Cybercrime Prevention

CRIME PREVENTION AND
SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Cybercrime
Prevention
Theory and Applications
Russell Brewer
Melissa de Vel-Palumbo
Alice Hutchings
Thomas Holt
Andrew Goldsmith
David Maimon
Crime Prevention and Security Management
Series Editor
Martin Gill
Perpetuity Research
Tunbridge Wells, Kent, UK
It is widely recognized that we live in an increasingly unsafe society,
but the study of security and crime prevention has lagged behind in
its importance on the political agenda and has not matched the level
of public concern. This exciting new series aims to address these issues
looking at topics such as crime control, policing, security, theft, work-
place violence and crime, fear of crime, civil disorder, white collar crime
and anti-social behaviour. International in perspective, providing criti-
cally and theoretically-informed work, and edited by a leading scholar in
the field, this series will advance new understandings of crime prevention
and security management.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14928
Russell Brewer · Melissa de Vel-Palumbo ·
Alice Hutchings · Thomas Holt ·
Andrew Goldsmith · David Maimon
Cybercrime
Prevention
Theory and Applications
Russell Brewer Melissa de Vel-Palumbo
School of Social Sciences Centre for Crime Policy and Research
University of Adelaide Flinders University
Adelaide, SA, Australia Adelaide, SA, Australia
Alice Hutchings Thomas Holt

Department of Computer Science School of Criminal Justice
and Technology Michigan State University
University of Cambridge East Lansing, MI, USA
Cambridge, UK
David Maimon
Andrew Goldsmith Department of Criminal Justice
Centre for Crime Policy and Research and Criminology
Flinders University Georgia State University
Adelaide, SA, Australia Atlanta, GA, USA
Crime Prevention and Security Management

ISBN 978-3-030-31068-4 ISBN 978-3-030-31069-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

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Series Editor’s Preface
Russell Brewer, Melissa de Vel-Palumbo, Alice Hutchings, Thomas Holt,

Andrew Goldsmith, and David Maimon present a critique of seven dif-
ferent types of commonly deployed crime prevention interventions
which they believe have the potential to be used in tackling cybercrimes
(with a specific focus on cyber-dependent offences). Certainly, for this
reader, these distinguished authors have fulfilled their aim ‘to make a
substantial original contribution’ as to how their chosen crime preven-
tion techniques can be used to tackle offending in the digital realm.
Running through their analysis are at least three issues. The first is
that cyber-offending and cyber-offenders typically have different char-
acteristics to traditional offline offenders/offences. This complicates the
potential application of traditional crime prevention approaches when
applied to the digital arena. Second, there is a paucity of research, and
in particular evaluations of these prevention approaches in the online
world. The third point is that where there is evidence, it often produces
mixed results—sometimes interventions work as intended, sometimes
not, sometimes their effect is neutral, and sometimes they can make
things worse. This book charts a path through these issues by critiquing
the available evidence in the offline world, identifying relevant overlaps
with activities online, and then exploring the potential for them to be so
applied—providing guidance at the same time as to how this might be
undertaken most effectively.
Taking situational crime prevention as an example, and there is
more research on this approach than any other they discuss, evaluations
v
vi SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE
suggest antivirus products are able at detecting and preventing malware

attacks but are less positive about the effectiveness of warning messages
in mitigating malicious hacking. The available evidence bars for other
techniques such as firewalls, passwords, and security awareness pro-
grammes are far less developed.
Mass media messages such as awareness-raising campaigns are found
wanting offline and have a limited applicability to online offending.
Educational workshops may have potential although they will need a
different orientation when applied in the cyber-world. Even good men-
toring programmes can be thwarted by the difficulty of identifying
relevant populations of both offenders and volunteers to help them.
Targeted warnings and cautions by the police to warn potential offenders
are deemed to have some potential where, for example, they focus on
the wrongfulness of the act rather than the offender. Positive diversions
that redirect offenders away from crime have some potential, for exam-
ple, by transitioning malicious hackers to legitimate cybersecurity jobs.
Restorative justice also has some appeal to victims and may help some
offenders.
You will read more. The potential varies with offences and offenders
and the context in which measures are introduced, but what is clear is
that there is a need for more research. Offending has proliferated online
because offences can generally be committed with more anonymity,
where they have less chance of being identified, arrested, and success-
fully prosecuted and where victims are in plentiful supply. We know that
policing generally and the security world specifically have struggled to
keep up with changes, and this book suggests criminologists have too.
Helpfully they outline in their final chapter ways of filling the knowledge
gaps, both in terms of key issues to focus on and the positives and limita-
tions of different evaluation methodologies.
This book is more than about cybercrime. It provides a critique and a
review of crime prevention approaches and charts a way of better identi-
fying how a much-neglected area of enquiry can be better understood,
and, as importantly, how we can best target future prevention efforts.
These alone make it an enticing read.
July 2019 Martin Gill

Acknowledgements
This work has its origins in a programme of research funded through

the Home Office, which studied cybercrime prevention, knowledge,
and practice. The book itself is an outgrowth from a symposium hosted
by the University of Cambridge in late 2017, where the findings from
this programme were presented by the authorship team. In bringing
this research together here in this volume, we hope to contribute to
the extensive work already being done by those within the cybersecurity
community, law enforcement, and the criminal justice system, who con-
tend with cybercrime and its impact every day.
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of several
individuals, without whom this book would not have been possible. First
and foremost, we would like to thank Catherine Schubert for her edito-
rial and research support over the life of this project. Her patience, dil-
igence, and good humour were greatly appreciated by all. We are also
grateful to Ross Anderson, Alistair Beresford, Robert Clarke, Samantha
Dowling, Richard Clayton, Sergio Pastrana, Daniel Thomas, and Julie-
Anne Toohey for their inputs on earlier drafts of this work. In addi-
tion, we would also like to acknowledge the numerous scholars cited
throughout the book, whose high-quality scholarship formed the basis
of our evaluations and discussion. Finally, we would like to express our
gratitude to Liam Inscoe-Jones, Josie Taylor, and the production staff at
Palgrave for their dedication to bringing this book together.
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In closing, the authors would like to acknowledge and thank the

Home Office for funding the original programme of research, as well as
the Centre for Crime Policy and Research at Flinders University for sub-
sequent financial support in the preparation of the manuscript for this
book.
Contents
1 Setting the Scene 1
Part I Primary Forms of Prevention
2 Situational Crime Prevention 17
3 Universal Communication Strategies 35
Part II Secondary Forms of Prevention
4 Educational Workshops 51
5 Mentoring Programs 63
6 Targeted Warnings and Police Cautions 77
ix
x CONTENTS
Part III Tertiary Forms of Prevention
7 Positive Diversions 93
8 Restorative Justice 109
Part IV New Directions
9 Designing and Evaluating Crime Prevention Solutions

for the Digital Age 125
Index 147
List of Tables
Table 9.1 Potential hypotheses and research designs for evaluating

interventions, using the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale 129
Table 9.2 Measures and data sources 133
xi
CHAPTER 1
Setting the Scene
Abstract  The book begins with an introductory chapter that sets the

scene: providing an overview of the core principles associated with crime
prevention targeting that will be drawn upon throughout. It chronicles
the unique aspects of offending within digital contexts, and in particular,
explicates offending lifecycles, and flags significant points of divergence
from what is broadly accepted for offline forms of offending. Next, it
provides a methodological account of the approach taken in researching
this book, before concluding with an overview of chapters to come.
Keywords  Cybercrime · Cyber-dependent crime · Cyber-offender ·

Crime prevention · Cybercrime prevention · Intervention
Introduction
Criminological research has made significant advances in the development,
deployment, and evaluation of the myriad crime prevention strategies
designed to identify and target individuals at various stages of the offend-
ing life cycle. This work, however, is principally rooted in understand-
ings of what may be loosely called ‘traditional’ crime settings (Newman
and Clarke 2003). Cybercrime is a relatively new crime type, and there
has been little systematic attention given to the specific digital settings
and contexts in which it occurs. As a result, many cybercrime prevention
© The Author(s) 2019 1

R. Brewer et al., Cybercrime Prevention,
Crime Prevention and Security Management,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_1
2 R. BREWER ET AL.
recommendations are not necessarily evidence-based. Such initiatives also

tend to ignore the role of the offender (who can often displace to new
targets or methods) and place the onus on victims to protect themselves.
Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers are now seeking more effective
ways to prevent cyber-offenders from attacking certain targets and to prac-
tically facilitate desistance from serious forms of cybercrimes. At present,
they face a largely undeveloped theoretical and empirical body of literature.
Identifying and articulating evidence-based approaches to cybercrime
prevention is critical due to the increasingly serious economic, national
security, and political harms associated with the now-routine reports of
compromised computer systems that have been used to access, reveal,
or resell sensitive data (Franklin et al. 2007; Holt et al. 2016; Hutchings
and Holt 2016; Motoyama et al. 2011). This book addresses this knowl-
edge gap by investigating the applicability of evidence-based interven-
tions to prevent cyber-dependent crimes. That is, crimes that can only
be committed using a computer or network and include such acts as
spreading viruses, malware, spyware, malicious hacking, and distributed
denial of service attacks (DDoS) (McGuire and Dowling 2013).1 These
attacks have become a common global problem: in 2015, more than
1600 data breaches targeting governmental and private organisations
exposed over 707 million records around the world (Gemalto 2015).
Moreover, users of private computers, smartphones, and even medical
devices increasingly report infiltration of their devices by illegitimate users
(Storm 2015). This book adopts a broad definition of cyber-dependent
crime that includes both ‘illicit intrusions into computer networks’, as
well as the ‘disruption or downgrading of computer functionality and
network space’ (McGuire and Dowling 2013, p. 4). Accordingly, the
term ‘cyber-offender’ used throughout this book is also to be construed
broadly—denoting those who use their knowledge to cause harm to,
or directly damage, computer software, hardware, and data. This may
include the use of malware (whether created by the individual or pur-
chased/acquired from others) or exploits, or the manipulation of human
actors to achieve said goals. This breadth is merited due to the range
of interests and attack techniques that can be, and have already been,
1 Such activities can be distinguished from cyber-enabled crimes which are regarded as
‘traditional’ crimes that are augmented through the use of computers or networking tech-
nologies (e.g. fraud) (McGuire and Dowling 2013).
1 SETTING THE SCENE 3
used by individuals to successfully complete a cyberattack. Additionally,

researchers have noted the overlapping interests and skills needed in
order to write malware, engage in DDoS attacks on a fee-for-service
basis, or complete malicious hacks more generally (Décary-Hétu and
Dupont 2012).
Overall, the book aims to make a substantial original contribution to
how the discipline of criminology understands and can reasonably apply
longstanding, tried and tested, traditional crime prevention techniques
to the digital realm, particularly for cyber-dependent crimes. In doing
so, it breaks new ground and articulates the ways that crime prevention
research and practice needs to be reimagined for an increasingly digital
world.
This introductory chapter sets the scene for the book, providing an
overview of the core principles associated with crime prevention tar-
geting that will be drawn upon throughout. It chronicles the unique
aspects of offending within digital contexts, and in particular, explicates
offending lifecycles, and flags significant points of divergence from what
is broadly accepted for offline forms of offending. Next, it provides a
methodological account of the approach taken in researching this book,
before concluding with an overview of chapters to come.
Approaches to Crime Prevention

In crafting any sort of preventative measure, be it on- or offline, it is
important to first consider the point at which (i.e. when) an interven-
tion is most suitable. Taking cues from an established public health lit-
erature, crime prevention scholars acknowledge that interventions can
be designed to target different points (in this case, of the offending life
cycle). These can broadly occur at one of three stages (Brantingham and
Faust 1976). First, interventions can be designed to target the primary
prevention stage, whereby they are intended to target and prevent crim-
inal behaviour before it occurs. Interventions appearing at this stage are
considered to be the most universal, being largely undiscriminating and
targeted at wide populations. Such interventions tend to focus upon
the earliest stages of the offender life cycle, before potential offenders
begin engaging in criminal behaviours. Typically, interventions occur-
ring at this stage involve reducing opportunities for crime, or enhancing
social factors that reduce an individual’s likelihood of becoming involved
in crime. The next stage, classed as secondary prevention, is targeted
4 R. BREWER ET AL.
towards people at risk of embarking on a criminal career, such as chil-

dren who show some signs of delinquent behaviour. Such interventions,
therefore, devote effort and resources towards those who may have an
increased proclivity for criminal conduct, but before they graduate into
more serious offending. Finally, the tertiary prevention stage focuses on
treating individuals after they have become involved in crime. The focus
at this stage is to prevent individuals reoffending. This is the most tar-
geted level of intervention, by which individuals are formally referred
to programming by the criminal justice system following a criminal
conviction.
Determining the appropriate stage at which an intervention is to be
directed can be based on several factors, including characteristics of the
crime and the offender group, as well as more practical considerations
such as resources. In particular, much research suggests the develop-
ment of effective interventions relies on the accurate identification of
factors known to contribute to offending (e.g. Bonta and Andrews
2017; Andrews and Bonta 2010; Andrews et al. 1990; Dowden and
Andrews 1999; Koehler et al. 2013). Considerable research has been
done to explicate such factors—particularly in offline settings. While
criminogenic factors vary somewhat across different criminal popula-
tions (e.g. sexual offenders versus others), there is substantial overlap
between categories, and correlates for criminal behaviour show many
similarities for specific forms of criminal deviance (Bonta and Andrews
2017). The best-validated risk factors for criminal behaviour include:
individual factors, such as being male and young, substance abuse, low
educational achievement/unemployment, lack of structured prosocial
leisure activities, antisocial personality patterns (i.e. impulsivity, poor
problem-solving), antisocial cognition (i.e. attitudes/values/beliefs that
promote criminal behaviour such as lack of empathy, pro-crime justifi-
cations, and anti-law attitudes); family factors, including coming from
a low socio-economic status home, abuse and neglect, poor parental
mental health, parental criminal history, parenting style, and parent–
child relationship (i.e. harsh, lack of affection and supervision); and
social factors, including urban environments, unstable living arrange-
ments, and exposure to delinquent peers (for reviews see Cottle et al.
2001; Gendreau et al. 1996; Lipsey and Derzon 1998; Murray and
Farrington 2010).
Factors Associated with Cyber-Dependent Offending

While cybercrime prevention literature is scant to date (Holt and Bossler
2016), there is a growing body of work explicating the offender charac-
teristics for cyber-dependent crimes. This body of work flags a considera-
ble departure from the above-mentioned broader literature and suggests
that they exhibit distinctive demographic characteristics for which needs
to be accounted. Particular characteristics of cyber-offenders may mean
that interventions designed for other populations have different out-
comes. For example, enrolment in education and employment reduces
the likelihood of traditional offending, whereas it is not statistically sig-
nificant in relation to cyber-offending (Weulen Kranenbarg et al. 2018).
In fact, the relationship between education/employment and crime may
be the inverse when it comes to cybercrime. Studies suggest that older
offenders appear to be gainfully employed, working primarily in the com-
puter security industry (Bachmann 2010; Schell and Dodge 2002), and
many have completed education beyond high school (Bachmann 2010;
Holt et al. 2008, 2009; Schell and Dodge 2002). In fact, said offenders
tend to have a mix of both formal education and knowledge acquired on
their own through reading and experiential learning (Bachmann 2010;
Holt 2007). Empirical studies conducted on online communities of
cyber-offenders (e.g. malicious hackers), however, suggest that offenders
are predominantly under the age of 30 although there are older offend-
ers as well working in the security community (Bachmann 2010; Gilboa
1996; Jordan and Taylor 1998; Schell and Dodge 2002). These younger
people may be attracted to cyber-offending because they have greater
access and exposure to technology, as well as the time to explore technol-
ogy at deep levels.
There is also substantive evidence that like their offline counterparts,
cyber-offenders have a number of social relationships that influence their
willingness to engage in different forms of behaviour over time (Bossler
and Burruss 2011; Holt et al. 2012; Leukfeldt et al. 2017; Skinner and
Fream 1997). For cyber-offenders, online (or virtual) ties are critical in
the formation of social networks and have been shown to serve as an
essential source for technical expertise, tutorials, and malicious software
tools (Décary-Hétu and Dupont 2012; Dupont et al. 2016; Leukfeldt
et al. 2017). Such ties are utilised by cyber-offenders across the globe at
every skill level and commonly manifest through widespread active and
passive participation in Web forums, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), ICQ,
6 R. BREWER ET AL.
and other forms of computer-mediated communication (CMC) (Holt

2009; Jordan and Taylor 1998; Skinner and Fream 1997; Leukfeldt
et al. 2017). Starting first with networked bulletin board systems, and
then later via Web forums, asynchronous CMCs have in particular (since
the late 1970s), served as a key resource for information on systems and
exploits, techniques on malicious hacking, as well as a potential source
of co-offenders. Here, both new and experienced cyber-offenders post
messages and respond to others and are often members of (or simply
browse) multiple forums to gain access to these resources and people
(Landreth 1985; Meyer 1989). In some cases, these forums are used as
a means of connecting to others for the purposes of establishing formal
malicious hacking groups (Slatalla and Quittner 1995). In addition to
these online relationships, cyber-offenders often report close peer asso-
ciations with individuals in the real world who are interested in malicious
hacking (Holt 2009; Meyer 1989; Schell and Dodge 2002; Steinmetz
2015). These networks may form in schools or through casual associa-
tions in local clubs and national conferences (Holt 2009).
This body of research has important implications for the design and
deployment of interventions for cyber-dependent crimes. While there
exists a considerable empirical evidence base for various interventions
across a number of offline contexts, given the divergent and distinctive
criminogenic factors, its usefulness in preventing cybercrime is by no
means assured. The coming chapters will shed light on this uncertainty
by scrutinising this evidence base, and in so doing elucidate the appli-
cability of such pre-existing intervention programs designed to deter
offenders from engaging in cyber-dependent crimes.
Parameters of the Review

In order to address the aims and objectives outlined above in a system-
atic fashion, the review of evidence undertaken in this book adheres to
strict criteria. First, for the purposes of this book, cybercrimes are strictly
defined as cyber-dependent crimes (e.g. writing/distributing viruses
and other malware, malicious hacking, DDoS). This book reviews
available evidence for seven types of commonly deployed interven-
tions for use in cybercrimes, selected for their potential applicability to
cyber-offending. These include forms of Situational Crime Prevention
(SCP) (Chapter 2), Universal Communication Strategies (Chapter 3),
Educational Workshops (Chapter 4), Mentoring Programs (Chapter 5),
Targeted Warnings and Cautions (Chapter 6), Positive Diversions

(Chapter 7), and Restorative Justice Practices (Chapter 8). Further dis-
cussion on each of these interventions and their applicability to digital
contexts is provided at the end of this chapter.
This book considers evidence for the intervention as applied to
cyber-offenders, and also by considering the evidence for the intervention
as applied to individuals engaging in traditional crimes or delinquent activ-
ities. However, in assessing the relevance of the traditional crime research,
populations that share characteristics with the proposed profile of cyber-of-
fenders are given priority. Notably, and unless otherwise specified, the
focus is on studies involving young people up to, and including, the age
of 18 years. Extension beyond this age range is, however, justified where a
paucity of studies directly arising from young people is encountered.
The evidence base examined in this book is inclusive of the inter-
national literature and works published after 1970. It considers only
published empirical evaluation studies and systematic reviews found
in articles, books, reports, and conference papers examining programs
and initiatives undertaken in the context of the above seven named
areas. This review is restricted to empirical studies written in English
only. Given this limitation, it is likely that this review favours interven-
tions designed, developed, and delivered in North America, Europe,
and Australia/New Zealand. However, other regions are incorporated
wherever data are available. It is worth noting that the majority of the
evidence emanates from the USA, where evaluations of juvenile justice
interventions are abundant. Given the scope of the aims and objectives
proposed in this book, a wide range of empirical research (including
studies using either quantitative or qualitative methods), encompassing a
variety of study designs, are considered.
Overview of the Book

The chapters ahead explore the crime prevention interventions most
commonly applied to crime problems. These include interventions spe-
cific to juvenile and young adult offenders, as well as changes to the
environment in which crime may occur. We review their theoretical
underpinnings and evidence for their efficacy. Most importantly, we con-
sider their potential utility in the digital realm, given the unique features
of the online environment. These main chapters are grouped together
across four distinct parts.
8 R. BREWER ET AL.
Part I examines types of interventions that are directed at prevent-

ing criminal behaviour before it occurs—that is, at the primary preven-
tion stage. To this end, SCP and universal communication strategies are
explored.
Chapter 2 examines a broad range of techniques known as SCP. This
form of intervention takes cues from a host of theoretical perspectives
and involves the design and manipulation of the environment to make
offenders’ decisions to become involved in crime less attractive (Clarke
1995). The use of SCP is widespread in traditional contexts and is by
far the most commonly deployed form of intervention in the preven-
tion of cybercrime. Though extensive criminological research has found
that SCP techniques can be successfully applied in traditional settings, it
is still unclear whether SCP interventions can effectively prevent cyber-
crime. This chapter scrutinises available empirical evidence regarding the
potential effect of SCP approaches (e.g. target hardening, surveillance,
posting instructions) in deterring offenders from engaging in and esca-
lating cybercrimes. It concludes by revealing the limitations of SCP in
preventing cybercrime, as well as by elucidating the most promising con-
figurations of SCP interventions in digital contexts moving forward.
Chapter 3 rounds out the first part of this book by exploring univer-
sal communication strategies: mass media messages that aim to deter
people from considering or committing crimes. These interventions are
underpinned by rational choice theories of crime (Cornish and Clarke
1986) and typically attempt to alter individuals’ perceptions of the risks
and rewards of offending. Mass media communications target a wide
audience and have been traditionally applied to common crimes such
as drink-driving. We consider the evidence, finding that overall there is
very limited support for the effectiveness of communications at reduc-
ing offline forms of crime. Though universal communications have
been applied to some extent in the digital realm, no evaluations have
been conducted to assess their effectiveness. We describe the limitations
of such strategies in digital contexts and provide a set of guidelines for
design of communication strategies in this realm.
Part II of this book examines interventions consistent with the
secondary prevention stage. That is, interventions that are targeted at spe-
cific individuals who may be at risk of engaging in serious forms of crime.
To this end, we explore several interventions associated with this stage,
including the use of educational workshops, mentoring programs, and
the use of targeted cease-and-desist messaging.
Chapter 4 investigates the use of educational workshops in prevent-

ing crime. This type of intervention brings together groups of individu-
als deemed at risk of offending to educate them about the consequences
of crime, or to promote positive behaviours and skills that reduce the
likelihood of committing crime. Though educational workshops vary
widely in terms of theory and content, most commonly they rely on
social-cognitive theories of learning. School-based workshops have been
applied extensively to combat illicit drug use, gang involvement, and
general delinquency with varying success—some with positive effects,
and some with negative effects. We conclude that workshops can be an
effective way to reduce crime, but this depends greatly on the content
and style of workshop deployed. However, to date, this strategy has not
been widely utilised to deal with cybercrime, and consequently there is
virtually no research on the success (or otherwise) of this strategy. We
discuss the applicability of workshops in this space, explicating the fea-
tures that would likely increase the success of this intervention in reduc-
ing cybercrime.
Chapter 5 examines interventions that can be broadly categorised as
mentoring. Mentoring is underpinned by a philosophy that promotes
supportive interpersonal relationships that offer guidance to young peo-
ple throughout their social-emotional, cognitive, and identity develop-
ment (Rhodes 2002, 2005). This chapter chronicles the popularity of
mentoring as being one of the most commonly deployed interventions
to prevent youth delinquency across traditional contexts, while at the
same time drawing together a robust evaluation research literature that
reveals only a modest-moderate effect associated with the intervention
for those at risk of, or already engaged in, delinquency. Although to
date, no research has examined either the utility or efficacy of mentor-
ing as an intervention to target young people involved in cybercrime, we
nevertheless argue that key lessons can be drawn from the extant offline
crime prevention literature about future prospects in digital contexts. In
making these arguments, we tease out the various factors associated with
successful mentoring interventions and create a blueprint for the future
design and deployment of such interventions.
Chapter 6 explores more coercive tactics, that involve the use of tar-
geted warnings and cautions (i.e. cease-and-desist messaging) by police
to warn potential offenders and deter them from future offending. These
interventions rely on rational choice and labelling theories of crime.
This chapter examines the results of studies that have evaluated such
10 R. BREWER ET AL.
interventions for offline crimes, given the dearth of online evaluations.

