Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence Volume 2

Dr. Wahbah Al-Zuh.
aylı̄’s
Al-Fiqh Al-’Islāmı̄ wa ’Adillatuh
(Islamic Jurisprudence and Its Proofs)
Financial Transactions in
Islamic Jurisprudence
Volume 2
Translated by: Dr. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal

Revised by: Dr. Muhammad S. Eissa
ii

In The Name of Allāh, The Most Gracious, The Merciful
Typeset in LATEX 2ε TM with ArabTEXTM macros by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal
c
2002 Dār Al-Fikr, Damascus
All rights reserved

iii
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Sheikh Mohamed Binzagr and Sheikh Khalid Abdul Hadi
Taher for their generous financial support that made this translation project
possible. I also wish to thank Sheikh Hussein Al-Banawi for his support of the
study of Islamic Economics, Finance, and Management at Rice University.
Last, but not least, I wish to thank Dr. Muhammad Eissa for carefully
reviewing my translation. It is impossible to have any publication, let alone a
translation, without mistakes. His efforts to minimize the number of remaining
errors are greatly appreciated.
May Allāh reward all our efforts and good intentions.
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal
Houston, TX
July 2002
Contents
VIII Guaranty Al-Kafālah 1

57 Legality and Cornerstones 5
57.1 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
57.2 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
57.3 Cornerstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
57.3.1 Guaranty language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
57.3.2 Types of guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
57.3.3 Modes of guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Unrestricted guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Restricted guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Suspended guaranty pending a condition . . . . . . . 11
Suspending financial guaranty on physical guaranty . . 12
D. Deferred guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Options in guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
58 Guaranty Conditions 15
58.1 Contract language conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
58.2 Guarantor conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
58.3 Debtor conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
58.4 Creditor conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
58.5 Guaranteed object conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Guaranty of future liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Guaranty of an unknown liability . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
59 Contract Status 25
59.1 Seeking compensation from the guarantor . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
59.1.1 Absolution of guaranteed debtors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
59.2 Seeking compensation from the principal debtor . . . . . . . . 28
60 Guaranty Termination 29
60.1 Guaranteed property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
60.1.1 Debt repayment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
60.1.2 Absolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
60.1.3 Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
v
vi CONTENTS
60.2 Guaranteed persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

60.2.1 Delivering the guaranteed person . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
60.2.2 Absolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
60.2.3 Death of the guaranteed person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
60.3 Guaranteed non-fungibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
61 Seeking compensation from the principal 33

61.1 Conditions for seeking compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Multiple guarantors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
61.2 Permissible sought compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
61.3 Time to seek compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
62 Contemporary Guaranty for a Fee 39

Letters of Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
63 Applications to Modern Guaranties 41

63.1 Major forms of commercial guaranties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
63.2 Letters of credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
63.3 Commercial insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
63.4 Guaranties for residents and visitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
IX Transfer of debt (Al-H

. awālah) 47
64 Definition, legality, and cornerstone 51

64.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
64.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
64.3 Cornerstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
65 Transfer of debt Conditions 55

65.2 Transferor conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
65.3 Transferred party conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
65.4 Transferee conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
65.5 Transferred item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Restricted and unrestricted transfers of debt . . . . . . 58
Transfer of rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
66 Legal Status 63
66.1 Absolution of the transferor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
66.2 Right to demand repayment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
66.3 Right of pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
CONTENTS vii
67 Contract Termination 67
67.1 Voiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
67.2 Death or bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
67.3 Debt repayment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
67.4 Death of the creditor or debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
67.5 Gift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
67.6 Charity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
67.7 Absolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
68 Compensation of the Transferee 71

68.1 Conditions for demanding compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
68.2 Type of compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
68.3 Transferor-creditor disagreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
68.4 Contemporary bills of exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
X Pawning/Mortgage (Al-Rahn) 75
69 Definition, Legality & Cornerstones 79
69.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
69.2 General characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
69.3 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
69.4 Non-bindingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
69.5 Cornerstones and components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
69.6 Forms of pawning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
70 Pawning Conditions 85
70.1 Contracting party conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
70.1.1 Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Guardian and plenipotentiary pawning . . . . . . . . . 86
1. Pawning in lieu of a child’s or insane person’s debt . 86
2. Pawning in lieu of a debt of the guardian’s . . . . . . 87
3. When the child reaches legal age . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Multiple transacting parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
70.3 Underlying debt conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
70.3.1 First H . anafı̄ condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
70.3.2 Second H . anafı̄ condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
70.3.3 Third H . anafı̄ condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
70.3.4 Shāfic ı̄ and H . anbalı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
¯
70.3.5 Mālikı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
70.4 Pawned Object Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
70.4.1 Eligibility for sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
70.4.2 Being a property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
70.4.3 Being valued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
70.4.4 Being known . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
viii CONTENTS
70.4.5 Being owned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

70.4.6 Not being attached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
70.4.7 Being separate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
70.4.8 Being clearly identified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
70.5 Receipt of the Pawned Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Non-Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Mālikı̄ ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
70.5.1 Means of receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Mortgaged real estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
70.5.2 Conditions of receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
1. Permission of the debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2. Eligibility of contracting parties . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3. Permanency of receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Pawning received items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
70.5.3 Receivers of pawned objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Trustee rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
The trustee as an agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Multiple trustees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Relieving a trustee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Trustee rights and obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
70.6 Specific consequences of pawning conditions . . . . . . . . . . 122
70.6.1 Pawning an unidentified property share . . . . . . . . . . 123
The H . anafı̄ ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
70.6.2 Pawning connected or occupied properties . . . . . . . . 125
70.6.3 Pawning fungible liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
70.6.4 Pawning leased or lent non-fungibles . . . . . . . . . . . 127
70.6.5 Pawning borrowed items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Mālikı̄ ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Shāfic ı̄ and H
. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
¯
Utilizing the borrowed property . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Types of guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Demands to release the pawned object . . . . . . . . . 131
Leasing to pawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
70.6.6 Pawning the property of others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
70.6.7 Pawning a pawned item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
70.6.8 Pawning part of an indebted estate . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
70.6.9 Pawning perishables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
70.6.10 Pawning fruit juices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
70.6.11 Pawning religious books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
71 Legal Status and Consequences 141

Status of valid pawning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Bindingness of valid pawning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Consequences of the pawning contract . . . . . . . . . . 143
71.1 Association of the underlying debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
CONTENTS ix
71.2 The right to hold the pawned object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

71.2.1 Demanding repayment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
71.3 Safeguarding the pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
71.4 The pawned objects’ expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
71.5 Utilization of the pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
71.5.1 Pawning debtor utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
71.5.2 Creditor utilization of the pawned property . . . . . . . . 154
71.6 Dealing in the pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
71.6.1 Pawning-debtor dealings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Prior to receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
After receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
71.6.2 Creditor dealings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
71.7 Guaranteeing pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
71.7.1 The creditor’s possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
71.7.2 Types of guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Non-H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
71.7.3 Consumption of the pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . 170
71.8 Selling pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
71.8.1 Right to sell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Voluntary sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Obligatory sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
71.8.2 Selling perishable pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
71.8.3 Priority claims of the creditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
71.8.4 Transfer of ownership to the creditor . . . . . . . . . . . 175
71.8.5 Third party entitlement after sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
71.9 Delivery of pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Debt termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Pawning termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Delivery timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Delivery location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
71.9.1 Rulings for defective pawning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
72 Growth of pawned property 183

72.1 Adding to the pawning or the debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
73 Pawning Contract Termination 187
74 Debtor-Creditor Disputes 191

74.1 Disputes over the underlying debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
74.2 Destruction of the pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
74.3 Disputes over receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
74.4 Disputes over the time of destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
74.5 Disputes over the pawned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
74.6 Disputes over possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
x CONTENTS
XI Settlement (Al-S.ulh.) 195

75 Definition, Legality, and Cornerstones 199
75.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
75.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
75.3 Types of settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
75.3.1 Shāfic ı̄ classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
¯
Settlement with the claimed debtor . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Settlement with a third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Contracts implied by settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
75.4 Cornerstones of Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
76 Settlement Conditions 207

76.1 Contract Language Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
76.2 Conditions for the settling party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
76.3 Settlement compensation conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
76.3.1 It must be a property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Acknowledged claims for non-fungibles . . . . . . . . . 209
Acknowledged claims for fungibles . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Monetary debts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Non-Monetary debts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Liability for an animal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Compensating with usufruct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
76.3.2 It must be valued property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
76.3.3 Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
76.3.4 Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
76.4 Underlying liability conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
76.4.1 Liability to man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Settling uncertain liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
76.4.2 A right of the claimant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
76.4.3 The claimant’s right must be established . . . . . . . . . 218
Settlement in lieu of defective merchandise . . . . . . . 221
Claimant settlement with a third party . . . . . . . . . 222
77 Legal Status 225
78 Invalid Settlements 229

78.1 Invalidating factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
78.2 Legal status after voiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
78.3 Estate settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
XII Absolution (Al-’Ibrā’) 233

79 Definition and Legality of Absolution 237
79.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
CONTENTS xi
79.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
80 Absolution Cornerstones 239

80.1 Is acceptance necessary? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
80.2 Rejecting absolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
81 Absolution Conditions 243

81.1 Absolving creditor conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
81.1.1 Absolution agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
81.1.2 Absolution by a dying creditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
81.2 Absolved debtor conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
81.3 Absolved debt conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
81.4 Absolution language conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
82 Objects of Absolution 253

82.1 Non-fungible properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
82.2 Fungible debts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
82.3 Absolution of legal rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
82.3.1 Absolution of alimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
82.3.2 Mutual absolution of spouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
82.3.3 Absolution of the right to level a charge . . . . . . . . . 255
83 Absolution Types 257

83.1 Generality of absolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
83.2 Absolution timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
83.3 Dropping vs. repayment absolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
84 Legal Status 259

84.1 Charges after general absolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
84.2 Compensated absolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
XIII Entitlement (Al-’Istih.qāq) 263

85 Definition and Consequences 267
85.1 definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
85.2 Legal Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
85.2.1 Proofs of entitlement claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
85.2.2 Self-contradicting claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
86 Rulings for Specific Contracts 271

86.1 Sales and barter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
86.1.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
(i) Partial entitlement of the merchandise . . . . . . . . 271
(ii) Full entitlement of the merchandise . . . . . . . . . 272
(iii) Entitlement to withholding rights . . . . . . . . . . 273
86.1.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
xii CONTENTS
86.1.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

¯
86.1.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
86.2 Entitlement of a pawned object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
86.2.1 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
86.2.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
86.2.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
¯
86.2.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
86.3 Division of joint property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
86.3.1 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
86.3.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
86.3.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
¯
86.3.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
86.4 Effect in settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
86.4.1 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
86.4.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
86.4.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
¯
86.4.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
86.5 Effect on lease and hire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
86.5.1 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
86.5.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
86.5.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
¯
86.5.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
86.6 Effect on crop-sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
86.6.1 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
86.6.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
86.6.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
¯
86.6.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
86.7 Effect on marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
86.7.1 Appropriation of the dowry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
¯
H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
86.7.2 Khulc (divorce at the instance of the wife) . . . . . . . . 285
¯
H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
¯
H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
86.8 Effect on wills and mortmain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
86.9 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
86.10 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
¯
86.11 H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
CONTENTS xiii
87 Entitlement to Sacrificial Animals 289

87.1 H . anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
87.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
87.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
¯
87.4 H . anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
XIV Debt-Clearance (Al-Muqās..sah) 291

88 Definition and Legality 295
88.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
88.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
89 The Object of Debt-Clearance 297
90 Types of Debt-Clearance 299

90.1 Obligatory debt-clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
90.1.1 Conditions of obligatory debt-clearance . . . . . . . . . . 299
1. Correspondence of the two debts or rights . . . . . . 300
2. Equality of the two cleared debts . . . . . . . . . . . 300
3. The no-harm clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
4. Avoidance of prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
90.1.2 Voluntary debt clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
90.1.3 Forbidden debt clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
1. Currency exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
2. The price of salam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
3. The object of salam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
4. The price of a voided salam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
5. Suspicion of ribā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
91 Consequences of Debt-Clearance 307

91.1 Voiding debt clearance contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
XV Coercion (Al-’Ikrāh) 311

92 Nature and types 315
92.1 The nature of coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
93 Coercion Conditions 317
94 Coerced Physical Actions 321

94.1 Rulings for the hereafter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
94.1.1 Permissibility due to coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
94.1.2 Licentious allowance due to coercion . . . . . . . . . . . 322
94.1.3 Forbidden actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
94.2 Rulings for this world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
xiv CONTENTS
94.2.1 Permissibility due to coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

94.2.2 Licentious allowance due to coercion . . . . . . . . . . . 326
94.2.3 Forbidden actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
94.3 Coercion to take one of two actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
95 Legal Actions 333

95.1 Binding legal actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
95.2 Non-binding actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
95.3 Coerced acknowledgement of liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
95.4 Coercion with some choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
XVI Interdiction 341

96 Definition and Legality 345
96.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
96.2 Proof of legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
96.3 The wisdom in permitting interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
96.4 Types of interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
97 Reasons for Interdiction 351

97.1 Young children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
97.1.1 Consequences of a child’s dealings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
97.1.2 Withholding the child’s property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
97.1.3 Reaching puberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
97.1.4 Discernment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
97.1.5 Guardians and plenipotentiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
97.1.6 Guardian dealings in a child’s property . . . . . . . . . . 360
H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
¯
H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
97.1.7 Authorizing the interdicted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
Guardian wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
97.2 Insane individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
97.3 Idiots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
97.4 The mentally incompetent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
97.4.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
97.4.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
97.4.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
¯
97.4.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
97.5 Stupid individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
97.5.1 Commencement and end of interdiction . . . . . . . . . . 377
97.6 Muslim sinners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
Note on absent individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
97.7 Public interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
CONTENTS xv
97.8 The terminally ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

97.9 Married women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
97.9.1 Digression on charitable contributions . . . . . . . . . . . 382
97.10 The bankrupt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
97.10.1 Definition of bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
97.10.2 Interdiction of the bankrupt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
97.10.3 The need for a court order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Non-Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
97.10.4 Travel of a bankrupt debtor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
97.10.5 Consequences of interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
1. Creditor rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
2. Maturity of deferred debts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
3. Precautionary incarceration and monitoring . . . . . 389
4. Selling the debtor’s property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
5. Taking repayment in kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
98 Ending Interdiction 405

98.1 Mental incompetence & insanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
98.2 Interdicted children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
98.3 The bankrupt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
99 Indebted Estates 409

99.1 Deferred debts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
99.2 Attaching debts to the estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
99.3 Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
99.3.1 Preferred ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
99.3.2 Minority ruling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
XVII Ownership and its characteristics 413

100 Definition of Ownership 417
101 Eligibility for Ownership 419
102 Types of Ownership 421
103 Partial Ownership 423

103.1 Ownership of the property alone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
103.2 Personal usufruct ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
103.2.1 Simple loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
103.2.2 Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
103.2.3 Mortmains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
103.2.4 Bequeathed usufruct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
103.2.5 Permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
Personal usufruct ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
xvi CONTENTS
Expiration of the usufruct extraction period . . . . . . 426

103.3 Easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
103.3.1 Water rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
103.3.2 Water-flow rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
103.3.3 Drainage rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
103.3.4 Passage rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
103.3.5 Neighboring rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
103.4 More on Easement Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
103.4.1 Easement vs. personal usage rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
103.4.2 Special rulings for easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
103.4.3 Origins of easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
104 Establishment of Total Ownership 433

104.1 Claiming ownerless property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
104.1.1 Land reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
104.1.2 Hunting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
104.1.3 Grass and forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
104.1.4 Mining and treasure-hunting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
Rulings for minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
Treasure rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
104.2 Ownership-transferring contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
104.3 Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
104.4 Derivation from owned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
105 Is Private Ownership Absolute? 441

105.1 introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
105.2 Property and ownership in Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
105.3 Constraining ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
105.4 Specific ownership constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
105.4.1 Avoidance of harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
105.4.2 Ineligibility for private ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
105.4.3 Social rights in private property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
XVIII Ownership-Related Topics 453

106 Land-Related Rulings 457
106.1 Conquered land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
106.1.1 Land conquered by force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Is the ruler bound to divide the land? . . . . . . . . . . 459
Proofs of the option to establish land as a mortmain . . 460
106.1.2 Abandoned lands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
106.1.3 Lands captured by treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
106.2 Lands within the Islamic state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
106.2.1 Owned useful land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
CONTENTS xvii
106.2.2 Owned wasteland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465

106.2.3 Used and unused wastelands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
Official permissions for land reclamation . . . . . . . . 467
Inviolable areas for wells and rivers . . . . . . . . . . . 468
107 Land Reclamation 471

107.1 Definition, legality, and desirability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
107.1.1 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
107.2 Reclaimable Wastelands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
107.2.1 Detailed rulings by school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
¯
H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
107.3 Means of Reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
107.3.1 Land enclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
107.4 Reclamation Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
107.4.1 Reclaimer conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
107.4.2 Reclaimed land conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
107.4.3 Reclamation conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
107.5 Consequences of land reclamation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
107.5.1 Ownership of reclaimed land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
107.5.2 The established tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
107.5.3 Inviolable boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
H. anafı̄ boundary estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
Mālikı̄ estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
Shāfic ı̄ estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
¯
H. anbalı̄ estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
108 Inaccessible Land & Land Distribution 487

108.1 Inaccessible properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
108.1.1 Origins and meaning of h.imā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
108.1.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
108.1.3 Inaccessible land rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
108.2 Land distribution (al-’iqt.āc ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
108.2.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
108.2.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
108.2.3 Types of land and rights distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 491
1. wasteland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
2. Distribution of easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
3. Distribution of mining rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
Shāfic ı̄ and H
. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
¯
xviii CONTENTS
109 Easement Rights (H . uqūq Al-’Irtifāq) 501

109.1 Definition and legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
109.1.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
109.1.2 Easement rights vs. rights of usage . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
109.1.3 Juristic characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
109.1.4 General legal status rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503
109.2 Types of Easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
109.2.1 Water rights (h.aqq al-shirb) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
¯
1. Water in containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
2. Water of wells and springs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
3. Private rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
4. Water of public rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
General rulings on watering rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
Maintenance and grafting of rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
109.2.2 Drinking rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
109.3 Water passage rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
109.4 Drainage rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
109.5 Passage rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
109.6 Vertical neighborhood rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
109.7 Horizontal neighborhood rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
XIX Share-cropping Arrangements 519

110 Muzārac a or Mukhābara 521
¯
110.1 Definition, legality, and cornerstones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
110.1.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
110.1.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
110.1.3 Cornerstones and characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
110.2 Muzārac a conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
110.2.1 Contracting party conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
110.2.2 Crop conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 524
110.2.3 Plant conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
110.2.4 Produce conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
110.2.5 Agricultural land conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
110.2.6 Object of contract conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
110.2.7 Means of production conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
110.2.8 Contract period conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
Mālikı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
Shāfic ı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
¯
H. anbalı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
110.3 Types of muzārac a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
110.4 Legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
110.4.1 Valid muzārac a for the H . anafı̄s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
110.4.2 Shāfic ı̄ status rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
¯
110.4.3 Defective muzārac a rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
CONTENTS xix
110.4.4 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533

110.5 Termination and voiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
110.5.1 Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
110.5.2 Death of one party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
110.5.3 Voiding based on a valid excuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
111 Musāqāh or Muc āmalah 537

111.1 Definition, legality, cornerstones, and source . . . . . . . . . . 537
111.1.1 Definition of musāqāh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
111.1.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
111.1.3 Cornerstone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538
111.1.4 Eligible trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
H. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
¯
111.1.5 Musāqāh vs. muzārac a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
111.2 Contract conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
111.2.1 H. anafı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
111.2.2 Non-H . anafı̄ musāqāh cornerstones . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543
1. Contracting parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543
2. Object of watering and tending . . . . . . . . . . . . 543
3. Fruits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543
4. Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
5. Contract language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
112 Legal Status 547

112.1 Valid musāqāh rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
112.1.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547
112.1.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
112.1.3 Shāfic ı̄ and H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
¯
Bindingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
Worker possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
112.2 Defective musāqāh rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
112.2.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
112.2.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552
112.2.3 Shāfic ı̄ and H. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
¯
112.3 Contract termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
112.3.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
112.3.2 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
112.3.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
¯
112.3.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
xx CONTENTS
113 Mughārasa or Munās.aba 559

¯ Definition . . . . . . .
113.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
113.2 Legal status rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
113.2.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
113.2.2 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
¯
113.2.3 H
. anbalı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
113.2.4 Mālikı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
XX Division Agreements (Al-Qisma) 565

114 Division of Physical Properties 567
114.1 Definition, legality, and cornerstones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
114.1.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
114.1.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568
114.1.3 Cornerstone and reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
114.1.4 Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
H. anafı̄ views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Mālikı̄ views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
Shāfic ı̄ views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
¯
H. anbalı̄ views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
114.2 Types of division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
114.2.1 H
. anafı̄ classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
114.2.2 Mālikı̄ classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
114.2.3 Shāfic ı̄ classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
¯
114.2.4 H
. anbalı̄ classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
114.3 Contract conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
114.3.1 Voluntary division conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
114.3.2 Obligatory division conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 576
H. anafı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 576
Shāfic ı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
¯
H. anbalı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Mālikı̄ conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
114.4 Methods of division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
Monetary adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
114.4.1 Dividing homes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
114.4.2 Land with buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
114.4.3 Vacant land and and a home, or a home and a shop . . . 582
114.4.4 Vertically neighboring properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582
114.4.5 Road division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
1. Easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
2. Disagreement over road closure . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
3. Disagreement over road size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
4. Road ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
5. Unequal shares in the road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
114.5 The divider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
CONTENTS xxi
114.5.1 Appointing a divider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584

114.5.2 Divider characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
114.5.3 Multiple dividers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586
114.5.4 Divider wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586
114.6 Legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
114.6.1 General rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
1. Bindingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
2. Options in divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588
3. Consequences of division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
4. Voiding divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589
114.6.2 Rulings pertaining to proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
1. Disputes over boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
2. Assessing the extent of injustice . . . . . . . . . . . . 593
3. Disputes over receipt of one’s share . . . . . . . . . . 594
115 Dividing Usufruct 595

115.1 Definition and legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
115.1.1 Definition of alternating use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
115.1.2 Legality of usufruct division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
115.2 Object of usufruct division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
115.3 Characteristics of usufruct division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
115.4 Types of usufruct division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598
115.4.1 Voluntary vs. obligatory usufruct division . . . . . . . . 598
115.4.2 Spatial vs. temporal division of usufruct . . . . . . . . . 599
1. Temporal division of usufruct . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
1-a. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
1-b. Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
1-c. Juristic characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
1-d. Period specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
1-e. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
2. Spatial usufruct division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
2-a. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
2-b. Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
2-c. Object of the contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601
2-d. Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
2-e. Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
2-f. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
115.5 Permitted actions after division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
XXI Usurpation and Destruction of Property 605

116 Usurpation and Its Status Rulings 609
116.1 Prohibition, definition, and demarcation . . . . . . . . . . . . 610
116.1.1 Prohibition of usurpation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610
116.1.2 Definition of usurpation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610
xxii CONTENTS
116.1.3 Consequences of juristic differences in demarcation . . . 613

1. Usurpation of immovable property . . . . . . . . . . 613
2. Growth in usurped property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614
3. Usufruct and output of usurped property . . . . . . 615
4. Usurpation of non-valued properties . . . . . . . . . 616
116.2 Legal status rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
116.2.1 Sinfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619
116.2.2 Returning usurped properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619
116.2.3 Compensation for perished usurped properties . . . . . . 620
1. Methods of compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 620
2. Time of guaranty and compensation assessment . . . 621
3. Absolution of usurper guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . 622
Usurper entitlement after compensation? . . . . . . . . 623
4. Changes in usurped property . . . . . . . . . . . . . 624
5. Diminution in usurped property . . . . . . . . . . . . 626
6. Increase in usurped property . . . . . . . . . . . . . 628
7. Usurped property usufruct and output . . . . . . . . 632
8. Disputes between usurper and owner . . . . . . . . . 633
9. Usurpation from the usurper . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634
Dealings of the usurper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635
Usurped property expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
117 Destruction of Property (Al-’Itlāf) 639

117.1 Definition, and establishment of guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
117.1.1 Leaving a store open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
117.1.2 Opening a fat container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641
117.1.3 Terrorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
117.1.4 Detention and incarceration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
117.2 Conditions for establishing guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643
117.3 Means of compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 646
XXII Fighting an Assailant 647

118 Legality, stages and legal status 649
119 Conditions for Fighting an Assailant 651
120 Is Fighting the Assailant Required? 653

120.1 Self defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
121 Compensation for Fighting an Assailant 655

Defending honor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
Peeking into a house . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
Defending property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
CONTENTS xxiii
XXIII Lost and Found (Al-Luqat.ah & Al-Laqı̄t.) 661

122 Nature and Rulings for Al-Laqı̄t. 665
122.1 Foster parenting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
122.2 Guardianship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
122.3 Presumed religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
122.4 Lineage considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 667
123 Found Property (Luqat.ah) 669

123.1 Definition and legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
123.1.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
123.1.2 Legal status rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
1. Preferability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
2. Guaranty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670
123.2 Types of luqat.ah, and modes of behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . 672
123.2.1 Types of luqat.ah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 672
123.2.2 What to do with luqat.ah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674
1. Methods of announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674
2. Period of announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 674
3. Location of announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
4. Announcement and property expenses . . . . . . . . 676
5. Returning the property to its owner . . . . . . . . . 677
6. Owning the found property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679
Lost and found in the H . aram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 680
XXIV Missing Persons 683

124 Missing Persons 685
124.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
124.2 Declaration of life or death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
124.3 Guardianship rights for the judge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
124.4 Declaration of death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 686
XXV Racing and Athletic Competition 687

125 Racing & Competition (Al-Sabq) 689
125.2 Permissibility conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
126 Al-munād.ala 693

126.2 musābaqa and munād.ala bindingness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
126.3 Legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
126.4 Conditions of validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
xxiv CONTENTS
XXVI Preemption (Al-Shufc a) 697

¯
127 Basics of Preemption (al-shufc a) 701
¯
127.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701
127.2 Proof and reason for its legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
127.3 Wisdom in legalizing preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
127.4 Cornerstone, and instigating factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703
127.5 Legal status and characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703
128 Object of Preemption 705

128.1 Vertical neighborhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
128.2 Easement rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706
128.3 Preemption rights in ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707
128.4 Preemption in crops, fruits, and trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708
129 The Preemptor 711

129.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711
129.2 Prioritizing preemption rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713
129.2.1 Allocation among multiple preemptors . . . . . . . . . . 714
1. Different priority-ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 714
2. Equal priority-ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 715
129.3 Absent preemptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716
129.4 Voluntary dropping of preemption rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 716
130 Legal Status Rulings 719

130.1 Establishment of ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 719
130.2 Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
130.2.1 The Price to be paid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
130.2.2 Reduction or increase in the price . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721
130.2.3 Price deferment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722
130.2.4 Predication on price payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 723
130.2.5 Entitlement of the preempted property . . . . . . . . . . 723
130.2.6 Disagreements over price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
131 Preemption Conditions 725

131.1 Negation of seller ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
131.2 Contract must be commutative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
131.3 Validity of the contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
131.4 Preemptor ownership at sale time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
131.5 Preemptor objects to the sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
Legal tricks to drop preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
132 Preemption procedures 733

132.1 Time of exercising preemption rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
132.2 Stages of requesting preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
132.2.1 Immediate request to exercise preemption right . . . . . 734
CONTENTS xxv
132.2.2 Second confirmation request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735

Legal status of the request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
132.2.3 Demanding to take the property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
Delay penalties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 736
Preemption requests for an interdicted person . . . . . 737
The judge’s role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
133 Changes in the Object of Preemption 739

133.1 Contracts and dealings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 739
133.2 Growth in the object of preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
133.2.1 Natural growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
133.2.2 Caused increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741
133.3 Diminution in the object of preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742
134 Dropping Preemption Rights 745

134.1 Preemptor sale of his property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
134.2 Voluntary dropping of the right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
134.3 Guaranty of the price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747
134.4 Division of the object of preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 748
134.5 Death of a preemptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 748
Part VIII
Guaranty Al-Kafālah
1
3
Preliminaries
Guaranty is known by many names in Arabic: kafālah, h.imālah, d.amānah,

and zac āmah. The prominent Shāfic ı̄ jurist Al-Māwardı̄ said that the first name
¯
is used in guaranteeing individuals, the second in guaranteeing blood money,
the third in guaranteeing debts, and the fourth in guaranteeing substantial
financial sums. In this regard, a financial guaranty of a debt, retaliatory financial
compensation (qis.ās), or other obligations, in the presence of the obligated party,
are also called a credit guaranty (kafālah bil-nafs or kafālah bil-wajh).
We shall discuss the guaranty contract in five chapters:
1. Legality, definition, cornerstones, and contract language.
2. Conditions of contract validity.
3. Legal status.
4. Contract termination.
5. Guarantor’s right to seek compensation from obligated party.

