile from Janet Napoles and Benhur Luy and I
personally delivered it to Senator Enrile's Chief-of-Staff, Atty. Gigi
Reyes. Sometimes she would come to my house to pick up the
money herself. There were also instances when I would personally
deliver it to her when we would meet over lunch. There were
occasions when Senator [Enrile] would join us for a cup of coffee
when he would pick her up. For me, his presence was a sign that
whatever Atty. Gigi Reyes was doing was with Senator Enrile's
blessing.
xxx xxx xxx
25. Initially, I was in-charge of delivering the share of
Senator Enrile to Atty. Gigi Reyes , but later on, I found out that
Janet Napoles dealt directly with her. Janet Napoles was able to
directly transact business with Atty. Gigi Reyes after I introduced
them to each other. This was during the Senate hearing of Jocjoc
Bolante in connection with the fertilizer fund scam. Janet Napoles was
scared of being investigated on her involvement, so she requested
me to introduce her to Atty. Gigi Reyes who was the Chief of Staff
of the [sic] Senate President Enrile. 166 (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, these pieces of evidence are already sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that the crimes charged were committed and Reyes is
probably guilty thereof as it remains apparent that: (a) Reyes, a public
officer, connived with Senator Enrile and several other persons (including the
other petitioners in these consolidated cases as will be explained later) in
the perpetuation of the afore-described PDAF scam, among others, in
entering into transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds;
(b) Senator Enrile and Reyes acted with manifest partiality and/or evident
bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of
his PDAF without the benefit of public bidding and/or negotiated
procurement in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on
government procurement; 167 (c) the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be
inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue injury to the government, and at the
same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to the
beneficiaries of the scam; and (e) Senator Enrile, through Reyes, was able to
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00.
In an attempt to exculpate herself from the charges, Reyes contends
that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it: (a) relied upon
hearsay and unsubstantiated declarations of the whistleblowers who merely
mentioned her name in general terms but did not positively declare that
they saw or talked with her at any time or that they had seen her receive
money from Janet Napoles or anyone else connected with the latter; 168 (b)
granted immunity to the whistleblowers and Tuason; 169 (c) denied her of
due process when she was deprived of the opportunity to rebut and disprove
the statements of Tuason as she was never furnished a copy of the latter's
Sworn Statement 170 dated February 4, 2014 despite repeated requests
therefor; 171 and (d) disregarded the fact that her signatures found on the
documentary evidence presented were forged, falsified, and fictitious. 172
Such contentions deserve scant consideration. SDAaTC
Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely

hearsay, it must be reiterated that — as held in the Estrada case — probable
cause can be established with hearsay evidence, so long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the same. 173 As aforestated, the modus
operandi used in advancing the PDAF scam as described by the
whistleblowers was confirmed by Tuason herself, who admitted to having
acted as a liaison between Janet Napoles and the office of Senator Enrile. 174
The Ombudsman further pointed out that the collective statements of Luy,
Sula, Suñas, and Tuason find support in the following documentary evidence:
( a ) the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts
received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his "commission"
from the so-called PDAF scam; (b) the 2007-2009 Commission on Audit
(COA) Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on
PDAF disbursements — that there were serious irregularities relating to the
implementation of PDAF-funded projects, including those endorsed by
Senator Enrile; and (c) the reports on the independent field verification
conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn
statements of local government officials and purported beneficiaries of the
supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent. 175 Clearly, these
testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably
conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam
and, hence, must stand trial therefor.
In this relation, the Court rejects Reyes's theory that the
whistleblowers and Tuason are the "most guilty" in the perpetuation of the
PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs her claim that the Ombudsman violated
Section 17, Rule 119 176 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting
immunity to them. To begin with, "[t]he authority to grant immunity is not an
inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the
Ombudsman[,] as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to
employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the
public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the
several accused before the courts. The latter do not, as a rule[,] have a
vision of the true strength of the prosecution's evidence until after the trial is
over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the
prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used
as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of
Section 17, Rule 119 [of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure]." 177 As
explained in Quarto v. Marcelo: 178
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a
constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical
decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve
a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the
State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a
crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain
the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will
probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended
the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed
solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power
to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be
prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to
prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent
court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be
an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success
or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then,
the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such
errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts
should correct the blunders of the defense. 179 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As earlier mentioned, Tuason admitted to having acted merely as a
liaison between Janet Napoles and the Office of Senator Enrile. It is in this
capacity that she made "direct arrangements" with Janet Napoles concerning
the PDAF "commissions," and "directly received" money from Janet Napoles
for distribution to the participants of the scam. In the same manner, Luy and
Suñas, being mere employees of Janet Napoles, only acted upon the latter's
orders. Thus, the Ombudsman simply saw the higher value of utilizing them
as witnesses instead of prosecuting them in order to fully establish and
strengthen her case against those mainly responsible for the scam. 180 The
Court has previously stressed that the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness is geared towards the realization of the deep-lying intent of the State
not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished by allowing an
accused who appears not to be the most guilty to testify, in exchange for an
outright acquittal, against a more guilty co-accused. It is aimed at achieving
the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the
greatest number among the accused for an offense committed. 181 In fact,
whistleblower testimonies — especially in corruption cases, such as this —
should not be condemned, but rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers
risk incriminating themselves in order to expose the perpetrators and bring
them to justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on
CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, et al.) , 182 the Court gave recognition and appreciation to
whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that corruption is often done
in secrecy and it is almost inevitable to resort to their testimonies in order to
pin down the crooked public officers. 183
For another, Reyes erroneously posits that under Section 4, 184 Rule II
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, she is entitled to
copies of Tuason's affidavit, as well as the transcripts of the clarificatory
hearings conducted by the Ombudsman with Tuason, and that the
Ombudsman's denial of such copies constitutes a violation of due process on
her part. In Estrada, the Court had already resolved in detail that under both
Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 4, Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, a respondent to a
preliminary investigation proceeding (such as Reyes in this case) is only
entitled to the evidence submitted by the complainants, and not to those
submitted by a co-respondent 185 (such as Tuason in this case, prior to her
grant of immunity as a state witness). It must also be noted that by virtue of
the Ombudsman's Joint Order 186 dated May 7, 2014, Reyes was even
provided with copies of Tuason and Cunanan's respective Counter-Affidavits,
187and directed to file a comment thereon. In fact, Reyes even submitted
separate Comments 188 on May 13, 2014. Thus, there is more reason to
decline Reyes's assertion that the Ombudsman deprived her of due process.
Time and again, it has been said that the touchstone of due process is the
opportunity to be heard, 189 which was undeniably afforded to Reyes in this
case. acEHCD
Finally, anent Reyes's claim that her signatures in the documentary

