TNO, CCR 01318 Application of Correlations To Quantify The Source Strength
TNO, CCR 01318 Application of Correlations To Quantify The Source Strength
TNO, CCR 01318 Application of Correlations To Quantify The Source Strength
Title : Ongerubriceerd
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ONGERUBRICEERD
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1 Summary
Correlations were derived in the preceding GAME project to quantify the source
strength of a vapour cloud explosion required to apply the Multi-Energy Method
for the determination of blast characteristics. The correlations relate a set of para-
meters describing the obstacle configuration in which the flammable cloud is
present and the fuel, to a single value for the overpressure in the exploding vapour
cloud.
This project investigates the difficulties and problems encountered while applying
the correlations to a number of realistic scenarios. The objective is to provide
guidance and recommendations on how to overcome these difficulties and to
decide on the actual values to be chosen for the parameters of the correlations in
specific situations. The emphasis is on the determination of the parameters: ‘Volu-
me Blockage Ratio’ and ‘Average Obstacle Diameter’.
The main finding is that a safe approach in most situations is to apply the procedu-
re of the new Yellow Book for the determination of the volume of the obstructed
region in combination with the hydraulic average obstacle diameter and a flame
path length equal to the radius of a hemisphere with a volume equal to the volume
of the obstructed region.
Lack of experimental data on specific items prevents the generation of more detai-
led guidance. Some guidance is developed based on a theoretical approach, to
assess the influence of the aspect ratio of the obstructed region and to quantify the
separation distance between multiple explosion sources. It is recommended to
perform an experimental research programme to generate the required data to
improve and validate the suggested procedures.
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2 Samenvatting
Het belangrijkste resultaat is dat voor de meeste situaties een veilige aanpak bestaat
uit het toepassen van de procedure uit het nieuwe Gele Boek voor het bepalen van
het volume van ruimte waarin de obstakels zich bevinden in combinatie met de
gemiddelde hydraulische obstakeldiameter en een vlampadlengte gelijk aan de
straal van een halfbol die een volume heeft gelijk aan dat van de ruimte waarin zich
de obstakels bevinden.
Een gebrek aan experimentele gegevens betreffende enkele specifieke aspecten is
de oorzaak voor het niet kunnen geven van meer gedetaileerde adviezen. Enkele
adviezen zijn gegeven op basis van een theoretische beschouwing, voor het bepalen
van de invloed lengte/breedte-verhouding van het volume waarin zich de obstakels
bevinden en voor het bepalen van de scheidingsafstand tussen meerdere explosie-
bronnen. Aanbevolen wordt om een experimenteel onderzoeksprogramma uit te
voeren waarmee de vereiste gegevens worden verkregen zodat de adviezen verbe-
terd en gevalideerd kunnen worden.
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Contents
Summary................................................................................................................... 3
Samenvatting ............................................................................................................ 4
1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 7
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12 Acknowledgement................................................................................. 103
Annexes:
A Procedure for the determination of the boundaries of the
obstructed region according to the Yellow Book
B Procedure for the application of the Multi-Energy
Method according to the Yellow Book
C Application of procedure to determine obstructed region
boundaries
D Critical separation distances between obstructed areas
E Application of GAME correlation to obstacle
configurations of high aspect ratio
F AutoReaGas pressure histories for the various situations
simulated with the Chemical Plant case
G AutoReaGas pressure histories for the various situations
simulated with the LNG Terminal case
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3 1 Introduction
The follow-up GAMES project: ‘Guidance for the Application of the Multi-Energy
Method, Second phase’ was initiated to investigate the applicability of the derived
guidance to realistic cases.
First, the background and objectives of the project are presented in Chapter 2.
While applying the correlations to determine the source overpressure to be used in
the Multi-Energy Method, values for the parameters of the correlation have to be
chosen. This introduces a number of specific questions. Considerations with res-
pect to the quantification of the parameters is the subject of Chapter 3. Also, a
number of white spots are identified. Initial thoughts on approaches to deal with
these deficiencies are presented in the same chapter.
No realistic cases are available for which accurate enough data on overpressure
occurring in a vapour cloud explosion exist. In order to be able to evaluate and to
compare the results of the application of the correlations to realistic cases, a refe-
rence was requested. This reference was obtained by applying a numerical code to
generate data on overpressures. Chapter 4 briefly describes how that reference set
of data was obtained.
The correlations were applied to four realistic cases. The exercises that were per-
formed for each case are described in the successive chapters, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
In two of the cases, the Chemical Plant case in Chapter 5 and the LNG Terminal in
Chapter 6, a number of exercises were performed on interesting subsets of the
obstacle configuration.
Chapter 7 deals with a large-scale experiment on a realistic obstacle configuration
typical of a gas-processing site for which some data is available. Chapter 8 deals
with a specific part of the LNG Terminal case, but filled with a flammable hydro-
gen mixture in order to investigate the influence of reactivity.
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Each of the Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 contains a final paragraph on the evaluation and
conclusions for that specific case.
Chapter 9 contains an overall evaluation of the exercises performed and provides
guidance to determine values for the parameters of the correlations. Also the identi-
fied white spots are discussed and guidance to deal with these white spots is pre-
sented and discussed.
Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the conclusions. Recommendations are given to
generate specific experimental data in order to be able to develop models to take
into account the influence of the aspect ratio of the obstacle configuration and of
the separation distance between obstacle configurations.
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In order to apply the blast charts of MEM, one requires values for two parameters
characterising the source, namely the overpressure P0 and the total combustion
energy E which contributes to the explosion.
Figure 1 shows the blast chart of the MEM. In order to determine the peak blast
overpressure Ps at a distance r from the centre of the explosion, a scaled distance r’
has to be calculated according to:
r
r′ = (1)
(E )1 / 3
p0
The blast chart provides a value for the scaled blast overpressure Ps’. The blast
overpressure Ps is obtained by multiplying Ps’ by p0.
The overpressure in the explosion P0, the pressure for scaled distance values smal-
ler than r0’, determines which line to follow to choose the correct overpressure at
the required scaled distance.
4.1.1 Overpressure
Two correlations were derived in the GAME project to determine a value for the
overpressure in a vapour cloud explosion. The overpressure is correlated to a set of
parameters characterising the environment in which the vapour cloud is located and
the vapour cloud itself. The difference between the two correlations is due to the
type of confinement of the vapour cloud.
For low ignition energy and no confinement (open, 3D), the expression is:
with:
P0 the maximum explosion overpressure (bar)
VBR the volume blockage ratio (-)
Lp length of the flame path (m)
D typical diameter (m)
SL laminar burning velocity of flammable mixture (m/s)
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95374-5.8a
10
10
9
scaled peak 'side on' overpressure Ps'
1 7
0.1 4
0.01 1
0.001
0.1 1 10 100
ro'
combustion energy-scaled distance r'
For low ignition energy and confinement between parallel plates (2D):
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aled that the recommendation of taking 100% of the energy of the obstructed part
of the cloud is conservative for low overpressures. The term ‘efficiency’ was
introduced, defined as the percentage of the energy of the obstructed part of the
cloud which contributes to the generation of blast. It appeared that the efficiency is
lower than 20% for overpressures below 0.5 bar.
The objective of the GAMES project is to apply the correlations to three realistic
cases in order to investigate which problems are encountered while doing so.
The correlations were derived from experiments in which the parameters in the
correlation were well-defined. This is not the case in realistic situations.
The purpose of the GAMES work programme is especially to investigate which
values to choose for the total volume of the obstructed region, Vor (which determi-
nes VBR), and for the diameter D.
The cases were selected based on availability of appropriate information and the
level of detail available on the plant lay-out. The plant lay-out constitutes the so-
called obstacle configuration which is used to determine the Vor and D and which
is used as part of the input of a numerical model to simulate explosions inside the
obstacle configuration.
A numerical model is necessary to create a reference for the results of the correlati-
ons. In general, accidental explosions are not monitored. The overpressure and
blast from an accidental vapour cloud explosion can only be estimated from dama-
ge analysis.
In the selection procedure for the three cases, it was investigated whether the
information of the well-known explosions at DSM in Beek (1975) and in Flix-
borough (1974) could serve as a reference. This was not the case. The information
on the exact plant lay-out was too coarse to be used.
An important practical issue in the selection of the cases was the availability of the
plant lay-out in digital format. Creating such a digital lay-out from scratch would
absorb too much of the available budget.
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During the execution of the project it was decided to put effort into two additional
items that were considered important.
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While applying the correlation in a realistic situation, some basic questions arise. In
trying to find an answer to these questions, other, more detailed, questions come to
one’s mind. The intention is to go through this procedure and try to find answers to
all those questions. Some answers may be obvious or can be derived from current
knowledge; others may need a more practical solution. Some answers may not be
found due to lack of knowledge.
The remainder of this chapter consists of separate sections for some considerations
on each of these questions.
White spot 1: the missing correlations could not be derived due to a lack of suffi-
cient experimental data.
Proposed approach: although there are only two correlations, these are expected
to cover most situations. By applying the available ones to the cases to be conside-
red, an impression may be obtained about the necessity to develop the remaining
four.
In many realistic situations the expansion will be partially 2D or 3D. For instance,
part of the gas cloud will be underneath a roof or floor. An important ratio to
consider then is the ratio of the horizontal dimensions of the cover and the height
underneath. If this ratio approaches unity then the main part of the expansion
process is three-dimensional. Also, the shape of the flame will be spherical rather
than cylindrical during most of the explosion process.
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Proposed approach: An exact value for the height over length ratio in order to
have a criterion to separate the application of the two correlations cannot be given.
One might expect though that the ratio should be between 5 and 10.
A formal procedure for the determination of the volume of the obstructed region is
given in the third edition of the ‘Yellow Book’ (CPR 14E,1997). The completely
revised Yellow Book now contains the MEM for determination of blast from
vapour cloud explosion.
White spot 3: the criteria given in the Yellow Book to decide whether an obstacle
belongs to an obstructed region cannot be motivated objectively.
Proposed approach: in most situations however it will be more or less obvious
and the rough boundaries of an obstructed region can be estimated.
It is explicitly stated in the Yellow Book that the criteria to decide whether or not a
specific obstacle belongs to the obstructed region are questionable and further
research is required to better define them. Also, the Yellow Book procedure does
not distinguish multiple explosion sources. If the procedure results in multiple
obstructed regions, one has to add all the volumes together to get one large explo-
sion source.
White spot 4: the separation into multiple explosion sources, often referred to as
the donor-acceptor problem, cannot be solved yet.
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Proposed approach: the new Yellow Book offers a procedure to reduce the com-
bustion energy in situations where one expects multiple explosion sources. More
consideration on separation distances is given in Annex D. A first attempt to quan-
tify a separation distance is given. A separation distance between two obstructed
regions should be at least half the linear dimension of the donor-obstructed region
to consider the donor and acceptor obstructed region as separate potential blast
sources.
The procedure to determine the volume of the obstructed region starts with the
definition of a box containing all obstacles in the obstructed region. The volume of
that box is the initial volume of the obstructed region. As this box probably con-
tains a lot of free space without obstacles, the volume can be reduced by excluding
this free space. The initial box is then replaced by a number of adjacent boxes, the
total volume of which is smaller than the initial box. This optimisation can be
repeated until all free space is eliminated; however, the time involved for the
optimisation may not be worthwhile.
If, for instance, Vor,2 equals 0.86Vor,1, the overpressure P0,2 is 50% higher than
P0,1. An increase of 10% in overpressure is obtained when the volume of the
obstructed region is reduced by 3%.
The accuracy of the correlation is about ±30%. With this value in mind, it is not
profitable to take the next step in the reduction of Vor if it cannot be reduced more
than 10%.
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The volume of the obstructed region influences the value of the energy E to be
used in MEM. This influence is of less importance than its influence on VBR. A
variation of ∆E implies an influence of ∆E1/3 on the distance at which a certain
blast overpressure will occur.
The determination of D in a realistic case is not obvious. Various definitions for the
average obstacle size are possible.
Darm =
∑ Li ⋅ Di (5)
∑ Li
Harmonic mean weighted by the tube length Li . Relative to the arithmetic mean,
the harmonic mean overweighs the smaller diameters.
1
1
∑ Li ⋅ D
= i
(6)
Dham ∑ Li
• Many other formulations are imaginable, for instance a mean on the basis of the
concept of hydraulic diameter, which is defined as 4 times the ratio between the
summed volumes and the summed surface areas of an object distribution.
Dhym = 4
∑Vi (7)
∑ Ai
This definition overweighs the larger objects in the collection.
The expressions to determine D give a single average value for the whole obstruc-
ted region under consideration, assuming a homogeneous distribution of obstacle
types and obstacle diameters. In many cases the obstructed region will consist of a
number of subregions, each with a typical obstacle distribution. In those cases it
may be more appropriate to calculate D (and VBR) for each subregion and combi-
ne these to a single value for the whole obstructed region.
An attempt to describe the framework of such a procedure was given by Eggen in
the GAME project (Eggen, 1995).
An issue not discussed yet is how to model non-cylindrical obstacles. The experi-
ments underlying the correlations were all with cylindrical obstacles. Non-
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cylindrical obstacles will produce another turbulence field than that of cylindrical
obstacles. It is yet not clear to what extent the shape of an obstacle will influence
the explosion progress.
The ignition location in the experiments used to derive the correlations was always
in the centre of the symmetrical obstacle configuration. A value for Lp is then easy
to determine. In other situations, this may not be the case. Three situations were
identified:
• an obstacle configuration with an aspect ratio other than 1;
• an ignition location outside the centre of the obstacle configuration;
• an obstacle configuration partially filled with a flammable mixture.
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path. Flame acceleration may still occur later in the process when the flame front is
inside the obstacle configuration where back venting has less influence.
In the case of an extended obstructed region, the expanded unburned gas will burn
inside the obstructed region instead of being expelled outside. The result is that the
efficiency will increase, but as the length of the flame path is longer, the overpres-
sure will be greater too.
White spot 7: influence of obstructed region being larger than the vapour cloud.
Proposed approach: due to the lack of any experimental back-up, any influence is
neglected.