Chapter 57
Legality and Cornerstones
57.1 Legality
We can generally say that the guaranty contract (al-kafālah) is legalized by
proofs from the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and juristic consensus (’Ijmāc ):
• Proof is found in the Qur’ān in the verse: “For the one who produces it [the
King’s beaker] is the reward of a camel load: I will be his Za‘ı̄m” [12:72].
’Ibn c Abbās stated that Zac ı̄m is another word for Kafı̄l, i.e. guarantor.
• Proof is provided in the Sunnah in the H . adı̄th : “The guarantor (Al-Zac ı̄m)
¯
is a debtor”. This H . adı̄th was narrated by ’Abū-Dāwūd, Al-Tirmidhı̄, and
¯ ¯
’Ibn-H. ibbān, with the latter two rendering it a valid H
. adı̄th (Sahı̄h).1
¯ . . .
Al-Bukhāri also narrated in his S.ah.ı̄h. that the Prophet (pbuh) came to
¯
the funeral of a man to pray on his soul. He asked those present: “did
he leave any wealth?”, they said “No”. Then he asked, “did he die with
any debts outstanding?”, and they said “yes, he owed two Dinārs”.2 The
Prophet (pbuh) was thus about to leave, and said “then you pray on your
companion”. At that time, ’Abū Qatādah said: “I guarantee his debt, Oh
Messenger of Allāh”, and the Prophet (pbuh) prayed on his soul.3
1 This Hadı̄th was narrated on the authority of three companions of the Prophet (pbuh):
. ¯
’Abū ’Umāmah Al-Bāhiliy, ’Anas ibn Mālik, and c Abdullāh ibn c Abbās. Its verification and
chains of narration were discussed previously (c.f. Al-Tirmidhı̄’s Jāmic , vol.6, p.295).
2 Another narration states that his debt was three Dinārs.¯
3 Narrated by Al-Bukhāri, ’Ahmad, Al-Nasā’ı̄, and ’Ibn Hibbān on the authority of Salamah
¯ . .
ibn Al-’Akwa‘. Also narrated by ’Ah.mad, and the authors of Sunan with the exception of
’Abū Dāwūd on the authority of ’Abū Qatādah, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ considered this chain of
¯
narration valid. The narrations of Al-Nasā’ı̄ and ’Ibn Mājah state explicitly the term kafālah
in ’Abū Qatādah’s statement. Another narration is provided by ’Ah.mad, ’Abū-Dāwūd, Al-
Nasā’ı̄, ’Ibn H . ibbān, Al-Dāraqut.nı̄, and Al-H
. ākim on the authority of Jābir ibn Abdullāh.
c
H. adı̄th s of similar imports were narrated by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ and Al-Bayhaqı̄ on the authority of
¯
’Abū Sa‘ı̄d Al-Khudriy, based on weak chains of narration. Another similar narration was also
¯
provided by Al-Bazzār on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah with a strong chain of narration.
The narration that renders the guarantor of the two-Dinār debt to be ‘Alı̄ ibn ’Abı̄ T . ālib
5
6 CHAPTER 57. LEGALITY AND CORNERSTONES
• There is also a consensus among Muslims that guaranty is permissible,

due to dire need for such contracts in financial dealings, and to protect
debtors.4 Thus, all jurists agreed on the general legality of guaranty con-
tracts, even though there are some differences in their detailed rulings, as
we shall see. In this regard, we note that a guaranty wherein the guaran-
tor has good intentions is considered a righteous act, for which Allāh will
reward the guarantor. However, in practice, a guaranty is immediately
followed by the guarantor blaming himself and being blamed by others,
then he regrets his act when demanded to pay on behalf of the guaranteed
party, and he finally loses some of his property.5
Guaranty contracts are legalized since they are a means for ensuring the
rights of economic agents through cooperation between people. Thus, it makes
dealings in loans and simple loans safer, and makes the means of ensuring such
safety less intrusive for the debtor.
57.2 Definition
The H . anafı̄s define kafālah as making the guaranteed person’s liability a joint
liability of the guaranteed and guarantor at the time of demanding compensa-
tion. Thus, any individual, property, usurped object, or other item that can be
demanded from the former can also be demanded from both parties by virtue of
the guaranty. However, the liability is not established on the guarantor alone,
and it is never dropped for the guaranteed.6 In this regard, the H . anafı̄s and
c
H. anbalı̄s use the term “conjoining” (al-d . amm), while the Sh āfi ı̄s use the term
¯
“obligation” (al-’iltizām). The H . anafı̄ terminology is the appropriate one in this
context.
The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s all held a stronger notion as given in
¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (): that a guaranty is a conjoining of the guarantor’s liability to
the liability of the guaranteed. Thus, the debt would be established as a joint
liability on both of them.7
In this regard, we note that the creditor’s right is not increased by conjoining
the guarantor’s liability to that of the guaranteed. This follows from the fact
that the creditor is still entitled to one repayment, either from the guarantor or
from the original debtor.
has a weak chain of narration, as noted by ’Ibn H . ajar. See ’Ibn H. ajar (, p.250 onwards),
Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.127), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.13, p.62), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5,
¯ ¯
p.237 onwards).
4 Al-Sanc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.62), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.19, p.160
. ¯ .
onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.198), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.534).
5 Some of the ¯ ¯ ¯
companions of the Shāfi ı̄ jurist Al-Qafāl: it is written in the Torah that
c
¯
guaranty is discouraged; it begins with blame, progresses to regret, and ends with loss of
property.
6 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.389), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.2), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.260).
7 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.329), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.198), ’Ibn
¯ . ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.534).
57.2. DEFINITION 7
We also note that the establishment of a mutual debt - as established by

guarantees – is permissible. In this regard, a debt is a legal (rather than ac-
tual) consideration which can be established as a multiple liability on multiple
parties. This is contrasted to non-fungible items that cannot be established
simultaneously in two actual places.
A proof that the debt of the guaranteed party is established as a liability
on the guarantor is the fact that the guarantor is eligible to accept the debt as
a valid gift, which the guarantor may then give to the original debtor. This is
an exception to the general rule that debts may not be offered as gifts to any
party other than the debtor, thus establishing that the guarantor is considered
a joint debtor. A second proof is also provided by the ruling that the creditor
may buy an item from the guarantor in exchange for the debt. This too is in
contrast to the general rule that debts may not be used as prices in trades with
a party other than the debtor, thus establishing that the guarantor is legally
considered a mutual debtor.
The H . anafı̄s support their alternative definition, whereby mutual indebt-
edness is not established for the guarantor and guaranteed, by arguing that
legal status should only be established by a reason. Thus, even though mutual
indebtedness may indeed be established, there is no reason to establish such
mutual indebtedness except if the right to demand repayment is established. In
this regard, they argued that the permissibility of giving the debt as a gift to the
guarantor, or using it to buy goods from him, can be established by considering
the debt two debts in order to render the creditor’s action valid.8
The H . anafı̄s provide further proof for their alternative definition by arguing
that guaranties can apply to individuals and non-fungible properties as well
as to fungible debts. Thus, their definition of guaranty as a right to demand
such items from the guarantor makes it more general than simply guaranteeing
liabilities of fungible property. Thus, we see that the H . anafı̄ definition is indeed
more general. In fact, the other schools intended the restrictive definition of
mutual indebtedness only in the case of financial guaranties, and agree with the
H. anafı̄ definition for other liabilities. Thus, we might take the H . anafı̄ definition
as the correct one.
c
However, in practice, the H . anafı̄ ’Ibn Ābidı̄n argued that all jurists agree
that financial guaranties establish the debt as a liability on the guarantor with-
out excusing the original debtor from that liability. As proof, he provided the
previously discussed examples of giving the debt as a gift to the guarantor, or
using it as a price in a sale. Moreover, he argued that if the joint liability was
only established if repayment is demanded, it would not have been possible to
rule that the debt can be collected from the estate of a deceased guarantor, since
death negates the right to demand the debt from him in analogy to other types
of guarantees. However, H . anafı̄s do in fact rule that debts may be collected
from the estate of a deceased guarantor. ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n provides further proof for
his acceptance of the principle of mutual indebtedness by the ruling that the
amount guaranteed by one guarantor may by guaranteed by a third party, thus
8 ibid.
establishing that the first guarantor is in fact a debtor.

The difference between the two definitions (mutual indebtedness vs. mutual
indebtedness only at the time of repayment demand) can be highlighted in a
specific example. If the guarantor were to take an oath that he is not indebted,
he would thus be considered a liar according to the first definition, but not
according to the second.
57.3 Cornerstone
For ’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad, the cornerstones of a guaranty contract are
the guarantor’s offer, and the debtor’s acceptance.9 On the other hand, ’Abū
Yūsuf and the majority of jurists define the guaranty cornerstone as the offer
alone, thus excluding acceptance from the contract cornerstones.10
Thus, a guaranty contract is concluded through the sole action of the guar-
antor in guaranties of wealth or person. In this regard, the majority of jurists -
with the exception of ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Muh.ammad – do not require the debtor
to accept the guaranty, since such acceptance was not mentioned in the above
mentioned H . adı̄th of ’Abū Qatādah. In that H. adı̄th , the offer of guaranty by
¯ ¯
’Abū Qatādah was sufficient to establish it, and thus to convince the Prophet
(pbuh) to pray on his soul. In this regard, guaranty is similar to vows, whereby
the guarantor establishes upon himself a liability for whatever the debtor was
required to pay.11
On the other hand, there is a consensus that consent of the creditor is not
required, since repayment of another’s debt does not require his consent, and
hence a vow to repay does not require his consent either. Moreover, all ju-
rists with the exception of ’Abū H
. anı̄fa permit guaranty of a deceased person’s
debts even if he died in a state of bankruptcy, providing further proof that the
creditor’s consent is not required.
The non-H . anafı̄ jurists enumerate four cornerstones for the guaranty con-
tract:12 (i) an eligible guarantor who can deal in his own property; (ii) a guaran-
teed right for which proxy is permitted (e.g. debts and guaranteed non-fungible
properties; to the exclusion of physical penalties and retaliations, in which no
proxy is permitted); (iii) guaranteed individual (i.e. any debtor, alive or dead);
and (iv) contract language (the offer of guaranty). The Shāfic ı̄s added the cred-
¯
itor as a fifth cornerstone.
9 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.261).
10 ’IbnAl-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.2), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.390), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
c
((H
. anafı̄), ibid.), Majma Al-D
c
. amānāt (p.275).
11 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.200), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.340), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.535).
12 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.325), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.198), Marc ı̄ ibn
¯ . ¯ ¯
Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.104).
57.3. CORNERSTONE 9
57.3.1 Guaranty language

The guaranty contract requires precise language for its establishments. In this
regard, the H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s permitted explicit and implicit indications of
¯
guaranty, through any language that customarily signifies trust.13 In this regard,
explicit language of guaranty would state “I guarantee the debt of so-and-so”,
“I am responsible for so-and-so’s debt”, “you can collect this debt from me”,
“leave this to me”, etc. On the other hand, the guarantor may establish guaranty
indirectly by saying “leave so-and-so, and his debt is mine”, “I guarantee so-
and-so”, or “I am liable for so-and-so’s guaranty”, etc. In this regard, if the
guarantor indicates guaranty of a material or physical debt, then the guaranty
is established, otherwise it is nugatory.
However, if the guarantor says “I owe so-and-so thus-and-thus”, the language
may mean that the named person had deposited an item with him, or that he
had established a liability for that item through guaranty. If this language
is used without further specification, then it is taken to mean that he is a
depositary, unless the item is fungible, in which case it is considered a liability,
since fungibles can only be established thus.
57.3.2 Types of guaranty

There are two modes of guaranty: physical (kafālah bi-l-nafs), and financial
(kafālah bi-l-māl). Thus, a physical guaranty is established if the guarantor
says: “I guarantee to bring so-and-so”, “I guarantee his neck”, “his soul”, “his
body”, “a portion of him”, etc. In this regard, the juristic principle states that
“specifying part of an indivisible object is tantamount to specifying the whole”.
Thus, any such specification implies full guarantee of the specified individual.14
This is in contrast to the case where a guarantor guarantees an individual’s arm
or leg (which are separable from the person himself). Physical guaranty is also
established if the guarantor says “I guarantee so-and-so”, “I am responsible for
so-and-so”, etc.; but not established if he says “I guarantee whatever he wishes”.
57.3.3 Modes of guaranty

A guaranty may be unrestricted, or restricted by description, suspended pending
a condition, or deferred to a future time.15
13 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.292), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.264), Majma Al-D
c
. amānāt (p.265), Al-Kh at.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.206), H. āshiyat Qalyūbı̄ wa Umayrah (vol.2, p.330).
c
14 This is¯ similar to the case where a man initiates half a divorce, which counts as a full
divorce, since divorces are indivisible. This is in contrast to financial guaranties, whereby an
individual can guarantee half the debt of another, since financial debts are divisible.
15 See the full classification in Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.3), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄),
. .
vol.5, pp.404,411).
A. Unrestricted guaranty
An unrestricted guaranty is valid subject to the conditions we shall list shortly.
However, we should note that it is nevertheless restricted by the nature of the
guaranteed debt. Thus, the guaranty is currently due or deferred according to
whether the guaranteed debt is current or deferred.
B. Restricted guaranty
A guaranty may be restricted by description (e.g. deferred or current). Thus,
it is valid to restrict a guaranty through deferment to a specified date. In
this regard, the term of deferment of guaranty may and may not coincide with
the term of deferment of the guaranteed debt. This follows since the right to
demand repayment is a legal right of the creditor, who may thus agree with the
guarantor and debtor on any conditions that are mutually agreeable.
In the case of a current debt, it is permissible to have a deferred guaranty,
since – according to the majority of jurists – the debtor may still benefit legally
from such deferment. In this regard, if deferment of the guaranty is specified
in the initial contract, it automatically renders the debt deferred. However, if
deferment of the guaranty is specified after the conclusion of the initial contract,
then it only affects the guarantor. In the latter case, if the creditor initiates the
debt deferment, the guarantor may proceed accordingly, but the guarantor may
not defer the guaranty without the debtor’s consent. This follows from the fact
that deferment of the debt means deferment of demanding repayment, and may
not be used to drop an established legal right.
The H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and Sh āfic ı̄s16 ruled that if the guarantor or the debtor
¯
were to die during the deferment period, the deferment term continues to be
valid, and the rights and liabilities are established for and on the estates of the
deceased. The H . anafı̄s base this opinion on the general principle that death
obliterates an individual’s liabilities and eligibility for dealing, except for trans-
actions that are necessary to satisfy legal rights that were established during his
life. On the other hand, there are two reported opinions in the H . anbalı̄ school,
of which ’Ibn Qudāmah prefers the view that the term of deferment remains
intact, and it is not permitted for the creditor to demand repayment earlier, in
analogy to the case where the guarantor remains alive.17
The H . anafı̄s, H. anbalı̄s, and Mālikı̄s permit guaranty with a vaguely specified
term of deferment, provided that it is a customarily used term of deferment (e.g.
until harvest time, etc.). They rule thus based on the view that this introduces
minor ignorance that can be tolerated in guaranties. On the other hand, Al-
Shāfic ı̄ did not permit such imprecise terms of deferment in guaranties.18 All
¯
16 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.28), Al-Tahāwı̄
. ¯ . . .
((H
. anafı̄), p.105), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.337), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ . ¯ ¯
p.208).
17 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.545).
18 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, ibid., p.560), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.307), Al-Sarakhsı̄
¯ . c ¯ ¯ ¯
(1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.19, p.172), Majma Al-D . amānāt (p.273), Al-Farā’id Al-Bahiyyah fı̄
Al-Qawāc id Al-Fiqhiyyah (p.142).
57.3. CORNERSTONE 11
schools agree that an unknown and unusual term of deferment of guaranty (e.g.
until it rains, etc.) introduces excessive ignorance and is thus rendered invalid.
However, while the deferment condition is rendered invalid, the guaranty itself
remains valid.
On the other hand, if the guaranty is current, the creditor may demand
immediate establishment of the liability, whether or not the debt itself is current
or deferred. Symmetrically, if the guarantor establishes a current liability for
the guaranteed debt, the creditor is entitled to defer it, thus deferring his own
right.
In summary, all four schools of jurisprudence permit deferred guaranties of
current debts, as well as current guaranties of deferred loans. This follows from
the fact that guaranty is a voluntary contribution that meets a financial need
in human transactions, and thus they are valid in any form stipulated by the
guarantor.19 In this regard, ’Ibn Mājah narrated in his Sunan that the Prophet
(pbuh) guaranteed a debtor for one month.
In the case of physical guaranties, it is permissible for a person to guarantee
the safe delivery of another for a specified term (e.g. one month, three days,
etc.). In this case, the majority of jurists agree that the guarantor is required
to deliver the guaranteed person at the end of the specified period, and not
responsible for immediate delivery. However, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the guar-
antor may be required to deliver the guaranteed person at any time, and is only
relieved of his responsibility once the specified period expires. This latter ruling
agrees with common custom, and it also agrees with Al-H . asan ibn Ziyād and
Al-Qād.ı̄ Al-Nasafiy, and many jurists have given this opinion as their official
fatwā.20
C. Suspended guaranty pending a condition

The H . anafı̄s permit a guaranty contract that is suspended pending a condition,
provided that the specified condition agrees with the consequences of the con-
tract; e.g. if the condition establishes or facilitates the satisfaction of a legal
right. For instance, the guarantor may say “I guarantee delivery of the mer-
chandise once it is due”, or “once the guaranteed debtor arrives, I guarantee his
debt”. The guarantor may also make the guaranty conditional on events that
make collecting a debt difficult, e.g. “if so-and-so leaves town, I guarantee his
debts”.
On the other hand, any conditions that do not satisfy that general principle
(e.g. suspension until it rains, or until someone enters his house, etc.) are
rendered nugatory, and the guaranty is established immediately.21 In general,
it is thus permitted for a guaranty to be suspended pending events that establish
19 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.331), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3,
. ¯
p.416), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.207), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.544).
20 Majmac¯ Al-Damānāt¯
(p.266).
¯
.
21 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.414), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.4), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
. .
((H
c
. amānāt (p.273), Al-Farā’id Al-Bahiyyah fı̄ Al-Qawā‘id
Al-Fiqhiyyah (p.142).
a right or the ability to collect that right, but not pending unconventional events
such as rain. However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that it is not permitted to suspend a
¯
guaranty pending the arrival of the new month.22
Suspending financial guaranty on physical guaranty
If a person guaranteed another, e.g. by saying “if I do not bring him tomorrow,
I guarantee his debts”, and then he did not bring him, or the guaranteed in-
dividual died, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the guarantor is liable for the guaranteed
property. In this case, there are in fact two guaranties, one physical and one
financial, whereby the physical guaranty was unconditional and the financial
was conditional on not satisfying the physical. Such suspension of the second
guaranty is permissible provided that the debtor acknowledged his debt, or that
a judge ruled thus.23 On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the guarantor
¯
does not guarantee the property in this case.24
The H . anafı̄s listed many similar instances under this heading. For instance,
they considered the case where a guarantor guarantees an individual, and stip-
ulates that if he does not deliver him the next day, he owes the creditor $1000.
In this case, if he did not specify that he owes the creditor “the $1000 claimed
to be owed by the guaranteed”, and if the debtor denied the debt, the H . anafı̄s
differed in the rulings. Thus, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the guar-
antor still owes the $1000, whereas Muh.ammad ruled that he does not. The
first two argued based on the text of the guaranty which guarantees delivery of
the $1000. On the other hand, Muh.ammad argued that this is an instance of
offering to pay an amount of money without an established liability, and sub-
ject to the occurrence of a risky event. In this regard, a liability would not be
viewed as risky if it were established, but guaranteeing a fixed amount of money
irrespective of liabilities makes it a risky offer.
On the other hand, if a person guarantees another with a financial compen-
sation, and tells the creditor “if I bring him to you tomorrow, I am exonerated
of the financial liability”, then some jurists rule that he is thus exonerated. This
opinion is based on the view that exoneration is not thus caused by delivery.
Rather, they argue, delivery was the objective of the contract, and the financial
compensation guarantee was stipulated to guarantee such delivery.
However, the more accepted opinion is the view that the guarantor is not
thus exonerated of the financial responsibility. This opinion is based on the view
that exoneration cannot be made suspended pending the condition of delivery.
This in turn is based on the general principle that exoneration results in transfer
of property, which cannot be suspended pending a condition.25
22 Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.415), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.341), Al-
¯ . ¯ ¯
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.207).
¯23 ¯ ¯
Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.4 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.396), Al-
Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.19, p.176), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.269), Majma
c
¯
. amānāt (p.266 onwards).
Al-D
24 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.25 onwards).
¯ .
25 Al-Kāsānı̄ ¯ ¯
((H
. anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Sarakh sı̄ (1st edition (H. anafı̄), vol.19, p.178).
¯
D. Deferred guaranty
The H . anafı̄s permit deferred guaranties. Thus, they permit one person to guar-
antee for another whatever he lends in the future to a specified party. They
also permit guaranteeing any property that the third party may consume or
usurp, and guaranteeing the price in a sale. In all such cases, the guaranty is
valid since it is thus suspended pending a condition that results in establishing
the right to be guaranteed. Thus, civil law has permitted suspending guaranty
pending a condition or deferring it to a future time.
Options in guaranty
There is a consensus among jurists that no options are permitted in guaranty
conditions. In this regard, options are permitted in cases where information
can be obtained about uncertain objects. However, a guarantor knows what
he guarantees and there is no uncertainty involved. Moreover, the guaranty
contract does not require acceptance, in analogy to vows, and thus does not
permit the establishment of any options.26

Chapter 58
Guaranty Conditions
Conditions of a guaranty contract may pertain to the language of the contract,

the guarantor, the debtor, the creditor, or the object of guaranty. In this termi-
nology, the guarantor is the one who would be required to pay what the debtor
owes the creditor (be it property or an individual).
58.1 Contract language conditions

There are three conditions for the language of a guaranty contract:
1. The language must explicitly or implicitly denote guaranty (e.g. “I guar-
antee so-and-so’s debt to you”, “the debt so-and-so owes you is now mine”,
etc.).
2. The language must signify the establishment of guaranty, thus invalidating
guaranties suspended on uncommon conditions (e.g. “if so-and-so returns
from his travel, then I guarantee so-and-so’s debt”, “if you do such-and-
such, then I shall guarantee delivering so-and-so”, or “if it rains, then I
guarantee such-and-such”). This follows since guaranty is a contract the
consequences of which are established immediately, and thus may not be
suspended thus.
3. A guaranty may not be timed in financial guaranty, wherein the objective
is repayment, or physical guaranty, wherein the objective is delivery. How-
ever, it is permitted to guarantee delivery of an individual immediately,
with a condition of deferment of his delivery. It is also permitted to con-
clude a guaranty of paying a current debt, with a condition of deferment
of guarantor payment. In such cases, the permission is granted since the
guarantor may not be able to deliver immediately. On the other hand, it is
permitted to establish an immediate guarantee of a deferred debt, since it
involves voluntary prepayment. However, as we have seen, the guarantor
in the latter case is not bound to prepay, and he may exercise the initial
debtor’s right to pay after the specified deferment term.
15
16 CHAPTER 58. GUARANTY CONDITIONS
58.2 Guarantor conditions

1
H
. anafı̄ and other jurists stipulated two main conditions for the guarantor:
1. The guarantor must be eligible for making voluntary contributions. Thus,
guaranty is not concluded by a child or an insane person. This follows
since guaranty is a contract that entails voluntary contribution to make a
payment. While all jurists agree on this eligibility condition, the Shāfic ı̄s
¯
add a condition of being of good religion. The Mālikı̄s, on the other hand,
deviated from the majority of jurists by restricting a woman’s ability to
act as guarantor with more than one-third of her wealth. This ruling
follows from their general restriction of women in dealing with more than
one third of their wealth lest the husband may suffer a loss. Thus, in
their school, if she guarantees with more than one third of her wealth, the
guaranty is not binding on her, and it is suspended pending approval of
her husband.
In this regard, guaranties initiated by an individual on his death bed
are restricted by the rules of inheritance in the same manner that all
his voluntary contributions are restricted. Thus, he may not make such
guaranties for more than one third of his property, and if he does, the
guaranty would be deemed suspending pending the approval of his heirs.
2. The condition of executability of guaranty is freedom to perform trans-

actions. Thus, guaranties may not be initiated by a slave, who may not
make voluntary contributions without his master’s permission. However,
in the stated case, the guaranty would be established, and the slave may
be demanded to satisfy its obligations upon obtaining his freedom.
58.3 Debtor conditions

