Rule 19, Sec. 2.

Time to intervene

Facts:
Respondent Palarca initiated a complaint for the recovery of two barges
named "Bangsi" and "Dangsol" from the possession of the First Coast Guard
District, Philippine Coast Guard, and seeking the issuance of a writ of
replevin. On May 21, 1991, the lower court, after the filing by said private
respondent of the requisite bond of P600,000.00, executed in favor of
therein defendant and private respondent Golden Flame Sawmill
Corporation, as defendant-intervenor, issued a writ of replevin for the
seizure of the two barges. Private respondent Golden Flame Sawmill
Corporation filed an urgent motion for intervention, claiming ownership over
the two barges which it allegedly acquired from herein petitioner in a public
auction sale, as evidenced a certificate of sale thereof.
On July 8, 1991, petitioner also filed a motion in the trial court seeking leave
to likewise intervene in the case on the ground that it is the owner of the
two barges in question on the strength of xerox copies of certain documents
issued by the Philippine Coast Guard consequent to its purchase of four
barges from Mahogany Products (Phil.) Inc. on May 30, 1979.
The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's motion for leave to
intervene and ordering the release of the two barges, whether identified as
"Bangsi' and "Dangsol" or "BCRC I" and "BCRC II", to respondent Palarca
upon the security of the replevin bond of P600,000.00 that he had filed.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before respondent Court of Appeals
which, however, dismissed said petition.
Issue:
Whether CA and trial court erred in denying motion to leave to intervene
filed by the petitioner.
Ruling:
No.
The right to intervene is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or
conditions for the right of intervention must be shown.  4 The procedure to
secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule,
and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the
terms of the applicable provision. 5 Under our rules on intervention, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. 
In the present case, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court. It denied petitioner's motion for intervention by
reason of its findings, which were affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals,
that the intervention would only unduly delay the case and prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties; that herein petitioner has no
legal interest in the matter in litigation; and that at any rate, his rights, if
any, can be ventilated and protected in a separate action.

Also, there is no pending principal action wherein petitioner may intervene.

A decision was already rendered therein by the trial court and no appeal
having been taken therefrom, the judgment in that main case is now final
and executory. 18 Intervention is legally possible only "before or during a
trial," hence a motion for intervention filed after trial - and, a fortiori, when
the case has already been submitted, when judgment has been rendered, or
worse, when judgment is already final and executory - should be denied. 

An intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal

action, and not an independent proceeding; it, is an interlocutory proceeding
dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where
the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the
intervention may be based. 

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 102927 October 12, 1993

BIG COUNTRY RANCH CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, MAX B. PALARCA and GOLDEN FLAME SAWMILL
CORPORATION, Respondents.

Domingo G. Lalaguit for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library

Abbas & Associates for respondents.chanrobles virtual law library

Horacio R. Viola for GFS Corporation.

 REGALADO, J.:

The instant petition stems from the order issued on July 16, 1991 by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 91-57097, entitled
"Max B. Palarca vs. Capt., Arturo Y. Capada, PN," denying petitioner's
motion for leave to intervene therein.  1chanrobles virtual law library

The said case was initiated by private respondent Palarca in a complaint filed
on May 9, 1991 for the recovery of two barges named "Bangsi" and
"Dangsol" from the possession of the First Coast Guard District, Philippine
Coast Guard, and seeking the issuance of a writ of replevin for that
purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On May 21, 1991, the lower court, after the filing by said private respondent
of the requisite bond of P600,000.00, executed in favor of therein defendant
and private respondent Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation, as defendant-
intervenor, issued a writ of replevin for the seizure of the two
barges.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Thereafter, the implementing sheriff submitted a report to the trial court,

dated May 27, 1991, to the effect that the barges in the custody of the
Philippine Coast Guard were " BCRC I " and "BCRC II", allegedly with
descriptions different from "Bangsi" and "Dangsol." In order to properly
determine the correct identities of the two barges in the custody of the
Philippine Coast Guard, the trial court ordered the re-admeasurement
thereof by the Marine Surveyor of the Philippine Coast Guard in the presence
of the representatives of both parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

