Divisional Transfer Price

9
DIVISIONAL TRANSFER
PRICING
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

❑ Explain and illustrate the basis for setting a transfer price using variable
cost, full cost, and the principles behind allowing for intermediate markets
❑ Explain how transfer prices can distort the performance assessment of
divisions and decisions made
❑ Compare divisional performance and recognize the problems of doing so
❑ Advise on the likely behavioral consequences of performance measurement
within an organization
❑ Evaluate the effects of transfer prices
© The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India

9.2 STRATEGIC COST MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
TRANSFER PRICING
Most business organizations in today’s world have a decentralized organization structure. The top
management delegates daily operations and decision-making responsibilities to appropriate
personnel in the senior, middle and lower management levels. This gives rise to responsibility
centres or divisions within the organization structure. Divisions either could be departments within
a company or a group companies of a parent organization. Divisional managers are responsible for
their assigned division’s operations and results. While each division works towards achieving its
individual objective, holistically, their goals have to align with the organization’s overall business
objectives. This concept is called goal congruence.
A manager may have the authority to control the division’s cost (cost centre) or both cost and
revenue (profit centre). Inter-divisional transactions could involve:
▪ Transfer of goods and services
▪ Payments for intangibles like intellectual property for usage of brand, patent in the form of
royalty fee or license fee.
▪ Inter-divisional loans at specified interest rates.
In this chapter, our focus is more on inter-divisional transfer of goods and services. Management
accounting system at the divisional level should determine a value for such tr ansactions. This
valuation is defined as transfer pricing.

DIVISIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 9.3
Ove rview o f T rans fe r Pri ci ng Sys te m
Utility of Transfer Pricing

Following are the notable uses of transfer pricing:
(i) Performance evaluation: Each division becomes profit accountable, which is a key metric to
evaluate its performance. This motivates each manager to maximize the division’s
profitability. Consequently, it improves the scope for company’s overall profitabili ty.
(ii) Employee engagement and compensation: Often managers are compensated based on
performance of the division they are responsible for. Since transfer pricing influences
financials, it must be priced at a rate that is perceived to be fair by all the conce rned
divisional managers. Transfer pricing that is unnecessarily detrimental to a division could
affect employee morale.
(iii) Resource allocation: Co-ordination among units for production and sales enables better
allocation and utilization of its resources like capacity, manpower etc. Based on transfer
price, key decisions regarding operations may be taken, e.g. to produce material in -house or
purchase from outside, to expand operations etc. Primary aim of these decisions would be to
maximize profits, while also promoting goal congruence among divisions.
(iv) Taxation and profit remittance: Transfer pricing will impact earnings of multi-national
companies having inter-divisional transfers. This could affect the over-all tax burden for the
company as well as the profits that may need to be repatriated to its head office.
A Question of Fair Value?
Transfer pricing is often associated with the term “arms-length” price. This implies that the price for
inter-divisional transfer has to be fair and competent enough as if dealing with a third party. The
application of the concept of “arms-length” price is more from taxation perspective.

In the accounting records, transfer price would be revenue for the division supplying the
goods/services and cost for the division receiving the goods/service. When each division is made
profit accountable, any transaction between them becomes more business driven, much like how
customers and suppliers compete using bargaining power to set the price. Arriving at a “good -deal”
for the division becomes imperative because it influences its profitability. Hence, fair value from a
business perspective depends on how each division finds the price compatible with its profit
targets.
Example
Division A produces goods at a cost of `10 p.u. and transfers the goods to Division B which has
additional costs of `5 p.u. Division B sells externally at `16 p.u. The company has a policy of
setting transfer prices at cost + 20%.
Calculate:
(i) Profit of each division and the overall profit the company made.
(ii) Write a brief analysis of the results.
Solution
(i) Division Wise Profitability Statement: Summarizing the information from the question, the
division wise profitability statement will be as below:
`
Sr. No. Particulars Division A Division B Company
1 Own Cost -10 -5 -15
2 Transfer-in Price 0 -12 0
3 = 1+2 Total Cost -10 -17 -15
4 Revenue 12 16 16
(i) Transfer Price of Division A
(Cost `10 + 20%)
(ii) Selling Price of Division B
5 = 4-3 Profit 2 -1 1
Profit Split between Divisions

Note
Transfer price of `12 does not affect the overall company profits since they get eliminated at
the time of consolidation. These records are useful for internal evaluation purposes and may
not involve actual cash settlement. Therefore, transfer- pricing methodology would greatly
influence each division’s financials, thereby underlining the need to have an accurate
measurement system.

(ii) Analysis of the Results: As shown above, Division A shows a profit of `2 while Division B
shows a loss of `1. Division A that incurs 2/3 rd of the cost while Division B incurs only 1/3 rd of
it. The net profit margin for the product is 6.7% (`1/`15) while the internal mark-up that
Division A charges is 20%. Therefore, Division A will always make a profit. Division B is
bearing internal mark-up at a much higher rate than the mark-up it can charge its customers.
Therefore, it will always be a loss-making unit.
Concept Insight
Behavioural Consequences
Manager of Division B could get demotivated since performance of the unit is affected by a
higher internal mark-up. Moreover, since the manager of Division A will always make a profit
under this method, efforts may not be taken to make costs efficient. The management can take
steps to review the following:
(i) Is the transfer pricing policy of cost plus 20% justified? If so, should the pricing policy for
external customers be revised?
(ii) What share of Division A’s costs are controllable? Is it possible for Division A to take
measures for cost efficiencies and charge Division B a lower amount?
(iii) Alternatively, should Division B be allowed to source the component from outside?
TRANSFER PRICING METHODS
Transfer
Pricing
Methods
Negotiation
Market Based CostBased
Based
Cost Plus
Marginal Cost Standard Cost Full Cost
Markup
Based Based Based
Based
Market Based Transfer Price

Transfer price is based on market price of goods or services similar to the ones transferred
internally within divisions. The transfer can be recorded at the external market price, adjusted for
any costs that can be saved by internal transfer e.g. selling and distribution expenses, packaging
cost.

Advantages
▪ Since demand and supply determine market price, it is likely to be unbiased.
▪ Market prices are less ambiguous compared to cost-based pricing. They cannot be
manipulated.
▪ Since the pricing is competitive, divisional performance can be linked more objectively to its
contribution to the company’s overall profits.
Disadvantages
▪ Market price may not be completely unbiased, if a competitive environment does not exist.
Examples could be a distress sale market or manipulative pricing strategies (like price
discrimination) that could distort the market price.
▪ May not be suitable when market prices can fluctuate widely or quickly.
▪ Goods that are transferred may be at an intermediate stage in the production proc ess. At
times market price may not be available for such intermediate goods.
Concept Insight
The existence of an external market promotes competitiveness within the entity. Both managers
will be motivated to improve performance. The supplying division will have to compete with the
outside vendor that may lead to cost competitive operations. The purchasing division has more
alternatives to choose from. However, the purchasing division must ensure that quality of the
goods is also comparative. Generally, goods produced in-house may be as per specifications
unique to the company’s products. Goods purchased externally may require additional work that
involves additional cost.
Shared Profit Relative to Cost Based Transfer Price

Shared profit relative to cost method is an alternative to market price method. Cost incurred by
each division indicates the value it has added to the product cost, that is finally used to arrive at
the selling price of the final product. The primary advantage of this method is that it allocates profit
based on the proportion of value addition to the product in terms of cost .
Example
Market Price and Shared Contribution Method
A manufacturer of cornflakes has two divisions, one producing the cornflak es and another
packaging division that manufactures cartons. The production division purchases all the cartons
from the packaging division. Cost of cartons from outside vendors would be:

Number of Cartons (`)

5,000 77,000
8,000 95,000
Production cost incurred by the packaging division for similar volume of cartons:
Number of Cartons (`)
5,000 75,000
8,000 80,000
The production and sale of the final product, cornflakes are as below:
Volume Total Cost Sales Value
(Number of cartons of Cornflakes sold) (Excluding Cost of Cartons) (Packed in Cartons)
` `
5,000 1,20,000 2,00,000
8,000 1,80,000 3,00,000
An appropriate transfer pricing policy is being framed. As the corporate management accountant,
Calculate-
(i) The transfer pricing based on (1) shared profit relative to cost method and (2) market
method. Show the profitability of each division under both methods.
(ii) Discuss the effect of both methods on the profitability of the divisions.
Solution
(i) Calculation of Profitability under both methods
Method 1: Shared Profit Relative to Cost Method
Methodology: Calculate the profit for both volume of cartons 5,000 units and 8,000 units.
Information about sales and costs are given in the problem and tabulated as below.
Statement of Profitability - Shared Profit Relative to Cost Method
Volume (Number of Cartons) 5,000 8,000
Figures in `
Sales …(a) 2,00,000 3,00,000
Less: Costs
Production Division 1,20,000 1,80,000
Packaging Division 75,000 80,000
Total Costs …(b) 1,95,000 2,60,000
Profit …(a) - (b) 5,000 40,000

The next step is to distribute this profit between the divisions based on the cost incurred. This
is done for both levels of production.
Distribution of Profit Based on Relative Cost
Figures in `
Share of Production Division
(5,000 × 1,20,000 / 1,95,000) 3,077 ×××
(40,000 × 1,80,000 / 2,60,000) ××× 27,692
Share of Packaging Division
(5,000 × 75,000 / 1,95,000) 1,923 ×××
(40,000 × 80,000 / 2,60,000) ××× 12,308
Total Profit 5,000 40,000
The last step is to calculate transfer price of cartons that packing division will charge the
production division = manufacturing cost of cartons + profit that is allocable to it under the
shared profit method (refer workings above).
Transfer Prices of Cartons under the Shared Profit Relative to Cost Method
Figures in `
Manufacturing Cost of Cartons 75,000 80,000
Profit Allocated as per working above 1,923 12,308
Transfer Price 76,923 92,308
Transfer Price p.u. 15.38 11.54
Method 2: Market Price Method
Methodology: Transfer price for the cartons is already given. It is the external market price of
the cartons. This is viewed as an unbiased price, that the packaging division will charge the
production division. The profitability statement will be as below:

Statement of Profitability - Market Price Method

Figures in `
Packaging Division
Market Price (transfer price basis) 77,000 95,000
Less: Manufacturing Cost 75,000 80,000
Profit of Packaging Division …(a) 2,000 15,000
Production Division
Sales 2,00,000 3,00,000
Less:
Transfer-in Price 77,000 95,000
Product Cost 1,20,000 1,80,000
Profit of Production Division ...(b) 3,000 25,000
Total Company Profit …(a)+(b) 5,000 40,000
Transfer price per unit will be based on the external market price given in the problem.
Transfer Prices of Cartons under Market Price Method
Volume 5,000 8,000
(number of cartons)
Market Price of Cartons 77,000 95,000
Transfer Price per carton p.u. based on Market Price 15.40 11.88
= Market Price/ Number of Carton
(ii) Analysis of Results
Overall company profits are the same under both methods. It is the distribution between the
divisions that is different, depending on the method followed. Consequently, the transfer price
per unit that the packaging division charges the production division will also be different.
When production volume is 5,000 cartons, transfer price per unit is approximately the same
under both methods `15.38 and `15.40 shared profit and market price method respectively.
This is because the cost of production for this volume is approximately the same as the
outside procurement price. Similarly, when production volume is 8,000 cartons, transfer price
per unit under the shared profit method has a slightly lower transfer price because lower
profit has been allocated to packaging department.
When the volume increases to 8,000 cartons, in-house production has benefitted from
economies of scale. The cost of manufacturing one carton is `15 p.u. for 5,000 carton
(`75,000/ 5,000 cartons) while it reduces to `10 p.u. when volume increases to 8,000
cartons (`80,000 / 8,000 cartons). Cost reduction is almost 33% due to economies of scale.

On the other hand, at 8,000 carton volume, the production department has not benefitted
much from economies of scale. Cost of manufacturing a carton of cornflakes excluding
packing cost is `24 for 5,000 cartons (`1,20,000/ 5,000 cartons) and is marginally lower at
`22.50 p.u. for 8,000 cartons (`1,80,000/ 8,000 units). Cost reduction is only 6% due to
economies of scale.
Therefore, when production volume is 8,000 units, out of the total production cost of
`2,60,000, major portion of the cost pertains to production department. Consequently, when
profit gets allocated based on cost, more profit has been allocated to the prod uction division
and lesser percentage to packaging department. Hence the transfer price base is lower at
`92,308 under the shared profit method as compared to the market price method which is at
`95,000.
Cost Based Transfer Price
Cost based pricing models are based on the internal cost records of the company. They may be
used when the management wants to benchmark performance with the cost targets set within the
company or may be an alternative when market prices for the goods cannot be determined due to
lack of comparable market. Cost based transfer price may consider variable cost, standard cost,
full cost and full cost plus mark-up. Therefore, the basis for cost price may be subjective and has
to adapted based on its suitability to the entity.
Advantages
▪ Performance can be benchmarked to internal cost targets (budgets).
▪ Information is more easily available as compared to market price. While evaluating
performance, cost components can be broken down further for internal analysis. Hence, the
basis for transfer pricing is more clearly defined as compared to market price, which may be
subject to the vagaries of demand and supply.
Disadvantages
▪ The cost basis on which transfer pricing is used can be subjective since there can be multiple
ways of interpreting costs. Variable cost, standard cost, full cost are some of those methods.
Managers may not always agree on the basis to be followed, since each will try to use the
one most beneficial to their division.
▪ Since cost is passed on to another division, there may be instances when managers of the
supplying division may find little incentive to lower the cost of production by adopting cost
efficient methods.
Marginal Cost Based Transfer Price
Transfer price is recorded marginal cost required to produce one additiona l unit.