Overall, we find that most of the evidence indicates qualified support for
the intervention. Although cease-and-desist visits and targeted preven-
tion messaging have been used in the context of cybercrime, there is lit-
tle known about how effective they are. In exploring the applicability of
these interventions to cybercrime, we highlight their limitations within
digital contexts and provide recommendations for optimal design of this
strategy for preventing cybercrime.
Part III of this book explores interventions aligning with the tertiary
prevention stage. As described above, such interventions focus on treating
individuals after they have become involved in crime, so as to prevent
them from reoffending. Here we explore the use of several prominent
forms of programming following a criminal conviction, including the use
of various positive diversions, as well as restorative justice practices.
Chapter 7 examines the use of positive diversions in reducing crime.
Positive diversions attempt to avoid the criminogenic effect of traditional
criminal justice procedures (e.g. via labelling and/or peer contagion) by
replacing these procedures with rehabilitative or prosocial activities (e.g.
arts, education, sporting activities). This chapter reviews the evidence for
such interventions, concluding that the findings are mixed, with some
diversions showing positive effects and others showing negative effects.
We then explore the applicability of positive diversions to cybercrime,
finding that although there is no research evidence for their effectiveness,
there is some anecdotal evidence that redirecting cyber-offenders into
cybersecurity programs or training could be beneficial. We conclude by
discussing what an ideal positive diversion program would look like for
cyber-offenders, drawing out the factors that would likely lead to its suc-
cess in the digital realm.
Chapter 8 investigates a series of interventions that fall under the ban-
ner of restorative justice procedures. These procedures offer an informal
alternative to formal court processes and typically involve bringing the
offender and the victim together to discuss the harm caused, as well as
measures to remediate the harm and assist the offender to avoid future
offending. Restorative justice is influenced by re-integrative shaming the-
ory (Braithwaite 1989), which argues that holding offenders accountable
for their crimes in a socially re-integrative way can facilitate reconciliation
and healing. We review the research literature, finding that the evidence
for restorative justice interventions in reducing recidivism for traditional
crimes is mixed, and overall, weak. To date, there are no studies that
have empirically assessed the use of restorative justice practices in relation

to cybercrimes of any kind, though some scholars have speculated as to
their potential applicability. We outline the difficulties of applying restor-
ative justice interventions to the online context and formulate a proposal
for best-practice restorative justice procedures for cybercrime.
Part IV of this book contains the final chapter (Chapter 9) which,
draws together the key empirical strands that have emerged through-
out and explicates the practical dimensions of this work. It acknowl-
edges first, that there has been very little research evaluating the effects
of crime prevention initiatives on cybercrime. It then outlines ways in
which this gap can be addressed in the future, and some of the issues
that both researchers and practitioners will need to be aware of when it
comes to implementing and evaluating cybercrime interventions. This
chapter concludes by offering a number of recommendations for prac-
titioners and researchers seeking to evaluate cybercrime interventions in
the future.
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PART I
Primary Forms of Prevention

CHAPTER 2
Situational Crime Prevention
Abstract  This chapter examines a broad range of techniques known

as situational crime prevention (SCP). This form of intervention takes
cues from a host of theoretical perspectives and involves the design
and manipulation of the environment to make offenders’ decisions to
become involved in crime less attractive. The use of SCP is widespread
in traditional contexts and is by far the most commonly deployed form
of intervention in the prevention of cybercrime. Though extensive crim-
inological research has found that SCP techniques can be successfully
applied in traditional settings, it is still unclear whether SCP interven-
tions can effectively prevent cybercrime. This chapter scrutinises availa-
ble empirical evidence regarding the potential effect of SCP approaches
(e.g. target hardening, surveillance, posting instructions) in deterring
offenders from engaging in and escalating cybercrimes. It concludes by
revealing the limitations of SCP in preventing cybercrime, as well as by
elucidating the most promising configurations of SCP interventions in
digital contexts moving forward.
Keywords  Antivirus software · Computer monitoring ·

Computer surveillance · Malicious software ·
Situational crime prevention · Warning messages

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_2
18 R. BREWER ET AL.
Introduction
In order to facilitate safe and secure Internet infrastructures, many cor-
porations and individuals use technical tools and security policies that
aim to configure the online environment in such a way that reduces the
probability of cybercrime from occurring or progressing. For instance,
firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems are commonly
used by large organisations to prevent the progression of cybercrime
(Bace and Mell 2001). Similarly, one important policy often incorpo-
rated into contemporary computing environments is the implementation
of surveillance means in users’ computer systems (Eivazi 2011). These
and other approaches to prevent the development of cybercrime coincide
with the list of crime prevention strategies that are recommended by the
situational crime prevention (SCP) perspective (Homel and Clarke 1997;
Cornish and Clarke 2003), originally designed to prevent the occurrence
of offline crimes.
In this chapter, we explore the theoretical underpinnings of the SCP
approach to crime prevention and details how this suite of techniques
has been applied in both offline and digital contexts. We then scrutinise
the available empirical evidence regarding the potential effect of SCP
approaches in deterring cyber-offenders from engaging in or escalating
their criminal activities. Despite the growing number of individuals and
organisations that implement these tools and policies on their computing
environments, the effectiveness of these strategies in preventing and miti-
gating the occurrence of malicious cyber activities is limited. This chapter
concludes by revealing the limitations of SCP in preventing cybercrime,
as well as by elucidating the most promising configurations of SCP inter-
ventions in digital contexts moving forward.
Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

The SCP perspective (Clarke 1995) is focused on the occurrence and
development of criminal events. The underlying premise of this per-
spective is that criminals are rational creatures who weigh the costs
and benefits of their behaviours, so successful crime prevention efforts
must involve the design and manipulation of human environments
to make offenders’ decisions to become involved in crime less attrac-
tive (Clarke 1995). Emphasising the centrality of offenders’ decision-
making processes in determining involvement in deviance and crime,
2 SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 19
Clarke (1995) differentiated between individual decisions to become

involved in crime (i.e. criminal involvement) and decisions to become
involved in a particular criminal event. According to Clarke (1995),
individuals first decide whether they are willing to become involved in
crime in the first place. This decision is largely influenced by past learn-
ing and experiences (including one’s moral code) and a range of back-
ground characteristics (demographic and social). Once the choice to get
involved in crime is made, individuals need to decide whether to commit
particular offences. This decision is largely determined by the immediate
situations and criminogenic opportunities individuals encounter.
Importantly, Clarke (1995) acknowledged the prevalence of situa-
tions conducive to crime in the lives of most people, and the commis-
sion of risky behaviours and illegal acts by both ‘ordinary citizens’ and
‘hardened offenders’. Incorporating this insight with the notion that
the decision to initiate a risky behaviour is induced by the absence of
moral opprobrium attached to criminal opportunities, Clarke (1995)
contended that both property and violent offences may be effectively
prevented by reducing the opportunity for criminal events and deter-
ring offenders from violating the law. Therefore, Clarke (1995) rec-
ommended the adoption of crime-specific prevention strategies (e.g.
strategies targeting theft, robbery, burglary, vandalism, etc.) that fall into
five categories: (1) increase offenders’ effort; (2) increase offenders’ risks;
(3) reduce offenders’ rewards; (4) reduce provocations; and (5) remove
excuses (Cornish and Clarke 2003).
Current Applications
SCP approaches have also been used extensively in the offline or ‘tradi-
tional’ contexts. In fact, many of the 25 techniques discussed in Cornish
and Clarke’s (2003) elaboration of the SCP perspective have proven
useful in reducing different types of offline crime. For example, after
reviewing a set of 41 studies, Welsh and Farrington (2008a) reported
that CCTV cameras were effective in reducing vehicle crimes, consistent
with the SCP strategy that calls for increasing formal surveillance. Welsh
and Farrington (2008b) further reported that improved street lighting
significantly reduces the probability of crime in public space, consist-
ent with the SCP strategy that calls for assisting natural surveillance.
Similarly, after reviewing evidence from 19 studies, Bennett et al. (2009)
reported that neighbourhood watches are effective in reducing crimes
20 R. BREWER ET AL.
in residential communities, consistent with the SCP strategy that calls

for extending guardianship. Finally, several studies suggest that warning
signs are effective in deterring claim padding of insured persons (Blais
and Bacher 2007) and unsafe driving (Rama and Kulmala 2000).
While these studies and systematic reviews present evidence regarding
the effectiveness of these specific SCP techniques in preventing crime,
extensive criminological literature extends anecdotal evidence regarding
the potential of these and other techniques in preventing a wide range
of crimes, including aircraft hijackings, robbery (Crow and Bull 1975;
Scott et al. 1985; Jeffrey et al. 1987), vandalism (Sloan-Howitt and
Kelling 1990), adolescent joyriding (Bell and Burke 1992), and shop-
lifting (Farrington 1993). For a comprehensive review of the effec-
tiveness of SCP techniques in preventing different types of crimes, see
Crawford and Evans (2017), Guerette and Bowers (2009), and Cozens
et al. (2005).
The growing volume of cybercrime incidents during the last fif-
teen years has led criminologists and information scientists around
the world to explore effective ways of preventing cyber-offenders
from victimising individuals and large organisations. Many scholars
have examined the utility of the 25 SCP techniques in preventing dif-
ferent types of cybercrime. These interventions manifest as a number
of distinct forms that include the use of firewalls (e.g. Lyu and Lau
2000; Surisetty and Kumar 2010), antivirus programs (e.g. Algaith
et al. 2016; Lévesque et al. 2013, 2016), intrusion detection or pre-
vention systems (e.g. Faysel and Haque 2010; Seeberg and Petrovic
2007; Garg et al. 2006; Lévesque and Fernandez 2014), vulnerabil-
ity patching (e.g. Dacey 2003; Gerace and Cavusoglu 2009; Korman
et al. 2017; Nayak et al. 2014), warning messages (e.g. Maimon et al.
2014; Testa et al. 2017), the use of passwords (e.g. Bonneau 2012;
Cazier and Medlin 2006; Florêncio et al. 2016), police crackdowns
(see Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2017), honeypots (see Algaith et al.
2016; Kambow and Passi 2014; Ramsbrock et al. 2007), surveillance
in computers (e.g. Eivazi 2011; Wilson et al. 2015), audit trails (e.g.
Berlin et al. 2015; Guttman and Roback 1995), website takedowns
(e.g. Hutchings et al. 2016), fraud detection systems, and spam filter-
ing (e.g. Hutchings et al. 2019).
Evidence Base for the Intervention

Given the burgeoning interest in SCP and the extent to which such strat-
egies have been deployed in preventing cybercrime, there is a small but
growing experimental and quasi-experimental evidence base demonstrat-
ing its effectiveness as an intervention. These scientific evaluations use
methodologically robust research designs (see further Chapter 9) to draw
conclusions about the effectiveness of some of the above-mentioned
interventions in preventing and mitigating cybercrime—particularly via
the use of antivirus software, and the deployment of warning messages,
as well as the use of monitoring and surveillance systems. This evidence
base will now be canvassed.1
First, Antivirus software programs are designed to keep computer
devices clean from malicious software (malware) such as viruses, worms,
and trojans (Sukwong et al. 2011) and are commonly deployed on com-
puter and smartphone users’ devices as the last line of defence against
cybercrime (Algaith et al. 2016). In general, several key approaches are
employed by scholars when evaluating the performance of antivirus
software. The typical evaluations conducted by commercial and schol-
arly labs are based on scans of collected or synthesised malware samples
(PC Security Labs 2013; Algaith et al. 2016; Bishop et al. 2011). While
this approach may test the program’s accuracy, it fails to consider com-
puter users’ behaviours with their computers. An alternative approach
for evaluating antivirus software performance is through the use of an
on-demand detection tool that can detect both the presence of threats
on the scanned computer and the availability of antivirus software (AV
Comparatives 2011). Although informative, these studies are subject
to sample selection bias because the samples they employ include com-
puter users who bought the scanning service only. Another approach
for assessing the effectiveness of antivirus software employs computer
users’ self-reports on security incidents they experience with their com-
puters, as well as reports on the presence of antivirus software on their
computers (Eurostat 2011). Unfortunately, these studies draw on survey
1 It is important to note that evidence reviewed did not include findings which reported
results of scans performed under lab conditions (of either collected or synthesised samples
of attacks). Although valuable for providing insights regarding specific features of these
tools and policies, these examinations are not representative of real-life situations since they
do not account for human, organisational, environmental, and other external factors that
may influence the performance and execution of these tools in the field.
22 R. BREWER ET AL.
methodology and may include multiple inaccuracies. Finally, two recent

studies (Lévesque et al. 2013, 2016), described below, employed trials to
assess the effectiveness of antivirus products in detecting and preventing
malware infections among computer users.
In 2013, Lévesque et al. provided 50 participants with new laptops
and monitored their real-world computer usage via various diagnos-
tic tools over a period of four months. These scholars also conducted
monthly interviews with the participants and administered question-
naires among them. The authors reported that during the four months
of the experimental period, 38% of the study participants were exposed
to malware. Accordingly, the authors suggest that almost 1 out of 2
newly installed laptops would have been infected with malware within
4 months if the computers had no antivirus software installed. In addi-
tion to determining the overall exposure to malware infection, the
authors also explored the proportion of malware infections that went
undetected by the antivirus software during the experimental period.
They reported that 20% of the study computers were infected by some
form of malicious software that was not detected by the antivirus soft-
ware that was installed on the machine.
In their second and more extensive investigation, Lévesque et al.
(2016) reported on a large-scale cohort study that was aimed to test the
effectiveness of different antivirus products in detecting and prevent-
ing malware infections. Using data collected from millions of comput-
ers that had the Microsoft Malicious Software Removal Tool and Microsoft
Windows Defender (Microsoft’s default antivirus software) installed, these
scholars reported results from a natural experiment: malware infection
was the outcome and being protected by a third-party antivirus prod-
uct was the exposure measure. Specifically, by monitoring close to 27
million Windows 10 systems for a period of 4 months, the scholars were
able to differentiate between systems that were protected by third-party
antivirus products (the treatment group) and systems that were pro-
tected by Microsoft Windows Defender, the control group. Using this
data, they tested the probability of these computers to become infected
with malware. The authors found that 1.22% of the computer systems in
the experimental group were infected by malware during the experimen-
tal period. In contrast, 14.95% of the computer systems in the control
group could have been infected by malware if no antivirus products were
protecting them. A comparison of the effectiveness of the 10 most prev-
alent antivirus products (more than 90% of the systems were protected
by third-party software) revealed that the effectiveness of these products

in detecting malicious software ranged from 90 to 98%. In summary,
antivirus programs appear to be an effective strategy for discovering and
preventing against malware infection, providing that the malicious soft-
ware signature is already updated in the antivirus software’s database of
malicious signatures.
Warning messages are intended to modify people’s behaviours and
serve as reminders about the hazards involved in a particular action
(Wogalter 2006). We review targeted warnings and cautions in Chapter
6—that is, warnings delivered by law enforcement personnel to identify
individuals who have engaged in criminal activity or are likely to do so
in future. In contrast, here we review generic warning messages that are
more closely aligned with the SCP perspective. That is, messages dis-
played by automated software to offenders in situ (i.e. the online space
as the potential crime is occurring) that are designed to prevent the com-
mission of the crime or reduce its severity. Maimon et al. (2014) investi-
gated the effect of a warning banner on the progression, frequency, and
duration of system trespassing events. To test their research questions,
the researchers deployed a large set of target computers built for the sole
purpose of being attacked (i.e. honeypots), on the Internet infrastructure
of a large American university. They then conducted two randomised
experiments. In both experiments, the target computers (86 com-
puters in the first experiment and 502 computers in the second) were
set to either display or not display a warning banner once system tres-
passers had successfully infiltrated the systems. Findings from these two
experiments reveal that a warning banner did not lead to the immedi-
ate termination or a reduction in the frequency of trespassing incidents.
Nevertheless, the duration of system trespassing incidents recorded on
target computers with a warning banner was significantly shorter than
those recorded on target computers with no-warning banners. These
differences were observed for both the first system trespassing inci-
dents recorded on each of the target computers and for the overall set
of incidents recorded during the experimental period. Moreover, these
authors reported that the effect of a warning message on the duration of
repeated trespassing incidents was attenuated in computers with a large
bandwidth capacity. A later study replicated Maimon et al.’s (2014) find-
ing that mean duration of a system trespassing event was significantly
shorter with a warning, than under the no-warning condition (Stockman
et al. 2015).
24 R. BREWER ET AL.
Using the data collected by Maimon et al. (2014), Testa et al. (2017)
explored the effect of a warning on mitigating trespassers’ levels of activ-
ity in an attacked computer system. These scholars reported three key
findings. First, the presence of a warning banner on an attacked com-
puter system had no statistically significant effect on the probability of
either navigation or ‘change file permission’ commands being entered
on the system. Second, the presence of a warning banner did not affect
either the probability or the average rate of navigation commands being
entered on computers infiltrated by system trespassers with administra-
tive privileges. However, the presence of a warning banner significantly
increased the proportion of target computers with ‘change file permis-
sion’ commands. Specifically, while 52% of the warning target com-
puters attacked by an administrative system trespasser recorded the
‘change file permission’ command, only 39% of the no-warning tar-
get computers that were attacked by administrative system trespassers
recorded a ‘change file permission’ command. Moreover, the average
rate of ‘change file permission’ commands entered on the warning tar-
get computers was significantly higher than the average rate of ‘change
file permission’ commands on no-warning computers. In contrast, these
authors reported that a warning banner substantially reduced the use of
both navigation and ‘change file permission’ commands on computers
attacked by system trespassers with non-administrative privileges.
Jones et al. (2016) explored what type of warning message—sanction
threats or moral persuasion—were more effective in reducing the prob-
ability of system trespassers manipulating data, and fetching software
and data, while on a compromised computer system. Using a similar
approach to that described in the aforementioned studies, Jones et al.
(2016) deployed the target computers on the Internet infrastructure
of a large Chinese university for a period of four months and waited
for trespassers to use brute force to access these computers. Once they
had accessed the computers, system trespassers were randomly assigned
to one of four experimental conditions (i.e. a 2 × 2 factorial design).
In the first treatment condition, the target computers were configured
to present an ‘altruistic’ message of moral persuasion. In the second
treatment condition, the target computers were set to present a ‘stand-
ard’ legal sanction threat. In the third treatment condition, the target
computers were configured to display an ‘ambiguous’ warning message.
Finally, target computers in the control condition were set to present
no message to trespassers. The authors found no significant effect from
the presence of legal warnings or ambiguous warnings on either the

proportion or volume of ‘change and fetch’ commands entered onto
target computers. However, the message of moral persuasion was found
to be effective in decreasing both the proportion and volume of ‘change
and fetch’ commands entered by system trespassers on a compromised
computer system. Finally, Howell et al. (2017) used the data collected
by Jones et al. (2016) to explore the effectiveness of different types of
warnings (i.e. sanction threats or moral persuasion) in reducing the
probability of ‘reconnaissance’ commands being entered on the target
computers. None of these warnings were found to have a significant
effect. These authors speculate that those system trespassers who would
have utilised tactical skills to avoid detection on the attacked system were
deterred from logging any keystroke command followed by observing
the warning.
In summary, warning messages are relatively ineffective in prevent-
ing the occurrence of system trespassing events, yet could be somewhat
effective in mitigating their consequences and influencing system tres-
passers’ online behaviours in the attacked computer systems. It is worth
flagging the one potential limitation of this body of work is that it was
not possible to account for automated scripts. It was, therefore, not pos-
sible to determine with absolute certainty whether the warning banner
was read by a human or merely disrupted the automated script.
One important social configuration that could be incorporated into
contemporary computing environments is the implementation of mon-
itoring and surveillance in the system (Eivazi 2011; Moore 2000).
Indeed, contemporary computer environments can be divided into two
broad categories: fortresses and weakly fortified. Fortress computer
environments have substantial control and supervision over their users’
access to, and operations on, the system (Ciocchetti 2011; Moore 2000),
and incorporate security mechanisms that primarily protect against an
external attack. Security professionals who maintain these environ-
ments perform frequent security audits on these computer networks,
and monitor employees’ computer and network activities (Hassan et al.
2015). Consistent with the implementation of surveillance in the physi-
cal environment (Welsh and Farrington 2009), the application of moni-
toring in computing environments is intended to increase social control
by improving the probability of rapid detection of any undesired use of
the system, whether by legitimate (D’Arcy and Herath 2011; Ciocchetti
2011; Moore 2000) or illegitimate users (Hsiao et al. 1979).
26 R. BREWER ET AL.
Wilson et al. (2015) sought to determine whether a surveillance

banner displayed to system trespassers upon entry to a computer sys-
tem would: (1) reduce the probability of computer commands being
entered into the compromised system during the first system trespass-
ing incident; (2) reduce the volume and probability of repeated system
trespassing incidents on a target computer; and (3) persist during sub-
sequent system trespassing incidents. These authors deployed target
computers on the Internet infrastructure of a large American university
for a period of seven months and waited for trespassers to use brute
force to access these computers. Once they had accessed the computers,
system trespassers were randomly assigned to one of four experimen-
tal conditions. In the first condition, the target computers were config-
ured to display a surveillance banner upon each entry to the system. In
the second condition, no banner was displayed, yet a surveillance-based
process, which could have been easily discovered by the trespassers, was
embedded in the background. In the third condition, target computers
were configured to present both the surveillance banner and run this
surveillance software. In the last condition, the target computers had
neither the surveillance banner nor the surveillance software installed.
The authors found that the presence of a surveillance banner in the
attacked computer system reduced the probability of commands being
typed during longer first system trespassing incidents. Further, they
reported that the probability of commands being typed during subse-
quent system trespassing incidents (on the same target computer) was
conditioned by the presence of a surveillance banner and by whether
commands had been entered during previous trespassing incidents.
However, the surveillance banner was found to be ineffective in reduc-
ing the volume and probability of repeated system trespassing incidents
on a target computer.
Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

Governmental agencies, private corporations, and individuals around
the globe employ a wide range of technical tools and security policies in
an effort to reduce their probability of becoming victims of cybercrime.
Many of the security tools and procedures coincide with the list of crime
prevention strategies that are suggested by the SCP perspective (Homel
and Clarke 1997; Cornish and Clarke 2003), which aim to prevent the
occurrence of offline crimes.
One key conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that rigor-
ous evidence regarding the effectiveness of security tools in preventing
and mitigating cybercrime is relatively scarce. Specifically, the availa-
ble evidence regarding the effectiveness of SCP techniques in prevent-
ing cybercrime tends to focus on three key strategies: antivirus products,
warnings, and formal surveillance software and tools. Research on the
effectiveness of antivirus products in detecting and preventing malware
infection reveals that most products are able to detect and prevent most
malware attacks. In contrast, research findings from studies that investi-
gate the effectiveness of warning and surveillance in preventing and mit-
igating malicious hacking reveal that both techniques are limited in their
effectiveness to reduce incidents. It remains unknown whether other sit-
uational crime preventions techniques, such as firewalls, passwords, and
security awareness programs, effectively reduce cybercrime. Given the
promise that these strategies carry, we encourage security researchers to
empirically assess the effectiveness of these strategies more widely in dig-
ital contexts.
One of the underlying reasons behind the relative scarcity of empir-
ical research in this area could be the absence of universally accepted
information security frameworks, theories, and measurement metrics
to provide organisations with practical tools for assessing the effective-
ness of security controls and policies to prevent cybercrime (Torres et al.
2006). Indeed, the most common approach for the implementation of
information security practices in governmental and private organisations
by Information Technology officers draws on their managers’ personal
experience in the field and world views (Siponen and Willison 2009).
Such an approach does not require rigorous empirical evaluations of
security tools and policies in order to support decision-making by these
professionals. However, Blakley (2002) suggests that this approach has
failed to prevent organisations from becoming the targets and victims of
cybercrime. Therefore, Blakely proposes the adoption of an information
security approach that monetises information security and calls for quan-
tifying the effectiveness of security tools and policies in achieving their
stated goals. Since this approach to information security is still relatively
new, there lacks an abundance of evaluations of security control, poli-
cies, and tools. However, with time, and with the realisation that organ-
isations should quantify and evaluate both their cyber-related risks and
the effectiveness of their security posture in mitigating them, there will
likely be an increase in the number of rigorous scientific evolutions of
28 R. BREWER ET AL.
cybersecurity practices in future. Such evaluations should include the

development of security metrics that are clear, objective, repeatable, and
simple (Atzeni and Lioy 2006). Using such agreed upon metrics (e.g.
the volume of malware detected on a computer or the rate of DDoS
attacks experienced per day) will allow security experts to improve their
organisations’ security postures. Moreover, adopting such metrics will
facilitate a better understanding of cybercrime displacement both within
and between organisations’ computer infrastructures. Until then, gov-
ernmental agencies should support independent and objective scientific
efforts that are aimed at testing the effectiveness of security tools and
policies in preventing cybercrime, as well as guide practical efforts for
facilitating a more secure cyber environment for computer and Internet
users around the world.
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CHAPTER 3
Universal Communication Strategies
Abstract  This chapter explores universal communication strategies:

mass media messages that aim to deter people from committing crimes.
These interventions are underpinned by rational choice theories of
crime, and typically attempt to alter individuals’ perceptions of the risks
and rewards of offending. Mass media communications target a wide
audience and have been traditionally applied to common crimes such
as drink-driving. We consider the evidence, finding that overall there is
very limited support for the effectiveness of communications at reduc-
ing offline forms of crime. Though universal communications have
been applied to some extent in the digital realm, no evaluations have
been conducted to assess their effectiveness. We describe the limitations
of such strategies in digital contexts and provide a set of guidelines for
design of communication strategies in this realm.
Keywords  Advertising · Cyberchoices campaign ·

Mass media campaigns · Mass media messaging ·
Rational choice theory · Universal communications
Introduction
This chapter examines universal communication strategies, which aim
to influence the offender calculus of the risks and rewards of criminal
activity. Universal communications are mass media messages primarily

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_3
36 R. BREWER ET AL.
broadcast on television, or through other audio/visual channels (e.g. the

Internet), where they can reach a wide audience. Though the content of
such messages can vary, typically they aim to deter offenders from con-
sidering or committing crimes by warning them about the consequences
of engaging in those behaviours. Alternatively, they involve messaging
aimed to channel would-be offenders away from crime into alternate
behaviour by making this option seem more attractive. A single message
might incorporate aspects of both approaches.
In this chapter, we describe the two principal approaches utilised in
universal communications, and the theory underlying these approaches.
We then critically assess the research evidence for the effectiveness of uni-
versal communications. Although universal communications have been
widely deployed to reduce the occurrence of common crimes (such as
drink-driving and illicit drug use), we find that overall there is very lim-
ited support for their effectiveness. Moreover, though universal com-
munications have been applied to some extent in the cyber realm, no
empirical research has been conducted to assess whether these interven-
tions have been successful in the online context. We argue that commu-
nication campaigns in isolation may be ineffective at shifting behaviour
without broader policy and environmental changes that impact the
decision landscape. Nevertheless, we provide a set of guidelines for the
design of effective communication strategies to prevent cybercrime.