Meanwhile, private respondent Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation filed an

urgent motion for intervention, claiming ownership over the two barges
which it allegedly acquired from herein petitioner in a public auction sale, as
evidenced a certificate of sale thereof. On May 30, 1991, the trial court
issued an order allowing respondent Golden Flame Sawmill to intervene in
said case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On July 8, 1991, herein petitioner also filed a motion in the trial court
seeking leave to likewise intervene in the case on the ground that it is the
owner of the two barges in question on the strength of xerox copies of
certain documents issued by the Philippine Coast Guard consequent to its
purchase of four barges from Mahogany Products (Phil.) Inc. on May 30,
1979. Respondent Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation filed an opposition
thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As earlier stated, on July 16, 1991 the trial court issued an order denying
petitioner's motion for leave to intervene and ordering the release of the two
barges, whether identified as "Bangsi' and "Dangsol" or "BCRC I" and "BCRC
II", to respondent Palarca upon the security of the replevin bond of
P600,000.00 that he had filed. The pertinent part of the order reads:

. . . it appearing that the said movant (petitioner) has not alleged any legal
interest over the matter in litigation, which are the two barges involved, or
in the success of either of the plaintiff, defendant or defendant-intervenor, or
legal interest against; all of them, or that said movant is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of the said property (2
barges) now in the custody of the Court; and considering the claim of
defendant-intervenor that the two barges were already sold at public auction
sometime in April, 1989, due to the failure of the said movant to pay a loan,
for which the said barges were pledged, thereby divesting movant of any
right over said barges, and finally, considering that the said motion will not
only unduly delay this case or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, but also the said movant may protect its rights, if it has any
rights at all, in a separate proceedings (sic), the Court is constrained to deny
the motion for lack of merit. 2chanrobles virtual law library

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before

respondent Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed said petition on
August 30, 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25474. 3 Hence this appeal, wherein
petitioner impugns the correctness of the judgment of respondent court and,
for good measure albeit improperly, contends that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion affirming the order of the court a quo which
denied petitioner's motion for leave to
intervene.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We do not agree, in the light of settled principles on which we shall essay a

restatement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The right to intervene is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or

conditions for the right of intervention must be shown.  4 The procedure to
secure the right to intervene is to a great extent fixed by the statute or rule,
and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the
terms of the applicable provision. 5 Under our rules on intervention, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. 6chanrobles virtual law library

Section 2(a), Rule 12 of the Rules of Court provides that "(a) person may,
before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest, in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when
he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof."chanrobles virtual law library

The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of

the rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same. 7 The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be
reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where
such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious
manner. 8 As a general guide in determining whether a party may intervene,
the court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original, parties, and whether
or not the intervenor's rights may be, fully protected in a separate
proceeding. 9chanrobles virtual law library

In the present case, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the trial court. It denied petitioner's motion for intervention by
reason of its findings, which were affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals,
that the intervention would only unduly delay the case and prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties; that herein petitioner has no
legal interest in the matter in litigation; and that at any rate, his rights, if
any, can be ventilated and protected in a separate
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The said findings of the trial court are not without rational bases. It is
admitted by petitioner that the two barges which are the subject of the
litigation have already been sold to defendant-intervenor, herein respondent
Golden Flame Sawmill Corporation, in a public auction held on April 17,
1989. 10 In fact, the corresponding certificates of sale therefor have been
issued in the name of said respondent corporation. These certificates of sale
constituted the very reason why it was allowed to intervene in the main
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's claim that the public sale was attended by some irregularities
and was, therefore, invalid could evidently be better threshed out in an
independent proceeding. To allow petitioner to intervene in the replevin suit,
which is primarily on the issue of possession, would only make the
proceedings therein unnecessarily complicated. New and unrelated issues on
conflicting claims of ownership, authenticity of documents of title and
regularity in the mode of acquisition thereof could expectedly be raised and
inevitably cause delay in the adjudication of the rights claimed by the
original parties. This is not the policy of our procedural law on the
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is firmly settled in this jurisdiction that intervention will not be allowed
when it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
principal parties, especially if intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding. 11 Intervention is not intended to change the nature
and character of the action itself, 12 or to stop or delay the placid operation
of the machinery of the trial. 13 The remedy of intervention is not proper
where it will have the effect of retarding the principal, suit or delaying the
trial of the
action. 14chanrobles virtual law library