Advantage
▪ Useful when the supplying division has excess capacity. The method ensures that the
supplying division recoups the cost of internal transfer, while the purchasing division enjoys
the benefit of a lower price compared to the market.
Disadvantage
▪ No fixed cost or mark-up is allowed to be charged to the purchasing division. Each unit of
internal sale will hence result in a loss at approximately fixed cost per unit.
Concept Insight
In such a setup, profit evaluation is centralized at the entity level. Therefore, the supplying
division may have little incentive to find measures for making cost efficient. Non -recovery of
fixed costs would demotivate the supplying division. It may oppose certain decisions like
capacity expansion or further infusion of investment, that lead to higher fixed costs.
Standard Cost Based Transfer Price

Transfer price is recorded at a predetermined cost, which is based on budgets and certain
assumptions regarding factors of productions like capacity utilization, labor hours etc. Any variance
between the cost absorbed using standard cost and the actuals, is either absorbed by the
supplying unit or in some cases could be passed to the purchasing unit as well.
Advantage
▪ Performance evaluation can be done against budgeted cost targets. Facilitates better
understanding of costs through variances. This enables the manager to take measures to
improve performance.
Disadvantage
▪ Profit performance measurement is centralized and cannot be measured for individual
divisions.
Concept Insight
Budgeted costs are generally based on historic records. Therefore, little incentive exists to make
costs more efficient to improve profitability.

Full Cost Based Transfer Price

Transfer price is based on full product cost. It includes cost of production plus a share of other
costs of the value chain like selling and distribution, general administrative expense, research and
development etc.
Advantage
▪ Full cost of goods transferred is recovered hence the supplying division will not show a loss.
Disadvantage
▪ Since mark-up cannot be charged on internal transfers, the supplying division does not
record any profit on these sales. This is a disincentive for the supplying division.
Cost plus a Mark-up Based Transfer Price
Transfer price is based on full product cost plus a mark-up. Mark-up could be a percentage of cost
or of capital employed.
Advantage
▪ Since the supplying division makes a profit, this method addresses the disincentive problem
discussed above in the full cost method.
Disadvantage
▪ Since the transfer price under this method could closely approximates its market price, the
purchasing division may bear a share of the selling expenses although none was incurred for
such internal sales. Again, this could distort the performance of purchasing division.
Therefore, it is essential to adjust the transfer price for such cost savings.
Concept Insight
The problem with using full cost as a basis for transfer pricing is that it distorts the company’s
cost structure while making decisions. The purchasing department would view the cost as a
variable one, since it varies in proportion to the units purchased internally. In reality, this price
includes a portion of fixed costs of the supplying division that is anyway a sunk cost.
Consequently, the market price that the purchasing division may calculate based on the
transfer price for the input supplied, may be slightly inflated.
Special orders from purchasing division may typically be placed to meet short term demands. If
transfer price is quoted at below full cost may be rejected because they could result in a loss for
the supplying division. This could lead to sub-optimization of resources. Fixed costs remain
constant in the short run, while the contribution margin from such special orders may have
benefited the company as a whole. In such cases, management intervention has to happen for
goal congruence.

Negotiation Based Transfer Price

This is a go-between between market and cost methods. Managers of the purchasing and
supplying divisions independently negotiate and arrive at a mutually agreeable transfer price.
Advantage
▪ Managers are given autonomy to decide whether to purchase (or sell) from its sister unit or
source then from (or to) external market.
Disadvantage
▪ This method requires sufficient external information to be available regarding the external
market price, terms of trade etc. Internal cost information must also be shared in order to
negotiate a reasonable price.
Concept Insight
These negotiations act as an integrating tool among the departments, it provides for autonomy
in decision making at the same time promotes goal congruence through efficient performance of
the concerned divisions.
While autonomy is given to the managers, top management intervention may be required if
decisions lead to sub-optimal utilization of resources. For example, when the purchasing
division decides to procure from an external vendor quoting a lower price, at the same time
supplying division has excess capacity, the management may have to intervene to ensure that
resources are used optimally and that the decision benefits the company as a whole.
Negotiated prices depend on the ability of the manager to bargain on behalf of the division. This
could affect the division’s performance. The process may be time consuming that could even
lead to conflict among the units.
TRANSFER PRICING AND GOAL CONGRUENCE

Since internal transfer pricing develops a competitive setting for managers of each division, it is
possible that they may operate in the best interest of their individual performance. This can lead to
sub-optimal utilization of resources. In such cases, transfer pricing policy may be established to
promote goal congruence.
Range of transfer price that promotes goal congruence:
(i) Minimum Transfer Price (determined by the supplying division)
= Additional Outlay Cost per unit + Opportunity Cost per unit.
Additional Outlay Cost
= Marginal Cost + Any Additional Incidental Costs incurred by the supplying
division e.g. storage, transportation etc.
Opportunity Cost is the benefit that is foregone from selling internally rather than externally.

(ii) Maximum Transfer Price (determined by the purchasing division)

= Lower of Net Marginal Revenue and the External Buy-in Price
Net Marginal Revenue
= Marginal Revenue (i.e. Selling Price p.u.) – Marginal Cost to Purchasing Division
Example
Division A transfers goods to Division B. Division A incurs marginal cost of `10 p.u. and Division B
incurs marginal cost of `5 p.u to process it further. Division B sells finished product externally at
`20 p.u.
To promote goal congruence:
(i) What should be the minimum transfer price that Division A should charge? Assume there is
no external market for this intermediate product.
(ii) If Division B can buy the intermediate part externally for (i) `14 p.u. (ii) `18 p.u what should
be the maximum price that Division A can charge to remain competitive with the external
vendor?
(iii) Assume that intermediate goods of Division A can be sold externally at `12 p.u. How does
opportunity cost affect the transfer price range when Division B can procure the part
externally at `14 p.u.?
Solution: Tabulating the information
Sr. No. Particulars Division A (`) Division B (`)
1 Transfer-in Price ? ? Net Marginal Revenue
2 Marginal Cost -10 -5 = `20 (MR) - `5 (MC)
= `15 p.u.
3 = 1+2 Total Cost -10 -5
Higher Transfer Price will
4 Selling Price 20 result in loss
Min. Recovery needed for Div. A

Range of transfer price that promotes goal congruence:
(i) Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u. to Division A = `10 p.u.
Note there is no opportunity cost here. Hence, the minimum that Division A will wish to
recover will be the marginal cost (or variable cost) p.u. that it incurs, which here is `10 p.u.
(ii) Calculation of maximum transfer price when Division B can procure externally.
Maximum Transfer Price
= Marginal Revenue – Marginal Cost to Division B
= `20 - `5
= `15 p.u.

This is the maximum price that Division B will pay for the intermediate good, whether it
purchases from Division A or procures from outside. Any higher is a loss to Division B.
Case 1: When procurement price is `14 p.u.
= Lower of Net Marginal Revenue `15, the External Buy-in Price `14
Maximum transfer price in this case will be external buy-in price `14 p.u. While, Division B
can afford to pay upto `15 p.u. to break even, it will prefer to buy at a lower rate from the
external vendor as that would yield a profit of `1 p.u. (selling price `20 – MC `5 – purchase
price `14). Hence, for Division A to remain competitive, it can charge no more than `14p.u.
Since MC of Division A is only `10 p.u. with no opportunity cost, a maximum price of `14 p.u.
should be acceptable to Division A as well.
To conclude transfer price range between `10 and `14p.u. will promote goal congruence.
Case 2: When procurement price is `18 p.u.
= Lower of Net Marginal Revenue `15, the External Buy-in Price `18
Maximum transfer price in this case will be the net marginal revenue `15 p.u. External buy-in
price of `18 p.u. will result in losses for Division B. Hence, Division A here can charge upto
`15 per unit. With no other opportunity cost, Division A can have a reasonable margin, while
Division B can procure the intermediate product at a price lower than market.
To conclude transfer price range between `10 and `15 p.u. will promote goal congruence.
(iii) Range when opportunity costs exists for Division A and Division B has buy -in price `14 p.u.
When Division A can sell externally at `12 p.u.
Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost per unit + Opportunity Cost per unit.
Opportunity Cost per unit
= External Sale Price – Marginal Cost
= `12 - `10
= `2, this represents the contribution per unit when external sales are made by Division A.
For the internal transfer to Division B to be equally profitable, Division A will demand a
minimum price of `12 = marginal cost `10 + opportunity cost `2.
As explained in sub-question (ii), Case 1, Division B will be ready to pay maximum `14 p.u.
which is the buy-in price. Hence, subject to negotiating skills of manager of Division B, the
transfer price can be set between `12 p.u. - `14 p.u. The ideal transfer price would be `12
p.u. Division A is able to achieve profitability at par with its external sal es, while Division B
can procure its material at a much lower cost.

TRANSFER PRICING DECISION, DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Different Capacity Levels
When the supplying division has excess capacity, the range for transfer pricing would be
(1) Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u.
This ensures that the supplying department is able to recoup at least its additional outlay
incurred on account of the transfer. Fixed cost is a sunk cost hence ignored.
Since capacity can be utilized further, it would be optimum for the supplying division to
charge only the marginal cost for internal transfer. The purchasing division gets the
advantage getting the goods at a lower cost than market.
(2) Maximum Transfer Price
When the supplying division operates at full capacity, the range for transfer pricing would be
(1) Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u. + Opportunity Cost p.u.
Since the supplying division is operating at full capacity, it has no incentive to sell the goods
to the purchasing division at a price lower than the market price. If the internal order is
accepted, capacity is diverted towards this sale. Hence the supplying division would
additionally charge the lost contribution from external sales that had to be curtailed.
(2) Maximum Transfer Price
Example
A company has a division A producing three products called X, Y, Z. Each product can be sold in
the open market in the following manner.
Maximum external sales are X 800 units, Y 500 units, Z 300 units. All figures in `
Particulars X Y Z
Selling Price per unit 96 92 80
Variable Cost of Production in Division A 33 24 28
Labour Hours Required per unit in Division A 6 8 4
Product Y can be transferred to Division B, but the maximum quantity that might be required for
transfer is 300 units of Y.
Division B could buy similar product in the open market at a price of `45 p.u.

(i) What should be the transfer price per unit for 300 units of Y, if the total labor hours available
with Division A are:
(a) 13,000 hours (b) 8,000 hours and (c) 12,000 hours.
(ii) Indicate the transfer pricing range that can promote goal congruence.
Solution
Division A has two type of clientele, external customers and Division B. Capacity in Division A is
defined by the number of labor hours available for production.
The total hours needed to meet external demand is 10,000 hours as explained below:
Statement of Hours Needed for External Sales
External Sales Qty Hours p.u. Total Hours Needed
X 800 6 4,800
Y 500 8 4,000
Z 300 4 1,200
Hours Needed for External Sales 10,000
Case 1: When 13,000 hours are available, after meeting the external demand requiring 10,000
hours, Division A will have surplus capacity of 3,000 hours.
Hours needed to produce 300 units of Y = 300 × 8 hours = 2,400 hours. Since Division A has
surplus capacity, it can meet the demand of Division B also without curtailing its external sales.
Hence, there is no opportunity cost on account of lost contribution.
Transfer price range:
Minimum Transfer Price p.u.
= Marginal Cost of Production p.u. of Y = `24.
The Maximum Transfer Price would be the External Procurement Price for Division B
= `45 p.u.
Note: Additional cost information related to Division B would be needed to calculate net marginal
revenue.
Case 2: When 8,000 hours are available, Division A has limited capacity as explained below.
The total hours needed for external sales is 10,000 and those need for internal transfer is 2,400
hours. In all, 12,400 hours are needed, when only 8,000 hours are available. There is a shortfall of
4,400 hours. Capacity is hence limited.
Therefore, labor hours have to be utilized optimally. This is determined by ca lculating the
contribution per hour from sale each product that is sold externally. It determines how valuable
each hour is product wise.

Statement of Product Wise Contribution per hour

Sr. No. Particulars X Y Z
1 Selling Price p.u. 96 92 80
2 Less: Variable Cost p.u. 33 24 28
3=1-2 Contribution p.u. 63 68 52
4 Labour hours needed p.u. 6 8 4
5=3/4 Contribution per hour 10.50 8.50 13.00
6 Ranking high to low II III I
Product Z gives the maximum contribution per hour, hence ranked 1. Product X and Y follow at
rank 2 and 3 respectively. This is the basis to allocate limited hours for optimal production in
Division A.
The entire demand of Product Z will be produced first. This requires 1,200 hours. Out of the
balance 6,800 hours, Product X will require 4,800 hours. This leaves a balance of 2,000 hours for
Product Y. Product Y requires 8 hours p.u. Hence maximum production of product Y = 2,000
hours/ 8 = 250 units.
Statement of Optimum Mix
Total Hours Available 8,000
Priority External Qty Hours Total Hours Remaining
Sales p.u. Needed Hours
1 Z 300 4 1,200 6,800
2 X 800 6 4,800 2,000
3 Y 250 8 2,000 -
Total Hours Needed for External Sales 8,000
If Division A accepts to produce 300 units of Y for Division B, the total hours required for internal
sales would be 2,400 hours. This can be catered to by curtailing its external sales. 2,000 hours
from production of external sales of Product Y is first diverted and the balance 400 hours are
diverted from production of Product X. Hence this results in lost contribution, an opportunity cost
that has to be included in transfer pricing.
Contribution Lost from Reduced External Sales
= Product Y (2,000 hours × contribution per hour of `8.5) + Product X (400 hours ×
contribution per hour of `10.5)
= `17,000 + `4,200 = `21,200
On a per unit basis, lost contribution works out to 21,200 / 300 units = `70.66
Therefore, Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u. + Contribution Lost from Reduced External Sales
= `24 + `70.66 = `94.66
Since Division B can source at `45, it would be cheaper to purchase the component from outside.