Universal communications rely on a number of theories and logic,
depending on the content of the particular communication. However,
two primary mechanisms underlie the majority of existing communi-
cation strategies. First, messages may attempt to change perceptions of
the risks of offending. In this common approach, mass media campaigns
provide information about the consequences of offending; for example,
by threatening punishment (i.e. increasing the perceived risks associ-
ated with the behaviour). Judgements of risk are influenced by various
aspects, such as the perceived severity and certainty of the punishment
(Nagin 2013; Nagin and Pogarsky 2001). Perceived risks might also be
informed by more emotional (Slovic et al. 2004), or psychosocial dimen-
sions, such as perceived social norms (Ajzen 1991; Akers 1990; Bandura
1971)—for example, in advertisement campaigns that try to persuade
viewers that antisocial behaviour is ‘uncool’. The perceived probability
3 UNIVERSAL COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 37
of detection and conviction appears to be the most influential factor in

reducing crime (see meta-analysis by Pratt et al. 2008). Therefore, uni-
versal communication strategies may be particularly limited when applied
to inherently low apprehension crimes (including cybercrime), in which
threats of punishment may be perceived as hollow.
The second primary mechanism is to promote positive behaviours and
values. Such interventions present an alternative to the offending behav-
iour and associate it with a reward, such that positive ways of respond-
ing are reinforced. For example, a communication may present a person
who uses streaming websites rather than downloading material illegally
as ‘cool’, boosting the reward associated with the desired behaviour.
Both these mechanisms rely on rational choice models of crime (e.g.
Cornish and Clarke 1986; based on classical criminological theory by
Beccaria 1764/2009), whereby individuals make broadly rational choices
about whether to commit crime or not based on the perceived costs and
benefits of engaging in the behaviour.
A special category of universal communications is an appeal to third
parties to intervene, though this mechanism is less common. Rather than
disclosing information about the crime in order to alert the offender
as to the risks and rewards of a given behaviour, awareness campaigns
may raise third parties’ awareness of the nature of crime in the hope that
they will intervene. For instance, a campaign may educate parents about
suspicious behaviours that might suggest their children are engaged in
offending behaviour, with the aim of encouraging parents to have a dis-
cussion with their children. Essentially, such campaigns appeal to the
rewards of intervening (e.g. a personal moral reward for doing the right
thing) or to the consequences of not intervening (e.g. a loved one will
face penalties).
Broadly speaking, universal communications aim to reach as large a
proportion of the population as possible, in order to deter individuals
before they engage in criminal behaviour. Universal communication
strategies are most relevant to individuals without a strong history of
engaging in negative behaviours that compete with the desired behav-
iour change; heavily reinforced behaviours are most difficult to shift.
Moreover, once an individual is already entrenched in a criminal life-
style, a host of additional factors is likely to be maintaining the behaviour
38 R. BREWER ET AL.
(Laub and Sampson 2001). This makes it increasingly unlikely that a

simple media message could be influential.
Appeals to third party intervention, on the other hand, are most
likely to function at the secondary or even tertiary prevention level, by
alerting third parties to suspicious behaviour so that criminal behaviour
is prevented from occurring or reoccurring. Universal communications
could also be directed at individuals who are already engaging in crimi-
nal activity in order to prevent further escalation (secondary prevention).
We explore the utility of more targeted messages aimed at offenders in
Chapter 6.
Very little has been done to tackle cybercrime through mass media
campaigns, though there have been some attempts to reduce incidences
of digital piracy and cryptomarket trade (Adermon and Liang 2014;
Bhattacharjee et al. 2006; Ladegaard 2018). Another exception is the
UK National Crime Agency’s Cyberchoices campaign, a multicomponent
cybercrime prevention strategy launched in 2015. In this campaign, a
series of short videos were posted online and shown in cinemas empha-
sising the consequences of cybercrime. Some advertisements showed
ex-offenders discussing the way their offending has ruined their lives and
promoting legitimate career opportunities for cyber skills, while other
advertisements were aimed at parents to raise their awareness of cyber-
crime. The Cyberchoices strategy also involved design and distribution of
in-class teaching materials for school children—though this component is
not relevant to this chapter (see instead Chapter 4).
While universal communication strategies are clearly in their infancy
in relation to cybercrime, they have been widely deployed in the offline
context—albeit selectively. Drink-driving and illicit drug use have been
common mass media campaign targets.
Evidence Base for Intervention

We could only identify three studies that have examined the effects of
media communications in the cyber context. A quasi-experimental study
on digital piracy revealed initial positive gains of publicised anti-piracy
laws, but these tended to disappear in the long term when the law was
not strongly enforced (Adermon and Liang 2014). A lack of enforce-
ment may reinforce the perception that risk of apprehension is low.
Supporting this notion, a survey found that more prolific file sharers had
increased awareness of the illegality and sanctions associated with their

behaviour, yet were less likely to believe they would be caught, relative to
low sharers (Cox and Collins 2014).
A potential solution to the problem of low apprehension crimes is to
increase the perceived likelihood of detection by publicising successful
enforcement activities. One longitudinal study found that legal threats
in the USA (in the form of highly publicised lawsuits against file shar-
ers) generally had a negative impact on digital piracy (Bhattacharjee
et al. 2006). While the initial public announcement to pursue legal
actions against offenders did not necessarily reduce piracy (in fact, some
increased their file sharing), the news of lawsuits being filed against
offenders decreased piracy, particularly after more intrusive measures
were employed to track down offenders. In contrast, Ladegaard (2018)
failed to find a positive effect of law enforcement media coverage on
cybercrime. Using a time series analysis, this study examined the effects
of media coverage of cryptomarket arrests and related law enforcement
efforts on digital drug trade activity. In fact, trade increased after peri-
ods with elevated media coverage, and also after court events. Analysis
of cryptomarket forum discussions following these events suggested that
subjective perceptions of risk may be harder to budge, or less effective
in deterring criminal activity, when such behaviour is ideologically driven
(i.e. morally justified by perpetrators). Moreover, discussions revealed
that the prosecution of a drug market founder was perceived to be a
result of chance (specifically, an amateur mistake that could have been
avoided), such that publicised prosecutions may inadvertently betray
weaknesses in law enforcement systems and thereby reduce the perceived
risk of apprehension (Ladegaard 2018).
While evidence of the effectiveness of universal communications in
reducing cybercrime are limited at this time, there is a wealth of evi-
dence regarding universal communication strategies in the offline con-
text. Overall, universal communications have had very mixed success at
reducing reoffending, though campaigns vary considerably in terms of
their content and thus their effects. There is an incredibly large number
of ways that such a strategy could be deployed (i.e. variance in the spe-
cific characteristics of the message). Beyond this there is a diverse range
of individual and situational factors varying across crime contexts that
may influence the effectiveness of a particular strategy at any one time.
Nevertheless, some of the broad research findings are highlighted below.
40 R. BREWER ET AL.
As will be detailed across a range of behaviours, the most effective

media strategies for behaviour change have typically consisted of more
than a one-off communication about the consequences of a behaviour—
they must also provide a solution. When individuals are not pre-
sented with an adequate means to change their behaviour, fear can
motivate avoidance (Rogers 1975; Witte and Allen 2000). Moreover,
when threat appeals are too strong, emotional response may inter-
fere with message processing (Petty and Wegener 1998). It is not
surprising, then, that health campaigns that rely on fear alone are inef-
fective. For instance, a quasi-experimental study found that homosex-
ual men reacted to the AIDS ‘grim reaper’ campaign in Australia the
1980s with helplessness and avoidance of behaviour change, relative to
those receiving sensitive, sexually positive material or no material at all
(Rosser 1992).
Two recent meta-analyses found that mass media campaigns in isola-
tion had no effect or a negative effect (i.e. an increase) on young peoples’
illicit drug use (Ferri et al. 2013; Werb et al. 2011). Werb et al. (2011)
caution that anti-drug campaigns can increase curiosity and the percep-
tion that drug use is widespread, leading to increased drug use. These
iatrogenic effects appear to be more marked for younger teen audiences.
A survey examining the impact of an anti-drug campaign in the USA
revealed that campaign awareness was associated with increased drug use
for 12–14 year olds but not for 15–18 year olds (Scheier and Grenard
2010). Additionally, another meta-analysis indicated that media efforts
to reduce substance abuse are most effective when messages include
alternatives to use and positive attitudes towards non-use (Derzon and
Lipsey 2002).
It is difficult, however, to separate the effect of media campaigns from
the policy changes that often accompany them (Wakefield et al. 2010).
Intensive mass media campaigns have been shown to have some effect
on reducing smoking initiation in young people (Brinn et al. 2010;
Wakefield et al. 2010), but changes in tobacco pricing, availability, and
advertising over the same time period have likely all played a role in the
decreased prevalence of smoking. Indeed, scholars argue that the most
effective programs focusing on alcohol use tend to include broader pol-
icy-driven environmental changes (Kelly-Weeder et al. 2011). Similarly,
media campaigns can be effective in reducing drink-driving rates across
the whole population when they are accompanied by visible enforcement
(i.e. increasing the certainty of detection; Elder et al. 2004; Tay 2005;
Wakefield et al. 2010). This is consistent with research in Australia which

found that random breath testing was more effective than legislation (i.e.
punishment certainty was more important than punishment severity),
thus the most effective threats must be highly publicised, enforced, and
difficult to evade (Homel 1990). This is, of course, a challenging task for
crimes that are difficult to police, as noted earlier in the chapter regard-
ing efforts to reduce digital piracy and drug market trade.
It is worth noting that much of the research showing positive effects
of communication strategies on drink-driving is not specific to a particu-
lar age group. Nevertheless, some research suggests that younger audi-
ences might be more resistant to such communications, and may in fact
respond negatively to such messages, with some expressing an increased
intention to drink-drive (Glendon and Cernecca 2003; but note that this
was on a self-report measure of behavioural intention, not commission).
Glendon and Cernecca suggest that their findings might be explained by
reactance (Brehm 1966), whereby individuals’ motivation to engage in
a behaviour increases when their freedom to engage in that behaviour
is threatened. The desire for independence and individuality, along with
a disavowal of authority, is common in adolescence (Hong et al. 1994).
The potential for reactance in this group is, therefore, relatively high.
Reactance may be particularly problematic for crimes where the threat-
ened behaviour is greatly valued by the person.
It may also be difficult to deter crimes that are characterised by strong
rewards that virtually supersede any potential risks. A dated—but rela-
tively robust study—evaluated a television campaign designed to deter
vandalism by young boys in England in 1978. The campaign ran two
advertisements: one showed a young boy being visited by a police officer
(i.e. increasing the perceived severity and/or risk of apprehension); and
the other was aimed at parents, imploring them to more closely super-
vise their children. Despite this two-pronged approach, the campaign
was unsuccessful at reducing rates of vandalism in a quasi-experimental
trial across several districts (Riley and Mayhew 1980). In explaining the
failure of the campaign, Riley and Mayhew expressed scepticism about
the ability of mass media to counteract the strong social forces which
underlie and immediately precede vandalism offences. For young people
in particular, crime can confer social acceptance and status in delinquent
peer groups (Warr 2002). This may explain why delinquent peers is one
of the most consistent predictors of criminal recidivism in young people
(Cottle et al. 2001; Grieger and Hosser 2014; Lipsey and Derzon 1998;
42 R. BREWER ET AL.
McGrath and Thompson 2012; Simourd and Andrews 1994). Thus, the
more one is surrounded by criminal peers who model criminal behaviour,
provide rewards for criminal behaviour, and inflict punishment for failing
to engage in criminal behaviour (i.e. social rejection), the less influential
external threats of punishment will be (Matthews and Agnew 2008).
If crime prevention agencies do not understand their target audience,
they have little chance at designing an effective educational strategy.
Researchers in the health field (where communication strategies have a
long history) have emphasised that media campaigns must use researched
and tailored messaging that is appropriate to the audience (Brinn et al.
2010). Importantly, universal communications have been most effec-
tive when health campaigns understand their target audience—their
motivations for engaging in the negative behaviour and the elements
most likely to persuade that audience—and provide useful concrete solu-
tions and information about how to overcome barriers to desired behav-
iour (see systematic reviews by Everett et al. 2011; Grilli et al. 2002;
Noar et al. 2009; Vidanapathirana et al. 2005). Young people in par-
ticular might respond well to messages high in sensation value and when
they come from credible spokespeople (Derzon and Lipsey 2002).
Due to some of the problems in influencing offenders’ behaviour
directly, a number of communication strategies have instead chosen to
appeal to third parties. The most notable example of this is the Crime
Stoppers program, which airs details of a crime on television (often
accompanied by video footage of the suspect) and asks members of the
public to come forward with information. Evaluations have concluded
that Crime Stoppers schemes in general are effective in the detection
and prosecution of crime, though these evaluations did not use com-
parison groups or other quality evaluation methodologies (Gresham
et al. 2001; Rosenbaum et al. 1989). While it is difficult to know
whether such crimes would have been otherwise solved, some com-
mentators are confident that these appeals can be useful (Challinger
2004). However, note that Riley and Mayhew’s (1980) more robust
study of the anti-vandalism campaign discussed above, in which par-
ents were alerted to the possibility that their children were committing
vandalism, did not increase parental supervision or reduce crime rates.
Third party intervention strategies rely on two conditions: that third
parties are aware of the crime and the identity of the criminal (difficult
for more covert criminal activities); and that third parties are willing
and able to intervene in an effective manner. In the above case, parents
may have been unwilling to sanction their children in a meaningful way

that reduced vandalism. The nature of the intervention demanded from
third parties will thus influence its success. It is important to make realis-
tic and feasible demands of third parties.

While there is no research that can speak to the effectiveness of universal
communications in reducing cybercrime, the nature of Internet connec-
tivity and policing strategies to affect cybercrime in particular demon-
strate that it is extremely difficult to influence the offender calculus. The
benefits of cybercrime can be substantial, and the risk of detection seems
low, making it difficult to deter offenders. Furthermore, the fact that
(potential) offenders can readily displace from one target to another in
the face of either sophisticated detection techniques or security makes it
exceedingly difficult to influence their decision to desist completely.
Furthermore, peer associations may diminish the perceived value
of strategies, as they may be able to shape vicarious perceptions of the
certainty of punishment. For young people who have very strong online
peer networks and environmental features that promote criminal behav-
iour, it could be hard to develop effective deterrence messaging even if
salience and severity of the threat is quite high. Moreover, campaigns
might inadvertently increase the perceived value of criminal activities
via reactance or curiosity. Focusing solely on the negative outcomes of
engaging in cybercrime, especially if the message is seen as illegitimate
by adolescents (e.g. delivered by police) is likely to have limited effective-
ness in preventing cybercrime.
Interventions that condemn negative online behaviour while also pro-
moting positive behaviours or attitudes may have some success if used
early on. Successful adoption of desired behaviours will rely on repeated
reinforcement, which would require highly saturated, long-term media
campaigns. Moreover, the content of the message will be critical to
its success and relies on detailed knowledge of the target audience
(cyber-offenders). Research has not yet reliably established the psycho-
logical and social profiles of cyber-offenders, far less their perceptions
of the costs and benefits of cybercrime (i.e. obstacles to desistance and
incentives for change). Without such knowledge, it would be difficult
to pitch a media message appropriately and formulate potential positive
behaviours in this space. Strategies to resist peer pressure may be one
44 R. BREWER ET AL.
potential element of such interventions, given the role of peers in cyber-

crime (Bossler and Burruss 2011; Holt et al. 2012; Skinner and Fream
1997). In any case, communication strategies would be better used as a
part of a wider approach and should not be expected to deliver substan-
tial behaviour change alone.
Appeals to third parties may have limited reach. Cybercrime can be
committed privately and with relative anonymity, thus there may be
a very small pool of potential third party targets for intervention who
are aware of the offending behaviour. From a parent’s perspective, it
may be particularly difficult to distinguish potential cybercrime activity
from innocuous online behaviour (i.e. spending time on the Internet).
It is also unclear what the message should be, if any. Parents may be
unlikely to report their children to the police, but they may benefit from
some softer advice (e.g. to have a discussion with their children about
cybercrime).
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PART II
Secondary Forms of Prevention

CHAPTER 4
Educational Workshops
Abstract  This chapter investigates the use of educational workshops in

preventing crime. This type of intervention brings together groups of
individuals deemed at risk of offending to educate them about the con-
sequences of crime, or to promote positive behaviours and skills that
reduce the likelihood of committing crime. Though educational work-
shops vary widely in terms of theory and content, most commonly they
rely on social-cognitive theories of learning. School-based workshops
have been applied extensively to combat illicit drug use, gang involve-
ment, and general delinquency with varying success—some with positive
effects, and some with negative effects. We conclude that workshops can
be an effective way to reduce crime, but this depends greatly on the con-
tent and style of workshop deployed. However, to date, this strategy has
not been widely utilised to deal with cybercrime; consequently, there is
virtually no research on the success (or otherwise) of this strategy. We
discuss the applicability of workshops in this space, explicating the fea-
tures that would likely increase the success of this intervention in reduc-
ing cybercrime.
Keywords  Cyberbullying · Educational workshops ·

Skill building · Social learning theory

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_4
52 R. BREWER ET AL.
Introduction
This chapter explores the use of educational workshops in prevent-
ing online and offline crimes. This intervention brings together groups
of (potential) offenders in single or multiple sessions for the purposes
of educating them about the nature of crime, and reinforcing prosocial
values and behaviours. Typically, programs are deployed within school
curricula, or may selectively target at-risk adolescents. Workshops can be
didactic (i.e. a presentation of information), but as will be argued, the
active ingredient in workshop effectiveness is the inclusion of interactive
elements, such as discussion, role-play, and providing practical strategies
to combat antisocial behaviour. Specialised programming using trained
professionals has also been used to reduce problematic behaviour, but
this tends to be high cost (requiring clinicians to work directly with fam-
ilies and/or schools, as well as individuals) and intensive (e.g. Hay et al.
2015; Goorden et al. 2016). In this chapter, we instead examine generic
workshops that can be easily and broadly implemented.
This chapter first outlines the theoretical underpinnings for this type
of intervention, describing the various features of workshops that are
thought to reduce crime. We then summarise the evidence for this type
of intervention in the offline context, as well as potential pitfalls. We con-
clude that workshops can be an effective way to reduce crime, but this
depends greatly on the content and style of workshop deployed. Finally,
we discuss the applicability of workshops to prevent cybercrime, explicat-
ing the features that would likely increase the success of this intervention
in the online space.

Though educational workshops vary widely in terms of theory and
content, most commonly they rely on social-cognitive theories of learn-
ing. That is, criminal behaviour is understood as a learned behaviour that
is the result of both social and personal factors (Ajzen 1991; Akers 1990;
Bandura 1971). Workshops focus on providing information about the
negative consequences of crime, as well as teaching psychosocial skills,
such as peer refusal, decision-making, and interpersonal communica-
tion. Particular attention is often paid to resisting negative peer influ-
ences, as the presence of delinquent peers represents one of the most
well-established risk factors for offending (Bonta and Andrews 2017).
4 EDUCATIONAL WORKSHOPS 53
Experiential and interactive components of workshops (e.g. role

playing and practicing skills) are thought to be critical in reinforcing desired
behaviours and cementing prosocial habits (e.g. Gneezy et al. 2011).
The majority of programming is aimed at young adults, with some
targeting youth under the age of 10 years. The bulk is focused at youth
in primary or secondary schools to affect early onset offending behav-
iours. Others more explicitly target groups or individuals deemed to be
at risk of offending, for example workshops for pre-delinquents (those
attracting disciplinary action at school but not yet committing seri-
ous offences). As a result, it can be argued that workshops are meant
to affect youth during the onset or potential acceleration phase of
offending, constituting both primary and secondary modes of crime
prevention.
We were able to identify only a few instances of workshops that specif-
ically target cybercrime. For example, the UK’s National Crime Agency,
in partnership with the Cyber Security Challenge UK, released a les-
son plan for teachers to educate pupils about the nature and effects of
cybercrime. Workshops identified through published research articles,
however, tended to focus on protecting victims from possible harm
(rather than targeting potential offenders). In contrast, workshops have
been—and are—widely deployed in the offline context, most commonly
to target illicit drug use, involvement in gangs, and general delinquency,
as well as broader health behaviours.

To date, there is minimal empirical research on the application of
workshops to cybercrime. One of the few peer-reviewed studies pub-
lished in this space reviewed existing cyber psychoeducation pro-
grams for children (Mishna et al. 2009). Most of these were aimed at
preventing online victimisation, but some targeted perpetration of
problematic online behaviours. Of particular relevance is the i-SAFE
program—a classroom-based curriculum containing five lessons (lasting
approximately 40 minutes each), which provides children with infor-
mation about potential hazards on the Internet, approaches for safely
dealing with those hazards, and activities to help them think about
54 R. BREWER ET AL.
the knowledge they receive and share with their peers. Chibnall et al.
(2006) conducted a quasi-experimental evaluation of i-SAFE across 18
schools in the USA for children aged 9–14 years old. Results showed
that over a nine-month period, the program had some success in chang-
ing attitudes and knowledge behaviour (e.g. knowledge of intellectual
property and piracy), but it had minimal impact on changing offender
behaviours (e.g. spending time on inappropriate websites). Though
the authors speculated that this failure was due to low baseline rates
of the behaviours studied, other reasons may also be offered. The pro-
gram was delivered offline, and while it had an active learning approach
(asking students to think about their own behaviour and talk with
each other to develop perspectives and solutions), in practice teachers
reported that ‘time constraints forced them to use lecture rather than
activities to teach the curriculum (Chibnall et al. 2006, p. 36). Thus,
the learning was in fact rather abstract and didactic, and there were
few opportunities to practice or reinforce actual positive online behav-
iours within the workshop sessions. Without experiential and interac-
tive activities, workshops are likely to be very limited in their effects on
behaviour change (Botvin and Griffin 2004; Soole et al. 2008; Tobler
and Stratton 1997).
Studies on cyberbullying are also potentially informative here, as the
phenomenon operates under similar dynamics to cybercrime, includ-
ing a lack of supervision, high accessibility of opportunities for negative
behaviours in the online environment, and perceived social anonymity.
Best practice for targeting cyberbullying tends to use comprehensive,
whole-of-school interventions (e.g. Pearce et al. 2011), but we located
two studies that examined the effectiveness of discrete workshop-based
programs in preventing the perpetration of cyberbullying. Both studies
showed favourable results for the intervention.
The first: the Arizona Attorney General’s Social Networking Safety
Promotion and Cyberbullying Prevention (SNSPCP) presentation, is
a school-based, single-session workshop for middle school (10–15-year
old) students. The presentation works on three levels, attempting to:
(a) change students’ attitudes, intentions, and behaviours, (b) convince
students that personally relevant and serious threats exist, and (c) pro-
vide students with effective techniques to reduce the threats that they
are able to perform. The presentation was evaluated using a trial with
random allocation to treatment (presentation) or control (no presenta-
tion). Despite its short exposure—a single session—there were significant
effects on self-reported attitudes towards safe Internet use, perception of

the certainty of punishment for cyberbullying, and behavioural intentions
to cyberbully others (Roberto et al. 2014). However, no measures of
actual behaviour change were assessed.
Another program developed in Germany, Media Heroes, consists of
a set of modules run by teachers over either 10 sessions or a one-day
intensive workshop. It has three components: raising awareness of
the consequences and legal risks of cyberbullying; changing norms
(e.g. increasing social responsibility through moral reasoning exercises);
and empathy training (using perspective-taking exercises). It also offers
strategies to protect oneself from becoming victimised. An evaluation
(also using random allocation) of a group of 11–17-year-old students
found that the program reduced self-reported aggressive behaviour
and perpetrated cyberbullying at nine months follow up, with slightly
stronger effects indicated for the multisession format (Wölfer et al.
2014). Both the Media Heroes and SNSPCP programs were experi-
mental designs, providing a good degree of reliability for the findings.
Overall, workshops for cyberbullying appear very promising.
Moving away from online deviance, there is a body of evidence we
can draw upon in understanding the effects of educational workshops
in reducing crime in general. Overall, the evidence suggests that work-
shops can be an effective way to change behaviour, but there is variance
depending on the type and mode of program implemented. For instance,
systematic reviews have found that school-based workshops that are
interactive, challenge beliefs and norms, and develop problem solving
and coping skills, can: reduce illicit substance use (Agabio et al. 2015);
violent behaviour (Park-Higgerson et al. 2008; Wilson and Lipsey 2008);
and general delinquency (Wilson et al. 2001). Similarly, sex education
workshops that address risk and protective factors for (unsafe) sexual
practices in a psychologically safe environment by focusing on building
positive skills rather than imbuing fear have also been effective (Kirby
et al. 2007). Too many individual programs exist to detail every single
one; the results of the reviews above provide sufficient evidence that this
type of intervention has utility in reducing criminal behaviour. We will
now discuss the effects of some of the most popular and well-researched
programs, particularly those providing important lessons regarding the
potential effectiveness of such strategies in the cyber context.
One of the more widely disseminated workshop programs targeting
early adolescents is the Life Skills Training (LST) program developed in
56 R. BREWER ET AL.
the USA, designed to reduce drug and alcohol use as well as general
delinquent behaviour. LST is an intensive program that involves 30 ses-
sions taught over a three year period (15 sessions in the first year, 10
in the second year, and five in the third year) with additional modules
for violence prevention in each year. Training is typically delivered in
class by regular teachers and is designed to enhance personal self-man-
agement skills, as well as social skills to overcome feelings of shyness,
engage with peers in effective ways, and respond to social challenges
using verbal and non-verbal skills. The program also emphasises the
development of resistance skills to combat peer pressure. The program
has been found to be successful in the reduction of juvenile drug and
alcohol use (Botvin and Griffin 2004). The studies are robust, using
random assignment to the experimental and control groups, and diverse
sample populations.
An additional model of note is the recent Promoting School-
University Partnerships to Enhance Resilience (PROSPER) intervention
(Osgood et al. 2013). It is not a program proper, but a delivery system
focused on implementing treatment programs efficiently and effectively
through university, school, and community partnerships. It also eval-
uates their outcomes. An example of this strategy in action was imple-
mented to affect negative peer influence through a reduction in the
individual network centrality of antisocial students in broader social net-
works (Osgood et al. 2013). It focused on the implementation of exist-
ing substance use programming—including the Strengthening Families
Program, Life Skills Training Program, All Stars Program, and Project
Alert—tracking the network centrality and influence of prosocial stu-
dents relative to antisocial students in school communities. Using 28
rural and semi-rural school districts in Iowa (n = 14) and Pennsylvania
(n = 14) based on matched characteristics, a sample of students in grade
six were targeted through a family-focused intervention followed by a
school-based intervention during seventh grade (Osgood et al. 2013).
The students were then followed through grade nine to assess the util-
ity of the treatment. The findings demonstrated that the treatment
reduced the influence of antisocial youth in friendship networks relative
to control (e.g. Osgood et al. 2013, 2015). Evidence also suggests that
the program is associated with reduced illicit substance use and conduct
problems (Spoth et al. 2011).
Other popular programs have limited evidence of effective-
ness. Programming like the G.R.E.A.T. program (developed by law
enforcement agencies in the USA) has a specific component related to the

formation of prosocial peers, prosocial activity involvement, bonding with
non-delinquent peers, and higher bonding with police. The initial imple-
mentation of the program, involving nine one-hour lessons administered
over a nine-week period, was linked with short-term reports of lower rates
of victimisation, negative views of gangs, and greater associations with
prosocial peers (Esbensen and Osgood 1999). A later, more robust ran-
domised study (following a substantial revision to the program) found
that the program promoted positive attitudes and behaviours, and reduced
gang membership at one year and four years post treatment (Esbensen
et al. 2013). However, effects on associations with delinquent peers, vio-
lent offending, and general delinquency were non-significant in both the
one- and four-year periods. As a result, G.R.E.A.T. appears to have a gen-
erally small effect on crime over the long term.
There have been a number of documented cases of workshops pro-
ducing negative effects—that is, increasing the likelihood of criminal
activity. One of the most infamous examples is Scared Straight program,
which was rolled out in schools across the USA through the 1980s and
1990s with much enthusiasm. Aiming to scare children from commit-
ting crime, the program involved visits to prisons where at-risk juveniles
were given confrontational presentations by inmates about life in prison.
Unfortunately, scholars have since concluded that the program increased
the odds of criminal behaviour (see review by Petrosino et al. 2013). The
mechanism underlying the increase in crime is unclear, but one hypoth-
esis is that placing troubled youth together and allowing them to inter-
act can reinforce problem behaviour—a process of peer contagion (Cho
et al. 2005; Dishion et al. 1999; Rhule 2005). Group programming also
introduces the danger that antisocial youth might victimise prosocial
youth in the group (Zhao et al. 2016).
Similarly, a meta-analytic review of a popular school-based program
for children, Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), found that
it had little to no effect on illicit drug use, and in some cases increased
drug use (West and O’Neal 2004). There are two possible reasons for
this. First, DARE is didactic, instructing children about the effects and
consequences of drug use. The program could have simply piqued young
peoples’ interest in drugs without building personal and social skills that
might promote non-use (see also Sanchez et al. 2017). A second expla-
nation for the findings points to the key role played by program facilita-
tors. DARE is delivered by police officers—towards whom young people
58 R. BREWER ET AL.
can feel disinterest or animosity. An authoritarian atmosphere, coupled

with a didactic educational style, is unlikely to promote an inclusive and
interactive learning environment, which is critical in facilitating behav-
iour change (Rosenbaum and Hanson 1998). It should also be noted
that the G.R.E.A.T. program (which was inspired by DARE) is primarily
delivered by uniformed law enforcement officers. This same explanation
might also account for G.R.E.A.T.’s limited effects.