There are two conditions for the debtor whose debt is being guranteed:2
1. ’Abū H
. anı̄fa stipulated a condition that the guarantor must be capable of
delivering what he guarantees, either directly or through an agent. Thus,
he ruled that it is not valid to establish a guaranty for the debt of a
deceased individual who died in a state of bankruptcy (i.e. his estate
cannot pay his debts). In this case, he ruled that the debt is dropped in a
manner analogous to exoneration, and thus may not be guaranteed. Thus,
he argued, all liabilities on the juristic personality of the deceased would
have perished, and no debt would remain. Since guaranty is conjoining
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.5 onwards), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.8),
. ¯ .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.262), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.159),
¯
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.433), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), p.325), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf
c
¯ ¯ ¯
(1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.103), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.541 onwards).
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.6), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, pp.262,278), ’Ibn Al-
. .
Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.419).
58.4. CREDITOR CONDITIONS 17
one person’s liability to another, he ruled that there is no guaranty in this

case.
However, ’Abū Yūsuf, Muh.ammad, and the majority of jurists ruled3 that
it is valid for a guarantor to guarantee the debts of a bankrupt deceased in-
dividual. They based their ruling on the above mentioned H . adı̄th of ’Abū
¯
Qatādah, whereby he guaranteed the debts of a deceased person whose
estate could not repay his debts. Moreover, the Prophet (pbuh) encour-
aged his companions to guarantee the debts of the deceased in that H . adı̄th
¯
by asking if one of them would guarantee his debts. They argued further
that the debts of a deceased person are established debts nonetheless, and
thus may be guaranteed whether or not the deceased left enough wealth to
repay them. As proof of this assertion, they cite the fact that the creditor
is permitted to collect repayment of such debts from a guarantor, whether
or not the debtor died prior to the establishment of the guaranty.
2. H. anafı̄ jurists argued that the guarantor must know the debtor whose
debts he guarantees. Thus, they ruled that it is not valid for a guarantor
to simply say “I have guaranteed what some person owes”. They based
this ruling on the view that such guaranties are unconventional. Moreover,
they said that this condition is necessary to know whether the debtor is
rich (and thus capable of paying his own debts) or poor, and whether or
not he is worthy of such voluntary charitable contributions.
However, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s, and some other jurists, argued that
¯
it is not necessary for the guarantor to specify or know the guaranteed
debtor. They based this ruling on analogy to the fact that consent of the
debtor is not necessary. They also answered the aforementioned argument
by saying that charity is charity, whether or not the recipient is worthy of
it.4
Jurists agree that it is not necessary for the debtor to be present when
the guaranty contract is initiated. Thus, it is permitted to guarantee the
debts of an absent or incarcerated person. In fact, the need for guaranty
usually arises precisely in this type of case.5
58.4 Creditor conditions

There are three conditions for the creditor:6
1. H. anafı̄ jurists stipulated that the creditor must be known. Thus, they
ruled that guaranteeing “somebody’s debt” is not valid. They argued for
3 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.294), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.331), ’Abū-
¯ .
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.339), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.537).
4 Al-Khat¯ ¯
. ı̄b Al-Sh irbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.200), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.535).
5 ’Ibn ¯Rushd Al-H ¯ ¯
afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.294), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
¯ . . anafı̄), vol.6, p.6), Al-Kh atı̄b
¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.204).
¯ ¯
6 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.6 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.417), Al-
. .
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.280).
¯
this condition based on the view that without knowing and specifying the
creditor, the objective of guaranty, which is ensuring repayment, cannot
be ascertained. Most of the Shāfic ı̄s agree with this condition, based on
¯
the view that creditors vary in their intensity of demanding repayment,
thus requiring specification of the creditor whose property is guaranteed.7
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s and H. anbalı̄s permitted guaranteeing debts
for unnamed creditors, e.g. “I guarantee the debts of Zayd that he owes
other people”. They find proof for their view in the verse: “They said: We
miss the great beaker of the king; and for him who produces is the reward
of a camel load; I will be bound by it” [12:72]. In this case, the speaker – an
agent for Yūsuf (pbuh) – was not an owner, but he nonetheless promised
a camel load for whoever produced the beaker, and bore the responsibility
for this offer on behalf of Yūsuf(pbuh).8
2. ’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that the creditor or his agent must be
present during the guaranty contract session. Thus, they ruled that the
guaranty is not permitted if a guarantor guarantees to an absent creditor,
even if the latter approves the guaranty once he hears of it. They based this
ruling on the view that guaranty has the effect of transferring ownership,
which thus requires offer and acceptance to complete the language of the
contract.
There are two narrated opinions of ’Abū Yūsuf in this regard. The latter
opinion renders guaranties for absent creditors valid. This ruling is based
on the view that guaranty adds a liability on the guarantor, and it can
thus be concluded by his offer alone. This is also the basis of the opinion
of the majority of jurists, who ruled that guaranty contracts are concluded
by offer alone.
3. The creditor must be sane. This condition follows from the previous con-
dition for ’Abū H
. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad. Thus, the acceptance of guaranty
by non-discerning children or insane individuals cannot render a guaranty
contract valid in their opinion, since they require acceptance by an eligible
party as a cornerstone of the contract.
58.5 Guaranteed object conditions

There are three conditions for the guaranteed object:9
1. The H. anafı̄s ruled that the object of a guaranty contract must be an estab-
lished liability (fungible, non-fungible, a person, or an action), guaranteed
by the debtor. In the case of non-fungible debts, the H . anafı̄s require
7 Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . Al-Sh ¯
irbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.).
¯
8 ’Ahkām Al-Qur’ān by ’Ibn ‘Arabı̄, ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.535 onwards).
.
9 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.7 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.402 onwards),
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.4, pp.264,281), Majma Al-D
c
. amānāt (p.271), Rawd.at Al-T. ālibı̄n
(vol.4, p.255), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.538 onwards).
58.5. GUARANTEED OBJECT CONDITIONS 19
this condition only for non-fungibles that are guaranteed by themselves.10

This latter category includes usurped objects, received objects of a defec-
tive sale, and a received object of an unconcluded sale.
On the other hand, H . anafı̄s ruled that non-fungibles that are held as a
possession of trust cannot be objects of guaranty, whether their delivery is
not required (e.g. deposits and partnership capital), required (e.g. simple
loans, and leased objects), or whether they are guaranteed by other objects
(e.g. the object of sale prior to receipt, or a pawned object). In this regard,
the objects of trust are not guaranteed, and those guaranteed by other
objects are not guaranteed by themselves. For instance, if the object of
sale were to perish prior to receipt, the seller is not required to make any
payments, since the buyer’s liability for the price is dropped. Similarly, if
a pawned object were to perish, the pawn broker is not responsible to pay
any compensation, since the debt of the owner is reduced by an amount
equal to the value of that object.
Thus, the majority of jurists, and the better accepted opinion of Al-Shāfic ı̄,
¯
ruled that guaranteed non-fungible items may be objects of a guaranty
contract provided that they are guaranteed by the person possessing them
at contract time. This ruling is based on the view that non-fungibles
guaranteed by their possessors are similar to debts established as liabilities
on such parties, and thus may be objects of a guaranty contract. The
less supported opinion of Al-Shāfic ı̄ states that such non-fungibles are not
¯
established as fungible liabilities, and thus may not be objects of guaranty
contracts. However, this opinion was rebutted by the fact that guaranties
of such objects are in fact guarantees either to collect and deliver them,
or to deliver their value if they had perished. Such responsibilities may
indeed be guaranteed, in analogy to guaranteeing the quality of an object
of sale, whereby the seller is responsible either to return the price or its
value if the object of sale is found to be defective.
Moreover, the best accepted opinion of Ah.mad renders as valid guaranties
of trusts such as deposits, leased objects, etc., if the holder guarantees the
objects due to transgression.
The reference to guaranteed actions pertains to actions such as delivering
the object of a sale or pawning. In such cases, the guaranty is valid, since
such delivery is guaranteed by the appropriate party (seller or debtor),
and thus may become guaranteed by the guarantor.
In this regard, it is permissible for the liable person to establish physical
guaranty of delivering himself,11 since that is thus a guaranteed action.
10 In this regard, there are two types of non-fungibles, trusts and guaranties. Trusts include
deposits, partnership property, silent-partnership property, objects of a simple loan, and a

leased object in the possession of the lessee. In contrast, guaranteed objects may be guaranteed
by themselves (e.g. usurped objects, etc.), or guaranteed by something else (e.g. the object
of a sale is guaranteed by the price, and a pawned object is guaranteed by the debt).
11 Physical guaranty refers to the case where the guarantor guarantees delivery of an indi-
vidual who is the object of guaranty.

The majority of jurists –including those of the four major schools – ap-
proved physical guaranty based on financial liability. This opinion is based
on the verse: “He said: I will never send him with you until you swear
a solemn oath to me in Allāh’s name that you will be sure to bring him
back to me unless you are yourselves hemmed and unable to do so” [12:66].
They also based it on the Prophet’s (pbuh) saying that the debtor is re-
sponsible to deliver what he owes, which covers both types of guaranty.
In this regard, whatever is required to deliver based on a contract can be
required to deliver based on a guaranty contract in analogy to property.
Moreover, the guarantor may be in a position to deliver the individual by
finding him and seeking the assistance of legal authorities to deliver him.
On the other hand, the argument of Al-Shāfic ı̄ that physical guaranty is
¯
relatively weak refers to the fact that is weak based on reasoning by legal
analogy. This weakness follows from the fact that a free person cannot
be possessed, and thus may not be “delivered”.12 Despite what H . anafı̄
references state, this is in fact the opinion of Al-Shāfic ı̄. However, the
¯
Shāfic ı̄s ruled that it is valid to establish a physical guaranty to deliver
¯
a person who owes money, or who must receive punishment for murder
or for libel. However, they do not permit it for individuals who must
receive punishments for transgressions against the Law, e.g. for drinking
wine, committing adultery, theft, etc., since their school attempts to avoid
exacting such punishments to the extent possible. In this regard, the
Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled as invalid physical guaranties of delivering any
individual who must receive punishment for any crime (be it murder, libel,
theft, adultery, or any other).
The guarantor in physical guaranties is bound by deadlines that establish
the right to deliver the object of guaranty. Thus, if a debt becomes due,
the creditor demands delivery of the debtor, and the guarantor fails to
deliver him, the judge may incarcerate the guarantor since he failed thus
to satisfy his obligation. However, if the guarantor delivers the debtor to
court, the market, or any place where the creditor can demand repayment,
then the guarantor is exonerated of his responsibility to deliver him.
In this regard, the Mālikı̄s did not permit a married woman from act-
ing as a physical guarantor, lest she be exposed to the humiliation of
incarceration or being forced to travel in order to deliver the guaranteed
individual. On the other hand, they permitted a type of physical guaranty
called “guarantee of search”. This type of guaranty differs from standard
physical guaranties by the fact that the guarantor may only be forced
to pay compensation if he was negligent in searching for the object of
12 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.344), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.291), Al-
¯ .
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.203), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.342),
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.556), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.19, p.162), Al-Kāsānı̄
¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.8), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.391), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄
¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.2, p.153), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.362), lbn-Rush d Al-
¯
Qurt.ubı̄ ((Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.399).
guaranty. This limited guaranty may be initiated by saying “I guaran-

tee finding him, on condition that I cannot be made financially liable if I
cannot find him”.13
2. The majority of jurists ruled that object of financial guaranty must be

possible to collect from the guarantor, otherwise the contract would not
be of any benefit.
14
The H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled according to the same princi-
ple that guaranties for receiving physical punishments are not valid, since
a person cannot receive a punishment in lieu of another, and hence the
guaranty is useless. This opinion was based on the H . adı̄th that the Prophet
¯
(pbuh) said: “there is no guaranty for a physical punishment” (h.add).15
Moreover, they argued that guaranties are intended to ensure rights, while
jurists always try to avoid exacting physical penalties by looking for suf-
ficient grounds to doubt the need for applying them. Thus, certification
and ensuring do not agree with the character of the exacting of physical
punishments. Finally, since the right cannot be collected from the guar-
antor if the guaranteed individual is not delivered, such guaranties are not
permitted.
However, the H . anafı̄s interpreted the impermissibility of guaranties for
physical punishments to imply only that the guarantor may not be forced
to provide the guarantee. However, if the accused individual guarantees
delivery of himself for the physical punishments of crimes for which he
was accused, the guaranty is valid. In this case, delivery of the guaranteed
individual is possible for the accused guarantor who does so of his own
volition.
However, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that if the accused individual does not volun-
teer himself, he may not be forced to provide a guarantor of his delivery.
In this case, as we saw, guaranty does not suit the nature of physical
punishments. Instead, the judge must in this case incarcerate the accused
individual until such a time as the charges are proven and the punishment
exacted (or he is set free if he is innocent). In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and
Muh.ammad ruled that the accused can be forced to provide a guarantor
of delivering him in the cases of physical punishments for murder or libel,
since they affect the rights of other individuals.
In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled as impermissible physical guaranties to
¯
13 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.430,433,451).
14 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.346), ’Ibn Rush ¯
d Al-H . afı̄d
((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.293), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.557), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5,
p.399), Majma Al-D c
. amānāt (p.272), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.157
¯
onwards).
15 Narrated in Al-Bayhaqı̄ with a weak and denied (munkar) chain of narration of c Amr
ibn Shuc ayb on the authorities of his father and grandfather. It was also narrated by ’Ibn
c Udayy in Al-Kāmil, where also found fault in the chain of narrations that contained ’Abū
c Umar Al-Kalāc ı̄ whose Hadı̄ths are not accepted. C.f. Al-Sanc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.63),
. ¯ .
Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.59).
¯
deliver individuals for physical penalties due to crimes that pertain to the
rights of Allāh (e.g. drinking wine, adultery, and theft). In such cases, as
we have seen, their school attempts to avoid exacting such penalties. How-
ever, they permitted physical guaranties to deliver individuals for physical
punishments due to committing crimes against men only (e.g. libel), in
which case guaranty is permitted in analogy to the case of liability for
financial rights.16
For the H . anafı̄s, it follows from this general condition that it is valid to
provide guaranty of delivering goods owed by another, without necessarily
specifying the means of transporting such goods. In such cases the guaran-
tor can in fact perform the obligation of delivering the objects. However,
they ruled that it is not valid to guarantee that such goods will be deliv-
ered on a special vehicle, animal, etc. In the latter case, performing the
guaranteed action may be made impossible if the means of transportation
perishes.
3. A guaranteed financial debt must be a valid and binding liability. Such

liabilities can only be dropped through repayment or exoneration. Thus,
jurists ruled that it is not valid to guarantee the compensation for free-
ing a slave (mukātab) who is permitted to buy his freedom. This ruling
follows from the fact that this compensation is not a binding debt (some
called it a weak debt), since the slave can drop the debt by deciding not
to exercise the option. Thus, certification of such a debt repayment is
rendered meaningless.
They also ruled that guaranty is not permitted for non-debts such as
the alimony of an ex wife before it is determined and agreed-upon. In
this regard, the alimony only becomes a debt after such agreement is
concluded.17
In this regard, Al-Baghdādı̄ ruled that guaranty of alimony payments
¯
is permissible even though they can be dropped if the guarantor or ex-
husband were to die (without payment or exoneration). The same applies
to guaranties of specific future alimony payments, etc.18
Guaranty of future liabilities

There is a consensus that guaranties of currently owed debts are valid if the debt
is known. Moreover, there is a consensus that it is not permissible to guarantee
debts prior to maturity if it is not certain that they will be binding in the future.
However, the majority of jurists permit guaranties of debts prior to maturity if
it is known that the debts will be binding in the future (e.g. promised reward or
16 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.203 onwards), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.343).
17 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, pp.262,274), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.333), Al-Dardı̄r
.
((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.431-434), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.340), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ ¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.201), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.356).
¯ 18 ¯
Majmac Al-D . amānāt (p.269).
jic ālah, or if a person says “deal with so and so, and I guarantee his liabilities to
you”). This ruling follows from the ruling by most jurists that it is permissible
to guarantee another person’s belongings before they are shipped.
In the case of promise of reward, two opinions were reported in the Shāfic ı̄
¯
school regarding guaranteeing such rewards before they are due. The more
accepted opinion in their school renders such guaranties impermissible, based
on the view that liabilities that are not due may not be guaranteed. This general
rule is applied by most Shāfic ı̄s regardless of whether the reason for establishing
¯
the debt is established (e.g. future alimony payments), or not yet established
(e.g. debts originating from a future loan). In this regard, they argue that
guaranty ensures a legal right, and hence may not precede it in analogy to legal
testimony. Thus, they permit guaranties of existing due liabilities, but not for
known future liabilities prior to becoming due.
Guaranty of an unknown liability

The majority of jurists19 do not require that a guaranteed debt be specified, or
known in amount and characteristics. Thus, they permit guaranteeing known
amounts (e.g. “I guarantee his debt of $1000”) as well as unknown amounts
(e.g. “I guarantee whatever you owe him” or “I guarantee whatever you owe
based on this sale”). This opinion is based on the view that guaranty is a
voluntary contribution contract meant to facilitate transactions. Thus, unlike
sales contracts, guaranty contracts may include ignorance.
In this regard, there is a consensus among jurists that guarantees of the price
paid in a sale are valid.20
The H . anafı̄s also permitted the guaranty if one person tells another to take
a particular road, stipulating that he guarantees his property against theft. In
this case, the guaranteed property is unknown, since neither party knows how
much would be stolen, and the guarantor does not know how much property
the guaranteed person will carry with him. The same also applies to the case
of guaranteeing a person’s wealth against usurpation by a named individual or
group.21
In contrast, the latter Shāfic ı̄ juristic system stipulates that a guaranteed ob-
¯
ject must be known in terms of genus, amount, characteristics, and specification.
This opinion is based on the view that a guaranty is a contract that establishes
19 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.9), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.402 onwards), ’Ibn
. .
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.294), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.200), ’Ibn
¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.536-539), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.20, p.50), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n
c
¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.275), Majma c Al-Damānāt
. (ibid.).
20 This is the guarantee provided when dealing with an unknown seller, where the buyer
fears that he may pay the price and receive nothing in return, c.f. Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄)). Thus, Professor Al-Zarqā’ defines al-kafālah bi-l-darak in his Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhı̄
¯ ¯
Al-c Ām (p.271) as the guarantee of the sold object that may not be collected due to a known
source of risk. Some H . anafı̄s ruled that this type of guaranty is permissible, and defined it
as guaranteeing delivery of the price when the object of sale is due. In this case, they ruled
that the guarantor is not liable until delivery is due from either the buyer or the seller, c.f.
Majmac Al-D . amānāt (p.275).
21 Majmac Al-Damānāt (p.270).
.
property as a liability on a human being, and thus it is sufficiently similar to

sales to warrant the exclusion of any type of ignorance regarding the established
liability. On the other hand, they permitted guaranty of the paid price for a
buyer, based on the need for such guaranties in everyday transactions.22
22 Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.403), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.201), ’Ibn
¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.1, pp.340-342).
Chapter 59
Contract Status
The legal status of a guaranty contract may take one of two forms:1
59.1 Seeking compensation from the guarantor

In this case, the compensation that is sought depends on the nature of the
object of guaranty. Thus, if the guaranteed item was a debt, then if there is one
guarantor, full compensation for the guaranteed debt is sought from him. If the
guarantors are many, then each of them would be asked to pay an equal share
of the guaranteed amount, provided that none of them had in turn guaranteed
the other. In this case, they are equal in the guaranty responsibilities, and since
the guaranteed item is divisible, their liability is divided equally. The guarantor
in this case, after having fulfilled his obligation, cannot seek compensation from
another guarantor, but should rather seek compensation from the guaranteed
party.
On the other hand, if the object of guaranty was a person, then the guaran-
tor is required himself to bring the guaranteed person, provided that he is not
absent. In the latter case, the guarantor is given a reasonable waiting period
to bring back the guaranteed person. If the guarantor does not bring the guar-
anteed person within the specified period, and if he cannot prove his inability
to do so due to reasons beyond his ability, then the judge may imprison him
until he can provide such proof. If the guarantor later provides the judge with a
material proof, witnesses, or other proof of his inability to bring the guaranteed
person, then the judge must release him and postpones the ruling until such a
time that he has the ability of bringing the guaranteed. This ruling follows in
this case by comparing the guarantor’s situation with that of a bankrupt person
who had guaranteed a debt. However, even though the judge may release the
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.10 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.391,403),
. .
Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.19, p.162), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.262), ’Ibn
¯
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.325), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.208), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd print-
¯ ¯ ¯
ing (H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.352), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.547).
25
26 CHAPTER 59. CONTRACT STATUS
guarantor in this case, the creditors may continue to monitor the guarantor’s
behavior, and the judge may not issue an injunction against further demands of
delivery. However, the creditors have no right to prevent him from his normal
daily activities of working, earning an income, etc. All the preceding are the
views of the H . anafı̄s.
The Shāfic ı̄s, on the other hand, ruled that the guarantor may be required to
¯
deliver the guaranteed person provided that he knows his whereabouts. How-
ever, if the guarantor is ignorant of the guaranteed person’s whereabouts, they
ruled that he is not obliged to deliver him. In the case where he is obliged to
deliver the guaranteed person, he is thus allowed enough time for the trip back
and forth. If that period passes, but he still fails to deliver the guaranteed per-
son, then he must be imprisoned until such a time that the guaranteed person
cannot be delivered due to his death, moving to an unknown location, or moving
to a location where others protect him from the guarantor’s pursuit.2
Finally, if the guaranteed item was a non-fungible property, the guarantor
is required to deliver the guaranteed item as long as it continues to exist intact.
If the guaranteed item had perished, then the guarantor is required to deliver
the equivalent of its value.
59.1.1 Absolution of guaranteed debtors

• The majority of jurists ruled that the guaranty contract does not absolve
the principal (guaranteed party) from his debt.3 Thus, the creditor is
given the option of demanding payment from the principal or from the
guarantor, unless absolution of the principal was stipulated as a condition
of the guaranty. In the latter case, the guaranty contract is in fact a
transfer of liability (h.awālah).4
• However, the Shāfic ı̄s did not allow the stipulation of such a condition,
¯
since they viewed it as a condition that is not in accordance with the
nature of the guaranty contract.
• Imām Mālik in one of two stated opinions ruled that a creditor may not
seek compensation from the guarantor unless he fails to seek repayment
from principal debtor. This opinion is based on his view that guaranty
is a legal means of ensuring repayment of a debt, and thus repayment
may not be demanded of the guarantor unless it is not possible to demand
repayment from the principal, in analogy to the pawning contract [wherein
the pawned object is forfeited only if the debt cannot be collected from
the debtor].
• On the other hand, ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Laylā, ’Ibn Shubrumah, ’Abū Thawr, ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Sı̄rı̄n, the Z.āhirı̄s, and the ’Imāmı̄s ruled that a guaranty contract absolves
2 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.205).
¯ . ¯ ¯
3 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H . anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.208), ’Ibn Rushd
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯
Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.292), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.546-7), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄),
vol.5, p.390).
4 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.46).
¯ .
59.1. SEEKING COMPENSATION FROM THE GUARANTOR 27
the principal debtor of his debt. Thus, they ruled that the debt is trans-
ferred to the juristic personality (dhimmah) of the guarantor. It follows
¯
in their opinion that the debtor may not seek repayment from the prin-
cipal debtor, in analogy to the transfer of liability case (h.awālah). They
provided for this opinion a proof based on the story that ’Abū Qatādah
(mAbpwh) guaranteed a dead person for his two Dinār debt, after which
the Prophet (pbuh) said to him: “May Allāh reward you well, and may
he release your pawned objects as you released your brother’s pawned ob-
jects”.5 They thus infer from this story that the principal whose debt was
guaranteed was thus absolved of his debt.
The opinion of the majority of jurists is the most valid of those mentioned,
since guaranty is essentially the conjunction of one person’s juristic personality
(dhimmah) to another; either for the purpose of demanding repayment of the
¯
debt or for the rights associated with the debt (as we have seen in the previous
list of opinions). In this regard, absolution of the debtor would not be in accor-
dance with the conjoining of liabilities. Moreover, were the guaranty contract
to absolve the principal debtor of his debt, it would in effect be the same as
a transfer of liability (h.awālah), but of course those are two different contracts
with two different names.
Moreover, the majority opinion was supported by the H . adı̄th : “The soul
¯
of a believer is tied to his debt until it is repaid”.6 They also used as proof
his (pbuh) statement in the story of ’Abū Qatādah, when he learned that his
debts were repaid: “now his grave may cool down”.7 In this regard, the Prophet
(pbuh) prayed for the deceased after his debts were guaranteed since the debt
was now payable; whereas his (pbuh) refusal to pray initially followed from his
objection to praying for a debtor whose debts seemed un-payable. As for his
saying (pbuh) “May Allāh release your pawned . . . ”, it refers to the fact that
the Prophet (pbuh) would not have prayed for him initially, but that condition
was resolved after the guaranty.8
In this regard, one must distinguish between the cases of guaranty and the
cases of a usurper and the one who usurps what the usurper had taken. In
the latter case, the owner of the usurped property may place the responsibility
for guaranteeing his property on either party (but not both). The difference
between the two cases is thus: in the case of usurped property, by designating
a specific party for guaranty, that usurper may in fact gain ownership of the
5 We have mentioned previously that the narration of this Hadı̄th by c Alı̄ is weak, as
. ¯
stipulated by ’Ibn H . ajar. This narration of ’Abū Qatādah is of greater validity.
6 Narrated by Ahmad in his Musnad, and also narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄, ’Ibn Mājah, and
. ¯
Al-H . ākim on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah. A similar H . adı̄th was narrated by Al-T . abarānı̄
¯
in Al-Awsat. on the authority of Al-Barā’ ibn c Āzib that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “the debtor
is a hostage to his debt, complaining to Allāh of his solitude”. However, the latter’s chain of
narration includes Mubārak ibn Fad.ālah, and while c Affān and ’Ibn H . ibbān authenticated it,
some others rendered it weak, c.f. Al-Suyūt.ı̄ (a, vol.2, p.188), Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.129).
7 This is established in the narration on the authority of Jābir ibn ¯ c
abd-Allāh reported
in ’Ah.mad, Al-Dāraqut.nı̄, and Al-H . ākim as “now you have cooled down his skin”, and in
another “his tomb”; c.f. ’Ibn H . ajar (, p.251), Al-Sh awkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.239).
¯
8 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.390), and ibid.
.
28 CHAPTER 59. CONTRACT STATUS
usurped item if a judge were to rule against the initial owner. However, in the
case of guaranty, the guarantor may never imply ownership of the guaranteed
object, since guaranty is essentially a conjoining of liabilities and not a transfer
of ownership, unless repayment is in fact effected, even if a judge were to rule.
59.2 Seeking compensation from the principal

debtor
In all types of guaranty, the guarantor has the right to demand compensation
from the principal debtor, provided that the latter had requested the guaranty.
For instance, if the object of guaranty was a debt, and if the guarantor is asked
to repay the debt, then the guarantor may seek relief from the guaranteed party.
Moreover, if the guarantor were to be imprisoned, he may seek the alternative of
imprisoning the guaranteed party who gave him the responsibility for his debt.
On the other hand, if the guaranty was not requested by the guaranteed
party, then the guarantor has no right to seek compensation from, or imprison-
ment of, the principal debtor. Moreover, if the guarantor voluntarily provided
guaranty to the principal debtor, whether or not the guaranteed party requested
it, with no intention of ever seeking compensation from him, then the debtor is
thus absolved of his debt.
In the cases where the guarantor may seek compensation from the guaran-
teed party, he may only do so after he has repaid the debt, even if the guaranteed
party had requested the guaranty. This follows since the right to seek compen-
sation is only established through lending and ownership transfer, both of which
are only established in our case through repayment of the debt. This ruling is
in contrast to the case of a buying agent, who may seek to collect the price from
the principal prior to paying it out of his own money. In the buying agent case,
the price is compensation for the object of sale, which is being transferred to
the principal and not to the agent. Thus, payment of the price in this case is
the responsibility of the principal alone, and the agent may demand to collect
it. In the case of guaranty, the guarantor’s repayment of the principal debtor’s
debt is considered a loan to the principal, for which the guarantor may seek
compensation, but only after the loan comes into existence through repayment
of the debt.
Chapter 60
Guaranty Termination
In what follows, I shall list the means by which a guaranty contract may be
terminated briefly according to the type of guaranty.
60.1 Guaranteed property