evidence presented were false, falsified, and fictitious, it must be
emphasized that "[a]s a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence and the burden of proof
lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in
the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been
forged." 190 Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to present clear
and convincing evidence to prove her claim of forgery, especially in light of
the following considerations pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General
in its Comment on the petition in G.R. Nos. 212593-94: 191 (a) in a letter
dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the COA, Senator Enrile himself admitted
that his signatures, as well as those of Reyes, found on the documents
covered by the COA's Special Audit Report are authentic; 192 and (b) Rogelio
Azores, the supposed document examiner who now works as a freelance
consultant, aside from only analyzing photocopies of the aforesaid
documents and not the originals thereof, did not categorically state that
Reyes's signatures on the endorsement letters were forged. 193 As there is
no clear showing of forgery, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the
Court cannot subscribe to Reyes's contrary submission. Notably, however,
she retains the right to raise and substantiate the same defense during trial
proper.
In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding
probable cause to indict Reyes of one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15)
counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Anent Janet Napoles's complicity in the abovementioned crimes,
records similarly show that she, in all reasonable likelihood, played an
integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile's PDAF. As exhibited
in the modus operandi discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of
the availability of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the "lead
employee" 194 of the JLN Corporation, would prepare a listing of the available
projects specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is released by the
Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down
payment from her own pockets for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes,
with the remainder of the amount given to the Senator after the SARO and/or
NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet Napoles's NGOs to
undertake the PDAF-funded projects, 195 which were "ghost projects" that
allowed Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation. 196
Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Court is convinced that
there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as
it has prima facie been established that: (a) she, in conspiracy with Senator
Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-
described modus operandi to obtain Senator Enrile's PDAF, who supposedly
abused his authority as a public officer in order to do so; (b) through this
modus operandi, it appears that Senator Enrile repeatedly received ill-gotten
wealth in the form of "kickbacks" in the years 2004-2010; and (c) the total
value of "kickbacks" given to Senator Enrile amounted to at least
P172,834,500.00.
In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for
violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that: (a) she
conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his chief of staff,
Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they would enter into
transactions involving illegal disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile,
among others, has shown manifest partiality and evident bad faith by
repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF-
funded projects — even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or
negotiated procurement, in direct violation of existing laws, rules, and
regulations on government procurement; 197 and (c) the "ghost" PDAF-
funded projects caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of
P345,000,000.00.
At this juncture, the Court must disabuse Janet Napoles of her mistaken
notion that as a private individual, she cannot be held answerable for the
crimes of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the
offenders in those crimes are public officers. While the primary offender in
the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held
liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in
committing the same. 198 This proceeds from the fundamental principle that
in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 199 In this case, given
that the evidence gathered perceptibly shows Janet Napoles's engagement
in the illegal hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF, the Ombudsman
rightfully charged her, with Enrile and Reyes, as a co-conspirator for the
aforestated crimes.
Furthermore, there is no merit in Janet Napoles's assertion that the
complaints are insufficient in form and in substance for the reason that it
lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and manner of the
commission of the crimes charged. "According to Section 6, Rule 110 200 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the
facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the offense." 201 In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints
stated that: (a) Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are
the ones responsible for the PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et al. are being
accused of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; (c) they used a
certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of which were
stated therein; (d) because of the PDAF scam, the Philippine government
was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount of
P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened sometime between the
years 2004 and 2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and
Pasay City. 202 The aforesaid allegations were essentially reproduced in the
sixteen (16) Informations — one (1) for Plunder 203 and fifteen (15) for
violation of RA 3019 204 — filed before the Sandiganbayan. Evidently, these
factual assertions already square with the requirements of Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-cited. Upon such
averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet Napoles has been completely
informed of the accusations against her to enable her to prepare for an
intelligent defense. 205 The NBI and the FIO Complaints are, therefore,
sufficient in form and in substance.SDHTEC
In view of the foregoing, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding probable cause to indict Janet Napoles of the crimes of
Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings
and De Asis, it must be first highlighted that they are placed in the same
situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged with crime/s
principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or
multiple violations of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as
private individuals on account of their alleged conspiracy with public officers,
Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that "[w]hen
there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." 206 Thus, the
reasonable likelihood that conspiracy exists between them denotes the
probable existence of the elements of the crimes above-discussed equally as
to them.
"Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests." 207
With respect to the Napoles siblings, it must be clarified that while it
appears from the evidence on record that: (a) they did not serve as officers
or incorporators of the JLN-controlled NGOs designated as "project partners"
in the implementation of Senator Enrile's PDAF projects; 208 (b) their names
did not appear in the table of signatories to the MOAs; 209 and (c) they did
not acknowledge receipt of the checks issued by the IAs in payment of
Senator Enrile's "ghost" PDAF-funded projects, they were nonetheless
involved in various phases of the PDAF scam. Their respective participations,
from which a unity of purpose and design with the acts of their mother, Janet
Napoles, resonates, were uncovered in the sworn statement 210 of
whistleblower Luy, as will be shown hereunder.
For its proper context, it should be first pointed out that Luy
specifically mentioned that Janet Napoles transacted with Senator Enrile
regarding his PDAF, among other legislators:
50. T: Nabanggit mo na may mga pulitiko na madalas
nakikipagtransact kay JANET LIM NAPOLES, maaari mo bang
sabihin kung sinu-sino ang mga pulitiko na nagpapagamit sa
mga PDAF nila?
S: Opo. Sa mga Senador po ang madalas pong makuha ni Madame
Janet na PDAF nila ay sina Senador JINGGOY ESTRADA, Senador
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, at si Senador BONG REVILLA. Sa
Congressman naman ay sina, Congresswoman RIZALINA LANETE
ng 3rd District ng Benguet, Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA ng
lone District ng Agusan Del Sur, Congressman CONSTANTINO
JARAULA ng lone District ng Cagayan De Oro, at si Congressman
EDGAR VALDEZ ng APEC Party List. Meron pa rin mga iba pero
nasa records ko po iyon. Itong mga nabanggit ko po ay familiar
na sa akin kasi regular silang nakaka-transact ng JLN
Corporation. 211 (Emphasis supplied)
He then explained that the share of the involved legislators in the PDAF
were termed as "rebates," and their disbursement from JLN Corporation were
reflected in "vouchers," which were, after his initial preparation, checked by,
among others, Jo Christine Napoles:
51. T: Papaano mo naman nalaman na madalas na nagagamit o
nakukuha ni JANET LIM NAPOLES ang PDAF ng mga nabanggit
mong pulitiko?
S: Kasi po bukod sa nakikita ko sila sa opisina ng JLN Corporation o
sa mga parties ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES o madalas na
kausap sa telepono, ay sila rin lagi ang nasa records ko na
pinagbibigyan ng pera ni Madam JANET LIM NAPOLES. Gaya po
ng sinabi ko, ako po ang inuutusan ni Madame JANET LIM
NAPOLES na gumawa ng mga dokumento at maghanda ng pera
para sa rebates ng mga Senador o Congressman na mga ito. May
VOUCHER po kasi ang mga pera na lumalabas sa JLN
Corporation. Doon sa voucher ay nakalagay ang pangalan ng
taong pagbibigyan gaya ng Senador, o Chief-of-Staff nila, o
Congressman, o sinumang public official na kumukuha ng
REBATES sa mga government projects na ipinatutupad ng NGOs
o foundations ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES.
52. T: Sino naman ang gumagawa ng sinasabi mong voucher?
S: Ako po.
53. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung papaano iyong paghahanda mo ng
voucher at ang proseso nito?
S: Noong ako ay nasa JLN Corporation pa, ang una po ay sasabihan ako
ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na may pupuntang tao sa opisina
n g JLN Corporation na kukuha nang pera. Maghahanda ako ng
VOUCHER kung saan naka-indicate ang pangalan ng politiko,
iyong petsa, iyong control number ng voucher at iyong amount
na ibibigay. Pipirmahan ko ito at ipapa-check ko ito sa
anak ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na si JO CHRISTINE o
di kaya ay kay REYNALD "JOJO" LIM. Kapag nasuri na nila na
tama [ang] ginawa ko ay pipirmahan na nila ito at ibibigay kay
Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES at siya ang nag-a-approve nito.
Babalik sa akin ang voucher para maihanda ko iyong pera.
Kukuha ako ng pera sa vault na nasa opisina ng JLN Corporation.
Kapag nandoon si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES sa opisina ay siya
mismo ang nag-aabot ng pera sa tao. Kung wala naman siya
kami na ang nag-aabot ng pera. Bago pa man iabot ang pera ay
bibilangin pa muna sa harap noong taong tatanggap ng pera at
papapirmahin siya sa voucher para katunayan na natanggap ng
ganoon halaga ng pera. 212 (Emphases supplied)
Luy further revealed that these "vouchers" do not actually contain the
names of the legislators to whom the PDAF shares were disbursed as they
were identified by the use of "codenames." These "codenames," which were
obviously devised to hide the identities of the legislators involved in the
scheme, were known by a select few in the JLN Corporation, among others,
the Napoles siblings:
57. T: Sinabi mo na inilalagay mo sa voucher iyong pangalan ng
kung sino man ang kukuha ng pera, may mga pagkakataon ba
na iyong sinabi sa iyo ni JANET LIM NAPOLES na kukuha ng pera
ay iba sa tatanggap?
S: Meron po. Kunwari po sa mga Senador, sasabihin ni Madame
JANET LIM NAPOLES na kinukuha na ni ganitong Senador ang
kanyang kickback pero ang pera ay kukunin ng kanyang Chief-of-
S t a ff o representative niya. Ilalagay ko iyong pangalan o
codename ng Senador tapos i-indicate ko na "care of" tapos iyon
pangalan o codename ng kung sinuman ang tumanggap.
58. T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"?
S: Ang pangalan po ng taong tumanggap ng pera ang nilalagay ko
sa "voucher" pero minsan po ay codename ang nilalagay ko.
59. T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"? AScHCD
S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi

daw po ay sa gobyerno kami nagta-transact.
60. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang mga "codenames"
ng mga ka-transact ni JANET LIM NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang
Chief-of Staff?
S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA"
kay Senator Jinggoy Estrada, "POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla,
"GUERERA" kay Congressman Rizalina Seachon-Lanete,
"BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA, "BULAKLAK" kay
Congressman SAMUEL DANGWA, "SUHA" kay Congressman
ARTHUR PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kay Congressman EDGAR
VALDEZ. Mayroon pa po ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa
ngayon po ay sila lang po ang aking naalala.
61. T: Bukod sa iyo, may ibang tao ba na nakakaalam ng
mga sinasabi mong codenames?
S: Opo.
62. T: Sinu-sino itong mga nakakaalam ng codenames na
nabanggit mo?
S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES, ang anak niyang sina JO
CHRISTINE at JAMES CHRISTOPHER, at mga seniors ko sa JLN
Corporation na sina MERLINA SUÑAS [sic], MARINA SULA, EVELYN
DE LEON, RONALD JOHN LIM at ako . 213 (Emphases and
As mentioned by Luy, the Napoles siblings' standing in the JLN
Corporation were as follows:
13. T: Bago ang sinasabi mong iligal na pagkakakulong mo noong
December 2012, sinu-sino ang mga ibang empleyado ni
JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang President/CEO, JAIME G.
NAPOLES po ang Consultant, JO CHRISTINE L. NAPOLES ang
Vice-President for Admin and Finance, JAMES
CHRISTOPHER L. NAPOLES Vice-President for Operations, .
. . . 214
xxx xxx xxx (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Subsequently, Luy shed light on the process through which the
"rebates" were received by the legislators, again identifying the Office of
Senator Enrile, through Tuason, as one of the recipients:
66. T: Papaano naman ibinigay ni JANET LIM NAPOLES ang
"rebates" ng Senador o Congressman?
S: Sa mga ibang transaction ay pumupunta sa opisina ng JLN
Corporation ang Chief of Staff o pinagkakatiwalaan na tao ng
Congressman o Senador. Ikalawa po, mayroon din po na
pagkakataon na bank transfer na mula sa account ng foundation
o JLN Corporation o JO CHRIS Trading patungo sa account ng
legislator o pinagkakatiwalang tao ng Congressman o Senador.
Ikatlong sistema pa ay si Madame NAPOLES o kaming mga
empleyado na po ang nagdadala ng cash sa mga kausap niya.
67. T: Mayroon bang pagkakataon na ikaw mismo ay nakapagbigay ng
pera na "rebates" ng transaction sa Senador o Congressman o sa
kung sino mang representative ng pulitiko?
S: Opo. Sa mga Chief-of-Staff ng mga Senador at sa mga Congressman
mismo ay nakapag-abot na po ako ng personal. Pero sa mga
senador po ay wala pong pagkakataon na ako mismo ang nag-
abot. Naririnig ko lang kay Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na
nagbibigay daw sa mga Senador.
68. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung sinu-sino itong mga tinutukoy
mong Chief-of-Staff ng Senador na tumanggap ng pera na
"rebates" sa transaction kay JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Opo, sina Atty. RICHARD CAMBE sa opisina ni Senador BONG
REVILLA, Ms. PAULINE LABAYEN, sa opisina ni Senador JINGGOY
ESTRADA, Ms. RUBY TUASON sa opisina nina Senador JUAN
PONCE ENRILE at Senador JINGGOY ESTRADA.
69. T: Sinu-sino naman sa mga Congressman ang pinagbigyan mo
ng pera na "rebates" ng transaction nila ni JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Sina Congressman EDGAR VALDEZ, Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA,
Congressman CONSTANTINO JARAULA po. Nakapag-abot din po
ako kay Mr. JOSE SUMALPONG na Chief of Staff ni
Congresswoman RIZALINA LANETE. 215 (Emphasis and
When asked if Luy was the only one involved in the disbursement of
"rebates," he clarified that the children of Janet Napoles, among others, were
also into the act:
70. T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung bakit ikaw ang nag-abot ng pera
n a "rebates" sa transaction ni JANET LIM NAPOLES sa mga
pinangalanan mong Chief-of-Staff o representative ng Senador at
mga Congressman?
S: Ganoon naman ang kalakaran sa opisina kung wala si Madame
JANET LIM NAPOLES. Kapag may pumupuntang tao sa opisina
para kumuha ng pera ay sinasabihan na kami ni Madame JANET
LIM NAPOLES para maghanda ng pera at kami na mismo ang
nag-aabot ng pera. Binibilang namin ito sa harap ng tatanggap
bago namin iabot at pinapapirma namin sila para ipakita kay
Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES kapag pinag-report niya kami.
71. T: Sinasabi mo na "kami", ibig mo bang sabihin ay bukod sa iyo
ay mayroon pang iba na nakapag-abot ng pera sa mga
pinangalanan mong tumanggap ng pera na "rebates" sa
transaction ni JANET LIM NAPOLES?
S: Opo, iyong mga ibang seniors ko sa opisina na trusted na tauhan ni
Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES na sina MERLINA SUÑAS [sic],
EVELYN DE LEON, at JOHN LIM. Pati iyong mga ANAK at
kapatid ni Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES ay nag-aabot din
ng personal sa mga kumukuha ng pera sa opisina ng JLN
Corporation. 216 (Emphases supplied)
Meanwhile, Suñas testified that the Napoles siblings were previously
involved in the forging of documents and signatures which were, however,
related, to illegal disbursements involving funds allotted to the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). She also stated that the Napoles siblings were
employees of the JLN Corporation who always held office thereat, and,
similar to Luy, knew their positions in the office: AcICHD
91. T: Maaalala mo pa ba kung sinu-sino ang mga kasama mo sa