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6 4 AutoReaGas calculations
In order to create a reference with which the results of the application of the corre-
lations can be compared, numerical simulations have to be performed for three of
the four cases. The code AutoReaGas is used as the numerical simulator (van den
Berg et al., 1995). Actually the code AutoReaGas consists of two numerical sol-
vers. The solver REAGAS is for modelling the combustion, expansion and turbu-
lence phenomena inside the exploding vapour cloud. The solver BLAST is for
modelling the propagation of the blast wave outside the combustion zone and the
interaction of the blast wave with structures.
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As long as objects with large cross-flow dimensions are considered, the interaction
of gas explosion blast is predominantly governed by the pressure wave character of
a blast wave and the drag component can be neglected. The pressure wave charac-
ter of blast flow fields is accurately represented by inviscid flow. Often, blast flow
fields are characterised by the presence of gas dynamic discontinuities such as
shocks. Modelling of blast-object interaction requires careful description of such
phenomena. Therefore, the blast simulator models blast-object interaction as fol-
lows.
• The gas dynamics is modelled as inviscid compressible flow of a perfect gase-
ous fluid which can be formulated as the conservation equations for mass, mo-
mentum and energy for inviscid flow, i.e. the Euler equations.
• Description of shock phenomena requires a sophisticated numerical technique
tailored to proper representation of steep gradients. To this end, the blast simu-
lator utilises Flux-Corrected Transport (FCT). FCT makes an optimised use of
numerical diffusion so that steep gradients present in shocks are retained. Nu-
merical diffusion is added only where it is required for numerical stability.
W have chosen to use a single calibration of the code for all simulations.
Large-scale validation has been performed recently in the Joint Industry Project
(Selby and Burgan, 1998). We applied the calibration factor for the combustion
model Ct = 65 in combination with a cell size of about 1 m and got acceptable
results for all tests in JIP. The same combination has been applied for all GAMES
simulations with AutoReaGas.
In all cases, we let the code automatically decide whether an obstacle has to be
modelled as a ‘solid’ or as a ‘subgrid’.
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The digital file containing the chemical plant to be assessed in GAMES, describes
a volume of width 32 m (x-direction), length 57 m (y-direction) and height 39 m
(z-direction).
Various parts can be distinguished:
1 a two storey concrete structure consisting of columns and floors containing
lots of equipment, vessels and pipelines, of various dimensions and orientated
in all three perpendicular directions (x: 8.5-25 m, y: 18.5-48.5 m, z: 0-15 m,
volume: 7425 m3); a stack is located on top of this structure with the outlet at
z: 33 m;
2 a large three storey pipebridge with numerous pipes running in the y-direction
(x: 0.5-8.5 m, y: 0-57 m, z: 0-7.5 m, volume: 3420 m3);
3 a small two story pipebridge with pipes orientated in the x-direction (x: 8.5-
32.5 m, y: 16.5-18.5 m, z: 0-5 m, volume: 240 m3);
4 a single floor concrete support structure (columns and floor) containing some
vessels (x: 8.5-18 m, y: 9-16.5 m, z: 0-12 m, volume: 855 m3);
5 two stacks with supply equipment; the equipment is bounded by x: 8.5-
12.5 m, y: 2-9 m and z: 0-7.5 m, volume: 210 m3, the outlet of the stacks is at
z = 39 m.
6 a single floor concrete structure containing some vessels (x: 8.5-17 m, y: 48.5-
56.5 m, z: 0-12 m, volume: 816 m3).
The numbers given correspond with the numbers in Figure 2. Other numbers in
Figure 2 denote ignition locations (IL-i) and pressure sampling locations (P-i) to be
used elsewhere in this chapter.
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95374-2b
P10
P13
6
iL-3 iL-9
P3 P6
1A 1B
2 P9
P2 P5
iL-1 iL-2
iL-8
iL-6 iL-5
P1 P4
P8
3
P14
P12
4
5
P11
P7
iL-7
Figure 2.b: View of the Chemical Plant case: horizontal projection on xy-plane.
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95374-2c
Figure 2.c: View of the Chemical Plant case: vertical projection on xz-plane.
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95374-2d
Figure 2.d: View of the Chemical Plant case: vertical projection on xy-plane.
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As this case is the first case to be considered in GAMES, it should be reduced and
simplified.
It was decided to isolate the two storey concrete structure from the rest of the
installation and to consider it a separate case for a first assessment in the GAMES
exercise because:
• the borders of the obstructed region can be rather well defined;
• it consists of a variety of different sized, shaped and orientated obstacles;
• confinement between two surfaces.
The third value is of importance as one of the two correlations derived in GAME is
applicable to the two-dimensional expansion.
The first floor of the obstructed region is only partially covered by the floor of the
second storey.
To simplify the problem more, we will assume that the obstructed region is filled
with a homogeneous stoichiometric mixture of methane in air. The cloud has a
height of 7.5 m, so the ground level is completely filled with the cloud.
The first floor is supported by a large number of stiffeners, which do not have a
physical thickness in the submitted database. This large number of stiffeners will
largely determine the determination of D. For reasons of simplification, these
stiffeners are neglected and the floor is considered smooth in this case.
There are also floors present inside the configuration. These floors are supported
by stiffeners also, which are taken into account in this case. They are given a
thickness of 0.01 m.
The simplified case, obstructed subregion number 1 (OSR-1), now consists of the
volume between:
x: 8.5 - 25 m, width 16.5 m;
y: 18.5 - 48.5 m, length 30 m;
z: 0 - 7.5 m, height 7.5 m.
The volume is filled with a variety of obstacles, and is confined between two
surfaces: the ground floor and the first floor.
We will now try to come up with a value for the explosion overpressure in the case
of ignition of the flammable mixture using the correlations and keeping the consi-
derations of Chapter 2 in mind to answer:
• which correlation do I have to apply?
• which value for VBR do I have to take, or better, which value for Vor?
• which value for D do I have to take?
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7.3.1 Correlation?
At first glance, the explosion process will be governed by a 2D expansion. Howe-
ver, the length to height ratio equals 30/7.5= 4 or 16.5/7.5 = 2.2. This implies that a
large part of the process is 3D.
At this stage it is not clear which correlation to choose. The AutoReaGas calculati-
on of the case should provide more insight.
7.3.2 VBR?
At this stage we will not go into detail to accurately determine the volume of the
obstructed region. It will be obvious that a good estimate for the volume of the
obstructed region is the product of its dimensions:
• Vor = 16.5 x 30 x 7.5 = 3712.5 m3.
The obstructed volume contains 760 objects, consisting of 618 cylinders and 142
boxes.
The VBR is calculated to be:
• VBR = 0.10.
7.3.3 D?
The objects in the obstructed region contain cylinders and boxes. To calculate a
diameter according to equations 6 and 7, the ‘diameter’ of a box should be calcu-
lated. For that, we calculated the diameter of a circle having the same surface area
as the surface of the box perpendicular to its longest dimension.
Applying equations 5, 6 and 7 resulted in:
• Darm = 0.23 m;
• Dham = 0.08 m;
• Dhym = 0.49 m.
7.3.4 Lp?
There are a number of possibilities for Lp.
The correlations are derived for central ignition. The longest path the flame can
travel for central ignition is Lp,1 = 15 m. Assuming symmetric shape, the flame
reaches the boundary of the obstructed region already after Lp,2 = 8.25 m because
of the length over width ratio is not equal to unity. It may be expected that using
Lp,1 will result in a too large overpressure, as venting has already started before the
flame reaches the short edge. Using Lp,2 will result in a too low value for the
overpressure, as combustion inside the obstructed region is not completed at the
moment the flame reaches the long edge.
Ignition may also occur elsewhere. The longest path for the flame is Lp,3 = 30 m
when ignition occurs in the centre of one of the edges of the obstructed region. As
explained in Chapter 2, using the correlations for edge ignition will result in too
high overpressures, as venting will start immediately after ignition.
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7.3.5 SL?
The choice of this parameter in the present exercise is straightforward. The corre-
lations were derived with SL = 0.45 m/s for methane, so
SL = 0.45 m/s
7.3.6 Overpressure?
Combinations of possible values for the parameters involved result in Table 1.
Table 1: Combination of parameters considered.
P0 (kPa)
2D 3D
Lp 8.25 m 15 m 30 m 8.25 m 15 m 30 m
7.3.7 AutoReaGas
Numerical simulations were performed with the CFD code AutoReaGas (ARG)
using the obstacle configuration defined in this section. Various ignition locations
were used:
Case: Ignition location: x(m): y(m): z(m):
NH01 IL1 8.5 33.5 4 centre of large edge
NH02 IL2 25 33.5 4 centre of large edge
NH03 IL3 8.5 48.5 4 corner
NH12 IL8 16.5 33.5 4 centre
NH13 IL9 16.5 48.5 4 centre of small edge
The pressure was sampled in six locations, P1 -P6, equally distributed over the
obstructed region. The pressure histories are presented in Annex F. An overview of
the maximum overpressures in these locations is given in Table 2; the highest value
per case is printed in bold.
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P1 (13, 22, 4) 18 36 13 47 55
P2 (13, 36, 4) 24 34 11 41 23
P3 (13, 47, 4) 26 59 5 65 9
P4 (22, 22, 4) 36 21 14 51 51
P5 (22, 36, 4) 40 19 22 42 34
P6 (22, 47, 4) 37 35 8 73 10
average 30 34 12 53 30
7.3.8 Evaluation
The first question which arises when comparing the numerical results with the
correlation overpressure is how to perform the comparison. The correlation gives a
single value, while numerical simulation will obviously result in a distribution of
maximum overpressures.
The correlation was derived based on an average of maximum overpressures meas-
ured during the experiments. One may wonder how to average, as a localised high
overpressure peak may contribute less to the blast than the lower overpressure in a
larger subvolume of the obstructed region. A definite answer cannot be given yet.
Therefore, the correlation results will be compared with an average value of the
maximum overpressures per case (last row of Table 2).
P0 (kPa)
2D 3D
Lp 8.25 m 15 m 30 m 8.25 m 15 m 30 m
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In comparison with the correlation results, the only reasonable results are predicted
with the largest average diameter: Dhym. The maximum average AutoReaGas value
(53 kPa) is in between the 3D correlation result for Lp = 8.25 and 15 m.
As could be expected based on the considerations in section 2.1, the best result is
obtained with the 3D correlation, and this correlation gives too low a value for the
smaller Lp and too large a value for the larger Lp.
An optimal value for central ignition may be expected for an averaged Lp. An
average value may be obtained by assuming the flammable cloud to be a hemisphe-
re with radius Lp and having the same value. In that case, Lp = 12.1 m. The corre-
lation (1) provides now P0 = 71 kPa using Dhym (P0 = 330 kPa for Darm, P0 = 2910
kPa for Dham).
While the AutoReaGas calculation would result in a class 6 for the MEM, the 3D
correlation with a conservative estimate for Lp would result in a class 7.5, and an
average value for Lp would result in a class 6.5.
Another typical part of the Chemical Plant case is the large pipebridge that runs
along the whole length of the total obstructed region.
We will consider the pipebridge a separate and isolated case, as this type of ob-
structed region is present in many industrial situations.
7.4.1 Correlation?
Neither of the two available correlations seems suitable to cover this case. The 2D
correlation is not applicable as there are no two confining surfaces. The density of
the layers of pipes might give the impression of a confining surface, they also may
act as turbulence generators. Although 3D expansion is possible, the obstacle
configuration as well as the aspect ratio of the obstructed region differs considera-
bly from those that were used to derive the 3D correlation. Nevertheless, taking the
3D correlation seems to be the best bad choice.
7.4.2 VBR?
The boundaries of the obstructed region are quite clear. An optimisation procedure
according to Annex A will therefore not be performed.
The boundaries are x:0.5-8.5 m, y: 0-57 m, z: 0-8 m. The volume Vor equals
3648 m3 resulting in a volume blockage ratio:
VBR = 0.14
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7.4.3 D?
The obstructed region contains 505 objects, consisting of 30 cylinders and 475
boxes.
We calculated that:
• Darm = 0.50 m;
• Dham = 0.41 m;
• Dhym = 0.53 m.
7.4.4 Lp?
We will consider the following values for the length of the flame path:
• Lp = 28.5 m central ignition, half the length;
• Lp = 4 m central ignition, half the width or height;
• Lp = 12 m central ignition, radius of hemisphere with equal volume;
• Lp = 8 m ignition in centre long edge, width;
• Lp = 57 m ignition in centre short edge, length.
7.4.5 SL?
Again we will take SL = 0.45 m/s.
7.4.6 Overpressure?
Combinations of possible values for the parameters involved result in the following
table (Table 4).
Table 4: Overpressures for various parameter combinations.
P0 (kPa)
Central ignition Long edge Short edge
ignition ignition
Lp 28.5 m 4m 12 m 8m 57 m
7.4.7 AutoReaGas
Numerical simulations were performed with the obstacle configuration defined in
this section. Three different ignition locations were used:
Case: Ignition location: x(m): y(m): z(m):
NH04 IL5 4.5 28.5 4 centre of obstructed
region;
NH05 IL6 0.5 28.5 4 centre of long edge;
NH06 IL7 4.5 0 4 centre of short edge.
Pressure were sampled in four locations, P7 -P10, equally distributed over the
obstructed region. Pressure histories are presented in Annex F. An overview of the
maximum overpressures in these locations is given in Table 5; the highest value
per case is printed in bold.
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P7 (4, 1, 4) 27 13 9
P8 (4, 20, 4) 62 33 9
P9 (4, 40, 4) 50 28 5
P10 (4, 55, 4) 26 13 5
The same trend is visible as in the obstructed region considered in the previous
section.
The table shows the highest pressures for central ignition.
Ignition in the centre of an edge results in lower overpressures. In spite of the
longer flame path compared to central ignition, the immediate back-venting after
ignition prevents flame acceleration into the obstructed region.
The side-, back- and top-venting apparently have a great influence. Maximum
overpressures do not occur in locations farthest away from the ignition location but
in a region around the ignition location. Initially, the flame accelerates, but because
of the large aspect ratio, the expansion is easily vented, resulting in a deceleration
of the flame in the later stage.