If the object of guaranty is property, then it may be terminated in one of two
ways:1
60.1.1 Debt repayment

If the debt is repaid to the creditor in one way or another, either by the principal
or by his guarantor, the guaranty contract is thus terminated. In this case,
the right to demand repayment was satisfied, and since the objective of the
guaranty contract was to ensure such repayment, the legal status of the contract
is terminated.
Also, if the creditor were to grant the property as a gift of charitable payment
to the principal debtor or his guarantor, then the situation is tantamount to
repayment of the debt, and the contract is thus terminated.
The contract is also terminated if the creditor dies and either the principal
debtor or his guarantor inherit his estate. In this regard, if the inheritor is the
guarantor, then he thus becomes the owner of his own liability for the princi-
pal’s debt through the inheritance. In this case, the guarantor may demand
compensation from the principal in analogy to the case where his own liability
is satisfied by repayment of the debt. On the other hand, if principal debtor
was the inheritor, then the guarantor is absolved of his liability, as if he had in
fact repaid the debt.
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.11), Al-Tahāwı̄ ((Hanafı̄), p.104), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄),
. . . . .
vol.4, p.285), Majmac Al-D . amānāt (p.274), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.546 onwards).
29
30 CHAPTER 60. GUARANTY TERMINATION
60.1.2 Absolution
If the creditor absolves either the guarantor or the principal debtor of the debt,
the guaranty contract is thus terminated. However, if the guarantor is the
one absolved of his liability, the principal debtor is not thus absolved; but if the
principal debtor is absolved, then so is the guarantor. This follows from the fact
that the debt is initially a liability on the principal and not on the guarantor.
Thus, the principal’s liability is like a root, and the guarantor’s liability is
like a branch; whereby absolution of the principal drops the branch together
with its root. On the other hand, absolution of the guarantor only absolves him
from the responsibility to repay the debt, but does not imply that the creditor is
absolved of his debt. In this regard, dropping a branch does not imply dropping
the root.
However, the language of absolution is crucial in determining its extent.
Thus, if the creditor were to say to the guarantor or the principal debtor: “you
are absolved of what you owe me”, the status of the debt is equivalent to that
of repayment. Thus, neither the guarantor nor the principal would owe the
creditor anything after such absolution. However, if the guaranty was requested
by the principal debtor, then the guarantor may still seek compensation from
him.
On the other hand, if the creditor does not mention himself (as in “what
you owe me”), and only says to the guarantor or principal: “you are absolved
of what you owe”, then ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the situation is identical to the
one in the previous paragraph. In this regard, he argued that this absolution
is still equivalent to receipt, since it is customarily assumed that absolution is
given only for debts owed to oneself.
In contrast, Muh.ammad ruled in this case that the guarantor is absolved,
but not the principal debtor. In this regard, he argued that absolution maybe
established either through repayment, or without. Thus, without stating ex-
plicitly that they are absolved of “what they owe him”, which would imply
repayment, the principal is not thus absolved of his debt.
60.1.3 Miscellaneous
In addition to the two main means of termination listed above, there are a few
other means by which a guaranty of property debt can be terminated:
• If either the guarantor or the principal debtor were to transfer liability for
the debt, through a h.awālah, to a third party who accepts the transfer,
then both parties are absolved of the debt and the responsibility to repay
if requested. Therefore, the guaranty is terminated in this case.
• If the guarantor reaches a reconciliation with the creditor for part of the
debt, both the guarantor and the creditors are absolved in two cases:
– If the agreement stipulates that both the guarantor and the principal
are absolved for the rest of the principal’s debt.
60.2. GUARANTEED PERSONS 31
– If the agreement simply stipulates that “we have reached a reconcil-

iation for so-much”, without mentioning absolution.
However, if the guarantor only mentions himself: “on condition that I am

absolved of the remainder of the debt”, then only he is absolved and the
principal remains liable for the remainder.2
• A guaranty may also be terminated through voiding of the instigating

factor for the guaranteed debt. For instance, if the guaranteed debt origi-
nated as the price or the object of a sale, then the guaranty is terminated
if the sale contract is voided. In this case, the guaranteed debt no longer
exists, and thus the principal has no rights over the guarantor.
60.2 Guaranteed persons

The guaranty of a person can be terminated in three ways:3
60.2.1 Delivering the guaranteed person

If the guarantor delivers4 the guaranteed person to a location that makes it
possible to bring him to a courthouse (e.g. to a city), the guaranty is terminated.
In this case, the objective of the guaranty, which is to bring the guaranteed
person to the judge for legal proceedings, is attained, the guaranty is terminated.
In this regard, even if the guarantor were to deliver the guaranteed person to a
judge, while the contract stipulated that he should deliver him to the ruler, he
would still be absolved of his responsibility.
However, if the guarantor were to deliver the guaranteed person to a desert
or far away place, he is not absolved, since the objective of bringing him to court
is not thus attained. The same is true if he is delivered in a small town with no
judicial facilities and/or personnel who can begin legal proceedings.
’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that the guarantor is absolved even if the guaranty con-
tract stipulated that he must deliver the guaranteed person to a specific city,
but he delivered him to another. He based his ruling on the fact that trying the
guaranteed person in the specified city was still possible after his delivery to the
other city. However, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that he is not absolved
thus, unless and until he completes the delivery to the specified location. They
based their ruling on the view that the stipulated condition may be useful, e.g.
if eye witnesses can only be found in the specified city.
2 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, pp.58,91), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid, p.12),
¯ . .
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5,p.412), Al-T . ah.āwı̄ ((H. anafı̄), p.105), Majma Al-D
c
. amānāt
(p.274).
3 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.12 onwards), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.19, pp.
. ¯ .
166,175), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.393 onwards, 411), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4,
p.267 onwards), Majma Al-D c
. amānāt (pp.277,274), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄),
¯
vol.2, p.153 onwards).
4 Deliver is attained by the removal of all impediments between the guaranteed person and
the one to whom the guarantee is given

32 CHAPTER 60. GUARANTY TERMINATION
60.2.2 Absolution
If the party to whom guaranty was provided absolves the guarantor, then the
guaranty is terminated. In this regard, the essence of a guaranty contract is the
right to demand delivery, which is thus dropped through absolution. However, in
this case, the principal guaranteed person is not absolved unless the absolution
is explicitly issued for both the guarantor and the guaranteed person.
60.2.3 Death of the guaranteed person

If the guaranteed person dies, then the guarantor is absolved of the contract,
since delivery becomes impossible. Similarly, if the guarantor were to die, he
would thus be unable to perform the required delivery and his estate cannot
be used to deliver the object of guaranty (in contrast to the case of guaranteed
property, where it may).
However, the death of the party to whom guaranty was given does not ter-
minate the guaranty of a person or property, since the guarantor is still capable
of performing his obligations under the contract, and the deceased party’s heir
or guardian may continue to demand delivery.
60.3 Guaranteed non-fungibles

Guaranties of non-fungibles, the satisfaction of which requires delivery of the
object itself, may be terminated in one of two ways:5
1. Delivery of the guaranteed item if it still exists, or delivery of a similar

item or the value of the item if it had perished.
2. Absolution of the guarantor or the principal debtor. In this regard, guar-

anty is a right for the party to whom it was given, and he can thus drop
it in analogy to debts.
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.13).
Chapter 61
Seeking compensation from

the principal
In this chapter, we discuss the cases wherein the guarantor may seek compensa-
tion from the principal debtor. This issue will be discussed in two sections: (1)
the conditions for seeking compensation, and (2) when to seek compensation,
and what to seek compensation for.
61.1 Conditions for seeking compensation

The conditions under which the guarantor may seek compensation from the
principal debtor are the following:1
1. The H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that for the guarantor to seek compensa-
¯
tion from the principal, the guaranty must be initiated by the principal’s
request or permission. Otherwise, the guarantor is considered to be of-
fering his guaranty as a gift. As proof for their ruling, they referred to
the Prophet’s (pbuh) praying for the deceased person once ’Abū Qatādah
offered his guaranty.2
On the other hand, ’Imām Mālik and ’Imām ’Ah.mad (in one of his re-
ported opinions) did not stipulate the principal’s permission as a condition
for the guarantor’s right to seek compensation from him. Their argument
was based on the view expressed by ’Ibn Qudāmah that paying compen-
sation to the guarantor is required to absolve the principal from a binding
debt. In this regard, the guarantor’s payment of the principal debtor’s
debt is considered similar to the judge’s payment of the debt when the
debtor refuses to pay, after which he may seek compensation. As for the
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.13 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.408 on-
. .
wards), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.19, p.178).
¯
2 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.341), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ol.2,
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.209).
33
34 CHAPTER 61. SEEKING COMPENSATION FROM THE PRINCIPAL
story of ’Abū Qatādah, they argued that he had in fact voluntarily given
his guaranty and repayment as charity to clear the liability of the deceased
person, so that the Prophet (pbuh) would pray for him. In this regard, he
was fully aware that he will not be compensated by the deceased party or
his estate or heirs. Thus, he was a charitable guarantor, who would never
demand compensation for his charity.3
2. The guaranty must be issued by consent of an individual who is qualified
to acknowledge indebtedness. Thus, if the principal debtor is a young
boy who is not eligible to perform financial transactions, the guarantor
of his debts may not seek compensation from him. In this regard, the
relationship between the guarantor who repays the principal’s debt and
the principal whose debt was paid is a relationship of borrowing, which is
not allowed for the young boy.
3. The principal must associate himself with the initial guarantee of the debt
(e.g. by saying “guarantee my debt”). In this regard, unless the principal
associates himself to the guarantee, the relationship of borrowing from the
guarantor would not be established. In fact, the request for guaranty is
a form of requesting to borrow on part of the principal, and agency to
pay the creditor on behalf of the principal, which becomes a loan to the
principal once the payment is made. For the creditor, his acceptance of
the guaranty is an acceptance to take what is owed to him by the principal
from the guarantor.
4. In order for the guarantor to seek compensation from the principal for
his repayment to the creditor, he must not be indebted to the principal
for an equal amount, otherwise the two debts would cancel one another
(muqās..sah).
We now recap some of the previously stated rulings pertaining to seeking
compensation from the principal:
• If the creditor gives the debt as a gift to the guarantor, he may still seek
compensation from the principal, since the gift is equivalent to repayment
of the debt.
• If the creditor gives the debt as a gift to the principal debtor, then the
guarantor is absolved of his responsibility, since the gift is thus equivalent
to repayment of the debt by the principal.
• If the creditor dies and is inherited by the guarantor, then he may still
seek compensation from the principal.
• If the creditor dies and is inherited by the principal debtor, the latter is
thus absolved of the debt, and the guarantor is absolved of his responsi-
bility.
3 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.294), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.449 onwards),
¯ .
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.325).
61.1. CONDITIONS FOR SEEKING COMPENSATION 35
• If the creditor absolves the guarantor, he may not seek compensation from
the principal. In this case, absolution only drops the creditor’s right to
collect from the guarantor, but does not drop the debt of the principal.
• The guarantor may absolve the principal of whatever he guaranteed for

him wither with his permission or as a gift. In such a case, the guarantor
may not seek compensation from the principal after repayment of the debt.
In the case of absolution, we review the previously stated opinions pertaining

to the language used by the creditor:
• If the creditor says to the guarantor: “you are absolved of the money you
owe me”, the H . anafı̄s agree that the guarantor may still seek compensation
from the principal. In this case, they ruled that absolution is tantamount
to receipt, since the word “absolve” is often used after the collection of
debts.
• However, if the creditor says to the guarantor: “you are absolved of the
money”, then the H . anafı̄ jurists differ in opinion.
’Abū Yūsuf ruled that this language implies receipt just like in the previous
case where the creditor mentioned himself. In both cases, he argues that
the creditor takes an action of absolving the guarantor himself, whether
or not that is explicitly stated.
Muh.ammad, on the other hand, ruled that the language in the second case
only ascertains that the guarantor is absolved of his responsibility to pay,
but is not sufficiently strong to indicate receipt (which is thus doubtful).
Thus, since there is doubt associated with the language as it pertains to
debt repayment, he ruled that the debt is not considered repaid, and thus
the guarantor may not seek compensation from the principal. This, in
fact, is the most widely supported opinion among the H . anafı̄s.
• If the creditor simply says “I have absolved you” to the guarantor, absolu-
tion is thus restricted to the guarantor alone. Thus, the H. anafı̄s agree in
this case that its effect does not extend to dropping the debt established
on the principal, and thus the guarantor may not seek compensation. The
difference for ’Abū Yūsuf between this case and the case of “you are ab-
solved of the money” is that being absolved of the debt through absolution
is not effected by the guarantor, but rather by the creditor. Thus, the ac-
tion may not be attributed to the guarantor.4
In summary: the dominant H . anafı̄ opinion is that the guarantor may
not seek compensation from the principal if the creditor said “you are
absolved” without saying “towards me” or “I absolve you”. In such cases
where the creditor does not mention himself, he is thus ruled only to
absolve the guarantor, but not to have declared receipt of his money.
4 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.93), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.413),
¯ . .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.287 onwards).
36 CHAPTER 61. SEEKING COMPENSATION FROM THE PRINCIPAL
Multiple guarantors
Consider the case where two men guarantee a third man’s debt (say of $1000),
without either of the guarantors guaranteeing the other. In this case, if one
of the guarantors repays the debt, then he may not seek compensation from
the other guarantor, but may only seek compensation from the principal debtor
whose debt he guaranteed with his consent.
Now, consider the case where one of the guarantors guarantees the other one,
and then repays the principal’s debt. In this case, the paying guarantor may
specify whether his payment was a fulfillment of his own guaranty or that of
the other guarantor. This follows from the fact that the creditor thus demands
his payment of the money in two capacities: (i) one as a personal liability
as guarantor of the principal, and the other (ii) as guarantor of the second
guarantor. In this regard, neither of the two obligations has a higher priority
than the other, and the paying guarantor is given the option of designating the
payment in either way.
Finally, consider the case where each of the two guarantors guarantees the
other. Then, whatever one of them pays, he is considered to be paying his own
liability up to half of the overall debt ($500 in our example). Thus, up to that
amount, the paying guarantor may not claim to be paying on behalf of the other
one. If the paying guarantor paid more than half the debt (i.e. more than $500
in the example) then he has the option whether to demand compensation for
the excess over half from the other guarantor or from the principal.
In fact, this rule applies in other contexts as well. For instance, if two men
were to buy an item for $1000, each guaranteeing the other’s share of liability for
the price, then whatever one pays up to $500 is considered payment on behalf
of himself. He may thus seek compensation from the other buyer only for the
amount paid over and above the first $500. Similarly, if two unlimited partners
part with a mutual liability, then the creditor may demand repayment from
either one. In this case, the paying debtor may only seek compensation from
the other only for any payments over and above half the debt.5
61.2 Permissible sought compensation

The H . anafı̄s rule that the guarantor may seek compensation from the principal
debtor for what he guaranteed, not for what he actually paid. In this regard,
what was guaranteed was the property established as a liability on the principal,
and that is what he should seek compensation for. Thus, if the guaranteed
object was of high quality, but the guarantor paid the debt with a lower quality
item, the guarantor may still demand compensation with the higher quality
item. Similarly, if he guaranteed a monetary debt, but repaid it in kind, he
still demands monetary compensation equivalent to what he guaranteed, not to
what he used as payment.
5 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.14 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.437 on-
. .
wards), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.20, p.34), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.298).
¯
61.3. TIME TO SEEK COMPENSATION 37
This is in contrast to the agent for debt repayment, who may only seek
compensation from the principal in the form and amount that he paid. In this
case, the agent is viewed by payment not to have transferred the debt to himself,
but simply as lending the principal the amount that he paid, and thus may only
seek compensation for what he lent him.
In the case of reconciliation for part of the debt, the guarantor may only
seek compensation up to the amount at which the reconciliation took place, not
for the full amount of the debt. This follows from the fact that by paying part
of the debt, the guarantor would not have owned the full amount of the debt
established as a liability on the principal. Thus, reconciliation at a lower value
than the full debt may not be considered a full transfer of credit rights, since it
can easily lead to ribā.6
In general, the Mālikı̄s and most of the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the guarantor may
¯
only seek compensation from the principal for what he in fact had paid. In the
cases of reconciliation or forgiveness of part of the debt, the Shāfic ı̄s rule that
¯
the guarantor may only seek compensation for what he paid, and the Mālikı̄s
rule that he should seek compensation for the lesser of the debt and the amount
paid at reconciliation.7
The H. anbalı̄s ruled generally that the guarantor should only pay the lesser
of what he pays and the amount of the principal’s debt. In this regard, they
argued that if he paid more than the principal’s debt, which is not a requirement,
he is deemed to have made this extra payment as a gift, and may not seek
compensation thereof. On the other hand, if the guarantor paid less than the
principal’s debt, then he may only seek compensation for what he paid, in
accordance with the Mālikı̄ and Shāfic ı̄ schools.8
¯
61.3 Time to seek compensation

The guarantor may not seek compensation from the principal prior to paying
his debt on his behalf. In this regard, the guarantor does not own the necessary
credit to demand compensation until he actually makes the payment on his
behalf. This is again in contrast to the buying agent, who takes the legal status
of the seller, and may thus seek payment of the price prior to delivery.
However, if the guarantor receives demands to pay the amount he guaran-
teed, he may thus issue demands to the principal. Moreover, if the guarantor
is incarcerated because of the debt he guaranteed, he may incarcerate the prin-
cipal until he releases him by repayment. In such cases, the guarantor is only
deserving of such hardships on account of the principal, and thus the principal
may be punished in a similar manner.9
6 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), ibid., p.15).

7 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.346), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.209
¯ ¯ ¯
onwards).
9c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.157).
¯ .
Chapter 62
Contemporary Guaranty for

a Fee
Guaranty is fundamentally a voluntary charitable contract, for which the guar-

antor should be rewarded for his good actions. In this contract, the guarantor
may seek compensation from the principal for the amount he paid on his behalf
to the party given his guarantee. In this regard, it is best to avoid all suspicions
by concluding this contract of guaranty without any compensation (over and
above what the guarantor actually pays on behalf of the principal). On the
other hand, it is permissible for the principal to give part of the property as a
gift to the guarantor, as a way of returning one favor for another.
However, if the guarantor were to demand a fee for providing guaranty, and
if the principal is unable to find a guarantor who would not demand such a fee,
then he may pay the fee to meet a necessity. Such necessity does exist since
guaranties are often required for travel to study or earn a living, to postpone
military service, etc. The permissibility of paying such a fee is based on the
jurists’ permission to pay fees for other goodly acts such as teaching the Qur’ān,
and other religious acts. They have also permitted paying some bribes in order
to find the truth and remove injustice, as well as paying money to enemies to
protect the people from their danger. In this regard, the principal for whom
the guaranty is effected benefits from having such a guaranty, and may thus
pay a fee for it; and guaranteeing agencies often have clerical costs for providing
guaranty, and thus may collect fees accordingly. However, since the essence of
guaranty is charity, it is still important not to charge excessive fees.
Letters of Credit
Letters of credit are customarily issued by banks at the request of an importer

to satisfy the requirements of a corresponding exporter. A bank would issue
such a letter as a guarantee to pay the foreign exporter for the goods that its
client (the domestic importer) wishes to buy. Upon providing proof of delivery
39
40 CHAPTER 62. CONTEMPORARY GUARANTY FOR A FEE
of the goods as stipulated in the contract, the bank would thus pay the foreign
exporter.
In a fully covered letter of credit, the bank acts mainly as an agent of the
principal importer, even as he simultaneously acts as his guarantor. In this
regard, the bank may collect a fee or commission for its agency, but not for its
guaranty.
However, if the account is uncovered or partially covered by the importer’s
funds, the bank acts primarily as a guarantor. Thus, if the bank collects a
commission in this case only in compensation for its guaranty, and not in com-
pensation for its actual work, then it would have taken a forbidden fee for the
guaranty itself.1
In the cases of fully or partially covered letters of credit, we have argued
that the bank may collect fees for its agency efforts, but not for its guaranty
services. In this regard, the fees for agency must be commensurate with the
actual clerical costs associated with the issuance of the letter of credit and
other banking operations associated with it, as stipulated in the first conference
for Islamic Banks held in Dubai.
Banking costs include the ones associated with information collection, cost-
benefit analyses for the relevant projects, the costs of collection and payment
of relevant amounts, etc. In the case of uncovered guaranty, the bank may still
collect fees in compensation for those costs.
1 c.f. Al-Kafālah by Dr. c Alı̄ Al-Sālūs (pp.159-60).