As already noted, there has been some application of educational work-
shops in the cyber realm with promising results—at least for cyberbully-
ing. However, more empirical work is needed to evaluate high-quality
programming before a firm conclusion can be drawn regarding the utility
of such interventions in this space. Successful adoption of desired behav-
iours will rely on repeated reinforcement, which would require multises-
sion interactive workshops.
Certainly, there are some reasons to be optimistic about the potential
for such programming. The literature on cybercrime offending has high-
lighted the significant role of social learning in online criminality (Bossler
and Burruss 2011; Holt et al. 2012; Skinner and Fream 1997). Given this,
peer and social influence elements of workshop programming may have
some impact on cybercrime. The difficulty in this programming lies in the
notion that individuals’ online social networks would need to be targeted
just as heavily as those in the offline world. Strategies to resist online peer
pressures would need to be a key element of such interventions. However,
there is no clear research to date as to how to effectively communicate
such information, aside from existing programs regarding risks of victimi-
sation from talking to strangers online. Such an issue requires substantive
investigation in order to determine the efficacy of any program.
Workshops may also need to recognise and communicate the inherent
fallacies of the techniques of neutralisation espoused by cyber-offenders
(e.g. Chua and Holt 2016; Morris 2011; Turgeman-Goldschmidt 2008).
It would be essential to minimise the acceptance of criminal norms asso-
ciated with hacking (e.g. websites or computers with open vulnerabilities
do not deserve to be exploited). This may be effective, but would have
to be implemented in early childhood so as to capture youth before an
interest in technology could take root.
Lastly, extreme caution should be taken in implementing workshops

with at-risk youth; that is, where group members hold antisocial attitudes
that could be transmitted to lower-risk group members. Best practice in
these cases involves using highly structured programming and careful
monitoring (e.g. Hektner et al. 2017).
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s10802-015-0120-x.
CHAPTER 5
Mentoring Programs
Abstract  This chapter examines interventions that can be broadly

categorised as mentoring. Mentoring is underpinned by a philosophy
that promotes supportive interpersonal relationships that offer guidance
to young people throughout their social-emotional, cognitive, and iden-
tity development. This chapter chronicles the popularity of mentoring
as being one of the most commonly deployed interventions to prevent
youth delinquency across traditional contexts, while at the same time
drawing together a robust evaluation research literature that reveals only
a modest-moderate effect associated with the intervention for those
at risk of, or already engaged in, delinquency. Although to date, no
research has examined either the utility or efficacy of mentoring as an
intervention to target young people involved in cybercrime, we never-
theless argue that key lessons can be drawn from the extant offline crime
prevention literature about future prospects in digital contexts. In mak-
ing these arguments, we tease out the various factors associated with
successful mentoring interventions and create a blueprint for the future
design and deployment of such interventions.
Keywords  Cognitive development · Identity development ·

Juvenile delinquency · Mentoring programs ·
Social-emotional development

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_5
64 R. BREWER ET AL.
Introduction
This chapter examines the utility and efficacy of mentoring programs
as an intervention, which broadly defined, involve the ‘commitment of
time and specific efforts by a more experienced person to the develop-
ment of mutually beneficial, supportive and nurturing relationship with
a less experienced person’ (Moodie and Fisher 2009, p. 1). Programs
incorporating such supportive relationships are regarded as having util-
ity as a corrective experience and intervention for at-risk youth who have
experienced poor relations with parents or other caregivers (Grossman
et al. 2012) and are designed to enhance the personal development of
affected young people (Ainsworth 1989; Rhodes 2005). More precise
definitions as to what mentoring interventions entail vary across contexts
and with respect to outcomes (e.g. reducing forms of delinquency and/
or aggression, promoting scholastic achievement and/or better health
outcomes, etc.).
To begin, this chapter probes the theoretical footings on which
assumptions about the utility of mentoring are based. It then chroni-
cles the popularity of this intervention as being one of the most com-
monly deployed to prevent youth delinquency across traditional crime
prevention contexts, while at the same time drawing together a robust
evaluative research literature that reveals only a modest-moderate effect
associated with the intervention for those at risk of, or already engaged
in, delinquency. Although to date no research has examined either
the utility or efficacy of mentoring as an intervention to target young
people involved in cybercrime, we nevertheless argue that key lessons
can be drawn from the extant research literature about future pros-
pects in digital contexts. In making these arguments, we tease out the
various factors associated with successful mentoring interventions
and create a blueprint for the future design and deployment of such
interventions.

Mentoring interventions are rooted in a wider body of research that
stresses the importance and enduring prosocial benefits of having pos-
itive and supportive interpersonal relationships that offer guidance to
children and adolescents throughout their development (Magnusson
5 MENTORING PROGRAMS 65
and Stattin 2006; Scales et al. 2006). More specifically, Rhodes (2002,
2005) argues that establishing and promoting such positive interpersonal
foundations serve to mobilise interacting developmental processes across
three areas. The first involves social-emotional development, whereby the
provision and modelling of supportive and caring relationships can serve
to challenge negative views held by young people of themselves, peers,
and other adults (Hayes et al. 1996). Moreover, the act of both listen-
ing to and modelling effective mature communication strategies can play
a role in helping young people better understand, regulate, cope with,
and express their emotions (McDowell et al. 2002). Second, support-
ive interpersonal relationships can also serve as a vehicle through which
learning can occur socially and promote cognitive development. Research
has found that young people can, through collaborative learning expe-
riences, develop new lateral thinking skills, and appreciation for proso-
cial values, norms, and perspectives (Radziszewska and Rogoff 1991;
Vygotsky 1978). Third, mentoring relationships can also play a role in
shifting youth perceptions of their current and future selves and thereby
promote identity development (DuBois et al. 2011). Such development
can inform choices made about how to behave. Indeed, Darling et al.
(2002) argue that substantial interpersonal relationships with mentors
have scope to introduce young people to new activities and resources,
as well as educational and vocational opportunities, which they can draw
upon to develop their identities over time.
In order to attain these developmental objectives, mentoring interven-
tions seek to support close positive relationships between young people
and (typically) adult volunteers. Mentoring interventions are increasingly
commonplace and take shape through various community-based and
school or site-based programs. The scope of these programs is broad and
encompasses a diverse range of outcomes that focus on an assortment of
not only delinquent behaviours (including drug and alcohol use, among
other antisocial activities), but scholastic (e.g. academic performance,
drop-outs) and health-related (e.g. obesity) issues as well. Given the wide
applicability of potential mentoring interventions to areas tangential to
crime prevention, only specifically stated delinquency-related outcomes
(e.g. reported offending by self or others, as well as arrest and juvenile
court records) are considered in this chapter. However, we acknowledge
the important links between low educational performance, certain physi-
ological conditions, poor health, and delinquency.
66 R. BREWER ET AL.
The targets for relevant mentoring interventions generally include those
young people who either exhibit a previous or current history of delin-
quent behaviour or exhibit certain characteristics that are assessed as
at risk for juvenile delinquency. The precise definition of what charac-
teristics are captured by the ‘at risk’ label in this context can vary from
intervention to intervention. They tend to correspond to a host of indi-
vidual and environmental risk factors that have been shown to increase
the likelihood of delinquency in later adolescence and adulthood (Tolan
2002; Tolan et al. 2013). Individual risk factors include evidence of ele-
vated levels of aggression, conduct disorders, and poor academic perfor-
mance, as well as antisocial attitudes, beliefs, and values. Environmental
risk factors, on the other hand, include social and familial factors, such as
place of residence; socio-economic status; family and parental influences
(particularly the conviction/incarceration of family members); exposure
to violence, abuse, and gangs; and negative peer relations and influences
(Matz 2014; Tolan and Gorman-Smith 2003).
Although there is scant reference to the use of mentoring interven-
tions in digital contexts, such interventions targeting at-risk populations
have been deployed across numerous offline contexts at various stages of
the offending life cycle. Interventions targeting at-risk youth are abun-
dant and oriented towards prevention, with a focus on reducing the
likelihood of the onset of offending. Interventions targeting juvenile
offenders are also commonplace—with their focus being either diversion-
ary or treatment oriented—addressing the acceleration phase of offend-
ing or promoting desistance.
Mentoring interventions represent one of the most commonly
deployed interventions with respect to the prevention, diversion, and
remediation of youth involved in, or at risk of, delinquent behaviour
(Tolan et al. 2013). Within offline contexts, the popularity of such inter-
ventions has seen considerable investment in, and deployment across,
the world. Such deployment has principally been through the use of an
extensive variety of community-based programs, as well as school or site-
based programs. Some programs are highly localised in nature (confined
to a particular school, community or district), while other larger initi-
atives operate at state, national, and in some cases—including the oft-
cited and researched Big Brothers Big Sisters program—operate on a
global scale.
The remit for these programs is broad and tends to involve young
people who are referred as a preventative measure and as a consequence
of presenting as being at-risk. Moreover, mentoring interventions have
also been applied in a treatment capacity in cases where young people
have a demonstrated history of prior offending behaviour. However, in
such cases, there is considerable variation as to the inclusion or intake
criteria of specific mentoring programs. These range from including only
young people with limited exposure to formal criminal proceedings (i.e.
police cautions, but no formal charges brought), to involving those with
more robust histories that include prior convictions for a wide variety of
offences, such as substance use (drugs and alcohol), motor vehicle theft,
burglary, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct and assault (Blechman
et al. 2000; Fo and O’Donnell 1975; Hanlon et al. 2002).

While at present, no publicly available peer-reviewed evaluation research
has examined either the utility or efficacy of mentoring as an interven-
tion to target young people involved in cybercrime, considerable schol-
arly attention has evaluated the use of such interventions in an offline
context. That is, there exists a substantial body of experimental and
quasi-experimental research that has evaluated the links between mentor-
ing and delinquency across a multiplicity of contexts, involving specific
programs within certain regions, and with specific mentee and mentor
characteristics. The resultant available evidence reporting specifically on
the effectiveness of such interventions on delinquency outcomes have
produced somewhat mixed results.
Some evaluations of mentoring interventions have reported very
promising results. For example, Tierney et al.’s (1995) highly cited
impact study of the Big Brothers Big Sisters mentoring program—
involving 10–16-year-olds over an 18-month period—utilised a random
assignment experimental design and found that participants were less
likely to start using drugs/alcohol, less likely to hit others, and experi-
enced improved educational outcomes and peer relationships after par-
taking in the program. Along these same lines, Keating et al.’s (2002)
non-experimental study of an intensive mentoring program involv-
ing youth (10–17 years old) at risk for juvenile delinquency or mental
illness in the Western USA found that mentoring had a broad positive
influence, particularly with respect to the escalation of emotional and
68 R. BREWER ET AL.
behavioural problems that include delinquency. Elsewhere, in their study

of similarly aged youth, Fo and O’Donnell (1975) used a random assign-
ment experimental design to find that the community-based buddy sys-
tem offered significant benefit with respect to reducing the likelihood of
delinquency during the project year for both those with prior offending
histories (i.e. marked desistance) and those without (i.e. prevention of
onset). More recently, Hanlon et al.’s (2002) random assignment exper-
imental study of mentoring groups (as opposed to one-on-one relation-
ships) in inner-city Baltimore found a significant impact upon delinquent
(including violent) behaviour during the one year follow-up period.
Elsewhere, Barnes et al.’s (2017) quasi-experimental study of school-
based violence also found that mentoring was associated with lower prev-
alence of student bullying and verbal abuse towards teachers.
On the other hand, there is also mounting evidence that mentoring
interventions do not work as intended with respect to delinquency out-
comes (Matz 2014). In a random assignment experimental study of the
US Department of Education’s Student Mentoring Program, Berstein
et al. (2009) reported no statistically significant impacts on students who
were at risk for, or engaging in, delinquent behaviour (self-reported or
school-reported). Blechman et  al.’s (2000) non-experimental study
of juvenile offenders concluded that mentored youth were more likely
to recidivate than those involved in either skill/vocational training or
other standard juvenile-diversion programs. Elsewhere, Royse’s (1998)
random assignment experimental evaluation of the four year Brothers
Project also found no evidence of impact from mentoring upon delin-
quency among 14–16-year-old African Americans. Berger and Gold’s
(1978) random assignment experimental study also found that volun-
teer mentoring programs (including voluntary probation and volunteer
group counselling) had a negligible effect on reducing a probationer’s
delinquent behaviour, and that some participating in a volunteer tutoring
program actually increased participation in delinquent behaviour.
In recent years, a number of systematic reviews and rapid evidence
assessments, focusing largely on experimental and quasi-experimental
studies, have sought to reconcile these disparate findings (e.g. Lipsey
and Wilson 1998; DuBois et al. 2002, 2011; Jolliffe and Farrington
2007; Tolan et al. 2013). This work has generally concluded that men-
toring interventions ‘may [emphasis added] be valuable for those at risk
or already involved in delinquency and for associated outcomes’ (Tolan
et al. 2013, p. 4). In fact, Tolan et al.’s (2013, p. 29) most recent review
specifically parses out evaluations that list delinquency and drug use as
outcomes and observe a modest positive effect of mentoring interven-
tions. In drawing such conclusions, the reviewers note factors impacting
positive outcomes:
• Relationship attributes: significantly larger effects were observed

when emotional support and advocacy were emphasised in the rela-
tionship (Tolan et al. 2013).
• The mentor’s motivation for being a mentor: effects were larger when
professional development and career advancement was an explicit
motive for mentor participation (Tolan et al. 2013).
• Frequency and duration of interactions: mentoring relationships
that were more frequent (i.e. more than once a week) and longer in
duration were associated with a reduction in recidivism (Jolliffe and
Farrington 2007).
• Coupling with other interventions: mentoring proved most successful
in reducing recidivism when supplemented by other interventions,
and was not as effective when used as the only intervention (Jolliffe
and Farrington 2007; Tolan et al. 2013).
Similar conclusions were also drawn by those specific studies that both
supported and contested the efficacy of mentoring with respect to delin-
quent outcomes:
• Qualities of the mentor: effectiveness is tied to the quality of train-

ing provided to mentors (Herrera et al. 2007; also see Dubois et al.
2011). Mentors who are adults (as opposed to peers) and have prior
in-common experiences with mentees are the most influential in
achieving positive behavioural change (Ware 2013).
• Mentoring approach: mentoring is unlikely to produce change
where the mentor is authoritarian or judgemental, where there is
too much emphasis on expected behavioural change (rather than
building a friendship first), and when too many goals are set, caus-
ing the mentee to become discouraged and give up (Ware 2013).
It is also worth noting that numerous studies cite the positive benefits
associated with the total length of the intervention. However, there lacks
universal agreement as to its effect. For example, Jolliffe and Farrington
(2007) found that longer mentoring programs did not present as being
70 R. BREWER ET AL.
more effective than shorter interventions (also see Keating et al. 2002;
Royse 1998). They believe that this was most likely associated with the
difficulty in recruiting high-quality mentors over long periods of time.
However, as Chan et al. (2013, pp. 130–131) found, ‘mentees who
experienced longer relationships and relationships of higher quality …
derived more benefits than those in shorter or lower quality relation-
ships’ (see also Herrera et al. 2007; Tierney et al. 1995). This point is
further supported by Ware (2013) who argues that long-term mentoring
relationships of at least 12–18-month duration, that are based on com-
mon interests, mutual respect, genuine friendship, and a fun, non-judge-
mental approach, have a positive effect on delinquency outcomes.
When all this evidence is considered together, the take-home mes-
sage about mentoring as an intervention is positive (even from studies
that question its impact on delinquency). For example, Blechman et al.
(2000, pp. 153–154) suggest that ‘when mentoring happens in a nat-
ural, uncontrived fashion, and when mentoring involves a one-on-one
relationship with a protégé, there is good reason to believe that the men-
tor-protege relationship serves as a pivotal turning point in the life of a
high-risk youth’. Moreover, despite its relatively small effect size, schol-
ars acknowledge that the explosive growth of mentoring interventions,
and thus the high volume of youths mentored through such programs,
can ultimately produce beneficial and cost-effective outcomes for a large
number of young people (Rhodes 2008).
One important caveat stressed by Tolan et al. (2013), as well as oth-
ers (i.e. DuBois et al. 2011; Rhodes 2008), about the meta-reviews and
individual studies canvassed, is that most of the evaluative data availa-
ble for comparison offers incomplete information with respect to other
moderating factors of mentoring intervention effects. For example, most
of the studies fail to provide clarity around whether or not mentoring
is the sole intervention or if it is used in concert with other preventive
or intervention strategies. Many also fail to report the frequency of con-
tact between mentor and mentee, the nature of activities undertaken,
as well as the total duration of those relationships. Further informa-
tion pertaining to mentee characteristics were often omitted, including
details of their interpersonal histories and social competencies (DuBois
et al. 2002, 2011). Additionally, little information was also made avail-
able with respect to the level of training provided to mentors, as well as
their assessment and evaluation. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the positive outcomes reported were as a direct result
of the mentoring intervention applied.
We, therefore, stress the importance of considering the above results

with caution. On this point, Pawson (2004, p. 2) provides valuable
insight, suggesting that the available evidence does not yield a ‘thumbs
up or thumbs down’ for mentoring, but only ‘circumstantial and con-
ditional truths’. He contends that available evidence illustrates that rela-
tionships cannot be forced and sometimes take the path of least resistance
with the most disaffected youths going un-mentored. As such, mentor-
ing does not always go where it is most needed, and while mentors often
have wisdom, they do not always have the resources to create and sustain
major and long-term changes. Close relationships—even ones voluntarily
and willingly tendered—cannot, in isolation, necessarily sweep away the
institutional and structural forces that impact a young person’s life.

While there currently exists a dearth of available literature exploring the
applicability of mentoring to cyber-dependent crimes, further examina-
tion is warranted given the underlying theoretical premise (social-emo-
tional, cognitive, and identity development) and potential benefits of the
intervention for reducing the likelihood of delinquency. As alluded to in
Chapter 1, a growing body of empirical work has flagged the important
role of social interaction and the learning associated with an enhanced
capacity to engage in criminal undertakings (Bossler and Burruss 2011;
Holt et al. 2012; Skinner and Fream 1997). In particular, recent research
emphasises the agency of personal, private, and intimate offline relation-
ships for cyber-offenders, particularly with respect to sustaining interest
and developing new skills (Holt 2009; Meyer 1989; Schell and Dodge
2002; Steinmetz 2015). It is, therefore, possible that the timely estab-
lishment of a mentoring relationship between a young person and a
mentor could have utility, and warrants exploratory study.
It is worth noting that mentoring, as it is currently situated, is likely
to yield the most benefit through its application as a diversionary or
treatment intervention, as opposed to one oriented towards preven-
tion for at-risk youth. This is because the various criteria or risk factors
used to identify at-risk youth would need to be developed and tested to
cater towards this unique target population. While only little is known
about the offender profiles of cyber-offenders, it is clear from the avail-
able evidence that such individuals are likely to exhibit different eco-
logical and individual risk factors than those involved in other forms of
delinquency. For example, unlike the poor educational and employment
72 R. BREWER ET AL.
outcomes noted in the above commentary, research shows that malicious

cyber-offenders often demonstrate comparably high levels of achieve-
ment in both areas (Bachmann 2010; Holt 2007; Schell and Dodge
2002; Weulen Kranenbarg et al. 2019). While some scholars have noted
that some malicious cyber-offenders do have histories of familial or
adjustment problems (Holt and Schell 2013), these outcomes are not
necessarily linked to routine exposure to violence, abuse, drug and alco-
hol use, or having incarcerated parents. Elsewhere, scholars have noted
that cyber-offenders are more likely to exhibit certain behavioural traits
including narcissism, anxiety, and depression (Schell and Dodge 2002),
as well as lack of empathy and ethical flexibility (Holt and Schell 2013),
while other behavioural traits, including elevated levels of aggression, do
not appear to be as prevalent.
This point, coupled with the relative scarcity of individuals who ulti-
mately develop the technical wherewithal and desire to hack, could
make it difficult to develop a sufficiently targeted list for this population.
Accordingly, interventions targeting young people already identified as
participating in cybercrimes may be better suited as a first step forward.
Such individuals can potentially be identified through a variety of means
including parent, teacher, and counsellor referrals, as well as those made
by police or courts where available. Such targeting would also be consist-
ent with best practice models put forward by some other evaluators who
suggest that mentoring interventions are potentially most effective when
applied to those individuals who have come into contact with the police
(Jolliffe and Farrington 2007).
Given the importance the mentoring literature places upon the qual-
ities of the mentor and the social dynamics of the relationship with
respect to attaining positive outcomes, it is also necessary to consider the
practical matter of building a pool of suitable mentors. Willing volun-
teers with interest or experience in computers and cybersecurity, along-
side pertinent social skills, may prove to be in short supply and difficult
to recruit (particularly outside of urban areas).
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CHAPTER 6
Targeted Warnings and Police Cautions
Abstract  This chapter examines the use of targeted warnings and cau-

tions by police (i.e. cease-and-desist messaging) that aim to deter
potential offenders from future offending. These interventions rely on
rational choice and labelling theories of crime. This chapter examines
the results of studies that evaluate such interventions for offline crimes.
Overall, we find that most of the evidence indicates qualified support for
these interventions. Although cease-and-desist visits and targeted preven-
tion messaging have been used in the context of cybercrime, there is lit-
tle known about how effective they are. In exploring the applicability of
these interventions to cybercrime, we highlight their limitations within
digital contexts and provide recommendations for optimal design of this
strategy for preventing cybercrime.
Keywords  Labelling theory · Police cautions · Procedural justice ·

Rational choice theory · Reintegrative shaming theory · Targeted warnings
Introduction
Targeted warnings and cautions are used by police to warn poten-
tial offenders with the aim of deterring them from future offending.
Though definitions of what constitutes such messaging can be broad,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_6
78 R. BREWER ET AL.
in this chapter we focus on stand-alone warnings, cautions, reprimands,

and instructions to ‘cease and desist’, which may be carried out by law
enforcement officers in person (e.g. on a home visit) or through letters.
These may be ‘formal’ (i.e. recorded on a police computer system) or
informal (i.e. no record being made). Excluded from the scope of this
chapter are interventions delivered by a court, including cease-and-desist
orders. Also excluded are similar interventions by other bodies, including
private law firms, which often send ‘cease and desist’ letters for civil mat-
ters. Interventions that include additional actions, such as the referral to
treatment or social services, have also generally been excluded.
This chapter first explores the various theories underpinning the effi-
cacy of targeted warnings. Drawing from rational choice theory, these
strategies are thought to prevent crime by increasing offenders’ perceived
threat of punishment for any future offence. Labelling theory provides
an alternate mechanism for effects of such warnings on criminal activ-
ity. Although we find evidence that targeted warnings have been used in
the context of cybercrime, there is little known about how effective they
have been. This chapter, therefore, considers the empirical evidence for
the utility of such interventions in relation to offline crimes. Overall, we
find that most of the literature indicates qualified support for the inter-
vention as applied to crime more broadly. Following this, we consider
the utility of this intervention in preventing cybercrime. While this inter-
vention has potential to be applied to the online context, we identify
some possible limitations. Finally, we provide recommendations for opti-
mal design of this strategy for preventing cybercrime.