Case 3: When 12,000 hours are available, Division A has limited capacity as ex plained below.
The total hours needed for external sales is 10,000 and those need for internal transfer is 2,400
hours. In all, 12,400 hours are needed, when only 12,000 hours are available. There is a shortfall
of 400 hours. Capacity is hence limited.
Therefore, labor hours have to be utilized optimally. Again, as explained in Case 2, this is
determined by calculating the contribution per hour from sale each product that is sold externally.
Referring to the table above, Contribution per hour is X: `10.5; Y: `8.5 and Z: `13. Accordingly,
production wise Z will be given first priority, followed by X and then Y.
The entire demand of Product Z will be produced first. This requires 1,200 hours. Out of the
balance 10,800 hours, Product X will require 4,800 hours. This leaves a balance of 6,000 hours for
Product Y. Product Y requires 8 hours p.u. External sales of product require 4,000 hours (500 units
× 8 hours p.u.).
Statement of Optimum Mix
Total Hours Available 8,000
Hours Total Hours Remaining
Priority External Sales Qty p.u. Needed Hours
1 Z 300 4 1,200 10,800
2 X 800 6 4,800 6,000
3 Y 500 8 4,000 2,000
Total Hours Needed for External Sales 10,000
This leaves 2,000 hours available for production of 300 units of Y to be sold to Division B. These
300 units will require 2,400 hours (300 units × 8 hours p.u.). Hence, there is a shortfall of 400
hours to meet this internal demand. This shortfall of 400 hours will be made up with diverting
hours earmarked for external sale of Product Y (Rank 3 as explained in the table above). Loss of
contribution on account of curtailed sales would then be built into the transfer price.
Contribution Lost by Diverting 400 hours from Product Y for External Sales
= 400 hours × contribution per hour
= 400 hours × `8.5
= `3,400.
On a per unit basis,
= 3,400 / 300 units = `11.33
Therefore, Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u. + Contribution Lost from Reduced External Sales
= `24 + `11.33
= `35.33
Division B can source this at `45 p.u. from outside. Hence transfer price can be in the range
`35.33 to `45.

Different Demand Levels

A supplying division caters to demand from (i) internal divisions (ii) external markets, if any and (iii)
any special orders. Production is subject to available capacity. Production cost benefits from
economies of scale. For example, a machinery may be capable of processing 10,000 units.
However, production beyond this level may require the purchase of another machine requiring
additional space. This increases the fixed cost incurred by the department. Hence, production
cost is dependent on economies to scale.
Certain types of demand may result in cost savings. For example, internal sales require lower
packaging costs since the product may be transferred in bulk to the purchasing division. Likewise,
special orders may not require selling expenses since typically it is the customer who approaches
the seller in these cases and not the other way around.
Therefore, while catering to different levels of demand, any change in cost should also be
accounted for to calculate transfer pricing. The general rule for minimum and maximum range of
transfer price applies here too.
Example
A company has two divisions A and B, making products A and B respectively. One unit of A is an
input for each unit of B. B has a production capacity of 45,000 units and ready market. Other
information available regarding Division A are:
Capacity (production units) 50,000
Maximum External Sales 30,000
Fixed Cost upto 30,000 units. Beyond 30,000 units- It increases by 50,000 for every 4,30,000
additional 10,000 units
Variable Manufacturing Cost p.u. 55
Variable Selling Cost p.u. (external sales) 10
Variable Selling Cost p.u. (special order/ transfer to B) 5
Selling Price p.u. (external market) 80
Selling Price (special sales) 70
B can buy the input A from outside at a slightly incomplete stage at `45 p.u. and will incur
subcontracting charges of `30 p.u. to match it to the stage at which it receives goods from Division
A. Division B is willing to pay a maximum of `75 p.u. if Division A supplies its entire demand of
45,000 units. If Division A supplies lesser quantity, Division B is willing to pay only `70 p.u.
Division A has also received a special order for 15,000 units which it needs to either accept in full
or reject. Division A may choose to avoid variable selling cost of `5 p.u. on transfer to B or special
order, by incurring a fixed overhead of `50,000 p.a. instead.
(i) What is the best strategy for Division A? Show the profitability of that option.
(ii) What will the range of transfer price be under if the best strategy is chosen?

Solution
(i) What is the best strategy for Division A?
With a production capacity of 50,000 units, Division A has to find an optimum mix of sales
between external sales, internal transfer to Division B and special order. Division B requires
45,000 units. Division A can supply the entire 45,000 units to Division B for which transfer
price is `75 p.u. or can supply lower quantity for which transfer price is `70 p.u.
As production increases, certain cost components would also change. Changes to cost of
production and selling expenses are discussed below.
1) Selling expenses: It is given that for special orders or internal transfers, Division A can
either bear a variable selling cost of `5 p.u. or choose to incur a fixed cost of `50,000 p.a.
Working out the indifference point, the selling cost will be the same at 10,000 units (at
what point will No. of units × `5 = `50,000; No. of units = 10,000). For any transfer or
sale below 10,000 units, it makes sense to bear the variable cost of `5 p.u. Over 10,000
units it makes sense to bear the fixed cost of `50,000.
Even If Division A chooses to cater entirely to external sales of 30,000 units, the
balance 20,000 units will be used to cater to either the special order or as internal
transfer to Division B or can even be both (special order 15,000 units and internal
transfer 5,000 units). Since in any case sale will be more than 10,000 units, Division A
can opt to bear the fixed cost of `50,000.
2) Since A is working at full capacity i.e. 30,000 units are produced. Fixed cost is
`4,30,000 that would increase by `50,000 for every extra 10,000 units produced over
30,000 units. Hence total fixed cost will be 5,30,000.
To arrive at the optimum mix, Division A will calculate the contribution received per unit under
the various options.
Statement of Contribution per unit
Particulars External Special Transfer Transfer
Sale Order to B < to B
Upto 30,000 15,000 45,000 45,000
units units units units
Selling Price …(a) 80 70 70 75
Less: Variable Cost …(b)
(i) Manufacturing 55 55 55 55
(ii) Selling & Dist. 10 0 0 0
Contribution …(a) – (b) 15 15 15 20

Hence, transfer to division B of 45,000 units yields the highest contribution. This leaves a
balance capacity of 5,000 units with Division A, whose maximum capacity is given to be
50,000 units. This is insufficient to meet the special order of 15,000 units .
Hence, Division A will utilize the balance 5,000 units to cater to external sales. Therefore, the
optimum production mix would be:
Transfer to Division B 45,000 units and external sales 5,000 units.
Profitability Statement of Division A
Particulars Figures in `
Contribution from
(a) Transfer to Division B (45,000 units × `20) 9,00,000
(b) External Sales (net of selling expense) (5,000 units × `15) 75,000
Total Contribution from Sales …(i) 9,75,000
Manufacturing Fixed Cost 5,30,000
Selling Fixed Cost 50,000
Total Fixed Costs …(ii) 5,80,000
Profit Earned …(i) – (ii) 3,95,000
(ii) Range of transfer price under the best strategy.
As explained above, the best strategy for Division A would be to transfer 45,000 units to
Division B and sell 5,000 units externally.
Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost per unit + Additional Outlay per unit + Opportunity Cost per unit
If 45,000 units are not transferred to Division B then next best alternative would be either sell
30,000 units to external market, sell 15,000 units to special order and transfer 5,000 units to
Division B (partial transfer) or sell 30,000 units to external market and transfer 20,000 units
to Division B (partial transfer); all cases yielding contribution of `15 per unit. This is the
opportunity cost for Division A for choosing the best strategy.
In all above options (best strategy and other alternatives) Division A will work on full capacity
and outlay on manufacturing fixed cost and selling cost will be the same. Therefore, impact
of additional outlay on the minimum transfer price per unit will be nil.
Therefore, Minimum Transfer Price that Division A will Demand
= `55 + `15
= `70
Maximum Transfer Price Division B is willing to pay (given) = `75
This would be range in which Transfer Price will be negotiated.

PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING TRANSFER PRICING CONFLICT

Conflict of interest between interests of individual divisions and the company can also be
addressed by following the following systems for transfer pricing:
Dual Rate Transfer Pricing System
The supplying division records transfer price by including a normal profit margin thereby showing
reasonable revenue. The purchasing division records transfer price at marginal cost thereby
recording purchases at minimum cost. This allows for better evaluation of each division’s
performance. It also improves co-operation between divisions, promoting goal congruence and
reduction of sub-optimization of resources.
Drawbacks of Dual Pricing include:
(i) It can complicate the records, thereby may result in errors in the company’s overall records.
(ii) Profits shown by the divisions are artificial and need to be used only for internal evaluations.
Two Part Transfer Pricing System
This pricing system is again aimed at resolving problems related to distortions cause d by the full
cost based transfer price.
Here, transfer price = marginal cost of production + a lump-sum charge (two part to pricing).
While marginal cost ensures recovery of additional cost of production related to the goods
transferred, lump-sum charge enables the recovery of some portion of the fixed cost of the
supplying division. Therefore, while the supplying division can show better profitability, the
purchasing division can purchase the goods a lower rate compared to the market price.
Case Scenario
Global Multinational Ltd. (GML) has two Divisions ‘Dx’ and ‘Dz’ with full profit responsibility. The
Division ‘Dx’ produces Component ‘X’ which it sells to ‘outside’ customers only. The Division
‘Dz’ produces a product called the ‘Z’ which incorporates Component ‘X’ in its design. ‘Dz’
Division is currently purchasing required units of Component ‘X’ per year from an outside
supplier at market price.
New CEO for Indian Operations has explored that ‘Dx’ Division has enough capacity to meet
entire requirements of Division ‘Dz’ and accordingly he requires internal transfer between the
divisions at marginal cost from the overall company’s perspective.
Manager of Division ‘Dx’ claims that transfer at marginal cost are unsuitable for performance
evaluation since they don’t provide an incentive to the division to transfer goods internally. He
stressed that transfer price should be ‘Cost plus a Mark-Up’.
New CEO worries that transfer price suggested by the manager of Division ‘Dx’ will not induce
managers of both Divisions to make optimum decisions.
Required
DISCUSS transfer pricing methods to overcome performance evaluation conflicts.

Solution
To overcome the optimum decision making and performance evaluation conflicts that can
occur with marginal cost-based transfer pricing following methods has been proposed:
“With a ‘Dual Rate Transfer Pricing System’ the ‘Receiving Division’ is charged with marginal
cost of the intermediate product and ‘Supplying Division’ is credited with full cost per unit plus a
profit margin”.
Accordingly Division ’Dx’ should be allowed to record the transactions at full cost per unit plus a
profit margin. On the other hand Division ‘Dz’ may be charged only marginal cost. Any inter
divisional profits can be eliminated by accounting adjustment.
Impact:
− Division ’Dx’ will earn a profit on inter-division transfers.
− Division ’Dz’ can chose the output level at which the marginal cost of the component ’X’ is
equal to the net marginal revenue of the product ’Z’.
“The ‘Two Part Transfer Pricing System’ involves transfers being made at the marginal cost per
unit of output of the ‘Supplying Division’ plus a lump-sum fixed fee charged by the ‘Supplying
Division’ to the ‘Receiving Division’ for the use of the capacity allocated to the intermediate
product.”
Accordingly Division ‘Dx’ can transfer its products to Division ‘Dz’ at marginal cost per unit and a
lump-sum fixed fee.
Impact:
− ‘Two Part Transfer Pricing System’ will inspire the Division ’Dz’ to choose the optimal
output level.
This pricing system also enable the Division ’Dx’ to obtain a profit on inter -division transfer.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING

Dynamic business models enable business to spread their business across countries. In the recent
decades, with the acceptance of a globalized environment, benefits of such business models are
being enjoyed across countries. Business have benefitted from a multi-national business model.
For multinationals considerations for such business models are driven by many factors:
▪ Demand for its final products
▪ Availability of raw materials in a specific country. To source such inputs, multi -national
companies can have business set-up in the foreign country. Example DeBeers Group that
sources diamonds from across the world or from India the Tata Group of companies.
▪ Availability of low-cost labor with specialized skills. India has been one of the major
beneficiaries of this outsourcing model.

It can be concluded that transactions between divisions of these multi-national companies could
involve transfer of goods, provision of services or even for intangibles for use of parents,
copyrights, brands in the form of royalty payments.
In few cases, they could be inter-company loans to take advantage of excess funds lying with a
company, meeting the needs of a company in another country.
Taxation, profit repatriation and transfer prices are critical considerations to the senior
management of the multi-national companies. Multi-national organizations try to maximize profits
by using transfer pricing as a tool to reduce the tax impact on earnings. Where, the supplying
division is in a country with higher tax rate, the transfer price will be set lower in -order to reflect
higher earnings (resulting from lower purchase cost) in the purchasing division, which has a lower
tax rate. Likewise, supply from lower tax rate countries may be priced higher, in order to reflect
higher earnings for that unit, thereby reducing the tax impact.
As explained in the beginning of the chapter, from a taxation perspective, transfer price is
analyzed as to whether it is at an “arms-length” price. However, what is “arms-length” is a
subjective question.
A recent case in point is the ruling on Starbucks UK subsidiary by the British authorities: Known for
their world famous coffee, that generate high margins for the company. Although management
claimed that business was good, the tax records reported losses. Investigations revealed that the
UK subsidiary paid its Netherlands unit 6% of sales as royalty for intellectual property such as its
brand and business processes. This agreement “6% of sale” is the transfer price between the
units. The question tax authorities raised was whether this was at arms -length, is it comparable
with market terms for similar transactions.
In India such tax avoidance measures are being regulated by the government with the introduction
of Section 92A to 92F in the Income Tax Act, 1961. This concept is covered in further detail in your
taxation syllabus.
Example
A car manufacturing company has two manufacturing divisions in different countries. Division A in
India manufactures engines for the cars. It has a capacity to manufacture 10,000 units each year.
The variable cost of production is `8,000 p.u. and the division can sell 8,000 engines externally to
customers within India at `11,000 p.u. The other division, Division B is in Italy that requires 5,000
engines every year to assemble them further into cars. It purchases these engines from a vendor
in Italy at a price that is equivalent to `9,000 p.u.. If Division B were to purchase these units from
Division A, the transfer price would be `10,000 p.u. Since no selling expenses need to be incurred
on internal sales, variable cost of such transfers would be `7,000 p.u. If Division A accepts the
internal order from Division B, it will have to curtail some of its external sales.
Given that the tax rate is 30% in India and 40% in Italy. Determine if the company will benefit
overall if Division B purchases from Division A.