Chapter 63
Applications to Modern
Guaranties
63.1 Major forms of commercial guaranties

Jurists have long known a number of commercial guaranties that are similar in
essence to the modern bank guaranties. The most important of those guaranty
forms are the following:
c
1. D
. amān Al-Darak or D . amān Al- uhdah, which constitutes guaranty of the
price to a seller and guaranty of an object of sale to the buyer.
2. Market guarantees, in which the guarantor guarantees all of a merchant’s

debts, as well as all non-fungibles in his possession of guaranty. This
includes guaranties of debts prior to maturity as well as guaranties of
unknown objects. The majority of jurists permitted this type of guaranty,
but Al-Shāfic ı̄ rendered it invalid.1 The majority’s proof for permissibility
¯
of this contract is the verse “For him who produces it is the reward of
a camel load: I will be bound by it” [12:72]. Thus, the author of Al-
c
uqūd Al-Durriyah fı̄ Tanqı̄h. Al-Fatāwā Al-H
. āmidiyyah (vol.1, p.285) has
rendered this guaranty permissible.
Thus, the Majallat Al-’Ah.kām Al-Sharc iyyah (#1094) stated: “Market
¯
guarantees are permissible. For instance, if a guarantor guarantees what
is owed a merchant, what he owes to other merchants, or whatever non-
fungibles he holds in a possession of guaranty, the guaranty contract is
valid”.
3. Guaranties against inaccurate tools of measurement of weight, volume, or

size.
1 c.f. Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyyah (vol.29, p.549).
41
42 CHAPTER 63. APPLICATIONS TO MODERN GUARANTIES
Thus, the Majallat Al-’Ah.kām Al-Sharc iyyah (item #1091) stated: “It is
¯
permissible to guarantee the buyer against diminution of the sold amount
in weight, volume, or length. Thus, if the buyer suspects that the bought
goods are less in weight, volume, or length, than specified, it is permissible
for a third party to guarantee the goods against being less. In this case, the
buyer may return the goods if he finds that they are less than advertised,
and his statement is accepted if backed by his oath”.
Those three types of guaranty, as mentioned in jurisprudence, constitute

pure guaranties. In other words, they are charitable contracts for which no fees
are collected. This is in contrast to the ribawı̄ banking practices of today.
63.2 Letters of credit

A letter of credit is issued by a bank on behalf of an importer guaranteeing a
foreign exporter that he will receive the promised price upon providing docu-
mentation to prove delivery of the goods he stipulated to export to the country.2
In this case, if the guaranty is fully covered by the customer, the bank is
acting purely as an agent, and may thus collect a fee for its agency. On the
other hand, if the guaranty is completely uncovered, then the bank is only a
guarantor, and thus may not collect fees for guaranty, but only for clerical and
administrative costs. If the guaranty is partially covered, then the bank is viewed
as a partner in profits and losses with the customer for a given percentage (say
2%), and the contract is not a pure guaranty.
63.3 Commercial insurance

It is sometimes common to give commercial insurance with fixed premiums
the name “guaranty” (e.g. The Syrian D . amān Corporation) to confuse people
between this forbidden practice and the permissible kafālah. Indeed, it may
even be thus included under the headings of guaranties of unknown items and
guaranties of debts prior to their maturity.
Legally, commercial insurance is a contract according to which the insurance
company is required to pay to the policy holder a lump-sum of money or a
periodic payment, in case the events stipulated in the contract take place. In
return, the policy holder pays a regular premium to the insurance company.
It is clear that this is a probabilistic commutative financial contract, wherein
the compensation is not a charitable contribution by the insurance company.
Such probabilistic contracts fall under the category of gharar contracts, since
the amounts to be paid and received by each party are unknown¯ at the inception
of the contract. For instance, the insured party may have an accident after
paying only one premium payment, or at the other extreme, he may pay all the
premiums for the life of the policy without incurring a single accident.3
2 Al-Kafālah fı̄ D arı̄c ah Al-’Islāmihyyah by Dr. c Alı̄ Al-Sālūs (p.159).
. aw’ Al-Sh
¯
3 Al-Gharar wa ’Atharuhu fı̄ al-c uqūd (pp.639-663).
¯ ¯
63.3. COMMERCIAL INSURANCE 43
Thus described, this contract is impermissible due to containing elements of

the forbidden gharar and ribā:
¯
• The element of gharar is clear in this probabilistic contract, in which
the object of the¯ contract may and may not exist. In this regard, it
is well established that the “Prophet (pbuh) forbade the gharar sales”.4
Moreover, all commutative financial contracts are judged ¯by analogy to
sales in matters of gharar, which thus renders them invalid. It is thus
¯ classified insurance under the heading of “gharar
that legal scholars have
¯
contracts”, since uncertainty is an integral part of the contract. Moreover,
the amount of uncertainty in insurance companies is substantial, since it
is the very cause for writing the contract, and the amount of uncertainty
does not depend upon the actions of the contracting parties.
At the inception of the insurance contract, neither party knows how much
they will pay or receive. In this regard, even though the insurance com-
pany may be able to know with very high probability how much it will
pay and receive from the large collection of underwritten contracts, the
uncertainty remains substantial for each insured party. Moreover, it is
not valid to argue that what the insured party is getting is “insurance” or
“safety” in return for the premia he pays, since safety is not the object of
the contract, but rather its instigating factor. In fact, if we render “insur-
ance” to be the object of the contract, the insurance contract would be
rendered invalid since total safety cannot be guaranteed.
• Moreover, it is well known that all insurance companies invest their funds
in ribā, thus making all their funds suspect. In addition, some insurance
companies pay life insurance policy holders a portion of its interest income,
which is definitely forbidden ribā.
Moreover, it is clear that there is ribā between the insured and the insur-
ance company, since the permia paid by the insured may be more or less
than what the insurance company pays him with deferment. Thus, if the
deferred payment exceeds the paid premia, there would ribā of increase as
well as deferment, and if it is equal, then there is deferment ribā alone,
but both are equally forbidden.
Ibn c Ābidı̄n (d. 1252 A.H.) was the first to consider marine insurance
impermissible. Thus, he ruled regarding insuring foreigners against marine
losses: “It is thus my opinion that it is invalid for the merchant to take
compensation for what perishes of his wealth, since that would be making
binding that which is not”.5
More recently, this ruling was reinforced by the decisions of the first con-
ference on Islamic economics in Makkah (1396 A.H./1976 A.D.) and by
4 Narrated by Muslim, ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Tirmidhı̄, Al-Nasā’ı̄, and ibn Mājah on the author-
¯
ity of ’Abū Hurayrah (mAbpwh).
5 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.273).
.
44 CHAPTER 63. APPLICATIONS TO MODERN GUARANTIES
the Fiqh Academy in Jeddah in 1406 A.H./1985 A.D. that rendered com-
mercial insurance invalid.
In this regard, ’Ibn Nujaym Al-Mis.rı̄6 said: deception does not justify
seeking compensation. Thus: if someone tells another that it is safe to
take some road, but then he was robbed on that road, or if someone is
told that it is safe to eat some food, but then was poisoned by eating it,
there is no guaranty and no right for compensation. He then stipulated
three exceptions to this general case, including the case where deception
pertained to a contract condition (e.g. if he married a woman under the
condition that she is free, but discovered that another can demand her
return). In such cases, the deceived may seek compensation from the
deceiver.
As an alternative, cooperative insurance among a group of people is legally
valid as a charitable contribution and cooperation contract. In this con-
tract, each participant pays his contribution voluntarily to reduce the
effects of losses incurred by other participants, regardless of the type of
loss (e.g. fire, drowning, theft, car accident, work accident, animal death,
etc.). Moreover, cooperative insurance distinguishes itself from commer-
cial insurance by not seeking to make profits.
In this regard, the second conference of Muslim scholars held in Cairo
(1385 A.H./1965 A.D.) and the seventh such conference (1392 A.H./1972
A.D.) rendered as valid both social and cooperative insurance. This is also
the opinion expressed by the Fiqh Academy in Makkah in 1398 A.H./1978
A.D. and the Fiqh Academy in Jeddah in ruling #9 in 1406 A.H./1985
A.D.
In summary, commercial insurance includes both ribā and gharar, and it
may not be considered a form of guaranty (kafālah), even¯if considered
for classification under the guaranty of an unknown and the guaranty of
debts prior to maturity. Such insurance can never be viewed as any form of
guaranty contract since the latter is a charitable contract while insurance
is a probabilistic commutative contract. However, social and cooperative
insurance are permitted since they are based on charitable contributions
and cooperation to do well without being a commutative contract.
63.4 Guaranties for residents and visitors

As we have seen, the guaranty contract is primarily a charitable contract for
which compensation is given in the hereafter. However, the guarantor may seek
compensation from the principal for whatever expenses he incurs as a conse-
quence of providing him guaranty. Both guaranties of property and guaranties
of persons are permissible.
It is well known that some of the GCC countries require having a property
and self guarantor for workers and businessmen who work there. Thus, the
6 Al-’Ashbāh wa Al-Naz.ā’ir, Damascus: Dār Al-Fikr (p.252 onwards).
¯
63.4. GUARANTIES FOR RESIDENTS AND VISITORS 45
guarantor assures the authorities that he is responsible to deliver the foreigner

workers to the relevant authorities for deportation once his residency permission
expires or is voided. The guarantor also assures the authorities that he will bear
the worker’s travel expenses at such a time, as well as cover all of the worker’s
debts and other financial responsibilities if it is not possible to collect those
debts directly from him or from his property.
Some countries’ laws also require a guarantor of individuals and property to
allow some of its citizens travel abroad for work, education, or postponement of
military service, etc. The guarantor in such cases is bound to pay an amount of
money if the guaranteed party does not present himself to the relevant author-
ities when requested.
In both forms of guaranty mentioned above, the guarantor may only demand
fees to cover his expenses and compensate him for his effort, in addition to
seeking compensation for any amounts of money he has to pay on behalf of
the guaranteed. Any fees collected over and above such legitimate expenses are
contrary to the guaranty’s charitable nature, and are considered to be a form
of forbidden injustice.7 For instance, it is not permissible for the guarantor to
transgress those legal boundaries by requiring the guaranteed party to pay him
a percentage of his profits, or periodic payments that are not a compensation
for any legitimate work, effort or expense.
Thus, item #1098 of the civil transactions law of U.A.E., which is derived
from Islamic jurisprudence, stated the following: “It is not permitted for the
guarantor to take a fee for his guaranty. If he takes any such compensation, he
must return it to the guaranteed party. Thus, the guaranty would be dropped if
he collects such fees from the creditor, the debtor, or from a third party with the
knowledge of the creditor. If he takes such fees without the creditor’s knowledge,
he is still bound by his guaranty, but must return the fees he collected”.
An explanatory note pertaining to this law states: “The guarantor is not
allowed to collect fees for his guaranty for the following reason: If the debtor
pays his debt to the creditor, then the fees collected by the guarantor would be a
wrongful devouring of others’ wealth. On the other hand, if the guarantor pays
the debtor’s debt and then seeks compensation for what he paid, he would thus
be taking more than he lent the debtor (the fees being an increment), which is
forbidden”.
Thus, in summary, fees may be collected for guaranties of travelers only to
cover real expenses and work associated with the guaranty, as well as to seek
compensation for payments made on behalf of the guaranteed party. However,
any additional fees that are collected would be forbidden property.
7 Al-Kafālah by Dr. c Alı̄ Al-Sālūs.

Part IX
Transfer of debt
(Al-H
. awālah)
47
49
Preliminaries
We shall discuss the transfer of debt contract in five chapters:
1. Definition, legality, cornerstone, and contract language.
2. Transfer of debt conditions.
3. Legal status.
4. Contract termination.
5. Seeking compensation from the principal.

Chapter 64
Definition, legality, and

cornerstone
64.1 Definition
In the Arabic language, the term h.awālah means “change” or “transfer”. The
H. anafı̄s define the term legally thus: “The transfer of the liability for a debt
from the legal personality of the debtor to the legal personality of the liable
person named in the contract”. Thus, transfers of debt must be distinguished
from guaranty contracts, since the latter entails the conjoining of liabilities
rather than the transfer thereof. As a consequence, once a transfer of debt is
concluded, repayment may not be sought from the original debtor.
However, the H . anafı̄ jurists differed in opinion regarding the legal issue of
whether or not a transfer of debt effects a “transfer of debt”. As we shall see
below, the most correct opinion in this regard is the one that stipulates the
transfer of debt. Indeed, that is the basis on which the author of Al-c ināyah
defined transfers of debt thus: “The juristic definition of al-h.awālah is ‘the
transfer of debt from being a liability on the principal debtor to being a liability
on the transferee, as a means of ensuring the debt’.”1
Similarly, the non-H . anafı̄s defined a transfer of debt as a contract by means
of which a debt is transferred from one person’s liability to another’s.2
64.2 Legality
There are proofs in the Sunnah and ’Ijmāc for the legality of transfers of debt
to transfer debts, the obvious exception being the forbidden trading of debts for
1 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.443), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.300), Majmac
. .
Al-D. amānāt (p.282).
¯ . ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.528), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.114), Al-Buhūtı̄
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.370).
51
52 CHAPTER 64. DEFINITION, LEGALITY, AND CORNERSTONE
debts:
• The proof from Sunnah is provided by the H . adı̄th in which the Prophet
¯
(pbuh) is reported by Al-Bayhaqı̄ to have said: “Delinquency of rich
debtors is a form of transgression, so if one of you has his debt transferred
to a rich person, let him accept the transfer of debt”.3 The majority of
jurists infer from this H
. adı̄th that it is preferred to accept the transfer of
¯
debt, but that it is not an obligation. On the other hand, Dāwūd and
’Ah.mad ruled that the text of the H . adı̄th includes an order which makes
¯
it obligatory to accept the transfer of debt [where the transferee is rich].4
• There is also proof for the legality of transfers of debt provided by the
consensus of jurists on its permissibility.5 In this regard, jurists have
permitted transfers of debt for the transfer of fungible debts. However, it
is not permissible for non-fungibles since the transfer of liability may only
be effected for fungibles.
64.3 Cornerstone
The H . anafı̄s stipulate as cornerstones of the transfer of debt contract: (i) an
offer by the debtor, and (ii) acceptance by the transferee and the creditor, using
specific language that indicate the nature of the transfer of liability as a h.awālah.
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s insisted on the consent of the transferee since the
contract transfers liability for the debt to him, which thus requires his consent
to establish a liability upon himself. Even in the case where the transferee
may be indebted to the principal debtor of a transfer of debt, changing the
creditor for his debt still requires his consent since creditors vary in their degree
of aggressiveness in collecting repayments.6
3 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the authors of the six major books of Hadı̄th, as well as ’Ibn
. . ¯
’Abı̄ Shaybah, and Al-T . abarānı̄ in his ’Aws.at. on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah. It was
¯
also narrated with slightly different wording by ’Ah.mad, ’Ibn Mājah, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the
¯
authority of ’Ibn c Umar. Another narration by Al-Bazzār on the authority of Jābir has a
weak link in its chain of narrators; c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.59),
¯
’Ibn H . ajar (, p.250), Al-Hayth amı̄ (, vol.4, p.130), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.61),
¯
Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.236).
4¯Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.61), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.527), Al-Shac arānı̄
¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.80).
¯5
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.521), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.337), Al-Khat.ı̄b
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.193), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.294), ’Ibn Al-
¯ ¯ ¯
6 Translator’s note: I decided not to use the literal translation of “transferor”, “transferee”
and “transferred” for “muh.ı̄l”, “muh.āl c alayh” and “muh.āl”, respectively. This translation
would be cumbersome and confusing to the reader. Thus, I decided to designate the transferor
as the principal debtor, the transferred as the creditor, and only use the literal translation
for transferee. In this context, the most common scenario is that the “principal debtor” or
transferor simultaneously owes the “creditor” or “transferred” a sum of money, and is owed
an equal or larger amount by the transferee or “ultimate debtor” in the chain. The transfer of
debt then empowers the creditor to collect his money from the transferee instead of collecting
it directly from the principal debtor.
The creditor’s consent is also required for a transfer of debt since the liability
being transferred pertains to a debt that is owed to him. In this regard, since
debtors vary in their credit-worthiness and promptness of payment, transferring
his credit from one party to another requires his consent.
Al-Qadūrı̄ also stipulated the principal debtor’s consent as a condition for
the validity of a transfer of debt. He based this ruling on the view that some
honorable debtors may not accept to have others bear their debts. On the other
hand, it is thus stated in Al-Ziyādāt, according to a popular H . anafı̄ opinion,
that “a transfer of debt is valid without the consent of the principal debtor,
since the transferee’s acceptance of transferring liability to himself is a personal
matter than only benefits and does not harm the principal debtor”.7
The H . anbalı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s ruled that only the consent of the principal debtor
is a condition of the contract. In this regard, they rely on the above mentioned
H. adı̄th to conclude that the creditor and the transferee are bound to accept the
¯
transfer of debt, rendering their expression of consent unnecessary.8 Notice that
this opinion is the exact opposite of the H . anafı̄ opinion, as it pertains to whose
consent is necessary. In this regard, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that it is sufficient for
the creditor and the transferee to be informed of the transfer of debt. In this
regard, they did not require the consent of the transferee since they argued that
the principal debtor may collect his debt from the transferee either himself, or
through an agent. In this regard, the principal debtor has appointed the creditor
as his agent in collecting the debt from the transferee.
The majority of Mālikı̄s and the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the consent of
¯
the principal debtor and creditor only. They based the first requirement on the
view that the principal debtor may repay his debt in any way he may wish, and
thus must not be bound to paying in any given way without his consent. They
also argued that the creditor’s consent is required since his credit is established
as a liability on the principal debtor, and therefore his consent is required to
transfer that liability to another person whose creditworthiness and promptness
of payment may be different from the first. In this regard, they argued that the
above mentioned H . adı̄th does not compel the creditor to accept the transfer of
¯
debt, since they ruled that the H . adı̄th merely makes such acceptance desirable
¯
(mustah.abb).
On the other hand, they argued that consent of the transferee is not nec-
essary, since the principal debtor has the right to collect what the transferee
owes him through another person. In this regard, the transfer of debt is simply
an authorization to the creditor to collect his money from the transferee, which
does not require the consent of the ultimate debtor (the transferee in this case).
The main difference between the creditor and the transferee is thus that the
former has a right that cannot be transferred without his consent (in analogy
to a seller who is owed a price) while the latter’s liability is tantamount to the
7 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.15), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), ibid., footnote), Al-Tahāwı̄
. . . .
. anafı̄), p.102), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
((H c
8 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.522,525,527), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.2,
.
p.114), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.374).
54 CHAPTER 64. DEFINITION, LEGALITY, AND CORNERSTONE
object of sale, whose consent is not required.9

Thus, we can enumerate six cornerstones or components to the transfer of
debt for the majority of (non-H. anafı̄) jurists: (i) principal debtor or transferor,
(ii) creditor or transferred party, (iii) transferee or ultimate debtor, (iv) the
transferred debt, (v) a debt owed to the principal debtor by the transferee or
ultimate debtor, and (vi) contract language.10
¯ .
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.338), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.193
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
onwards).
10 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.443).
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
Chapter 65
Transfer of debt Conditions
The H. anafı̄s stipulate contract conditions for the transfer of debt that pertain
to the contract language, the principal debtor, the creditor, the transferee, or
the object of transfer. In what follows, we shall list those conditions in that
order.

The transfer of debt contract is concluded through verbal or written offers and
acceptance. For instance, an offer can be issued by the principal debtor by
saying: “I have transferred your credit to so and so”, and the creditor may issue
an acceptance by saying: “I agree”. In this regard, both offer and acceptance
must take place during the contract session, and the contract is binding and
does not admit contract session or conditional options.
65.2 Transferor conditions

The transferor (principal debtor) must be eligible to conduct such contracts,
i.e. he must be of legal age and a sane mind. Thus, transfers of debt issued
by insane persons of undiscerning children are invalid, since that is a financial
contract that requires sanity and discernment. In this regard, a transfer of
debt concluded by a discerning child is not considered executable. Rather, it
is considered suspended upon the approval of his guardian. Thus, we can see
that being of legal age is an executability condition rather than a conclusion
condition.
Second, validity of the transfer of debt is predicated upon the consent of the
principal debtor. Thus, a transfer of debt concluded by a coerced transferor is
not valid. This follows from the fact that a transfer of debt involves an absolution
that results in ownership transfer, and thus coercion renders it defective in
55
56 CHAPTER 65. TRANSFER OF DEBT CONDITIONS
analogy to other transfers of ownership.1 The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H

. anbalı̄s
¯
agreed with the H . anafı̄s on this condition. In this regard, ’Ibn Kamāl said
in Al-’Id.āh.: “the consent of the transferor is a condition to justify seeking
compensation from him”.
65.3 Transferred party conditions

There are three conditions for the creditor or transferred party in a transfer of
debt:
1. He must be eligible for the contract. In this regard, sanity is a condition

of conclusion of the contract since the cornerstone of acceptance cannot
be fulfilled if that condition is not satisfied. He must also be of legal age
as an executability condition, as we have seen in the case of the transferor;
thus requiring approval of his guardian if he is not of legal age.
2. The H. anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s all agree that the transferred party must
¯
be consenting to the transfer of debt, otherwise the contract is not valid.
3. ’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that acceptance must be issued by the
transferred party during the contract session, and listed this as a conclu-
sion condition. Thus, they ruled that if the transferred party was absent
from the transfer of debt session, but accepts when he receives information
about the contract, the contract is not executable. However, ’Abū Yūsuf
ruled that this is a condition of executability rather than conclusion. Al-
Kāsānı̄ argued that the opinion of ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Muh.ammad is the
correct one, since acceptance of the transferred party is a cornerstone of
the contract (c.f. ibid.).
65.4 Transferee conditions

The H . anafı̄ conditions for the transferee are exactly the same three conditions
listed above for the transferred party.2
65.5 Transferred item

There are two conditions pertaining to the transferred item in a transfer of debt.
Those two conditions are:3
1 Al-Kāsānı̄((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.16), Majma Al-D . amānāt (p.282).
c
2 Al-Kāsānı̄((H. anafı̄), ibid.).
3 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.16), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.295), Al-Dardı̄r
. ¯ .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.325 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.194), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.337), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.533).
¯ ¯
65.5. TRANSFERRED ITEM 57
1. The transferred item must be a debt, i.e. the transferor must be a debtor
to the transferred party. If no such debt exists, then the contract is one of
agency rather than transfer of debt. As a consequence of this condition,
transfers of debt are not allowed for non-fungible items, since those cannot
be established as liabilities.
2. The debt must be binding. For instance, in the historical example of al-
mukātab (a slave who can free himself for a sum of money), a transfer of
debt could not be used for the sum of money necessary to free the slave
since it is not a binding debt.
In general, any debt that does not qualify for guaranty does not qualify for
a transfer of debt. The debts that qualify for both are non-probabilistic
debts that are sometimes called “real debts”.
Thus, the transfer of debt is not valid if the debt owed the transferor by
the transferee is not binding (e.g. the debt of a young boy or a mentally
incompetent person without their guardian’s consent). In such cases, the
transfer is not valid since the debt on such parties is not binding, and may
be dropped by their guardian.
Similarly, liability for the price in a sale suspended by an option is not
binding, and thus does not qualify for transfers of debt.
All non-H . anbalı̄ jurists agree on the condition that a debt must be binding
to qualify for a transfer of debt. On the other hand, the H . anbalı̄s permitted
transfers of debt even for the monies required to free a slave, or for the
liability of a sales price during the option period.
Also, the Shāfic ı̄s allowed transfers of debt for debts that will ultimately
¯
become binding, e.g. liability for a price that will take effect once a con-
tract option is exercised or expired, liability for dowry prior to consum-
mation of the marriage, and liability for wages prior to completion of the
job.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s did not make it a condition for the validity
of a transfer of debt that the transferee must be indebted to the transferor prior
to the transfer prior to the contract. Thus, they render as valid transfers of debt
whether or not the transferee owes the transferor, and whether the transfer is
restricted or unrestricted (as we shall see below).
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s stipulated three conditions for
¯
the object of transfer in a transfer of debt:4
1. The transferred debt must have matured.
2. The transferred debt must be equal to the debt owed to the transferor
by the transferee in kind and amount. If there is any difference between
the two debts, they consider this no longer to be a transfer of debt, and
classify it under the forbidden trading of one debt for another.
4 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.425-6), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.326 onwards), Al-
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.194 onwards).

¯ ¯ ¯
3. Neither of the two debts must be foodstuffs named as the object of a

Salam sale, lest the contract falls under the category of selling foodstuffs
prior to receiving them, which is forbidden. However, if one of the two
debts resulted from a sale and the other from a loan, the transfer of debt
is permissible if the transferred debt is not forbidden.
Restricted and unrestricted transfers of debt

The H . anafı̄s classified transfers of debt into two categories; restricted and un-
restricted:
• In an unrestricted transfer of debt, the principal debtor (transferor) trans-

fers his debt to a transferee who accepts the contract, without tying the
transfer to a transferee debt towards the transferor. Only the H . anafı̄s,
’Imāmı̄ Shic ı̄s, and most of the Zaydı̄s permitted this type of transfer of
¯
debt.
However, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s consider this type of unre-
¯
stricted transfer of debt a pure guaranty, the validity of which requires the
consent of all three parties (transferor, transferred party, and transferee).
• All jurists accept what the H . anafı̄s call a restricted transfer of debt,
whereby the transferor ties the transferred debt to a debt owed to him
by the transferee.5
The H . anafı̄s argued that both types of transfers of debt are permissible
based on the general language regarding transfer of liability in the above refer-
enced H . adı̄th . However, unrestricted transfers of debt differ significantly from
¯
restricted ones in the following respects:6
1. If the transfer of debt is unrestricted, and the transferee does not owe
anything to the transferor, then the transferee may only be asked to pay
the amount of transferred debt.
On the other hand, if the transferee owes the transferor an amount, but
the transfer of debt was not tied to that debt, and the transferee accepted
that arrangement, then the transferee is subject to two liabilities (one for
his initial debt, and one for the liability he accepted through the transfer
of debt). For instance, if a man deposited $1000 with another, and then
transferred a liability for $1000 to the depositary without tying it to the
deposit, with the consent of the depositary, then the depositor may collect
5 The legal scholar Dr. Al-Sanhūrı̄ argued that this form of contract is in fact closer to
being a means of debt payment that it is to being a h.awālah in the precise juristic sense, c.f.
Al-Wası̄t. (p.240). It is also his view that al schools of Islamic jurisprudence did not permit
transfers of debt in the western sense. He argued, however, that Mālikı̄s differed from other
schools by permitting the transfer of rights according to some conditions, through the vehicles
of giving debts as gifts, or selling debts to a party other than the debtor, c.f. Al-Wası̄t. (p.240).
Those views are debatable.
6 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.16 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.306), Majmac
. .
his deposit, while the depositary would still be responsible to pay the $1000
liability according to the transfer of debt.
However, if the transfer of debt is tied to the debt owed by the transferee,
then the transferor may no longer seek repayment from him. In this case,
the transfer of debt was tied to the debt, and thus both are tied together,
and the money of the debt serves as a quasi-pawned object, and payment
of the transferred debt would result in mutual cancellation of the two
debts.
2. If the transfer of debt is tied to a debt of the transferee, but then it is

found out that the transferee is free of the debt to which the transfer was
tied (e.g. if the debt was the price of a sold item which was subsequently
returned), the transfer of debt is voided. In this regard, since the transfer
of debt was tied to that debt, there is no transfer of debt if there is no
debt.
On the other hand, the transfer of debt is not voided if the transfer of
debt was unrestricted and then it was discovered that the transferee is not
indebted to the transferor. In this latter case, the transfer of debt is tied
to the transferee’s liability and not to any other specific debt.
3. If the transfer of debt is tied to a debt, and the transferor dies prior to
repayment of his debt by the transferee with other debts and no credits
other than the one with the transferee, then ’Abū H
. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf and
Muh.ammad ruled that the transferred creditor has no preferential right
to that money over other creditors of the deceased transferor. Zufar, on
the other hand, ruled that the transferred creditor has priority over the
other creditors, in analogy to the holder of a pawned object.
However, Zufar’s opinion was rejected on the basis of the difference be-
tween transfers of debt and pawning, where the pawn-broker bears the risk
of the pawned object alone. Thus, the legal ruling in this case rests on
the H. adı̄th “returns are due to the one who bore the risk of guaranty”.7
¯
In this regard, the transferred creditor does not carry any more of the
risk than other creditors, and hence is not allowed preferential rights of
collection, and he must share equally with other creditors.
On the other hand, if the transfer was unrestricted, then the total amount
of debt owed by the transferee to the transferor is collected and distributed
among the other creditors, without paying any share to the transferred
7 Narrated by ’Ahmadn, Al-Shāfic ı̄, and ’Abū Dāwūd Al-Tayālisı̄, as well as the authors of
. ¯ .
the four Sunan books. It was also rendered a valid H . adı̄th by Al-Tirmidhı̄, ’Ibn H
. ibbān, ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Al-Jārūd, Al-H. ākim, and ’Ibn Al-Qat.t.ān on the authority of A’ish
c ah. In another narration
¯
in Al-Nasā’ı̄, the Prophet (pbuh) is narrated to have ruled that “income is earned by the
one who guaranteed the object, and he (pbuh) forbade profits derived from what one has not
guaranteed”. In one narration, this H . adı̄th is put in the context of a man who bought a slave
¯
and then returned him under the defect option clause, and when the seller asked for a the
output of his sold slave, the Prophet (pbuh) ruled that his output belonged to the one who
guaranteed him; c.f. ’Ibn Al-’Athı̄r Al-Jazarı̄ (, vol.2, pp.28-32), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.213).
¯ ¯
creditor. In this regard, the transferred creditor’s right is established only