The intention of targeted warnings is to deter recipients from commenc-
ing, or continuing, offending, by imparting to the recipient that there
is a cost to their activities, and a consequence if they continue down a
criminal pathway. Two key theoretical perspectives underpin this type
of intervention: deterrence and labelling. While these perspectives con-
flict, both offer rationales for crime prevention through diversion and
warning.
The deterrence perspective, which originates from principles proposed
by Beccaria (1764/2009), relies on rational choice models of crime,
whereby individuals are seen as logical decision-makers who weigh up
the potential costs and benefits of their actions. Punishment thus deters
6 TARGETED WARNINGS AND POLICE CAUTIONS 79
people from committing crime by elevating the costs of offending.

Accordingly, issuing a warning to an individual who is beginning to show
inclinations towards crime could potentially act as a deterrent by mak-
ing punishment appear more certain—a key element of the deterrence
model (Pratt et al. 2008).
On the other hand, labelling theory sees punishment as stigmatising,
which can lead to further criminal activity (Becker 1963; Lemert 1967;
Sherman et al. 1992b; Tittle 1995). Indeed, research has indicated that
restrictive and deterrence-based sanctions can increase the likelihood
of reoffending (Bernburg et al. 2006; Gatti et al. 2009; Koehler et al.
2013; Lipsey 2009; Petrosino et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2002). Labelling
someone as an offender creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which indi-
viduals adopt criminal identities. Not only may others perceive that per-
son as being a lawbreaker, placing them under greater scrutiny so that
even minor transgressions are detected, but also that label may be inter-
nalised, and the individual may behave as they believe others see them.
Therefore, by diverting a potential offender away from the criminal jus-
tice system, it is theorised that they are able to avoid the stigmatising
effects of a court appearance.
Reintegrative shaming theory (Braithwaite 1989) provides some guid-
ance as to which sanctions are likely to be more, or less, stigmatising.
According to this perspective, sanctions that focus on the wrongfulness
of (and harm caused by) the act, rather than the characteristics of the
offender, are more likely to reduce crime. A related theory developed in
the context of police behaviour is procedural justice, whereby people’s
compliance with the law is conditioned by their perceptions of fairness
and legitimacy (Tyler 1990). These factors are critical in understanding
the potential effectiveness of targeted warning interventions. Drawing
from these theories, it is hypothesised that targeted warnings can pre-
vent crime if the recipient perceives: (a) the warning as being fair; (b) the
police officer who delivers the intervention as acting rightfully; and (c)
the intervention is focused on the act rather than the actor.
Targeted warnings and cautions are examples of secondary crime pre-
vention approaches, which intervene at the early stages of offending in
order to avoid someone committing a crime or one that is more seri-
ous (Brantingham and Faust 1976). As such, they have traditionally been
80 R. BREWER ET AL.
deployed in the context of less serious crimes, such as recreational drug

use, or aimed at juveniles before the offending escalates to more serious
criminal behaviour.
Substantial headway has been made in the UK with respect to the
deployment of targeted approaches to warn those considered at risk of
committing serious and organised crime, including cybercrime (Home
Office 2018). This disruption activity has been delivered at scale on at
least two occasions in the UK, targeting those believed to be in the early
stages of committing cybercrime offences. In 2014, there was a UK-wide
police investigation into Blackshades, a remote access tool designed to
take over, control, and steal information from personal computers. The
investigation resulted in 17 people being arrested and 80 receiving a visit
from a police officer. Approximately 500 others received a warning letter
advising that it was believed they had purchased the software and that
using it could be illegal (BBC News 2015).
The following year, the database for the LizardStresser booter ser-
vice, which provided denial of service attacks for a fee, was compromised
and leaked. This database contained customer details for those who had
purchased denial of service attacks from, or registered with, the service.
Six individuals who had purchased denial of service attacks were subse-
quently arrested. Approximately 50 others who had registered with the
site, but were not believed to have carried out an attack, received a home
visit from the police (National Crime Agency 2015). Those receiving vis-
its were told that denial of service attacks are ‘illegal, can prevent individ-
uals from accessing vital online services, and can cause significant financial
and reputational damage to businesses’ (National Crime Agency 2015,
p. 1). They were also informed that ‘committing cybercrime can result in
severe restrictions on their freedom, access to the Internet, digital devices
and future career prospects’ (National Crime Agency 2015, p. 1).
There have also been coordinated international law enforce-
ment actions involving users of a number of booter services. In 2016,
Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre coordinated law enforcement
authorities from Australia, Belgium, France, Hungary, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and
the USA. Overall, 34 individuals were arrested, and 101 suspects were
interviewed and cautioned (Europol 2016).
Despite differences in their method of delivery, the objectives of
these interventions were quite similar. The interventions were aimed
at people already involved in cybercrime or at least on the periphery.
For example, it would not have been a crime to create an account with
the LizardStresser service or even to use it to test one’s own systems.
However, using it against another target without permission would be
considered a criminal offence in many jurisdictions. Therefore, regis-
tering with the website may be considered a warning sign of awareness
of such criminal services and contemplation of their use. Consequently,
in these cases, the targeted warnings aimed to reduce the frequency or
severity of offending, if not to stop it altogether.

At the time of writing, we were unable to locate any empirical evidence
pointing to the effectiveness of targeted caution interventions in reduc-
ing cybercrime. There is, however, a wealth of evidence for the use
of targeted cautions in the offline context. Most of the evidence indi-
cated qualified support for the use of cautions or warnings for identi-
fied offenders and those at risk of offending. It should be noted that in
many cases, cautions are considered a control condition for the purposes
of evaluating the effects of a different type of intervention (e.g. a court
program). Given this, it would be an insurmountable task to locate every
single study utilising cautions as at least one of the experimental condi-
tions. Nevertheless, we have included these where possible.
A meta-analysis of 14 studies revealed that caution or warning inter-
ventions were more effective than traditional criminal justice processing
at reducing recidivism among adolescent offenders (Wilson and Hoge
2013). In fact, the effect found for simple cautions was equivalent in size
to that found for more comprehensive intervention programs (e.g. refer-
ral to support services and treatment). However, most of the caution
evaluations employed a weak methodological design.
An early study, and also one of the most rigorous, was conducted by
McBride and Peck (1970) who evaluated warning letters delivered to
18,000 negligent drivers. They randomly allocated drivers into a num-
ber of experimental groups, as well as a control group who received no
letter. The experimental groups either received a standard letter, which
was already in use, or one manipulated to change the intimacy of style
or degree of threat. Participants who received any warning letter were
less likely to be detected committing further violations, though the best
effects were found for those that received low-threat or standard letters.
82 R. BREWER ET AL.
Chapman et al. (1994) also used random allocation into control and
experimental conditions to evaluate the effects of warning letters on the
illegal sale of tobacco products to underage children by retail outlets.
Undercover buying operations were conducted three months apart, with
half of the shops that sold to minors on the first occasion receiving a
warning letter. The letter stated that they had been recorded as having
sold cigarettes to children and that at an unspecified date in the future,
children would again be sent unannounced into their shop to attempt to
purchase cigarettes. The letter warned that if they were identified selling
tobacco to those underage on a second occasion, they could be prose-
cuted. Shops which sold on the first occasion and received warning let-
ters reduced selling by 69%, although the control group also had a 40%
reduction.
Mazerolle et al. (1998) differed from the other studies considered
here, as they used place as the unit of analysis, rather than individuals.
Specifically, they researched the effectiveness of civil remedies for proper-
ties in Oakland, California, that were reported as having drug crime and
disorder problems. The experimental condition included warning letters,
along with inspections, evictions, and property clean-ups, while those
randomly allocated to the control condition faced traditional police tac-
tics, including surveillance, arrests, and field interrogations. The research
team observed each site twice before the intervention, and twice after,
to measure changes in street behaviour. They found that the locations
assigned to the treatment condition had less observed drug dealing and
fewer signs of disorder after the intervention, compared to the control
group.
In the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman et al.
1992a), police dispatchers randomly allocated eligible cases of domestic
violence into one of three groups: (1) full arrest, in which the suspect
was eligible for release on $250 bail; (2) short arrest, in which sus-
pects were released as soon as possible and preferably within two hours;
and (3) warning, in which the suspect was not arrested, but was read
a standard warning indicating they would be arrested if the police had
to return that evening. Sherman et al. (1992a) found that there was an
initial deterrent effect, in which both short and full arrest groups had
fewer instances of repeated violence, compared to the warning group.
However, in the long term, arrest had an escalating effect, with arrest
increasing the risk of violence compared to warnings. Therefore, warn-
ings seemed to be more effective than arrests.
More recently, Sherman and Harris (2015) published a follow-up

study on the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment. Rather than
measuring reoffending, this particular analysis compared the death
rates of the victims of domestic assault, whose partners had been ran-
domly allocated to either receive a warning or be arrested. They found
that 23 years later, if the abuser had been arrested, the victim was 64%
more likely to have died than those whose partners had been warned.
However, in total, only three homicides were recorded (two in the arrest
group, one in the warning group), with other causes of death including
alcohol and drugs, cancer, and heart disease. Due to the low incidence of
the relevant outcome (intimate partner homicide), this later study only
provides weak evidence in favour of targeted warnings.
A number of other less rigorous studies also provide evidence in
favour of targeted warning interventions (Allard et al. 2010; Baker and
Goh 2004; Bazemore et al. 2004; Dennison et al. 2006; Kraus 1981;
Vignaendra and Fitzgerald 2006; Wang and Weatherburn 2019).
The main limitation of these evaluations is there is no random alloca-
tion. Therefore, there may be key differences between the groups that
received the intervention and those that did not.
In addition to the favourable research cited above, a number of stud-
ies have found no significant difference in later offending for those who
received a warning, rather than another type of intervention (Mott 1983;
Shanahan et al. 2017; Shirley 2017; Wilcox et al. 2004). These studies,
however, had a number of methodological limitations, so they should
not be weighted as heavily as those further above. We also identified
research that was not supportive of targeted warnings (Galeazzi et al.
2009; Storey and Hart 2011; Willner et al. 2000). These studies also
had severe shortcomings, with both Galeazzi et al. (2009) and Storey
and Hart (2011), relying exclusively on subjective perceptions of caution
strategies.
Overall, the evidence considered here indicates that cautions and
warnings can have a beneficial effect on reducing offending, at least
for some offence types and populations. However, moderating varia-
bles might enhance the effectiveness of targeted warning interventions.
McBride and Peck (1970) claim that the way cautions are delivered can
play an important role. For example, the language used and information
provided may have an impact on outcomes. Paternoster et al. (1997)
analysed data from the Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment for
evidence of procedural justice and perceptions of fairness and legitimacy,
84 R. BREWER ET AL.
which, as previously mentioned, can have an effect on compliance

with the law (Tyler 1990). Here, the authors examined interview data
of arrested offenders, coding for whether those arrested believed the
officers had taken the time to listen to their side of the story, if they had
expected to be arrested, and if the officers had listened to their story as
well as the victim’s story. They found that perceived procedural justice
was important to outcomes, as individuals who were arrested and per-
ceived that they had been treated unfairly had higher recidivism rates
than those who were warned. Subsequent assault rates for those who
were arrested but believed they had been treated fairly were similar as
those who had been warned.
Similarly, targeted cautions may have potential unintended effects
that reduce their effectiveness. Of particular note, there is the potential
for net-widening with the use of cautions, as noted by at least one study
(see Baker and Goh 2004). Net-widening refers to more individuals
being included within interventions than originally intended. The effect
is to move the goalposts so that police take action at a lower threshold
(Decker 1985). Therefore, rather than diverting people from the crim-
inal justice system, other individuals are drawn in for relatively minor
transgressions, meaning they could face more stigmatisation than they
would have otherwise and be more likely to face court later. Therefore,
net-widening that might occur through encouraging the use of cautions
may actually increase the likelihood of future offending.
Compounding this problem, cautions may, in some cases, result
in defiance—the antithesis to the re-integrative shaming approach
(Sherman 1993). If the recipient of a warning perceives it as being unfair
or disrespectful, they may defy the warning given and even become a
more persistent offender, increasing in frequency and/or seriousness.
Where cautions are issued for behaviours that are considered legitimate
by the recipient (e.g. behaviour that is not illegal), defiance may follow.
Furthermore, a caution might be seen as a ‘badge of honour’, which
glamorises criminal status (Hodgkinson and Tilley 2007). In such cases,
the effect of the intervention would not be to deter the recipient, but
rather to enhance their standing with peers. It is, therefore, important to
carefully consider the scope and target of caution strategies.

Targeted warnings and cautions have qualified support in the offline con-
text. However, these findings may not be generalisable to cybercrime
offenders for a number of reasons. Though there has been no published
evaluation of this type of approach by law enforcement when applied
to cybercrime offenders, we consider below factors that are likely to be
applicable in this context.
The observation that offenders who engage in different types of crime
may be more, or less, amenable to deterrence was an issue of interest to
Chambliss (1967). He reviewed the evidence on drug addiction, park-
ing law violations, white-collar crime, and shoplifting, hypothesising that
deterrability depends on the type of act and degrees of commitment to
crime. The most likely to be deterred include those who have a low com-
mitment to crime but do it for instrumental reasons, such as white-collar
criminals, while the least likely to be deterred are people with a high com-
mitment to ‘expressive’ crimes, such as drug and sex offences. Research
suggests that many types of cybercrime are committed for instrumental
purposes, such as money or peer recognition (Hutchings 2016). If this is
the case, then well-targeted cautions that increase offenders’ perceptions
of the likelihood of detection could be a promising strategy.
The characteristics of the offender may also affect the outcomes.
Green (1985) evaluated warning letters sent from a cable company
(i.e. not by police) to people identified as stealing premium cable tele-
vision. By inspecting the terminals connected to subscribers’ homes,
the researchers were able to detect basic subscribers who had installed
devices to descramble the signals of premium services. Following the
intervention, the evaluation found that the most common reaction to
the warning letter was to remove the descrambler, while one-third of
recipients took no action. Follow-up inspections indicated that the least
deterred were men, the youngest (those aged 18–25), and those who
were most affluent. This finding is important to consider in respect to
cybercrime, as young men make up the most common demographic
(Hutchings and Chua 2017).
The role of peer recognition in cybercrime makes the use of cau-
tions a potentially problematic approach. Being the recipient of a cau-
tion, particularly something that can be displayed, such as a letter, may
be perceived as a ‘badge of honour’ (Hodgkinson and Tilley 2007).
In addition, online communities may provide a strong source of
86 R. BREWER ET AL.
legitimacy to justify individuals’ cybercrime activities, such that recip-

ients of a caution they view as illegitimate may respond with defiance.
As Paternoster et al. (1997) found, the success of any intervention could
depend on the details of delivery and the recipients’ perceptions of legiti-
macy and procedural justice.
Other potential unintended effects of this type of intervention include
enticement, displacement, creative adaptation, and chilling effects. When
it comes to enticement, the ‘forbidden fruit effect’ (see, e.g., Grabosky
1996) may induce those being warned to try out the illicit behav-
iour. This can occur through outright rebellion on behalf of the recipi-
ent, inciting their curiosity or highlighting the potential of an action to
which they were previously oblivious. Crime displacement occurs when
crime moves to other locations, times, targets, methods, perpetrators, or
offences, as the result of crime prevention initiatives (Smith et al. 2003).
Some crime prevention strategies—including targeted warnings and cau-
tions—may cause offenders to refine their avoidance behaviour. This is
particularly relevant to cybercrime, as different and changing technolo-
gies proffer tools enabling creative adaptation (Grabosky 1996), where
innovative offenders can change their behaviour so they are harder to
catch in the future. Lastly, interventions may also harm the general
law-abiding population (Grabosky 1996). For example, electronic surveil-
lance can have a ‘chilling effect’ on Internet use more generally (Schneier
2015). This includes individuals avoiding searching for information on
potentially sensitive topics, such as health, sexuality, or religion.
On the other hand, offenders interviewed by Hutchings (2016) also
indicated that it was the likelihood of detection, not the severity of pun-
ishment, that mattered to them. Therefore, warnings and cautions may
be useful in highlighting that low-level offenders are not necessarily
anonymous online, increasing the perceived likelihood of detection.
The research reviewed in this chapter provides some insights into
what best practice may look like for warnings and cautions in the cyber-
crime context. First, the intervention should highlight the costs of
offending (e.g. to future career prospects) but avoid threatening lan-
guage. Second, it is best to focus on the wrongfulness of the act, rather
than the actor (e.g. avoid stigmatisation). Third, those delivering the
intervention should take time to listen to the recipient, hearing their side
of the story, and treat them fairly and respectfully.
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PART III
Tertiary Forms of Prevention

CHAPTER 7
Positive Diversions
Abstract  This chapter examines the programs and strategies associated

with positive diversions. Positive diversions redirect individuals towards
prosocial behaviours and peer influences and focus on rehabilitation
rather than punitive actions. This chapter reviews the evidence for such
interventions in reducing offline crime, concluding that the findings are
mixed, with some diversions showing positive effects and others show-
ing negative effects. We then explore the applicability of diversions to
cybercrime prevention, finding that though there is no research evidence
for the effectiveness of such, there is some anecdotal evidence that redi-
recting cybercriminals into cybersecurity programs or training could be
beneficial. We conclude by delineating what an ideal diversion program
could look like for cybercriminals, drawing out the factors that would
likely lead to its success in the digital realm.
Keywords  Academic programs · Cultural arts programs ·

Peer contagion · Positive diversions · Sports programs ·
Wilderness camps
Introduction
This chapter examines the programs and strategies associated with posi-
tive diversions. Diversions are strategies that redirect a person away from
traditional criminal justice procedures and sanctions. More specifically,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_7
94 R. BREWER ET AL.
positive diversions can be understood as redirection towards inter-

ventions that enhance young people’s well-being and social inclusion
(Haines et al. 2012; Smith 2014). That is, positive diversions aim to fos-
ter positive attitudes, peers, and behaviours through a more rehabilitative
approach to risk management. Positive diversions can take a variety of
forms, including art, sports, and outdoors programs. We exclude from
consideration strictly psychotherapeutic interventions (e.g. counselling),
though these may form part of a positive diversion strategy. Instead, we
focus on broader programming that is aimed at enhancing individuals’
peer and social context.
This chapter reviews the evidence for such interventions in reducing
offline crime, concluding that the findings are mixed, with some diver-
sions showing positive effects and others showing negative effects. More
specifically, we examine some of the most widely deployed diversion
programs, drawing out the factors that lead to their success and some
potential pitfalls. We then explore the applicability of positive diversions
to cybercrime, finding that though there is no research evidence for the
effectiveness of such, there is some anecdotal evidence that redirecting
cyber-offenders into cybersecurity programs or training could be benefi-
cial. We conclude by delineating what an ideal diversion program could
look like for cyber-offenders, drawing out the factors that would likely
lead to its success in the digital realm.

Imposing traditional criminal justice sanctions on young people has,
at best, little effect on reoffending; at worst, restrictive and deter-
rence-based sanctions can increase the likelihood of youth reoffending
(Bernburg et al. 2006; Gatti et al. 2009; Koehler et al. 2013; Lipsey
2009; Petrosino et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2002). Diversions, therefore,
attempt to avoid the criminogenic effect of these processes (e.g. via
labelling and peer contagion) by disposing people into alternate path-
ways before they come into formal contact with the criminal justice
system.
Positive diversions are situated in a social context, seeking to tackle
the underlying causes of youth offending by providing mechanisms to
promote prosocial and positive behaviour (Haines and Case 2015). At
the very minimum, positive diversions attempt to bond offenders back to
communities by connecting them with prosocial activities. Through this,
7 POSITIVE DIVERSIONS 95
it is hoped that offenders will develop alternative, prosocial identities

that are diametrically opposed to criminal identities and can, therefore,
act as motivators to avoid criminal behaviour. Thus, positive diversions
lean heavily on social bond theories of crime, which claim that genuine
attachment to families, peers, and social institutions are critical in pre-
venting crime (Hirschi 1969; Uggen and Wakefield 2005).
Though there is little doubt that antisocial attitudes and beliefs are
strongly related to youth reoffending (Grieger and Hosser 2014;
McGrath and Thompson 2012; Simourd and Andrews 1994), simply
placing youths into social courses is in most cases likely insufficient to
modify antisocial behaviour. Thus, many diversion programs incorpo-
rate more active strategies to foster prosocial attitudes and behaviours
by drawing on social-cognitive principles of behaviour change (Bandura
1971; Turner and Oakes 1986). For example, programs can model
prosocial attitudes and behaviours; provide incentives for, and reward,
positive behaviours; appeal to role models that are relevant to poten-
tial offenders’ self-concepts (e.g. ex-offenders) to motivate change; and
challenge antisocial attitudes and beliefs through cognitive-behavioural
techniques.
Diversions, in general, have traditionally been used for young people and
first-time offenders (Smith 2014), targeting individuals deemed to be at
risk of offending before their behaviour escalates into serious criminal
behaviour (i.e. it is a secondary prevention measure). For example, pro-
grams may target troubled youth who have shown antisocial behaviour
or have had some contact with the police but not yet committed seri-
ous offences. The logic for this targeting is as follows: if contact with the
criminal justice system is criminogenic, it is more efficacious to divert a
person from first contact with the criminal justice system rather than later
down the track when a person has already had extensive exposure to the
criminal justice system. Thus, the aim of diversion is to reduce the num-
ber of first-time entrants to the criminal justice system (Smith 2014).
In practice, diversions may be a substitute for criminal sanctions or
court proceedings or be an accompaniment to such processes. Note,
however, that to minimise criminogenic effects, in line with the the-
ory underpinning the intervention, diversion should avoid contact
with the criminal justice system as much possible in order to minimise
96 R. BREWER ET AL.
exposure to delinquent peers or labelling. Diversions, in general, may

thus vary in criminogenic potential, from informal cautions (poten-
tially least criminogenic with a low risk of peer contagion and stig-
matising labelling) through to prison-like residential placements
(potentially most criminogenic with a high risk of peer contagion and
labelling).
Turning to positive diversions specifically, to date there is no evidence
that systematic programming has been implemented to deal with cyber-
crime, though there is anecdotal evidence that some notorious cyber-of-
fenders have been able to transition their skills from criminal pursuits to
legitimate security jobs, such as Kevin Mitnick, Peiter ‘Mudge’ Zatko,
and Kevin Poulsen (see, e.g., Mitnick and Simon 2011). In contrast,
positive diversions (and diversions more generally) have been widely
deployed in response to various low-severity crimes and general delin-
quency. Due to the potential criminogenic effects of contact with the
criminal justice system, and the reduced emphasis of retribution in pos-
itive diversions, normally only less serious offences are considered suita-
ble for diversion from formal legal sanctions. This is consistent with the
risk principle of offender intervention: less intensive, minimal interven-
tions should be used with low-risk individuals (Andrews et al. 1990a).
However, some more intensive diversions (e.g. those that involve a res-
idential placement) have been used for more serious offences, often in
place of incarceration.

