Blockchain in Africa
Blockchain in Africa
Blockchain in Africa
PREAMBLE.......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................................................................... 6
3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS..........................................................................................................................................24
3.1 Blockchain technology and data protection...................................................................................................... 24
3.1.1 From regulatory goals to legal techniques .......................................................................................27
3.1.2 Legal design choices to operationalise
data protection objectives for blockchain technology.......................................................................28
3.1.3 Supervisory authorities and enforcement in the face of blockchain technology...............................32
3.2 Financial regulation: considerations for distributed ledger technology
applications in finance......................................................................................................................................33
3.3 Existing national blockchain strategies under review ...................................................................................... 35
3.3.1 Between promoting innovation and preventing crime.......................................................................36
3.3.2 Capacity building and research........................................................................................................37
3.3.3 Policy approaches.............................................................................................................................37
PREAMBLE
Blockchain technologies have been finding real-world utility across Africa
and the world at large over the last few years. The concept of blockchain
is still getting traction daily and use-cases are still being understood
as innovators and innovation ecosystems define new ways of bringing
blockchain technologies into the real world. What we can be certain of
is that these technologies have immense potential for addressing some
challenges that Africa faces.
There are key principles that are inherent to blockchain, such as trans-
parency, and decentralization which on the surface, can address many of Africa’s challenges. From
elections, to international remittance, as well as energy services and alternatives to banking; Africa
has many developing systems that could benefit from this technology.
The purpose of this paper is to proffer a critical assessment of these technologies in order to
understand them better. This in turn helps us to understand the potential use cases. We delve into
essential use cases within this document related to key verticals that form the digital economy and
Africa’s immediate digital agenda. These include key aspects such as digital payments, gover-
nance, public spending and trade facilitation among others.
Its is important to offer a critical view of blockchain technologies and to be objective about what
can work in Africa and what cannot work. We need to be certain that the use of blockchain does
not amount to the surrendering of sovereignty and data protection rights. The technology we adopt
must enhance Africa’s progress towards a single digital economy.
At the end of it all, this paper gives a number of recommendations based on the understanding we
have collectively developed.
We thank our partners from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and
a committed team from the Smart Africa Secretariat for the work they have put into this paper. It
is through strategic partnerships such as these, that we will achieve great strides in our journey
towards a single digital market.
Mr Lacina Koné
Director General of Smart Africa
6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Few technologies have oscillated between public appreciation and depreciation, between hype and
caution as much as as blockchain technology has since its inception roughly a decade ago. This
paper offers a fresh view on blockchain technology as it is maturing. The purpose is to inform African
decision and policy makers about viable use cases and about the policy choices that need to be made
in order to take full societal advantage of distributed ledgers and related technologies.
As part of this paper, we look at blockchain with a focus on its key characteristics and remaining short-
falls that inform the following use cases. Besides drawing on the actual practicability of the specific
use cases based on the technology as to date, we also considered the maturity of existing use cases
in our selection. Now, we gathered those use cases that, at this point in time, appear most feasible,
promising or as in the case of digital payments politically pressing for the African continent. The use
cases are:
This list of use cases is far from being comprehensive. The innovation ecosystems constantly bring
up novel applications of blockchain and combinations with various other technologies such as internet
of things and artificial intelligence as well as common databases. The relevant topics of digital ID and,
related, self-sovereign identity will be addressed in depth in a separate publication by the Smart Africa
Secretariat.
In summary, any approach to regulate blockchain technology should commence with a clear consen-
sus on regulatory objectives that are based on the particular positions of the governments involved.
From there, regulatory means to realise these objectives can be drawn.
We conclude this report with the following recommendations to African decision and policy makers:
• Strategy: develop a pan-African blockchain strategy in accordance with the African Union’s digital
strategy.
• Capacity building: support research and education about blockchain technology and blockchain
governance. Foster skills, develop talent and stimulate innovation.
1. INTRODUCTION: BLOCKCHAIN
TECHNOLOGY IN A NUTSHELL
Blockchain technology describes a new way of data handling. It refers to a specific form of distributed
ledger architecture, which stores transactions in a list of blocks, which are linked cryptographically.
Due to their similar use in the public discourse and despite the slight imprecision, the terms distributed
ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain are being used interchangeably in this paper.
An in-depth technical explanation of blockchain or DLT at large would go beyond the scope of this
paper.1 Additionally, for decision and policy makers the most important concepts to conceive are the
characteristics of blockchain that make it appropriate for new private and public use cases. It also
must be noted that no blockchain system exists in isolation. In order to provide many of the features
noted below, any blockchain requires a trustworthy governance model.
In light of the purpose of this paper - which is to inform decision and policy makers about opportunities
and preconditions for the implementation of blockchain technology - and acknowledging that there
is not one genuine and universal definition of blockchain, we offer the following working definition of
blockchain technology before looking at some specific properties, i.e. distribution, public and private
blockchains, immutability, incentivisation and automation.
DATABASE / LEDGER
P2P-NETWORKS CRYPTOGRAPHY
TECHNOLOGIES
1 This chapter is particularly informed by Bogensperger, A., Zeiselmair, A. and Hinterstocker, M., 2018. Die Blockchain-Technologie -
Chance zur Transformation der Energieversorgung?. Forschungsstelle für Energiewirtschaft e.V. (FfE). Available at:
https://www.ffe.de/attachments/article/803/Blockchain_Teilbericht_Technologiebeschreibung.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
For conceptual differentiation see e.g. Rauchs, M., Glidden, A., Gordon, B., Pieters, G., Recanatini, M., Rostand, F., Vagneur, K. and Zhang,
B., 2019. Distributed Ledger Technology Systems: A Conceptual Framework. Campridge Centre for Alternative Finance. Available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230013 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
9
In order to ensure that these copies of the same data are fully identical and synced in real time, block-
chain technology makes use of various consensus mechanisms. This enables participating parties of
the network to computationally find consensus on what information is stored on the blockchain, and,
thereby, put trust in the system and in one another without actually having to know the other partici-
pants in the network. Thanks to these consensus mechanisms2 - and depending on their formulation
- blockchains work without a centralised entity, e.g. an administrator managing the ledger.
Public vs. private, permissioned vs. permissionless blockchains: The attribute of distribution
holds especially true for public permissionless blockchains.3 By design, these blockchains operate
on the open internet and allow for anyone to read, write and verify transactions by operating a node
in the network. Public permissioned blockchains meanwhile are also accessible on the open internet,
but they limit the ability to verify transactions to a selection of participants or by certain conditions.
The openness of public blockchains potentially makes for a high degree of architectural and political
decentralisation4 and making them maximally resilient to malicious adaptation. In contrast, private, so-
called federated/consortium/syndicate distributed ledger networks are managed by one or a number
of entities that may limit read-and-write access of the blockchain and determine the ruleset for verifica-
tion.5
TRANSACTIONS ON A BLOCKCHAIN
2 The most common consensus mechanisms currently include so-called Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake and Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance.
3 Prominent examples of public blockchains are the Bitcoin blockchain - best known for the associated cryptocurrency -, and the
Ethereum blockchain.
4 Vitalik, B., 2017. The Meaning Of Decentralization. Available at:
https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralization-a0c92b76a274 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
5 Prominent private blockchains are Hyperledger Fabric and Quorum; a large federated blockchain is the R3 Corda Network.
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Immutability: Once a transaction is confirmed by the participating parties and written into the ledger,
the protocol does not allow for any changes to be made after-the-fact. This is on the one hand due
to the distributed logic and consensus mechanisms of the ledger, but also based on the particular
structure of a blockchain. Here, new information is saved in self-referencing blocks that are added to
an add-only chain [see Figure 2]. Previously stored information is not overwritten, and retrospective
manipulation is nearly impossible in public and permissionless blockchains. The particular data struc-
ture of distributed ledgers and blockchains ensures the integrity of each individual ledger entry and
the accuracy of the ledger as a whole. Any attempt to alter the data ex-post would be rejected by the
consensus rule, and the attempt itself would become visible to all participating parties. This ensures
an extremely high level of data integrity in public/permissionless blockchains. Immutability means that
high data quality is particularly important in blockchain systems.
Incentivisation: In order to foster the trust in the status of the ledger that blockchain is widely praised
for, the technology may rely on incentivisation mechanisms that encourage network participants to
behave positively. As part of a blockchain’s consensus mechanism, for example, participants may be
rewarded (economically) when positively contributing to the system (i.e. by processing and validating
transactions). An example for this reward system is the Bitcoin blockchain, where successful valida-
tion of new transactions is rewarded in the payout of bitcoins. In other scenarios, negative incentivisa-
tion is also possible, as participants are discouraged from malicious behaviour that would ultimately
harm the system and themselves. Such incentivisation schemes, born from game theoretical princi-
ples, are a core characteristic of public/permissionless blockchain protocols. They can also be adapt-
ed for a variety of scenarios and use cases. By representing certain economic rewards or real-world
goods in the form of digital tokens and by defining clear means to earn these tokens, participants of
a blockchain can be encouraged to behave in desirable manners. An example of this are community
coin systems that reward the purchasing of local goods instead of imported products.6
Automation: Unlike a centralised database held by a single entity, a blockchain continues to run
even if individual participants or machines stop participating in the network. Just like the availability of
stored data does no longer depend on a single machine within the network, the processing of code
does also no longer run on a single computer or server. Instead, code can run directly on a block-
chain, following the logical iterations that it was programmed to process: If transaction A has taken
place, then transaction B will automatically be executed. This capacity is also known as smart con-
tracts. Running such an if-then-statement independently from a centralised processing unit or server
enables a new level of automation through blockchain technology.
Scalability: Currently, the number of transactions that can be executed per time unit on most block-
chains is very limited. Due to the size limitations of individual new blocks on the chain and the redun-
dancy of linked previous blocks, the speed of processing transactions is comparably low. Therefore,
scaling blockchain-based projects to industry-scale is a key challenge that needs to be addressed or
worked around.
Privacy: Most blockchains do not currently provide sufficient levels of privacy as required for gov-
ernment and enterprise applications. While the major public blockchains reveal data and metadata
publicly and permanently, many private and permissioned blockchains allow some form of privacy. For
instance, data may be public among the members of a particular blockchain consortium, but private to
non-members. However, private and permissioned blockchains may not provide for the level of trust
and immutability and heavily rely upon their off-chain governance structure to ensure reliability of their
content.7 Moving forward, both private and public blockchains are expected to enhance privacy based
on so-called zero-knowledge proofs.