sinabi mong pagpupulong kung saan nabanggit ni Madame
JENNY na may nakuha siyang pondo mula sa DAR?
S: Opo, andun po iyong mga empleyado ng JLN Corporation na
sina BENHUR LUY, EVELYN DE LEON, LAARNI UY, ARTHUR LUY,
JR., JOHN LIM, MARINA SULA at mga anak ni Madam JENNY LIM na
sina JO CHRISTINE a.k.a "NENENG" at JAMES CHRISTOPHER
a.k.a "BUTSOY." Tapos noong bandang October 2009 ay
pinulong ulit kami ni Madame JENNY at dito niya sinabi na ang
pondo ay nagkakahalaga ng Php900 million mula sa DAR. 217
xxx xxx xxx
111. T: Nabanggit mo na kasama ang mga anak ni Madame
JENNY na sina JO CHRISTINE at JAMES CHRISTOPHER sa
paggawa ng mga pekeng dokumento at pamemeke ng
mga pirma, sila ba ay nasa opisina ng JLN Corporation
lagi?
S: Opo. Dahil empleyado din sila at doon nag-oopisina sa
JLN Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
149. T: Bilang dating empleyado ng JLN Corporation mula taong
2000 hanggang 2013, natatandaan mo pa ba kung sino-sino
ang mga nakatrabaho mo sa JLN Corporation?
S: Opo. Sila ay [sina] JANET LIM NAPOLES na president and CEO,
asawa niyang si JAIME G. NAPOLES bilang consultant, mga anak
niyang sina JO-CHRISTINE L. NAPOLES ang VP for admin
and finance at JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES na VP for
operations . . . . 218 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Notably, the JLN Corporation, as per whistleblower Sula's account, had
no income from business transactions aside from the PDAF coming from the
legislators involved that go through Janet Napoles's conduit NGOs:
12) T: Nabanggit mo sa iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29
Agosto 2013 na ikaw ay nagtrabaho kay JANET LIM NAPOLES
mula pa noong taong 1997, ano ba ang uri ng negosyo ng JLN
Corporation?
S: Ayon po sa SEC paper ng JLN Corporation ay trading ng mga
marine supplies and equipment at construction materials ang
line of business subalit sa papel lamang pa iyon dahil
pakikipag-transact po sa mga lawmakers, government
agency heads at LGU officials para sa implementation ng
mga government funded projects ang naging negosyo ng
JLN Corporation gamit ang mga NGOs o foundations na
itinatag ni Madam JANET NAPOLES.
13) T: Paano naman kumikita ang JLN Corporation sa mga PDAF ng
lawmakers? caITAC
S: Sa katotohanan po ay hindi naman po kumikita ang JLN Corporation

dahil wala naman po itong anumang business transactions. Ang
mga pondo po na nagmumula sa PDAF ng mga lawmakers ay
pumapasok sa mga NGOs ni Madam JANET NAPOLES. Mula
po sa mga bank accounts ng NGOs ay winiwidraw po ang
pera at inire-remit po kay Madam JANET NAPOLES. Kay
Madam JANET NAPOLES po napupunta ang pera at hindi
sa JLN Corporation.
14) T: Sa paragraph No. 21 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may
petsang 29 Agosto 2013 ay may mga listahan ng miyembro ng
pamilya NAPOLES at mga tao na may kaugnayan sa kanyang
mga negosyo, makikita dito na coded at mga alyas lamang ang
ID names, maari mo bang ibigay ang mga kumpletong pangalan
nila?
S: Opo, ang mga katumbas po ng mga codes/alyas na nakasaad sa
aking notebook ay ang mga sumusunod:
xxx xxx xxx
3) N1 JO CHRISTINE L. NAPOLES
4) N2 JAMES CHRISTOPHER L. NAPOLES
xxx xxx xxx 219 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it may be gathered that the Napoles siblings:
(a) worked at the JLN Corporation, which was apparently shown to be at the
forefront of the PDAF scam, as it was even revealed that it received no other
income outside of the PDAF transactions; (b) do not work as mere regular
employees but as high-ranking officers, being the Vice-President for
Administration and Finance and Vice-President for Operations, respectively
of JLN Corporation; and (c) as high-ranking officers of the JLN Corporation,
were ostensibly privy to and/or participated in the planning and execution of
the company's endeavors, which, as claimed, include illegal activities
concerning the misappropriation of various government funds, which, as
specifically pointed out by Luy, included, among others, Senator Enrile's
PDAF. To recount, Luy stated that Jo Christine Napoles, as part of the
scheme, checked the "vouchers" he had prepared; that the Napoles siblings
knew of the "codenames" of the legislators in the illicit "vouchers"; and that
they were also included in the actual disbursement of "rebates" to the
legislators, among others, Senator Enrile. More so, although Sunas's
testimony that the Napoles siblings forged documents and signatures
pertaining to the disbursement of the DAR funds which does not directly
prove that they had committed the same with respect to Senator Enrile's
PDAF, such evidence, when juxtaposed with Luy's testimony, gains relevance
in ascertaining the illegal plan, system or scheme to which they were alleged
to be involved. It also tends to directly prove the fact that they had
knowledge of JLN Corporation's illegal activities. 220 The Court notes that
these accounts gain more credibility not only in view of the whistleblowers'
allegations that they worked closely with the Napoles siblings in JLN
Corporation for a considerable length of time, 221 but also that Sula, Suñas,
and particularly Luy as "lead employee," were among the most trusted
workers of Janet Napoles in the furtherance of the PDAF scam. 222 Also, there
appears to be no motive for any of these whistleblowers, particularly, Luy, to
incredulously implicate the Napoles siblings in this case. With all these
factors together, there is, at least, some substantial basis to conclude, that
the Napoles siblings were, in all reasonable likelihood, involved in the entire
con.
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the
whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states that the rights of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30
of the same Rule. 223 To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical
rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of
preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be
inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary
investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."
224 This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not

finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." 225 Applying the same
logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for
crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection
interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta
rule should falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on
evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation," 226 as in this case.
Therefore, on account of the above-mentioned acts which seemingly
evince the Napoles siblings' participation in the conspiracy involving Senator
Enrile's PDAF, no grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed against the
Ombudsman in finding probable cause against them for fifteen (15) counts
of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.
In the same vein, the evidence on record exhibits probable cause for
De Asis's involvement as a co-conspirator for the crime of Plunder, as well as
violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. A perusal thereof readily reveals that
De Asis is the President 227 of KPMFI and a member/incorporator 228 of
CARED — two (2) among the many JLN-controlled NGOs that were used in the
perpetuation of the scam particularly involved in the illegal disbursement of
Senator Enrile's PDAF. 229 Moreover, in the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay 230 of whistleblowers Luy and Suñas, as well as their respective
Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay, 231 they tagged De Asis as one of those
who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker; 232 that he, among
others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the
same in the bank; 233 and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank,
De Asis was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles's
house. 234 With these, the Court finds that there are equally well-grounded
bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation as
President of KPMFI and member/incorporator of CARED, as well as his acts of
receiving checks in the name of said NGOs, depositing them in the NGOs'
bank accounts, delivering money to Janet Napoles, and assisting in the
delivery of "kickbacks" and "commissions" of the legislators, conspired with
the other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.
Certainly, De Asis's defenses, which are anchored on the want of
criminal intent, as well as the absence of all the elements of the crime of
Plunder on his part, are better ventilated during trial and not during
preliminary investigation. At the risk of belaboring the point, a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may
be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits. 235
Hence, for De Asis's apparent participation in the PDAF scam, the
Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause
against him for one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as charged.
In totality, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos.
213542-43, and G.R. Nos. 213475-76 questioning the March 28, 2014
Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding
probable cause against Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De
Asis should all be dismissed for lack of merit.
II. Petitions Assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
In G.R. Nos. 213163-78, Reyes ascribes grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Sandiganbayan for allegedly failing to perform its duty of
personally evaluating the evidence on record and, instead, merely adopting
the findings of the Ombudsman in the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014.
236 She argues that, had the Sandiganbayan conducted a judicious and
independent evaluation of the evidence on record, it would have determined
that there is no probable cause against her for plunder and violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. 237
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 215880-94, the Napoles siblings
impute grave abuse of discretion against the Sandiganbayan in issuing its
Resolutions dated September 29, 2014 238 and November 14, 2014 239
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
240 They claim that the challenged Resolutions which were concluded
without any additional evidence presented by the OSP were hastily issued
and decided; that the documents submitted by the prosecution, which were
used as bases in resolving the challenged Resolutions, were mere bare
allegations of witnesses that did not relate to the crime charged and most of
them even made no mention of them; that the NBI Complaint submitted by
the prosecution creates serious doubt on their participation; that not even
one of the essential elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is present in the
case in so far as they are concerned; and that there is no proof to show that
they conspired with any of the accused public officers. 241 ICHDca
Their arguments fail to persuade.

Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable
cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a
judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a
warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused.
The Court, in People v. Castillo, 242 delineated the functions and purposes of
a determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor, on the
one hand, and the trial court, on the other:
There are two kinds of determination of probable case:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause
is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal
case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he
has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause
in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The
judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant. 243 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As above-articulated, the executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. 244
This notwithstanding, the Court in Mendoza v. People 245 (Mendoza)
clarified that the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct
options upon the filing of a criminal information before it, namely to: (a)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; (b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and(c) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause. 246 The Court went on to elaborate that "the
option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory" and reiterated that "the court's first option . . . is for it to
'immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause.'" 247
Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the
judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled to make his
own assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is
probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial;
or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal
case. 248 This is in line with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint
or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court." 249 Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the
trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature:
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge
must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of
probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence
before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand
absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she
can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable
cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and
trial in order that justice may be served. 250
A careful study of the records yields the conclusion that the
requirement to personally evaluate the report of the Ombudsman, and its
supporting documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it
explicitly declared in its Resolution 251 dated July 3, 2014 that it had
"personally [read] and [evaluated] the Information, the Joint Resolution dated
March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the [Ombudsman],
together with the above-enumerated documents, including their annexes
and attachments, which are all part of the records of the preliminary
investigation . . . ." 252 A similar pronouncement was made by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 253 dated September 29, 2014, wherein it
was said that "[a]fter further considering the records of these cases and due
deliberations, the Court finds the existence of probable cause against the
said accused . . . ." 254 Later on, in a Resolution 255 dated November 14,
2014, the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier findings when it held that the
presence of probable cause against all the accused "was already
unequivocally settled . . . in its [Resolution] dated July 3, 2014 . . . ." 256
Besides, the Sandiganbayan should be accorded with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of its official duties. 257 This presumption was
not convincingly overcome by either Reyes or the Napoles siblings through
clear and convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail. 258 As such, the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes and the
Napoles siblings was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when it
examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued warrants of arrest
against them. 259 TCAScE
Also, the Court cannot lend any credence to Reyes's protestations of

haste on the part of the Sandiganbayan in issuing the assailed Resolutions,
absent any clear showing that the presumed regularity of the proceedings
has been breached. Reyes would do well to be reminded of the Court's ruling
in Leviste v. Alameda 260 wherein it was instructed that "[s]peed in the
conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one's
prompt dispatch may be another's undue haste. The orderly administration
of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with
particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case." 261
Finally, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in denying Reyes's motion to suspend proceedings against
her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the
Ombudsman's issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94. Under
Section 7, Rule 65 262 of the Rules of Court, a mere pendency of a special
civil action for certiorari in relation to a case pending before the court a quo
does not ipso facto stay the proceedings therein, unless the higher court
issues a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
against the conduct of such proceedings. Otherwise stated, a petition for
certiorari does not divest the lower courts of jurisdiction validly acquired
over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari
is an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower
court. It is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, including grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, under
Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public
respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
in order to interrupt the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule
65 petition has the burden of proof to show that there is a meritorious
ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the
proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the existence of
an urgent necessity for the writ or order, so that serious damage may be
prevented. 263 In this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos.
212593-94, then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with
the proceedings before it.
Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion
in judicially determining the existence of probable cause against Reyes and
the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes's Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R.
Nos. 215880-94 is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions and Orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, * J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., I concur. See separate opinion.
**
Jardeleza, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague Associate Justice

Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. The Petitions should be dismissed. The
Ombudsman did not act in grave abuse of discretion when it found probable
cause to charge petitioners with Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 1 and
violation of Section 3 (e) 2 of Republic Act No. 3019. 3
In addition, the Petitions before us could also be dismissed for being
moot and academic. When the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners after finding probable cause, all petitions questioning the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, including these Petitions before us,
have already become moot.
The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is different
from the determination of probable cause by the trial court. 4 A preliminary
investigation is conducted by the prosecutor to determine whether there is
probable cause to file an information or whether the complaint should be
dismissed. Once the information is filed, the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over the case. The trial court then determines the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Any question relating to the
disposition of the case should be addressed to the trial court. 5 In Crespo v.
Mogul: 6
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. 7
Similarly, in People v. Castillo and Mejia: 8
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:

executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause
is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal
case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he
has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause
in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant. 9 (Emphasis supplied)
Although both the prosecutor and the trial court may rely on the same
records and evidence, their findings are arrived at independently. Executive
determination of probable cause is outlined by the Rules of Court, 10
Republic Act No. 6770, 11 and various issuances by the Department of
Justice. 12 It is the Constitution, however, that mandates the conduct of
judicial determination of probable cause:
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ho v. People: 13
Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital

matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that
which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a
necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their
findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should
be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot
rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support
his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an
offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than
the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own
findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue
an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is
lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.
Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge
and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not
only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause,
but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to
enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding
on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of
the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of
the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he
cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation,
as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys
the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of
accuracy, the Constitution we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of
the investigating officer. 14 (Emphasis provided)
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is also not a venue for an
exhaustive display of petitioners' evidence. It is merely preparatory to a
criminal action. In Drilon v. Court of Appeals: 15
Probable cause should be determined in a summary but
scrupulous manner to prevent material damage to a potential
accused's constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of
freedom and fair play. The preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It
is for the presentation of such evidence as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. The validity
and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in People v. Narca , 17 this court pointed out that any alleged
irregularity in the preliminary investigation does not render the information
void or affect the trial court's jurisdiction: cSaATC
It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the

venue for the full exercise of the rights of the parties. This is why
preliminary investigation is not considered as a part of trial but
merely preparatory thereto and that the records therein shall not
form part of the records of the case in court. Parties may submit
affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses though they can
propound questions through the investigating officer. In fact, a
preliminary investigation may even be conducted ex-parte in certain
cases. Moreover, in Section 1 of Rule 112, the purpose of a
preliminary investigation is only to determine a well grounded belief if
a crime was probably committed by an accused. In any case, the
invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of the
information nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
A trial court's finding of probable cause does not rely on the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause. Once the trial court finds the
existence of probable cause, which results in the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, any question on the prosecutor's conduct of preliminary investigation
has already become moot.
In De Lima v. Reyes , 19 we dismissed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
questioning the Secretary of Justice's finding of probable cause against the
accused. Once probable cause has been judicially determined, any question
on the executive determination of probable cause is already moot:
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of
any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second
Panel, that probable cause exists to cause the issuance of the warrant
of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially
determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to
the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot
by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of
arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially
determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the
preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy" provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is
an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered
moot.
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed
to trial. Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He may still
file any appropriate action before the trial court or question any
alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial. 20
(Emphasis supplied)
In its July 3, 2014 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan categorically states
that "it had 'personally [read] and [evaluated] the Information, the Joint
Resolution dated March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the
[Ombudsman] together with the above-enumerated documents, including
their annexes and attachments, which are all part of the records of the
preliminary investigation.'" 21 In its Resolution dated September 29, 2014,
the Sandiganbayan reiterated that "[a]fter further considering the records of
these cases and due deliberations, the [Sandiganbayan] finds the existence
of probable cause against said accused." 22 Warrants of arrest have already
been issued against petitioners. 23 Thus, these Petitions questioning the
Ombudsman's determination of probable cause have already become moot
and academic.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions.
Footnotes
* On leave.
** No part.
1. Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160 (1949).