It is difficult to make broad claims about the effectiveness of diver-
sions in general. Two meta-analyses of diversion programs (comparing
diversion programs to traditional criminal justice processes) have been
undertaken with mixed findings. Schwalbe et al. (2012) conducted a
meta-analysis of 28 studies of mostly Caucasian male first-time/minor
offenders (mean offender age 14.2 years) and found that there was no
effect on reoffending, except for a single positive effect if the diversion
was family treatment. However, this study included ‘minimal inter-
vention’ (incorporating cautions) as a control group (versus diversion)
because it only considered more intensive diversions in the treatment
group. Therefore, the findings can only suggest that intensive diver-
sions are no more effective than formal justice processing or minimal
intervention.
In contrast, a larger meta-analysis conducted by Wilson and Hoge

(2013)—45 studies, mean age 14.7, also mostly male and Caucasian,
mainly low-risk property offenders—found diversions reduced reoffend-
ing. Notably, the authors included cautions (i.e. a minimal interven-
tion) as a diversion rather than as a control group. Moreover, diversions
that were a condition of a traditional disposition were excluded. Thus,
the analysis in this study is a better reflection of the effects of diversion
proper. Results indicated that recidivism depended on a number of fac-
tors. Specifically, diversions were more effective for those who could be
considered low risk (e.g. those diverted without receiving a formal crim-
inal charge and low in criminogenic need). There are two things that
could be suggested here: one, that no treatment is better than any pro-
gram (diversion or otherwise) or two, that diversions are more effective
for those with less chronic or less severe dysfunction.
It must be remembered, however, that both reviews included a range
of diversion programs, including restorative justice, drug courts, and psy-
chotherapeutic treatment programs (not included in the current defini-
tion of positive diversions). Effects are likely to vary depending on the
type of program and services offered; thus, considering these programs
separately is more meaningful than relying on an average effect of diver-
sion (e.g. Lipsey 2009). Focusing specifically now on positive diversions,
some of the most popular programs are reviewed below.
To begin with, one of the most well-known positive diversions, wil-
derness camps, involve structured group-based physical challenges in
an outdoor environment (e.g. trekking, rock climbing). These are dis-
tinct from punitive boot camps that attempt to instil discipline in young
people through military training regimes. Though boot camps are a
diversion to some extent (i.e. they often replace custodial sentences),
they focus on the suppression of negative behaviours and use punish-
ment and humiliation to try to change behaviour. Therefore, they are
not a positive diversion (and generally, they are not effective at reduc-
ing criminal behaviour) (Drake et al. 2009; Lipsey 2009; Meade and
Steiner 2010; Wilson et al. 2005). In contrast, wilderness camps are
rehabilitative and constructive in orientation. The rationale of such pro-
grams is that mastering challenges facilitates personal growth through
the development of self-efficacy, self-control, and interpersonal skills.
A meta-analysis of 22 studies (mostly male Caucasians between the ages
of 13 and 15, who were on probation and/or adjudicated delinquents)
indicated that wilderness programs have a modest effect on recidivism for
98 R. BREWER ET AL.
antisocial or delinquent youth (Wilson and Lipsey 2000). Programs were

more effective when they were explicitly complemented by therapeutic
components. These findings suggest that the positive skills and capacities
developed through structured challenge activities can form the basis for
behaviour change for more moderate-risk individuals—alongside thera-
peutic treatment.
Sports and recreation programs are also widely deployed. They aim
to keep youths busy, build positive character/values, and foster lasting
social bonds. However, robust evaluations for sports and recreation pro-
grams are lacking, so it is unclear whether such programs are effective at
preventing delinquency. A recent meta-analysis found no effect of sports
participation in general (i.e. programs may include non-delinquents) on
crime (Spruit et al. 2016). Indeed, some commentators argue that sports
programs are unlikely to have direct effects on crime and that such pro-
grams must be integrated with health, welfare, and other support ser-
vices (Coalter 2013; Morris et al. 2003). In line with this, many sports
programs have moved away from sports as simply a use of leisure time,
to sports as a process that can facilitate change through positive social cli-
mate, and supportive, reinforcing relationships (Coalter 2013). Though
this is a step in the right direction, without demonstrated effects on
crime it is possible that some sports programs are ineffective, or at worst,
counterproductive. Sports, unlike wilderness camps, are inherently com-
petitive, which may work against the desired outcome of positive peer
interaction. Moreover, Spruit et al. (2016) suggest that some sports have
an alcohol consumption culture, which could interfere with positive pro-
gram effects. Though it is important to consider how recreation activities
may provide enjoyment, confidence, and purpose for young people—
worthwhile goals in isolation perhaps—in terms of reoffending, some of
these programs may carry hidden risks.
Robust evaluations of cultural arts programs (e.g. visual art, drama,
dance) are similarly scant but there is some evidence that they can be
effective in some cases. Theoretically, arts-based programs can provide
an outlet for expressing and addressing emotional and cognitive prob-
lems (including those that are related to individuals’ offending), while
learning skills and developing a sense of mastery and purpose. Generally,
arts programs have a weak theoretical basis and have been poorly imple-
mented/evaluated (Rapp-Paglicci et al. 2006). However, there are some
exceptions. Reading for Life is a 16-week literature-based diversion pro-
gram for non-violent juvenile offenders in the USA, designed to foster
character development in at-risk adolescents through moral discussions

about characters and narratives. It is facilitated by trained volunteer facil-
itators who also act as prosocial role models and mentors. A robust ran-
domised control trial of 418 young offenders (average age 15–16 years)
found that the program had a sizeable effect on rearrests, even at two
years follow-up (Seroczynski et al. 2016). The program may have been
effective because it targeted antisocial cognition—a strong predictor of
youth recidivism (Grieger and Hosser 2014; McGrath and Thompson
2012; Simourd and Andrews 1994)—through cognitive-behavioural
techniques, such as cognitive restricting.
Similarly, a drama-based program in the USA was designed to build
young offenders’ perspective-taking skills in order to facilitate empathy
and moral development. In small groups, youth were asked to develop,
portray, and record brief skits relevant to their age group. The program
was evaluated based on a sample of chronic delinquent boys (defined as
those who had lengthy police and court records, and had committed
crimes which would have constituted felonies were they adults). Aged
11–13 years, and mostly African American, these boys were randomised
to the treatment group, a placebo group (drama but without the perspec-
tive-taking instruction/orientation of the treatment group), and a con-
trol group. Significant reductions in delinquency at 18-month follow-up
were found only for the treatment group (Chandler 1973). However,
the study was limited by the very small sample size (only about 10–15 in
each group), and the applicability to the current context is questionable
as the boys were serious offenders. Nevertheless, though the findings are
tentative, they suggest that arts-based positive diversions may be effective
when they actively target criminogenic risk factors (e.g. antisocial cogni-
tion). The arts framework itself provides a vehicle for the social-cognitive
strategies to be communicated and practised. Though the art component
itself might attract, retain, and motivate young people by appealing to
their interests and capacities—an important consideration for any pro-
gram (Andrews et al. 1990a)—it is unlikely to be the active ingredient in
reducing recidivism.
Academic and vocational programs are hypothesised to provide skills
and qualifications that can lead to the adoption of prosocial roles in soci-
ety, while increasing the costs of reoffending (i.e. having ‘more to lose’;
Andrews et al. 1990b, p. 375). Moreover, such interventions may bolster
protective factors, such as involvement with prosocial peers and activities.
In line with the logic of these programs, research has found that poor
100 R. BREWER ET AL.
education and unemployment are risk factors for delinquency (Grieger

and Hosser 2014; Lipsey and Derzon 1998; Maguin and Loeber 1996;
McGrath and Thompson 2012; Simourd and Andrews 1994). This is
particularly the case for low-risk offenders (Gavazzi et al. 2008).
Academic and vocational interventions have been demonstrated to
have relatively small effects on youth reoffending, with academic pro-
grams faring better than employment programs (Lipsey 2009). However,
some scholars have argued that there is a spurious relationship between
academic/vocational performance and delinquency: traits such as impul-
siveness and low self-control might lead to both poor academic/voca-
tional performance and delinquency and could be responsible for much
of the relationship between them (Felson and Staff 2006; Maguin and
Loeber 1996). This might explain the limited effects of educational and
vocational programs. It is simply too much to ask troubled young people
to adopt prosocial roles and identities when they lack the fundamental
capacities to do so effectively. Clearly, providing meaningful opportuni-
ties for advancement in society is important, but in isolation, this is not
enough in many cases to prevent people slipping back into criminal ways
of thinking and acting.
A discrete category of positive diversion programs is those that
attempt to redirect or transform criminal behaviour into noncriminal
behaviour rather than suppressing it entirely. For example, a young per-
son who engages in illegal graffiti may be diverted into a program that
encourages legal ‘urban art’. The key feature of this type of diversion
is that it accepts and leverages the motivation for committing a crimi-
nal behaviour and provides a legitimate means to express it. This opens
the door not only to a legitimate pastime, but also to the skills that can
lead to gainful employment and exposure to noncriminal peers. Rather
than simply using a diversion program activity as an angle or hook to
attract and retain young people (as can be argued for sports and arts
programs in general), here the diversion activity itself is directly rele-
vant to the offending behaviour. Of course, this approach relies upon
an understanding of a person’s motivation and goals for engaging in the
undesired behaviour and a feasible legal means to achieve those same
goals—which may be more relevant to some types of offending than
others.
This diversion approach has been widely used with graffiti offend-
ers. Though we could not locate any robust evaluations for these sorts
of programs, we will draw upon the limited literature in this area due
to its potential applicability to cybercrime. Councils embracing this

type of positive diversion have adopted strategies that allow artists to
express their graffiti in a legal way (e.g. tolerance zones, commission of
murals). In addition, some councils coordinate art workshops facilitated
by senior street artists, providing positive role modelling, skills, and
opportunities for young people to engage in art. Programs are usually
run within community facilities where referral to other services is pro-
vided if necessary. Scholars, councils, and young people have indicated
support for such programs, lending them some credibility (Halsey and
Pederick 2005; Macdonnell 2015). Of course, pending robust evalua-
tion, it is impossible to infer that urban art diversions actually reduce
crime.
It should be noted that not all positive diversions using this logic have
had success. The U-Turn program was developed in Australia to redi-
rect young people from stealing cars by transforming the thrill-seeking
that is associated with motor vehicle theft into legal, safe, and fun mot-
orsport activities. The program, which targeted both low- and high-
risk offenders, consisted of a course in car maintenance and bodywork,
supplemented with case management, links to employment and further
education, recreational activities (e.g. go-karting), and post-course sup-
port. An evaluation of one program site found that about two-thirds of
participants self-reported antisocial behaviour while participating in the
course, and at follow-up, 48% had recorded new offences (Kellow et al.
2005). Though there was no comparison group with which to compare
this figure, the program did not strike policymakers as sufficiently effec-
tive, and they subsequently abandoned the scheme in favour of a psy-
chotherapeutic intervention that addresses antisocial cognition and other
criminogenic needs (Bolger 2015). Though the initial U-Turn program
evaluation was far from robust, it does suggest that not all offences and
motivations may be readily redirected into prosocial alternatives; in par-
ticular, higher-risk offenders may require careful and tailored targeting of
criminogenic risk factors.
Moreover, the U-Turn program had adverse effects on some low-risk
participants (Kellow et al. 2005), which may partially account for the
evaluation findings. This raises the important issue of the need to keep
low-risk and high-risk offenders separate in treatment programs (as per
the RNR model). Placing groups of low-risk youths together with high-
risk youths, even in a well-meaning spirit of diversion/prevention, can
increase crime via peer contagion. When juvenile delinquents are placed
together, they may reinforce antisocial behaviours and attitudes, which

will be of particular detriment to those who are not highly deviant to
begin with (Boxer et al. 2005). However, this is also a problem even
when higher-risk youths are treated separately, as they can reinforce and
amplify each other’s antisocial attitudes (Cho et al. 2005; Dishion et al.
1999; Rhule 2005). Furthermore, by connecting with peers who have
similar criminal histories and propensities, such interventions may sim-
ply offer an opportunity for young people to form deviant friendships
or build cohesion among existing groups (see Braga 2016). In addition,
Braga (2016) cautions that using ex-offenders in deviant peer programs
is precarious, as by sharing their past experiences, former offenders may
inadvertently glorify criminal lifestyles, reinforce group processes, and in
some cases, they might turn back to crime themselves through the rela-
tionships they develop with group participants.
In summary, positive diversion programs vary substantially in their
ability to reduce crime. Novel or exciting programs are more likely to be
more appealing to young people, but it is imperative that these programs
address criminogenic factors (e.g. antisocial personality and cognition)
rather than relying on a ‘feel good’ approach—no matter how well inten-
tioned these programs may be. In addition, group programming carries
risks such as peer contagion. Cécile and Born (2009) recommend sev-
eral possible strategies to reduce the negative influence of antisocial peers
in crime prevention programs, including more structured activities (also
see Rorie et al. 2011), familial involvement, and contact with prosocial
peers. Other scholars warn that labelling young people as delinquents,
even within well-intentioned prevention programs, may be another pos-
sible explanation for criminogenic effects (Gatti et al. 2009), which may
be harder to overcome.

To date, there has been no empirical evaluation of positive diversion pro-
gramming for preventing cybercrime. Nevertheless, it is plausible that
one could redirect the skills used for cybercrime into prosocial avenues
(e.g. cybersecurity). Some cyber-offenders have expressed interest in, or
have transitioned to, legitimate cybersecurity jobs (Mitnick and Simon
2011; Opie 2019). Moreover, from anecdotal evidence it appears that
(at least some) graffiti artists and cyber-offenders derive a sense of iden-
tity and pleasure from offending, while their crimes are characterised by
a notable status culture—that is, they are rewarded by peers in their own
communities based on the skills/talent they use to offend (for graffiti
culture see Halsey and Young 2002). Thus, it is possible that cyber-
offenders would benefit from diversion into cybersecurity programs or
training, where their skills can be recognised and rewarded. There is,
however, little empirical evidence that such diversion is common, or out-
lining what factors enable such a transition. Since there is no empirical
evidence conclusively proving the effectiveness of such positive diver-
sions, they may be worth trialling and evaluating. However, from a prac-
tical perspective, it might be difficult to obtain support from industry for
such schemes, given the security risks presented (e.g. providing opportu-
nities to offend, contagion of prosocial peers).
In addition, resistance training would be needed to encourage the
ability to overtly reject peer pressure to engage in delinquency or crime
as with traditional interventions. This could include messaging models
for individuals to apply in their own lives or adapt to specific situations
when appropriate. There are various ways this could be achieved offline.
Linking security professionals and others who engage in hacking as a
legitimate career could serve as a vital source of imitation and messaging
to shape attitudes towards the negative outcomes associated with crim-
inal applications of hacking and promote the benefits and importance
of prosocial hacking. Such programs could be implemented via hacker/
security conferences locally and nationally, as well as through ‘maker-
spaces’ and ‘hackerspaces’ where individuals are encouraged to engage in
experiential learning with others in socially inviting situations (e.g. Holt
and Kilger 2012; Kinkade et al. 2013; Steinmetz 2015). Connecting
individuals to prosocial peers through mentoring (see Chapter 5) could
provide another source of messaging.
A programmatic threat lies in the fact that it is extremely difficult to
identify all the various forums, websites, social networking sites, and
communities where individuals may go for information related to mali-
cious hacking. Additionally, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which
individuals espouse criminal values privately but display knowledgeable
prosocial values in open spaces. Thus, interventions may benefit from
partnering with prosocial cyber-offender (especially malicious hacker)
websites and forums to encourage legitimate applications of hacking,
downplay criminality, and promote prosocial values. Such partnerships,
operating in conjunction with real-world programming, may be able to
influence the formation of bonds with ethical hackers and minimise con-
nections to antisocial or criminal communities.
The challenge of any such program lies in the fact that positive diver-
sions provide ways to keep individuals engaged in prosocial activities and
separate them from deviant peer networks. Research suggests cyber-of-
fender online social networks are as influential as those in the real world,
if not more so, due to the smaller proportion of the population who take
an interest in computers and technology (e.g. Holt 2009; Leukfeldt et al.
2017; Marcum et al. 2014). In this sense, gains in programs will only be
sustained if individuals continue to participate in the activity past a one-
off program. Since the Internet is always ‘open’, it would prove difficult
to keep offenders from connecting with delinquent peers online and
diverted from offending behaviours at all times.
Similarly, addressing criminogenic needs is likely key to the success of
positive diversions. For example, challenging the justifications espoused
by cyber-offenders through moral reasoning and cognitive restructuring
might be particularly useful for this population (Chua and Holt 2016;
Morris 2011; Turgeman-Goldschmidt 2008). Yet there is little research
as to the criminogenic family and personal circumstances that may affect
an individual’s engagement in cybercrime (but see Weulen Kranenbarg
et al. 2018, 2019). More research on cyber-offenders’ criminogenic
needs is required if programs are to be appropriately targeted.
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CHAPTER 8
Restorative Justice
Abstract  This chapter investigates a series of interventions that fall

under the banner of restorative justice procedures. These procedures
offer an informal alternative to formal court processes and typically
involve bringing the offender and the victim together to discuss the
harm caused, as well as measures to remediate the harm and assist the
offender to avoid future offending. Restorative justice is influenced by
re-integrative shaming theory, which argues that holding offenders
accountable for their crimes in a socially re-integrative way can facilitate
reconciliation and healing. We review the research literature, finding that
the evidence for restorative justice interventions in reducing recidivism
for traditional crimes is mixed and, overall, weak. To date, there are no
studies that have empirically assessed the use of restorative justice prac-
tices in relation to cybercrimes of any kind, though some scholars have
speculated as to their potential applicability. We outline the difficulties
of applying restorative justice interventions to the online context and
formulate a proposal for best-practice restorative justice procedures for
cybercrime.
Keywords  Family group conferencing · Procedural justice ·

Restorative justice · Reintegrative shaming theory · Sentencing circles ·
Victim-offender mediation

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_8
Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the scope for the application of restora-
tive justice practices to cases of cybercrime. Restorative justice has been
defined as a ‘voluntary, community-based response to criminal behaviour
that attempts to bring together the victim, the offender, and the com-
munity, in an effort to address the harm caused by the criminal behav-
iour’ (Latimer et al. 2005, p. 131). Its focus, simply put, is restoration
rather than punishment. In most understandings of restorative justice,
restoration refers to assisting offenders as well as victims. This is one rea-
son why it has had extensive application to younger offenders and mainly
in relation to less serious forms of crime (Sherman and Strang 2007): in
contrast to formal criminal court processes, restorative justice generally
has a stronger victim orientation.
We begin this chapter by exploring the theoretical background and
rationale for restorative justice practices, before examining their effec-
tiveness in preventing criminal activity. As we will demonstrate, there
is very little empirical evidence to date of restorative justice for cyber-
crimes, although some anecdotal evidence of its trial use can be found.
Thus, we shall examine the evidence of restorative justice’s efficacy for
offline crimes, focusing on differences between crime types as well as
qualitative differences in the way restorative justice conferences are con-
ducted. Given the key findings in the broader literature, we then discuss
the applicability of restorative justice to the online context, accompa-
nied by recommendations on best practice for the deployment of such
interventions.

Restorative justice is strongly linked to Braithwaite’s theory of re-inte-
grative shaming (Braithwaite 1989) and associated conferencing prac-
tices, appearing first in Australia. Re-integrative shaming posits the idea,
based upon several other criminological theories, that justice procedures
should aim to assist offenders to acknowledge the harm they have caused
(shaming) but also treat them in ways that re-integrate them into the
community. More recently, a connection to procedural justice and the
work of Tyler (1990) has been acknowledged. This body of work con-
siders restorative justice procedures to more likely be viewed as legiti-
mate by offenders if they are treated with procedural fairness, where it is
8 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 111
acknowledged that they have a right to participate in the process and to

have their perspective considered. Legitimacy, in turn, is likely to be asso-
ciated with a number of positive outcomes, including reduced recidivism.
Given the breadth and vagueness of its definition, it is not surprising
that restorative justice has assumed various forms and thus been imple-
mented in a variety of ways. Most typically, restorative justice is discussed
in relation to (at least) one of three particular forms: family group confer-
encing (conferencing, hereafter); victim-offender mediation (VOM); and
sentencing circles (Wong et al. 2016; Lauwaert and Aertsen 2015). These
forms can exist either as alternatives (diversions from), or as supplements
to, formal criminal justice processes. This means that restorative justice
can occur prior to, instead of, during, or after the formal criminal pro-
cess, including post-conviction with sentenced prisoners.
As noted, restorative justice events are intended to operate with less
formality than court-based proceedings. Despite taking a variety of
forms, there are some common features. Restorative justice events tend
to be single meetings of varying duration: from less than one hour to
several hours (see, e.g., McGarrell and Hipple 2007). In many cases, the
parties will reach an agreement on remediation and other subsequent
steps, usually relating to the offender agreeing to measures to reduce
reoffending. Significantly, there will often be no monitoring or follow-up
process after the event has ended. However, in rare instances, these tasks
will be done by courts or some other agency acting under the court’s
direction.
Restorative justice events are chaired by a convener, a mediator, or a
coordinator (hereafter, conveners). In some conferencing practices (e.g.
the Canberra Re-Integrative Shaming Experiments [RISE]; Sherman
et al. 2000), this person may be a police officer, though this is not a
widespread practice. There is typically a period of pre-event planning in
which the convenor contacts the parties to explain what is likely to hap-
pen and to secure their consent to participation, as well as arrange for
supporters of both parties to attend (Strang et al. 2013, p. 47).
Participants usually include the convener, the victim, and the offender
at a minimum. In some mediations, the victim and offender will not be
present together (indirect mediation). However, co-presence is a fea-
ture and expectation of most restorative justice events. In conferences (as
contrasted with mediations), parties beyond the victim and the offender
are encouraged to participate, such as family members and supporters
of the victim and the offender. In addition, one or more community
representatives will be present. This may include a police officer or a rep-

resentative from a non-government service provider. In sentencing cir-
cles, the event will normally be hosted by a senior community member.
During the event itself, participation among those present will be facili-
tated by passing a ‘talking piece’ from one participant to another (Zehr
2002).
Offender acknowledgement of responsibility for the harm caused
is a key component of restorative justice events. This sets the scene for
the victim to speak to the impact of the crime and for the offender to
respond to what the victim has to say. Expressions of remorse by the
offender are highly prized. In restorative justice events involving young
offenders, there will normally be a significant focus on the offender’s
response during the event and to their circumstances more generally.
An apology or other expression of remorse will commonly set the scene
for a pro-active attempt among those present to explore ways in which
the offender can be assisted to improve his or her circumstances and to
reduce the risk of further offending, as well as ways of remediating the
harm to the victim.
As noted, the production of an agreement between the parties is a pri-
mary aim of these events (with the exception of VOM). These agree-
ments, in addition to containing undertakings made by the offender
to assist the victim or otherwise remediate the harm caused, may also
record undertakings by others to assist the offender through referral to
such things as treatment programs or educational or employment oppor-
tunities. This feature of restorative justice events points to the impor-
tance of restorative justice being nested within a broader supportive
prosocial framework. Restorative justice, thus, can be viewed as one step
along the pathway to desistance from crime (Claes and Shapland 2016).
Restorative justice interventions most frequently take the form of confer-
ences and have been most commonly applied to young people, although
they have also been deployed with adults. While mainly targeted at crim-
inal offending, restorative justice has also been used to address student
behaviour management issues in schools (Morrison 2007; Fronius et al.
2016) and workplace bullying (Braithwaite 2013). Much of the focus
of restorative justice has been upon younger offenders as a diversion
from formal processing, though it can also be used as a supplement to
sentencing, or following conviction or a finding of guilt. In these cases,

the court will monitor the outcomes of restorative justice events, and
they can then influence the sentence imposed as well as the kinds of
conditions specified as part of that sentence. Successful completion of a
restorative justice agreement frequently leads to a reduced sentence.
While restorative justice is often targeted at first-time offenders, this is
not always the case. One of the acknowledged challenges facing restora-
tive justice is that it not be seen as an ‘easy’ or lax option by offenders or
victims. In order to merit its use after subsequent incidents of offending
by a particular individual, Braithwaite (2018) has argued there needs to
be a level of escalating support in cases of reoffending, while making it
clear to offenders that there will be a limit to how many times restorative
justice will be used. In essence, he argues, there is the need to ensure
that its extended application must come with the perception by the
offender that the ‘Sword of Damocles’ (in the form of unavoidable pun-
ishment) will follow if restorative justice chances are not taken seriously
(Braithwaite 2018).
As noted earlier, there have been no studies to date on restorative jus-
tice’s application to cybercrime. In the offline context, however, it has
been applied quite broadly to a range of crime types. As a general obser-
vation, restorative justice has tended to mainly be deployed in less serious
forms of offending (Bergseth and Bouffard 2013, p. 1058), though it
has also been applied to more serious crimes. Most frequently, restorative
justice events have been applied to violent and property crimes (Sherman
and Strang 2007), as well as being used to address sexual offences,
public order offences, and alcohol and drug-related offences (Sherman
et al. 2000). In post-sentencing situations, restorative justice has even
been applied to homicides (Walters 2015). Nevertheless, there is some
reticence about its application to more serious crimes because restora-
tive justice can be viewed as delivering insufficient specific and general
deterrence.