6 See Gericke, M., 2019. New Report Release: Community Currencies. PositiveBlockchain.io. Available at: https://positiveblockchain.io/
new-report-release-community-currencies/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
7 Off-chain governance refers to the rules that determine the operation of the blockchain system itself (governance of the infrastructure),
whereas on-chain governance refers to rules such as incentivisation or smart contracts that are directly encoded into the blockchain (gover-
nance by the infrastructure).
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Interoperability: To little surprise, the young technology has not seen sufficient streamlining through
standards across sectors and industries. This leaves businesses with difficult decisions on the use
of specific blockchains that are currently not interoperable. While projects are working towards an
increase in interoperability, achieving this as an industry-wide standard will require additional time.
Infrastructure: Logically, any blockchain-based system will rely on the existence of functioning and
reliable infrastructure, including internet connectivity. While the choice between a variety of block-
chains (e.g. private vs. public) may to some degree alleviate this precondition, it remains a key factor
of consideration for any implementation - especially in the African context.
Data quality: Strictly speaking, blockchain technology ensures data integrity and not data quality. The
data stored on a blockchain is only as accurate as it was when entered. Especially as data cannot be
retrospectively changed, high standards on data quality are required in the application of blockchain
technology. In many scenarios, the entry of such high quality data onto the blockchain poses a partic-
ular challenge.
Smart contracts: The automation that blockchain offers by allowing lines of code to be directly
programmed on-chain also comes with its own caveats. As the processed code can no longer be
amended after it was stored on the blockchain, it needs to fulfil the highest quality standards - similar
to data entered on-chain. However, experience of software development proves that programming
bug-free code is virtually impossible. Considering this, the lacking ability to fix badly designed smart
contracts or to update them when external factors make it poses a further complication for the use of
smart contracts.
Integration: Blockchain systems can be difficult to integrate within existing system landscapes. It is
thus necessary to include the integration with legacy systems into the technical design choices. Ad-
vances towards open, interoperable standards serve this goal.
As much as these limitations should be evaluated within the context of any blockchain-based project,
one cannot overstate how the field of blockchain development remains in flux and is rapidly changing.
Therefore, a look at the already feasible use cases and an outlook into the nearest future to ensure
enabling environments for soon-to-be-realised approaches remains worthwhile.
12
Energy 7
Living Conditions 3
Health 2
Environment 1
0 10 20 30
Number of Projects
8 An example for economic and social impact are innovations in cross-border payments, which foster both the financial sector and benefit
communities.
13
This section provides a snapshot of the blockchain ecosystem as it currently exists on the African con-
tinent. It is structured in a thematic order. Each theme is introduced in a way that highlights initiatives
from the dynamic African project scape. It is then complemented with an explainer of the underlying
use cases and links to additional resources in order to ease uptake and adaptation.
We will present the following use cases of blockchain pertinent to Africa. Most of which show how
blockchain technology can ease cross-border transactions - and thereby complement existing efforts
to that end on the African continent:
According to a survey of 63 central banks in 2018, whose catchment area covers 80% of the world’s
population, more than two-thirds of these central banks were working on the issue of central bank digi-
tal currencies (CBDC) at various stages. This includes both general-purpose, retail11 CBDCs, which
would provide a direct cash and electronic payment substitute, and wholesale CBDCs, which mainly
involve interbank transfers and collateral.12 Back then, no central bank indicated concrete implementa-
tion intentions yet. Since 2018, however, the playing field of digital currencies has changed. In particu-
lar, Facebook’s announcement to create Libra13 stimulated new discussions and rapid developments.
This private sector driven initiative increased the pressure on existing - and in some cases slowly
progressing - projects in the political arena. European, US and Chinese politicians subsequently com-
9 Chironga, M., De Grandis, H. and Zouaoui, Y., 2020. Mobile Financial Services In Africa: Winning The Battle For The Customer. McK-
insey. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/mobile-financial-services-in-africa-winning-the-bat-
tle-for-the-customer# [Accessed 8 May 2020].
10 The World Bank, 2019. World Development Report. The World Bank. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/816281518818814423/pdf/2019-WDR-Report.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
11 Applied to retail payments, DLTs can be used for money transfers denominated in fiat currencies. DLTs use so-called tokens to transfer
values, e.g. information or monetary values, from party A to party B. Each of these digital DLT-based tokens must be fully backed by
respective currency units deposited at a bank, an e-money provider, the central bank or another party. If the tokens are not fully backed by
respective amounts of money, then it would not be possible for all clients to withdraw their funds, which would undermine trust in the project.
Since the DLT itself cannot verify that backing, participants need to trust the e-money provider promising this fact. - That is the reason for
license requirements for e-money providers.
12 Bank for International Settlements, 2020. Proceeding With Caution - A Survey On Central Bank Digital Currency. BIS Papers No 101.
Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap101.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
13 In its original version (1.0) Libra has been described as a so-called stablecoin, linked to a basket of different financial assets, mainly cur-
rencies (US$, €, £, ¥) and government bonds. After facing a backlash from regulators in many countries, plans for a Libra version 2.0 were
presented, which would omit operation in countries with weak currencies and would include modes of direct cooperation with regulators and
central banks.
14
mented14 on their plans to introduce digital currencies (and the threat they see in these private-sec-
tor-driven currencies).
The following section outlines different design options for digital payment infrastructures, discusses
features and drawbacks and explains possible effects or lines of action for African countries.
2.1.1 Stablecoins
Stablecoins are crypto assets that are designed to minimise volatility by pegging their market value
to an external currency. Currently, there exist various crypto asset projects like Tether, TrueUSD or
Stasis, which issue tokens backed by fiat currencies (fiat-backed stablecoins). Holders of stablecoins
must trust that all tokens are fully backed by assets - typically commodities, fiat currencies or crypto-
currencies. However, worldwide stablecoin issuers are currently not regulated (if they do not promise
to return fiat) and therefore stablecoins are not covered by deposit insurance schemes. This imposes
regulatory risk. Further, liquidity in stablecoins is limited. Hence, customers are exposed to a non-neg-
ligible risk that stablecoins could potentially default, besides apparent liquidity risk.
China is currently pioneering as they might already start their retail CBDC prototype for a digital yuan
or a common digital currency of the BRICS states in 2020. There are also a number of initiatives by
smaller countries: the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank is investigating the application of DLT for a dig-
ital Eastern Caribbean dollar. The Sand dollar of the Bahamas pursues a similar goal and is already
available to Bahamian citizens in a pilot phase since December 2019. The so-called sovereign, a
Marshall Islands crypto asset, shall also be issued in the upcoming months.
14 See von Weizsäcker, F., Meier-Hahn, U. and Wannemacher, L., 2020. Libra Vs. Governments: The Race Towards An Inclusive Global
Payment Infrastructure. Available at: https://medium.com/@GIZ_Lab/libra-vs-governments-the-race-towards-an-inclusive-global-payment-in-
frastructure-a1432124d8fc [Accessed 8 May 2020].
15 Implementing a CBDC does not necessarily imply using DLT; it is one technology option next to regular databases. However, all the
major CBDC prototypes (Sweden, China, Marshall Islands, Bahamas, Eastern Carribean Region) are based on DLT. Therefore, DLT seems
to be highly relevant in the context of a CBDC.
16 Boar, C., Holden, H. and Wadsworth, A., 2020. Impending Arrival - A Sequel To The Survey On Central Bank Digital Currency. BIS
Papers No 107. Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap107.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
15
Within the European Union, the Swedish central bank (Riksbank) has been analysing the issuance of
a digital version of the Swedish krona (e-krona) since 2017 and is already testing a DLT-based e-kro-
na prototype. The German government’s Blockchain Strategy is committed to the digital euro, and
work is underway with the European Central Bank (ECB) and others to find appropriate solutions.17
The current target is wholesale instead of retail, i.e. not the big disruption (a CBDC for private users),
but "only" a payment infrastructure for the digital euro in interbank business, with some open ques-
tions about the operator model.
In international forums such as the G20, G7, and the World Economic Forum, CBDCs are prominently
on the agenda. On the African continent, the Central Bank of Tunisia is currently examining the poten-
tial and options for action on CBDCs. It appears therefore only as a matter of time until first CBDCs
will be introduced.
Central banks’ motives for introducing a retail CBDC are manifold. The survey of the BIS shows that
they differ between advanced economies on the one hand and emerging market economies on the
other hand: emerging economies mainly hope to increase financial stability by lowering the concentra-
tion of money in the banking sector, to increase the efficiency of payment transactions, i.e. transaction
time and costs, and increase the security of digital transactions. Another hope by central bankers
in emerging market economies is to increase financial inclusion by introducing a CBDC. A consum-
er-friendly CBDC with low entry barriers such as the opportunity to transact small units of CBDC
without know-your-customer (KYC) requirements could ease the access to digital transaction services
for citizens, who are currently excluded from the financial system (financially excluded). One can
think of the example of M-Pesa in Kenya, where holders of mobile phones can transfer money from
phone to phone. If a CBDC is implemented in a similar fashion and can be transferred peer-to-peer
via phones more citizens would get access
to the financial system. Nowadays, IDs and
"A consumer-friendly CBDC with low bank accounts are most often necessary
to transfer money. However, many citizens
entry barriers could ease the access in developing countries do not have an ID
to digital transaction services for nor a bank account. On the precondition
of eased KYC requirements such a CBDC
citizens, who are currently excluded could be a gamechanger and allow citizens
from the financial system." even to some extent without ID and bank
account to conduct payments.
Even though a CBDC introduction can have various benefits for the domestic payment system, there
are drawbacks. These have to be addressed when considering the issuance of a CBDC. First, the
introduction of a CBDC can lead to excessive disintermediation of the financial sector if citizens see
CBDC as a close substitute for commercial bank money and transfer large amounts of their bank
deposits to the central bank as soon as CBDCs are available. In this case, banks could lose sizable
market shares. This could threaten the business of commercial banks, trigger liquidity shortages and
in the worst case another banking crisis. Besides, monetary transmission mechanisms are poorly
understood and need to be investigated further.