with the transferee, and he thus has no right attached to the debt owed
the transferor by the transferee.
Transfer of rights
The transfer of rights is a replacement of one debtor in place of another in
his relationship with the creditor. If the established debt for which one debtor
replaces another is a fungible established as a liability, then the transfer of debt
is a valid transfer of rights, in which the principal debtor is a transferor, and the
ultimate debtor is the transferee. As we have seen, jurists agree on the validity
of such transfers of debt.
Moreover, the transfer of rights is also valid according to the four Sunni
schools of jurisprudence, and not only for the non-H . anafı̄s as some professors
of law and Islamic law understood. This follows since the permitted restricted
transfers of debt in the H . anafı̄ school include transfers of rights. For instance,
if one person is indebted to another and a creditor for a third, he may effect a
transfer of debt so that his creditor may collect the debt from his debtor. This
is therefore a transfer of debt and a transfer of right at the same time.
We have also seen that non-H . anafı̄s only permit restricted transfers of debt
(and it is thus understood that a transfer of debt is restricted unless otherwise
specified). In this regard, they require the two debts to be equal in genus, kind
and amount. Thus, if the debt owed by the transferor and that owed by the
transferee are identical in genus and amount, they render the transfer of debt
valid, otherwise they render it invalid.
In contrast, the H. anafı̄ notion of an unrestricted transfer of debt is a transfer
of debt only, without any transfer of rights. This follows since only the debtor
is exchanged, but the transferor remains to be a creditor for the transferee.
There are many examples of restricted transfers of debt that are viewed as
transfers of rights. For instance:
• A seller may transfer his debtor’s credit to the buyer (to collect the price
in lieu of his credit).
• A pawn-broker may transfer a creditor to the pawner for collection of his
debt.
• A wife may transfer a creditor to her husband to collect his debt from the
dowry.
• The beneficiary of a mortmain may transfer his creditor to the adminis-
trator of the mortmain to collect his share of the crop.
• A debtor beneficiary from the spoils of war may transfer his creditor to
the ruler to collect what he is owed.
In all such examples, a new debtor takes the place of the principal debtor
by virtue of the transfer of debt as a transfer of debt and a transfer of rights.
The reason some scholars were confused regarding the H . anafı̄ views on trans-
fers of rights stems from the H . anafı̄ doctrine that transfers of debt are not a
form of sale that is subject to all its rulings. Instead, they view transfers of debt
as a separate contract that was legalized for a different necessary reason, and
not as a branch of another more general contract. On the other hand, they do
recognize that transfers of debt are similar to a number of other contracts. For
instance, it is similar but not identical to a sale (of debt or of rights), similar
but not identical to guaranty, similar but not identical to debt collection, and
similar but not identical to collection agency. It is also similar but not identical
to the current practice of opening a credit account, and it has some character-
istics similar to charitable contributions and to commutative contracts, etc. In
fact, the legal status of transfers of debt reflects all the various similarities it
has with other contracts.
Indeed, despite the fact that H . anafı̄s did not permit the sale of debt to
any party other than the debtor, they do not deny the legality of transfers of
rights. This follows since they do not recognize the replacement of one debtor
with another as a change of ownership of the debt. Instead, they recognize the
essence of a transfer of debt as a temporary transfer of the debt, or the locus
of demanding its repayment, provided that the transferee does not die, declare
bankruptcy, or deny having accepted the transfer of debt. They then argue that
the transferred party would only gain ownership of what he collects from the
transferee, without ever owning a new debt. Thus, they differentiate between
transfers of debt and sales.
On the other hand, the non-H . anafı̄ jurists who permit transfers of rights
base their rulings on the general permissibility implied by the above mentioned
H. adı̄th on transfers of debt. This permissibility is thus not restricted on whether
¯
or not one views the contract as trading one debt for another.
As for trading one debt for another or giving a debt as a gift to a party other
than the debtor, the H . anbalı̄s do not permit such practices, while the Mālikı̄s
and Shāfic ı̄s permit them subject to a number of conditions. For instance, they
¯
require for such practices that compensation is received or identified during
the sales contract, that the sold debt is not foodstuffs, that the price and the
sold debt are of different genera, and that the debtor’s debt is not sold to his
adversary so that he may be subjugated to that adversary. Thus, they do not
consider the transfer of rights to be a form of trading one debt for another.
In summary, Muslim jurists do not classify transfers of debt as a form of
sale, but rather classify it as a special contract with different conditions and
consequences.8 In this regard, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s who permit giving debts
¯
as gifts or selling them to a party other than the debtor only allow the transfer of
rights in such contracts subject to a list of special conditions for those contracts.
8 See the transfer of debt chapter in the Kuwaiti Fiqh Encyclopedia (pp.95-100), as well as
the introduction to Naz.ariyyat Al-’Iltizām fı̄ Al-Fiqh Al-’Islāmı̄ by Professor Al-Zarqā’ (p.64
onwards).
Chapter 66
Legal Status
There are three main effects pertaining to the legal status of a transfer of debt,
as detailed below.1
66.1 Absolution of the transferor

The majority of jurists ruled that if a transfer of debt is concluded with the
consent of the transferor (or principal debtor), then he is thus absolved of his
debt towards the creditor. However, any means of ensuring repayment of the
debt, e.g. pawning or third-party guaranty, are thus terminated rather than
transferred for the benefit of the new debt.
On the other had, Al-H . asan Al-Bas.rı̄ ruled that the transferor is only ab-
solved if the creditor absolves him explicitly. Similarly, the H . anafı̄ jurist Zufar
ruled that a transfer of debt does not result in absolution for the transferor,
whose liability for the debt remains intact as before. He based this ruling on
analogy to the case of a guaranty contract, considering both types of contracts
as means of ensuring repayment.
However, this minority opinion is invalid, since the very name of the contract
(h.awālah) suggests that the contract is a transfer of rights, which implies that
the initial rights do not remain the same after being transferred. In this regard,
the best way to ensure repayment of debts is to choose the most creditworthy
debtors one can find. In contrast, the guaranty contract is in essence a conjoining
of liabilities, as its name kafālah suggests. In this regard, the legal status of
contracts can often be inferred from the etymology of contract names.2
The major H . anafı̄ jurists differed in opinion regarding the nature of the
transfer that is effected by means of a transfer of debt:
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.17 onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ .
p.160).
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.17), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.445 onwards), Al-
. .
T
. ah.āwı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.300), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3,
p.328), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.195), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
63
64 CHAPTER 66. LEGAL STATUS
• ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that both the debt and the liability
to be asked to repay are transferred from the principal debtor to the
transferee. They ruled, however, that if the transferee dies in a state of
bankruptcy, or if he denies having consented to the contract and no proof
can be provided to document it, then the liability returns to the principal
debtor. Muh.ammad and ’Abū Yūsuf also stipulated that the liability
returns to the principal debtor if the transferee declares bankruptcy during
his lifetime.
They thus ruled that if the creditor absolves the transferee of the debt,
the absolution is valid, but if he absolves the principal debtor after the
transfer of debt, the absolution is invalid.
• Muh.ammad ruled that the transfer of debt only transfers the liability to
be asked to pay the debt, without transferring the debt itself. Thus, he
ruled that liability for the original debt remains with the principal debtor.
The proofs of ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf on the one hand, and those of
Muh.ammad on the other, suggest that the opinion of the first two is on
more solid footing. As proof for this preference of the first opinion, note
that it is not valid to absolve the principal debtor after the transfer of debt
is concluded, establishing that the debt had been transferred from being a
liability on the principal debtor to being a liability on the transferee. This
result also follows from the etymology of the term h.asālah, which indicates
transference of whatever the contract pertains to, which includes the debt
itself as well as the obligation to receive requests of repayment.
• We have previously reported the opinion of Zufar that neither the debt
not the obligation to receive requests of repayment are transferred to the
transferee. Instead, it was the opinion of Zufar that the liabilities of the
transferee and the principal debtor are conjoined by virtue of the contract,
in analogy to the case of guaranty.
66.2 Right to demand repayment

The transfer of debt establishes the creditor’s right to demand repayment of
the debt from the transferee. This follows from the fact that the transfer of
debt transferred the liability for the principal debtor’s debt to the transferee,
according to the opinion I chose by juristic preference (tarjı̄h.) in the previous
section.
66.3 Right of pursuit

If the creditor exercises the right to pursue the transferee (transferor) until he
repays him, the transferee thus has the right to pursue the transferor to get
rid of being himself pursued. Similarly, if an unrestricted transfer of debt is
initiated by the transferor, and if the transferee does not owe the transferor and
66.3. RIGHT OF PURSUIT 65
equal amount, then if the creditor incarcerates the transferee in lieu of the debt,
he may in turn incarcerate the transferor in his place.
On the other hand, if the transferor did not initiate the transfer of debt, or if
he initiated it but the transferee owes him an equal amount, i.e. if the transfer
of debt is restricted, then the transferee does not have the right to pursue the
transferor if himself pursued, or to incarcerate him if himself incarcerated.
Chapter 67
Contract Termination
A transfer of debt may be terminated in one of seven ways:1
67.1 Voiding
If a transfer of debt is voided, the creditor may once again demand repayment
from the principal debtor. In this regard, jurists define contract voiding as any
termination of the contract prior to accomplishing its objective.
67.2 Death or bankruptcy

The H . anafı̄s ruled that a transfer of debt is terminated at the incidence of
any death, bankruptcy, or denial of the contract that makes its implementation
impossible. This ruling is based on the narration that c Uthmān (mAbpwh) said:
¯
“if [a transferee] dies in a state of bankruptcy, then the debt is reestablished as
a liability on the transferor”. In this regard, since a transfer of debt is intended
to secure the rights of the creditor, the condition of the transferee’s ability to
repay the debt is similar to the condition of good quality in an object of sale.
In this regard, jurists have differed in their definition of the conditions under
which they recognize that the transferee may never repay the debt:
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that there are two such conditions: either (i) the trans-
feree dies in a state of bankruptcy, or (ii) he denies having consented to the
transfer of debt and the transferor fails to provide proof to the contrary.
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad added to the two conditions listed by ’Abū
H. anı̄fa a third: which is legal declaration of bankruptcy in a court of law
during the transferee’s lifetime. This addition is based on another juristic
. .
Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.20, p.52), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.304), Majmac
¯
67
68 CHAPTER 67. CONTRACT TERMINATION
rule about which the three differ. This rule according to ’Abū Yūsuf and
Muh.ammad is that they allow a judge to rule that a person is legally
bankrupt, while ’Abū H. anı̄fa does not allow a judge to rule thus, since
wealth comes and goes.
For each jurist, if one of the conditions he recognizes for impossibility of collect-
ing the debt from the transferee is effected, then the creditor must once again
demand repayment from the transferor (the principal debtor).
On the other hand, the H . anbalı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that if the trans-
¯
fer of debt is concluded, and the creditor consents to the transfer of liabilities,
he no longer has a right to demand repayment from the transferor under any
circumstances, whether or not it is possible to collect from the transferee. Even
if the transferee was in fact bankrupt at the time of contract, and even if the
creditor did not know of that bankruptcy when he accepted the transfer of debt,
he has no recourse to the transferor. In the latter case, the creditor is consid-
ered negligent not to have investigated the transferee’s financial position prior
to agreeing to the contract, in analogy to one who is cheated in a sale where he
could have avoided being cheated. However, if the creditor stipulates a condi-
tion that the transferee must be in good financial position, and then discovers
that he was in fact facing financial difficulties, then the Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s
ruled that he may again seek repayment from the principal debtor. They based
that final ruling on the H. adı̄th : “Muslims are bound by their conditions”.2 The
¯
Mālikı̄s ruled in addition that if the transferor principal debtor deceived the
creditor by knowingly signing a transfer of debt with a bankrupt transferee,
then the creditor may still demand repayment from the transferor.
The proof for this general non-H . anafı̄ ruling is based on the narration that
the grandfather of Sac ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyab “was owed a debt by c Alı̄ (mAbpwh).
The creditor then transferred the debt through a transfer of debt, but the trans-
feree died shortly thereafter. When the creditor then informed c Alı̄ that the
transferee had died, he told him ‘you chose him over us, so stay away’.” Thus,
he ruled that the transfer of debt ended the creditor’s right to demand repay-
ment from the principal debtor, and did not tell him that he has any such right
after the transferee’s death. This is proof that the transfer of debt establishes
absolution of the debt, which was established with a solid contract, and thus the
absolution is final. As for the narration regarding c Uthmān, which the H . anafı̄s
¯
used as proof for their position, it must be false, otherwise the statement of c Alı̄
would contradict his statement.3
2 This Hadı̄th was previously discussed, as narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄ and Al-Hākim on the
. ¯ ¯ .
authority of c Amr ibn c Awf, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.112),
¯
Al-S.an ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.59).
c
3 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.526), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.296), ’Ibn Juzayy
¯ .
((Mālikı̄), p.327), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.326), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.338), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.195 onwards).
¯ ¯ ¯
67.3. DEBT REPAYMENT 69
67.3 Debt repayment

Naturally, if the transferee repays the debt to the creditor, the transfer of debt
is terminated, since its legal status ceases to exist.
67.4 Death of the creditor or debtor

If the creditor dies, and the transferee inherits the debt of the transfer of debt,
the contract is terminated. In this regard, inheritance is a means of transferring
ownership, and thus results in ownership of the debt by the transferee in this
case.
’Abū H. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad also ruled, in opposition to other
jurists, that a restricted transfer of debt is terminated upon the death of the
principal debtor. They based this opinion on the fact that the property to which
the transfer of debt was tied thus becomes part of the principal debtor’s estate.
67.5 Gift
If the creditor gives the property established as debt as a gift to the transferee,
and if the latter accepts that gift, then the transfer of debt is terminated.
67.6 Charity
Similarly, if the creditor gives the debt as a charitable payment to the transferee,
and if the latter accepts that charity, then the transfer of debt is terminated.
This case and the one before follows from the fact that gift and charity receipt
are similar to inheritance and repayment of the debt.
67.7 Absolution
If the creditor absolves the transferee of the debt, the transfer of debt is termi-
nated.
Chapter 68
Compensation of the
Transferee
In this chapter, we discuss two topics: (1) the conditions under which the trans-
feree may seek compensation from the transferor, and (2) listing of what may
be sought from the transferor. We then end the chapter with two more sections
on disagreements between the transferor and the creditor, and on modern bills
of exchange (suftāj).
68.1 Conditions for demanding compensation

There are three conditions under which the transferee may seek compensation
from the transferor:
1. The transfer of debt must be initiated by the transferor in order for the
transferee to seek compensation from him. Otherwise, if the transfer of
debt is initiated by another party (e.g. the creditor), the transfer may be
valid, but the transferee may not seek compensation from the transferor
upon repaying his debt. In the latter case, the transferee is considered to
have paid the transferor’s debt as a voluntary charity, without transferring
ownership of the debt to the transferee.
2. The transferee is only entitled to demand compensation from the trans-
feror after having paid his debt, or received it as a gift, charity or in-
heritance. All such events would make the transferee the owner of the
transferor’s debt, and thus may seek compensation through repayment.
However, if the transferee is absolved of the debt, he may not seek payment
from the transferor, since absolution drops his right to the debt.
3. For the transferee to seek compensation from the transferor, he must
not be indebted to the transferor with a debt similar to the one that
was transferred. If, however, the transferee is indebted to the transferor
71
72 CHAPTER 68. COMPENSATION OF THE TRANSFEREE
with an equal debt, then the two debts are mutually cancelled through a
muqās..sah).1
68.2 Type of compensation

If the transferee is entitled to seek compensation from the transferor, he may
only seek compensation equivalent to the transferred debt, and not the amount
actually paid, in analogy to guaranty. Thus, if the transferred debt was mon-
etary, and the transferee paid it in kind, he may only demand monetary com-
pensation. In this regard, whatever compensation is sought by the transferee
must be in accordance with the debt that he owns by virtue of the transfer and
repayment. In this case, the owned debt is that which was transferred, and not
the amount actually paid in lieu of that debt. This is in analogy to the case of
guaranty, and in contrast to the case of an agent for debt-payment.
68.3 Transferor-creditor disagreements

Consider the case where the creditor collects the transferred debt, and then
disagrees with the transferor. For instance, the transferor may deny having been
indebted to the creditor and claim that he was in fact his agent for collecting his
debt from the transferee, and demand delivering the collected property to him.
In this case, the transferor’s claim is accepted if backed by his oath. In this
case, the creditor is claiming that the transferor owed him, while the transferor
is denying it. In all such cases, the claim of the denier is accepted subject to his
oath, unless the claimant can provide a material proof for his claim.2
68.4 Contemporary bills of exchange

We have studied bills of exchange in the part on loans. In this contract, a person
gives some property to a merchant to pay to another in a different country. The
sender thus benefits by insuring himself against the risks of transferring that
property himself. This practice is reprehensible to the level of prohibition in the
H. anafı̄ school, since it is in essence a loan that benefits the lender (against the
risks of transportation). Such loans that benefit the lender were forbidden in a
H. adı̄th of the Prophet (pbuh).3
¯
1 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.19), Majma Al-D . amānāt (p.283).
c
2 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H . anafı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.449), Al-Sarakh ¯
sı̄ (1st
edition (H. anafı̄), vol.20, p.57), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.305).
3 Al-Hārith ibn ’Abı̄ ’Usāmah narrated on the authority of c Alı̄ that he said that the Prophet
. ¯
(pbuh) said: “every loan that brings a benefit to the lender is ribā”. The people of H . adı̄th
¯
found fault in the chain of narrations of this H . adı̄th due to its inclusion of Suwār ibn Mus.c ab,
¯
whose narrations are disregarded. It was also narrated b Al-Bayhaqı̄ in Al-Sunan Al-Kubrā
on the authority of ’Ibn Masc ūd, ’Abū ibn Kac b, c Abdullāh ibn Salām, and ’Ibn c Abbās,
with truncated chains of narration at their levels. There is another H . adı̄th narrated by ’Ibn
c Udayy in Al-Kāmil on the authority of Jābir ibn Samurah that he said¯ that the Prophet
68.4. CONTEMPORARY BILLS OF EXCHANGE 73
The reprehensibility of this practice is predicated on stipulating a condition

of ensuring against the risks of transportation. However, if the loan is extended
without stipulating a condition that the borrower must deliver the property in
another country, the loan is thus valid. It is also permissible to give the merchant
such property to deliver to someone in another country as a trust rather than a
guaranteed loan.4
(pbuh) said: “bills of exchange (al-suftajāt) are forbidden”, but this is a weak H . adı̄th with a
¯
weak link in its chain of narration, c.f. Al-H
. āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.60),
¯
’Ibn H. ajar (, p.254).
4c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.162).
¯ .
Part X
Pawning/Mortgage
(Al-Rahn)
75
77
Preliminaries
We shall study the pawning/mortgage contract in seven chapters:
1. Definition, legality, cornerstones, and types.
2. Conditions (pertaining to contracting parties, contract language, debt for

which pawning takes place, pawned object, conditions of conclusion, re-
ceipt of pawned object, properties eligible for pawning, consequences of
receipt and other conditions).
3. Legal status and effect (valid vs. defective pawning).
4. Inherent growth of a pawned object.
5. Increase in the pawned object and/or the debt.
6. Termination of pawning.
7. Disagreement between the contracting parties.

Chapter 69
Definition, Legality &

Cornerstones
69.1 Definition
The Arabic term “rahn” may refer either to constancy, or to holding and bind-
ingness. In this regard, the verse “every soul will be held (rahı̄nah) in pledge for
its deeds” [74:38] refers to the binding aspect of the term. Of the two opinions,
the holding aspect is the more physical one, and hence we deem it to be the
primary linguistic meaning, while the permanency meaning is derived from that
primary one. The juristic meaning of the term is closely associated with its
linguistic meaning. Oftentimes, one uses the term rahn to refer to the object
that was pawned to ensure a debt.
Legally, the pawning or mortgage contract is defined1 as holding an item in
lieu of a legal right that may be satisfied from that item. In other words, the
contract involves holding a valuable non-fungible good as insurance against a
debt, where the non-fungible may be used to extract the value of the debt or
part thereof. This contract may differentiated from the guaranty contract thus:
the guaranty contract insures a debt through the liability of a creditworthy
individual (the guarantor), while the pawning contract ensures a debt with
valuable property. In this regard, since the insuring pawned object must be
valued property, impure objects whose impurities cannot be removed are not
eligible to serve in this capacity as a pawned object insuring a debt.
The Shāfic ı̄s defined the pawning contract thus:2 “Taking a non-fungible
¯
property as insurance against a fungible debt, whereby the debt may be ex-
tracted from the held property if it is not repaid”. Their explicit specification
of “non-fungible property” as the pawned object implies that usufruct may not
be used as the object of a pawning contract, since they are transient and thus
1c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.5), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.339),
¯ . .
Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.21, p.63).
¯
2 Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.121), Al-Sharqāwı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.122,124).
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
79
80 CHAPTER 69. DEFINITION, LEGALITY & CORNERSTONES
do not provide the required insurance.

3
The H . anbalı̄s defined the contract thus: “A pawned object is a property
used as insurance for a debt, so that the debt may be extracted from the property
if it is not possible to recollect from the debtor”.
The Mālikı̄s defined the pawning contract thus:4 “It is the act of taking a
valued property from its owner, as a means of insuring a loan that has ma-
tured or is about to mature”. Thus, they allow this contract to include taking
non-fungible properties such as real estate, animals, or commodities, as well as
usufruct, as pawned objects. In the latter case, pawned usufruct must be tied
to a specific time period or task, and must be deducted from the debt. As for
the debt itself, they stipulated that it must be matured, e.g. the price in a con-
cluded sale, the repayment of a matured debt, or the value of ruined objects;
or it must be about to become matured, e.g. taking an object from an artisan
or borrower to ensure against losing one’s capital or lent object. In the latter
cases, the pawned object is used as insurance against the value of the objects
for which the artisan or borrower is liable.
It is worthwhile to note that the Mālikı̄ use of the phrase “the act of taking”
does not necessarily imply actual delivery of the pawned object. In fact, such
physical delivery is not required in their school as a condition of conclusion,
validity, or bindingness. In this regard, they recognize as concluded, valid, and
binding any pawning contract that is concluded with the proper language of
offer and acceptance, and the pawn broker may later demand receipt of the
pawned object.
69.2 General characterization

The pawning contract is a voluntary charitable contract (tabarruc ), since what
the pawned object is given without financial compensation.5 It is also one of
the contracts involving non-fungibles, which are not considered totally binding
until the object of contract is delivered. The five contracts that share this
classification are: gifts, simple loans, deposits, loans, and pawning. In those five
contracts, the necessity of delivery to make the contract final follows from the
voluntary charitable nature of the contract. In fact, this ruling is formalized
as a juristic rule: “voluntary charitable acts are not fully concluded prior to
receipt”. As a consequence, such contracts have no effects prior to receipt, and
thus all their effects are considered to be derivative of the act of receipt.
69.3 Legality
There are proofs of legality of the pawning contract in the Qur’ān, the Sunnah,
and consensus:
4 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.303 onwards, 325).
.
69.3. LEGALITY 81
• Proof from the Qur’ān is provided by the verse “If you are on a journey
and cannot find a scribe, then use the receipt of pawned objects” [2:283]
[as an act of insurance, instead of the proscribed documentation]. Based
on this verse, only Mujāhid and the Z.āhirı̄s restricted pawning to the
state of traveling, while most jurists agreed that taking pawned objects
is permissible both at home and while traveling, based on the Prophet’s
Sunnah which allowed it unconditionally.6 In this regard, the Qur’anic
verse mentioned the state of travel to alert people that there is an easy
means of documenting and insuring a debt if there is no scribe at hand.
• Proof from the Sunnah is provided by the H. adı̄th narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄
¯ ¯
on the authority of c A’isha (mAbpwh) that “The Prophet (pbuh) bought
¯ 7
some food from a Jew, and he pawned his iron shield with him”. In
another H . adı̄th , Anas (mAbpwh) said: “The Prophet (pbuh) pawned a
¯
shield with a Jew in Madı̄nah, and he took from him some barley for his
family”.8
In another narration on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, the Prophet
(pbuh) was narrated to have often said: “pawned riding animals may be
mounted in exchange for their expenses, and the milk of pawned dairy
animals in exchange for their expenses; and the one who rides or drinks is
thus responsible for the animal’s expenses”.9
In another narration on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, it is reported that
the Prophet (pbuh) said: “The ownership link between a pawned object
and its owner is not severed; he is still responsible for its expenses, and he
is entitled to its output”.10 This H
. adı̄th negated the common pre-Islamic
¯
practice of assigning ownership rights to the pawn-broker if the debtor
does not repay in the specified time period. However, the Legislator has
thus negated that practice, since the wisdom behind legalizing pawning
is to ensure debts against default, just like guaranties ensure them. Such
insurance of debts with pawned properties makes it easier to extend credit,
thus benefiting the debtor. Pawning also benefits the creditor by giving
him primacy over other creditors through possession of the pawned object
from which he has the first right to extract what is owed to him.
• Muslims have also reached a consensus that pawning is permissible.
Pawning is one of the most powerful means of ensuring against default. In
this regard, documentation and guaranty provide les certain insurance of the
6 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.327), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305), Al-Kāsānı̄
. ¯ ¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.135), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.271), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄),
¯
p.323), ’Ibn Hubayrah ((H . anbalı̄), vol.1, p.238), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3,
p.307 onwards).
7 This Hadı̄th and the next one may be found in Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th),
. ¯ . . . ¯
vol.4, p.319 onwards), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.233 onwards).
¯
8 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukh
. ārı̄, Al-Nasā’ı̄, and ’Ibn Mājah.
9 Narrated by the major narrators ¯
of H. adı̄th with the exception of Muslim and Al-Nasā’ı̄,
¯
c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.234).
¯
10 Narrated by Al-Shāfic ı̄ and Al-Dāraqut.nı̄.
¯
82 CHAPTER 69. DEFINITION, LEGALITY & CORNERSTONES
creditor’s right compared to a pawned object that he holds in his possession,

and which he may sell to collect what the debtor owes him with the permission
of a judge or the object’s owner. As we have previously mentioned, pawning
also benefits the debtor by making it possible for him to receive credit through
a loan or price deferment. Thus, this contract is beneficial to both parties.
69.4 Non-bindingness
Jurists agree that pawning as a means of insuring a debt is permissible but
not required. In this regard, pawning is a means of documenting and insuring
a debt, similar to guaranty, and neither is required. Thus, the verse’s [2:283]
instruction to collect pawned objects if scribes are not found is understood to be
guidance to the believers, and not an order. As proof of this interpretation, one
may cite the continuation of the verse [2:283] “If you trust one another, then
let the trusted party deliver that with which he was entrusted”. In addition,
Allāh (swt) ordered the use of pawned objects in the absence of scribes, but it
can be inferred from the “trust” continuation of [2:283] that documenting the
debt itself is not required, and thus its replacement is not required either.11
69.5 Cornerstones and components

The pawning contract has four components: “the debtor (who pawns an object
of his), the creditor (who receives the pawned object), the pawned object (as
insurance of the debt), and the debt in lieu of which the object is pawned”.
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s stipulated the offer and acceptance from the debtor
and creditor, respectively, as the cornerstone of the pawning contract, in analogy
to most other contracts.12 However, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the contract is not
finalized or binding until the pawned object is delivered either by transportation
to the creditor, or by giving him access to it. Thus, the debtor may make an
offer along the lines: “I pawn this object with you in lieu of the debt I owe
you”, and the creditor may indicate his acceptance by saying: “I accept”. In
this regard, the term “pawn” need not be uttered in the offer, for instance, a
buyer may give an object to the seller saying: “keep this until I pay you the
price”, in which case the pawning contract is concluded, since what matters in
contracts is their economic content.
The non-H . anafı̄s, on the other hand, stipulated four cornerstones for the
pawning contract: contract language, contracting part(ies), pawned object, and
underlying debt.13 This trend for non-H . anafı̄ jurists to stipulate more corner-
stones than their H . anafı̄ counterparts is quite common in all contracts. This
11 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.327), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.307).
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.135), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.340), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n
c c
((H
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.189 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.63), Abd Al-
c
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.54).