Though we could not locate any empirical testing of restorative justice
interventions for preventing cybercrime, there is a wealth of evidence in
the offline context. In summary, the evidence for restorative justice’s suc-
cess in reducing reoffending across all types of crime is mixed. Results in
terms of recidivism vary according to offence type, as will be discussed
shortly. It is also easier to declare restorative justice successful on meas-

ures other than recidivism, such as victim satisfaction (Wilson et al.
2017). In their narrative review, Weatherburn and Macadam found ‘little
support for the hypothesis that RJ [restorative justice] is more effective
than court in reducing re-offending’ (Weatherburn and Macadam 2013,
p. 14). One of the problems they observed in evaluating restorative jus-
tice effectiveness is a tendency for less serious, less persistent offenders
to be directed to restorative justice, biasing findings of effectiveness in a
positive direction (Weatherburn and Macadam 2013, p. 14). They also
noted that more recent studies tend to be less favourable, as are those
that adopt a more rigorous approach to evaluation.
Though several meta-analyses of restorative justice programs and prac-
tices have been conducted over the years, here we summarise only the
most up-to-date and rigorous reviews pertaining to effects on recidivism.
Strang et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of ten randomised trials.
They noted positively that nine of those studies showed less crime with
restorative justice conferences than without them, though they also con-
ceded that only one of the 10 indicated a statistically significant effect.
The effect size found across the studies was, however, small.
Livingstone et al. (2013) undertook a meta-analysis review of restora-
tive justice in reducing recidivism in young offenders 7–21 years of age.
Based upon four randomised controlled trials only, they noted a high risk
in most studies of a self-selection bias, as well as performance, detection,
and attrition bias. They concluded that there was ‘a lack of high qual-
ity evidence’ regarding the effectiveness of restorative justice for young
offenders and that there was no difference between those who were part
of restorative justice conferences and those in normal court proceed-
ings (Livingstone et al. 2013, p. 2). In relation to school-based offences,
there is currently no strong evidence one way or the other in terms of
restorative justice’s efficacy (Fronius et al. 2016).
A more recent meta-analysis that took into account 60 randomised
and quasi-experimental studies concluded that restorative justice pro-
grams and practices showed a modest reduction in future delinquent
behaviour relative to more traditional juvenile court processing (Wilson
et al. 2017). However, the authors noted substantial variability across
the studies, as well as evidence of bias present in many of them. Across
the 19 most robust studies (randomised designs), the overall mean
effect size was reduced to a very small effect size that was not statistically
significant.
Though restorative justice practices are often targeted at younger

offenders, there are mixed findings in regard to whether the intervention
is more effective when pitched at younger offenders. Hayes and Daly
(2004) found that first-time offenders aged 10–12 years did better than
older individuals (13–16 years) and that males were quicker to re-offend
than females. However, in a comparison of youths and adults, Latimer
et al. (2005) found no significant difference between the two groups in
recidivism.
There is some evidence to suggest that restorative justice works more
effectively with respect to some offence types than others. Some studies
have suggested that it has greater impact on reoffending in cases of vio-
lent crime than property crime (see, e.g. Strang et al.’s 2013 systematic
review). This systematic review examined studies of restorative justice
dealing with both youths and adults. Unfortunately, this review expressly
excluded from consideration two RISE experiments relating to crimes
without personal victims—shoplifting and drink-driving (Sherman et al.
2015, p. 524). For non-victim crimes, the picture is less clear. For exam-
ple, Shapland et al.’s (2008) UK study only considered offences with
‘direct, individual victims’ with the result that ‘nothing can be said about
offences with institutional or commercial victims’ (Shapland et al. 2008,
p. 36).
Given the remote nature of much cybercrime, the evidence with
respect to non-victim crime (e.g. disorderly behaviour, nuisance offences,
drink-driving) warrants close examination. There is relatively little evi-
dence unfortunately to draw upon here. While one study claims a small
effect size for offenders under the age of 14 years (McGarrell et al.
2000 discussed in Strang et al. 2013; Sherman and Strang 2007), there
is some uncertainty given that some victim offences seem to have been
included in the non-victim group. Further evidence against its efficacy
in non-victim cases is provided by Sherman et al.’s (2000) finding that
drink-driving offenders who were conferenced showed a small increase
in offending compared to those who went to court, while in relation to
juvenile shoplifters apprehended by store security officers, no difference
was found in offending rates (Sherman et al. 2000). Further, Bergseth
and Bouffard (2013) found that restorative justice was not effective for
a category of miscellaneous crimes including curfew violations, alco-
hol and tobacco offences, drug possession, traffic offences, and dis-
orderly conduct—which might be considered non-victim offences.
Their findings suggest support for a more selective and targeted applica-
tion of restorative justice than is customary.
One of the possible impacts upon restorative justice’s effectiveness,
especially among young people, is its perceived lack of legitimacy (see
Tyler et al. 2007). Sherman and Strang (2007) observed a strong nega-
tive reactivity towards restorative justice in their Australian study involv-
ing Indigenous youth shoplifters. They speculate that this reaction may
only arise in relation to property offences because ‘it is arguable …
that a victim of property crime can be seen as part of an unfair system’
(Sherman and Strang 2007, p. 75). It may be, as Sherman and Strang
suggest, ‘that some people who are told they have behaved immor-
ally by other people they neither trust nor like will become more crim-
inal in future, rather than less’ (Sherman and Strang 2007, p. 75). As
Braithwaite (2018, p. 85) recently put it, ‘people who are well liked
but not loved are not potent at inducing remorse. Nor are the police’.
Perceptions of unfairness and injustice, it has been suggested, threaten
to undermine the legitimacy of formal procedures in dealing with cyber-
crime, as well as other kinds of offending (Holt et al. 2018). We will
return to this point further below.
Under these conditions, securing the participation of offenders in
restorative justice can be challenging, especially with younger offenders.
Their participation includes acknowledgement of the harm they have
caused. Without this, there is little prospect of ‘eliciting remorse for
the offender and allowing the victim to articulate harm’ (Rossner and
Bruce 2016, p. 116). Some offenders might not see their activities as
harmful, or if they do, they see their actions as justified. Others, often
younger offenders, lack the linguistic competence needed to communi-
cate an apology. Some young offenders also tend to view restorative jus-
tice in instrumental terms, seeing it as a ‘softer option’. In this context,
an effective apology or show of contrition will be unlikely (Sherman and
Strang 2007; Hayes and Daly 2003). Remorse appears as an important
component of desistance from crime (Hayes and Daly 2003; Piquero
2017; Tangney et al. 2011).
Addressing perceptions of fairness and justice is, therefore, important
in improving the potential efficacy of restorative justice. Hayes and Daly
(2004), in their study of 200 case histories of young offenders, exam-
ined the issue of variability within conferences. They concluded that
reoffending is less likely among young offenders involved in restorative
justice if they express remorse and where the agreements were the result
of genuine consensus rather than being imposed upon the offender (see
also McGarrell and Hipple 2007; Maxwell and Morris 2001). Shapland
et al. (2008) found some significant relationships between adult offender
assessments of restorative justice and a number of measures of reoffend-
ing. These included ‘the extent to which the offenders felt the confer-
ence had made them realise the harm done’ (Shapland et al. 2008, p. iv).
Increasingly, it is seen as unrealistic to evaluate restorative justice out-
comes in the way other therapeutically intended interventions might be
evaluated. One reason is the short duration of a typical restorative jus-
tice conference. Second, as Weatherburn and Macadam (2013, p. 14)
have pointed out, restorative justice ‘was never designed to reduce the
risk factors known to be associated with involvement in crime’. Instead,
restorative justice might be better viewed as a ‘way of delivering multi-
ple strategies’ (Braithwaite 2018, p. 87) or, similarly put but in the lan-
guage of desistance, an opportunity to ‘facilitate a desire, or consolidate
a decision [by an offender] to desist’ (Robinson and Shapland 2008, p.
352). Hence, it has been suggested, restorative justice might be com-
bined ‘with correctional measures that have been shown to be effective
in reducing re-offending’ (Weatherburn and Macadam 2013, p. 14,
emphasis in original), such as family therapy programs (Schwalbe et al.
2012, p. 30). Latimer et al. (2005) undertook a meta-analysis of 35 pro-
grams, 26 of which were youth focused. While restorative justice could
be said to have delivered a statistically significant reduction in recidivism,
it was clear that generally speaking, psychologically informed treatments
yield much stronger impacts on reoffending (Latimer et al. 2005, p.
140). Linking restorative justice more effectively to programs of proven
efficacy, therefore, makes a lot of sense.

The potential application of restorative justice to economic cyber-
crimes, including online fraud, has been raised by a small group of schol-
ars (Levi et al. 2015; Button et al. 2015). In a research report for the
City of London Corporation, Levi et al. (2015, p. 70) state that while
the small number of prosecutions of these crimes make the salience of
restorative justice to this area questionable, it might have some value in
responding to younger offenders or prospective offenders. They suggest
that its value potentially is to be found in its ability to convey a message
of the harmfulness arising from such crimes. Moreover, some victims of
cybercrime have expressed interest in restorative justice responses. In an

exploration of the views of online fraud victims, Button et al. (2015)
encountered considerable interest among their victim group in the
potential of restorative justice to offer two things. First, it would enable
victims to learn about who had victimised them and how and why they
had been selected. Second, it would enable victims to demonstrate to the
offenders the harm they had caused the victims (Button et al. 2015, p.
208). Given the ready availability of rationalisations for malicious hack-
ing behaviour among the cyber-offender communities (see Brewer et al.
2019), victim pressure for restorative justice may indeed lead to more
opportunities in which harms can be explained to offenders and given a
human face.
As already noted, however, there is no evidence to date of the appli-
cation, or effectiveness, of restorative justice in the cybercrime realm.
Given the pervasive interest in this domain by young people, and
the widespread use of restorative justice particularly for cases of youth
offending, this apparent gap is surprising. While the evidence for its effi-
cacy in offline crimes is mixed at best, there remains a strong commit-
ment to its improvement and its ongoing application particularly in the
earlier stages of criminal trajectories. It seems unlikely, therefore, that
this gap will remain for long as more cases of youth offending come to
light.
We see several opportunities here. The prevalence of rationalisations
among young cyber-offenders, especially those that downplay or deny
harm from their actions, means that conferences need to provide credible
counters to these views. Where offenders see their actions as warranted
because the ‘system’ is unfair, their responses to official intervention
(court or conference) may be ones of defiance or resistance. Overcoming
this stance will probably require a sustained, concerted effort that cannot
be delivered by restorative justice alone. Given the arm’s-length—even
anonymous—nature of much cybercrime, conferences will often pro-
vide the first opportunity to present an embodied victim to the offender.
This will frequently challenge those facilitating and convening the con-
ference because the victims will often be located in other jurisdictions.
Videoconferencing will often be a practical solution for these situations.
Practitioners wishing to apply restorative justice to cybercrime will
also face some key challenges. As with offline offending, the diversity of
types of cybercrime makes generalisations of any kind about appropriate
interventions difficult. As canvassed in Chapter 1, we still have limited
understandings of cyber-offender characteristics. Furthermore, as flagged

above, giving cybercrime a human face, especially by bringing offenders
and victims together in the same physical space, will often prove difficult.
Cybercrimes are typically committed remotely by offenders who never
meet their victims. However, in some cases, there will be no ‘victim’ with
a face. A malicious hack on infrastructure, for example, will undoubtedly
inconvenience or harm many, but the harms are diffused, at least from
the offender’s point of view, across a largely unknown group of individ-
ual victims. How victims could be represented effectively in relation to
such crimes is an important threshold question. Proxy or representative
victims in other restorative justice settings have been seen as detrimen-
tal in terms of achieving the offender’s buy-into the process, especially
where the proxy is seen as dominating the discussion. Any persons who
play this role would need to adopt a measured approach, one that shows
some appreciation of the offender’s circumstances.
As noted earlier, an important element of restorative justice is to have
the supporters of the offender present as well as the victim. Harnessing
the disapproval of those esteemed by the offender for his or her actions
can assist in feelings, and subsequent expressions, of remorse. In terms
of showing support for the offender, and providing assistance to him
or her to adopt a more prosocial position in future, this is likely to
prove challenging, again, given the isolated nature of some offending.
Nevertheless, while more thought is required, there may indeed be ways
of doing this virtually that overcome the physical separation yet remain
effective (see Freitas and Palermo 2016). Moreover, the influence of peer
groups is acknowledged in studies of how cyber-offenders are initiated
and supported, yet researchers have thought little so far about the role of
peers in assisting desistance and reduced reoffending in digital contexts.
Where reinforcement for continued offending can be found online, as
well as among one’s offline peers, addressing peer influence (in terms of
both recruiting prosocial peers to the restorative justice proceedings and
considering external forces pulling on participants) is likely to be doubly
difficult. Moderating features of the online environment, such as reduc-
ing perceived anonymity, as well as influencing their choice of offline
peer associates, may be necessary. These measures of course are beyond
the capability of restorative justice itself to implement or monitor.
The silver lining in terms of what restorative justice might posi-
tively contribute arises out of the fact that the skill set involved in many
cybercrimes, especially of the more serious kind, has actual or potential
application in legitimate fields of computer and software activity, as com-

pared say to the skill set of a violent offender or thief. Therefore, there
are potentially some proximal influencers and opportunities in these
legitimate fields that could be incorporated into restorative justice pro-
cedures for cybercrimes (see Chapter 7). Obviously, there would be real
value in tracking cases of this kind over time in order to gather evidence
of efficacy.
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PART IV
New Directions
CHAPTER 9
Designing and Evaluating Crime Prevention

Solutions for the Digital Age
Abstract  This chapter draws together the key empirical strands that

have emerged throughout the preceding chapters and explicates the
practical dimensions of this work. It acknowledges first that there has
been very little research evaluating the effects of crime prevention ini-
tiatives on cybercrime. It then outlines ways in which this gap can be
addressed in the future, and some of the issues that both researchers
and practitioners will need to be aware of when it comes to implement-
ing and evaluating cybercrime interventions. This chapter concludes by
offering a number of recommendations for practitioners and researchers
seeking to evaluate cybercrime interventions in the future.
Keywords  Data collection · Evaluation design · Ethical issues ·

Generalisability concerns · Intervention evaluation ·
Maryland Scientific Methods Scale
As demonstrated across this book, to date there has been very little
to no research evaluating the effects of crime prevention initiatives on
cybercrime. Chapter 2 demonstrated that situational crime prevention
(SCP) was by far the most commonly deployed cybercrime interven-
tion, with some robust evidence (i.e. experimental and quasi-experimen-
tal studies) indicating that particular forms of SCP have showed some

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1_9
promise in effectively reducing cybercrime (albeit in limited contexts).

These include the use of antivirus software, the use of warning banners,
and the monitoring or surveillance of computer systems.1 When it comes
to other primary, secondary, and tertiary forms of cybercrime prevention,
the other chapters in this book illustrate a far less developed evidence
base. That is, there is only scant research available evaluating the effec-
tiveness of such cybercrime interventions as universal communication
strategies, educational workshops, mentoring, targeted warnings and
police cautions, positive diversions, and restorative justice procedures.
This lack of published research could be reflective of the relative novelty
of cybercrime, a potential lack of interest by cybercrime researchers, or
publication bias. In any case, despite there being a relatively robust evi-
dence base for these interventions in offline contexts, the unique charac-
teristics of the cyber environment, as well as cyber-offenders, necessitate
that cyber-specific evaluations be designed and conducted.
Such research is pivotal to ensure that crime prevention strategies are
achieving their crime reduction goals, delivering value for money, and
that there are no unforeseen or undesirable consequences (Hutchings
and Holt 2017). Just like clinical trials are necessary to ensure that med-
icines are effective at preventing and treating diseases, crime prevention
initiatives should be rigorously evaluated to determine whether interven-
tions are effective at preventing crime or reducing recidivism. Moreover,
the existence of a rich evidence base can also make it possible to deter-
mine whether specific factors associated with an intervention have an
impact on positive outcomes (e.g. who runs the intervention, who the
targets are, the intervention’s duration), as well as take stock of any other
moderating effects.
Evaluations also provide other critical insights not immediately appar-
ent. For example, as has been established in offline contexts, crime pre-
vention initiatives can have unintended effects and may even cause an
increase in offending (Grabosky 1996; McCord 2003; Sherman 1993;
Welsh and Farrington 2001). We have discussed such potential unan-
ticipated consequences across this book. For example, some of the
1 We acknowledge that elsewhere, less methodologically robust studies have also exam-
ined the merits of other SCP approaches within cybercrime contexts, including the use of
firewalls and passwords, vulnerability patching, police crackdowns, intrusion detection and
prevention systems, honeypots, audit trails, website takedowns, fraud detection systems,
and spam filtering (see further Chapter 2).
9 DESIGNING AND EVALUATING CRIME PREVENTION SOLUTIONS … 127
evaluations examining the effects of various interventions showed an

association with increased criminal activity (see Chapters 4–7). As laid
out in these chapters, the factors driving these trends are complex and
multifaceted and may be a product of poor intervention planning or
training, net-widening effects, peer contagion, or crime displacement
among others. We are still learning about the potential unintended out-
comes for interventions designed to disrupt cybercrime (see further
Hutchings et al. 2016; Moore and Clayton 2011; Soska and Christin
2015), and additional rigorous study is warranted.
This chapter sets out to address this need for additional research into
the effectiveness and impact of cybercrime interventions by charting a
path forward for researchers and practitioners alike. It is not our inten-
tion to provide a detailed account of how to conduct evaluations. For
this, readers should consult the wealth of available resources on this topic
(see, e.g., Cook and Campbell 1979; Ekblom and Pease 1995; Shaw
et al. 2006, among others). This chapter instead seeks to build on this
work and flag some of the potential challenges likely to confront those
setting out to evaluate both new and pre-existing cybercrime interven-
tions. We argue that in order to successfully navigate these challenges,
researchers and practitioners must specifically tailor their evaluations to
suit digital environments, as well as acknowledge the distinctive charac-
teristics of cyber-offending. This chapter concludes by drawing together
key points emerging from the discussion and offers a number of recom-
mendations for undertaking research in the field—a way forward—which
we hope will promote both more widespread and consistent use of evalu-
ations in future interventions.
Navigating the Cybercrime Intervention Minefield

We acknowledge that conducting robust evaluations is challenging,
and that the digital realm presents many unknowns. Researchers and
practitioners who seek to implement evaluations must be cognisant of
the many pitfalls before them. In particular, they must be attentive to
the study design selected, be mindful of data collection techniques and
sources, as well as give due consideration to the limits inherent in such
approaches. As noted across the chapters in this book, cybercrime inter-
ventions are not simply offline interventions in a digital context. As such,
we argue that intervention research pertaining to cybercrime presents
some methodological challenges that can be different to those previously
encountered in offline contexts. These challenges, if not addressed at the

outset, have the potential to compromise the integrity of an evaluation
and also affect its feasibility. Such matters must, therefore, be consid-
ered when designing and implementing any evaluation of a cybercrime
intervention—whether this be for new interventions that are yet to be
deployed, or pre-existing interventions where an evaluative component is
being added. These challenges are canvassed below.
Selecting the Appropriate Study Design

Given that there are so few available evaluations of cybercrime inter-
ventions to date, it is particularly important that future evaluations be
rigorous. One of the underlying reasons behind the relative scarcity
of empirical research in this area could be the absence of universally
regarded methodologies and consistent measurement frameworks to pro-
vide organisations with practical tools for assessing the effectiveness of
cybercrime interventions (Torres et al. 2006). As demonstrated through-
out this book, such evaluations can potentially be designed and imple-
mented at different points in the offending lifecycle and can assume
various forms. This is not to say that all evaluations are created equal.
Both practitioners and researchers must take care to select an appropriate
study design that will best measure the effects of an intervention.
Evaluations differ substantially in terms of their quality and robust-
ness. There are a number of ways that the effects of an intervention can
be measured, and the quality and usefulness of these vary considerably.
Those looking to implement any such evaluation—pertaining to cyber-
crime or otherwise—must acknowledge that the stronger the research
design, the greater the confidence that can be placed in the findings.
Through the development of the Maryland Scientific Scale, Sherman
et al. (1998) set out to design a tool to guide practitioners and research-
ers along this path, and to demonstrate the breadth and relative strength
of the different research designs available. The Maryland Scientific
Methods Scale scores a number of evaluation methods from one to five,
with five being the most rigorous (Sherman et al. 1998). Just as the con-
cept of primary, secondary, and tertiary crime prevention originates from
public health, this scale is similar to those used for clinical trials (Sherman
et al. 1998). Details of the methods, along with example hypotheses, are
presented in Table 9.1, adapted from Farrington et al. (2002). The ideal
method is an experimental design (Method 5), with random allocation
Table 9.1 Potential hypotheses and research designs for evaluating interven-

tions, using the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale
Method Description Example hypotheses
1. Correlation between an intervention Following the intervention, there

and a measure of crime at one point will be fewer cybercrime incidents
of time recorded
2. Measures of crime before and after Those who receive the intervention
the intervention, with no comparable will commit fewer cybercrimes than
control condition before
3. Measures of crime before and after Those who receive the intervention
the intervention in experimental and will commit fewer cybercrimes than
comparable control conditions before, but there will be no decrease
for those in the control condition
4. Measures of crime before and after the Those who receive the intervention
intervention in multiple experimental will commit fewer cybercrimes than
and control units, controlling for before, but there will be no decrease
other variables that influence crime for those in the control condition,
after controlling for other factors that
influence cybercrime offending
5. Random assignment of program and Those randomly assigned to the
control conditions to units experimental condition will have
reduced offending rates compared
to those assigned to the control
condition
to experimental and control groups, and pre- and post-intervention

measurements. Ideally, experiments will have large sample sizes and long
follow-up periods (Welsh and Farrington 2001). Methods 3 and 4 are
quasi-experimental designs, which can be used when random allocation
is not possible, but the experimental and control groups can be matched
so that they are comparable. It should be noted, however, that the scale
has some limitations. For instance, it is not well suited to scoring robust
repeated-measures analyses (e.g. time series analyses). At the very least,
the scale provides a simple measure of internal validity that illustrates the
study designs best suited for making inferences about causal effects of
interventions (Farrington 2003).
Evaluations can be introduced using post-intervention designs that take
a retrospective approach to measure the effects of interventions that have
already been delivered. Alternatively, evaluations can be designed to run as
part of the intervention. A key benefit of a prospective design is that the
evaluation can involve both pre- and post-intervention measurements.

When it comes to the deployment of future cybercrime interventions, they
should, where possible, be implemented with evaluation in mind. Previous
interventions, such as the LizardStresser and Blackshades interventions
described in Chapter 6, took place at scale when police had data that ena-
bled them to identify those who could have offended, or might do so in the
future. When further opportunities arise to deliver such an intervention, we
recommend random allocation to control and experimental groups, so that
the effectiveness of the intervention can be evaluated robustly.
Random allocation to experimental and control conditions is particu-
larly useful when comparing different intervention types. The control
condition could consist of ‘doing nothing’, proceeding to investigation
and potentially prosecution; alternatively, a warning could be the control
condition, and the experimental condition might be restorative justice,
mentoring, or education. The use of a control group also enables the
evaluation of the intervention, while controlling for other factors that
could affect the outcome, such as an underlying reduction in the rate
of crime. Furthermore, random allocation to control and intervention
group controls for selection biases might have an effect on the outcome
(Sherman et al. 1998). For example, police decisions to divert offend-
ers from the criminal justice system are not random (Hancock 1978;
Sherman 1984; Snowball 2008). Therefore, the outcome may have more
to do with who they decide to divert, rather than the intervention itself.
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs can also be used to
inform cost–benefit analysis to evaluate the effectiveness of the interven-
tion (Welsh and Farrington 2001). Cost–benefit analysis expresses costs
and benefits in monetary terms; its outcome being presented as a ratio
of the cost of the intervention to the monetary value of the outcome
(Dossetor 2011). Other approaches to evaluation include cost-effective-
ness analysis, which expresses outcomes in non-monetary terms (such
as the cost per crime avoided), and cost-saving analysis, which limits the
evaluation to one stakeholder, without including wider social outcomes
(Dossetor 2011).
Even the most robust experimental designs are subject to threats to
validity. Particularly with cybercrimes, interventions are likely to be dis-
cussed online by recipients, which could result in a contamination effect.
General deterrence principles mean that someone in a control group
who becomes aware of the intervention delivered to the experimental
group may also change their behaviour. Furthermore, cyber populations
are frequently mischievous (Hutchings and Holt 2018). If they are aware
that different interventions are being applied, along with requests to
speak to a researcher, they could potentially conspire together when pro-
viding responses to influence the results of an experimental design.
Finally, to draw robust conclusions, any evaluation, be it experimen-
tal, quasi-experimental or otherwise, needs adequate statistical power.
This is a large subject in and of itself, and while some researchers have
sought to set guidelines on such (e.g. Welsh and Farrington [2001] pro-
pose that for experimental designs, there should be a minimum of 50
units in each category in order to balance the treatment and compari-
son groups on extraneous variables), the reality is far more complex than
this. Statistical power is a function of several factors, including the effect
size of the intervention—that is, how much the intervention reduces the
outcome variable (crime). The smaller the expected effect size, the larger
the sample must be to detect a statistically significant effect, holding
everything else constant. Underpowered studies are also more likely to
produce false positive results, that is, effects that are not real (Ioannidis
2005). Furthermore, if the experiment aims to identify if there are differ-
ential (interaction) effects, such as whether the intervention works dif-
ferently for some populations than others, larger sample sizes are usually
needed (Sherman 1984). Required sample size can thus be calculated by
determining the anticipated size of the effect (Cohen 1992), or alterna-
tively, the smallest effect size of interest—that is, the minimum reduction
in crime as a result of the intervention that may be considered practi-
cally meaningful or important (see King 2001). For researchers and pol-
icymakers concerned with cost-effectiveness, for example, knowing the
absolute number of cybercrimes averted by a particular intervention
would be a key consideration to build into evaluation design. Yet, finding
enough participants (that is, cyber-offenders) to conduct a high-powered
evaluation that can answer such questions is likely to be challenging.
Sourcing the Best Possible Data

For evaluation studies, offending should ideally be measured both pre-
and post-intervention. This is easier said than done. Criminologists have,
for some time, acknowledged the considerable difficulties associated
with measuring criminal behaviour, as compared to health outcomes,
because the former is often covert and hidden (Green 1985). Researchers
typically use one of several ways to measure crime committed by an
individual. These include self-reported offending and official records or

reports (Kleinman and Lukoff 1981), although victim reports are rarely
used in evaluation studies. Alternatively, other data, including those col-
lected through monitoring and observation, can prove fruitful (Mazerolle
et al. 1998). Evaluation research can also draw upon multiple sources to
achieve its aims. Depending on the intervention and its goals, an eval-
uation may appropriately leverage data on the behaviours of particular
individuals, whereas others may instead measure incidences of crime and
crime attempts before and after an intervention has been implemented.
It is worth noting that regardless of the data type, intervention form, or
measure used, there are data challenges and biases that a researcher must
be aware of, and account for, at the outset. These potential hurdles, espe-
cially as they pertain to cybercrime, are elaborated upon below.
Evaluations can utilise self-report data, which can be collected through
surveys, as well as interviews, and may cover a number of topics, ranging
from the subjects’ views of the intervention, and their pathways into and
out of offending, through to other questions of interest to the research-
ers. Questions can be a combination of fixed option (closed) responses
and open responses and can assess various measures relevant to eval-
uating an intervention (see Table 9.2). Self-report data can be particu-
larly robust and offer unique quantitative and qualitative insights into
an intervention that are not possible through other means. However,
self-report data can be notoriously challenging to collect (particularly in
cybercrime contexts) and can be prone to bias.
Self-report data are typically collected from offenders through the use
of interviews with a researcher (face to face, telephone, or online), or via
the administration of a survey. Interviews can take place at the time an
individual is referred to or receives an intervention, as well as at intervals
post-intervention. While interviews have the potential to produce highly
detailed data, they can be incredibly time-consuming, inconvenient, and
expensive to arrange and conduct. In online contexts, such problems
may be exacerbated by the limited contact points available, as well as the
inability for the researchers to build a personal rapport with participants
to encourage follow-up. In addition, interviews, be that on- or offline,
require that offenders provide informed consent, which means that the
subjects must be able to opt-out without penalty. This can have negative
repercussions for the evaluation’s sample size (discussed further below).
Given the desirable study design characteristics discussed above, the val-
ue-for-money proposition of interviews alone may be limited.
Table 9.2 Measures and data sources
Measures Data sources
Self-report data Official data Observation data
Whether the offender received the X X X

intervention
The offender’s perceptions of the X X
intervention
Whether the offender had X X X
committed any offences before
receiving the intervention
Whether the offender had com- X X X
mitted any offences after receiving
the intervention
If so, the frequency and nature X X X
of their offending, and how this
has changed since receiving the
intervention?
If so, the time between receiving X X X
the intervention and resuming
offending
Why the offender became X
involved in offending?
If the offender stopped offending, X
why?
If the intervention changed the X
offender’s perception of being
caught
Prior to receiving the interven- X
tion, did the offender realise the
illegality of their activities?
The offender’s personal character- X X
istics, such as age, gender, school
level, employment status, and
relationship status
Surveys are also commonly used to collect self-report data. Surveys

are generally simpler, quicker, and less expensive than interviews to con-
duct at scale. They can be conducted online via the provision of a web
link, or by using a paper-based survey (complete with a reply-paid enve-
lope). Paper-based surveys offer an additional benefit in terms of pro-
viding participants greater confidentiality, as there will be no possible
leakage through their Internet history records or IP address logging.