7.4.8 Evaluation
Table 6 gives values for the average maximum overpressures.
Table 6: Averaged maximum overpressures according to ARG simulations.
Average P0 (bar) 41 22 7
Comparing these values with the predictions according to the correlation shows
that none of the predictions are acceptable.
The aspect ratio of the obstructed region is too large to obtain a reasonable answer
by using an average Lp and central ignition. The aspect ratio here is more than 7.
The approach adopted for aspect ratios other than one does not give an acceptable
answer here. The correlation gives 9 to 15 kPa for an Lp of 4 m. This is lower than
30 kPa, so the overpressure is not expected to increase. The overpressure according
to ARG reaches an average value of 41 kPa instead, more than a factor three hig-
her.
It is not possible to conclude on the diameter to apply. The variation of the various
average diameters is too small.
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The two obstructed regions considered in the two previous paragraphs form toge-
ther a large part of the total case. It is therefore interesting to investigate the com-
bination of the two before considering the case as a whole.
The volume of the combination of the two obstructed subregions (OSR-1/2) equals:
Vob = 7364 m3. The volume contains 1265 objects, consisting of 648 cylinders and
617 boxes. It can be calculated that:
• VBR = 0.12;
• Darm = 0.37 m;
• Dham = 0.14 m;
• Dhym = 0.51 m.
Table 7: Lp values considered per ignition location.
IL-1
4 distance to top of cloud
8 width of OSR-2
16.5 width of OSR-1
33.5 maximum distance to short edge of OSR-2
IL-2
4 distance to top of cloud
24.5 width of OSR-1/2
41.5 distance to corner (0.5,0,4) of OSR-1/2
IL-5
4 distance to top of cloud
4 distance to long edge of OSR-2
20.5 distance to long edge of OSR-1
28.5 distance to short edge of OSR-2
IL-7
4 distance to top of cloud
4 half width of OSR-2
57 length of OSR-2
IL-8
4 distance to top of cloud
8.5 distance to long edge of OSR-1
16 distance to long edge of OSR-2
37 distance to corner (0.5,0,4) of OSR-1/2
Five ignition locations are considered; all coincide with an ignition location used in
the previous assessments. A number of Lp values can be chosen.
With SL = 0.45 m/s and the value defined above, the 3D correlation results in a set
of overpressures which are collected in Table 8.
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P0 (kPa)
Ignition location Lp (m) Darm = Dham = Dhym= AutoReaGas
0.37 m 0.14 m 0.51 m average
IL-1 137
4 10 72 5
8 67 490 34
16.5 500 358 253
33.5 3420 25100 1770
IL-2 142
4 10 72 5
24.5 1450 10620 350
41.5 6170 45200 3200
IL-5 109
4 10 72 5
4 10 72 5
20.5 890 6510 460
28.5 2200 16100 1140
IL-7 17
4 10 72 5
4 10 72 5
57 14780 108300 7650
IL-8 167
4 10 72 5
8.5 79 578 41
16 449 3290 232
37 4500 33000 2330
AutoReaGas simulations were performed for the various ignition locations. Pressu-
res were sampled at the same locations used in the simulations of OSR-1 and OSR-
2. Pressure histories are presented in Annex F. Results are presented in Table 9.
The last row of the table shows average maximum overpressures.
The average overpressure is highest in the case of central ignition (IL-8). The
difference in average overpressure for the edge ignition locations is striking. Back-
and side-venting for IL-7 appears to have a strong influence on flame development.
The flame is still so slow when it enters OSR-1 that it cannot accelerate to produce
high overpressures inside OSR-1.
The influence of venting in the case of IL-2 is less pronounced. The flame is able
to accelerate inside OSR-1, producing pressures above 0.5 bar and accelerates even
more inside OSR-2 where the highest overpressures are reached at the edge. The
flame speed inside OSR-2 is high enough to reduce the influence of side-venting.
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P1 (13, 22, 4) 97 74 63 7 99
P2 (13, 36, 4) 114 77 81 16 99
P3 (13, 47, 4) 166 90 166 30 115
P4 (22, 22, 4) 153 42 103 17 84
P5 (22, 36, 4) 143 36 158 34 75
P6 (22, 47, 4) 178 60 187 19 112
P7 (4, 1, 4) 174 394 70 8 380
P8 (4, 20, 4) 127 154 65 8 238
P9 (4, 40, 4) 61 106 70 11 107
P10 (4, 50, 4) 158 387 125 19 359
Average 137 142 109 17 167
The average overpressure according to ARG does not depend much on the ignition
location. Overpressures are in between 1 and 1.7 bar, except for corner ignition,
where they are much lower.
The results of the correlation are confusing. The dependence on Lp and D is strong.
The best result seems to be a small Lp (for top-venting) in combination with
Dham = 0.14 m, the smallest diameter. This result is, however, in contradiction to
the adopted approach for the aspect ratio.
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y (m) 95374-3
2 H = 7.5m V = 3420m3
8.5
5
x (m)
H=6m 4 6
12.5 V = 168m3 H = 12m
H = 12m 1a H = 15m V = 3825m3 V = 816m3
V = 1083m3
17
18
3
H = 5m V = 145m3
1b H = 10m V = 2400m3
25
32.5
Following step 6 of the procedure in Annex A and the example in Annex C one
arrives at the shape of the obstructed region as given in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows
the contours of a number of boxes with different heights. The height and volume of
each box is given in the figure. The total volume of the obstructed region is:
Vor = 11857 m3
A more accurate determination of Vor does not seem worthwhile. A further reduc-
tion of 10%, about 1200 m3, cannot be found.
The formal procedure of the Yellow Book leads to almost the same intuitive subdi-
vision into typical obstructed regions as given in 2.2. The total volume of this
intuitive subdivision is Vor = 12966 m3.
According to equation (4), the Yellow Book obstructed volume results in a 28%
higher overpressure using the correlation than the intuitive obstructed region.
The procedure of the Yellow Book does not account for typical obstacle configura-
tions within each box defined in the obstructed region. Therefore, the intuitive
subdivision is preferred.
The intuitive subdivision can be improved by subdividing subregion 1 (see Figu-
re 2) into two parts, because one part consists of two storeys while the other is a
single storey support structure:
1a width 8.5 m (x: 8.5 -17 m), length 30 m (y: 18.5 - 48.5 m) and height 15 m,
volume 3825 m3;
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The VBR and D can now be calculated for each obstructed subregion and for the
obstructed region as a whole (Table 10).
Table 10: Parameters for various obstructed subregions.
Obstructed x (m) y (m) z (m) VBR Darm (m) Dham(m) Dhym (m)
subregion
We are considering a problem where the obstructed region is filled with a homoge-
neous and stoichiometric mixture of methane/air up to a height of 7.5 m.
Here, the obstructed region is larger than the flammable cloud. The problem here is
which obstacle parameters to use. This problem was identified as a white spot
(section 2.4). We choose to work with the obstacle parameters of that part of the
obstructed region filled with the cloud. Table 11 contains the obstacle parameters
for the obstructed subregions limited to a height of 7.5 m.
The total volume of the obstructed part filled with the cloud is: Vor = 8627 m3. The
radius of a hemisphere with equal volume is 16 m.
Table 11: Parameters for various obstructed subregions with height limited to height of
cloud.
Obstructed x (m) y (m) z (m) VBR Darm (m) Dham (m) Dhym (m)
subregion
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3.5 7 63 4
8.5 98 721 44
16.5 609 4460 270
33.5 4260 31300 1890
16 595 4100 248
Pmax (kPa)
Case NH01 NH02 NH03 NH12 NH13 NH04 NH05 NH06 NH07 NH010 NH08 NH09 NH14 NH11
OSR 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 all
Ignition: IL-1 IL-2 IL-3 IL-8 IL-9 IL-5 IL-6 IL-7 IL-1 IL-2 IL-5 IL-7 IL-8 IL-1
Sample location
P1 18 36 13 47 55 97 74 63 7 99 109
P2 24 34 11 41 23 114 77 81 16 99 123
P3 26 59 5 65 9 166 90 166 30 115 176
P4 36 21 14 51 51 153 42 103 17 84 158
P5 40 19 22 42 34 143 36 158 34 75 144
P6 37 35 8 73 10 178 60 187 19 112 186
P7 27 13 9 174 394 70 8 380 374
P8 62 33 9 127 154 65 8 238 128
P9 50 28 5 61 106 70 11 107 61
P10 26 13 5 158 387 125 19 359 196
P11 239
P12 215
P13 163
P14 270
Average 30.2 34.0 12.0 53.1 30.3 41.3 21.8 7.0 137 142 109 17 167 182
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Table 13 shows the details of the ARG simulation in comparison with the other
cases, the results of which are given in previous tables. The highest overpressures
in NH11 occurred in the corners of the obstructed region. The extension of OSR-
1/2 with OSR 3, 4 and 5 appears to promote flame acceleration in the large pipe-
bridge (OSR-2).
The numerical simulations for the Chemical Plant case and also for the cases to be
presented in the following chapters, were performed using an obstacle database.
Such an obstacle database can never exactly match the obstacle configuration as
built in reality. There will also be details which are not described in the database.
As obstacles play an important role in the gas explosion mechanism, the level of
detail with which the obstacles are described may influence the numerical result.
This result is in contradiction to the common opinion that adding more small
objects will result in an increase in overpressure. On the other hand, this common
opinion is not fully supported by the physical modelling. The consequence of
leaving out small objects is a reduction of the fluid dynamic drag. This means a
reduction of the fluid dynamic drag leading to a reduction of the turbulence source
term At the same time, a reduction in drag means an increase in the expansion
velocity and, in this way, an increase in the turbulence source term. Thus, there are
competing effects, the balance of which is case dependant.
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Table 14 shows how the omission of small obstacles influence the parameters in
the correlation.
The reduction in overpressures according to the correlation follow the same trend
as the results of the numerical simulations. There is hardly an effect until obstacles
with a diameter smaller than 0.4 m are removed. Until that point the removal of
obstacles did not result in a significant reduction of the total obstacle volume.
Table 14: Influence of obstacle removal.
400
P1
P3
P5
P7
300 P9
P11
P13
P15
P17
Overpressure (kPa)
P18
200
100
0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Removed objects with sizes less than (m)
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7.8.1 General
The Chemical Plant obstacle configuration as a whole can be subdivided into a
number of specific obstructed subregions.
The application of the correlations to the subregions and combination of subregions
showed that a very large band of predictions for the overpressure is obtained for a
specific situation by substituting possible values for all parameters in the correlati-
on. On the one hand, this is due to the various ways in determining an average
diameter; on the other hand, the configuration in combination with the ignition
location differs very substantially from the configurations used to derive the corre-
lation. The correlation is not capable of including the influence of the aspect ratio
and of an ignition location at the edge of the configuration.
The correlation results when using the hydraulic diameter appear to be of the same
order as the numerical results.
Except for the subregion containing the pipebridge, the influence of the ignition
location according to the AutoReaGas calculations is not very strong. Edge ignition
resulted always in lower overpressures than ignition inside the configuration. This
observation may not be valid in other cases where the flame may be accelerated
due to a higher level of obstruction in combination with the longer flame path.
An acceptable result was obtained when the correlation was used with the average
hydraulic obstacle diameter Dhym in combination with an average value for the
flame path length Lp. The average flame path length is equal to the radius of a
hemisphere with a volume equal to the volume of the obstructed region under
consideration.
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6 Lp in the case of aspect ratios other than unity and ignition location outside
centre of configuration
For aspect ratios differing from unity and central ignition, the value for Lp
may vary between half the height, width or length of the obstructed region.
The additionally provided guidance stated that the overpressure will not incre-
ase anymore after the moment the flame propagated the shortest Lp if the
overpressure is less than a specific value at that moment. The specific value
was arbitrarily chosen to be 30 kPa.
Application of this guidance in this case does not result in much confidence.
The flat cloud in combination with the z-co-ordinate of the ignition location
results in a smallest Lp of 4 m. Overpressures for Lp = 4 m were always very
low, while the final overpressures were much higher.
For edge ignitions, the flame path length will always be longer than in the case
of central ignition. Therefore the correlation will provide higher overpressures
in the first situation, while in reality, lower values will be obtained in the ma-
jority of the situations, due to the influence of (back- and side-)venting. At the
present, it is not possible to define when the pressure increasing effect due to a
combination of a long flame path and a high volume blockage ratio is larger
than the pressure reducing effect of back- and side-venting.
In the case of the Chemical Plant, edge ignition resulted in a lower overpressu-
re than central ignition, so the correlation can be applied safely when used
with the Lp for central ignition.
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The digital file containing the LNG Terminal case to be assessed in GAMES
covers a volume of length: 175 m (x-direction), width: 57 m (y-direction) and
height: 15.5 m (z-direction).
Figures 5.a, 5.b, 5.c and 5.d show an overview and various cross-sections.
The case mainly consists of a number of pipebridges running parallel to the x- and
y-axes. The largest obstructed region can be found between the co-ordinates x: 25 -
85 m and y: 20 - 45 m. Two minor obstructed regions are located at approximately
x: 1 - 10 m, y: 30 - 38 m and at x: 153 - 167 m, y: 30 - 45 m. There is an isolated
obstructed region consisting of some large vessels surrounded by walls at x: 113 -
132 m, y: 15 - 27 m.
We will adopt the next nomenclature for the various parts (the dimensions given
are not yet the boundaries of the obstructed subregions (OSR) but an indication of
where the part considered is located):
• OSR 1 from x = 28 to 82 m and from y = 21 to 44 m;
• OSR 2 from x = 153 to 167 m and from y = 30 to 45 m;
• OSR 3 from x:= 1 to 10 m and from y = 30 to 38 m;
• OSR 4 from x = 113 to 132 m and from y = 15 to 27 m;
• OSR 5 pipebridge 1, running parallel to the x-axis from x = 15 to 175 m and
width from y = 38 to 44 m;
• OSR 6 pipebridge 2, running parallel to the x-axis from x = 1 to 97 m and
width from y = 6 to 10 m;
• OSR 7 pipebridge 3, running parallel to the y-axis from y = 10 to 47 m and
width from x = 1 to 6 m;
• OSR 8 pipebridge 4, running parallel to the y-axis from y = 1 to 45 m and
width from x = 88 to 95.