¯13
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.304 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.121), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.307 onwards).
69.6. FORMS OF PAWNING 83
follows from the H . anafı̄ definition of a cornerstone as: “Part of something, the
existence of which is predicated on that part”. In this regard, there may be
parts upon which existence is predicated, and others upon which it is not. On
the other hand, non-H . anafı̄ jurists define a cornerstone thus: “Something upon
which the existence of the thing is predicated, and without which the thing may
not be imagined”, whether or not it is a part of the thing. Thus, the contracting
party is considered by the non-H . anafı̄s as a cornerstone, since it is impossible to
imagine a contract without contracting parties. However, the contracting party
is not a part of the contract, and thus the H . anafı̄s list such parties as conditions
of contracts rather than cornerstones.
69.6 Forms of pawning

A pawning may exist in one of three forms:14
1. A pawning may originate with the debt-generating contract. For instance,

a seller in a credit sale may stipulate a condition that the buyer must pawn
an object in lieu of the price established as a debt. All jurists render such
pawning valid, since they recognize that it serves a valuable economic
purpose.
2. A pawning may originate after the debt is established. Jurists also agree
that this form of pawning is valid, as a means of insuring an existing debt,
in a manner similar to the guaranty contract. In this regard, they refer
to the verse [2:283] regarding taking pawned objects to insure debts, as
a substitute for written documentation, which normally takes place after
the establishment of the debt.
3. A pawning may also be originated prior to establishment of a debt. For

instance, a person may pawn some of his property with another ahead of
getting a loan from that person. This form is valid for the Mālikı̄s and
H. anafı̄s, since they view pawning as insurance of a legal right, which may
thus be provided prior to the establishment of that right, in analogy to
guaranty. This, indeed, is the most logical conclusion.
On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s and most of the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that such a
¯
form of pre-pawning is not valid. They based their ruling on the view that
insurance of a legal right may not precede its establishment, in analogy to
testimony. Thus, they argued that since pawning is derivative of a legal
right, it may not precede it.
14 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.327), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.127), ’Abū-’Ishāq
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.308), Al-Dardı̄r
¯ ¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.245).
Chapter 70
Pawning Conditions
The pawning contract has conditions for conclusion, conditions for validity, and
one bindingness condition (which is receipt of the pawned object). In what
follows, we shall list the contract conditions by its components (contracting
parties, contract language, etc.).
70.1 Contracting party conditions

The two parties to a pawning contract (the debtor and creditor) must satisfy
the following conditions:1
70.1.1 Eligibility
The H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s stipulated that eligibility for pawning is the same as
eligibility for sales. Thus, since pawning is a financial dealing similar to sales,
whoever is deemed to be eligible for sales is deemed to be eligible for pawning.
Thus, the two parties to a pawning contract must be sane, and discerning, in-
validating pawning by insane individuals or non-discerning children. Moreover,
being of legal age is not a condition for pawning, provided that the contracting
party is a boy who is permitted to engage in trade. In the case of a discern-
ing child, or a mentally incompetent person, a pawning would be valid but
suspended on the permission of his guardian.
For Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s, eligibility conditions for pawning are the same as
¯
those for trading or making charitable contributions. They based this view on
the fact that pawning is a non-required voluntary action, which is thus invalid if
the actor is coerced, not of legal age, insane, mentally incompetent, or bankrupt.
Moreover, pawning of a child’s or mentally incompetent person’s property is
not valid if initiated by a father, grandfather, legal guardian, or judge, except
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.135), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.268), Al-
. ¯ .
Sharqāwı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.123), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.309), Al-Dardı̄r
¯ ¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.231 onwards, 292).
85
86 CHAPTER 70. PAWNING CONDITIONS
in cases of necessity and apparent benefit to the legally restrained individual.

For instance, pawning a child’s property to borrow foodstuffs to be repaid from
an anticipated crop, debt repayment, or improvement in market conditions, is
permissible. Similarly, it is permissible for take pawned objects as insurance
against an extended loan or an item sold on credit due to a necessity such as
fear of theft, etc.
An example of beneficial pawning on behalf of a legally restrained individual
would be pawning an item that is worth $100 as insurance for an item which
was bought for a deferred price of $100, but which is worth $200 at the time
of pawning. Similarly, collecting a pawned item that is worth more than the
deferred price in a credit sale would be clearly beneficial to the young creditor.
In this regard, a legal guardian or plenipotentiary may only pawn a child’s
object to a creditworthy and rich individual, and he should have eyewitnesses
to the contract. Moreover, he should only engage in such pawning for periods
of time that are customarily considered short. Otherwise, if any of those con-
ditions are violated, the pawning is not permissible.2 For instance, it is not
permissible for a legal guardian or plenipotentiary to pawn the property of a
child as insurance for a debt owed by both of them to a third party, since that
is not of benefit to the child.
The H . anbalı̄s expressed this legal ruling in the form of two conditions: (i)
that the pawn-broker is trustworthy, and (ii) that the child benefits from the
pawning through receiving funds or clothing, or through the maintenance of his
property or livestock.3
On the other hand, they allow a father to pawn his objects to his son and
his son’s property to himself. For the Shāfic ı̄s, those transactions are also valid
¯
for a grandfather, since they view fathers and grandfathers as equal in their
affection and concern for their children and grandchildren.
Guardian and plenipotentiary pawning

There are three forms that we need to consider for the H . anafı̄ rulings on a
guardian’s or plenipotentiary’s pawning of the property of a young child: (1) a
child’s property may be pawned in lieu of a debt on the child, or (2) in lieu of
a debt of the guardian or plenipotentiary; and (3) the status of the pawned
object from the child’s point of view once he reaches legal age.4 We have
already discussed the non-H. anafı̄ rulings in this regard immediately preceding
the current discussion.
1. Pawning in lieu of a child’s or insane person’s debt

It is permissible for a guardian or plenipotentiary to pawn the property of
a mentally incompetent person (either a young child or an insane person) to
2 Al-Sharqāwı̄((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.123), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.122).
3 ’Ibn¯Qudāmah ¯ ¯ ¯
(, vol.4, p.359), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
¯
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.319).
4 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.72 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8,
. .
p.209 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, pp.352,364).
70.1. CONTRACTING PARTY CONDITIONS 87
ensure that person’s debts that were established to feed or clothe him, or to
trade in his property. In the former case, indebting the incompetent person to
meet his feeding and clothing needs is permissible, and in the latter case, trading
in his property is necessary to make it grow. In this regard, since pawning is
a contract used to ensure the rights of the creditor, it is permissible in those
circumstances where debt establishment is valid.
If the guardian was the debtor child’s father or grandfather, or if the same
person served as a guardian for both the creditor and the debtor, then he may
play both roles in the pawning contract. In such contracts, he serves as a
pawning party on behalf of the child, and as pawn broker on behalf of himself
or the creditor. In such cases, since the guardian’s concern for the benefits of the
child are uncontested, he may take both positions for the creditor and debtor,
in analogy to the permissibility of selling the child’s property to himself.
However, the preceding is not permissible for a judge or plenipotentiary,
whose concern for the child’s well-being is not as certain as that of a father.
In contrast to the father, their role in such contracts would be construed as
sheer agencies, wherein the agent may not take two sides of a sale or pawning
contract.
2. Pawning in lieu of a debt of the guardian’s

’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled based on juristic approbation (istih.sān) that
a father, grandfather, or plenipotentiary may pawn a property of the child’s in
lieu of a debt that he himself owes. They based this ruling on the permissibility
for such properties to deposit the child’s property. In this regard, pawning
is more eligible for permissibility, since a pawn-broker guarantees the pawned
object against any loss or destruction, while a depositary guarantees a deposit
against such events only as long as he is neither negligent nor transgressing
against the property.
On the other hand, ’Abū Yūsuf and Zufar ruled on the basis of ruling by
analogy that a guardian or plenipotentiary is not allowed to pawn the property
of a child in lieu of a debt that they themselves owe. They ruled thus by
classifying the pawning of the child’s property in lieu of their own debts as
a form of repaying their debts out of his property, which repayment is not
permitted.
If we accept the first ruling by juristic approbation, and then the pawned
object was destroyed while held by the creditor, the guardian (e.g. father or
grandfather) must guarantee for the child only the lesser of the debt and the
value of the pawned property.
However, a plenipotentiary must guarantee the full value of the pawned
property. The difference between the two cases is the permissibility for a fa-
ther or grandfather to use the child’s property for his own benefit, while the
plenipotentiary is not permitted to use his property thus.
Similarly, a father or grandfather may pawn his own property to a young
child in lieu of a debt that he owes him. In this case, he would set the pawned
property aside for the benefit of the young child. However, such pawning is not
permissible for a plenipotentiary.

Also, a father or grandfather may pawn the young child’s property with
himself in lieu of a debt the child owes him, since he is permitted to take both
sides of such contracts due to the establishment of his concern for the child’s
benefit. Thus, such guardians may issue both offers and acceptances in such
contracts with their young child, in analogy to the permissibility of trading
with him. A plenipotentiary, on the other hand, is a sheer agent in all such
contracts as we have seen, and thus may not take both positions of contracts
that may result in financial benefits or losses to the child.
3. When the child reaches legal age

In all of the above, once a child reaches legal age, or the reason for mental
incompetence or legal restraint is removed, he may not invalidate an established
pawning, and may only collect the pawned object upon debt repayment. In this
regard, the transactions of the eligible guardian are executable and binding,
regardless of whether the underlying debt was established as a liability on the
child, the guardian, or both.
However, if a debt on the guardian is collected from the child’s pawned
property, or if the pawned object perishes prior to recollection, the child may
seek compensation for his due right from the guardian once he reaches legal age,
whether the guardian is still alive or dead. In this case, the ruling is similar to
the case of a lent item that is pawned by the borrower in lieu of a debt that he
owes to a third party. In this case, the lender may recollect his pawned property
by paying the borrower’s debt, and then he may seek recollection of the debt
he repaid from the borrower.
Multiple transacting parties

The number of pawning individuals, or the number of pawn-brokers, may be
more than one. The H . anafı̄s rule that such pawning from or to multiple parties is
permissible based on the absence of property right sharing rules that invalidate
the pawning contract.5 In the case of multiple pawning parties, the pawned
object is received by the creditor without establishing common ownership, and
thus the contract status is the same as that of a single pawning agent. On
the other hand, in the case of multiple pawn-brokers, the entire pawned object
is tied to the debt by a single contract. In this regard, holding the pawned
object in lieu of the debt cannot be divided, and hence the non-fungible object
is considered to be held thus simultaneously by all creditors without division,
rendering the contract valid.
This is in contrast to the case of giving a gift to multiple recipients, which
is rendered by ’Abū H . anı̄fa to be impermissible. His ruling in the latter case
is that the intention of a gift is to establish ownership of the recipient. Since
5 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.78 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5,
. .
p.354 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.218 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
¯
((H
70.1. CONTRACTING PARTY CONDITIONS 89
the multiple recipients may not each have full and independent ownership of
the gift, the stipulated situation requires dividing the gift ownership among the
recipients.
In what follows, we list some of the specific H . anafı̄ rulings pertaining to
different transacting parties:
• In the case of multiple pawning subjects, the pawning is considered valid

in lieu of the entire debt. In this case, the single pawn broker may hold the
pawned object until he collects the entire debt from the multiple pawning
individuals. Thus, if one of the debtors repays his portion of the debt, he
may not collect any part of the pawned object, lest he may division the
contract for the pawn-broker who is entitled to hold the entire pawned
object as insurance for full repayment.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if one of the debtors repays his part
¯
of the debt, a proportional part of the pawned object must be released
by the creditor. Thus, they do not allow the creditor to keep the entire
pawned object until he recollects the rest of the debt.
• In the case of multiple creditors as pawn-broker, the entire pawned object

is considered to be held by each of them in lieu of his debt. Thus, as long
as the debtor does not repay all of his debts, the object must continue to
be held in pawning. For instance, if the debtor repays one of two creditors
fully, the object would thus be considered to be held entirely in pawning
with the second creditor. This ruling follows from the above-listed view
that the entire pawned object is considered to be held simultaneously by
all creditors, without any division.
In this regard, if the object pawned to two creditors is divisible, then
each of them may hold half of it. Then, if one of the two creditors allows
the other to hold the entire divisible pawned object, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled
that the holder must guarantee half to the other, while ’Abū Yūsuf and
Muh.ammad ruled that he must not. On the other hand, if the pawned
object is indivisible, then the two creditors may share in its holding by
alternating holding periods. In this case, the holder of the pawned object
is considered to be a legal representative of the other in that holding.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the debtor repays one of his creditors,
¯
the corresponding proportion of the pawned object must be released from
pawning. In this regard, if a debtor were to pawn two cars to two creditors
in lieu of two debts, without explicitly specifying which car is pawned for
which debt, then he is not permitted to recollect one of the pawned cars
by repaying one of the creditors without paying the other. However, if he
explicitly pawns one car for each of the debts, then the contract is in effect
two separate contracts, and he may collect one of the cars if he repays one
of the debts.
If an indivisible pawned object perishes in the possession of the multiple
creditors, each of the creditors is considered to have been repaid his portion
of the debt from the pawned object. This follows from the fact that
recollecting one’s credit from the object is in fact divisible. In this regard,
if the debtor had repaid one of his creditors prior to the perishing of his
pawned property, he may recollect whatever he repaid. This follows from
the fact that the pawned object is considered a liability on both creditors,
and each creditor is considered to be a legal representative of the other in
the holding.

The H . anafı̄s ruled that a pawning contract may neither be suspended by any
condition, nor deferred to a future date.6 In this regard, they argued that the
pawning contract is similar to the sales contract, since it is a means of debt
repayment, which may neither be suspended by a condition nor deferred. Thus,
if a pawning is suspended pending a condition or deferred to a future debt, they
render it defective in analogy to suspended or deferred sales contracts.7
If a pawning contract includes a defective or invalid condition, the pawning
is deemed valid, and the condition is invalidated. This ruling follows from the
fact that pawning is not a commutative financial contract. Thus, it was stated
in Al-Ziyādāt and Al-Bizāziyya: “A pawning is not invalidated by defective
conditions. This ruling follows since a pawning is similar to gifts in that it does
not require the pawn-broker to pay anything in return for keeping the pawned
object in his possession”.
On the other hand, it was stated in Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.140), that
a pawning is rendered invalid by the inclusion of defective conditions, in analogy
to sales and in contrast to gifts. However, I think that the previous opinion of Al-
Ziyādāt and Al-Bizāziyya is the correct one, since pawning is not a commutative
financial contract, whereby the contract is valid even if the debt is dropped if the
pawned object perishes. In this regard, it was stated in Al-Hidāya that: “The
pawning contract is a voluntary contribution contract, since the pawn-broker
need not give anything in exchange for the pawned object”.8
The non-H . anafı̄ jurists classified conditions in a pawning contract into valid
conditions and defective conditions. They further classified defective conditions
into those that render the contract defective, and those that are considered
nugatory and leave the contract valid and intact. In what follows, we shall list
those conditions and classifications by juristic school:
• The Shāfic ı̄s listed three types of conditions in pawning contracts:9
¯
1. Valid conditions: Under this category, they list all conditions that are
implied by the pawning contract, e.g. giving priority to the pawn-
6 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.135).
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.374,357), wherein it is sated that “deferment of a pawning
renders it defective”.
8 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.190).
.
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, pp.310-2), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.254 onwards).
¯
70.2. CONTRACT LANGUAGE CONDITIONS 91
broker over other creditors in collecting his credit from the pawned
object. They also stated that valid conditions must be of benefit to
the contract, and must not lead to any uncertainty, e.g. securing wit-
nesses. Such conditions render both the contract and the condition
valid, as they do for sales contracts.
2. Nugatory conditions: Under this category, they list all conditions
that do not serve any beneficial purpose, e.g. that a pawned animal
is not fed a certain type of animal feed. Such conditions are voided
and invalidated, but the contract is deemed valid.
3. Conditions that render the contract defective: Conditions that harm
the pawn broker render the pawning contract defective. Examples of
such harmful conditions include: a condition that the pawn-broker
may not sell the pawned item except one month after the debt is due
but unpaid, or a condition that puts a ceiling on the price at which
the pawned item may be sold. Similarly, conditions that harm the
debtor and benefit the pawn-broker render the pawning defective.
Examples of such conditions include: a condition that the pawn-
broker may extract usufruct for an unspecified period without com-
pensation, or a condition that grants the pawn-broker rights to any
growth in the pawned object. Such conditions are voided due to
uncertainty and non-existence at the initiation of the contract, and
based on the H . adı̄th : “Any condition that is not listed in the Book
¯
of Allāh is invalid”.10 Moreover, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s rule in this
¯
case that the contract itself is deemed invalid, since such conditions
are contrary to the implications of the contract, whether they harm
the debtor or the creditor in the pawning.
The Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that the condition and the contract are deemed
¯
invalid if a condition is stipulated that increases in the pawned object
are considered to be pawned themselves. Examples of such increases
include wool on the back of pawned sheep, fruits on pawned trees,
or the offspring of a pawned animal. All such increases were not in
existence at contract inception, and involve significant uncertainty,
and thus the condition and the contract are rendered invalid if such
a condition is stipulated.
Most Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that a pawning contract is deemed defective
¯
if it is deferred to a future date or suspended pending a condition.
Thus, we may conclude that two types of conditions are deemed
defective: (i) those that harm one of the contracting parties, and
(ii) those that involve uncertainty. It is also clear that most Shāfic ı̄s
¯
ruled that a defective condition renders the contract defective.
10 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of c A’isha as follows: “Any condition
¯ ¯
that is not in the Book of Allāh is invalid. Even if there were one hundred conditions [in a
contract], the rights of Allāh are more worthy of fulfillment, and the conditions of Allāh are
firmer”, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.10).
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that any condition that does not contradict the implica-
tions of the contract, or result in a forbidden transaction, is deemed valid.
They further ruled that any condition that contradicts the implications
of the contract are defective, and thus render the pawning contract in-
valid. Examples of such defective conditions include: a condition that the
pawned object is kept with the debtor instead of delivery to the creditor,
a condition that the pawned object is not to be sold after the debt reaches
maturity without being paid, or a condition that the debtor must approve
the price at which the pawned object is sold.
The most notable forbidden condition that voids the pawning contract
is the condition that if the debt is not repaid at or before maturity, the
pawned object becomes the property of the creditor/pawn-broker. This
prohibited condition voids the pawning contract based on the H . adı̄th :
¯
“The pawned object does not become property of the creditor if the debt
is not paid on time”.11
In summary, the Mālikı̄s classified conditions in pawning contracts into
two categories only: valid and defective.
• The H. anbalı̄ agreed with the Mālikı̄s in classifying all conditions in pawn-
ing contracts into valid ones and defective ones.12
For both schools, valid conditions are those that reinforce the contract,
do not contradict its implications, and do not result in a forbidden trans-
action. Examples of valid conditions include: conditions that the pawn-
brokers must be of good character and trustworthy, or conditions that
such pawn-brokers may sell the pawned property if the debt is not repaid
at maturity.
In contrast, defective conditions are those that contradict the implications
of the contract. Examples include: conditions that the pawned object may
not be sold if the debt is unpaid at maturity, conditions that the creditor
may not collect his credit from the pawned object, conditions that the
pawned object may not be sold if it is subject to perishing, conditions
that it may only be sold at a pre-specified price or only at a price that is
accepted by the debtor. All such conditions make it more rather than less
difficult to repay a debt, which is contrary to the purpose of the pawning
contract.
Other examples of defective conditions in pawning include: giving the
debtor an option, making the pawning non-binding on the debtor, timing
the pawning with a fixed period, requiring that the debtor hold the pawned
object, requiring that the debtor or the creditor may use the pawned ob-
ject, or considering the pawn-broker as a guarantor of the pawned object.
11 We have explained this Hadı̄th previously. It refers to the pre-Islamic practice, whereby
. ¯
a pawn-broker was given ownership of the pawned object if the debtor did not pay his debt,
which was forbidden in Islam, c.f. Al-Nihāyah fı̄ Gharı̄b Al-H . adı̄th by ’Ibn Al-’Athı̄r (vol.3,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.379).
12 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.381-3), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.309).
.
70.3. UNDERLYING DEBT CONDITIONS 93
Another defective condition is the one by means of which the pawn-broker

is given ownership of the pawned object if the debt is not paid at matu-
rity, as if the pawned object is traded for the matured debt. Moreover,
any suspension of a pawning contract pending a condition is defective, in
analogy to the ruling regarding such suspension in sales contracts.
H. anbalı̄s differed in opinion regarding whether or not a defective condition
renders the pawning contract defective. Thus, the Justice ’Abū Yac lā
ruled that it is possible for a pawning contract to be rendered defective
if it contains such defective conditions. He based this ruling on the view
that the debtor only accepted to give his property to the creditor if the
stipulated condition holds. Thus, if the condition is invalidated due to
being defective, consent of the contracting parties is not longer satisfied,
and the contract is rendered invalid.
The majority of H
. anbalı̄ jurists agreed that timing conditions in pawning
contracts (e.g. pawning for a day, or on alternating days) render the
pawning defective. However, they differed over other types of defective
conditions:
– Some H . anbalı̄ jurists ruled that all defective conditions render the
pawning contract defective.
– However, ’Abū Al-Khat.t.āb and other H . anbalı̄s ruled that those other
¯
defective conditions do not render the pawning contract defective. He
based his ruling on the H . adı̄th : “The pawned object does not become
¯
property of the creditor if the debt is not paid on time”, which relates
to a pawning contract with a stipulated defective conditions but did
not render the contract itself defective. In this case, he argued that
the debtor would have accepted the pawning with this condition, and
therefore he would have certainly accepted it without it.
– Some H . anbalı̄s argued that any defective condition that harms the
creditor renders the pawning defective, while those that do not harm
the creditor may or may not render it thus.
– The accepted opinion among later H . anbalı̄s agrees with what was
stated in item #962 of the Majallat Al-’Ah.kām Al-Sharc iyyah: “The
¯
pawning contract is not rendered defective if it contains a defective
condition. Rather, the condition is rendered nugatory”.
70.3 Underlying debt conditions

The H . anafı̄s stipulated the following three conditions for the underlying debt
or legal right in lieu of which a pawned object is given:
70.3.1 First H
. anafı̄ condition
The underlying right in lieu of which an object is pawned must be binding and
matured as a liability on the debtor. Thus, if the underlying debt was not
due, there is no point in giving a pawned object as insurance for its repay-
ment. Thus, they ruled that the request to ensure the creditor’s right (through
pawning) cannot be justified without a binding right to be thus ensured.13 The
H. anafı̄s expressed this condition by requiring the underlying right ensured by
the pawning contract to be “a guaranteed debt”.14 In other words, the underly-
ing right must be a matured debt that is established as a liability on the debtor.
Our statement is clearer, since the underlying right may either be a [fungible]
debt, or it may be a non-fungible object that must be delivered to the creditor:
1. If the underlying right in lieu of which a property is pawned is a matured

debt, then the pawning is valid regardless of how that debt was established
(e.g. through a loan, a sale, ruining the property of another, or usurping
the property of others). This follows since all such debts must be repaid,
and thus pawning a property to ensure such repayment is meaningful.
In this regard, most H . anafı̄s agreed that the pawning is valid whether
the established debt may be exchanged prior to receipt (like most debts),
or may not (e.g. the capital of a salam contract, one side of a currency
exchange contract, or the object of a salam contract). This, indeed was
the opinion of ’Abū H. anı̄fa, Muh.ammad, and ’Abū Yūsuf.
On the other hand, Zufar ruled that debts that may not be exchanged prior
to receipt are not eligible as underlying rights in lieu of which a pawning
may take place. He based his ruling on the argument that an integral
component of a pawning contract is dropping the debt if the pawned object
were to perish in the creditor’s possession. This dropping of the underlying
debt is in fact an exchange of the perished pawned object for the debt, but
that is not allowed for the specified non-exchangeable debts, by definition.
In fact, we have pointed out this legal problem in our study of the salam
contract. Were it permissible to base a pawning on such debts, the debts
would be exchangeable prior to receipt for the pawned object if it perishes,
but that would result in a legal contradiction, which we do not allow. In
this regard, we may not avoid treating this case as a forbidden exchange
of such debts by arguing that the debt was thus repaid when the pawned
object perished, since repayment must be made of the same genus as the
established debt.
The majority of H . anafı̄s, however, defended their view by arguing that in
all pawning contracts, the debt is dropped if the pawned object perishes in
the creditor’s possession as a form of repayment not as a form of exchange.
In this regard, they argued that the pawned object and the established
debt share the necessary genus of being valued properties, even if they do
not share the same genus in other respects. In this regard, they argued
that having the same genus in the more general sense of being a property
13 See lecture-notes on pawning by Professor Sheikh c Alı̄ Al-Khafı̄f (p.45).
14 Al-Kāsānı̄ ¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.142 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, pp. 196,
206 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.66), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄
¯
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.55 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
((H c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.350).
may be sufficient if need or necessity may require it, in analogy to the

case where a person destroys a property for which there is no equal in
genus in the specific sense.15 In such cases, they further argue that the
need or necessity that legitimized the pawning contract would have been
satisfied, and such needs to ensure debt repayment exists for all types of
debts, exchangeable or otherwise.16
17
The non-H . anafı̄s had a number of opinions in this regard. Thus, there
are two opposite reported opinions of ’Imām ’Ah.mad regarding the debt of
the seller in a salam contract. One such report permits pawning an object
in lieu of that debt, and another does not permit it. The first report
suggests that if an object is pawned in lieu of liability for the object of
salam, and then the contract is voided, the pawning is considered to be
invalidated due to the non-existence of its underlying debt. In this case,
the seller in the salam contract must return the received price to the buyer
immediately.
’Imām Mālik and the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that pawning in lieu of one side of a
¯
currency exchange program, or the price of a salam contract established as
a liability on the buyer, is not permissible since receipt is required during
the contract session of such contracts. However, they permitted pawning
in lieu of the object of salam that is established as a debt on the seller,
since it is qualifies as one of the debts for which pawning was allowed in
the Qur’ān.
2. If the underlying liability for which an object is pawned is non-fungible,

we need to consider multiple cases:
• If the object is held in a possession of trust (e.g. a deposit, a lent

object, a leased object, or the capital of a partnership or silent part-
nership), then jurists agree that it may not be used as an underlying
15 Such cases are considered repayments, which do not require consent of the repaid party,
rather than exchanges which require the repaid party’s consent.