Solution
Problem Definition: If Division B buys from Division A, will it benefit the company as a whole?
Key Considerations: Contribution p.u. under external and internal sale options and the tax impact.
Methodology:
Part 1: Benefit to Division A
Currently external sales are 8,000 units. If Division A accepts to cater to Division B’s requirements,
external sales have to be curtailed by 3,000 units. The sales mix would be external sales 5,000
units and internal transfer 5,000 units. (refer working note 1).
Division A was previous producing 8,000 units. On accepting Division B’s order, it is operating at
full capacity of 10,000 units, an additional 2,000 units are being produced. As per working note 2,
contribution from each option is the same at `3,000 p.u.
Additional Contribution
= 2,000 units × `3,000 p.u.
= `60,00,000.
Division A pays tax in India at 30%.
Hence, the Net Tax Contribution
= `60,00,000 × (100% - 30%)
= `42,00,000.
Part 2: Net Additional Cost to Division B
Division B is currently purchasing the engine within Italy at `9,000 p.u. (` equivalent value). If it
purchases from Division A, it will pay `10,000 p.u.
Additional Purchase Cost
= 5,000 units × (`10,000 - `9,000)
= `50,00,000.
However, this extra cost is tax deductible at a rate of 40%, the tax rate in Italy. Hence Additional
Cost (net of tax)
= `50,00,000 × (100% - 40%)
= `30,00,000.
Part 3: Overall benefit (after tax) to the company
As explained above, Division A benefits by `42,00,000 while Division B incurs an extra cost of
`30,00,000. Hence, the net after tax benefit to the company is `12,00,000.
Therefore, Division B should purchase engines internally from Division A.

Working Notes
1. Statement of Capacity Utilization of Division A
Sr. No. Particulars Number of units
1 Maximum Capacity 10,000
2 External Sales 8,000
3=1-2 Spare Capacity 2,000
4 Division B's Requirement 5,000
5=4-3 External Sales Curtailed to meet B's Demand 3,000
= B's Requirement - Spare Capacity Available
= 5,000 units - 2,000 units
From the above table it can be seen that Division A has a spare capacity of 2,000 units
currently. However, if it has to cater to Division B’s requirements, external sales have to be
curtailed by 3,000 units.
2. Statement of Contribution p.u.
Figures in `
Sr. No. Options External Sale Internal Sale
1 Selling Price p.u. 11,000 10,000
2 Less: Variable Cost p.u. 8,000 7,000
3=1–2 Contribution p.u. 3,000 3,000
Illustration 1
ABC miners operates two divisions, one in Japan and other in United Kingdom (U.K.). Mining
Division is operated in Japan which is rich in raw emerald.
The other division is United Kingdom Processing Division. It processes the raw emerald into
polished stone fit for human wearing.
The cost details of these divisions are as follows:
Division Japan Mining Division United Kingdom Processing Division
Per carat of raw emerald Per carat of polished emerald
Variable Cost 2,500 Yen 150 Pound
Fixed Cost 5,000 Yen 350 Pound
Several polishing companies in Japan buy raw emerald from other local Mining Companies at
9,000 Yen per carat. Current Foreign Exchange Rate is 50 yen = 1 Pound. Income Tax rates are
20% and 30% in Japan and the United Kingdom respectively.
It takes 2 carats of Raw Yellow emerald to yield 1 carat of Polished Stone. Polished emerald sell
for 3,000 Pounds per carat.

Required
(i) COMPUTE the transfer price for 1 carat of raw emerald transferred from Mining Division to
the Processing Division under two methods - (a) 200% of Full Costs and (b) Market Price.
(ii) 1,000 carats of raw emerald are mined by the Japan Mining Division and then processed and
sold by the U.K. Processing Division. COMPUTE the after tax operating income for each
division under both the Transfer Pricing Methods stated above in (i).
Solution
(i) Transfer Price: 200% of Full Cost Basis
= 200% of (¥ 2,500 + ¥ 5,000)
= ¥ 15,000 or £300 (¥ 15,000/ 50)
Transfer Price: Market Price Basis
= ¥ 9,000 or £180 (¥ 9,000/ 50)
(ii) Statement Showing “Operating Income”
Particulars Japan Mining Division UK Processing Division

Transfer Price Transfer Price
¥15,000 ¥9,000 £300 £180
Selling Price (Polished Stone) --- --- £3,000 £3,000
Transfer Price (Raw Emerald) ¥ 15,000 ¥ 9,000 --- ---
Raw Emerald --- --- £600 £360
(£300 × 2) (£180 × 2)
Variable Cost ¥ 2,500 ¥ 2,500 £150 £150
Fixed Cost ¥ 5,000 ¥ 5,000 £350 £350
Profit Before Tax ¥ 7,500 ¥ 1,500 £1,900 £2,140
Less: Tax 20%/ 30% ¥ 1,500 ¥ 300 £570 £642
Profit After Tax per Carat of Raw ¥ 6,000 ¥ 1,200 £1,330 £1,498
Emerald
Raw Emerald 1,000 Carats 1,000 Carats 500 Carats 500 Carats
Total Profit ¥ 60,00,000 ¥ 12,00,000 £6,65,000 £7,49,000
Or Or
Total Profit (£) £1,20,000 £24,000 £6,65,000 £7,49,000

International Transfer Pricing and Currency Management

International firms are exposed to exchange fluctuation risks. These fluctuations create uncertain
cash flows in corporate currency and also can misrepresent performance of subsidiaries. With
inter-divisional trading between subsidiaries in different countries, when one subsidiary makes a
loss on a contrary exchange rate movement, the other will make a profit. The company as a whole
should manage its exposures to currency risks. The management of currency risk is the
responsibility of either the profit centre managers or a treasury department. A multinational
company might be keen to set transfer prices in a currency such that any currency losses arise in
the subsidiary in the high-tax country, and currency profits arise in the country with the lower tax
rate if it is fairly - certain about exchange rate movement in the future.
Conclusion
From the discussion above, we can conclude that transfer pricing is not just about passing on the
charge from one division to another. They are vitally important because financial results are greatly
influenced by transfer prices. They impact management decision making, employee performance
and morale as well as certain investment decisions. Many times these factors determine the
success of businesses.
SUMMARY
▪ Divisions could be departments within a company or group companies of a parent
organization.
▪ Inter divisional transfers could involve transfer of goods and services, payments for
intangibles like intellectual property for usage of brand, patent in the form of royalty fee or
license fee, or inter-divisional loans at specified interest rates.
▪ Valuation of inter-divisional transfer of goods and services in the management accounting
system is called Transfer Pricing
▪ Utility of Transfer Pricing – Performance Evaluation (profit accountable divisions), Employee
Engagement and Compensation (motivates employees in improving divisional profits),
Resource Allocation (optimisation of resources and critical like make or buy), Taxation and
Profit Remittance (impact earnings of multi-national companies affecting the over-all tax
burden for the company as well as the profits that may need to be repatriated to its head
office).
▪ Fair Value – Transfer Pricing is often associated with the term “arms-length” price. This
implies that the price for inter-divisional transfer has to be fair and competent enough as if
dealing with a third party. Fair value from a business perspective depends on how each
division finds the price compatible with its profit targets.
▪ Transfer Pricing Methods and Transfer Pricing Decision in Different Scenarios–
i) Market Price – Transfer price is based on market price of goods or services similar to the
ones transferred internally within divisions. The transfer can be recorded at the external

market price, adjusted for any costs that can be saved by internal transfer e.g. selling and
distribution expenses, packaging cost.
Advantages – Unbiased, less–ambiguous, more objective divisional performances.
Disadvantages – Fluctuating market prices may not be suitable, non-availability of market
prices in case of intermediate products, manipulative pricing strategies .
Behavioural Consequences - The supplying division will have to compete with the outside
vendor that may lead to cost competitive operations. The purchasing division has more
alternatives to choose from. However, the purchasing division must ensure that quality of
the goods are also comparative.
Shared Profit Relative to Cost Method – Cost incurred by each division indicates the value it
has added to the product cost, that is finally used to arrive at the selling price of the final
product. The primary advantage of this method is that it allocates profit based on the
proportion of value addition to the product in terms of cost.
ii) Cost Price Method – Cost based pricing models are based on the internal cost records of
the company. They may be used when the management wants to benchmark performance
with the cost targets set within the company or may be an alternative when market prices for
the goods cannot be determined due to lack of comparable market.
Advantages – Benchmarking to budget, easy availability of information.
Disadvantages – Multiple ways of interpreting costs like variable cost, standard cost, full
cost, find little incentive to lower the cost of production by adopting cost efficient methods
since its passed on to the receiving department.
a) Variable Cost – Transfer price is recorded marginal cost required to produce one
additional unit.
Advantages – useful when the supplying division has excess capacity, while the purchasing
division enjoys the benefit of a lower price compared to the market.
Disadvantages – No fixed cost or mark-up is allowed to be charged to the purchasing
division.
Behavioural Consequences – Profit evaluation is centralized at the entity level. Therefore,
the supplying division may have little incentive to find measures for making cost efficient.
Non- recovery of fixed costs would de-motivate the supplying division.
b) Standard Cost – Transfer price is recorded at a predetermined cost, which is based on
budgets and certain assumptions regarding factors of productions like capacity utilization,
labour hours etc.
Advantages – Performance evaluation against budgeted costs, variance analysis.
Disadvantages – Profit performance measurement is centralized.
Behavioural Consequences – Budgeted costs are generally based on historic records.
Therefore, little incentive exists to make costs more efficient to improve profitability.

c) Full Cost – Transfer price is based on full product cost. It includes cost of production plus
a share of other costs of the value chain like selling and distribution, general administrative
expense, research and development etc.
Advantages – Supplying division will not show a loss.
Disadvantages – Since mark-up cannot be charged on internal transfers, the supplying
division does not record any profit on these sales
d) Full cost plus Mark-up – Transfer price is based on full product cost plus a mark-up.
Mark-up could be a percentage of cost or of capital employed.
Advantages – Full incentive to supplying division.
Disadvantages – The purchasing division may bear a share of the selling expenses although
none was incurred for such internal sales.
Behavioural Consequences – The problem with using full cost as a basis for transfer pricing
is that it distorts the company’s cost structure while making decisions.
iii) Bargained or Negotiated Pricing – Managers of the purchasing and supplying divisions
independently negotiate and arrive at a mutually agreeable transfer price.
Advantages – Autonomy to decide whether to purchase (or sell) from its sister unit or source
then from (or to) external market.
Disadvantages – Requires sufficient external information to be available regarding the
external market price, terms of trade etc. Internal cost information must also be shared in
order to negotiate a reasonable price.
Behavioural Consequences – Provides for autonomy in decision making at the same time
promotes goal congruence through efficient performance of the concerned divisions
▪ Divisional Conflict–
Dual Pricing – The supplying division records transfer price by including a normal profit
margin thereby showing reasonable revenue. The purchasing division records transfer price
at marginal cost thereby recording purchases at minimum cost.
Advantages – Allows better evaluation of each division’s performance, improves co-
operation between divisions, promoting goal congruence and reduction of sub-optimization
of resources.
Disadvantages – Complicate the records, artificial profits can be used only for internal
evaluations
Two Part Pricing System –
Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost of Production + a Lump-Sum Charge (two part to pricing).
Lump-Sum charge enables the recovery of some portion of the fixed cost of the supplying
division. Therefore, while the supplying division can show better profitability, the purchasing
division can purchase the goods a lower rate compared to the market price.

▪ Transfer Pricing and Goal Congruence –

a) Minimum Transfer Price (determined by the supplying division)
= Additional Outlay Cost per unit + Opportunity Cost per unit.
Additional Outlay Cost
= Marginal Cost + Any Additional Incidental Costs incurred by the supplying
division e.g. storage, transportation etc.
b) Maximum Transfer Price (determined by the purchasing division)
= Marginal Revenue (i.e. Selling Price p.u.) – Marginal Cost to Purchasing
Division
▪ Transfer Pricing Different Capacity Levels –
When the supplying division has excess capacity, the range for transfer pricing would be
a) Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u.
b) Maximum Transfer Price
When the supplying division operates at full capacity, the range for transfer pricing would be
a) Minimum Transfer Price
= Marginal Cost p.u. + Opportunity Cost p.u.
b) Maximum Transfer Price
▪ Transfer Pricing Decision – Different Demand Levels: while catering to different levels of
demand, any change in cost should also be accounted for to calculate transfer pricing. The
general rule for minimum and maximum range of transfer price applies here too.
▪ International Transfer Pricing – Taxation, profit repatriation and transfer prices are critical
considerations to the senior management of the multi-national companies. Multi-national
organizations try to maximize profits by using transfer pricing as a tool to reduce the tax
impact on earnings. Where, the supplying division is in a country with higher tax rate, the
transfer price will be set lower in-order to reflect higher earnings (resulting from lower
purchase cost) in the purchasing division, which has a lower tax rate. Likewise, supply from
lower tax rate countries may be priced higher, in order to reflect higher earnings for that
unit, thereby reducing the tax impact.

TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE

Basic Concepts
1. G is the transferring division and R, the receiving division in a company. R has a demand for
20% of G's production capacity which has to be first met as per the company's policy. STATE
with reason, which division, G or R enjoys more advantage in each of the following
independent situations, assuming no inventory build -up.
Sl. G Transfers to R at G’s Production External Division having Reason
No. Transfer Price equal to level Demand more advantage
(i) Full cost: No mark up 60% 40%
(ii) Market Price 80% 60%
(iii) Marginal Cost 100% 80%
(iv) Market Price 100% 90%
Methods of Transfer Pricing

2. B Ltd. makes three products X, Y and Z in Divisions X, Y and Z respectively. The following
information is given:
X Y Z
Direct Material (` / unit)
8 22 40
(excluding material X for Divisions Y and Z)
Direct Labour (` / unit) 4 6 8
Variable Overhead (` / unit) 2 2 2
Selling price to outside customers (` / unit) 25 65 90
Existing capacity (no. of units) 6,000 3,000 3,000
Maximum external Market demand (no of units) 5,000 5,500 5,000
Additional fixed cost that would be incurred to install
45,000 9,000 23,100
additional capacity (`)
Maximum additional units that can be produced by 6,000 2,000 2,250
additional capacity
Y and Z need material X as their input. Material X is available in the market at `23 per unit.
Defectives can be returned to suppliers at their cost. Division X supplies the material free
from defects and hence is able to sell at `25 per unit. Each unit of Y and Z require one unit of
X as input with slight modification.
If Y purchases from outside at `23 per unit, it has to incur `3 per unit as modification and
inspection cost. If Y purchases from Division X, it has to incur, in addition to the transfer
price, `2 per unit to modify it.