The database contains many objects describing the ground surface. The ground
surface appears to be not completely horizontal but its z-co-ordinate varies between
2.5 and 3 m. For reasons of simplicity, the ground surface was chosen to be at
z = 3 m. The ground surface is then represented by a single large plate.
The differences in height of the total obstacle configurations is slight. The height is
mainly determined by the height of the pipebridges which is at z = 7 and 8 m
(height 4 and 5 m). The height of pipebridge 4 is about 8 m.
The height of obstructed region 1 varies from 2 to 5 m for the largest part. There is
a single large vertical cylinder with some pipework with a height of 12 m (see also
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Figure 5.b-d: View of the LNG Terminal case: b: horizontal projection on yx-plane; c: vertical projection on
xz-plane; d: vertical projection on xy-plane.
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95374-6
y
OSR - 5 H = 5m
H = 8m
OSR - 3 H = 5m OSR - 2
H = 10m OSR - 1 H = 5m
OSR-7 H=5m
H = 2m H = 12m OSR - 4
OSR - 8
H = 3m
OSR - 6 H = 4m
x
x
10m
The effect of the pipebridges has to be investigated. The Chemical Plant case
showed that ignition at the short edge resulted in a very low overpressure. It is
therefore interesting to investigate whether an explosion in OSR-1 results in flame
acceleration in OSR-5 to finally produce higher overpressures in OSR-2. It also
may be possible that explosions in OSR-1 and OSR-2 have to be regarded as two
separate explosion sources.
A question is also to what explosion the combination of OSR-1, -7, -6 and -8 will
result. Is such an explosion governed by OSR-1 only or do the other OSRs have a
contribution?
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Contrary to the Chemical Plant case, there is no obstructed subregion present for
which one may consider the correlation for 2 dimensional expansion. The applica-
tion of the correlations will therefore be restricted to equation 2 in combination
with SL = 0.45 m/s.
The step-by-step procedure of the Yellow Book, given in Annex A, will be applied
to determine the boundaries of OSR-1.
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95374-7a
P6
P3
iL-1
iL-3
P5
P2
iL-4
P4
P1
iL-2
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Figure 7.b-c: Details of OSR-1: b: vertical projection on the xz-plane; c: vertical projecti-
on on the yz-plane.
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It will soon be clear while applying the procedure that all obstacles in the
LNG Terminal case belong to a single obstructed region according to the
Yellow Book procedure; even OSR-4.
Step 5
In order to limit the first assessment to OSR-1 and to determine the Vor of
OSR-1, we will assume that a single box containing the obstacles of OSR-1
is located between x = 28 to 82 m, y = 21 to 44 m and z = 3 to 15.5 m. The
dimensions of the box are length 54 m, width 23 m and height 12.5 m.
Step 6
Without conflicting the criteria for the obstructed region, the volume of the
box can be reduced by leaving out free space. Also, the height of the box is
limited to the height of the cloud. A study in detail of the obstacle configu-
ration inside OSR-1 resulted in the shape of Vor visualised in Figure 8.
The single box defined in step 5 is reduced to 4 subboxes:
• subbox 1: x = 28 - 45, y = 21 - 31, z = 3 - 5, volume = 340 m3;
• subbox 2: x = 28 - 63, y = 31 - 35, z = 3 - 8, volume = 700 m3;
• subbox 3: x = 28 - 63, y = 35 - 44, z = 3 - 7, volume = 1540 m3;
• subbox 4: x = 63 - 82, y = 29 - 44, z = 3 - 8, volume = 1425 m3.
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95374-8
44
y (m) H=4
H=5
35
H=5
31
29
H=2 H=0
21
28 45 63 82
x (m)
9.3.3 Determination of Lp
A number of values for Lp are possible depending on the ignition location.
The following ignition locations will be considered:
• IL-1 at (x,y,z) = (55,36,5), central ignition;
• IL-2 at (x,y,z) = (28,36,5), centre of short edge;
• IL-3 at (x,y,z) = (55,31,5), centre of long edge;
• IL-4 at (x,y,z) = (55,44,5), centre of long edge.
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P0 (kPa)
LP (m) Darm = 0.32 m Dham = 0.23 m Dhym = 0.48 m
The overpressures calculated for Lp = 2 and 54 are unrealistically low and high,
respectively.
Maximum overpressures calculated for the various ignition locations and pressure
sampling locations are given in Table 16.
Table 16: Maximum overpressures calculated with ARG.
Po (kPa)
P1 (35, 34, 5) 36 24 7
P2 (55, 34, 5) 21 89 7
P3 (75, 34, 5) 73 82 7
P4 (35, 39, 5) 72 30 9
P5 (55, 39, 5) 22 70 9
P6 (75, 39, 5) 81 96 9
average 51 65 8
Table 16 shows that the overpressure increases at increasing distances from the
ignition location. Despite the fact that IL-2 is located in the centre of the short
edge, the maximum overpressures is higher than in the case of central ignition
(IL-1). Edge ignition in the Chemical Plant case always resulted in a lower over-
pressure than central ignition.
9.3.6 Evaluation
The correlation results for the Lp values according to half the width, the width and
the equivalent radius give results in the same order as the averaged numerical
results. The best results seems to be those when a smallest value for the diameter is
used (Dham).
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This is in contradiction to the results of the Chemical Plant case where the best
results were obtained when the largest value for the diameter was used.
A difference between the Chemical Plant case and the subcase of LNG Terminal
considered here is the lower VBR. The average Lps are comparable because the
Vors are more or less the same. A difference is present in aspect ratio.
The initial boundaries for OSR-2 were taken from x = 153 to 167 m and from
y = 30 to 45 m. Closer examination and application of the procedure in Annex A
resulted in slightly different boundaries. Figure 9 shows the boundaries. As in the
previous section, application of the Yellow Book procedure to determine an ob-
structed region results in the complete LNG Terminal obstacle configuration be-
coming a single obstructed region. It is assumed for the limitation of the boundaries
of OSR-2, the sections through pipebridge 1 at x = 147 m and x = 168 m are boun-
daries.
OSR-2 now consists of three subboxes:
• subbox 1: x= 150 - 168, y = 27 - 36, z = 3 - 6, volume 486 m3;
• subbox 2: x = 147 - 168, y = 36 - 45, z = 3 - 8, volume 945 m3;
• subbox 3: x = 157 - 165, y = 45- 47, z = 3 - 8, volume 80 m3;
with a total volume Vor = 1511 m3.
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95374-9a
2 P18 P19
iL-9 P8
P10
iL-5
1 P7 P9
P20
Figure 9.a: Subdivision of OSR-2 into subboxes: horizontal projection on the xy-plane.
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95374-9b
95374-9c
Figure 9.b-c: Subdivision of OSR-2 into subboxes: b: vertical projection on the xz-plane, c: vertical projection on
the yz plane.
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P0 (kPa)
LP (m) Darm = 0.31 m Dham = 0.21 m Dhym = 0.46 m
2 0.1 0.2 0
10 9 19 4
9 6 14 3
ARG calculations were performed using all obstacles enclosed within the space
bounded by: x = 147 to 168 m, y = 27 to 47 m and z = 3 to 8 m and using IL-5 for
the ignition location.
The maximum overpressures for locations P7, P8, P9 and P10 (see Figure 9a)
were:
• P7: 18 kPa;
• P8: 28 kPa;
• P9: 20 kPa;
• P10: 21 kPa.
The average maximum overpressures equals 22 kPa.
Table 17 shows that variation of the parameters for the correlation within a realistic
range results in a wide range of overpressure predictions. Acceptable results were
obtained when using Dhym together with an average Lp. Here, this combination
results in a too low overpressure (3 kPa).
A reason why this underprediction occurs may be that the procedure to determine
the obstructed region according to the Yellow Book is too conservative, especially
for small obstructed volumes. If the procedure would allow a reduction in Vor of
50%, the overpressure would increase despite the smaller Lp.
Room for volume reduction is available, see Figure 9. A reduction of 50% in Vor
doubles the VBR to 0.08 and reduces the average Lp to 7.1 m. The correlation
predicts the overpressures of Table 18 when using these values.
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P0 (kPa)
LP (m) Darm = 0.31 m Dham = 0.21 m Dhym = 0.46 m
It appears that even with a 50% volume reduction the correlation using Dhym and
Lp,ave results in too low overpressures when compared with the numerical results.
Although the Yellow Book procedure to determine Vor is thought to be conservati-
ve, a reduction of 50% does not seem to be possible.
The conclusion is that the choice of parameters for the correlation which worked
well in the Chemical Plant case is not appropriate in the present case of OSR-2.
Maybe the low value for the VBR of OSR-2 (0.04) is responsible for this.
9.5.1 Introduction
The combination of the obstructed regions 1 and 2 via pipebridge 1 into one large
obstructed region is interesting for the application of the Multi-Energy Method.
When ignited at the short ends, the pipebridge in the Chemical Plant case did not
generate much overpressure. Here in the LNG Terminal case, the number of pipes
and pipe layers is even less than in the Chemical Plant case. It may be expected
therefore that a flame, initiated in either OSR-1 or OSR-2, will decelerate during
propagation through the pipebridge. The result will be two separate explosions; one
in OSR-1 and one in OSR-2.
The ARG pressure histories for the pipebridge (P11 and P12) and for OSR-2 show
two peaks. The first peak appears before the flame arrived at the sampling location
and must therefore be due to a pressure wave. This pressure wave is initiated by the
explosion in OSR-1. The second peak in the pressure histories inside the pipebrid-
ge and OSR-2 is due to the combustion in and near these locations.
The overpressures in OSR-1 are similar to the overpressures calculated previously
considering OSR-1 only with IL-2 (65 kPa). The acceleration of the flame while
propagating through OSR-1 causes a pressure wave which reduces from 60 to
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33 kPa inside the pipebridge to 25 kPa inside OSR-2. Later the flame travels
through the pipebridge and decelerates (overpressure from 70 kPa inside OSR-1 to
14 and 7 kPa closer to OSR-2). Inside OSR-2, the flame accelerates again to an
overpressure of 11 kPa (near the 17 kPa in the case of an isolated OSR-2 with
central ignition IL-5).
Table 19: ARG results for the combination of OSR-1,-2 and -5 with IL-2.
P1 26
P2 94
P3 80
63
P4 31
P5 70
P6 76
P11 60 - 14
P12 33 - 7
P7 26 - 7
P8 26 - 12
25 - 11
P9 21 - 12
P10 25 - 12
Simulations have been performed with ignition locations IL-1, IL-5 and IL-6. The
latter being in the centre of the pipebridge 1 at (x,y,z) = (99,37,5). Some divergen-
ce problems occurred during the simulations in these cases.
The results of the simulation before divergence showed however the same trend as
the one ignited in IL-2: two separate explosions in OSR-1 and OSR-2, with a
pressure wave preceding the combustion pressure wave in the acceptor-obstructed
region. The overpressures being equal to the overpressures in the explosion of the
isolated obstructed subregion.
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The assessment of the combination of obstructed regions 1,2 and 5 resulted in the
conclusion that an explosion due to an ignition location in OSR-1 is not influenced
by an explosion due to an ignition location in OSR-2. The next item to consider is
then the influence of pipebridges 2, 3 and 4 (OSR-6, 7, and 8) and OSR-3 on the
explosion potential of the LNG Terminal case. It may expected that the flame, after
leaving OSR-1 where ignition is assumed, will decelerate in the open space in
between OSR-1 and the surrounding pipebridges. Some acceleration of the flame
when it enters the pipebridges may perhaps be expected.
An intuitive subdivision into subboxes results in Figure 10a. The subboxes contai-
ning OSR-1 according to paragraph 5.3 is extended with subboxes containing the
other OSR-1, assuming dimensions according to paragraph 5.1.
The Yellow Book procedure is a more strict procedure to subdivide this initial box
into subboxes and to reduce the volume Vor.
The result of the first step to reduce the initial box into subboxes using the Yellow
Book procedure is presented in Figure 10.b. According to the procedure, the height
of the initial box can be lowered if the distance between obstacles is greater than
25 m. The height of the space in between these obstacles is then the height of the
obstacle or subregion to which the flame propagates.
A further reduction in the height locally becomes questionable. The procedure is
not very strict about the height of the space in between two volumes containing
obstacles, and various values for the height appear to be possible.
In order to remain conservative, a next step to further reduce Vor will not be taken.
For the volume of the obstructed region according to the Yellow Book procedure:
• Vor = 17985 m3;
• VBR = 0.027;
• Darm = 0.35 m;
• Dham = 0.24 m;
• Dhym = 0.48 m.
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95374-10a-b
A 5
10
5
8
y
5
x
B 5 4
4
4
5
10 5
2 8
y
4 4
x
10m
Although the pipe diameters and VBRs vary considerably for the various subboxes
in both alternative approaches, the average pipe diameters as stated above do not.
This indicates that the only difference between the two approaches concerns empty
space only.
Also possible values for Lp are the same in both approaches, except the average
value based on volume.
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• IL-7 at (x,y,z) = (0,27,5); the centre of the short edge, which results in the
following values for Lp:
• Lp1 = 2 m, average distance to the top of the combined obstructed regions;
• Lp2 = 20.5 m, half the width of the combined obstructed regions;
• Lp3 = 41 m, the width;
• Lp4 = 46 m, half the length;
• Lp5 = 92 m, the length;
• Lp,aveYB = 20.5 m, radius of hemisphere of volume 17985 m3;
• Lp,aveIN = 16.5 m, radius of hemisphere of volume 9482 m3.