Secondly, data protection has to be ensured. Currently, wide-spread payment methods such as credit
cards, mobile payments or cash payments have different degrees of data privacy. While in case of
credit card payments, the credit card provider and potentially the partnering bank have insights into
transaction data, cash is the only fully anonymous payment method. Issuing a CBDC without account-
ing for data privacy concerns would go against digital rights and not be desirable.
17 The European approach to promoting the international significance of the euro digitally is moving, as was recently underlined by
EU Council President Ursula von der Leyen. (The Economist. 2020. America’s Aggressive Use Of Sanctions Endangers The Dollar’s Reign.
Available at: https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/01/18/americas-aggressive-use-of-sanctions-endangers-the-dollars-reign
[Accessed 8 May 2020].)
16
In the larger picture, the question which payment ecosystems will be of global importance in the future
is not only important for banking, but also for geopolitical spheres of influence. Not only economic
interests, sanction regimes, but also values can be anchored in the procedures of monetary and pay-
ment ecosystems. For example, how is personal data handled, how are mechanisms against money
laundering and terrorist financing implemented, how high or low are the barriers to participation, how
is technical and political interoperability anchored, how is the degree of centralisation or distribution of
transaction processing (i.e. is it more likely to be a central database or more likely to be a syndicate
blockchain between states with consensus protocols anchored in international law).
It appears likely that the need for international cooperation on CBDCs and the underlying payment
infrastructures will continue to increase, and that foreign policy, security policy and economic policy
objectives will be prominently reflected in this. Different stakeholders are likely to seek to enhance
their geopolitical relevance in the longer term and take an active and also accelerated role in shaping
the future of global monetary and payment ecosystems.
• Report: Central Bank Digital Currency Policy‑Maker Toolkit by the World Economic Forum18
• Research: Overview over current CBDC projects19
18 World Economic Forum, 2020. Central Bank Digital Currency Policy‑Maker Toolkit. World Economic Forum. Available at:
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_CBDC_Policymaker_Toolkit.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
19 Mehrländer, A., 2020. Overview Over Current CBDC Projects. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3817648 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
17
Blockchain-based workflow tools can allow for efficient project implementation by offering function-
alities to track expenditures in a collaborative and transparent way. They can help to coordinate the
implementation of donor-funded investment projects by providing a shared and up-to date view on
project-related expenditures and by allowing multiple parties to lock transactions in real time.
Example project TruBudget: Germany’s KfW Development Bank has developed the Trusted Budget
Expenditure software (TruBudget, https://trubudget.net). It serves as a platform for all stakeholders
involved in a development project or programme (e.g. ministries, agencies, donors, auditors). Each
stakeholder receives specific rights based on their role in the project. The software mirrors specific
workflow processes of project planning and implementation and allows for real-time information to be
shared among the users. It would be designed in a way that it can interface (using APIs) with existing
IT-systems of the involved country’s institutions. This means that crucial approval steps, such as a
non-objection to a procurement process or a contract, or the release of payments, can be granted im-
mediately without any delay. All activities are documented in the system and are traceable at all stages.
The software is based on a private blockchain, which provides a tamper-proof database, thus adding
the trust required by donors to integrate with country systems. TruBudget is a modular open-source
software with APIs that is available to anyone free of charge.
Public spending applications of this kind can benefit partner countries and donors in several ways:
This, in turn, has the potential of increasing the structural impact of development cooperation by
strengthening domestic governance structures and public financial management systems.
The operational model of this use case would see the software to be fully owned, utilised and adapted
by the countries that receive funds. It can serve as a platform for donor-funded initiatives, which would
assist donor harmonisation. Finally, countries would also be free to adapt and use the software for the
implementation of domestic programmes and projects, again benefiting from the increased efficiency
and transparency as the core feature of blockchain-based public expenditure tools.
By 2023, the energy sector is foreseen to account for the second largest share of the forecasted
global revenues of 23 billion US dollars for blockchain technology – just after the financial industry.20
The ongoing trend of renewable energy goes hand in hand with an increase in decentralised ener-
gy generation and distribution. This specifically poses a major opportunity for the African continent,
where the need for electrification may be covered in a decentralised manner – without the rigorous
structures of centralised energy markets that exist in many developed countries.
To provide decentralised energy solutions, off-grid solutions for electrification such as microgrids have
been identified as essential. Microgrids are small-scale electricity distribution systems which can be
connected to the main electricity grid or operate independently in "island mode" (off-grid). They are
often used for the distribution of electricity from renewable energy sources. In contrast to conventional
energy trading, which is usually unidirectional, peer-to-peer energy trading within a microgrid environ-
ment allows for direct trading interaction between local energy prosumers and consumers.
In this context, blockchain technology holds the potential to facilitate trading interaction as it functions
as a shared information and transaction platform for all market participants. Electricity generation and
real-time demand are recorded on a blockchain by automatically documenting executed transactions
between the participants using internet-enabled smart meters. The technology’s ability to make even
small data transactions economically viable ultimately entails new degrees of participation and incen-
tives.
Major challenges include hardware requirements and regulation. This specifically relates to the
requirement of smart meter penetration. As in many countries, energy systems are often heavily regu-
lated by the state or controlled by a state-owned-corporation, a matching legal framework is crucial for
the implementation of energy trading in peer-to-peer microgrids. Even the upgrading of predominant
hardware may require regulatory intervention.
20 Peter, V., Paredes, J., Rosado Rivial, M., Soto Sepúlveda, E. and Hermosilla Astorga, D., 2019. Blockchain Meets Energy - Digital
Solutions For A Decentralized And Decarbonized Sector. German-Mexican Energy Partnership (EP) and Florence School of Regulation
(FSR). Available at: https://fsr.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/Blockchain_meets_Energy_-_ENG.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
19
21 Donahue, E., 2019. Microgrids: Applications, Solutions, Case Studies, and Demonstrations. In: M. Ghofrani, ed., Micro-grids:
Applications, Operation, Control and Protection. University of Washington Bothell. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.83560
[Accessed 8 May 2020].
22 Tracking SDG 7 : The Energy Progress Report 2019, 2019. International Energy Agency; International Renewable Energy Agency;
United Nations Statistics Division; World Bank; World Health Organization, Washington, DC.
23 Brooklyn Microgrid, n.d. Brooklyn Microgrid | Community Powered Energy. Available at: https://www.brooklyn.energy/
[Accessed 8 May 2020].
24 See Reuters, 2020. Wisekey And Microsoft Collaborate To Support Rwandan Government Make Secure Transactions. Reuters. Avail-
able at: https://www.reuters.com/article/brief-wisekey-and-microsoft-collaborate/brief-wisekey-and-microsoft-collaborate-to-support-rwan-
dan-government-make-secure-transactions-idUSFWN1ML111 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
20
are doubts as to the validity of a land ownership claim, anybody can consult the public ledger for
validation. A smartphone app or web platform could be used as a user interface to that end.
This decentralised land registry adds value through its immutability and resilience. The fraud and cor-
ruption scenarios that rely on the forging or "disappearing" of documents, or attempts to sell land more
than once, are effectively discouraged by a timestamped hash on a public ledger. Once land titles
are appropriately digitised and secured using blockchain, this would especially benefit marginalised
groups in society, such as women or indigenous populations, who are often the victims of land fraud.
For this, however, a quality assured and safeguarded approach throughout the implementation phase
is required.
So far, Georgia has successfully implemented the use of blockchain technology for timestamping
digital land titles. Their National Agency of Public Registry has further decided to extend their exist-
ing project, enabling mobile phone-based land transactions in the long run, which could speed up
such processes to a matter of minutes. However, globally, there remains a long way to go as other
implementations remain in the pipeline, for example, in Sweden and Ghana. Especially countries with
competing systems or conflicted histories in the realm of land management, or countries without the
needed high-quality datasets and preceding digitalisation efforts, may find it difficult to move onto
implementation of a blockchain-based land registry.
25 Makala, B. and Anand, A., 2018. Blockchain and Land Administration. In: UNOPS, ed., The Legal Aspects of Blockchain. The World
Bank. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/b/wbk/wbpubs/31419.html [Accessed 8 May 2020].
26 Eder, G., 2019. Digital Transformation: Blockchain and Land Titles. In: OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum. Available at:
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/integrity-forum/academic-papers/Georg%20Eder-%20Blockchain%20-%20Ghana_verified.pdf [Accessed 8
May 2020].
27 v. Weizsäcker, F., Eggler, S. and Atarim, E., 2019. Land Registries On A Distributed Ledger. GIZ Blockchain Lab. Available at:
https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2019-en-distributed-land-registry.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
21
corruption. Ideally, learners, educational institutions and third parties will benefit equally from forg-
ery-proof certificates and reduced costs from efficiency gains.
1. Education providers such as universities or schools issue certificates as digital originals and
store so-called hashes of these files - which can also be called digital fingerprints - on a block-
chain.
2. Students receive their certificates in digital form and can pass them on to third parties or upload
them to professional online social networking platforms (such as LinkedIn) that are exploring auto-
matic verification of digital certificates.
3. Third parties such as employers or administrations can then validate the submitted certificates
electronically by comparing the document’s fingerprints with those stored on the blockchain. They
do not have to go through the cumbersome process of contacting the issuing institutions anymore.
Crucially, the technical infrastructure should be governed by a reputable consortium of institutions that
is deemed trustworthy, similarly to how trust and power is (explicitly or implicitly) present in today’s
educational systems. A key role of this consortium would be to authorise schools and other education-
al institutions to issue digital certificates with their credentials.
A few educational institutions around the world have already implemented blockchain-based educa-
tion credentials today. Standing out because of their open source approach are the software projects
OpenCerts from Singapore, and recently AUTHER (http://auther.org), which is based on Blockcerts
and widely-used standard OpenBadges. AUTHER has been developed by GIZ together with the
Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization SEAMEO INNOTECH and the Technische Univer-
sität Berlin, piloting how such an open system can work in practice.
28 v. Weizsäcker, F., Meier-Hahn, U. and Wannemacher, L., 2020. Blockchain-based education credentials. GIZ Blockchain Lab.
29 Netzwerk Digitale Nachweise, 2020. Digitalisation of certificates with the support of blockchain technology. Available at:
http://netzwerkdigitalenachweise.de/static/doc//Whitepaper_digitales_Zeugnis_en.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
30 Digital Credentials Consortium, 2020. Building the digital credential infrastructure for the future. Digital Credentials Consortium.