Also, in general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit

by intervention, 15 hence such intervention will not be allowed where it would
enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. 16 It
is not proper where there are certain facts giving intervenor's case an aspect
peculiar to himself and differentiating it clearly from that of the original
parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to litigate his claim
in a separate suit. 17chanrobles virtual law library

Coming back to the petition at bar, it is to be noted that, at this point, there
is no pending principal action wherein petitioner may intervene. A decision
was already rendered therein by the trial court and no appeal having been
taken therefrom, the judgment in that main case is now final and
executory. 18 Intervention is legally possible only "before or during a trial,"
hence a motion for intervention filed after trial - and, a fortiori, when the
case has already been submitted, when judgment has been rendered, or
worse, when judgment is already final and executory - should be
denied. 19chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner would do well to reflect on the doctrinal rule that an intervention is

merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an
independent proceeding; it, is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or
subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where the main action
ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may
be based. 20chanrobles virtual law library

Also, in taking its grievance to the Court of Appeals through a petition

for certiorari, it apparently ignored the sine qua non for such recourse that
there should be no other adequate remedies available to it. Indeed, as
pithily observed by respondent court, petitioner could very well have sought
reconsideration of the challenged order by pointing out and proving that, the
barges "BCRC I" and "BCRC II" are different from its barges "Bangsi" and
"Dangsol"; or it could have filed a third-party claim over the barges under
Section "7 of Rule 60; or, of course, it could have instituted the proper
action to vindicate its claim to said barges aforecited
rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, the petition at bar is hereby DENIED and the assailed

judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Nocon and Puno, JJ.,

concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Padilla, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1 Per Judge Clemente M. Soriano.chanrobles virtual law library

2 Rollo, 38.chanrobles virtual law library

3 Ibid., 58-61.chanrobles virtual law library

4 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, 657.chanrobles virtual law library

5 Elliot vs. Superior Court of San Diego County, 144 Cal 501; Public Water
Supply Dist. No. 2 vs. Davis (Mo App) 607 SW 2d 835.chanrobles virtual law
library

6 Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Republic, et al., 188 SCRA

775 (1990).chanrobles virtual law library

7 Garcia, etc., et al., vs. David, et al., 67 Phil. 279 (1939).chanrobles virtual
law library

8 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 184 SCRA 382 (1990).chanrobles

virtual law library

9 Sec. 2 (b), Rule 12; Balane, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., 20 SCRA 177
(1967).chanrobles virtual law library

10 Rollo, 46.chanrobles virtual law library

11 Rizal Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Tan, 83 Phil. 732 (1949); Peyer
vs. Martinez, etc., et al., 88 Phil. 72 (1951); Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank vs. The Monetary Board, et al., G.R. 70054, Resolution En
Banc, March 3, 1990.chanrobles virtual law library

12 Garcia, etc., et al., vs. David, supra; Reliance Commercial Enterprises,

Inc. vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 97 Phil. 1001 (1955).chanrobles virtual law
library

13 Reay vs. Butler, 7 P. 669, 671; 33 C.J. 477.chanrobles virtual law library

14 67A C.J.S., Parties, 805.chanrobles virtual law library

15 Ibid., 823.chanrobles virtual law library

16 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. vs. Gerlach, 128 Cal. Rptr. 39656 C.A. 3d
299.chanrobles virtual law library

17 Del.-Keller vs. Wilson & Co., 194 A. 45, 22 Del. Ch. 175.chanrobles
virtual law library

18 Rollo, 91-97.chanrobles virtual law library

19 Spouses Oliva vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 166 SCRA 632

(1988).chanrobles virtual law library

20 Ordoñez vs. Gustillo, etc., et al., 192 SCRA 469 (1990).