P0 (kPa)
VBR = 0.027 VBR = 0.048
Lp (m) Darm= Dham= Dhym= Darm= Dham= Dhym=
0.35 m 0.24 m 0.48 m 0.33 m 0.23 m 0.47 m
20.5 19 39 9 90 189 44
41 125 262 60 607 1273 294
46 171 359 83 834 1747 404
92 1153 2416 558 5608 11756 2716
20.5 19 39 9 - - -
16.5 - - - 50 104 24
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P0 (kPa)
Location IL-3 IL-4 IL-7
P1 32 27 27
P2 7 8 15
P3 71 24 49
P4 29 24 17
P5 11 9 21
P6 52 35 40
P14 13 11 10
Average 31 20 26
P13 5 4 12
P15 7 4 22
P16 5 8 7
Average 5.6 5.3 13.7
Ignition in OSR-1 (IL-3 and IL-4) does not result in significant overpressures
outside OSR-1. Overpressure is generated in the pipebridges only by ignition in
IL-7. Presumably, this overpressure is due to the other direction of flame propaga-
tion, which is parallel to the pipebridge OSR-6 for IL-7 and perpendicular to the
pipebridge OSR-6 for IL-3 and IL-4.
9.6.4 Evaluation
Application of the correlation to an obstructed volume like the combined one
considered here shows that no insight is obtained into the overpressure distribution
inside the obstructed volume itself.
A reasonable result is obtained when using the correlation with Dhym, Lp,ave and
the intuitive Vor. Applying the correlation with the Yellow Book Vor gives a reaso-
nable result in combination with Dham. This implies that the procedure in the
Yellow Book to determine Vor might be too conservative in a sense that too much
empty space is included.
In general, it appears that a smaller average diameter has to be chosen to get an
acceptable overpressure prediction for lower VBRs.
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The objective of the MEM is to predict the blast characteristics outside the vapour
cloud and outside the obstructed region. It is therefore interesting to investigate the
influence the various combinations of the parameters have on the blast characteris-
tics in order to get insight into the required accuracy with which the parameters
have to be applied.
The blast chart of the MEM is given in Figure 1. It shows that for source strengths
higher than 6 (P0 > 50 kPa) the blast overpressures at greater distances (r’>2) are
independent of the source strength.
The source overpressure P0 is uniform within the cloud (r’ < r’0). The blast over-
pressure equal to the source overpressure for r’ is about 2r’0 (at about r’= 0.6),
which is the radius of the fully expanded burnt hemispherical flammable cloud. For
r’ > 2r’0, the blast decays with distance according to acoustic law (a straight line in
a log P - log r’ scale):
For source strengths of class < 6, the blast overpressure decay P(r’) can be ap-
proximated by two straight lines:
P(r’) = P0 for r’< 0.6 (8)
log P(r’) = log P0 - (log r’ - log 0.6) for r’> 0.6 (9)
Changing D does not influence Vor, so the scaled distances do not have to be
changed.
Changing from D1 to D2 will increase the overpressure at a certain distance by a
factor α-2.05, or change the actual distance for a certain P with the same factor.
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For source overpressures larger than 50 kPa, changing D only influences the blast
characteristics at scaled distances smaller than 2, for MEM class 6, and 1 for MEM
class 7.
and
r’2 = β-1/3 r’1 (13)
A reduction in Vor increases the pressure P at a certain distance r due to the increa-
se in P0, but reduces P due to the increase of r’.
and
P2 = β-1.5P1 for P0 < 50 kPa (15)
In order to get a feeling for the variation in blast overpressure induced by the factor
β, the equations (14) and (15) will be applied to two examples.
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According to paragraph 2.2, it is useful to apply the Yellow Book procedure for the
determination of Vor until a further reduction of 10% is not possible.
A 10% reduction equals β = 0.9, which means that the error in the blast peak
overpressure induced by the criterion for stopping the procedure will be 4 to 17%
according to (14) and (15), respectively. These values are acceptable given the
accuracy of the correlations.
The conclusion is that the criteria in the Yellow Book procedure to include or
exclude free space in the obstructed region should be more validated than they are
at present, because a conservative estimate for the obstructed region may result in
an unsafe prediction of the blast overpressures.
Table 22 shows the distances to the centres of the various obstructed regions for
specific blast overpressures
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Distance r (m)
blast: 25 kPa 10 kPa 5 kPa 1 kPa
It is interesting to note that the distances for cases 1, 2 and 3b do not differ much.
For cases 2 and 3, the numerical average overpressure was about 20 kPa. It may be
expected that the blast, when calculated numerically, also will not differ much from
the blast according to the MEM.
The conclusion is that blast is only produced by OSR-1; the pipebridges do not
contribute to the blast in this case.
Although the Yellow Book procedure results in a large volume Vor and conse-
quently a low P0, the blast at some distance is comparable with the blast calculated
using other assumptions.
The conclusion is also that following a strict procedure, like the one in the Yellow
Book, in this particular case with a complicated obstructed region, results in ac-
ceptable blast overpressures at long distances. The high source overpressures in the
specific parts of the obstructed region, which are the actual explosion sources, will
not be identified.
9.8.1 General
The LNG Terminal obstacle configuration consists of a number of large elongated
obstructed regions, the pipebridges, which connect a single large volume with a
congestion of obstacles with a couple of smaller congested volumes. The pipebrid-
ges enclose a considerable volume of space without obstacles.
As in the Chemical Plant case, the correlations were applied first to single obstruc-
ted subregions. A large band of predictions of the overpressures was obtained when
using the correlation depending on the location of the ignition source and the
definition of average obstacle diameter.
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In general, the results from the correlations were lower than the numerical results
when compared to the Chemical Plant case.
The correlation results when using the arithmetic obstacle diameter in combination
with the radius of an equivalent hemisphere for Lp appear to be of the same order
as the numerical results.
The application of the correlation to the combination of OSR-1 and OSR-3 together
with three pipebridges, is problematic. The obstacle distribution inside the ob-
structed region varies considerably. The numerical calculation shows low as well
as high overpressures depending on the location. This makes it difficult to deduce a
single average maximum overpressure. The strict Yellow Book procedure results,
however, in acceptable values for far field blast overpressures.
In the case of OSR-2, it is suspected that too much free space is included in the
obstructed region using the Yellow Book procedure.
If this is indeed the case, then the blast overpressures outside the obstructed region
may be underpredicted. A numerical calculation of the blast may provide the
answer.
In order to determine blast outside the obstacle configuration, only the contributi-
ons from OSR-1 and OSR-2 should be taken into account. The pipebridges and the
free space enclosed do not significantly contribute to blast. The two obstructed
regions should be considered as separate explosion sources.
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6 Lp in the case of an aspect ratio other than unity and ignition location outside
the centre of configuration
The height of the obstructed region (maximally 5 m) is very low compared to
the other dimensions (40 to 100 m). Using the height for Lp in the correlation
will not result in any overpressure. This is not correct, as the numerical results
demonstrate.
Also, the model derived in Annex E to take the aspect ratio into account is in-
correct, as the overpressure increases considerably after the flame has left the
obstructed region through the top.
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The test rig comprises a mixture of pipework, vessels and support structure in a
cuboidally shaped region. The congested region of the test rig had maximum
dimensions of approximately 8.3 m length, 5.3 m width and 3.5 m height.
The digital file containing the Gas Processing case covers a volume of 207.5 m3
enclosed by: x from 5 to 11.3 m, y from 0 to 8.9 m and z from 0 to 3.7 m. Figu-
res 11.a, b, c and d show an overview and various cross-sections.
The obstacle configurations consist of three support structures closely located to
each other. The first layer of obstacles above ground level consists of large cylin-
drical vessels (diameter about 0.8 m) with axes parallel to the x-axis. The higher
layers consist of smaller pipes (about 0.1 to 0.3 m diameter) orientated parallel to
the x- and y-axes. The vertically orientated obstacles consist mainly of the legs of
the bearing structure.
The experiment published was performed with propane as the fuel. The whole
obstacle configuration was covered with a plastic sheet to retain the gaseous mixtu-
re inside the rig. The plastic sheet was not removed prior to ignition.
The concentration of the propane in air was 4.2%.
Ignition occurred in the centre of the rig at (x,y,z) = (8.35, 4.15, 0).
There were 16 pressure transducers mounted inside the obstacle configuration (T1
to T16) and 3 pressure transducers outside the configuration (T17, T18 and T19),
the last 3 being mounted at a height of 1 m above ground level.
Figure 12 shows the location of the pressure transducers.
Figure 13 shows a typical pressure history obtained during the experiment (trans-
ducer T1).
The peak overpressures measured are gathered in Table 23. The average of the
measured peak overpressures inside the obstacle configuration is 24 kPa.
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Figure 11.b: Views of the Gas Processing case: horizontal projection on xy-plane.
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Figure 11.c: Views of the Gas Processing case: vertical projection on xz-plane.
Figure 11.d: Views of the Gas Processing case: vertical projection on xy-plane.
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95374-12
T12 T10,T11
2.4m
T9 4.8m
3.2m
Plan view
(ground level) T7 T6 T2 T3 T4,T5 T17 T18 T19
T8
4.0m
3.2m 2.4m *
T1 2.4m 3.2m 4.0m 8.0m 16.0m 24.0m
T15
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overpressure 24 24 27 36 30 23 23 22 23 36 14 19 21 20 20 25
(kPa)
As experimental results are available, this case offers an opportunity to check the
validity of the AutoReaGas calculations. The calculations were performed for this
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case in exactly the same way as they were calculated for the other cases: using a
cell size of 1 m3 and a Ct factor of 65.
Overpressures inside the obstructed region were calculated in 7 locations. The
maximum values varied from 21.3 to 28.3 kPa. The average of the maximum
values is 24 kPa, which is equal to the average of the maximum overpressure
recordings during the tests. This remarkable result provides confidence in the
AutoReaGas caculations which serve as the basis for the evaluation of the correla-
tions.
Although the obstacle configuration consists of three bearing structures, the free
space in between them is small compared to the overall dimensions of each of the
bearing structures. The obstacle configuration is therefore to be considered a single
obstructed region.
The volume of the obstructed region can be determined easily from Figure 11:
• Vor = 154 m3.
Application of equations 5, 6 and 7 to the obstructed region results in values for the
various diameters:
• Darm = 0.11 m;
• Dham = 0.07 m;
• Dhym = 0.25 m.
Applying the correlation using the set of parameter values defined above results in
a wide variety of overpressures (Table 24).
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P0 (kPa)
Lp (m) Darm = 0.11 m Dham = 0.07 m Dhym = 0.25 m
2.65 87 219 16
3.5 186 470 35
4.15 298 752 52
5.3 583 1275 108
8.3 2004 5062 372
4.2 308 778 57
Blast outside the obstructed region can be calculated using the contributing energy
and a value for the overpressure and applying Figure 1.
Ps (kPa)
Distance to centre (m): 8 16 24
E = 464 MJ 56 37 24
E = 232 MJ 51 29 18
In comparison with the average peak overpressure measured during the test, the
best predictions using the correlations are obtained by using Dhym. Using Darm or
Dham results in high and unrealistic overpressures. The experimental average peak
overpressure of 24 kPa is in between the predictions using Dhym and Lp1 and Lp2.
Using Dhym and Lp,ave results in an overprediction by a factor of 2.5.
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A similar result was obtained for the reduced problem within the Chemical Plant
case in paragraph 5.3. There the overpressure was also in between the values
predicted by using for Lp the two shortest distances to the edges of the obstructed
region where the flame leaves the region. Venting will reduce further pressure
generation inside the obstructed region (venting through the top was not possible in
the Chemical Plant case of paragraph 5.3).
The outer dimensions of obstacle configuration in this case are within the range of
dimensions of the configurations in MERGE used to derive the correlation. The
same counts for the VBR. The difference is that different types, dimensions and
orientations of obstacles are present. Because the obstacle configuration in
MERGE is considered to produce high overpressures it could be expected that the
predictions using the correlation for this case are high compared with the experi-
mental result.
Taking the overpressure corresponding to the average flame path length and Dhym
(57 kPa) results in an MEM class number of about 6.3, while the test gives a class
of about 5.3.
Even when an efficiency factor of 50% is adopted, the blast overpressures are
overpredicted.
It is expected that better predictions are possible if the influence of the aspect ratio
can be taken into account.
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The procedure for the application of the correlation is similar to paragraph 6.4.
The obstructed volume according to the Yellow Book procedure consists of three
subboxes:
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P0 (kPa)
Lp (m) Darm = 0.31 m Dham = 0.21 m Dhym = 0.46 m
2 26 58 12
10 2196 4880 977
9 1644 3652 732
ARG calculations were performed using all obstacles enclosed within the space
bounded by: x = 147 to 168 m, y = 27 to 47 m and z = 3 to 8 m and using IL-5 for
the ignition location.
Initially, the ARG simulations were performed using a cell size of 1 m. The pressu-
re peaks appeared to be of very short duration (less than 1 ms). Because of this
very short duration, the peak values are cut off due to the rather large cell size.
Therefore the calculations were repeated using a cell size of 0.5 m.
The maximum overpressures for locations P7, P8, P9, P10, P18, P19 and P20 (see
Figure 9.a) calculated with a cell size of 0.5 m are given in Tables 27.a and 27.b,
while the pressure histories are shown in Figures 15 and 16.
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Central ignition (IL-5) of the highly reactive mixture results in high overpressure in
the centre of the obstructed region. The overpressure even increases while the
flame propagates through the obstructed region while accelerating. A shock is
already created inside the mixture and a detonation can be expected in the case of a
longer flame path.
The acceleration until detonation is more clear in the case of edge ignition (IL-9).
Overpressure near the ignition is about 100 kPa and the pressure sharply increases
at locations farther away from the ignition location. The highest pressure is obtai-
ned in P10, which is in a direction parallel to the pipebridge. Outside the pipebrid-
ge where obstacle density is considerably lower, the overpressure increase is less
(P20).
It is expected that the cell size is still too large to prevent the peaks from being cut-
off. Pressures will increase when the cell size is reduced further.
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600
P10
P18
500 P19
P20
400
Overpressure (kPa)
300
200
100
-100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
time (ms)
600
P7
P8
500 P9
400
Overpressure (kPa)
300
200
100
-100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
time (ms)
Figure 15: Pressure histories according to ARG for ignition location IL-5.
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; , ; 2
1400
P10
P18
1200
P19
P20
1000
800
Overpressure (kPa)
600
400
200
-200
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
time (ms)
1400
P7
P8
1200
P9
1000
800
Overpressure (kPa)
600
400
200
-200
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
time (ms)
Figure 16: Pressure histories according to ARG for ignition location IL-9.