If Z gets the material from Division X, it can use it after incurring a modification cost, of
`1 per unit. If Z buys material X from outside, it has to either inspect and modify it at its own
shop floor at `5 per unit or use idle labour from Division X at `3 per unit. Division X will lend
its idle labour as per Z's requirement even if Z purchases the material from outside.
The transfer prices are at the discretion of the Divisional Managers and will remain
confidential. Assume no restriction on quantities of inter-division transfers or purchases.
Required
DISCUSS with relevant figures the best strategy for each division and for the company as a
whole.
3. Centurion Co. operates a Pulp Division that manufactures Wood Pulp for use in production of
various paper goods. The following information are available:
`
Selling Price 210
Less: Variable Expenses 126
Contribution 84
Less: Fixed Expenses (based on a capacity of 1,00,000 kgs per year) 54
Net Income 30
Centurion Co. has just acquired a small company that manufacturers paper cartons. This
company will be treated as a division of Centurion with full profit responsibility. The newly
formed Carton Division is currently purchasing 10,000 kgs of pulp per year from supplier at a
cost of `210 per kg less a 10% quantity discount. Centurion's President is anxious that the
Carton Division begins purchasing its pulp from the Pulp Division if an acceptable transfer
price can be worked out.
Situation I
If the Pulp Division is in a position to sell all of its pulp to outside customers at the normal
price of `210 per kg, will the Managers of the Carton and Pulp Division agree to transfer
10,000 kgs of pulp next year at a determined price? EXPLAIN with reasons.
Situation II
Assuming that the Pulp Division is currently, selling only 60,000 kgs of pulp each year to
outside customers at the stated price of `210 per kg will the Managers agree to a mutually
acceptable transfer price for 10,000 kgs of pulp in next year? EXPLAIN with reasons.
Situation III
If the outside supplier of the Carton Division reduces its price to `177 per kg, will the Pulp
Division meet this price? EXPLAIN. If the Pulp Division does not meet the price of `177 per
kg, what will be the effects on profits of the company as a whole?

4. APC Ltd. has two divisions- Division X and Division Y with full profit responsibility. Division X
produces components 'Gex' which is supplied to·both division Y and external customers.
Division Y produces a product called 'Gextin' which incorporates component 'Gex'. For one
unit of 'Gextin' two units of component 'Gex' and other materials are used.
Till date, Division Y has always bought component 'Gex' from division X at `50 per unit since
the lowest price at which the component 'Gex' could have been bought by Division Y was `52
per unit.
Division X charges the same price for component 'Gex' to both division Y and external
customers. However, it does not incur selling and distribution costs when transferring
internally.
Division Y has received a proposal from a new supplier who has offered to supply component
'Gex' for `47 per unit at least for the next three years.
Manager of Division Y requests the manager of Division X to supply component 'Gex' at or
below, `47 per unit. Manager of Division X is. not ready to reduce· the transfer price since
the divisional performance evaluation is done based on profit margin ratio of the division.
The following additional information is made available to you :
Component 'Gex'` Product 'Gextin'`
Selling Price per unit 50 180
Less: Variable Costs
Direct Materials
Component 'Gex' - 100
Other materials 12 22
Direct labour 16 13
Manufacturing Overhead 2 5
Selling and Distribution Costs 4 2
Contribution per unit 16 38
Annual fixed costs `40,00,000 `20,00,000
Annual external demand (units) 3,00,000 1,20,000
Capacity of plant (units) 5,00,000 1,50,000
Required
(i) CALCULATE the present profit of each division and the company as a whole.
(ii) ANALYSE the impact on the total annual profits of each division and the company as a
whole if Division Y accepts the offer of the new supplier.

(iii) In the changed scenario, DISCUSS why the top management should intervene and
advise a suitable transfer price for component 'Gex' for resolving transfer pricing conflict
which promotes goal congruence through efficient performance of the concerned
division.
5. A manufacturer has two divisions, Division A and Division B. Division B produces
components that are used by both Division A as well as external customers. Division A gets
its entire requirement for the component from Division B.
The annual production capacity of Division B is 1,00,000 units. The division operates at full
capacity, with no inventory at the beginning and end of the year. It sells its components to
external customers at ₹4,000 per unit. Variable cost of production for the component is
₹2,750. Internally, it transfers it components to Division A factoring any opportunity cost in
the form of lost sales. Total sales of Division B were ₹36 crores, of which sales to external
customers was ₹20 crores.
As per company policy, demand from Division A has priority over external customers. This
year, there was an additional demand from external customers for 18,000 components.
However, since Division B operated at full capacity, this demand was not catered to.
Required
(i) ANALYZE the Sales in terms of ₹and units made by Division B to both external and
internal customers.
(ii) RECOMMEND the transfer pricing range that would promote goal congruence between
Divisions A and B.
(iii) DISCUSS the effect of changes in external demand on the transfer price for the
company, assuming the current policy continues.
6. GL Ltd. is a multiproduct manufacturing concern functioning with four divisions. The Electrical
Division of the company is producing many electrical products including electrical switches.
This division functioning at its maximum capacity sells its switches in the open market at
`25 each. The variable cost per switch to the division is `16.
The Household Division, another division of GL Ltd., functioning at 70% capacity asked the
Electrical Division to supply 5,000 switches per month at the rate of `18 each to fit in night
lamps produced by it. The total cost per night lamp is being estimated as detailed below;
`
Components purchased from outside suppliers 50.00
Switch if purchased internally 18.00
Other variable costs 40.00
Fixed overheads 21.00
Total cost per night lamp 129.00

The Household Division is marketing night lamps at a price of `130 each, with a very small
margin, as it is doing business in a very competitive environment. Any increase in price made
by the division will push out the division from the market. Therefore, the division cannot pay
anything more to switches if they the Electrical Division. Further, the manager of the division
informed that it is very much essential to keep on the market share for night lamps by the
Household Division to retain the experienced workers of the division. The company is using
return on investments (ROI) as a scale to measure the divisional performances and also
marginal costing approach for decision making.
Required
(i) Would you RECOMMEND the supply of switches to Household Division by Electrical
Division at a price of `18 each? Substantiate your recommendation with suitable
reasons.
(ii) ANALYZE whether it would be beneficial to the company as a whole the supply of
switches to Household Division at a unit price of `18 by Electrical Division.
(iii) Do you feel that- the Divisional Managers should accept the inter-divisional transfers in
principle? If yes, what should be the range of transfer price?
(iv) SUGGEST the steps to be taken by the chief executive of the company to change the
attitude of divisional heads if they are against the inter-divisional transfers.
7. Great Vision manufactures a wide range of optical products including lenses and surveillance
cameras. Division ‘A’ manufactures the lenses while Division ‘B’ manufactures surveillance
cameras. The lenses that Division ‘A’ manufactures is of standard quality that has a number
of applications. Due to huge demand in the market for its products Division ‘A’ is operating at
full capacity. It sells its lenses in the open market for `140 per lens, the variable cost of
production for each lens is `110, while the total cost of production is `125 per lens.
The total production cost of a camera by Division ‘B’ is ₹400 each. Currently Division ‘B’
procures lens from foreign vendors, the cost per lens would be `170 each. The management
of Great vision has proposed that to take advantage of in-house production capabilities and
consequently the procurement cost of the lens would reduce. It is proposed that Division ‘B’
should buy an average of 5,000 lenses each month from Division ‘A’ at `120 per lens. The
estimate cost of a surveillance camera is as below:
`
Other components purchased from external vendors 150
Cost of lens purchased from Division ‘A’ 120
Other variable costs 30
Fixed overheads 50
Total cost of a camera 350

Each surveillance camera is sold for `410. The margin for each camera is low since
competition in the market is high. Any increase in the price of a camera would reduce the
market share. Therefore, Division ‘B’ cannot pay Division ‘A’ beyond `120 per lens procured.
Great vision’s management uses Return on investments (ROI) as a scale to measure the
divisional performance and marginal costing approach for decision making.
Required
(i) ANALYZE the behavioral consequences of each division when Division ‘A’ supplies
lenses to Division ‘B’ at `120 per lens? Substantiate your answer based on the
information given in the problem.
(ii) ANALYZE if it would be beneficial to the company as a whole for Division ‘A’ to supply
the lenses to Division ‘B’ at `120 per lens.
(iii) Do you feel that the divisional managers should accept the inter-divisional transfers in
principle? If yes, CALCULATE the range of transfer price?
(iv) ADVISE alternate transfer pricing models that the chief executive of the company can
consider in order to change the attitude of the divisional heads if they are against the
transfer pricing policy.
(v) CALCULATE the range of transfer price, if Division ‘A’ has excess capacity and can
accommodate the internal requirement of 5,000 lens per month within the current
operations.
8. Business Model
Rest Easy Company is a rapidly growing start-up in the technology sector. It develops
customized ERP packages for clients across various business sectors. The business
comprises primarily of two departments (1) consultant and (2) customer support. Consultant
department has highly qualified professionals from management, accounting, and technology
background, who approach clients as a team and work out solutions that meet their needs.
Customer support personnel are in charge of IT implementation and provide support through
telephone, e-mail or on-site. Currently, the strength of the consultant’s department is 200
while that of customer support is 150.
Yash, the founder and CEO of the company, is very passionate about this business model.
To deliver high-quality product solutions, he believes that his staff should be well-trained and
up-to-date with developments in their professional fields. Therefore, Rest Easy provides
periodic training to its staff in-house. All employees are expected to undergo 2 weeks of
training annually. A training department has been set up with qualified trainers in various
fields, who provide periodic training sessions to both Consultant and Customer Service
departments. The training department has 5 trainers. Training sessions are aimed at
providing skills that the executives need to provide better service to their clients. This in -
house focus of high-quality delivery, is the key factor that Yash believes would set apart Rest
Easy from its competitors.

In addition to delivering training sessions, trainers are responsible for developing training
material for routine, on-going as well as specialized training sessions. They attend
conferences, train the trainer sessions and subscribe to journals to keep themselves up -to-
date with various developments that consultants and customer support executives need to be
aware of.
At the beginning of each year, heads of consultant and customer service departments advise
the training department on the expected number of training sessions that their staff would
undertake. In special situations, where developments need to be communicated rapidly, extra
sessions can also be conducted. Training department budgets are prepared based on these
needs.
Transfer Pricing - Training Cost Allocation
Cost incurred by the training department is allocated to the consultant and customer service
department based on the training sessions availed by both departments. A standard quote
(transfer price) based on budgets is provided at the beginning of the year. At the end of the
year, actual cost is allocated based on actual training sessions of each department.
Each of the user departments use the transfer price to prepare their individual budgets, that
further gets built into their pricing models used for billing clients. One of the metric for
manager appraisal is also the financial performance of their individual departments. Hence,
managers of both consultant and customer service departments are very cost conscious.
Figures for budget and actual costs for 2020 of the training department are as follows:
Figures in `
Cost Particulars Budget Actual
Salaries 25,00,000 30,00,000
Depreciation on Office Equipment 2,00,000 5,00,000
Software Licenses for Training Packages 80,000 1,05,000
Conference Travel for Train the Trainer Sessions 10,000 15,000
Telephone 20,000 25,000
Training Supplies 50,000 60,000
Trainee Lunch 100,000 120,000
Total Expenses 29,60,000 38,25,000
Consultant and Customer service departments are charged based on the number of training
sessions actually availed. Details of training sessions for each department are:
Department Budget Actual
Consultant 100 100
Customer Service 100 80
Total 200 180

Problem of Goal Congruence

In accordance with the above explanation, the training department quoted a rate of `14,800
per session based on the budgeted cost and budgeted training sessions. (Budgeted cost
`29,60,000 for 200 training sessions). Actual cost per session is `21,250 (Actual cost
`38,25,000 for 180 training sessions). Cost overrun of `6,450 per session, a jump of 44%
from the original quote.
Consequently, a meeting was called that was attended by the managers of consultant,
customer service and training departments, along with the CEO Yash.
The user departments were unhappy with the higher charge. Manager of the consultant
department raised the following concerns:
(a) The market rate for similar trainings provided by external vendors was only `12,000 per
session. He has accepted a higher transfer price of `14,800 per session only because
the in-house training program was more customized towards Rest Easy’s end-user-
clients. However, if the department is actually going to be charged ` 21,250 per
session, he would rather source the training to the outside vendor.
(b) Further, he pointed out that while his department had adhered to its commitment of 100
training sessions, the customer service department has availed of 20 lesser sessions
than its commitment. Reviewing the cost structure of the training department, most of
the expenses are fixed in nature. Therefore, when the transfer price is based on the
actual cost and actual training sessions, the per session cost has increased because
the customer service department did not undergo the entire 100 sessions. He
questions, why he should bear a higher allocation of cost due to variance in actual and
budgeted usage of training resources of the customer service department?
Manager of the customer service department explained that the variance of 20 training
session is on account of the executives handling high-priority work pressure that did not allow
them enough time to complete some of the training sessions. At the same time, she
contended that she should not be charged for those 20 sessions for which no training was
availed.
Manager of the training department explained that the `5,00,000 cost overrun on salary due
to new hire of a trainer. The trainer’s experience is very valuable to the compan y and hence
to get her on board, the company had to offer a higher pay scale. Depreciation on office
equipment was higher by `3,00,000 due to higher replacement cost of ageing equipment. A
specialized software license resulted in an excess spend of `25,000. The manager argued
that the rest of the expenses were normal increases which were not controllable.
Yash, the CEO, was understandably not happy with the cost over-run. Higher internal
transfer price to the end user departments would affect employee morale. However, even
though a cheaper option was available from an outside vendor, he could still foresee the
value of investing in in-house training programs. Intangible benefits from these customized
sessions, would definitely help the company’s growth.