Available at: https://digitalcredentials.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/white-paper-building-digital-credential-infrastructure-future.pdf
[Accessed 8 May 2020].
31 W3C, n.d. Verifiable Credentials For Education Task Force.Verifiable Credentials for Education Task Force. Available at:
https://github.com/w3c-ccg/vc-ed [Accessed 8 May 2020].
22
Supply chains are intrinsically complex flows of goods, money and services. Their traceability refers
to the collection, documentation, and application of information related to all processes in the supply
chain in a manner that provides guarantee to the end-customer and other stakeholders along the sup-
ply chain on the provenance, location and life history of a product. It represents the ability to conduct a
full backward tracking to determine characteristics of the goods by means of records.
Often, the opaqueness of supply chains hinders customers from understanding the provenance of a
product, as well as its social and environmental impact for smallholder farmers and other participants
of the supply chain. While increasing numbers of customers seek out organically produced goods,
industry fails to provide such goods at a satisfactory standard. Currently, the only way for customers to
be promised higher standards is through certification schemes. These schemes tend to be too costly
for single smallholder farmers and even corporates may shy away from the investment. Hence, farm-
ers and workers may carry on receiving low prices for goods that could be distinguished as sustain-
ably sourced.
However, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Each supply chain has to be checked for its potential
to leverage distributed ledger technology. The capacity to run blockchain-powered supply chains will
largely rely on the willingness of all stakeholders involved and the ability to tokenise a traded good.
The more unique and identifiable the good is, the more its digital twin will faithfully reflect its attributes.
Unprocessed coconuts or pineapples for example are easier use cases for traceability as they can be
easily marked and traced - off-chain and on a blockchain.
Furthermore, a data model that everyone can access is crucial in this context to fully leverage the val-
ue chain cooperation. When opting for a distributed model, the governance itself needs to be equally
distributed and consensus on key aspects, including the technological setup and the data model ap-
plied, needs to be reached. Especially data quality and credibility have to be ensured. Individual data
of single actors that is not crucial for other actors along the chain should not be accessible. A good
balance between data transparency and privacy is required. Achieving good data quality is not part
of the blockchain technology solution. There are different ways to achieve this goal, one is internet of
things technology, where sensors monitor and record certain situations and environments. A second
32 NEPAD, 2013. Agriculture In Africa - Transformation And Outlook. NEPAD. Available at: https://www.nepad.org/file-download/download/
public/15582 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
23
approach is to diminish human error by educating and capacitating those handling the data, e.g.
through training courses, guidelines, handbooks or auditing structures.
To reduce these costs and inefficiencies, the application of blockchain is envisioned as a promising
use case. It would enable the exchange of information on international freight transports in real time.
Customs authorities could process customs declarations more quickly thanks to the information being
made available in advance. By using a blockchain-powered platform, all participants of the shipping
process are brought together and can view or edit their relevant shipping files based on individual per-
missions. The added trust of using blockchain in this scenario, improves collaboration and automation.
It also records all movements of the shipped goods simultaneously to the editions of documents and
documentation. Goods shipments can be processed immediately pre-arrival or pre-departure and then
released thanks to the availability of accurate and trusted documentation.
As an example: The German Alliance for Trade Facilitation is preparing a project together with Maersk
and UNCTAD to prove the possible reduction in time and cost of international maritime trade. Together
with customs authorities in the prospective pilot countries, Sri Lanka and Cambodia, the partners will
work on the data integration solution, ASYHUB, for the smooth exchange of data between UNCTAD’s
automated system for customs data (ASYCUDA) and blockchain-based applications, such as the
TradeLens data platform. Based on the experiences of the pilot countries, the approach is going to be
scaled up in five more countries within the project and eventually all ASYCUDA using countries. This
provides several opportunities for African countries with sea ports, for example, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire,
and many others.
The global TradeLens platform already accounts for 20% of global freight ocean traffic, while ASYCU-
DA is used in over 60 countries. This evidences the potential for global scaling.
33 Tholen, D., de Vries, A., Daluz, A., Antonovici, C., van Brug, W., Abelson, R., Lovell, D., 2020. Is There A Role For Blockchain In Re-
sponsible Supply Chains?. OECD. Available at: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Is-there-a-role-for-blockchain-in-responsible-supply-chains.
pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
34 Wannemacher, L. and Mehrländer, A., 2020. Agricultural supply chain traceability. GIZ Blockchain Lab. Available at: https://www.giz.de/
en/downloads/giz2020-en-agricultural-supply-chain-traceability.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
35 UNECE, 2019. Blockchain For Trade Facilitation. Available at: https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/cimem7p16_Lance%20
Thompson_en.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
36 McDaniel, C. and C. Norberg, H., 2019. Can Blockchain Technology Facilitate International Trade?. Mercatus Research. Mercatus Center
at George Mason University. Available at: https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mcdaniel-blockchain-trade-mercatus-research-v2.pdf
[Accessed 8 May 2020].
24
3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The versatility of blockchain technology across the range of use cases outlined in the previous chapter
comes with its own caveats. For each use case, it is not only a question of how to design a techno-
logical system, but also one of how to embed the technology in the legal and political environment.
Blockchain-based systems are neither generally compatible nor generally incompatible with these
dimensions of data protection. Therefore, this chapter foregrounds how different positions on each of
these matters may inform both technology design and policy action.
25
Focus Box:
Status quo of pan-African data protection initiatives and harmonisation efforts
The current considerations of blockchain technology fit into overarching efforts to harmonise data
protection across the African continent. Such a harmonisation of data protection regimes rather needs
to be understood as a negotiated compromise instead of shared values. An example for this is the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Despite it serving as a possible inspiration in terms of legal
methodology, the Regulation does not suffice as a direct import to establish Africa’s data protection
framework for that would anticipate the yet to find African compromise.
Today, several initiatives for the harmonisation of data protection laws coexist. Over the last fifteen
years, some regional frameworks have been developed, such as the 2008 East African Community
Framework for Cyberlaws, the 2010 Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection of the Economic
Community of West African States, or the 2013 Southern African Development Community model law
harmonising policies for the ICT Market in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2014, the first pan-African frame-
work was adopted with the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection
(Malabo Convention). The Malabo Convention’s pace of ratification and adoption is still slow.
Almost 6 years after the Convention was signed, out of the 54 African countries, only 29 indeed do
have data protection legislation (see figure on state of data protection regulation in Africa). While an
increasing number of governments are planning to adopt such a framework, this situation creates un-
certainty for many businesses that plan to develop digital products and services in Africa, in particular
when these services require cross-border data transfers (see figure on the state of cross-border data
flows regulation in Africa).
The harmonisation of the legal frameworks for the collection and processing of data in Africa still fac-
es various obstacles:
• significant cultural and legal diversity across the continent, with different expectations regarding
the good that shall be protected, such as privacy, fairness, dignity or fundamental rights and free-
doms at large.
• variations in access to technology and online services among African states
• different levels of capability in the fields of technology and technology-related law and
governance 37
As part of the current efforts towards a harmonised framework, Smart Africa has launched a work-
ing group to support member states that want to develop data protection and policy strategies. The
current situation poses an opportunity to form a digital single market in Africa. The working group will
therefore also propose monitoring and support mechanisms for the harmonisation and adoption of
data protection frameworks.
The international harmonisation of laws can, however, only be considered a first step. One of the ma-
jor issues governments are facing today is the mismatch between existing regulatory frameworks and
their enforcement. Enforcement depends on the existence of an independent administrative authority
with a clear mandate and sufficient resources. In addition, enforcement and compliance depend on
the level of awareness on privacy rules in both the public and private sectors and among citizens.
The enforcement of data protection frameworks will require important efforts on capacity building and
educational programmes for data protection authorities. This applies in particular to the context of
emerging technologies like blockchain which require a high level of expertise for regulators. A pan-Af-
rican approach should be adopted here as well, in order to mutualise expertise and scarce resourc-
es, and to ensure harmonisation not only of national legal frameworks but of the specific implementa-
tion strategies countries adopt. The role of pan-African organisations, like the African Data Protection
Network (Réseau Africain sur la Protection des Données, RAPDP) will be crucial to this end.
37 Internet Society and African Union, 2018. Personal Data Protection Guidelines For Africa - A Joint Initiative Of The Internet Society And
The Commission Of The African Union. Internet Society and African Union. Available at: https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/05/AUCPrivacyGuidelines_2018508_EN.pdf [Accessed 8 May a].
26
State
DPA of
LAW data protection regulation in Africa State of cross-border data flows regulation in Africa
cross-border data flows
Three basic approaches [see Figure 4] to regulating modern information processing can be distin-
guished that foster its positive and mitigate its negative implications:
• The rights-based approach: It is followed by many francophone countries and conveys rights to
data subjects. These rights must then be safeguarded by data controllers and processors. Supervi-
sory authorities come in to bear part of the burden of the individual.
• The duty-based approach: It is more common in anglophone countries and stipulates objective re-
quirements and duties for data controllers and processors. The role of supervisory authorities in this
approach is to complement the controllers’ and processors’ self-monitoring by external supervision.
• Mixed approach: Mutual reinforcement of individuals (who prompt enforcement of their rights) and
processors who have to guarantee certain safeguards.
While these three approaches apply different means, they can all achieve the same regulatory out-
come by setting similar standards to which information collection, processing and use has to adhere.
Imagine a scenario in which the operator of an e-commerce shop (the data controller) should provide
information about the processing of personal data to the customer (the data subject): a rights-based
approach would grant a right to request this information to the customer; a duty-based approach
would require the shop operator to proactively inform its customers; and a mixed approach would
include two separate provisions, one granting the right to request information to the customer and
one imposing the duty to inform the customer onto the shop operator. Enforcement mechanisms to a)
uphold the rights of the customer in the rights-based approach and/or to b) monitor the controller’s
compliance with his duties in the duty-based approach either follow existing legal procedures, such
as sending a warning letter, filing a lawsuit or initiating supervisory procedures, or must be newly
created.
The pan-African harmonisation therefore essentially requires a negotiation of the desired regulatory
outcomes. Such a directive - formally comparable to the EU’s legal framework - would provide for a
consented regulatory goal as well as general guidelines. It would further permit national characteris-
tics in the directive’s implementation in the Member States. In their own laws, Member States could
include a provision that considers the laws of those other Member States equivalent who implement
the same directive. This results in a mutual recognition of adequate levels of protection. The directive
in combination with each member state’s laws are thus a multilateral form of well-known bilateral ar-
rangements of mutual recognition, such as the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield or double taxation agreements.