The correlation predicts rather low overpressures when the shortest distance from
the ignition location to the nearest boundary of the obstructed region is used (Lp =
2 m). For other flame path lengths and for Darm and Dham, extremely high over-
pressures are predicted. Their value is that in fact a detonation is predicted in those
cases and that overpressures will be in the order of 20 bar.
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The influence of the laminar burning velocity is evaluated best using Darm, as this
diameter gave the best results in the LNG Terminal case. The combination with the
average flame path length of 9 m gives 16 bar, which is in line with what can be
expected.
The influence of the laminar burning velocity in the correlation is based on the
fractal scaling theory developed by Shell Research. The factor 2.7 is derived from
measurements on flame structures using hydrocarbons like methane and propane.
Nevertheless, the scaling appeared to work very well for acethylene also. Over-
pressures in the same obstacle configurations could be predicted for other fuel
types with an accuracy of 10%, based on the experiments using methane (Mercx et
al. 1994).
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The influence of aspect ratio is demonstrated in the Chemical Plant case. Overpres-
sures in sub-obstructed regions having a more or less cubical shape can be predic-
ted much better than in sub-obstructed regions with an elongated shape. For instan-
ce, the large pipebridge present in the case. The distance from the ignition location
to the centre of an edge is either very short or very long, which results in a large
under- or overprediction of the numerically predicted peak overpressure.
The influence of aspect ratio and the ignition location are both related to the flame
path length and the possibility of early venting. Overpressure may be vented
through one or more of the boundaries of the obstructed region while the flame is
still burning through parts of the obstructed region located farther away from the
ignition location. Early venting (side-, top- or backventing) occurs in a direction
opposite to the flame propagation direction.
In the case of edge ignition, venting starts immediately after ignition. In most cases
simulated numerically, this early venting results in lower overpressures than for the
situation in which the same obstacle configuration is ignited in the centre. An
exception is the Sub Obstructed Region 1 in the LNG Terminal case. Here, edge
ignition resulted in a higher overpressure than central ignition. The flame burns
very slowly initially due to backventing, but after propagating a certain distance,
the backventing is overruled by the acceleration due to obstacle-induced turbulen-
ce. Apparently, the remaining flame path length is long enough to accelerate the
flame to a speed greater than the flame path length in the central ignition case is
able to.
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The MERGE experiments, underlying the correlation, have a highly regular pat-
tern. The repeatibility of obstacles, the equal obstacle spacing and the small obsta-
cle diameter was chosen intentionally to obtain high overpressures. As a conse-
quence, the correlation is expected to provide safe and conservative values.
The exercises performed in the four cases have shown that the correlations easily
overpredict the numerical results. As correlation overpressure decreases for increa-
sing obstacle diameters, the best results were obtained by choosing a rather large
value for the average obstacle diameter.
The exception again is the LNG Terminal case where, despite the low numerical
overpressures, the arithmetic average diameter had to be used in order to obtain
acceptable results. It is not clear why the LNG Terminal case provided answers
different from the other cases. The obstacle configuration is different obviously: a
large width and length in combination with a rather low height (length: 157 m,
width: 57 m, height of cloud: 5 m), and a low volume blockage ratio.
12.2.1 Correlation
The expansion possibilities in the cases and subcases considered were all three-
dimensional. The subcase of the Chemical Plant case in which obstacles located
between two parallel floors were considered appeared to be of a three-dimensional
expansion nature also. The length and width of that case were too small in relation
to the height to obtain two-dimensional expansion during a large part of the com-
bustion process.
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The criteria in the Yellow Book procedure are probably too conservative, but there
is a lack of knowledge to better quantify them. In combination with a high class
number for MEM, the procedure will result in conservative predictions. In case the
procedure is coupled with the correlation, the overpressure inside the obstructed
region will be underpredicted, as the exercise with the LNG Terminal subcase in
paragraph 6.4 has demonstrated (obstructed subregion 2). Also, the blast overpres-
sures at great distances may be underpredicted as is demonstrated with the theoreti-
cal approach in paragraph 6.7.
Nevertheless, the Yellow Book procedure resulted in an acceptable average over-
pressure for the LNG Terminal subcase described in paragraph 6.6 (combination of
obstructed subregions 1, 3, 6, 7 and 8) in combination with a smaller (arithmetic)
value for the average diameter.
The Yellow Book procedure specifically fails for the obstructed subregion 2 of the
LNG Terminal case probably due the relatively small outer dimensions of that
subregion in combination with the low obstacle density.
The criteria in the Yellow Book procedure to build up the obstructed region should
be probably coupled with the outer dimensions of the obstructed region already
defined.
The numerical exercises for the LNG Terminal case and its subcases have demon-
strated that the pipebridges do not contribute to the explosion overpressure. Ob-
structed subregions connected via pipebridges can be regarded as separate explosi-
on sources. Obviously, the space in between obstructed regions does not have to be
totally obstacle free in order to consider the regions separate explosion sources.
Also in the Chemical Plant subcase of the isolated large pipebridge, no acceleration
of the flame inside the pipebridge is observed.
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overpressures. Using the longest distance to an edge, on the other hand, results in
far too high overpressures.
In order to deal with the problem of aspect ratios other than one, a simple model is
presented in Annex E. There it is assumed that the pressure will not rise after the
flame leaves the obstructed region through the nearest edge if the pressure at that
instant is below a certain limit. The underlying physics is that the flame speed
acceleration for pressures below that limit is too low to overtake pressure reduction
due to venting.
Observed in the exercises is that the final average numerical overpressures are in
between the predicted values using the correlation with values for the flame path
length according to the distances of the ignition location to the two nearest edges
(Chemical Plant subcase of paragraph 5.3) or the second and third nearest edge
(Gas Processing case). Furthermore, it is not clear whether there is a single value
for the overpressure limit. The exercises still show an increase in overpressure after
the start of venting through one of the edges also at a low overpressure level.
The best results are obtained where an average value for Lp is used. The average
value is the radius of a hemisphere with a volume equivalent to the volume of the
obstructed region Vor. Acceptable results are obtained for aspect ratios smaller than
about 5.
Central ignition is implicit when the radius of a hemisphere is adopted for Lp. The
numerical results however show lower overpressures, in most cases, for edge
ignition. Applying an average flame path length would cover all ignition locations
in most cases.
The following statements, considerations and rules can be kept in mind while
applying the correlations to a realistic situation.
12.3.2 Reminder
A general consideration to start with is that the correlation will provide the best
results when the obstacle configuration of the realistic situation resembles, as
closely as possible, the obstacle configuration used in the experiments underlying
the correlation. These were configurations with cubical outer dimensions, single
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size obstacles equally spaced, completely filled with flammable mixtures which
were centrally ignited.
12.3.3 Comparison
The first thing to do is to compare the case under consideration with one of the
cases and subcases assessed in this report
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The Yellow Book procedure will lead to a too large volume especially for small
obstructed regions. The combination with a low obstacle density will result in very
low overpressure as the subcase OSR-2 of the LNG Terminal case revealed (volu-
me of 1000 m3 and VBR of 4%).
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White spot 7: influence of obstructed region larger than the vapour cloud
It can be argued that overpressure will increase as the cloud expansion occurs
partially inside an obstructed region. The efficiency, that part of the combustion
energy inside the obstructed region which contributes to blast, will increase.
The Multi-Energy Method is a practical tool for determining the blast overpressu-
res from vapour cloud explosions. The reality is simplified into a one-dimensional
problem. The blast charts are for hemispherical clouds having an energy density of
3.5 MJ/m3. The blast charts result from numerical calculations using a constant
flame speed inside the cloud.
Other blast charts can be composed in order to differentiate more between the
numerous situations which may be present in reality. Other blast charts may inclu-
de:
• other energy densities;
• non-constant flame speeds: linear or exponential functions;
• obstructed regions with an aspect ratio other than one;
• arrival times to be able to superimpose blasts from various sources.
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The emphasis in this project was on the parameters Volume Blockage Ratio and
Average Obstacle Diameter. The results of numerical calculations were used as a
reference for comparison with results from the correlations. Due to this approach,
attention had to be given to the other parameters as well.
The exercises performed showed that the procedure given in the new Yellow Book
can be used for the determination of the volume of the obstructed region in order to
arrive at the Volume Blockage Ratio. This procedure is the best there is at the
present. It is not fully consistent but differences which may arise from that incon-
sistency will not lead to deviations outside the band of uncertainty of the correlati-
ons. Only for small and low obstacle density obstacles may the procedure lead to
less safe answers.
The average obstacle diameter to use should not be chosen too small. It was found
that in most cases, the hydraulic diameter of all obstacles together provided the best
answers.
A safe upperbound in most situations and scenarios appears to be to use the hy-
draulic diameter in combination with a flame path length equal to the radius of a
hemisphere with a volume equivalent to the volume of the obstructed region. This
approach is fully in line with the concept of the Multi-Energy Method.
The ‘white spots’ encountered while applying the correlations in the four cases are
all related to the deviations of the ideal simplified situation. They comprise:
• obstructed regions having different values for length, width and height;
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All these items refer to the obstacle configuration. No problems were encountered
in incorporating the influence of the fuel.
An approach is suggested in order to pass the white spots while applying the cor-
relations.
For the white spots: ‘obstructed region with aspect ratios other than unity’ and
‘multiple explosion sources’, the suggested approach has a physical footing. Ho-
wever, experimental validation is lacking completely. Also, the results of the
numerical exercises do support some of the physical phenomena occurring but
seem to indicate that more complex criteria are requested. For instance, in the case
of an aspect ratio other than unity, there does not seem to be a general overpressure
threshold below which the flame will not accelerate after it has reached the nearest
edge of the obstructed region.
For situations where more than a single explosion source may be expected, and for
situations where the radius of an equivalent hemisphere appears to be an unaccep-
table approach, experimental data should be generated to develop and validate
procedures for the application of the Multi-Energy Method and the correlations.
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14 11 References
Berg, A.C. van den; The, H.G.; Mercx, W.P.M.; Hayhurst, C.J.; Clegg, R.A.;
Robertson, N.J. and Birnbaum, N.K. (1995),
‘Gas Explosion Hazard Analyses Using the CFD Code AutoReaGas’,
Proceedings of the 6th Annual PETRO-SAFE Conference on Pipelines, Terminals
and Storage, 31 January – 2 February 1995, Houston, Texas, USA.
EMEG (1997),
‘Explosion Model Evaluation Group, Specifications of test cases for gas explosions
- test case C1’,
EME project, DGXII, Brussels, Belgium, 1997.
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15 12 Acknowledgement
This project could only be accomplished due to the participation of the following
companies and organisations:
• Air Liquide (F);
• BP International Ltd. (UK);
• Elf Atochem (F);
• ENEL SpA CRIS (I);
• Gaz de France (F);
• Health and Safety Executive (UK);
• ICI (UK);
• INERIS (Fr);
• Norsk Hydro (N);
• RIVM (NL);
• Snamprogetti SpA (I).
Their contribution to the discussions during the progress meetings are highly
appreciated.
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16 13 Authentication
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16.1.1 5.5.3 Procedure for the division of an area into obstructed and
unobstructed regions
The procedure given is thought to be a safe and conservative one in a sense that
always a too large volume of the obstructed region will be selected. The procedure
offers a possibility for optimisation, i.e. reduction, of the obstructed volume. This
optimisation procedure can be followed but obviously requires more time. The
optimisation procedure in itself will not lead to unsafe situations.
After ignition of a flammable cloud in a congested area the flame will travel out-
ward, so the orientation with respect to the flame propagation direction of each
obstacle is known.
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Let the smallest dimension oriented in a plane perpendicular to the flame propaga-
tion direction be D1 then:
D1 = lc or dc for cylinder
D1 = smallest of b1 and b2, b2 and b3, or b1 and b3 for a box
D1 = ds for a sphere
Let the obstacle dimension parallel to the flame propagation direction be D2.
An obstacle belongs to an obstructed region if the distance from its centre to the
centre of any obstacle in the obstructed region is smaller than 10 times D1 or 1.5
times D2 of the obstacle under consideration in the obstructed region (D1 and D2
belonging to any obstacle in the obstructed region).
If the distance between the outer boundary of the obstructed region and the outer
boundary of the obstacle is larger than 25 m, then the obstacle does not belong to
that obstructed region.
Note: there are values given to three factors. These are a factor times D1 and a
factor times D2 (respectively 10 and 1.5) for obstacle distances and a value (25 m)
for the distance between obstructed region and obstacle to determine if the obstacle
is part of that obstructed region. It is not yet possible to quantify these values
accurately. The values given are thought to be safe.
The obstructed region is defined as a box that contains all the obstacles in the
obstructed region:
including: the space between a confining surface and an obstructed region where
the distance between that surface and any obstacle in the obstructed region is less
than 10 times D1 or 1.5 times D2 (for instance, the earth’s surface)
excluding: parts of cylinders or boxes that obviously do not belong to the obstruc-
ted region like upper parts of chimneys, distillation columns (vertically oriented
cylinders) or pipes (horizontally oriented cylinders) connecting, for instance,
chemical units, each potentially being an obstructed region, at a chemical plant.
The excluded parts may form an obstructed region themselves.
The free volume of the obstructed region Vr is the volume of the box minus the
space occupied by the obstacles. In case it is not possible to calculate or estimate
the volume occupied by the obstacles, assume Vr equals the total volume of the
box.
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The box containing the obstructed region smooths the outer boundary of the actual
obstacle boundaries, thereby including additional space free of obstacles. In case
this free space is not included in the obstructed region by the procedure for buil-
ding up the obstructed region but by drawing the box around the obstructed region,
sub-division into multiple directly adjacent boxes is acceptable for reducing the
volume of the obstructed region.
If not all obstacles present are inside the obstructed region, perhaps more obstruc-
ted regions within the cloud can be defined.
In that case, the region where ignition occurs is called the ‘donor’ region; the other
regions are ‘acceptor’ regions.
The direction of flame propagation, required for the orientation of the obstacles in
the acceptor region, depends on the orientation of the acceptor region with respect
to the donor region.