However, paper-based postage may result in increased inconvenience, as
well as increased costs on account of postage and handling. Regardless
of the deployment mechanism, surveys have notoriously poor response
rates (particularly among offending populations, and especially for
online cohorts), and require robust follow-up procedures on the part of
the researcher to ameliorate this issue (see Bachman and Schutt 2016;
Gideon 2012; Baruch and Holtom 2008). In addition, while survey
instruments can be created to canvass a wide range of topics, the circum-
stances and complexity of cybercrime may also make survey instruments
hard to design. For example, the diverse nature of online behaviour can
make it hard to provide closed response options, or to compare severity
or offence type across participants. Cybercrime surveys are also necessar-
ily limited with respect to the kind of data they can collect (i.e. lacking
the nuance surrounding a response that might be gleaned through alter-
nate means). They are also vulnerable to other problems common across
crime surveys. For example, offenders may exaggerate facts, report only
selectively, or have difficulty providing accurate answers about what they
did and when (particularly if spanning a significant period of time).
It is also important to note that self-report data, whether collected
through interviews or surveys, can be biased. This can occur in numer-
ous ways. The fact that the behaviour of interest is criminal may add
problems of veracity, particularly if subjects are sceptical of the ano-
nymity provided by the research design. For instance, prolific or serious
offenders may be less likely to confess via self-report data, while those
that do respond may misreport the frequency or severity of their activi-
ties (Florêncio and Herley 2013). Such bias can also be exacerbated by
low response rates. Giving strong assurances of anonymity may be coun-
terproductive if it simply makes the anonymity risk more salient. Finally,
if interviewing participants in person, the researchers need to have some
technical knowledge to have credibility with participants (Hutchings and
Holt 2018). Few people combine such knowledge with the skills needed
to interview offenders.
Those relying upon self-report data should be prepared for low
response rates and potential participation bias (particularly for cyber-
crime-related evaluations), and deploy active measures to combat
this. Very little research on cybercrime offender populations has used
a sampling frame (and hence been able to provide a response rate).
Nevertheless, in one example, Hutchings and Clayton (2016) achieved
a 25% response rate with their survey of booter service providers, but
they sent up to four invitations to each subject. They also compared
invitations to participate in an online survey versus an interactive online
interview and found the former to elicit more responses (although those
who took part in an interview answered more questions). In addition,
the potential for attrition during follow-up periods should be considered
(Farrington and Welsh 2005). For example, some individuals may not
participate in self-report surveys during follow-up periods. Others may
opt to have their data removed from the analysis, their whereabouts may
not be ascertained, or they may have died.
Another important source of data is official records/reports. This
involves examination of records held by government sources, such as
through the criminal justice system, including police arrest records,
offender databases, court, and other records (e.g. data collected from
schools, corrections, social services, etc.). Such data have been used by
criminologists for over a century for the analysis of crime and criminal
justice trends. Criminal justice data can yield unique and potentially
detailed insights into offending and offender characteristics that can be
particularly useful in evaluating interventions. For example, such data
can provide essential information about crime events, as well as offenders
and their offending. It can contain information on all reported crimes,
arrests, and convictions.
Many scholars have noted, however, that conducting research using
criminal justice data presents numerous challenges. Gaining access
to quality, usable data is arguably one of the greatest challenges facing
researchers seeking to evaluate interventions. Such research requires the
assistance of the relevant agency or body that maintains official records
of contact (with the criminal justice system or otherwise). Data access
would need to be negotiated and is by no means assured. Such access
procedures may be labour-intensive, time-consuming and also poten-
tially come at a financial cost. In addition, much official data have origi-
nally been collected for other purposes and must, therefore, be prepared
for evaluation research. As such, any data extracted and used by the
researcher would also first need to be searched, matched, and provided
in a de-identified format suitable for analysis.
Researchers have also long understood that such data are both incom-
plete and limited (Becker 1963), which therefore frames the ways in
which it should be understood, as well as limits analysis and interpre-
tation. Notably, such data include only a sample of criminal events and
offenders, including only those who have come to the attention of law
enforcement. This makes the true extent of crime difficult to measure,
particularly crimes that are less likely to be reported or are more cov-
ert in nature. Cybercrime is often a particularly hidden crime, and many
offenders never come to the attention of law enforcement. Cyber-
offenders may also be particularly likely to ‘drift’ into and out of offend-
ing (Goldsmith and Brewer 2015), and there may be significant gaps
in time involved. Online offenders often believe that they will never be
detected (Hutchings 2016), and in many cases, they will be right. This
point is demonstrated using data collected by Hutchings (2019): those
arrested, charged, and prosecuted for online offences were offending
for an average of 1.7 years, and in some cases as many as 8 years, before
being detected. This can be particularly problematic for research evaluat-
ing a cybercrime intervention, as failure to detect offending will have an
adverse effect on the accuracy of the results of the evaluation.
Relatedly, when analysing official data, it is important to recognise
that even if crime is reported, there can be many delays in the system
that can impact the quality of the data. For example, Kleinman and
Lukoff (1981) reviewed the criminal records of heroin addicts shortly
after the end of their methadone treatment, and again two years later.
They found that there could be a ‘noticeable lag’ in time between
a crime and its entry into the official records. In a more recent exam-
ple, Ringland (2013) compared estimates of reoffending obtained from
police and court data. They found that the median time between reof-
fending and police commencing court proceedings was one day, while
the time until finalisation in court was 86 days.
Measurements using official data do not suffer from the same par-
ticipation biases as self-reported offending. However, researchers using
official data must be aware of other biases. First, the data made available
to researchers are unlikely to offer a complete picture of offending, but
may instead be shaped by the assumptions, methods and priorities of the
original custodians of the data (Faust and Tita 2019). Put another way,
these custodians may have introduced their own biases into the data.
For example, arrest data will be reflective of who is actually detected by
law enforcement—which in turn may be influenced by choices made
by police about which cybercrimes, individuals or online spaces (e.g.
particular web forums or illicit markets) to target; what investigative
techniques, capabilities, and resources are available; and staffing require-
ments. Cybercrime investigations and prosecutions can be long, costly,
and incredibly resource-intensive. Therefore, choices are made about

which cases are pursued and which are not (Smith et al. 2004). It is also
possible that cyber-offenders who have been detected differ from those
who have not. For example, they may be more prolific or more likely to
attack high-value targets, or they may simply be less skilled.
In addition to self-report and official data, it is possible to observe
‘ground truth’ behaviours, through the monitoring of cyber-offender
activities as they occur and analysing the data these behaviours gen-
erate. For example, law enforcement agencies around the world have
experience in infiltrating and assuming control of forums and markets
dedicated to a wide range of cybercrimes (e.g. Glenny 2011; Bleakley
2018). Elsewhere, cyber-offenders who buy or sell illicit goods or ser-
vices using Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies are particularly open to
traffic analysis (Christin 2013). Such techniques could be used to eval-
uate interventions, including the random allocation of buyers and sellers
to experimental and control conditions, and measure their subsequent
activities. Some advance planning is likely to be useful here, as certain
factors beyond the evaluator’s control could potentially undermine
results as will now be discussed.
It is possible, for example, that the users of a forum would discuss
any intervention they received, potentially exposing the experimen-
tal design and compromising the evaluation. Indeed, discussions about
interventions have already been observed on underground forums. Data
collected for the CrimeBB dataset (Pastrana et al. 2018) from the pop-
ular online forum Hackforums, illustrated this following the Blackshades
warning letter intervention (see further Chapter 6). Here, one user took
to the forum and wrote:
What the actual f*ck! Got a letter from the NCA to my NEW address
regarding the use of BlackShades… I never f*cking bought BlackShades nor
did I ever use it due to hearing about it’s … backdoor. This is f*cking horse
sh*t - luckily no arrest made but they’ve asked me to destroy it if I still have
possession.. I never had f*cking possession.. I never touched that f*cking
sh*t.. I’m not sure if others in the UK got this but this is bullsh*t. It’s dated
the 1st of July; it took 23 days to deliver this sh*t.. (Fun fact; I’m about
200 meters from a police station).. Yeah I blanked my first name; plenty of
people know it; I know. I never touched BlackShades so I don’t give a f*ck
- I’m more bothered about how my name and stuff got in their database -
they clearly got my new address due to me registering to vote ect. Plus I got
nothing to hide so I didn’t exactly hide it.
This post resulted in robust discussion and debate among forum users
regarding both the merits of intervention, as well as speculation sur-
rounding the processes by which the National Crime Authority (NCA)
may have compiled its dataset. On this latter point, one commenter
within the same thread suggested that someone else could have used the
recipient’s email address, which might explain why they had received the
letter without having purchased Blackshades. Another provided an alter-
nate explanation:
Probably they busted the guy who made the blackshades and contacted
paypal for the names of all the people who purchased it; then send the let-
ter to all the names; hoping to scare them and make them delete it. Your
name was going in the list probably because you purchased something
rat-related (crypters).
As the result of such discussions, users who were not given the inter-
vention might be deterred indirectly (no longer acting as an appropriate
control condition), or users could displace to a different service that is
not being monitored (e.g. another web forum or illicit market). In addi-
tion, it is entirely possible that police or investigative agencies endowed
with this type of access may elect to use it for covert monitoring or
high-profile arrests rather than for research purposes such as evaluating
interventions.
It is also possible that the user above was in fact telling the truth.
Sometimes those that are targeted for intervention may not necessar-
ily be connected to any actual cybercrime activities. Evaluations relying
upon observations or monitoring of cybercrime must, therefore, con-
sider available data with caution, as the attribution of cybercrimes can
be difficult to accurately discern. While there can be indicators as to
who was involved in an incident, these can often be faked, particularly
by more skilled offenders. For example, the mapping of IP addresses
to subscriber information, which is often used for attribution, is not
always perfect. Offenders can use VPNs, proxy servers, anonymity net-
works, or unsecured Wi-Fi connections. Attribution can also fail due to
human error, such as incorrectly recording the IP address (Champion
2017). Most consumer IP addresses now change over time, so attribu-
tion depends on accurate reading and recording of time zones (Clayton
2005). Furthermore, account takeovers can be targeted in order to ‘set
up’ a rival or take advantage of their status and reputation. There can
be higher confidence when an incident is linked to a subscriber multiple

times, or across multiple platforms. Where there is just one indicator, it is
perhaps better treated as a clue than as definitive evidence.
Being Attentive to Ethical Issues

Researchers engaging offenders, victims, and criminal justice data must
be attentive to a wide range of ethical concerns when designing, imple-
menting, and analysing evaluations. There is an established literature
exploring the ethical considerations in evaluation research (see Simons
2006), particularly across criminal justice contexts (see Weisburd 2003).
As such, all of these will not be retrodden here. However, those evaluat-
ing cybercrime interventions should be attentive to certain ethical issues
that may be exacerbated through digital environments, which could
afflict such research. These include concerns regarding the potential
for obfuscation of age (and other forms of disadvantage), as well as the
chronic over-sampling of cyber-offenders by researchers.
The relative anonymity afforded by digital technologies and the
Internet makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the composi-
tion of samples of cyber-offenders (Goldsmith and Brewer 2015), par-
ticularly in cases where observational or surveillance data sources are
used. Unbeknownst to the researcher, targets of an intervention (and
thus the evaluation) may be from vulnerable populations, such as chil-
dren or adolescents (Holt et al. 2018), or suffering from a mental health
condition (Schell and Melnychuk 2011). As such, it is possible that such
individuals are recruited into a study without the necessary consent
protocols being in place, or other risks and burdens being adequately
addressed.
It is also important to note that as a whole, cyber-offenders are poten-
tially subject to over-sampling by researchers other than those involved
in a particular evaluation. Criminologists, for example, routinely collect
and analyse content found online in their research (e.g. data scraped
from illicit markets or web forums). These data are widely used because
they can be rapidly collected at scale (i.e. through the use of a crawler),
and is increasingly done without the consent or knowledge of site own-
ers or content creators (Ball et al. 2019; Décary-Hétu and Aldridge
2015). As such, cyber-offenders may be the subject of a multiplicity of
different research studies. Moreover, as cyber-offenders often have affili-
ations across multiple sites, their exposure may be increased further. Not
only does this serve as a burden to participants, but there are also impli-
cations for data quality if it results in a higher refusal rate (i.e. a less rep-
resentative sample) (see further Clark 2008).
Acknowledging Generalisability Concerns

As with most forms of empirical social research, evaluating interventions
presents unique challenges to generalisability beyond the population
being studied (Sherman et al. 1998). In addition to the routine gener-
alisability limitations regarding the applicability of specific case studies to
other jurisdictions or group contexts, and the implications from incom-
plete or missing data, there are other generalisability concerns that need
to be acknowledged when undertaking criminal justice-related interven-
tions. Such concerns can stem from the type of intervention and crime
type, as well as offender characteristics.
Given the time and costs associated with developing and deploying
robust evaluations, it is likely that the research design must necessarily
be constrained. As was demonstrated throughout this book, evaluations
are typically highly focused on a single intervention taking place in a par-
ticular context, and in relation to a single form of criminal activity (e.g.
possessing a specific type of malware, as was the case in the Blackshades
intervention). Given the diversity of cyber-offenders and cybercrimes dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, findings for one type of activity (e.g. DDoS attacks)
may not hold true from other types of criminal activity (e.g. writing
viruses or malware)—particularly given their different motivations, meth-
ods, and required skill sets.
Even within a sample of offenders, the effectiveness of an intervention
may also vary by certain offender characteristics such as relationship sta-
tus, employment status, education level, and race (Sherman et al. 1992).
As such, particular characteristics of cyber-offenders may mean that
interventions designed for other populations (offline offenders, or even
other types of cyber-offenders) have different outcomes.
Charting a Path Forward for Researchers

and Practitioners
In this final section, we draw together the key challenges identified in the
above discussion and offer a number of recommendations for research-
ers and practitioners seeking to undertake evaluations of cybercrime
interventions. Researchers conducting evaluations in digital environ-

ments must carefully consider the study design, preferably selecting
one that is both robust, yet feasible to design alongside the interven-
tion (in lieu of tacking an evaluation on after the fact). The randomised
controlled trials described above are the most valuable of the studies
that evaluate the effects of crime prevention in terms of the insights
they can provide. However, they are also the most resource-intensive.
Furthermore, when planning such an evaluation, researchers should
particularly consider the length of any follow-up period. Welsh and
Farrington (2001) suggest that a lengthy follow-up period is required to
assess how long the effects of an intervention persist after it has ended.
Grabosky (1996) also notes that there may be a ‘reversal of effects’; even
if an intervention leads to an initial reduction in crime, it may actually
increase in the longer term. An evaluation could incorporate multiple
follow-up periods to measure short- and long-term effects. Self-report
measurements of offending behaviour could be taken at each follow-up
and matched with official data on contacts with the criminal justice
system.
Given the challenges, and potential pitfalls of obtaining quality cyber-
crime data—be it through self-report or official data, or observation—
researchers must consider innovative ways to collect data. One path
forward would be to consider using triangulated data where possible.
This could help to counter the potential biases cybercrime evaluation
researchers are likely to encounter with each data type. In the process
of data collection, researchers must be alert to ethical issues. For exam-
ple, they must carefully build in safeguards, so as to ensure that the risks
to vulnerable people or groups are minimised (e.g. have processes in
place to appropriately work with children), and to mitigate the burdens
of over-sampling cyber-offenders insofar as is possible. For research that
requires access to official criminal history data, other processes are appro-
priate, such as having data-sharing agreements in place.
Regarding generalisability, research needs to provide clear and detailed
statements about the intervention and its aims, the types of cybercrimes
targeted, the limitations of the data, as well as pertinent offender char-
acteristics that may have bearing upon results. Providing clarity on these
aspects can facilitate clear statements on the generalisability of results for
each discrete study and allow such results to be meaningfully compared
against the results from other evaluations.
We conclude by emphasising that it is not our intention to dissuade

researchers from developing evaluations of cybercrime interventions.
Rather, we echo the call made at the very outset of this book: that rigor-
ous evaluations will be critical to understanding the impact and effective-
ness of new cybercrime interventions as they are deployed. While to date
the available evidence base is scant, a tremendous opportunity awaits. It
is our hope that the discussion and recommendations presented offer a
useful path forward and a means by which to navigate this challenging
undertaking.
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Index
A C
academic programs, 99, 100 Canberra Re-Integrative Shaming
account takeover, 138. See also Experiments (RISE). See
cyber-dependent crime, definition Re-Integrative Shaming
adaptation, creative, 86 Experiments (RISE)
advertising, 40. See also mass media cautions, police, 7, 67, 77, 79, 126
campaigns cease-and-desist-messaging, 8–10, 78
All Stars Program, 56 chilling effects, 86
antivirus software, 21–23, 126 computer monitoring, 25, 126
definition, 21, 126 computer security employment. See
evaluation of, 21 Cybersecurity employment
audit trails, 20, 126 computer surveillance, 18, 20, 25, 26,
126. See also warning messages
crackdowns, police, 20
B Crime Stoppers, 42
Big Brothers Big Sisters, 66, 67 criminal behaviour, risk factors for, 4
Blackshades, 80, 130, 137, 138, 140 cryptomarket trade, 38
boot camps, 97 cultural arts programs, 98
Brothers Project, 68 cyberbullying, 54, 55, 58
Cyberchoices, 38
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 147

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31069-1
148 Index
cyber-dependent crime, 3, 6 anonymity, 44, 54, 119, 134, 138,

definition, 2, 6 139
cyber-offenders, 2, 5–7, 10, 18, 20, benefits of, 18, 37, 43, 71, 78
43, 58, 71, 72, 94, 96, 102–104, ethical issues, 139, 141
118, 119, 126, 131, 136, 137, generalisability, 140, 141
139–141 over-sampling, 139
characteristics of, 5, 119 study design, 7, 127–129, 132
definition, 2
social relationships, 5, 6
Cyber Security Challenge UK, 53 F
Cybersecurity employment, 72, 102 family group conferencing, 111
firewalls, 18, 20, 27, 126
fraud detection systems, 20, 126
D
data, 2, 7, 22, 24, 25, 70, 83, 84, 127,
130, 132, 134–141 G
official, 133, 135–137, 141 Gang Resistance Education and
self-report, 132–134, 137, 141 Training (G.R.E.A.T.), 56–58
delinquency, juvenile Grim Reaper advertising campaign, 40
risk factors for, 66, 67
deterrence perspective, 78
digital piracy, 38, 39, 41 H
displacement, 28, 86, 127 hackerspaces, 103
distributed denial of service attacks Hackforums, 137
(DDoS), 2, 3, 6, 28, 140. See also hacking, malicious, 2, 6, 27, 118.
cyber-dependent crime, definition See also cyber-dependent crime,
diversions, positive. See positive definition
diversions hacking, prosocial, 103. See
diversions, 10, 66, 68, 78, 93–98, also cyber-offenders, social
100, 101, 103, 111, 112 relationships
definition, 97 honeypots, 20, 23, 126
Drug Abuse Resistance Education
(DARE), 57, 58
I
information technology security
E employment. See Cybersecurity
educational workshops, 6, 8, 9, 52, employment
55, 58, 126 interviews, 22, 84, 132–135
theoretical basis, 52 intrusion detection system, 18, 20, 126
enticement, 86 intrusion prevention system, 18, 20,
evaluation, cyber-specific intervention 126
Index 149
IP address, 134, 138 P

mapping of, 138 passwords, 20, 27, 126
i-SAFE, 53, 54 peer contagion, 10, 57, 94, 96,
101–103, 127
peer influence, 52, 56, 58, 66, 102,
L 119. See also cyber-offenders,
labelling theory, 78, 79 social relationships; hacking,
Life Skills Training (LST), 55, 56 prosocial; peer contagion
LizardStresser, 80, 81, 130 peer recognition, 85. See also cyber-of-
fenders, social relationships
positive diversions, 10, 93–97, 99,
M 101, 103, 104, 126
makerspaces, 103 definition, 97
malicious hacking, 2, 3, 5, 6, 27, 103, Poulsen, Kevin, 96
118, 119 primary prevention, 3, 8
malware, 2, 3, 6, 21–23, 27, 28, 140. definition, 3
See also cyber-dependent crime, procedural justice, 79, 83, 84, 86, 110
definition Project Alert, 56
Maryland Scientific Methods Scale, Promoting School-University
128, 129. See also evaluation, Partnerships to Enhance
cyber-specific intervention, study Resilience (PROSPER), 56
design
mass media campaigns, 36, 38, 40
mass media communications. See uni- R
versal communications rational choice theory, 8, 9, 78
Media Heroes, 55 recreation programs, 98
mentoring programs, 6, 8, 64, 67–69 Re-Integrative Shaming Experiments
definition, 6, 64 (RISE), 111, 115
factors impacting positive outcomes, re-integrative shaming theory, 10
69 reprimands, police, 78
theoretical basis, 64 resistance training, 103
Mitnick, Kevin, 96, 102 restorative justice, 7, 10, 11, 97,
110–120, 126, 130
definition, 97, 111
N evaluation of outcomes, 117
National Crime Agency, UK, 38, 53,
80
S
Scared Straight, 57
O secondary prevention, 3, 8, 38, 95
official records. See data, official definition, 3
official reports. See data, official security awareness programs, 27
online fraud, 117, 118 self-report data. See data, self-report
150 Index
sentencing circles, 111, 112 definition, 6, 35

situational crime prevention (SCP), 8, U-Turn Program, 101
18–21, 23, 26, 125, 126
definition, 6
techniques, 8, 20, 27 V
social bond theory, 95 victim-offender mediation (VOM),
Social Networking Safety Promotion 111, 112
and Cyberbullying Prevention virus, computer, 2, 21. See also
(SNSPCP), Arizona Attorney cyber-dependent crime, definition
General’s, 54, 55 vocational programs, 99, 100
spam filtering, 20, 126 vulnerability patching, 20, 126
sports programs, 98
spyware, 2. See also cyber-dependent
crime, definition W
Strengthening Families Program, 56 warning banners. See warning messages
surveys, 21, 38, 40, 132–135 warning messages, 20, 21, 23–25
warnings, stand-alone, 78
website takedowns, 20, 126
T wilderness camps, 97, 98
tertiary prevention, 4, 10, 38
definition, 4
Z
Zatko, Peiter ‘Mudge’, 96
U
universal communications, 6, 8,
35–39, 42, 43, 126

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CRIME PREVENTION AND

More information about this series at

Alice Hutchings Thomas Holt

Crime Prevention and Security Management

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

Cover illustration: Przemyslaw Klos/EyeEm

Russell Brewer, Melissa de Vel-Palumbo, Alice Hutchings, Thomas Holt,

suggest antivirus products are able at detecting and preventing malware

July 2019 Martin Gill

This work has its origins in a programme of research funded through

In closing, the authors would like to acknowledge and thank the

1 Setting the Scene 1

Part I Primary Forms of Prevention

2 Situational Crime Prevention 17

3 Universal Communication Strategies 35

Part II Secondary Forms of Prevention

6 Targeted Warnings and Police Cautions 77

Part III Tertiary Forms of Prevention

8 Restorative Justice 109

Part IV New Directions

9 Designing and Evaluating Crime Prevention Solutions

Table 9.1 Potential hypotheses and research designs for evaluating

Abstract The book begins with an introductory chapter that sets the

Keywords Cybercrime · Cyber-dependent crime · Cyber-offender ·

© The Author(s) 2019 1

recommendations are not necessarily evidence-based. Such initiatives also

used by individuals to successfully complete a cyberattack. Additionally,

Approaches to Crime Prevention

towards people at risk of embarking on a criminal career, such as chil-

Factors Associated with Cyber-Dependent Offending

and other forms of computer-mediated communication (CMC) (Holt

Parameters of the Review

Targeted Warnings and Cautions (Chapter 6), Positive Diversions

Overview of the Book

Part I examines types of interventions that are directed at prevent-

Chapter 4 investigates the use of educational workshops in prevent-

interventions for offline crimes, given the dearth of online evaluations.

have empirically assessed the use of restorative justice practices in relation

Clarke, R. V. (1995). Situational crime prevention. Crime and Justice, 19,

Rhodes, J. E. (2005). A model of youth mentoring. In D. L. DuBois &

Primary Forms of Prevention

Situational Crime Prevention

Abstract This chapter examines a broad range of techniques known

Keywords Antivirus software · Computer monitoring ·

© The Author(s) 2019 17

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Clarke (1995) differentiated between individual decisions to become

in residential communities, consistent with the SCP strategy that calls

Evidence Base for the Intervention

methodology and may include multiple inaccuracies. Finally, two recent

by third-party software) revealed that the effectiveness of these products

the presence of legal warnings or ambiguous warnings on either the

Wilson et al. (2015) sought to determine whether a surveillance

Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

cybersecurity practices in future. Such evaluations should include the

Décary-Hétu, D., & Giommoni, L. (2017). Do police crackdowns disrupt drug

Universal Communication Strategies

Abstract This chapter explores universal communication strategies:

Keywords Advertising · Cyberchoices campaign ·

© The Author(s) 2019 35

Table 9.1 Potential hypotheses and research designs for evaluating

Abstract  The book begins with an introductory chapter that sets the

Keywords  Cybercrime · Cyber-dependent crime · Cyber-offender ·

Approaches to Crime Prevention

Factors Associated with Cyber-Dependent Offending

Parameters of the Review

Overview of the Book

Abstract  This chapter examines a broad range of techniques known

Keywords  Antivirus software · Computer monitoring ·

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Evidence Base for the Intervention

Wilson et al. (2015) sought to determine whether a surveillance

Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

Abstract  This chapter explores universal communication strategies:

Keywords  Advertising · Cyberchoices campaign ·

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Evidence Base for Intervention

Wakefield et al. 2010). This is consistent with research in Australia which

Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

Abstract  This chapter investigates the use of educational workshops in

Keywords  Cyberbullying · Educational workshops ·

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Evidence Base for Intervention

Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

Abstract  This chapter examines interventions that can be broadly

Keywords  Cognitive development · Identity development ·

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Evidence Base for the Intervention

Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

Targeted Warnings and Police Cautions

Abstract  This chapter examines the use of targeted warnings and cau-

Keywords  Labelling theory · Police cautions · Procedural justice ·

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Evidence Base for the Intervention

Future Applications and Adaptations to Digital Contexts

Abstract  This chapter examines the programs and strategies associated

Keywords  Academic programs · Cultural arts programs ·

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Intervention

Evidence Base for Intervention