To conclude, he was not willing to shut down the training department. At the same time, he
had to resolve the dispute resulting from internal transfer pricing in an amicable way. Like
profits, teamwork is critical to success.
Required
(i) IDENTIFY the threats to goal congruence due to internal transfer pricing.
(ii) During the meeting, an alternate transfer pricing methodology based on two-part pricing
system was formulated. Costs would be segregated into fixed and variable categories.
A transfer price for each category would be arrived based on budgeted costs and
budgeted usage. The standard rate for fixed cost will be applied to the budgeted training
sessions and charged to the user departments. The standard rate for variable cost will
be applied to the actual training sessions and charged to the user departments. Fixed
cost would be defined as those that are not directly impacted by the number of training
sessions. CALCULATE the transfer price to be charged to each department under this
method.
(iii) EVALUATE how the two-part pricing price method of transfer pricing address the
threats to goal congruence as identified in question 1?
International Transfer Pricing
9. Standard Corporation Inc. (SCI) is a US based multinational company engaged in
manufacturing and marketing of Printers and Scanners. It has subsidiaries spreading across
the world which either manufactures or sales Printers and Scanners using the brand name of
SCI.
The Indian subsidiary of the SCI buys an important component for the Printers and Scanners
from the Chinese subsidiary of the same MNC group. The Indian subsidiary buys 1,50,000
units of components per annum from the Chinese subsidiary at CNY (¥) 30 per unit and pays
a total custom duty of 29.5% of value of the components purchased.
A Japanese MNC which manufactures the same component which is used in the Printer and
Scanners of SCI, has a manufacturing unit in India and is ready to supply the same
component to the Indian subsidiary of SCI at `320 per unit.
The SCI is examining the proposal of the Japanese manufacturer and asked its Chines
subsidiary to presents its views on this issue. The Chinese subsidiary of the SCI has
informed that it will be able to sell 1,20,000 units of the components to the local Chinese
manufactures at the same price i.e. ¥ 30 per unit but it will incur inland taxes @ 10% on
sales value. Variable cost per unit of manufacturing the component is ¥ 20 per unit. The
Fixed Costs of the subsidiaries will remain unchanged.
The Corporation tax rates and currency exchange rates are as follows:
Corporation Tax Rates Currency Exchange Rates
China 25% 1 US Dollar ($) = ` 61.50
India 34% 1 US Dollar ($) = ¥ 6.25
USA 40% 1 CNY (¥) = ` 9.80

Required
(i) PREPARE a financial appraisal for the impact of the proposal by the Japanese
manufacturer to supply components for Printers and Scanners to Indian subsidiary of
SCI. [Present your solution in Indian Currency and its equivalent.]
(ii) IDENTIFY other issues that would be considered by the SCI in relation to this proposal.
(Note: While doing this problem use the only information provided in the problem itse lf and ignore the
actual taxation rules or treaties prevails in the above mentioned countries)
ANSWERS/ SOLUTIONS
1. Sl. Division Having Reason
No. More Advantage
(i) G is utilizing only 40% of production capacity by selling to
‘External Market’ which implies that G might have not been
G able to recover its full fixed costs. By transferring 20% of its
production capacity to division R at full cost, G will be able to
recover fixed costs components.
(ii) G will not be losing any external market demand as it is within
its production capacity. By transferring 20% of production
G
capacity to division R at market price, G will earn extra
contribution towards the fixed costs and profit.
(iii) Here G is operating at 100% capacity level and external market
demand is 80% only i.e. G is not losing any external market
demand. But by transferring 20% of production capacity to R at
R
marginal cost i.e. at variable cost, G may not be able to
recover fixed cost part of total cost. On the other hand R will be
able to get these units at marginal cost only.
(iv) Though G is losing its 10% of external market demand but it
would be able to earn the same revenue by transferring the
G
goods to division R at market price. Moreover, G will be able to
utilize 100% of its production capacity.
2. Statement Showing “Contribution per unit”
(`)
Particulars Division X Division Y Division Z
Sale Internal Transfer Purchase Transfer Transfer
to to from from from
Outside Y Z Outside X X
Selling Price 25.00 --- --- 65.00 65.00 90.00
Transfer Price --- 24.00* 25.00# --- --- ---
Direct Material 8.00 8.00 8.00 22.00 22.00 40.00

(Excluding Material ‘X’)

Direct Labour 4.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 8.00
Variable Overhead 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Purchase Price ‘X’ --- --- --- 23.00 --- ---
Transfer Price ‘X’ --- --- --- --- 24.00 25.00
Modification Cost --- --- --- 3.00 2.00 1.00
Contribution 11.00 10.00 11.00 9.00 9.00 14.00
(*) Division ‘Y’ will not pay Division ‘X’ anything more than `24, because at `24, it will incur
additional cost of `2 per unit to modify it, `23 + `3 = `26, the outside cost.
(#) To purchase material X from outside is costly for Division ‘Z’ as after modification at own shop
floor, cost of the same comes to Division ‘Z’ is ` 28 (`23 + `5).
If Division ‘X’ goes to utilize its full capacity in that case labour would not be availabl e for
modification to Department ‘Z’.
Accordingly Division ‘Z’ may purchase material X at `25 from Division ‘X’ i.e. market price to
outsiders.
Statement Showing “Internal Transfer Decision (units)”
Particulars X Y Z
Existing Capacity …(A) 6,000 units 3,000 units 3,000 units
Maximum Capacity that can be added …(B) 6,000 units 2,000 units 2,250 units
Total Maximum that can be produced 12,000 units 5,000 units 5,250 units
…(C)=(A)+(B)
Maximum External Demand …(D) 5,000 units 5,500 units 5,000 units
Balance …(C) – (D) 7,000 units --- 250 units
Internal Transfer to Other Divisions 5,000 units to Z* N.A. N.A.
2,000 units to Y
Internal Transfer from Other Divisions N.A. 2,000 units 5,000 units
transfer from transfer from
X (material X) X (material X)
(*) Division ‘X’ will supply its production to Division ‘Z’ first (after meeting its external requirement)
as contribution from product Z is high.
Statement Showing “Decision Whether to Expand or Not”
(`)
Particulars X Y Z
Additional Fixed Cost on Expansion 45,000 9,000 23,100
Contribution that can be earned by 64,000 18,000 28,000
expansion (4,000 units × `11 + 2,000 (2,000 units (2,000* units
units × `10) × `9) × `14)
Net Benefit from Expansion 19,000 9,000 4,900
Decision Expansion Expansion Expansion
(*) As maximum demand of product Z is 5,000 units which Division ‘Z’ first complete with existing
capacity of 3,000 units. Balance 2,000 units from expansion.

Statement Showing “Net Revenue Addition”

(`)
Particulars X Y Z Total
Contribution 55,000 45,000 70,000 1,70,000
– External Sales (5,000 units × `11) (5,000 units × `9) (5,000 units ×`14)
Contribution 75,000 --- --- 75,000
– Internal (2,000 units × `10 +
Transfer 5,000 units × `11)
Additional Fixed Cost 45,000 9,000 23,100 77,100
Net Revenue Addition 1,67,900
Strategy for Company & Divisions
(i) Division ‘X’ will transfer maximum possible material to Division ‘Z’ as Division ‘Z’ is
offering maximum transfer price to Division ‘X’. At the same time Division ‘Z’ is fetching
maximum contribution for the organisation so it is beneficial for both the Di visions as
well as organisation as a whole.
(ii) As shown above all the three Divisions are getting net benefit when they are taking
decision to expand and hence, all the three Divisions should expand their activity by
incurring additional fixed cost on expansion.
3. Situation I
The lowest acceptable transfer price from the perspective of the selling division is given by the
following formula:
Variable cost Total contribution margin on lost sales
Transfer price +
per unit Number of units transferred
The Pulp Division has no idle capacity, so transfers from the Pulp Division to the Carton Division
would cut directly into normal sales of pulp to outsiders. Since the costs are the same whether the
pulp is transferred internally or sold to outsiders, the only relevant cost is the lost revenue of `210
per kg from the pulp that could be sold to outsiders. This is confirmed below:
Transfer Price `126 + (`210 - `126) × 10,000= `210

10,000
Therefore, the Pulp Division will refuse to transfer at a price less than `210 per kg.
The Carton Division can buy pulp from an outside supplier for `210 per kg, less a 10% quantity
discount of `21, or `189 per kg. Therefore, the Division would be unwilling to pay more than `189
per kg.
Transfer Price ≤ Cost of Buying from Outside Supplier = `189
The requirements of the two divisions are incompatible. The Carton Division won’t pay more than
`189 and the Pulp Division will not accept less than `210. Thus, there can be no mutually
agreeable transfer price and no transfer will take place.

Situation II
The Pulp Division has idle capacity, so transfers from the Pulp Division to the Carton Division
do not cut into normal sales of pulp to outsiders. In this case, the minimum price as far as the
Carton Division is concerned is the variable cost per kg of `126. This is confirmed in the
following calculation:
`0
Transfer price `126 + = `126
10, 000
The Carton Division can buy pulp from an outside supplier for `189 per kg and would be unwilling
to pay more than that for pulp in an internal transfer. If the managers understand their own
businesses and are cooperative, they should agree to a transfer and should settle on a transfer
price within the range:
`126 Transfer price `189
Situation III
Yes, `177 is a bona fide outside price. Even though `177 is less than the Pulp Division’s
`180 “full cost” per unit, it is within the range and therefore will provide some contribution to
the Pulp Division.
If the Pulp Division does not meet the `177 price, it will lose `5,10,000 in potential profits.
Price per kg `177
Less: Variable Costs `126
Contribution margin per kg `51
10,000 kgs × `51 per kg = `5,10,000 potential increased profits.
This `5,10,000 in potential profits applies to the Pulp Division and to the company as a whole.

For situation III also considered that “the Pulp Division is currently selling only 60,000 kgs of pulp
each year to outside customers”.
4. (i) Profitability of each division and the company as a whole when Division X supplies
240,000 units of Gex annually to Division Y.
Division Y produces 1,20,000 units of Gextin. Each component of Gextin requires 2
components of Gex that it currently procures from Division X. Therefore, it procures
2,40,000 units of Gex from Division X annually.
Division X has an overall capacity of 5,00,000 units annually to produce Gex. Of this it
produces 2,40,000 units for Division Y, which it must first cater to. The remaining
2,60,000 units of Gex is sold to external customers.

Divisional and Overall Profitability of APC Ltd.

Sr. Particulars Division X Division Y Total APC
No. Per External Internal Total Per unit External Ltd
unit Sales Sales Division X of Sales
of Gextin
Gex
2,60,000 2,40,000 5,00,000 1,20,000
units Units Units units
1 Selling Price 50 1,30,00,000 1,20,00,000 2,50,00,000 180 2,16,00,000 4,66,00,000

2 Less: Variable
Cost
a Direct Material
b Component Gex --- --- --- --- 100 1,20,00,000 1,20,00,000
c Other materials 12 31,20,000 28,80,000 60,00,000 22 26,40,000 86,40,000
d Direct Labour 16 41,60,000 38,40,000 80,00,000 13 15,60,000 95,60,000
e Manufacturing 2 5,20,000 4,80,000 10,00,000 5 6,00,000 16,00,000
Over-head
f Selling and 4 10,40,000 ---- 10,40,000 2 2,40,000 12,80,000
Distribution Costs
Total 34 88,40,000 72,00,000 1,60,40,000 142 1,70,40,000 3,30,80,000
3 Contribution 16 41,60,000 48,00,000 89,60,000 38 45,60,000 1,35,20,000
(Step 1 - 2)
4 Annual Fixed 40,00,000 20,00,000 60,00,000
Cost
5 Annual Profit 49,60,000 25,60,000 75,20,000
(Step 3 - 4)
Note
Division X does not incur marketing costs on internal sales. Therefore, cost not incurred
on transfer of 240,000 units to Division Y.
(ii) Impact if Division Y accepts to buy 240,000 units of Gex annually from the external supplier
at `47 per unit of Gex.

Sr. Division X Division Y Total

No. Particulars Per External Internal Total Per unit External
unit Sales Sales Division X of Sales
of Gextin
Gex
3,00,000 0 3,00,000 1,20,000
units Units units units
1 Selling Price 50 1,50,00,000 - 1,50,00,000 180 2,16,00,000 3,66,00,000
2 Less: Variable
Cost
a Direct Material
b Component Gex - - - - 94 1,12,80,000 1,12,80,000
c Other Materials 12 36,00,000 - 36,00,000 22 26,40,000 62,40,000
d Direct Labour 16 48,00,000 - 48,00,000 13 15,60,000 63,60,000
e Manufacturing 2 6,00,000 - 6,00,000 5 6,00,000 12,00,000
Overhead
f Selling and 4 12,00,000 - 12,00,000 2 2,40,000 14,40,000
Distribution Costs
Total 34 1,02,00,000 - 1,02,00,000 136 1,63,20,000 2,65,20,000
3 Contribution 16 48,00,000 - 48,00,000 44 52,80,000 1,00,80,000
(Step 1 - 2)
4 Annual Fixed 40,00,000 20,00,000 60,00,000
Cost
5 Annual Profit 8,00,000 32,80,000 40,80,000
(Step 3 - 4)
Analysis
APC Ltd
Overall profitability of APC Ltd. reduces from `75,20,000 per annum to `40,80,000 per
annum. The reduction in profit is therefore `34,40,000 per annum. Reasons are:
(a) The cost of manufacturing Gex is only `30 per unit while Division Y is procuring
this at `47 per unit from an external supplier. Annually this results in a loss of
`40,80,000 (240,000 units of Gex×`17 per unit).
(b) Since Division X no longer makes Gex for internal sales, it can ramp up its
external sales to meet the full annual demand of 300,000 units. This results in
extra external sales of 40,000 units annually. Each unit gives a contribution of `16
per unit. Therefore, additional contribution from sale of 40,000 units of Gex to
external customers is `640,000 per annum.
(c) Therefore, netting both (a) and (b) above, the net loss to the company is
`34,40,000 per annum.