If separate obstructed regions are located close to one another, they may be initia-
ted more or less at the same time: then coincidence of their blasts in the far-field
may not be ruled out and the respective blasts should be superposed.
At the present, their is no guidance on the minimum separation distance between
donor and acceptor regions at which they can be assumed to be separate explosi-
ons. Due to this lack, a great possibility of reducing the hazards of a vapour cloud
explosion cannot be applied. The procedure for applying the Multi-Energy Method
described in the next section contains a safe and conservative approach to cover
this deficiency.
Remarks
Due to the choice of having a high initial blast strength for an obstructed region,
the need to have a clear definition of an obstructed regions grows.
The exact boundaries of an obstructed region are, in fact, not so important for the
determination of blast. According to the blast charts (Figure 5.8), the energy E has
to be raised to the power of 1/3.
Nevertheless, a solid definition might be required.
The subdivision of a hazardous site into obstructed and unobstructed regions and
the attribution of a source strength to each region is a major issue of ongoing
research. As a simplified Multi-Energy Method is applied here, a simplified proce-
dure for the subdivision into obstructed and unobstructed regions is adapted.
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In order to obtain a rather straightforward, easy to apply and fully closed procedu-
re, a number of obvious influences which lead to reduction of the explosion seve-
rity have been neglected. This indicates that further optimisation is possible, but
this should be obtained through consultation with experts.
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The procedure of vapour cloud explosion blast modelling according to the Multi-
Energy concept can be subdivided into a number of steps. Figure 5.9 shows these
successive steps to be taken.
Apply constraints
Recognise potential
blast sources
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Locate of unobstructed
part of vapour cloud
Calculate radius
Handle of multiple
obstructed regions
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- Realise that the Multi-Energy Method is to determine the blast parameters from
‘unconfined’ vapour cloud explosions. Blast from vented vapour cloud explosi-
ons and from internal explosions should be assessed by other methods.
- Realise that the Multi-Energy Method is a simplification of reality. It does not
take into account directional blast effects due to the inhomogeneous distribution
of confinement and obstruction of the vapour cloud or due to the non-point
symmetrical shape of the vapour cloud. Use other, more sophisticated, models
to assess these aspects.
- Assume that blast modelling on the basis of deflagrative combustion is a suffi-
ciently safe and conservative approach. Keep in mind that unconfined vapour
cloud detonation is extremely unlikely and has only one single precedent, to our
present knowledge.
- Determine the mass quantity after an accidental release that can contribute to
the formation of a flammable cloud.
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- Define obstructed regions with the procedure given in the previous section or
estimate boundaries of obstructed regions and determine the free volume Vr of
each obstructed region.
- Determine the maximum part of the cloud Vgr that can be inside the obstructed
regions.
- Calculate the volume Vo of the unobstructed part of the vapour cloud with:
Vo = Vc - Vgr (m3) (5.8)
• Step 5: estimate the source strength or class number for each region
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- Determine a centre for the unobstructed vapour cloud volume. This centre can
be determined by considering the centres of the separate unobstructed regions
and their respective energies.
Now a certain number of explosion centres and their respective energies E have
been determined. For each centre, the blast parameters as a function of distance to
its centre can be calculated with the blast charts given in Figure 5.8.
- Model the blast from each source by the blast from an equivalent hemi-
spherical fuel-air charge of volume E/Ev m3 (Ev = 3.5 MJ/m3 is an average va-
lue for most hydrocarbons at stoichiometric concentration).
Get an impression of the scale by calculating the radius ro for each blast source
from:
ro = (3/2 · E/(Ev · π))1/3 (m) (5.9)
The blast parameters at a specific distance r from a blast source can be read from
Figure 5.8 A, B and C after calculating the scaled distance r’.
- Depending on the class number 1, 3 or 10, read the scaled peak side-on over-
pressure Ps’, the dynamic peak pressure pdyn’ and the scaled positive phase du-
ration tp’ from the respective blast charts in Figure 5.8.
- Calculate the peak side-on overpressure Ps, the peak dynamic pressure pdyn and
the positive phase duration tp with:
Ps = Ps’ · pa (Pa) (5.3)
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- Determine the shape of the blast wave from the Figure 5.8.
If separate blast sources are located close to one another, they may be initiated
more or less at the same time. Therefore, coincidence of their blasts in the far-field
may not be ruled out, and the respective blasts should be superposed This should
be accomplished by taking the respective quantities of combustion energy of the
sources in question together.
To determine the parameters in the blast wave at a specific distance, one should use
the blast source as defined in step 6.
It may be assumed that the blast history at a specific location consists of the blast
parameters and blast shape resulting from the obstructed region on which the blast
parameters of the unobstructed region is superposed.
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The facility comprises six spherical storage tanks; four with a volume of 1600 m3
and two with a volume of 2400 m3. An additional 48 horizontal cylindrical bullet
tanks are situated near the large spheres.
The total storage capacity is about 16000 m3.
The storage is subdivided into six zones, see Figure 5.12.
Horizontal distances are given in Figure 5.13.
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At first glance, it will be clear that any of the groups of cylinders or spheres are an
obstructed region.
The structures consist of big spheres and cylinders. Other structures like stairs,
walkways, supports and pipes will not be considered here. This is a valid approach:
the dimensions of the large obstacles will dominate the process of building an
obstructed region: 10 times D1 of a big obstacle will override 10 times D1 of a
small obstacle located near the larger one (step 4). Figure 5.12 shows all major
basic geometrical structural shapes.
Assume ignition in the centre of the southern group of cylinders in zone 4 (Figure
5.13).
The build-up of the obstructed region is started by taking the cylinder west of the
ignition location as a start (marked as 1).
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95374-5.11
20
24
14
unigas gasomatico
1 2
6 9 19
5
3 22 13
8
7 4 12
15
10
18
11
16 17
21 23
Legend:
1 2 spheres of 2400 m3, ds = 16.5 m 12 car loading
2 4 spheres of 1600 m3, ds = 14.5 m 13 gas boiler store
3 4 cylinders of 270 m3, dc = 3.5 m, length = 32 m 14 pipe/valve manifold
4 14 cylinders of 180 m3, dc = 3.5 m, length = 21 m 15 waterpower
5 21 cylinders of 36 m3, dc = 2 m, length = 13 m 16 LPG storage Unigas
6 6 cylinders of 54 m3, dc = 2 m, length = 19 m 17 Storage Gasomatico
3 cylinders of 45 m3, dc = 2 m, length = 16 m 18 battling Terminal
19 depot cars with bottles
7 flare pit 20 entrance
8 pond 21 rail car loading
9 control room 22 store
10 pumphouse 23 watertank
11 fire pumps 24 garrison
95374-5.12
1 2 6
3 4 5
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10m 95374-5.13
12.75
14.5 10.5
8.5
12.75
6
13
5 43 2 1
*
1.5 11.5 1.5 10 3 2
3.5 3.5
* ignition
In order to decide if cylinder 2 is part of the obstructed region, values for D1 and
D2 have to be determined. Following the direction of flame propagation from the
ignition location via cylinder 1 towards cylinder 2, the orientation of the axis of
cylinder 1 is perpendicular to the direction of flame propagation. Therefore, both
D1 and D2 equal the diameter 3.5 m in this case.
The distance between cylinder 1 and the adjacent one, cylinder 2, is 1.5 m. This
distance is shorter than 10 times D1 and also shorter than 1.5 times D2. Thus,
cylinder 2 is part of the obstructed region.
It is obvious that all seven cylinders of the southern group in zone 4 are within one
obstructed region.
The distance between the east cylinder in zone 3 (number 5) and the west cylinder
of the obstructed region (number 4) is 11.5 m. D1 and D2 both equal 3.5 m still.
Thus, cylinder 5 belongs to the obstructed region too.
It is derived very easily that all four cylinders of zone 3 belong to the obstructed
region also.
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The distance between the northern and southern group of cylinders in zone 4 is
13 m. In this case, D1 = 3.5 m and D2 = 21 m. The distance of 13 m is shorter than
10 times D1 and 1.5 times D2. Thus, cylinder 6 and all other cylinders in that group
are part of the obstructed region.
Repeating the procedure for the other cylinder groups as well as the spheres results
in one obstructed region covering all cylinders and spheres.
Additional pipework and stairs located within a distance of D1 or D2 from a sphere
or cylinder belongs to the obstructed region too.
A box containing all obstacles in the obstructed region has dimensions of length
108.5 m, width 110 m and height 19.5 m (Figure 5.14; 19.5 m is the height of the
highest cylinder including pipework on top).
The space underneath the obstacles is part of the obstructed region too; the distance
of 2 m to a confining surface (the earth) is smaller than 10 times D1 or 1.5 D2 or all
big obstacles.
A single big box in this case includes large volumes of free space, due to the large
variation in height between cylinders and spheres. A sub-division in multiple
directly adjacent boxes is therefore beneficial.
10m
95374-5.14
110m
108.5m
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95374-5.15
3 2
A second further subdivision is possible as the free space in box 1 north of zone 3
does not belong to the obstructed region. All other free space between groups of
cylinders are part of the obstructed region and cannot therefore be excluded by
further subdivision into multiple boxes.
95374-5.16
4 3
* centre of cloud
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The volume of the obstructed region is the sum of the volumes of the four boxes
minus the space occupied by the obstacles:
Box 1 32 · 31.5 · 6 = 6048 m3
Box 2 77 · 65 · 6 = 30030 m3
Box 3 45 · 31.25 · 4.5 = 6328 m3
Box 4 65.5 · 45 · 19.5 = 57476 m3
Total volume = 99882 m3
The volume of the cloud inside the obstructed region is determined by deduction of
the volume of the cylinders and spheres of the volume of the obstructed region.
The storage capacity is 16000 m3, which is assumed to equal the volume of the
storage vessels.
So: Vgr = 99882 - 16000 = 83882 m3
Obviously further subdivision is possible and acceptable as long as the rules for
subdivision are followed. One has to balance the benefit from further subdivision
(which can be rather small) with the required time to perform the subdivision
(which can be rather long) in order to decide to which level of detail subdivision is
carried out.
As all obstacles present are inside the one obstructed region defined, no additional
obstructed regions are requested.
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The Multi-Energy (ME) method is a simple method for vapour cloud explosion
blast modelling. A vapour cloud’s explosive potential is modelled by the specifica-
tion of an equivalent explosive fuel-air charge whose blast characteristics can be
read from blast charts.
The ME method recognises that in gas deflagration, turbulence generative bounda-
ry conditions are the predominant factor in the generation of overpressure and
blast. The mechanism of a gas explosion implicates that, as soon as the appropriate
turbulence generative boundary conditions are lacking, the burning speed and the
pressure build-up in the process of flame propagation will slump. The direct conse-
quence of the ME concept is that an extended vapour cloud containing several
obstructed areas, separated by open spaces of sufficient extent, will produce the
same number of separate blast waves on ignition. In the modelling process of blast
effects, the individual obstructed areas should be considered separately.
The objective of this report is to develop some practical simple guidance for the
quantification of the term ‘open spaces of sufficient extent’. In other words: how
large should an open space be between two obstructed areas to be treated as sepa-
rate sources of blast? Or, the other way around, how closely should obstructed
areas be located to one another, to be treated as one single blast source? Some
general notion of the critical separation distance can be developed by considering
the phenomena and mechanisms that govern the gas dynamics in gas deflagration.
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The turbulent motion induced by the boundary conditions will be limited to the
medium originally present within the obstructed, turbulence generative area. There-
fore, the explosive combustion will not extend beyond the medium originally
present within the obstructed area. This observation may lead to a very simple
theoretical delimitation of the critical separation distance.
• 3D expansion
A spherical charge will expand up to a sphere of 3 8 = 2 times the original charge
radius upon combustion. In more generalised terms: a fully unconfined cloud
expands up to a distance of twice its original linear dimensions.
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R
2R (burnt)
• 2D expansion
A cylindrical charge, confined by parallel planes, will expand up to 8 ≈ 2.8 times
its original charge radius upon combustion.
R
2.8R (burnt)
• 1D expansion
A charge confined by a tube or channel-like structure will expand up to 8 times its
original linear charge size upon combustion.
R
8R (burnt)
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Because of the assumed stoichiometry, these figures may be regarded as safe and
conservative upper limits for the separation distance. However, for the 2D and 1D
case, these figures may be substantially reduced.
Figure D.2a: The mushroom-shaped flame jet produced by a charge confined between
parallel planes.
Therefore, the recommended value for the separation distance for a flammable
mixture confined between parallel planes may be reduced. Experimental data on
the length of flame jets from this type of configuration are not available. For the
time being, therefore, the recommended value for the separation distance is assu-
med equal to that for the 3D, unconfined charge, i.e. 2 times the linear dimension
of the charge radius.
In the same way, the flame jet in the 1D case will possibly be substantially shorter
than 8 times the linear dimension of the original charge as it expands from a chan-
nel into 3D space.
Fortunately, giving a concrete value for the 1D case is not relevant as most practi-
cal application of the ME concept is to chemical plants whose layout can be ap-
proximated by the 3D or 2D cases.
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Only few data on the flame jet length in vented explosions were found in papers by
Wirkner-Bott (1992) and Bartknecht (1993). For vented dust explosions, Bart-
knecht (1993) poses a rough empirical relation which relates the flame jet length Lf
to the vessel volume V.
Lf = 8.V0.3
This expression also covers experimental data generated by Wirkner-Bott et al.
(1992).
Donor-acceptor experiments
At TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, Van Wingerden (1988 and 1989) investigated a
gas explosion developing in two subsequent obstructed areas separated by a free
space, i.e. a separation distance. The obstructed areas consisted of a configuration
of concrete cylinders confined between parallel planes.
The gap size between the two obstructed areas was varied. The results showed that
as long as the separation distance was larger than the linear dimension of the donor
array, the blast waves produced by the respective configurations were clearly
separated. This result does not contradict the values for the separation distance,
proposed above.