With a view to blockchain technology, both regulatory means and objectives may create tension be-
tween the technology’s design and data protection regulation, in areas such as:
In order to avoid possible tensions between blockchain technology and data protection regulation,
several elements, described below, shall be included in design provisions for all data protection laws
for blockchain technology to strive.
38 There is no consensus either on the concept of "privacy", see Mulligan, D. K.; Koopman, C. & Doty, N. (2016), Privacy is an essentially
contested concept: a multi-dimensional analytic for mapping privacy. In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Math-
ematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, p. 374.
29
Every legal system has developed its own differentiated way of treating particular issues, events,
practices and activities as secret, confidential, open or transparent. These differentiations reflect so-
cial and national history, past and present experiences as well as cultural and political values. In many
cases, neither secrecy, confidentiality, openness nor transparency are meant to be an end in itself,
but a means for achieving other ends.39 The following design choices have to be made in blockchain
systems.
• General transparency rules out selective disclosure. Only if particular information is generally
kept confidential, it can be made available to particular persons, groups or organisations on a case-
by-case basis, e.g. after examining their legitimate interest or for specific purposes only.40 Confiden-
tiality thus serves the end of making information selectively available. The use of a public blockchain
would impede the regulator’s ability to selectively disclose information, as it would be generally
transparent.
• Blockchain systems present new ways to access information and require new digital literacy.
Distributed ledger technologies may create obstacles for those lacking particular technical means
or skills, especially if applied to public information, this may widen the digital divide. Conversely,
presenting information through the form of blockchain may also allow for completely new levels
of access, e.g. through applying computational methods of analysis that were not possible on the
datasets before.
As exemplified above, the application of DLT may challenge traditional structures and values regard-
ing different forms of secrecy and transparency. It may, in fact, negate the very purposes they are
intended to serve if introduced without considering the consequences. Putting information directly on a
public blockchain, e.g. financial transactions as in the case of the Bitcoin blockchain, would make hith-
erto confidential data open to everyone. Putting previously public information on a private blockchain
would make them inaccessible for the general public. The sudden transparency of formerly secret or
confidential data may introduce unintended consequences, such as exposing individuals’ financial,
health, educational or application data to blackmailing, extortion or scams, or exposing journalists to
parties whom they are investigating if their freedom of information requests are made public. In addi-
tion, it may undermine the purpose formerly served by secrecy or confidentiality.
Like every other form of digitalisation, the application of blockchains may create new kinds of meta-
data, with public blockchains also making these widely available. This could lead to unintentionally
exposing individuals within organisations, who are merely tasked with appending information to the
ledger. This new deluge of metadata will allow for new forms of data analysis and possibly surveil-
lance.
To prevent unintended consequences, decisions on treating particular issues, events, practices, activ-
ities as secret, confidential, open or transparent should rest with the political decision-maker. Block-
chain-based systems should then be designed, implemented and used according to these decisions,
and not the other way around.
39 For example, both the traditional openness of individual and corporate tax returns in Northern European countries and the equally tradi-
tional confidentiality of tax returns in Central European countries serve the same purpose: maximising the state’s tax revenue. In the former
case, the tax returns’ openness allows for members of a community to monitor the tax honesty of their fellow community members, while
in the latter case, the state promises to keep tax returns confidential if and only if they are submitted exhaustively and honestly covering all
tax-related issues. Thus, tax return openness and confidentiality are means for the same purpose, with each state’s choice of the former or
the latter being historically contingent, originating from a particular value system at the time of its introduction, and forming and reinforcing
the value systems of today.
40 For example, in Germany residential registration data is generally confidential, but upon request, political parties are given access to this
data to distribute election campaign information.
30
Societies have developed different cultural, legal and institutional answers on how to cope with re-
membering and forgetting beyond the sphere of the individual and community memory. For example,
forgetting is deeply enshrined in American culture as a society originating primarily from immigrants
leaving their former home countries to start a new life in the New World, a culture that was reinforced
over centuries with people moving westwards, leaving behind their old lives and starting anew some-
where in the West. While historically very different, Germany, for example, introduced a legislation
to erase past criminal records with an eradication period of 5, 10, 15 or 20 years depending on the
amount of the penalty as long as no new criminal offenses have been committed. This can be regard-
ed as a form of "institutional forgetting". A similar approach has been taken by many truth commis-
sions in the historical reappraisal of states’ and collectives’ dictatorships, crimes or civil wars. These
societies’ particular histories have strongly shaped their individual - and often highly political - ap-
proaches to remembering and forgetting, which have then been implemented in data protection laws,
e.g. the "right to be forgotten" enshrined in Article 17 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation.
All data protection laws require data to be correct and kept up to date. This requirement poses severe
challenges for the application of distributed ledger technologies, such as blockchains. With distribut-
ed ledgers, it is essentially impossible to correct false or update outdated information stored on the
blockchain. Instead, blockchain technology only allows for adding new information to the (end of the)
blockchain. Thus, every blockchain will show its entire history of entries, including those that were
found incorrect, invalid, misleading or outdated. Anyone, including the data subjects, are only able to
flag or revoke, but not to permanently remove such entries.
Data protection laws usually confer rights to the individual whose data is being processed, the data
subject. These rights can be of different character: they may be ends in themselves, they may be
means serving other ends, or both.
• Data subjects’ rights as ends in themselves - typical for rights-based regulatory regimes:
Data subject’s rights are then concretisations of the more general rights that the law aims to protect,
e.g. privacy or fundamental rights and freedoms. They are meant to guide the design, implementa-
tion and practices of information processing.
The EU General Data Protection Regulation is an example of combining both. The rights conferred
are ends in themselves, which directly bind controllers and processors. They aim to guide the imple-
mentation of appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to protect these rights ("data
Individual Choice v2 protection by design", Article
State of data subject rights in data regulations in Africa 25). They are, however, also
means to facilitate the detec-
28 countries grant 27 countries grant 20 countries grant tion of data protection breach-
the right to access the right to access the right to access, es and the enforcement of the
personal data and rectify personal rectify and erase Regulation by distributing the
data personal data
power to question and control
97% of countries 93% of countries 69% of countries the controllers’ data process-
with data protection with data protection with data protections ing practices.
laws laws laws
Algeria ● ●● In the EU regulation, subjects’
Angola ● ●● ●●● rights may include the right
Benin ● ●● ●●●
of information about the data
Botswana ● ●●
that is held about them, the
Burkina Faso ● ●●
right to access these data, the
Cabo Verde ● ●● ●●●
● ●● ●●●
right to rectification, the right
Chad
● ●● ●●● to erasure - sometimes called
Côte d'Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea ● ●● ●●● the "right to be forgotten" -, the
Gabon ● ●● ●●● right to restriction of process-
Ghana ● ●● ing, the right to object, whether
Guinea ● ●● ●●● in general or to the sale of
Kenya ● ●● ●●● personal data, and the right to
Lesotho ● ●● ●●● data portability.
Madagascar ● ●●
Mali ● ●● ●●● These rights generally pose
Mauritania ● ●● ●●●
similar challenges regarding
Mauritius ● ●●
the use of blockchain technol-
Morocco ● ●●
ogy to the respective duties:
Niger ● ●● ●●●
● ●● ●●●
the right to rectification consti-
Nigeria
São Tomé and Príncipe ● tutes similar challenges to the
Senegal ● ●● ●●● duty to keep data correct and
Seychelles ● ●● ●●● up-to-date, the right to erasure
South Africa ● ●● ●●● to the duty to delete personal
Togo ● ●● ●●● data not necessary anymore
Tunisia ● ●● ●●● for the purposes for which it
Uganda ● ●● ●●● was collected, etc.
Figure 7: State of data subject rights in data regulations in Africa
32
Other data subjects’ rights in the EU regulation, such as the right of information, the right to access,
the right to restriction of processing or the right to data portability, pose no particular challenges to
blockchain technology if it is designed, implemented and used in an appropriate manner to safeguard
these rights.
It is thus highly recommended to establish "data protection by design" provisions in all data protection
laws that require companies and other public and private organisations to implement technical and
organisational measures at the earliest stages of the design of the processing operations, in such a
way that safeguards data protection principles and data subjects’ rights right from the start (see figure
on state of data subject rights in data protection regulations in Africa).
DPA enforcement v2
The application of rules is context-specific and best identified in coordination with the financial regula-
tory authority of the concerned jurisdiction.
Traditional crypto-assets, i.e. the type of permissionless (public) tokens (e.g. Bitcoin), typically claim
to not be governed by any particular party. Therefore, their issuance is difficult to regulate. During the
hype of initial coin offerings, many tokens which fall under the securities regulations of various jurisdic-
tions have been issued and publicly sold. All of those tokens have attracted the attention of financial
policymakers and regulators internationally due to implications on the integrity and stability of the
financial system.41 Regulators are especially concerned about issues around consumer and investor
protection (due to little or inadequate disclosure of risks involved in the acquisition of tokens) and the
use of crypto-assets to cover up illicit activities, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, bribery,
corruption or fraud. Such illicit financial flows are increasing, and DLT have become known as means
of facilitating them. At the same time, the Financial Stability Board42 emphasises that the technologies’
underlying crypto-assets "have the potential to improve the efficiency and inclusiveness of both the
financial system and the economy".
With the increasing use of crypto-assets globally, global standards and national regulations for finan-
cial integrity have become a key issue.43 In October 2018 and June 2019 the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) moved on to update its standards (mainly the Recommendation 15) in order to clarify
the application of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CFT) requirements
on what it calls "virtual assets" and "virtual asset service providers," i.e. crypto-asset exchanges and
wallet providers, in view of addressing the threat posed by illicit financial flows through crypto-assets
41 See Financial Stability Board, 2018. To G20 Finance Ministers And Central Bank Governors. Financial Stability Board. Available at:
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P180318.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020] and Financial Stability Board, 2018. Crypto-Assets: Report
To The G20 On Work By The FSB And Standard-Setting Bodies. Financial Stability Board. Available at: https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/up-
loads/P160718-1.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
42 The FSB is an international body that coordinates the work of national financial regulatory authorities.
43 The FSB thus calls for further international coordination and more engagement by standard-setting bodies such as the (Committee on
Payments and Market Infrastructures) CPMI, International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS).