Division Y
Impact on profit of Division Y, increase from `25,60,000 per annum to `32,80,000 per
annum that is `7,20,000 per annum increase. This is due to the savings in procurement
cost of Gex for Division Y. Instead of procuring Gex at `50 per unit Division Y proposes
to buy it at `47 per unit externally. For its annual demand of 2,40,000 units of Gex , it
translates to savings of `7,20,000 annually in procurement cost for Division Y.
Division X
Impact on profit of Division X, reduction from `49,60,000 per annum to `8,00,000 per
annum. A substantial reduction of `41,60,000 in its divisional profit per year. Division X
earns a contribution of `20 per unit of Gex from its internal transfer to Division Y.
(Selling price `50 per unit less variable cost of manufacturing `30 per unit). If Division Y
procures Gex externally, this would result in an annual loss of `48,00,000 in
contribution for Division X (240,000 units ×`20 per unit). However, due to additional
external sales of 40,000 units of Gex, Division X can earn an additional contribution of
`6,40,000 per year (40,000 units of Gex × `16 contribution per unit of external sale).
Offsetting, this results in a lower contribution of `41,60,000 per annum for Division X.
This also results in excess capacity of 2,00,000 units per annum in Division X.
(iii) APC Ltd. can suffer a loss of `34,40,000 per annum if Division Y decides to procure
Gex from the external supplier. It costs on `30 per unit to manufacture Gex internally as
compared to `47 per unit that Division Y is willing to pay to the external supplier.
However, Division X is unwilling to reduce the price from `50 per unit since divisional
performance is done based on the profit margin ratio of the division. Therefore, the
management of the company has to step in to promote goal congruence. If Division Y
buys GEX from the external supplier, not only is it costly for the company, it also r esults
in a lot of unused capacity lying idle in Division X.
In the current scenario, one possible way of arriving at an acceptable transfer price
range could be:
Division X is currently working at full capacity of 5,00,000 units per annum. Of this
production, 2,40,000 units is supplied internally to Division Y while the balance is
supplied to external market. The marginal cost of production of Gex is `30 per unit. If
this were sold externally, it would earn a contribution of `16 per unit. Therefore, the
minimum transfer price the Division X would demand = marginal cost of
production per unit + opportunity cost per unit = `30 + `16 = `46 per unit of Gex.
(The other way of looking at this could also be that Division X does not incur any selling
and distribution costs on internal transfers. To outside clients it needs to spend `4 per
unit towards the same. Therefore, to make its price more competitive with the externa l
market, Division X can reduce the price by `4 per unit, which it has been recovering
from Division Y for a cost it does not incur in internal transfers. Thus, based on its cost
structure and the competitive profit margin it earns from external sales, it can price its
internal transfers at `46 per unit.)
Division Y will be willing to pay the lower of net marginal revenue or the external buy -in
price.

The Net Marginal Revenue per unit of Gextin = Selling price per Gextin – (marginal cost
for Division Y other than the cost of Gex) = `180 - `42 = `138 per unit of Gextin. This
translates that Division Y will be willing to pay upto `69 per unit of Gex, that it can incur
without incurring a divisional loss. Meanwhile, the external buy-in price is `47 per unit.
Therefore, the maximum price Division Y will be willing to pay = lower of Net
Marginal Revenue or external buy-in price = lower of `69 or `47 per unit of Gex.
Therefore, Division Y will be willing to pay maximum `47 per unit of Gex to
Division X.
Therefore, the transfer price range can be set between `46 - `47 per unit of Gex.
Division X would then have to compete with the external supplier to retain its internal
sales. This would promote more efficient working between Division X and Y. By selling
it at `46 per unit, the contribution of Division X would be maintained at `16 per
unit. For Division Y. the procurement of Gex at `46 per unit would be beneficial
since it is lower than the external market price. If transfer price set at external
market rate `47 per unit, Division Y would still be able to improve its profit margin
as compared to the original transfer price of `50 per unit.
Given that the marginal cost of manufacturing Gex is only `30 per unit, the
management has to ensure that production of Gex is made in-house. Performance
measure at a divisional level should then not be restricted to financial performance
alone (full profit responsibility) and should be accordingly modified to include non -
financial / operational measures as well.
5. (i) Sales Analysis of Division B
Total annual capacity and actual production of Division B is 100,000 units of
components. Zero inventory implies that sales for the year was also 100,000 units of
components. Sales to external customers was ₹20 crores, at ₹4,000 per unit.
Therefore, units sold to external customers would be 50,000 units this year ( ₹20 crores
sales / ₹4,000 per unit sale price).
Therefore, internal sales can be derived to be 50,000 units for the year (annual sales
100,000 units less external sales 50,000 units). For the year, value of sales made to
Division A is ₹16 crore ( Division B’s total sales of ₹36 crore less external sales of ₹20
crores).
Had there been no extra demand, opportunity cost for Division B would have been nil.
Therefore, transfer price would only be the variable cost of ₹2,750 per unit of
component, However, given in the problem, that there was excess demand for 18,000
units of components from external customers, that could not be met since Division B
had to give priority to internal demand. Had these sales been made Division B would
have earned ₹1,250 per unit contribution (Sale price ₹4,000 per unit less variable cost
₹2,750 per unit). This lost contribution of ₹1,250 per unit is the opportunity cost per unit
for Division B. Due to company’s policy of giving priority to internal demand, Division B
lost a profit of ₹2.25 crore during the year. (18,000 units × contribution of ₹1,250 per
unit).

Therefore, internal sales comprises of two parts:

32,000 units of components transferred at variable cost of ₹2,750. This amounts to
₹8.8 crores.
18,000 units of components transferred factoring any opportunity cost = variable cost +
contribution per unit = external sale price = ₹4,000 per unit. This amounts to ₹7.2
crores.
Therefore, internal sales = ₹8.8 crores + ₹7.2 crores = ₹16 crores.
Summarizing
External sales are 50,000 units amounting to ₹20 crores annual sales value. Internal
sales are 50,000 units amounting to ₹16 crores annual sales value. Transfer price for
32,000 units is at variable cost of ₹2,750 per unit while for 18,000 units is at external
sales price of ₹4,000 per unit.
(ii) Transfer Price Range for Divisions A and B
Division A procures its entire demand of 50,000 units from Division B. Out of this,
18,000 units at market price of ₹4,000 per unit while 32,000 units are procured at a
lower rate of ₹2,750 per unit. Had Division A procured 32,000 units from the market, th e
additional cost of procurement would be ₹4 crores {(External price of ₹4,000 per unit
less internal transfer price at variable cost of ₹2,750 per unit) ×32,000 units}. Only
Division A currently enjoys this benefit of lower procurement cost. Financials of Division
B show no profit from such internal transfers. This may skew the performance
assessment of the divisions, if it is based primarily on financial metrics of each division.
In order, promote goal congruence, some portion of this benefit can be share d with
Division B.
Division B will at the minimum want to recover its variable cost of ₹2,750 per unit, while
Division A will be ready to pay only up to external market price of ₹4,000 per unit.
Therefore, transfer price range can be set between ₹2,750 - ₹4,000 per unit. Division A
enjoys lower procurement rate while Division B financial reflect some benefit of
transferring components internally to Division A.
(iii) Impact of External Demand on Transfer Price
As per the company’s transfer pricing policy, Division B gives priority to demand from Division
A. The division has a production capacity of 100,000 units annually. If there is no external
market for Division B’s components, then transfer price for the entire internal transfer would be
the variable cost of ₹2,750 per unit plus portion of the fixed cost (if any). This is the minimum
cost that Division B would like to recover from Division A.
When there is an external market, transfer price would depend on whether Division B
had to incur any opportunity in the form of lost sales. When total demand (internal and
external) is within production capacity of 100,000 units, the entire demand can be met.
There would be no lost sales for Division B, no opportunity cost. Therefore, transfer
price for the entire internal transfer would be the variable cost of ₹2,750 per unit. This is
the minimum cost that Division B would like to recover from Division A.

When there is an external market, such that total demand (internal and external) is
more than production capacity of 100,000 units, due to priority given to internal transfer,
some portion of the external demand might not be met. This would be lost sales for
Division B, opportunity cost would be the contribution lost from such sales at ₹1,250 per
unit. This opportunity cost would be passed onto Division A. As explained in part (ii)
above, transfer price range will be from ₹2,750 - ₹4,000 per unit. More lost sales for
Division B would keep the average transfer price higher towards ₹4,000 per unit. Lesser
lost sales for Division B would keep the average transfer price towards the lower bound
of ₹2,750 per unit. Therefore, the proportion of external demand that could not be
catered to, would determine the average transfer price. Higher the demand from
external customers would drive up the average transfer price within the company.
6. (i) Electrical Division is operating at full capacity and selling its switches in the open
market at `25 each. Therefore, it can transfer its production internally by giving up
equal number of units saleable in the open market. In this situation, transfer price
should be based on variable cost plus opportunity cost {`16 + (`25 - `16)} = `25/-.
As the price quoted by Household Division `18 is less than the transfer price based on
opportunity cost, the Electrical Division should not accept internal transfer. Further, the
company is measuring divisional performances based on ROI. Therefore, transferring
for a price which is less than the minimum price would affect the return on investments
and divisional performance severely.
(ii) In the total cost per night lamp, the Fixed Overheads being a fixed cost is not relevant
for decision making. Similarly, the variable cost of switch (`16 p.u.) included in the cost
of night lamp is also irrelevant as it is common for both internal and external transfers.
The only relevant cost is the loss of revenue when units are transferred internally.
Accordingly, the benefit from internal transfer would be {`130 - (`50 + `40) - `25)
=`15/- on each unit sale on night lamp. Therefore, it is beneficial to the company as a
whole to the extent of `15 per unit of night lamp sold.
Hence, internal transfer is profitable to the company as a whole. Further, Hou sehold
Division is operating at 70% capacity and has experienced workers which may be
utilized for other divisions requirements if any and based on contribution earned fixed
cost could be minimized due to large scale of production.
(iii) Internal transfer pricing develops a competitive setting for managers of each division, it
is possible that they may operate in the best interest of their individual performance.
This can lead to sub-optimal utilization of resources. In such cases, transfer pricing
policy may be established to promote goal congruence. The market price of `25 per
switch leaves Electrical Division in an identical position to sale outside. Thus, `25 is top
of the price range. Division Household will not pay to Electrical Division anything above
(`130 - `50 - `40) = `40/-. The net benefit from each unit of night lamp sold internally is
`15. Thus, any transfer price within the range of `25 to `40 per unit will benefit both
divisions. Divisional Managers should accept the inter divisional transfers in principle
when the transfer price is within the above range.

(iv) Transfer at marginal cost are unsuitable for performance evaluation since they do not
provide an incentive for the supplying division to transfer goods and services internally.
This is because they do not contain a profit margin for the supplying division. Chief
Executive’s intervention may be necessary to instruct the supplying division to meet the
receiving division's demand at the marginal cost of the transfers. Thus, divisional
autonomy will be undermined. Transferring at cost plus a mark-up creates the opposite
conflict. Here the transfer price meets the performance evaluation requirement but will
not induce managers to make optimal decisions.
To resolve the above conflicts the following transfer pricing methods have been
suggested:
The supplying division records transfer price by including a normal profit margin thereby
showing reasonable revenue. The purchasing division records transfer price at marginal
cost thereby recording purchases at minimum cost. This allows for better evaluation of
each division’s performance. It also improves co-operation between divisions, promoting
goal congruence and reduction of sub-optimization of resources.
This pricing system is again aimed at resolving problems related to distortions caused
by the full cost based transfer price. Here,
transfer price = marginal cost of production + a lump-sum charge (two part to pricing).
While marginal cost ensures recovery of additional cost of production related to the
goods transferred, lump-sum charge enables the recovery of some portion of the fixed
cost of the supplying division. Therefore, while the supplying division can show better
profitability, the purchasing division can purchase the goods at lower rate compared to
the market price.
7. (i) Analysis of Behavioral Consequences
Division ‘A’ has huge demand for its lenses enabling it to operate at full capacity.
External sales yield a contribution of `30 per lens sold (selling price of `140 less
variable cost of `110 per lens). Likewise, each sale yields a profit `15 per lens (selling
price of `140 less cost of production `125 per lens). This yields an ROI of 12% (profit of
`15 per lens over a cost investment of `125 per lens).
If Division ‘A’ sells lens to Division ‘B’ at `120 per lens, it contribution reduces to
`10 per lens (transfer price ₹120 less variable cost `110) while overall it shows a loss
of `5 per lens (transfer price `120 less total cost of production is `125 per lens). The
loss of `5 per lens is on account of (i) only partial recovery of fixed cost of production
and (ii) opportunity cost in the form of loss of profit from external sales. This would
therefore result in lower divisional profit for Division ‘A’.
Consequently, the manager of Division ‘A’ would not accept the transfer price of
`120 per lens. Lower profitability due to internal sales may demotivate the division. Due
to the benefits of internal procurement, the management of Great vision may want to
increase the capacity of Division ‘A’ or infuse more investment to expand its operations.