For application to realistic problems, i.e. the (petro-)chemical industries, the rules
concerning the separation distance must be generalised. A plant can be regarded
either as a spatial configuration of equipment (obstacles) or as a configuration of
equipment confined between the floors of an open building. Such a configuration
of obstacles definitely has not the idealised spherical or cylindrical shape the
theoretical considerations were based on. Therefore, the rule for the critical separa-
tion distance is generalised.
The critical separation distance around a potential blast source area is equal to
half its linear dimension in each direction. If the distance between potential sour-
ces is larger, the sources should be modelled as separate blasts. If not, they should
be modelled as one single blast of summed energy content.
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Bartknecht, W. (1993),
Explosionsschutz,
Springer Verlag,
Berlin, 1993.
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When a reactive mixture in an obstructed area is not ignited at the area’s centre but
at an edge, the flame propagation process finds the proper conditions to speed up
only inside obstructed area. Then the combustion products behind the flame are not
stagnant but expand partly freely backwards (back relief) without contributing fully
to the medium velocity ahead of the flame. Then the expansion of the products is
not fully utilised for the generation of flow in the reactants ahead of the flame front
in the obstructed area. The feedback coupling is not optimum. Therefore, an edge-
ignited obstructed area will develop more slowly than a centrally ignited area over
the same distance of flame propagation.
The flammable mixture is ignited near the centre of the obstacle configuration.
Initially, as long as the entire flame front propagates within the obstructed area, the
flame bubble (closed in itself) develops more or less symmetrically because it finds
similar boundary conditions all around. During this initial stage of flame propaga-
tion, the aspect ratio of the obstructed area does not play a significant role.
Then the flame propagates out of the obstructed area at the long sides into the open
where the proper boundary conditions for pressure build-up are lacking. The con-
sequence is that from that point on, the part of the flame front outside the obstruc-
ted area does not fully contribute to the generation of expansion flow ahead of the
flame in the obstructed area and thereby does not contribute to the feedback any
longer. The flame propagation inside the obstructed area is less supported by
expansion from the back as a consequence of what is called side relief.
Almost all of the experimental data on gas explosions have been derived from
experiments in obstacle configurations of aspect ratios approximately equal to 1.
So far, only very limited data on gas explosion development in obstacle configura-
tions of an aspect ratio substantially higher than one are available. Two sources of
data were found: Van Wingerden (1988 and 1989) and Harris and Wickens (1989)
Van Wingerden (1988 and 1989) reports on a number of flame propagation expe-
riments performed in a 4× 4 m2 rig consisting of a configuration of circular rows of
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vertical 0.08 m diameter cylinders confined between parallel planes with a 0.16 m
interspace. The cylinder configuration was characterised by a 50% area blockage in
a row of cylinders and a pitch between the respective rows of 3 cylinder diameters.
The obstacle configuration was filled with a stoichiometric ethylene-air mixture
and ignited by a spark.
Ignition at the edge of the configuration showed a slower initial development than
for central ignition. However, a higher ultimate flame speed and overpressure were
obtained simply because the flame path length was twice as long and the number of
obstacle rows passed by the flame was twice as high as in the case of central igniti-
on.
Subsequently, the width of the obstacle configuration was varied from 4 to 2 and
1 m so that the configuration’s aspect ratio varied from 1 to 2 and 4. The length of
the rig (distance of flame propagation) was kept constant and equal to 4 m. The
configurations were ignited in the centres of their short edges.
In aspect ratio 1 and 2 experiments, flame speed and overpressure quickly ran up to
respective maximum values of over 600 m/s and 600 kPa within the 4 m propagati-
on distance. Possibly the maximum flame speed was limited by choking flow
conditions.
The aspect ratio 4 experiment, on the other hand, showed quite different behaviour,
namely: a slow development which resulted in an ultimate flame speed of about
150 m/s and a maximum overpressure of approximately 30 kPa.
The key point in these experiments is the big difference in the flame speed and
overpressure development between the aspect ratio 1 and 2 experiments on the one
hand and the aspects ratio 4 experiment on the other. The experiments suggest that
a certain width of configuration or a certain number of obstacles in lateral direction
is required to develop a high level of flame speed and overpressure. If that width of
configuration or that number of obstacles is present, the flame propagation process
develops quickly and independently of side relief effects. If not, the flame propa-
gation process develops slowly.
Harris and Wickens (1989) report on flame propagation experiments with natural
gas, propane and cyclohexane-air mixtures in a very elongated 3× 3× 45m3 fully
unconfined rig whose cross-section was obstructed by vertical arrays of horizontal
tubes. The tube arrays, characterised by an area blockage of 40%, were placed at a
mutual distance of 1.5 m.
If the rig was ignited by a spark, a slow but gradual increase in flame speed over
the full length of the rig was observed. If the rig was initiated with a flame jet at a
flame speed higher than approximately 500 m/s, the high flame speed was more or
less maintained. Initiation at lower flame speeds, on the other hand, resulted in a
slump of the process down to much lower values, from which the slow and gradual
speed-up started.
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Generalisation
The experimental observations suggest some sort of a jump in behaviour. If the
lateral dimension of the obstructed area is too small to develop some critical value
of flame speed and overpressure before the flames reaches the lateral edge of the
configuration, the development of the process will be largely governed by side
relief and the ultimate explosion overpressure will be low. If, on the other hand, the
lateral size is sufficient to exceed this critical value before the flame reaches the
lateral edge of the configuration, the process will develop independently of side
relief effects and the ultimate explosion overpressure will be high.
Modelling
Given a 3D obstructed area of dimensions: a length L, a width W and a height H.
The area is characterised by an obstacle configuration of an average obstacle size
D. The area is fully engulfed by a vapour cloud of a flammable mixture characteri-
sed by a laminar burning speed SL.
The experimental observations suggest a way of implementation of the aspect ratio
in the application of the GAME correlation which roughly reflects the behaviour
observed experimentally. The procedure is as follows.
• Check the lateral dimensions of the obstructed area on pressure build-up capa-
bility. Apply the GAME correlation to the minimum dimension ½W or H. In
other words: evaluate the parameter combination by taking the flame path
length equal to the minimum of ½W or H.
• If the correlating overpressure is below some critical value, the ultimate explo-
sion overpressure will be largely determined by side relief effects. The ultimate
explosion overpressure is taken equal to the overpressure calculated on the basis
of the minimum lateral dimension.
• If the correlating overpressure, on the other hand, exceeds the critical value, the
ultimate explosion overpressure must be calculated on the basis of the real fla-
me path length in the obstructed area.
For a choice of the critical level of overpressure the described experiments must be
quantitatively interpreted. If the GAME correlation is applied to the above-
mentioned experiments in which the aspect ratio of the obstacle configuration was
varied from 1 to 2 and 4.
• VBR = 0.13;
• D = 0.08 m;
• SL = 0.66 m/s;
• Sc = 0.08 m;
• the rig dimensions in the aspect ratio 2 experiments were 2× 4 m2;
• ignited in the centre of the smallest dimension (2 m);
• a lateral flame path length of 1 m;
• the aspect ratio 4 experiment gives a flame path length of 0.5 m.
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VBR ⋅ L 2.25
ARG = LOG 0.7
p
⋅ S 2.7
⋅ Sc
L
D
• Lp = 1 m results in an overpressure of approximately 50 kPa (aspect ratio 2);
• Lp = 0.5 m results in an overpressure of approximately 10 kPa (aspect ratio 1).
The critical overpressure level must be somewhere between the two. Let’s assume
the critical overpressure level is in the middle, i.e. Pcrit = 30 kPa. This value is
simply extrapolated to hold for the 3D case as well. There is a lack of experimental
data.
VBR ⋅ L 2.75
ARG = LOG 0.7
p
⋅ S 2.7
L ⋅ Sc
D
• ARG = -1.2, which correlates with an explosion overpressure Pexp on the order
of 5 kPa (MERGE-data);
• compare with critical overpressure Pcrit = 30 kPa ⇒ P exp < Pcrit;
• conclusion: lateral pressure build-up capability of this obstacle configuration is
not sufficient to develop the critical overpressure. Therefore, the ultimate explo-
sion overpressure will be largely determined by side relief effects and will not
be higher than 5 kPa.
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The procedure proposed above is partly based on largely intuitive arguments and
drastic simplification of the behaviour of gas explosion phenomena observed in
just a very few experiments. In addition, a critical overpressure level had to be
determined for which sufficient quantitative support is lacking. Therefore, the
proposed procedure may be substantially adapted after the performance of a speci-
fic experimental programme.
Before the guidance can become fully concrete, in a way that two users in the same
problem come up with similar answers, the data points in the correlation graphs
must be brought back to a single line, a best fit, or the most realistic fit realising
that the MERGE data probably constitute an upper bound: if agreement can be
achieved, in relation of the best realistic correlation.
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20
10
-10
-20
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
time (ms)
40
P4
30 P5
P6
Overpressure (kPa)
20
10
-10
-20
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
time (ms)
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
time (ms)
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30
20
10
0
-10
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
time (ms)
-10
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400
time (ms)
20
P4
P5
P6
10
Overpressure (kPa)
-10
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400
time (ms)
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40
20
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
20
10
-10
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
time (ms)
-5
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time (ms)
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100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
200
P4
P5
150 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
200
P7
P8
150 P9
P10
Overpressure (kPa)
100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
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100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
time (ms)
200
P4
P5
150 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
time (ms)
200
P7
P8
150 P9
P10
Overpressure (kPa)
100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
time (ms)
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20
10
-10
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
time (ms)
40
P4
P5
30 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
20
10
-10
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
time (ms)
40
P7
P8
30 P9
P10
Overpressure (kPa)
20
10
-10
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
time (ms)
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50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
time (ms)
100
P4
P5
P6
Overpressure (kPa)
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
time (ms)
400
P7
P8
300 P9
P10
Overpressure (kPa)
200
100
-100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
time (ms)
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100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
200
P4
P5
150 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
400
P7
P8
300 P9
Overpressure (kPa)
200
100
-100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
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400
P10
P11
300 P12
Overpressure (kPa)
200
100
-100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
400
P13
P14
300
Overpressure (kPa)
200
100
-100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
time (ms)
40
20
-20
-40
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
time (ms)
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80
P4
60 P5
P6
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
time (ms)
20
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time (ms)
60
P4
P5
P6
40
Overpressure (kPa)
20
-20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time (ms)
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100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time (ms)
200
P4
P5
150 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
100
50
-50
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time (ms)
400
P7
P8
300 P9
P10
Overpressure (kPa)
200
100
-100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time (ms)
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40
20
-20
-40
-200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
time (ms)
100
P4
P5
80 P6
60
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
time (ms)
60
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
time (ms)
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100
P4
P5
80 P6
60
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
time (ms)
10
Overpressure (kPa)
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
20
P4
P5
15 P6
10
Overpressure (kPa)
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
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10
-10
-20
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
time (ms)
60
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
100
P5
P6
80 P7
P8
60
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
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100
P9
P10
80 P11
P12
60
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
-40
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
40
20
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
80
P4
P5
60 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
40
20
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
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20
P13
P14
P15
10 P16
Overpressure (kPa)
-10
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
10
-10
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
30
P4
P5
20 P6
Overpressure (kPa)
10
-10
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
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10
P13
P14
5 P15
Overpressure (kPa)
P16
-5
-10
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
time (ms)
30
Overpressure (kPa)
20
10
-10
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
time (ms)
50
P4
P5
40 P6
30
Overpressure (kPa)
20
10
-10
-20
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
time (ms)
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30
P13
P14
P15
P16
20
Overpressure (kPa)
10
-10
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
time (ms)
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SUMMARY: ONGERUBRICEERD SUMMARY: ONGERUBRICEERD
Correlations were derived in the preceding GAME project to quantify the source strength of a vapour Correlations were derived in the preceding GAME project to quantify the source strength of a vapour
cloud explosion required to apply the Multi-Energy Method for the determination of the blast characte- cloud explosion required to apply the Multi-Energy Method for the determination of the blast characte-
ristics. The correlations relate a set of parameters describing the obstacle configuration in which the ristics. The correlations relate a set of parameters describing the obstacle configuration in which the
flammable cloud is present and the fuel, to a single value for the overpressure in the exploding vapour flammable cloud is present and the fuel, to a single value for the overpressure in the exploding vapour
cloud. cloud.
This project investigates the difficulties and problems encountered while applying the correlations to a This project investigates the difficulties and problems encountered while applying the correlations to a
number of realistic scenarios. The objective is to provide guidance and recommendations on how to number of realistic scenarios. The objective is to provide guidance and recommendations on how to
overcome these difficulties and to decide on the actual values to be chosen for the parameters of the overcome these difficulties and to decide on the actual values to be chosen for the parameters of the
correlations in specific situations. The emphasis is on the determination of the parameters: ‘Volume correlations in specific situations. The emphasis is on the determination of the parameters: ‘Volume
Blockage Ratio’ and ‘Average Obstacle Diameter’. Blockage Ratio’ and ‘Average Obstacle Diameter’.
The main finding is that a safe approach in most situations is to apply the procedure of the new Yellow The main finding is that a safe approach in most situations is to apply the procedure of the new Yellow
Book for the determination of the volume of the obstructed region in combination with the hydraulic Book for the determination of the volume of the obstructed region in combination with the hydraulic
average obstacle diameter and a flame path length equal to the radius of a hemisphere with a volume average obstacle diameter and a flame path length equal to the radius of a hemisphere with a volume
equal to the volume of the obstructed region. Lack of experimental data on specific items prevents the equal to the volume of the obstructed region. Lack of experimental data on specific items prevents the
generation of more detailed guidance. Some guidance is developed based on a theoretical approach, to generation of more detailed guidance. Some guidance is developed based on a theoretical approach, to
assess the influence of the aspect ratio of the obstructed region and to quantify the separation distance assess the influence of the aspect ratio of the obstructed region and to quantify the separation distance
between multiple explosion sources. It is recommended to perform an experimental research programme between multiple explosion sources. It is recommended to perform an experimental research programme
to generate the required data to improve and validate the suggested procedures. to generate the required data to improve and validate the suggested procedures.
The classification designation Ongerubriceerd is equivalent to Unclassified. The classification designation Ongerubriceerd is equivalent to Unclassified.