2. See orders of consolidation in Court Resolutions dated July 22, 2014 (rollo [G.R.
Nos. 213163-78], Vol. I, pp. 220-221); September 30, 2014 ( rollo [G.R.
Nos. 213542-43], pp. 480-481); October 7, 2014 (rollo [G.R. Nos. 213475-
76], Vol. I, pp. 570-571); October 14, 2014 ( rollo [G.R. Nos. 213540-41],
Vol. I, pp. 484-485); and February 24, 2015 ( rollo [G.R. Nos. 215880-94],
Vol. III, pp. 1248-1250).
3. Pertains to the following petitions: (a) petition in G.R. Nos. 212593-94, which
was filed on June 9, 2014 by Reyes ( rollo [G.R. Nos. 212593-94], Vol. I, pp.
3-83); (b) petition in G.R. Nos. 213540-41, which was filed on August
13, 2014 by Janet Napoles (rollo [G.R. Nos. 213540-41], Vol. I, pp. 3-41);
(c) petition in G.R. Nos. 213542-43, which was filed on August 13, 2014
by the Napoles siblings (rollo [G.R. Nos. 213542-43], Vol. I, pp. 3-22); and
(d) petition in G.R. Nos. 213475-76, which was filed on August 8, 2014
by De Asis (rollo [G.R. Nos. 213475-76], Vol. I, pp. 3-70).
4. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 87-230; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213540-41), Vol.
I, pp. 43-186; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, pp. 25-168; and rollo
(G.R. Nos. 213475-76), Vol. I, pp. 74-217. Signed by Special Panel of Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officers M.A. Christian O. Uy, Ruth Laura A.
Mella, Francisca M. Serfino, Anna Francesca M. Limbo, Jasmine Ann B.
Gapatan, and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
5. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 231-296; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213540-41),
Vol. I, pp. 360-425; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, pp. 342-407; rollo
(G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. II, pp. 419-484; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-
76), Vol. I, pp. 391-456, some pages are apparently misarranged.
6. Defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING
AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER," approved on July 12, 1991, as
amended by, among others, Section 12 of RA 7659, entitled "AN ACT TO
IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING
FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on
December 13, 1993.
7. Entitled "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT," approved on August 17,
1960.
8. This pertains to Reyes's petition in G.R. Nos. 213163-78, which was filed on
July 18, 2014 (rollo [G.R. Nos. 213163-78], Vol. I, pp. 3-23).
9. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. I, pp. 26-45. Issued by Presiding Justice and
Chairperson Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and Associate Justice Alex L.
Quiroz. Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires issued a Separate Opinion
dated July 4, 2014 (see rollo [G.R. Nos. 215880-94], Vol. II, pp. 629-645).
10. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. I, pp. 46-52. See also Associate Justice
Samuel R. Martires's July 4, 2014 Separate Opinion (see rollo [G.R. Nos.
215880-94], Vol. II, pp. 629-645).
11. Dated June 13, 2014. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. I, pp. 101-111.
12. This pertains to the Napoles sibling's petition in G.R. Nos. 215880-94, which
was filed on January 30, 2015 (rollo [G.R. Nos. 215880-94], Vol. I, pp. 3-
42).
13. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 46-48. Composed by the
Sandiganbayan (Special Third Division). Penned by Presiding Justice and
Chairperson Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang with Associate Justices Samuel R.
Martires, Alex L. Quiroz, Jose R. Hernandez, and Maria Cristina J. Cornejo
concurring. Prior to the issuance of this Resolution, Justice Maria Cristina J.
Cornejo issued a Separate Opinion dated September 11, 2014 (rollo [G.R.
Nos. 215880-94], Vol. II, pp. 646-648) which was concurred in by
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez on September 17, 2014 ( rollo [G.R.
Nos. 215880-94], Vol. II, p. 649).
14. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 49-60. Penned by Presiding Justice and
Chairperson Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang with Associate Justices Samuel R.
Martires and Alex L. Quiroz concurring.
15. See Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay (rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94], Vol. II,
pp. 481-491); Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Suñas before the NBI
(rollo [G.R. Nos. 212593-94], Vol. II, pp. 503-533); Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Luy before the NBI (rollo [G.R. Nos. 212593-94],
Vol. II, pp. 538-578); and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Sula (rollo
[G.R. Nos. 215880-94], Vol. III, pp. 1027-1051).
16. See NBI Complaint; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 305-306; March
28, 2014 Joint Resolution; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 114-
115; July 3, 2014 Resolution; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. I, p. 31;
Information in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238; rollo (G.R. Nos.
213163-78), Vol. I, pp. 53-54; and Ombudsman's Consolidated
Comment dated December 19, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I,
pp. 547-548 and rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-76), Vol. I, pp. 618-619.
(G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 72-91; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-76),
Vol. I, pp. 371-390. Signed by Assistant Director Atty. Medardo G. De
Lemos.
(G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 92-242; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-76),
Vol. I, pp. 218-370. Signed by Associate Graft Investigation Officers Karen
Rose C. Tamayo, Julber P. Tadiaman, Corinne Joie M. Garillo, Ann
Germaine L. Constantino, and Myrene Q. Suetos, and Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officers Ronald Allan D. Ramos, John Sernan T.
Sambajon, R. Epicurus Charlo S. Salcedo, and Ryan P. Medrano, and
certified by Assistant Ombudsman, FIO Atty. Joselito P. Fangon.
19. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94). Vol. I, pp. 181-182.
20. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 471-478.

21. Id. at 479-480.
22. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 155 and 187.
23. "JLN" stands for "Janet Lim Napoles."

24. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, p. 177.
25. See Sworn Statement of Ruby Tuason before the FIO Investigation; rollo (G.R.
Nos. 215880-94), Vol. II, p. 689.
26. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 164 and 184.
27. See id. at 303.

28. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 158.
30. Id. at 329 and 450.

31. Id. at 447-448.
32. Id. at 450.
33. Referred to as "JLN Group of Companies" in some parts of the rollos. See id. at
330.
34. Id. at 452.

35. Charged under the FIO Complaint only.
36. Jo Christine Napoles is the "CFO" or more commonly known as the "Vice-
President for Administration and Finance," while James Christopher
Napoles is the "COS" or the "Vice-President for Operations" of the JLN
Corporation. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, p. 616.
37. Id. at 104.
38. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, p. 616. See also rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-
94), Vol. I, p. 451.

41. Id. at 321-322.
42. See table showing receipt of payments by De Asis; id. at 297-299.
43. Id. at 137.

44. Id. at 171 and 331.
45. De Asis is an incorporator of the Countrywide Agri & Rural Economic
Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED). Id. at 237 and 243.
46. De Asis is the President of Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc.

(KPMFI), Id. at 378-379.
47. Tuason acted as the "agent" of Senator Enrile, in-charge of delivering the
share of Senator Enrile through Reyes. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. II,
p. 705; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, p. 120.
48. See Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 148 and 419.
49. In this case, Senator Enrile agreed to a 50% "commission" (see Pinagsamang
Sinumpaang Salaysay; rollo [G.R. Nos. 212593-94], Vol. II, p. 488). Rollo
(G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, p. 302.
50. See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 148 and 420.
51. Id. at 149, 302-303, and 420.

52. Id. at 149.
53. Id. at 149, 303, and 421.
54. Id. at 184.

55. See id. at 149-150 and 303.
56. See id. at 303-304.
57. Id. at 150 and 188.

58. Id. at 151 and 304.
59. See id. at 304 and 421. See also id. at 188.
60. See id. at 310 and 421.
61. Id. at 188.

62. See id. at 417.
63. See id. at 183-185.
64. Dated December 26, 2013. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 591-673.
65. Id. at 645 and 650-651.
66. Dated February 21, 2014. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 243-259.
67. Id. at 245.

68. Id. at 247 and 251.
69. Id. at 255.
70. See rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-76), Vol. I, p. 124. See also id. at 13.
71. See id. at 372.
72. See id. at 237.
73. Id. at 124.

74. Id. at 72 and 382.
75. See Supplemental Sworn Statement of Tuason; rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94),
Vol. II, pp. 704-709.
77. Id. at 713.

79. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, p. 715.
80. See Order dated March 27, 2014 signed by Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer IV and Chairperson M.A. Christian O. Uy; id. at 718-
721.
81. Id. at 721.
82. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 87-230; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213540-41)
(G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 260-403; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-
76), Vol. I, pp. 74-217.
83. See Motion for Reconsideration dated April 4, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-
94), Vol. II, pp. 722-778.
41), Vol. I, pp. 426-459.
43), Vol. I, pp. 408-422.
86. See Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation dated April 21, 2014;
rollo (G.R. No. 213475-76), Vol. I, pp. 457-469.
89. Not attached to the rollos.

90. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
91. See Reyes's respective Comments on Tuason's Supplemental Sworn
Statement filed on May 13, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp.
798-802; and on Cunanan's Counter-Affidavit filed on May 13, 2014; rollo
(G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 803-821.
93. See id. at 685-691.

94. Dated May 8, 2014. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 793-797.
95. Dated May 12, 2014. Id. at 822-825.
96. See Joint Order dated May 13, 2014; id. at 826-827.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 784-788. See also <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/599180/ruby-tuason-
gets-immunity-for-pdaf-scam-not-yet-for-malampaya-fund> (last accessed
February 10, 2016).
99. See Immunity Agreement dated April 23, 2014; rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94),
Vol. II, pp. 650-654.

101. See Letter dated May 15, 2014 signed by Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer IV M.A. Christian O. Uy; id. at 828-829.
102. Entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE
TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,
GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE,
ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
approved on February 20, 1989.
Vol. I, pp. 360-425; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, pp. 342-407); rollo
76), Vol. I, pp. 391-456; some pages are apparently misarranged.

(G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. I, pp. 260-403; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-
76), Vol. I, pp. 74-217.
Vol. I, pp. 360-425; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, pp. 342-407); rollo
76), Vol. I, pp. 391-456, some pages are apparently misarranged.
110. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. I, pp. 53-100; and rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-
94), Vol. II, pp. 508-554.

112. Id. at 518-563.
114. Id. at 101-111.

115. Id. at 203-207.
117. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. I, pp. 26-45; rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94)
Vol. II, pp. 602-621.
Vol. II, pp. 603-604.
120. Id. at 644.
Vol. II, pp. 622-628.
123. Id. at 3-21.
124. Id. at 26-45. Signed by Associate Justice and Chairperson Amparo M.
Cabotaje and Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz.
125. Id. at 46-52.

127. See Urgent Motion for Reconsideration (with Request to Hold in Abeyance
the Arraignment of the Accused) dated October 8, 2014; id. at 61-71.
128. See id. at 11.

129. It appears from the records that the November 14, 2014 Resolution pertains
to the denial of the motions for reconsideration of accused Mario L.
Relampagos, Antonio U. Ortiz, and Ronald John Lim. Id. at 49-60.
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id. at 3-42.
132. Id. at 46-48.

133. Id. at 49-60.
134. See rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 25-33.
135. See id. at 29.

136. See id. at 42-56.
137. See id. at 56-60.

139. See id. at 38-40.
140. See id. at 26-31 and 40.

142. See Reply dated February 12, 2015; id. at 655.

144. See id. at 48-49.
145. See Ciron v. Gutierrez , G.R. Nos. 194339-41, April 20, 2015, citing Soriano v.
Marcelo, 610 Phil. 72, 79 (2009).
146. See id.
147. See id., citing Tetangco v. Ombudsman , 515 Phil. 230, 234-235 (2006),
further citing Roxas v. Vasquez, 411 Phil. 276, 288 (2011).
148. See Encinas v. Agustin, Jr. , G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 240,
263-264, citing Bautista v. Court of Appeals , 413 Phil. 159, 168-169
(2001).
149. Clay & Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, 664 Phil. 764, 771 (2011).
150. 691 Phil. 335 (2012).
151. Id. at 345-346, citing Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc. , 582 Phil. 505, 518-
519 (2008); emphases and underscoring supplied.
152. Shu v. Dee , G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 512, 523; emphases
and underscoring supplied.
153. Section 2 of RA 7080 reads in full:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public

officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1
(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

154. Section 1 (d) of RA 7080, as amended provides:
Section 1. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the term —
xxx xxx xxx
d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or

material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of

public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks, or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivision, agencies
or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly, or indirectly any shares

of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended
to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection, or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
155. See Enrile v. People , G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015.
156. Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
157. See Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Navarro-Gutierrez,
G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015.
158. Shu v. Dee, supra note 152.
159. Lee v. KBC Bank N.V. , 624 Phil. 115, 126 (2010), citing Andres v. Cuevas ,
499 Phil. 36, 49-50 (2005).
160. Id. at 126-127; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
161. See De Chavez v. Ombudsman , 543 Phil. 600, 619-620 (2007); emphasis
and underscoring supplied.
162. See Estrada v. Ombudsman , G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015, citing
Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan , G.R. No. 179367, January 29, 2014, 715
SCRA 36, 49-50, emphasis and underscoring supplied.
163. See id.

164. See id.
166. See Supplemental Sworn Statement of Tuason dated February 21, 2014;
rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94), Vol. II, pp. 704-709.
167. "As correctly pointed out by the FIO, the [Revised] Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9184 states that an NGO may be contracted only when
so authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance:
53.11. NGO Participation. When an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to [NGOs], the
procuring entity may enter into a [MOA] with an NGO, subject to
guidelines to be issued by the [Government Procurement Policy Board
(GPPB)].
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 476, as amended by NBC No. 479,
provides that PDAF allocations should be directly released only to those
government agencies identified in the project menu of the pertinent
General Appropriations Act (GAAs). The GAAs in effect at the time
material to the charges, however, did not authorize the direct release of
funds to NGOs, let alone the direct contracting of NGOs to implement
government projects. This, however, did not appear to have impeded
Senator Enrile's direct selection of the [JLN-controlled NGOs], and which
choice was accepted in toto by the IAs.
Even assuming arguendo that the GAAs allowed the engagement of

NGOs to implement PDAF-funded projects, such engagements remain
subject to public bidding requirements. Consider GPPB Resolution No.
012-2007:
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an
amount for projects to be specifically contracted out to NGOs, the
procuring entity may select an NGO through competitive bidding
or negotiated procurement under Section 53[(j)] of the [IRR-A]. . .
..
The aforementioned laws and rules, however, were, disregarded by
public respondents, Senator Enrile having just chosen the JLN-controlled
NGOs." (Emphases and underscoring in the original; see rollo [G.R. Nos.
212593-94], Vol. I, pp. 159-160.)
168. See id. at 56-60.
169. See id. at 33-34 and 38-42.

172. See id. at 42-56.
173. See Estrada v. Ombudsman, supra note 162.

175. Id. at 154.
176. Section 17, Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or
more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court
is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty ; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
177. People v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. Nos. 185724-32, June 26, 2013, 699 SCRA
713, 720.
178. 674 Phil. 370 (2011).
179. Id. at 392-393.
180. See id. at 402.

181. People v. Feliciano , 419 Phil. 324, 341 (2001).
182. 590 Phil. 8 (2008).
183. See id. at 49-50.
184. Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
reads:
Section 4. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall
be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports,
the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting
witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall
issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other
supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit, within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The
complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of
the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondents [sic] does not file a counter-affidavit, the
investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his
answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access
to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction.
Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If
respondents [sic] desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be
clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of
clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this
section.
e) If the respondents [sic] cannot be served with the order mentioned in

paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith,
the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the
evidence on the record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting
evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating
officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing
during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being
questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is
impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing,
whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or
a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the witness concerned
who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his
resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action
thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without
the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy
Ombudsman in all other cases.
187. Among the documents allegedly attached to the May 7, 2014 Joint Order
were copies of the Supplemental Sworn Statement of Tuason dated
February 21, 2014 and the Sworn Statement of Cunanan dated February
20, 2014 (see rollo, [G.R. Nos. 212593-94], Vol. I, pp. 16-17).
188. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 798-802 and 803-821.
189. Republic v. Transunion Corporation , G.R. No. 191590, April 21, 2014, 722
SCRA 273, 286.
190. Heir of Bucton v. Gonzalo , G.R. No. 188395, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA
457, 465-466.
191. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. III, pp. 1172-1214.
192. See id. at 1188.
193. See id. at 1187.