However, due to inability to recover fixed costs in its entirety from internal sales the ROI
of the division is impacted, therefore divisional performance would be perceived to be
lower. Therefore, it may oppose decisions as this would lead to higher fixed costs. At an
overall level, such opposition may be detrimental to the company, leading to sub
optimization of resources.
The current total cost of production for Division ‘B’ is `400 per camera. Each sale yields
a profit of `10 per camera (Selling price `410 less total cost of production
`400 per camera). Therefore, the current ROI is 2.50% (profit of `10 over cost
investment of `400 per camera). If the lens is procured from Division ‘A’ at `120 per
lens, Division ‘B’ can get a benefit of `50 per camera due to lower procurement cost. If
lenses are procured from Division ‘A’, referring to the cost estimate given in the
problem, Division ‘B’ can earn a contribution of `110 per lens sold (sale price of `410
per camera less variable cost of `300 per camera) and a profit of `60 per camera (sale
price of `410 per camera less total cost of production of `350 per camera). Therefore,
ROI improves to 17.14% (profit of `60 over cost investment of `350 per camera). By
procuring the lenses internally, the profit of the division improves substantially.
Consequently, the manager of Division ‘B’ would accept the transfer price of `120 per
camera.
(ii) Analysis of Overall Benefit to the Company (from internal transfer)
While calculating the benefit to the company, the fixed cost of each division is ignored.
It is also given in the problem, that only marginal cost (variable cost) is considered for
decision making.
As explained above, each external sale yields a contribution of `30 to Division ‘A’. The
lost contribution each month from diversion of external sales of Division ‘A’ towards
internal transfer to Division ‘B’ = 5,000 units × `30 per lens = `1,50,000 per month. This
is an opportunity cost to the company.
The current procurement price for Division ‘B’ is `170 per lens. The same lens can be
manufactured at `110 (variable cost) by Division ‘A’. Therefore, cost of production
reduces by `60 for the company. Savings in procurement cost = 5,000 units × `60 per
lens = `3,00,000 per month. This is a savings to the company.
Therefore, the net benefit to the company at an overall level = `1,50,000 per month.
Please note that the internal transfer price affects profitability of individual division but
does not affect the company’s overall profitability.
(iii) Range of Transfer Price
As explained above, the company gets a net benefit of `1,50,000 per month by
procuring the lenses internally. Therefore, the divisional managers should accept the
transfer pricing model. At the same time, neither division should be at a loss due to this
arrangement. When the transfer price is `120 per lens, Division ‘A’ bears the loss,
which will impact assessment of the division’s performance. Therefore, an acceptable
range for transfer price should be worked out. This can be done as below:

When the supplying division operates at full capacity, the range for transfer pricing
would be-
Minimum transfer price = marginal cost p.u. + opportunity cost p.u.
Since the supplying division is operating at full capacity, it has no incentive to sell the
goods to the purchasing division at a price lower than the market price. If the internal
order is accepted, capacity is diverted towards this sale. Hence the supplying division
would additionally charge the lost contribution from external sales that had to be
curtailed. By doing so, the division will be indifferent whether the sale is an external or
internal one.
Therefore, the minimum transfer price (which would be set by Division ‘A’, the supplier)
= marginal cost per lens + opportunity cost per lens = `110 + `30 per lens = `140 per
lens. In other words, the minimum transfer price would be the external sale price of
each lens.
Maximum transfer price = Lower of net marginal revenue and the external buy -in price.
The maximum transfer price (which would be determined by Division ‘B’, the procurer) =
lower of net marginal revenue and the external buy-in price.
Net marginal revenue would be the revenue per one additional sale. Net marginal
revenue per camera = marginal revenue – marginal cost (i.e. variable cost excluding the
cost of the lens) to Division ‘B’ = `410 - `(150+30) = `410 - `180 = `230 per camera.
This is the maximum price that Division ‘B’ can pay for the lens, without incurring any
loss. As mentioned before, fixed cost is ignored for this analysis.
The current external procurement price is `170 per lens.
Therefore, the maximum price that Division ‘B’ would be willing to pay = lower of net
marginal revenue (`230 per camera) or external procurement cost
(`170 per lens). Therefore, Division ‘B’ would pay a maximum price, equivalent to the
current external price of `170 per lens. It will not pay Division ‘A’, price more than the
external market price for a lens.
Therefore, the acceptable range for transfer price would range from a minimum of
`140 per lens and maximum of `170 per lens. The managers may be given autonomy
to negotiate a mutually acceptable transfer price between this range.
(iv) Advise on Alternative to Current Transfer Pricing System
Other alternative transfer pricing models that can be considered are:
Dual Pricing
The supplying division, Division ‘A’, records transfer price by including a normal profit
margin thereby showing reasonable revenue. At the current market price per lens,
transfer price for Division A would be `140 per lens. The purchasing division, Division
‘B’, records transfer price at marginal cost thereby recording purchases at minimum
cost. As per the current production cost, the transfer price for Division ‘B’ would the
variable cost incurred by Division ‘A’ to manufacture one lens, that is `110 per lens.

This allows for better evaluation of each division’s performance. It also improves co -
operation between divisions, promoting goal congruence and reduction of sub -
optimization of resources.
Drawbacks of dual pricing include:
(a) It can complicate the records, thereby may result in errors in the company’s overall
records.
(b) Profits shown by the divisions are artificial and need to be used only for internal
evaluations.
Two Part Pricing System
Here, transfer price = marginal cost of production + a lump-sum charge (two part to
pricing). While marginal cost ensures recovery of additional cost of production related to
the goods transferred, lump-sum charge enables the recovery of some portion of the
fixed cost of the supplying division. Therefore, while the supplying division can show
better profitability, the purchasing division can purchase the goods a lower rate
compared to the market price.
The proposed transfer price of `120, is a two-part price that enables Division ‘A’ to
recover the marginal cost of production of a lens as well as portion of the fixed cost.
However, as explained in part (i) above, this price is insufficient to provide a reasonable
return to Division ‘A’. Therefore, the management of Great vision along with the
divisional managers have to negotiate a price that is reasonable to Division ‘A’ while not
exceeding the current procurement price of `170 per lens for Division ‘B’. As explained
in part (iii) of the solution, in the given case, the range of `140 to `170 per lens, would
help resolve this conflict.
(v) Range of Transfer Price where Division ‘A’ has excess capacity
When the supplying division has excess capacity, the range for transfer pricing would
be
(a) Minimum transfer price (determined by Division ‘A’) = marginal cost per len s =
`110 per lens. This ensures that the Division ‘A’ is able to recoup at least its
additional outlay of `110 per lens incurred on account of the transfer. Fixed cost is
a sunk cost hence ignored. Since capacity can be utilized further, it would be
optimum for Division ‘A’ to charge only the marginal cost for internal transfer.
Division ‘B’ gets the advantage getting the goods at a lower cost than market
price.
(b) Maximum transfer price (determined by Division ‘B’) = Lower of net marginal
revenue and the external buy-in price. As explained in part (iii) above, this would
be lower of net marginal revenue of `230 per camera or external buy-in price of
`170 per lens, Therefore, the maximum transfer price would be `170, the external
market price beyond which Division ‘B’ will be unwilling a higher price to Division
‘A’.
Hence, when Division ‘A’ has excess capacity, the minimum transfer price would
be `110 per lens while the maximum transfer price would be `170 per lens.

8. (i) Threats to goals congruence due to internal transfer pricing are:

(a) User groups, consulting and customer service department are concerned that
training department is not controlling its costs. Since the entire actual costs gets
allocated to the users, training department may not be managing its costs
efficiently. Since the financials of user departments are affected, it may lead to
conflict between the departments.
(b) Yash, the CEO is a firm believer of in-house training and its benefits. However,
there are outside vendors that provide similar service at substantially reduced
costs. Performance assessment of managers of consulting and customer service
are based on their department’s financial metrics. Higher internal transfer price for
training would affect employee morale since they have no control over these
allocated costs. However, their performance is being evaluated based on
uncontrollable factors. This could lead to discontent among the managers.
Alternatively, Yash may want to re-consider his strategy of in-house training.
When suitable, training can be sourced to cheaper options available in the market,
without compromising on quality.
(c) Most costs of the training department are fixed in nature, as they need to be
incurred irrespective of the number of training sessions. These costs are being
allocated to the users based on actual training sessions. The budgeted target
price is used by the user departments, to determine their billing model to Rest
Easy’s end user clients. Hence it is important that the budget transfer price is not
very different from the actual transfer price charged at the end of the year.
In the given problem, internal transfer price has been based on a budget of 200
sessions. Here the customer service department does not adhere to its commitment
of 100 training sessions, training sessions actually availed are only 80. Since costs
are mostly fixed in nature, the actual cost per training session increases. This is then
charged out to the consultant and customer service departments. Consequently,
despite meeting its commitment, the consultant department bears a higher cost
allocation due to variance in the usage of training resources. This can lead to friction
between the user departments.
(ii) By segregating the costs into fixed and variable components, Rest Easy is working out
two-part pricing system for transfer price.
Two-Part Pricing System = Lump-Sum Charge + Marginal Cost
To segregate the costs into fixed and variable categories, the criteria is whether the
costs change per additional training session. Accordingly, the classification of costs will
be as below:

Cost Particulars Budget (`) Classification

Salaries 25,00,000 Fixed
Depreciation on Office Equipment 2,00,000 Fixed
Software Licenses for Training Packages 80,000 Fixed
Conference Travel for Train the Trainer 10,000 Fixed
Sessions
Telephone 20,000 Fixed
Training Supplies 50,000 Variable
Trainee Lunch 100,000 Variable
Total Expenses 29,60,000
The lump-sum charge would be based on the fixed cost budget. Marginal cost would be
based on the variable cost budget.
Total budget fixed expenses = `28,10,000 and total budget variable expenses =
`150,000. Number of training sessions is 200, that is 100 each for consultant and
customer service departments. Hence the fixed cost allocation rate would be `14,050
per session and variable cost allocation rate is `750 per session.
Transfer price to the consulting department = lump-sum charge + marginal cost
= (Standard Fixed Cost per session × Budgeted Training Sessions) + (Standard
Variable Cost per Session × Actual Training Sessions)
= (`14,050×100) + (`750×100)
= `14,05,000 + 75,000
= `14,80,000.
Transfer price to the customer service department = lump-sum charge + marginal cost
= (Standard Fixed Cost per session × Budgeted Training Sessions) + (Standard
Variable Cost per session × Actual Training Sessions)
= (`14,050 × 100) + (`750 × 80)
= `14,05,000 + `60,000
= `14,65,000.
Total transfer price allocation is `29,45,000 versus actual expenses of `38,25,000.
Unallocated expenses are `880,000.
(iii) Evaluate how the two-part transfer pricing model would address the goal congruence
issues listed in question 1?

(a) Since transfer prices are based on budgets, the training department would
become more cost-conscious. As explained above, as per this transfer pricing
method, unallocated expenses of `8,80,000 would have to be borne by the
training department. As given in the problem, this variance is mainly on account of
extra cost for the newly hired trainer and the higher depreciation expense. The
department will be more cautious while taking future decisions. However, Yash the
CEO must ensure that the quality of training is not compromised and remains in
line with the company’s strategic policy.
(b) Internal transfer price of `14,800 per session is still higher than the outside rate of
`12,000 per session. Further decisions would be based on the company’s
strategic objective. At the same time, if the number of training sessions are
expected to increase beyond the budget, this transfer pricing method charges the
user department only a marginal cost of `750 per session. This is definitely lower
that the external rate.
(c) Under this method, fixed expenses that form majority of the cost are allocated
based on budgeted cost and budgeted usage. Variable expense are allocated
based on actual training sessions. Hence, any variance in the utilization of training
resources, does not impact the other user department.
Therefore, most of the goal congruence issues can be addressed through this
methodology.
9. (i) Impact of the Proposal by the Japanese Manufacturer to Supply Components for
Printers and Scanners to the Indian Subsidiary of the SCI.
On Indian Subsidiary of SCI
Particulars Amount (`)
Cost of Purchase from the Chinese Manufacturer :
Invoiced Amount {(1,50,000 units × ¥ 30) × `9.80} 4,41,00,000
Add: Total Custom Duty (` 4,41,00,000 × 29.5%) 1,30,09,500
Total Cost of Purchase from the Chinese Manufacturer …(A) 5,71,09,500
Cost of Purchase from Japanese Manufacturer in India:
Invoice Amount (1,50,000 units × `320) 4,80,00,000
Total Cost of Purchase from Japanese Manufacturer in India …(B) 4,80,00,000
Savings on Purchase Cost Before Corporate Taxes …(A) – (B) 91,09,500
Less: Corporate Tax @34% 30,97,230
Savings after Corporate Taxes 60,12,270

On Chinese Subsidiary of SCI

Loss of Contribution 29,40,000
[{(1,50,000 – 1,20,000 units) × ¥ (30 – 20)} × `9.80]
Add: Inland taxes on Local Sale - Chinese Manufacturer 35,28,000
[{(1,20,000 units × ¥ 30) × 10%} × `9.80]
Total Loss Before Corporate Taxes 64,68,000
Less: Tax Savings on the Losses (`64,68,000 × 25%) 16,17,000
Net Loss after Corporate taxes 48,51,000
On SCI Group
Saving from Indian Subsidiary 60,12,270
Loss from Chinese Subsidiary 48,51,000
Net Benefit to SCI Group 11,61,270
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the proposal from the Japanese
manufacturer in India is beneficial for the SCI as it give a net benefit of `11,61,270.
(ii) The SCI need to consider various other issues before reaching at a final decision of
accepting the proposal of the Japanese manufacturer in India. The few suggestive
issues that should be considered are as follows:
- The longevity of the proposal of the Japanese manufacturer: Whether Japanese
manufacturer will supply the components in the future also. For this purpose, a
long term agreement between the Indian Subsidiary of SCI and Japanese
manufacturer in India needs to be entered.
- Certainty of the fiscal policy in India: The Japanese manufacturer will not be able
to supply the component at the present price if the fiscal policy of India will change
in the future.
- Repatriation of Profit earned in India: Though the Indian subsidiary is making profit
but it depends on the Government policy on the repatriation of profit from India to
USA.
- Operating Conditions in China: The SCI has to make sure that the Chinese
subsidiary is operating profitably and able to use the spare capacity in the future
as well.
- The fiscal policy in China: If the Government of China liberalize its fiscal policies in
China in future then the manufacturing cost will be cheaper than the today’s cost.
Apart from above suggestive points the foreign relations and other tax treaties and
accords should also be kept in consideration.
CS→ 4

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9

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

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Ove rview o f T rans fe r Pri ci ng Sys te m

Utility of Transfer Pricing

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Profit Split between Divisions

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TRANSFER PRICING METHODS

Market Based Transfer Price

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Shared Profit Relative to Cost Based Transfer Price

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Number of Cartons (`)

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Statement of Profitability - Market Price Method

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Standard Cost Based Transfer Price

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Full Cost Based Transfer Price

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Negotiation Based Transfer Price

TRANSFER PRICING AND GOAL CONGRUENCE

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(ii) Maximum Transfer Price (determined by the purchasing division)

Min. Recovery needed for Div. A

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TRANSFER PRICING DECISION, DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES

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Statement of Product Wise Contribution per hour

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Different Demand Levels

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PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING TRANSFER PRICING CONFLICT

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INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING

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Particulars Japan Mining Division UK Processing Division

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International Transfer Pricing and Currency Management

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▪ Transfer Pricing and Goal Congruence –

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TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE

Methods of Transfer Pricing

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