34
to the integrity of financial systems. The updates include obligations for risk mitigation as well as for
licensing and registration of such providers.44, 45
The FATF Recommendations are meaningful both to its member states and to non-members.
Non-member states that do not follow the FATF standards have to expect sanctions, which make it
more complicated to conduct international payments. Additionally, the existence of global standards
for crypto-assets will increase the pressure on non-member states to position themselves vis-à-vis
such new, interconnected global payment infrastructures. An effect of the FATF Recommendations is
that they practically introduce a demarcation between two regimes: the compliant blockchain world
and the non-compliant blockchain world. Outcomes of such an approach can be seen in Switzerland
where compliant service providers are prohibited from doing business with non-compliant systems.
A seamless transition is apparently not desired and is becoming increasingly difficult. This may be a
relevant message for African countries that already struggle with cross-border financial transactions:
virtual asset service providers are supposed to require a license or at least be registered publicly.
Additionally, the so called travel rule is extended to the transfer of virtual assets, which means that
virtual asset service providers need to obtain, hold and submit to the beneficiary virtual asset service
provider information on the originating as well as beneficiary wallet account that are parties to a given
transfer. Moreover, they must implement measures to monitor, freeze and prohibit transactions.
These requirements assume a central service provider and the industry initiated certain working
groups to deliver technical solutions satisfying the FATF recommendations. However, it remains to
be seen how FATF deals with truly decentralised tools. For the African continent, the so-called FATF
regional communities help with implementation and channel feedback to the main organisation.
The NGO Alliance for Financial Inclusion (https://www.afi-global.org/) additionally supports central
banks and regulators in developing and emerging economies in their dialogue with FATF.
In addition to the public money laundering and terrorism financing monitoring needs, protecting
investors by providing for a proper disclosure regime (especially prospectus requirements for public
securities offerings) and protecting customers of finacial servicing offerings (like payment services,
investment advice, custody of finanical assets) are core topics for financial regulatory regimes.
44 FATF, 2019. Public Statement On Virtual Assets And Related Providers. FATF. Available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/
fatfrecommendations/documents/public-statement-virtual-assets.html [Accessed 8 May 2020].)
45 For a legal interpretation see: DWF, 2019. DWF Spotlight: FATF Recommends Regulating And Monitoring Virtual Asset Service Providers.
DWF. Available at: https://www.dwf.law/Legal-Insights/2019/August/Regulation-of-virtual-asset-service-providers [Accessed 8 May 2020].
35
Easing KYC has been identified as a lever to increase financial inclusion, foster innovation and drive
competition in financial services long before blockchain. Now, the idea is gaining track to use block-
chain technology in favour of KYC. Blockchain technology could offer the infrastructure to power a
trustworthy KYC layer for financial services (sometimes referred to as collaborative CDD). As a dis-
tributed, digital repository, this KYC layer would facilitate the sharing of authoritative KYC information.
It could provide a single source of primary data required to conduct CDD checks on counterparties.
Information would be independently verified prior to publishing on the repository. In addition to the
host of such a blockchain-powered CDD platform, regulators could participate by verifying logged
information. This way, information could be collated for KYC checks in line with globally recommend-
ed standards (such as FATF). Financial institutions, SME and corporate entities would upload their
information on the repository using standardized KYC/AML templates.
Market participants would benefit from "one stop access" to KYC/CDD information. This would ease
onboarding of customers, increase efficiencies and reduce regulatory risk. African economies could
benefit from consistent CDD information for various entities on the continent.
46 See Appendix A.
36
At the same time, many governments see the need to close regulatory gaps (taxation, data protection)
and create safeguards against the abuse of blockchain technology, e.g. to prevent corruption and
crime and to protect consumers. One of the focus areas are initial coin offerings. Germany is con-
sidering to condition the publication of such crypto-tokens on the disclosure of baseline information
that has been reviewed by the financial authority. Other governments focus on avoiding tax evasion
through cryptocurrencies. The idea is to create taxation regimes for transactions that involve business
activities in cryptocurrencies (Australia, Cyprus). This could imply treating token transactions the same
as transactions with fiat currency per the Income Tax Law and consider block rewards to blockchain
miners as ordinary income (Cyprus). Another set of measures concerns AML law. The FATF, which is
a de facto standardisation body in this field, has adopted an interpretive note to its recommendations
on distributed ledger services in June 2019. Some of the more recent blockchain strategies pledge
to comply with the FATF and focus on regulating so-called virtual asset service providers, who act as
intermediaries in blockchain ecosystems [see chapter Financial regulation].
47 Currently, every provider of financial services is tasked with securing identification of new customers independently.
37
1. timing of involvement,
2. degree of involvement,
3. role in development of (technical) standards.
Ex-post and ex-ante approaches to blockchain governance present different mindsets in the field of
technology governance. They either make openness the starting point of digital policy or they start
with caution and control. In many strategies, we can observe elements of both.
The ex-post approach stands for openness. It allows for permissionless innovation, meaning that all
innovation with blockchain technology - both on the protocol and on the application layer - is possi-
ble unless declared otherwise. This fosters an innovation ecosystem that is open for unknowns. An
expression of this is Uganda’s Kampala Declaration, which pledges "non-regulation of the blockchain"
until further research has been conducted.
In softer variations of this approach, governments create baseline protections and frameworks that
guide innovation, e.g. by providing regulatory certainty. An example of a softened ex-post approach
is the EU’s or Australia’s encouragement of innovation in the field of digital ID, as long as applications
38
An innovation-friendly path in-between ex-post and ex-ante regulation lies in so-called regulatory
sandboxing (Kenya, Mauritius, Germany). "Regulatory sandboxing" is a fairly new supervisory con-
cept allowing companies to pilot blockchain-based systems under priviledged regulatory conditions
within limited time and scope. This way, the private sector can pilot systems, while governments with
oversight can mitigate risks and learn along the way. Despite the popularity of the term however, there
is little information yet on how sandboxing actually works with regard to blockchain.
Degree of involvement
Different degrees of governmental involvement with blockchain development can be identified in the
strategies. They present different ways and intensities of interacting with and stimulating the ecosys-
tem.
1. Governments support private sector innovation in industries and for use cases that are deemed
to be of national relevance. This type of involvement resembles classical approaches of regional and
sectoral economic support programmes.
2. Governments act as first movers. Here, governments drive the adoption of blockchain technology
by implementing it in public administration for the purpose of good governance. The aim is to directly
improve public service delivery, e.g. by making document processing more efficient or increase trans-
parency and accountability through secure, tamper-proof and transparent handling of data. Application
areas include managing licenses, permits and registries as well as import and export documents or
pension data. By being first movers, governments act not only as regulators, but also as customers
and/or users of blockchain technology. They gather hands-on experience and - by investing in soft-
ware infrastructures - possibly create spillover effects on the private sector to promote innovation and
economic growth.
As blockchain technology is maturing, most strategies articulate that it should be a common goal to
strive for widely accepted, interoperable technical standards because such standards can unlock net-
work effects that will help the blockchain ecosystem to flourish. Harmonised (technical) standards are,
among other things, the basis for inclusiveness and connectivity between blockchains, which could in
turn enable interconnected markets as well as interconnected public blockchain infrastructures.
Similar to the field of internet governance, governments have different visions as to which stakeholder
groups should be involved or lead the process of defining such global standards. Positions range from
• leaving standard development in the hands of the private sector and technical communities while
confining their focus on legislative outcomes and generally embracing a language of technological
neutrality to,
• leading standard development by working with international organisations such as the International
Organization for Standardization,48 emphasising public competencies and authority, to
• fostering multi-stakeholder approaches that facilitate collaboration across-industries, between public
and private sectors as well as with civil society.
While every government will have its own reasoning with regard to standard development, it seems
worth mentioning that in emergent and connected, but for the most part unregulated industries, techni-
cal standards need the buy in of as many stakeholder groups as possible to become de facto norms.
48 Australia is highlighting its leading role in promoting blockchain standardisation through the ISO where a new ISO technical committee
(# 307) has been established for blockchain standards topics, including interoperability, terminology, privacy, security and auditing. Result
of the group’s work can be found in the catalogue (ISO, 2020. Standards By ISO/TC 307 - Blockchain And Distributed Ledger Technologies.
ISO. Available at: https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604/x/catalogue/ [Accessed 8 May 2020]).
40
Ethiopia
The Ethiopian Government partnered49 with blockchain research and development company IOHK
to develop blockchain applications for coffee shipments and other areas of agriculture. IOHK further
announced50 the use of Atala, an enterprise blockchain framework focused on governments in need
of a municipal currency or a supply chain management system, in collaboration with the government
of Ethiopia.
Ghana
In partnership with a blockchain technology platform, the Land Commission and the World Bank
launched a pilot51 project to register lands on a blockchain. The pilot project focused on 20 communi-
ties in Kumasi Ghana.
Mauritius
The Government of Mauritius52 created a regulatory sandbox license allowing development of block-
chain based solutions under the supervision of the financial services regulator. The Economic Devel-
opment Board of Mauritius issued regulatory sandbox licences53 to various FinTech companies.
Kenya
The Capital Markets Authority of Kenya was also among the first regulators in Africa to implement a
sandbox environment for startups and blockchain/fintech companies to test blockchain applications,
however excluding cryptocurrency projects54 out of these incubation efforts in 2019.
Noteworthy are also the efforts of the government of Kenya, specifically its creation of a Blockchain
and AI task force in 2018 and its publication of a comprehensive strategy55 paper outlining regulato-
ry approaches in 2019. After the country’s fast adoption of mobile payment systems, the task force
released a report identifying use cases and recommending the creation of financial and regulatory
sandboxes for emerging technology applications.
The Government of Kenya also explored the use of blockchain in issuing a retail savings bond called
M-Akiba.56 Utilizing a blockchain platform for this service would enable the government to seamlessly
manage a large number of small transactions and accounts.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s National Union of Road Transport Workers launched57 a blockchain- based passenger man-
ifest system to ensure drivers and passenger information are securely captured in a digital, secure,
transparent and fully auditable manner. The blockchain platform was deployed to monitor, track and
analyze all the operations of the scheme in real time.