195. See id. at 132-133.
196. See id. at 138-139.
198. See People v. Balao , 655 Phil. 563, 572-573 (2011), citing Dela Chica v.
Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 720 (2003).
199. See People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).
200. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states in full:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
201. See Enrile v. Manalastas , G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014, citing People
v. Balao, supra note 198, at 571-572; emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
202. See NBI and FIO Complaints; rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. I, pp. 301-306,
417-421, and 438.
204. Id. at 55-57, 58-60, 61-63, 64-66, 67-69, 70-72, 73-75, 76-78, 79-81, 82-85,
86-88, 89-91, 92-94, 95-97, and 98-100.
205. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 347 (2001).
206. Quidet v. People , 632 Phil. 1, 11 (2010); emphasis and underscoring
supplied.
207. People v. Cadevida , G.R. No. 94528, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 218, 228.
208. See rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, pp. 38-39 and 192-198.
209. Id. at 40-41.
211. Id. at 1150.
212. Id. at 1150-1151.

213. Id. at 1139-1140 and 1151-1152.
214. Id. at 1139-1140.
215. Id. at 1153-1154.
216. Id. at 1155.
217. Id. at 1122.
218. Id. at 1122, 1125, and 1133.

219. Id. at 1031-1032.
220. Section 34, Rule 130 of the 2000 Rules of Court states:
Section. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or a similar thing at another time, but it may be received
to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like.
221. Sula worked with Janet Napoles for sixteen (16) years ( rollo [G.R. Nos.
215880-94], Vol. III, p. 922). Suñas worked with Janet Napoles for twelve
(12) years (rollo [G.R. Nos. 215880-94], Vol. III, p. 897). Luy worked with
Janet Napoles for ten (10) years (rollo [G.R. Nos. 215880-94], Vol. III, pp.
896 and 1139).
222. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-76), Vol. I, pp. 83, 136, and 351.
223. "An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This
provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator
may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that:
(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy."
(People v. Ibañez , G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 161, 174-
175.)
225. See id.

226. See id.
227. See NBI Complaint; rollo (G.R. Nos. 213475-76), Vol. I, pp. 378-379.
228. See FIO Complaint; id. at 243.
229. See NBI Complaint (id. at 379-380) and FIO Complaint (id. at 222 and 228).
231. For Suñas, id. at 1106-1135; for Luy, id. at 1136-1176.

232. Id. at 1018.
233. Id. at 1020.
234. Id. at 1020-1021.
235. See Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., supra note 159, at 126.
237. Id. at 15.
238. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 215880-94). Vol. I, pp. 46-48.

239. Id. at 49-60.
240. Id. at 4.
241. Id. at 16.
242. 607 Phil. 754 (2009).
243. Id. at 764-765.
244. Mendoza v. People , G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 647, 656.
245. Id. at 659.
246. Id., citing People v. Dela Torre-Yadao , G.R. Nos. 162144-54, November 13,
2012, 685 SCRA 264, 287-288.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 659-660.

249. Id. at 659, citing Leviste v. Alameda , 640 Phil. 620, 638 (2010).
250. Id. at 660-661.

252. Id. at 35-36.
254. Id. at 47.
255. Id. at 49-60.
256. Id. at 56.
257. See Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence.
258. "In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties which the records failed to rebut. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness."
(Bustillo v. People , 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010), citing People v. De Guzman ,
G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994, 299 SCRA 795, 799.)
260. 640 Phil. 620 (2010).
261. Id. at 645, citing Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice , 567 Phil. 70, 89
(2008).
262. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. — The court in
which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings,
and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent
from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten
(10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
263. Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club , G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014,
726 SCRA 298, 312.
LEONEN, J., concurring:
1. An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder (1991).

2. Rep. Act No. 3019 (1960), sec. 3 provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
3. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (1960).
4. See People v. Castillo and Mejia , 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division].
5. See Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
6. 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
7. Id.
8. 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
9. Id. at 764-765, citing Paderanga v. Drilon , 273 Phil. 290, 296 (1991) [Per J.
Regalado, En Banc]; Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , 324 Phil. 568, 620-
621 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc]; Ho v. People , 345 Phil. 597, 611
(1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
10. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 112.
11. The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
12. The most common of these issuances is the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal.
13. 345 Phil. 597 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
14. Id. at 611-612, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Section 6 (b) and J. Reynato
S. Puno, Dissenting Opinion in Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals , 324 Phil.
568, 623-642 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
15. 327 Phil. 916 (1995) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
16. Id. at 923, citing Salonga v. Cruz-Paño , 219 Phil. 402 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez,
En Banc]; Hashim v. Boncan , 71 Phil. 216 (1941) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc];
Paderanga v. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 86, 92 [Per
J. Regalado, En Banc]; J. Francisco, Concurring Opinion in Webb v. De
Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 809-811 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
17. 341 Phil. 696 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
18. Id. at 705, citing Lozada v. Hernandez , 92 Phil. 1051 (1953) [Per J. Reyes, En
Banc]; RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 8; RULES OF COURT, Rule 112,
sec. 3 (e); RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 3 (d); Mercado v. Court of
Appeals, 315 Phil. 657 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division]; Rodriguez v.
Sandiganbayan, 306 Phil. 567 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]; Webb v. De
Leon, 317 Phil. 758 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division]; Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 313 Phil. 870 (1995) [Per C.J. Narvasa, En Banc]; and
People v. Gomez, 202 Phil. 395 (1982) [Per J. Relova, First Division].
19. G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/january2016/209330.pdf> [Per J. Leonen,
Second Division].
20. Id. at 20, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1.
21. Ponencia, p. 38.
22. Id.
23. See ponencia, p. 3.

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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 212593-94. March 15, 2016.]

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

[G.R. Nos. 213163-78. March 15, 2016.]

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

[G.R. Nos. 213540-41. March 15, 2016.]

JANET LIM NAPOLES, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-

[G.R. Nos. 213542-43. March 15, 2016.]

JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES and JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES,

[G.R. Nos. 215880-94. March 15, 2016.]

JO CHRISTINE NAPOLES and JAMES CHRISTOPHER NAPOLES,

[G.R. Nos. 213475-76. March 15, 2016.]

JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS , petitioner, vs. CONCHITA CARPIO-

"In dealing with probable cause[,] as the very name implies, we

(d) De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger, 40

While preliminary investigation proceedings were ongoing before the

On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the

Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of

been deﬁned as such facts as are suﬃcient to engender a well-

11. . . . It starts with a call or advise from Atty. Gigi Reyes

Assuming arguendo that such whistleblower accounts are merely

Finally, anent Reyes's claim that her signatures in the documentary

S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi

91. T: Maaalala mo pa ba kung sinu-sino ang mga kasama mo sa

S: Sa katotohanan po ay hindi naman po kumikita ang JLN Corporation

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

Their arguments fail to persuade.

Also, the Court cannot lend any credence to Reyes's protestations of

I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague Associate Justice

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:

Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital

It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the

1. Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160 (1949).

20. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 471-478.

23. "JLN" stands for "Janet Lim Napoles."

27. See id. at 303.

30. Id. at 329 and 450.

34. Id. at 452.

39. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213542-43), Vol. I, p. 616.

43. Id. at 137.

46. De Asis is the President of Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc.

51. Id. at 149, 302-303, and 420.

54. Id. at 184.

57. Id. at 150 and 188.

61. Id. at 188.

67. Id. at 245.

73. Id. at 124.

77. Id. at 713.

89. Not attached to the rollos.

93. See id. at 685-691.

100. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 212593-94), Vol. II, pp. 789-790.

105. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213540-41), Vol. I, pp. 3-41.

111. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 213163-78), Vol. II, pp. 516-517.

114. Id. at 101-111.

125. Id. at 46-52.

128. See id. at 11.

132. Id. at 46-48.

135. See id. at 29.