49 Sundararajan, S., 2018. Ethiopia Is Exploring The Use Of Blockchain Technology To Track The Supply Chain For Its Largest Export,
Coffee. Available at: https://www.coindesk.com/ethiopia-explores-blockchain-role-in-tracking-coffee-exports [Accessed 8 May 2020].
50 Wolfson, R., 2019. Cardano Founder Launches Enterprise Blockchain Framework In Collaboration With Ethiopian Government. Forbes.
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson/2019/04/30/cardano-founder-launches-enterprise-blockchain-framework-in-
collaboration-with-ethiopian-government/#5eca31164e10 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
51 The World Bank, 2013. Project Performance Assessment Report: Ghana Land Administration Project. The World Bank. Available at:
https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/PPAR-75084-P132252-Ghana_Land_Administration.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
52 ConsenSys, 2019. Which Governments Are Using Blockchain Right Now?. Available at: https://consensys.net/blog/enterprise-blockchain/
which-governments-are-using-blockchain-right-now/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
53 Economic Development Board, 2019. EDB Issues Regulatory Sandbox Licences To Fintech Companies For Their Innovative Projects.
Economic Development Board. Available at: https://www.edbmauritius.org/newsroom/posts/2019/january/edb-issues-regulatory-sandbox-
licences-to-fintech-companies-for-their-innovative-projects/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
54 Mwaniki, C., 2019. CMA Locks Cryptocurrencies Out Of Innovation Hub. Business Daily Africa. Available at: https://www.businessdailyafrica.
com/markets/marketnews/CMA-locks-cryptocurrencies-out-of-innovation-hub/3815534-4993324-mh01pkz/index.html [Accessed 8 May 2020].
55 Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology, 2019. Emerging Digital Technologies For Kenya. Exploration And Analysis.
Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology. Available at: https://www.ict.go.ke/blockchain.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
56 M-Akiba, n.d. M-Akiba. Available at: https://www.m-akiba.go.ke/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
57 Avan-Nomayo, O., 2019. Africa Using Blockchain To Drive Change, Part One: Nigeria And Kenya. Cointelegraph. Available at:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/africa-using-blockchain-to-drive-change-nigeria-and-kenya-part-one [Accessed 8 May 2020].
41
As earlier stated, House Africa, an indigenous Nigerian company has partnered with58 the Nigerian
Mortgage Refinancing Company to service land verification for all Nigerian commercial and mort-
gage banks.
Rwanda
The National Bank of Rwanda and Rwanda Utility and Regulatory Authority has established59 a sand-
box facility to test blockchain technology.
In 2018, the country announced60 the world’s first blockchain project to track tantalum from the pit to
refineries in an effort to boost investor confidence of conflict-free sources of minerals.
Sierra Leone
The Government of Sierra Leone announced61 it was developing a blockchain-based digital iden-
tification system. The project is said to be already in the first phase where all identity records are
being digitised. In the subsequent phase, every person shall be issued a unique, non-duplicated and
non-reusable national identity number. The system is planned to be up and running by 2020. The
project is in partnership with the United Nations. It is also planned that credit history will be recorded
on the digital ID, allowing people to access credit instantly.
South Africa
Next to the previously mentioned Next Einstein Forum, regulatory pioneers for blockchain include the
South African Reserve Bank. For their blockchain pilot based on the Ethereum blockchain, the South
African Reserve Bank was recognised with the inaugural "Best Distributed Ledger Initiative" award
from Central Banking Publications.62 The Reserve Bank in April 2019 further issued a tender notice63
requesting for expressions of interest from prospective solution providers in order to explore piloting
a CBDC. The Center for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa also piloted a blockchain-based prop-
erty registry.
Tanzania
The government of Tanzania utilised blockchain technology to audit the public sector payroll thereby
eliminating about 10,000 ghost workers64 from the public sector.
Uganda
The Government of Uganda announced65 that it was going to pilot a proof of concept land titles
registry.
58 Nigeria Mortgage Refinance Company, 2020. NMRC Hosts Stakeholder Workshop On Building Credible Data To Drive Delivery Of
Affordable Housing In Nigeria. Nigeria Mortgage Refinance Company. Available at: https://nmrc.com.ng/nmrc-hosts-stakeholder-workshop-
on-building-credible-data-to-drive-delivery-of-affordable-housing-in-nigeria/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
59 UNCDF, 2019. The Fintech Landscape In Rwanda. UNCDF. Available at: https://www.uncdf.org/article/5216 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
60 Uwiringiyimana, C., 2018. Rwanda Hosts First Tantalum-Tracking Blockchain. Reuters. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/rwanda-blockchain/rwanda-hosts-first-tantalum-tracking-blockchain-idUSL8N1VM3W9 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
61 The Republic of Sierra Leone State House, 2019. Sierra Leone Gets Africa’s First Blockchain National Digital Identity System.
The Republic of Sierra Leone State House. Available at: https://statehouse.gov.sl/sierra-leone-gets-africas-first-blockchain-national-
digital-identity-system/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
62 South African Reserve Bank, 2018. Press Statement. South African Reserve Bank. Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/
News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/8753/Project%20Khokha%20press%20statement%2006%20September%202018.pdf
[Accessed 8 May 2020].
63 South African Reserve Bank, 2019. Request For Expression Of Interest From Prospective Solution Providers In Anticipation Of A
Feasibility Project For The Issuance Of Electronic Legal Tender. South African Reserve Bank. Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za
/AboutUs/Departments/FinancialServices/ProcNew/Pages/Publications.aspx?sarbweb=9f333ff2-bf64-4708-a361-076bd6802ff4&
sarblist=fdf9dae8-3990-44d4-b89a-c87649f22461&sarbitem=40 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
64 Ng’wanakilala, F., 2016. Tanzania Says Over 10,000 'Ghost Workers' Purged From Government Payroll. Reuters. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-corruption/tanzania-says-over-10000-ghost-workers-purged-from-government-
payroll-idUSKCN0Y70RW [Accessed 8 May 2020].
65 Economic Development Board, 2019. EDB Issues Regulatory Sandbox Licences To Fintech Companies For Their Innovative Projects.
Economic Development Board. Available at: https://www.edbmauritius.org/newsroom/posts/2019/january/edb-issues-regulatory-sandbox-
licences-to-fintech-companies-for-their-innovative-projects/ [Accessed 8 May 2020].
42
42
This report has presented specific opportunities and challenges that block-
chain technology poses when applied in an African context to further cap-
italise on its potential. As the technology’s concepts may mirror a sense of
community present across the continent, it may also assist in further cultivat-
ing the overarching cross-continental harmonisation. As such, it offers ICT
decision and policy makers the opportunity to support not only economic and
social development in Africa, but also the continent's vision of "an integrated,
prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a
dynamic force in the global arena"66.
However, the regulatory frameworks for blockchain are still very uncertain,
thereby limiting institutional, government and widespread adoption. ICT
decision and policy makers therefore need to work with stakeholders to un-
derstand the technology in detail in order to regulate it in a way to drive inno-
vation and not stifle it. Previously mentioned regulatory pioneers are providing
helpful examples in how collaboration on early innovations can take place.
Additionally, it must be kept in mind that blockchain development also de-
pends on internet development. Many blockchain applications and all block-
chain protocols need network infrastructure to run on, i.e. typically internet
connectivity. That is why fostering internet connectivity and internet access
across Africa is a foundational recommendation. With regard to blockchain
technology in particular, the following cross-cutting issues need addressing
by ICT decision and policy makers.
66 African Union. 2020. Vision Of The African Union. Available at: https://au.int/en/about/vision [Accessed 8 May 2020].
43
SUGGESTION:
Develop a pan-African blockchain strategy in accordance with the African Union’s digital strategy.
RATIONALE:
Blockchain technology offers vast design options and can be implemented for a plethora of use cases.
Any blockchain application requires thoughtfully arranging on-chain and off-chain governance. In this
complex scenario, a blockchain strategy helps by developing a common objective and vision. On the
national level, a blockchain strategy identifies country-specific opportunities, provides guidance on how
to unleash these potentials and marks desirable as well as necessary growth areas. At the pan-African
level, the opportunity is even greater: a pan-African blockchain strategy could be a tool to start bridging
different jurisdictions and avoid high legal costs for blockchain systems to be compliant across the con-
tinent. If designed in an inclusive manner, the process of strategy development itself presents an op-
portunity to grow both the national and the African blockchain ecosystems. By harnessing contributions
in a multi-stakeholder dialogue, the screening of opportunities and obstacles becomes more complete
and potential lines of conflict can be reconciled early on. Such a dialogue or alternatively, a review
mechanism, should include the private sector, the technical community, research and civil society. In
the international context, a blockchain strategy presents a valuable document to communicate policy
positions, signal aspirations and make states approachable for collaboration and investments.
Bring all parties from the existing ecosystem to the table on equal footing, including ICT and financial
regulators, blockchain associations, businesses, innovation hubs, researchers and representatives
from the digital civil society. Develop a common vision and plan for a promising and suitable block-
chain journey. Many blockchain strategies plan for similar stages:
• Explore the technology: gather and analyse the plethora of possible use cases.
• Gather hands-on experience: conduct action research by initiating pilot projects to verify opportuni-
ties, identify hurdles and discard unfeasible applications.
• Broaden the knowledge base: encourage interdisciplinary research and foster in-country capacity
building.
• Create innovation-friendly regulatory regimes and reduce regulatory uncertainties: address policy
challenges that arise from the interplay of architectural properties and the in-country institutional
landscape, e.g. in the areas of data protection, financial regulation, standardisation and interopera-
bility. Consider engaging with existing and emerging bodies for standardisation and their resources,
e.g. FATF for financial regulation, the International Organization for Standardization for market rele-
vant standards, the Coalition for Automated Legal Applications for the coordination of legal questions
and associations aiming at fostering the discussion between governmental bodies, research, science
and private industry like the International Association of Trusted Blockchain Applications (INATBA).
• Focus and assign resources: identify application areas that are both viable and strategically valuable
and devote resources to these areas.
44
44
SUGGESTIONS:
• Seek pan-African harmonisation of data protection by negotiating consensus on the regulatory goals.
• Leave regulatory means to individual countries while creating a mechanism for mutual recognition of
data protection laws.
• Mandate public authorities for monitoring and enforcing data protection laws, equip them with the
necessary powers and resources.
RATIONALE:
Harmonisation of data protection on the African continent would create legal certainty as African soci-
eties transform into the digital age. It is a precondition for a digital single market and a cornerstone for
any cross-border blockchain-based service. A consensus on regulatory goals can be combined with
general guidelines regarding the implementation. On this basis, harmonisation can be achieved by
developing a framework and mechanisms for mutual recognition of existing data protection regulations.
This would provide for an adequate level of protection across the African continent, while allowing for
national characteristics in the implementation of data protection regulations in the laws of the individual
African countries. Supervisory authorities play a major role in achieving data protection in practice. In
order to fulfil their tasks of monitoring and enforcing data protection laws, they need to be equipped
with proper mandates, powers and resources. Consistent application of data protection nationally and
across Africa can be achieved by fostering their cooperation, information sharing and rendering mutual
assistance. The role of pan-African organisations, like RAPDP will be crucial to this end.
• Set up a process to negotiate regulatory objectives and to find consensus between countries. Keep
in mind that views on the parameters in question can strongly depend on the socio-historical, political
and cultural context. That is why the EU General Data Protection Regulation can serve as inspira-
tion, but not a copy & paste catalogue.
• Leave regulatory means to individual countries.
• When operationalising data protection goals, be aware of the use and possible interplay of different
legal techniques (rights-based vs. duty-based approach).
• Countries should mandate other countries’ laws on the directive to be equivalent and applicable.
• Build capacity of data protection officials responsible for harmonisation.
• Establish data protection authorities with clear mandate and adequate resources.
45
SUGGESTION:
Decide about policy options at the intersection of data protection and blockchain technology according
to the values and policy goals of individual countries and the African community, not according to real
or perceived technical constraints. Establish "data protection by design" provisions in data protection
laws.
RATIONALE:
Blockchain technology can be very flexibly designed, thus, it can be political decisions that guide the
design, implementation and use of such systems, and not the other way around. With the primacy of
political decisions on what is to be protected and how, "data protection by design" provisions can guide
the design, implementation and use of blockchain technology by applying appropriate technical and or-
ganisational measures to ensure the protection of the protected goods and to meet the requirements of
the applicable laws, whether these requirements are formulated as objective duties, subjective rights,
or both.
• When determining desired data protection outcomes with regard to blockchain technology, consider
key parameters or tension points, including:
• secrecy vs. transparency,
• remembering vs. forgetting,
• data subjects, enforcement and oversight.
• Let the design of blockchain-based systems follow data protection objectives and not vice versa.
46
46
SUGGESTIONS:
In order to reach the goals of innovation, business development and socio-political progress with
the help of blockchain technology, legal certainty in financial markets regulation is one of the major
preconditions. Therefore, ICT policy and decision makers, in close collaboration with financial regula-
tors, may consider the option of developing a pan-African concept for token classification. This could
include security tokens, tokens representing other financial instruments such as e-money or payment
and unregulated tokens, e.g. voucher and club tokens. Disclosure and registration regimes for security
tokens could be an instrument to achieve stakeholder protection. Policy and decision makers may
also consider introducing license regimes for service providers concerning security and other financial
instruments tokens, specifically taking into account compliance with the relevant FATF recommenda-
tions.
RATIONALE:
Financial regulatory regimes typically serve the protection of financial stability and investors as well as
other financial services’ customer protection. Some tokens might trigger concerns in this regard while
others rather compare to instruments not typically caught by financial regulation (e.g. a voucher for a
mere software license). In order not to stifle innovation beyond what is required by these goals, devel-
opers benefit from legal certainty about token classifications. As a consequence certain software might
only be deployed if the applicable disclosure regime is obeyed or if entities hold applicable licenses.
Developers might only offer such software as a service but not deploy their software themselves. In
contrast, software issuing or servicing unregulated tokens can be freely deployed by anyone.
Anything that is marketed as an investment opportunity to the public could then trigger certain min-
imum disclosure rules (typically a prospectus) to ensure that the public has sufficient information at
hand to come to an educated investment decision. It appears advisable to create legal certainty about
such disclosure rules, which might ideally be harmonised across the continent to limit the legal costs of
a compliant security token issuance.
Any service provider offering to deal with customers’ financial instruments or assets could be regulated
to prevent fraud and to ensure high quality best practices in order to protect the financial instruments
belonging to third parties. In addition, monitoring financial transactions to prevent money laundering as
well as terrorism financing is a common public interest which is typically outsourced by governments
to the regulated finanical service industry. Hence, FATF recommendations require that virtual asset
service providers are licensed or at least registered.
• Collaboratively, ICT and financial policy makers could (re)visit concepts from regions with already
highly sophisticated financial regulation (EU, US and Asia) to carefully assess, evaluate and com-
pare these in the blockchain context.
• When thinking about setting Africa-specific standards, policy and decision makers should consider
that if the goals of the regulatory regime of another important economic area coincide with their own
policy goals, (partly) mirroring regulation can lower the legal costs for projects to include Africa in
their service offerings.67
• One option to enter into a discussion of regulatory concepts would be to join the Governmental Ad-
visory Body of INATBA (initiated by the European Commission in 2019). The European Commission
had been highly interested to interact with Africa in this regard and INATBA shall be much obliged to
include African governmental representatives in their Advisory Bodies.
67 Consider the general caveats that apply to importing regulatory measures from other legislative systems and jurisdictions, as explained in
the chapter on data protection.
47
Support research and education about blockchain technology and blockchain governance. Foster
skills, develop talent and stimulate innovation.
RATIONALE:
The education levels on blockchain and other advanced technologies in Africa are low. On the one
hand, this poses a problem for projects and initiatives to find and attract adequate talent for solution
development. On the other hand, low levels of technology awareness and education can also pose a
problem in the rollout and adoption of consumer-focused applications, especially in rural areas and the
so-called "last mile".
• Build a network. The Smart Africa Secretariat could help in this task with its convening power.
• Map already existing initiatives and identify capacity development needs. Engage with research insti-
tutions68 and blockchain associations69 across the continent. Collaborate with blockchain innovation
hubs.70
• Understand that especially for the African startup ecosystem, securing international collaborations
and funding, as well as participation in international dialogue can be quite challenging. The partici-
pation in international industry events is often hindered by visa requirements and limited availability
of travel funding, which makes startups often reliant on international mediators or team members to
build connections. Previously mentioned groups, events and associations with a more international
focus can play a key role in a better facilitation of those connections.
• Foster the meetup and event culture that is typical for blockchain. It serves to connect entrepreneurs
to investors, policymakers, corporates and the larger ecosystem.71
• Create educational programmes for users, innovators and policy-makers alike. Leaders could go
abroad for training, e. g. ministers of finance to understand blockchain and intensify collaboration
between entrepreneurs and government.
68 Within the scientific community, the Next Einstein Forum (NEF; https://nef.org/) plays an important role in connecting science, society
and policy in Africa to the rest of the world. Its innovation index captures progress in STEM education, as well as output of innovation and
investment.
69 The following associations offer connections into the existing entrepreneurial ecosystem: Africa Blockchain Alliance, South African Na-
tional Blockchain Alliance, Cryptography Development Initiative Nigeria, Blockchain Association of Kenya, Blockchain Association of Uganda,
Cameroon Blockchain Business Council, Blockchain Tanzania Community, Blockchain Society Ghana.
70 Hubs exist in Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Johannesburg, Lagos, Nairobi, Kampala, Yaonde, Addis Ababa and Gaborone.
71 The largest Blockchain Conference on the African continent is held in Johannesburg, South Africa. Another relevant event is the Africa
Tech Summit held annually in Kigali, Rwanda. Meetups already occur in hubs like Cape Town, Johannesburg, Nairobi and Lagos.
48
48
Explore the feasibility of creating and operating a pan-African blockchain service infrastructure that
offers a testbed for researchers, enterprises and administrations to run blockchain-based applications.
RATIONALE:
For blockchain systems to sustainably deliver the benefits that DLT are praised for - i.e. immutability,
automation and trust in transactions - they need to be operated in an assuring governance environ-
ment that provides certainty for blockchain-based service providers and users. As has been pointed
out, this is not always the case with blockchains. Creating such off-chain governance arrangements
can be as challenging as the technical design of blockchain applications itself. In addition, reconciling
the openness of public, permissionless blockchains with governmental duties and jurisdictional realities
can be singled out as the greatest challenge that inhibits the uptake of distributed ledger technologies
at large.
The biggest challenge in creating a common blockchain infrastructure among parties who cannot be
assumed to share interests beyond receiving the benefits of a resilient, trustworthy and performant dis-
tributed ledger network service would be to bring them to the same table and get them to agree on the
off-chain governance model. The Smart Africa Secretariat could serve as a neutral convener to help
African states explore the idea to collaboratively maintain such an infrastructure. Technical inspiration
can be taken from various national blockchain service infrastructures; governance inspiration can be
taken from the European Blockchain Service Infrastructure.
72 On the trust-generating role of distrust in governance see Sztompka, P., 1997. Trust, Distrust And The Paradox Of Democracy. WZB
Discussion Paper, No. P 97-003. WZB Berlin Social Science Center. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50255 [Accessed 8 May 2020].
49
Push for interoperability and harmonised standards, specifically to enable interconnectivity between
different blockchains.
RATIONALE:
Integration points across various blockchain protocols and into legacy systems are often limited. Users
of different blockchain networks cannot interact and transact with each other frictionlessly and without
extra cost. Custom solutions need to be built to make blockchain systems interoperable with each
other and with legacy systems, if possible at all. The introduction of adequate standards thus plays a
key role in building scalable and interoperable systems across company, institutional and governmen-
tal levels. Common standards are also regarded as a cornerstone to achieve global interconnection of
regional digital markets, e.g. markets for emission trading.
Interoperability of blockchain networks, protocols and applications remains an issue at the stage of
research and development because it involves business model, platform and infrastructure aspects.
The World Economic Forum lists73 a number of organisations that currently work on the topic and could
be approached for further information and collaboration.
73 World Economic Forum and Deloitte, 2020. Inclusive Deployment Of Blockchain For Supply Chains: Part 6 - A Framework For Blockchain
Interoperability. World Economic Forum and Deloitte, p.11. Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Framework_for_Blockchain_I
nteroperability_2020.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2020].
50
50
State or Publication
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Strategy
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Blockchain Strategy of
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