16 If a pawned object given in lieu of the capital of a salam contract, or in lieu of one side
of a currency exchange contract, were to perish during the contract session, the contract is
thus deemed valid. In this case, the party that received the pawned object is considered to be
paid his due during the contract session, as required by the conditions of those two contracts.
However, if the pawned object were to perish after the contract session, the contract would be
rendered invalid, since receipt did not take place during the session of a salam or .sarf contract,
as required. If an object is pawned in lieu of the liability for the object of salam, and then
it perishes prior to delivery, it is cancelled against the lesser of its value and the value of the
object of salam. If a salam contract is voided after pawning an object in lieu of the liability for
its object, the ruling by juristic approbation renders the object pawned in lieu of the capital
of salam, since the latter is a compensation for the object of salam. However, if the pawned
object were to perish after the contract is voided, it is cancelled against the object of salam
rather than its price. This ruling follows from the fact that the pawning was initiated in lieu
of liability for the object of salam, and thus is cancelled against it, despite the fact that it was
held afterwards in lieu of another liability, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.207).
17 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.269 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.323), Al-
¯ .
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
’Abu Al-Barakāt ((H . anbalı̄), vol.1, p.335).
liability for pawning. This ruling follows from the fact that receipt of
a pawned object is a receipt of guaranty, which must thus correspond
to a non-guaranteed item. Thus, the general rule is that no pawning
is permitted except in lieu of liability for a guaranteed item, so that
receipt of the pawned object may make debt repayment easier.
• The non-fungible object may be guaranteed by itself (i.e. must be
replaced by an equal if it has one, or its value otherwise), e.g. if in
the possession of a usurper, the buyer prior to concluding the sale,
the dowry prior to consummating a sale, if it is compensation for
seeking divorce in the possession of the wife, or if it is compensation
to the family of a killed person. The H . anafı̄s ruled that liabilities for
such non-fungibles are eligible as underlying liabilities in a pawning
contract. In such cases, the creditor is permitted to hold the pawned
object until he collects the owed non-fungible. If the pawned object
perishes in the possession of the creditor prior to collecting his non-
fungible, while the latter is in good condition, the debtor must thus
deliver the non-fungible he owes, and collect the lesser of the value of
the pawned object and the value of the non-fungible he owed. This
rule follows since the pawned object was guaranteed by the lesser of
those two values.
The Mālikı̄s and H. anafı̄s also permitted pawning in lieu of liabilities
for such non-fungibles that are guaranteed by themselves.18
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s did not permit pawning in lieu of a liability
¯
for a non-fungible that is held in a possession of trust or guaranty.19
This ruling is based on restrictions of underlying liabilities for pawn-
ing to be fungible debts (dayn). Their proof is that Allāh (swt) only
mentioned pawning in such debts, and thus they argued that legality
of pawning is not established in lieu of other liabilities. Moreover,
they argued that non-fungibles may not be taken out of the price
of a pawned object, and thus contradicts the purpose of pawning in
sales.20
• If the non-fungible is guaranteed by another (e.g. the object of sale
in the seller’s possession which is guaranteed by the price, whereby
liability for the price is dropped if the object of sale perishes in the
seller’s possession), then the H . anafı̄s agree that liabilities for such
non-fungibles are not eligible to be underlying a pawning contract.
In this regard, it is narrated that ’Abū H . anı̄fa based this ruling on
the view that pawned objects’ receipt is a form of debt repayment.
In this regard, receipt cannot be established in lieu of a non-fungible
18 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.270), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3,
¯ . .
pp.311).
19 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.126), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.265), ’Abū-
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305).
¯
20 Thus, we ¯
can see that the common practice of establishing a book as a mortmain with a
condition not to lend it or take it out of its place unless an object is pawned as insurance, c.f.
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄ni ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.59).
¯ ¯ ¯
liability that is guaranteed by another. As proof, he argued that if

the pawned object were to perish in the possession of the creditor in
this case, the debt would not be deemed to be repaid.
However, the more reasonable ruling is that pawning is permissible
in lieu of liability for the object of a sale, since it is guaranteed by
the seller. In this case, the buyer may hold the pawned object until
he receives the sold object. Thus, repayment of the debt is in fact
accomplished in reality, since the object of sale is either guaranteed
by its value or its price, and dropping the price if the object perishes
prior to delivery is viewed as a form of financial compensation.
As a consequence of the condition that the underlying debt in a pawning

contract must be a matured liability, we list the following rulings:
1. Pawning in lieu of identified monies: If a man marries a woman in ex-

change for specified monies, or buys an item in exchange for specified
monies, and pawns an object in lieu of his liability for those monies, ’Abū
H. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad consider this pawning impermissible
based on their ruling that monies cannot be made non-fungible through
specification. On the other hand, Zufar allowed monies to be made non-
fungible through specification, and thus allowed such pawning.
2. Pawning in lieu of a future debt: At face value, our basic condition implies
that if the underlying liability is not established, matured, and binding at
contract time, the pawning is not valid.
However, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled by juristic approbation that pawn-
ing in lieu of a promised loan is valid, based on people’s needs for such
contracts.21 However, did not allow pawning in lieu of future debts that
were not based on a promise.
The Shāfic ı̄s and most H
. anbalı̄s ruled that it is not valid to pawn an object
¯
in lieu of a future debt or liability, whether or not it is promised. Their
ruling was based on the view that the liability must be established at he
inception of the pawning contract, and the mere promise of lending does
not establish such a liability.22
3. Pawning in lieu of liability for an object of sale:23 If a sale contract is

concluded, the seller receives the price, and the buyer receives the object of
sale, and then the buyer worries that the object of sale may in fact belong
to a third party, then he may wish to ask the seller to pawn an object with
him as insurance against seeking repayment of the price if the third party
21 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.143), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.351), Al-Dardı̄r
. .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.245).
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
23 The technical term for this type of pawning is al-rahnu bi-l-darak, where al-darak refers
to a buyer who demands repayment of the price if the object of sale is found to belong to
another, c.f. continuation of ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.206).
repossesses the object of sale. The juristic ruling is that this pawning
contract is not valid prior to the actual time of seeking repayment of the
price if the third party repossesses the object of sale. This is in contrast to
the permissibility of guaranty at such a time. The ruling follows from the
fact that repossession of the object by its rightful owner is probabilistic,
and thus any pawning thereof would not have an established liability, and
may in fact be based on a liability that never comes into existence.
The difference between guaranty and pawning in this case is thus: Guar-
anty is permissible for future events, since binding promises to do some-
thing in the future are permissible, in analogy to pledges (al-nudhūr).
¯
Thus, the H . anafı̄s permitted guaranties for darak, but invalidated pawning
24
for it. In contrast, pawning is intended as a means of debt repayment,
and thus requires the existence of a debt to be repaid. Moreover, this
repayment aspect of pawning makes it similar to other commutative con-
tracts, which may not be deferred to avoid uncertainty. Indeed, pawning
in lieu of darak, wherein a seller pawns an object with the buyer saying
“if a true owner of the sold object were to appear, you can use this prop-
erty of mine to collect the price you paid me”, would be similar to such
uncertain deferred commutative contracts.
In this regard, the fundamental difference between the case of darak and
the case of a promised loan is that the former is non-existent while the sec-
ond is about to exist. Moreover, the H. anafı̄ jurists have rendered guaranty
of the latter based on need, as we have shown.
70.3.2 Second H
The H. anafı̄s also stipulated a condition that the pawned object must make it
possible for the creditor to extract repayment of his debt. Thus, the pawning is
not valid if it cannot serve the purpose of repaying the debt in lieu of which it
came into effect, since the very purpose of pawning would thus not be fulfilled.25
Consequently, the following are not eligible liabilities for a pawning contract:
1. If the underlying liability is the right to take a life, it is impossible to

extract that right from any pawned object, and hence the pawning is
impermissible. However, if the liability is for financial compensation for a
crime (arsh), then pawning is valid since the financial compensation can
¯
be extracted from a pawned object.
2. Liability to bring a guaranteed person to justice may not be insured

through a pawning contract, since the liability cannot be extracted from
any pawned object. This extends to the case where one person guarantees
to deliver another within a year, otherwise he would have to pay a $1000
24 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.206), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.143 onwards), ’Ibn
c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.350).
25 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.143 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.208), ’Ibn
. .
c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.351).
.
penalty. In this case, the guarantor may not pawn some of his property
for the year, since the money is not established as a liability before the
year passes, and delivery of the guaranteed person cannot be guaranteed
by the pawned property.
3. The right of shufc ah is a right of first refusal for the purchase of property
¯
in which a person has a right. If a person buys a property or part thereof
and then discovers that another has the right of shufc ah, delivery of the
¯
property becomes a liability on the buyer. In this case, the creditor may
not seek a pawned object in lieu of that liability, since the right to buy
the property cannot be extracted from the pawned property. Moreover,
the buyer of the property to which a right of shufc ah is attached does not
¯
guarantee that property, i.e. if the property were to perish, he would not
be liable in any way.
4. Liabilities for wages paid as compensation for forbidden actions (e.g. to

be paid to one who wails at funerals, a female singer or dancer, etc.) is
not eligible for pawning contracts. All such contracts of hiring individuals
to perform forbidden acts are invalid, and thus the wages are not legally
considered as legitimate liabilities, and thus cannot serve as the basis for
a pawning.
5. If two individuals lease a property together, and one of them owes the
other a portion of the usufruct, that liability cannot be used as a basis for
pawning since it cannot be extracted from a pawned object.
70.3.3 Third H
The liability underlying a pawning contract must be known to all parties. Thus,
the pawning is deemed invalid if there is any uncertainty, e.g. if the debtor pawns
one object for an unnamed debt out of two that are owed to the creditor.
70.3.4 Shāfic ı̄ and H

. anbalı̄ conditions
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s stipulated three conditions that the liability under-
¯
lying a pawning contract must satisfy:26
1. The liability must be an established and matured fungible debt. Examples

of such debts include: loans to be repaid, the value of a ruined object, and
work to be performed in a joint hiring contract. In all such cases, the
pawned object may be sold to collect the financial debt, or to hire another
worker to perform the task. This ruling regarding the object of a hiring
contract disagrees with the ruling of the H . anafı̄ school. On the other
hand, all three schools agree that liability for a non-fungible object of a
26 Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.264), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.126 onwards),
¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄ni ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.60), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.311).
¯ ¯ ¯
lease contract may not be used as a basis for pawning, since the liability
may not be extracted from the pawned object.
This requirement of fungibility implies that Shāfic ı̄s do not allow pawning
¯
based on liabilities for borrowed or usurped non-fungibles.
The H . anbalı̄s allowed pawning a property in lieu of a guaranteed non-
fungible (such as the object of a simple loan, a usurped object, an object
received by the buyer prior to concluding the sale, or the received object
of a defective contract). The H
. anbalı̄s based this ruling on the basis of the
rule that pawning is allowed in lieu of any matured debt, or any debt that
is about to be matured (e.g. the price of a sale during an option period).
In contrast to the H
. anafı̄s, the Sh āfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that promised
¯
loans may not be used as a foundation for a pawning contract.
However, they did not differentiate between finally established loans (al-
dayn al-mustaqirr, such as those established by loans and received objects
of sale), and those that are not finally established (such as liability for
the price prior to receiving the merchandise, liabilities for rent prior to
extracting usufruct, or liability for a dowry prior to consummation of a
marriage). In this regard, wages payable to a worker hired to perform a
given task are due during the contract session (like the price in a salam
sale) and thus may not be the basis of a pawning since it cannot be
established as a liability.
2. The debt must be matured or about to be matured. Thus, it is permis-

sible to base a pawning on the liability for the price of a binding sale, or
during the option period before it becomes binding. In the latter case, the
contract is about to become binding when the option period expires, and
thus the debt as about to become established irrevocably.
On the other hand, liability for an amount of money that a slave may use
to free himself and liability for a juc ālah prior to completion of the task
are not considered binding liabilities, and therefore pawning is not valid
in lieu of such liabilities. In the two mentioned examples, one party may
void the contract, and thus the purpose of pawning, which is to ensure a
liability, cannot be satisfied.
3. The debt must be known in amount and characteristics. Thus, if one or

both contracting parties are uncertain about the liability in lieu of which
an object is pawned (e.g. an unspecified debt out of two), the pawning is
not valid.
70.3.5 Mālikı̄ conditions

The Mālikı̄s ruled that all fungible binding liabilities are eligible for use in
pawning contracts except for two: (i) the price of salam, and (ii) either part
of a currency exchange contract. The fungibility condition implies that they
invalidate pawning an object in lieu of a trust such as a deposit or the capital
70.4. PAWNED OBJECT CONDITIONS 101
of a silent partnership. The condition of establishment as liability further im-

plies that non-fungibles and their usufruct may not be the basis of a pawning
contract.27 Finally, the condition that the debt must be binding or about to
become binding implies that pawning in lieu of liability for the amount of money
by means of which a slave can buy his freedom is not valid.
70.4 Pawned Object Conditions

The pawned object is a property of the debtor that is held by the creditor in lieu
of the underlying debt. Thus, if the pawned object is of the same genus as the
underlying liability, the creditor may extract his credit from the pawned object
if the debt is not repaid. On the other hand, if the underlying liability was
monetary, and the pawned object was a non-fungible of a different genus, then
the pawned object may be sold, and the debt may be repaid from the collected
price. Finally, if the underlying debt was not monetary, e.g. if it is denominated
in wheat, while the pawned object is of a different genus, then repayment may
be effected through exchange.
For those reasons, jurists have agreed that a pawned object must satisfy the
conditions of objects of sale, so that it may be sold to repay the debt out of
its price.28 The H . anafı̄s ruled that if the debtor is absent, and it is not known
whether or not he is alive, then the pawned object may be sold by permission
of the judge. However, if the debtor is present, he is forced to sell the pawned
item, otherwise the judge or his deputy may sell it and repay the creditor.29
The H . anafı̄s listed eight conditions for the object of a pawning contract: (i)
being valued property, (ii) being known, (iii) being deliverable, (iv) being in
receipt, (v) being in possession, (vi) not being attached to a non-pawned item,
(vii) being separate from other properties, and (viii) being distinguished from
other properties. Otherwise, the pawned object maybe movable or immovable,
fungible or non-fungible. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall discuss each
of the conditions separately.
70.4.1 Eligibility for sale

The object of a pawning contract must satisfy the conditions of the object of sale.
Thus, it must exist at the inception of the contract, and must be deliverable.
Thus, it is not permissible to pawn items that do not exist, or whose items are
uncertain, at the inception of the contract. For instance, it is not permissible
27 For example, if someone buys a specific animal from another, and receives a pawned object
from the seller to ensure against possible defects, whereby the seller should deliver the same
non-fungible without a defect to take back his pawned object (which is impossible). Another
example is the case where a person rents a specific car from another, and receives a pawned
object as insurance that the lessor will deliver the exact same car if it is claimed by a third
party or found to be defective, which is also impossible. Since both examples are logically
impossible, they are legally impermissible. On the other hand, pawning so that the buyer or
lessee may extract the value of the non-fungible or its usufruct is permissible.
.
to pawn the fruits of one’s trees this year, the offspring of one’s sheep this
year, birds in the sky, runaway animals, etc. In this regard, non-existence or
uncertainty of existence of the pawned object makes it impossible to sell it, and
thus makes it impossible to use for debt repayment.
As a consequence of this condition, most jurists agree with the H . anafı̄ jurists
that pawning of fruits or green plants prior to ripening is not valid. This is the
most widely accepted opinion among the Shāfic ı̄s and Mālikı̄s (as reported by
¯
Al-Dusūqı̄), and one of two reported opinions in the H . anbalı̄ school. Thus,
they ruled that pawning fruits prior to their ripening, and pawning green plants
without the condition of cutting them, are invalid since such goods are not
eligible for sale.30
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄ jurists ’Ibn Al-Qāsim and ’Ibn Al-Mājishūn,
¯
and the majority of H . anbalı̄s, enumerated some exceptions to the general juristic
rule that: “Properties ineligible for sales are ineligible for pawning”. The excep-
tions they stipulated are: pawning fruits prior to ripening without a condition
of cutting, pawning green plants without a condition of pulling, and pawning
of runaway and lost animals. In this regard, they argued that the prohibition
of selling such items was based on the possibility of defects in such properties,
or unnecessary risk and uncertainty. However, such considerations do not affect
pawning, since the underlying debt is established as a liability on the pawning
party, and thus if the pawned object were defective or lost, the right of the
creditor remains intact as a liability on the debtor. On the other hand, if the
pawned object turns out to be intact, e.g. the fruits ripen or the lost animal
returns, then the creditor would benefit from being able to sell the pawned ob-
ject to collect his credit once it becomes due. On this basis, some Mālikı̄s and
H. anbalı̄s permitted pawning certain properties that are not eligible for sale at
the inception of the pawning contract, provided that those properties are not
sold until they become eligible (e.g. when the fruits ripen, or the lost animal
returns) and the debt is matured.
70.4.2 Being a property

It is not permissible to pawn non-properties such as dead animals or animals
hunted during a state of ritual purity in preparation for pilgrimage (’ih.rām),
since their meats are of no use to Muslims.
The majority of non-Mālikı̄ jurists also stipulated that usufruct may not be
pawned, e.g. pawning the rights to use a house for a stipulated period.31 This
ruling follows from the H . anafı̄ classification of usufruct as non-properties, and
the non-H. anafı̄ view that usufruct is undeliverable at contract time, since it does
30 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.233 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2,
¯ .
p.269), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.323), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.343), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.124), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.315), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-
¯
Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.309).
c
¯ 31 ¯
The H . anbalı̄s said that pawning such usufruct is not valid, since the objective of the
creditor in such a contract is to extract the debt from the pawned object, but the usufruct of
an object would have vanished by the time the debt is matured, c.f. ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4,
p.350), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.307).
not exist at that time, and since it vanishes immediately following its transient
existence.32 Thus, since usufruct is transient and does not remain intact for any
extended period of time, but gets replaced by another, it cannot be possessed
or delivered, and it cannot remain in existence until the time of debt maturity
and required repayment. However, the Shāfic ı̄s only forbade pawning usufruct
¯
at the contract inception, but permit usufruct to be pawned if it is not used to
establish the pawning contract, e.g. if a person dies in debt while having the
rights to the future usufruct of some properties [the rental value of which may
be used to pay creditors].
70.4.3 Being valued

The pawned property must be valued so that it may be used to repay the
pawning party’s debt. Thus, a Muslim is not allowed to pawn wine or pork, nor
to accept them as pawned objects from a Muslim or a non-Muslim. This ruling
follows from the fact that a Muslim may neither repay his debts, nor collect
debt repayments, from such forbidden products. Thus, if a Muslim debtor were
indeed to pawn such forbidden objects with a non-Muslim creditor, that creditor
would not guarantee the pawned objects, in analogy to the ruling that a usurper
does not guarantee such value-less forbidden objects for their owner. On the
other hand, if a non-Muslim debtor pawned some wine with a Muslim creditor,
the latter must guarantee the wine for the former, again in analogy to the ruling
of a usurper. In this regard, while the wine is non-property for the Muslim, it
is a valued property for the non-Muslim, and thus the two resulting debts may
be used to cancel out one another. In the case of a non-Muslim debtor and a
non-Muslim creditor, Islamic law would recognize the pawning of pork or wine
between them as valid, since they both would recognize such objects as valued
properties.
70.4.4 Being known

As with the object of a sales contract, the object of a pawning contract must be
known. In this regard, all items with sufficiently minor uncertainty to permit
their sale would also be eligible for pawning, and vice versa. In this regard, we
recall that the minimal degree of knowledge regarding an object of sale is that
level that would make it customarily unlikely for a dispute to ensue from the
contract.
Thus, if a debtor pawns “a house with all its contents” to a creditor (without
specifying the contents), the H . anafı̄s render the pawning valid, since they would
permit such a specification (a house with all its contents) in a sales contract.
However, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s deem such a specification to contain signif-
¯
32 The Shāfic ı̄s expressed this by saying: It is certainly invalid to pawn usufruct, since
¯
usufruct vanishes and thus does not provide the required insurance, c.f. Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.122), Al-Bājūrı̄ (5th printing (Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.124).
¯ ¯
icant uncertainty, rendering a sale or pawning to be invalid.33 Similarly, if the

debtor says “I pawn on of those two houses to you” (without specifying which
one), the H . anafı̄s render the pawning valid on the basis of their ruling that a
sale with similar incomplete specification is valid, with a selection option given
to the buyer.34 On the other hand, the lack of specification would render a sale,
and thus the proposed pawning of an unspecified house, invalid for the Shāfic ı̄s
35 ¯
and H . anbalı̄s.
In this regard, if a debtor gives two dresses to a creditor, saying: “Take
whichever one you wish in pawning in lieu of my debt”, neither dress is consid-
ered to be pawned until the creditor selects which one in his possession is the
pawned object. Thus, prior to selection, the pawned object was unknown, and
hence the pawning was invalid; but after selection the pawned object becomes
known, and the pawning becomes valid. If both dresses were to perish in the
possession of the creditor prior to specification of which one was pawned, and if
the underlying debt equaled the value of one of the dresses, then the debt would
be cancelled against half the value of each.
70.4.5 Being owned

The condition that the debtor must be an owner of the property he pawns with
the creditor is not a condition of validity for the pawning. Rather, the H . anafı̄s
and Mālikı̄s consider this a condition of executability of the pawning. Thus, we
may determine the legal status of pawning the property of another.
Thus, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that pawning the property of another
without his permission is permissible if the pawning party has a legal guardian-
ship, such as being the owner’s father or plenipotentiary who pawns a child’s
property in lieu of a debt of the child’s or of his own. They also ruled that it is
permissible to pawn the property of another person with his permission, e.g. by
borrowing an item to pawn it with a creditor. In the most general case, if the
owner of the pawned property did not give his permission, the pawning would
be considered suspended subject to the owner’s consent, in analogy to sales.
36
On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s ruled that it is not permissible
¯
to pawn the property of another person without his permission. They based
this ruling on their rulings of impermissibility of selling the property of another
without his permission, its undeliverability (in analogy to birds in the sky or
runaway animals), and the impermissibility of selling it to repay the creditor.
However, if a debtor pawns a property thought to belong to another, and then
it is discovered that it belonged to his deceased father and was thus his by
inheritance, the H . anbalı̄s and some of the Sh āfic ı̄s render the pawning valid.
¯
This ruling is based on the view that the essence of the contract is what matters
33 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, pp.309,263), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.348), ’Ibn
. ¯ ¯
c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.356), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.231).
34 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.356; vol.4, p.61), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.157).
. .
35 ibid.
36 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.308), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3,
. ¯ ¯ .
p.315).
and not its form. However, the most widely accepted Shāfic ı̄ view is that this
¯
contract is invalid since it was initiated without satisfying the conditions of the
contract.
Finally, all jurists agree that it is permissible to borrow an item and pawn
it with a creditor.37 This ruling is based on the view that once the item is
borrowed, the debtor is in possession of the item for his sole benefit, and without
the need to compensate the lender. This is indeed the nature of the simple loan
contract, whereby the borrower has the right to benefit from the borrowed item.
70.4.6 Not being attached

It is not permissible to pawn a property that is occupied by another non-pawned
property of the debtors. For instance, it is not valid to pawn palm trees without
pawning the dates on it, agricultural land without the plants therein, or a house
without the furniture therein. On the other hand, it is permissible to pawn the
occupying property without pawning the property that it occupies, provided
that the two are not connected. For instance, it is permissible to pawn the load
on a car without pawning the car, or pawn the furniture within a house without
pawning the house.
70.4.7 Being separate

The object of a pawning contract must be separate from other products and
collected together. Thus, it is not permissible to pawn items that are distributed
and connected to other properties, such as pawning fruits without pawning the
trees they are on, or pawning plants without pawning the land in which they
are planted. In such cases, the fruits or plants cannot be possessed without
possessing the trees or land, and hence the pawning is not valid.
70.4.8 Being clearly identified

The pawned object must be clearly identified and separated from other prop-
erties. For instance, it is not permissible to pawn a fraction of a house or car,
even if the debtor and creditor were both partners in that property.
In this regard, the requirements that the pawned object be non-attached,
separate, and clearly identified are all necessitated by the fact that receipt of
the pawned object is a fundamental condition in pawning contracts, and not
just a condition of validity. In this regard, if the pawned object was attached
to another, not separate, or not separately identified, receipt of that object
would be impossible. However, when the pawned object is separate and clearly
identified, it may be received by the creditor, and then the pawning contract
is deemed concluded and binding. However, prior to delivering the pawned
object to the creditor, the debtor would still have an option to deliver it or to
void the pawning, in analogy to gifts. In this regard, the pawning contract is
37 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6,
¯ . .
p.88).
similar to the gift contract in its characterization as a voluntary contribution

contract, which only becomes binding after receipt. Thus, we see that the
last three conditions are in effect requirements that the object of pawning has
characteristics that make its delivery and receipt possible.
70.5 Receipt of the Pawned Object

All jurists agree that receipt is a condition in the pawning contract, based
on the verse “. . . then use received pawned objects [as insurance of the debt]”
[2:283]. However, they differed over the classification of this condition as one
of contract completion or as a bindingness condition. This difference in opinion
is meaningful, since rendering receipt a bindingness condition implies that the
debtor may change his mind prior to delivering the pawned object. In contrast,
those who render the condition one of contract completion would rule that the
contract is binding upon conclusion, and the debtor may be forced to deliver
the pawned object, provided that the creditor was not lenient in demanding its
receipt until the debtor died, became sick, or declared bankruptcy.38
Non-Mālikı̄ rulings
The non-Mālikı̄ jurists ruled that receipt is not a validity condition in a pawning
contract, but rather deemed it a condition of bindingness.39 Thus, they ruled
that the pawning is not binding upon the debtor prior to delivering the pawned
object, and thus he may change his mind prior to such delivery. However, after
the creditor receives the pawned object, the contract becomes binding, and thus
may not be voided unilaterally by the debtor.
Their proof for this ruling is the verse “. . . then use received pawned ob-
jects [as insurance of the debt]” [2:283]. Thus, they argue that Allāh (swt) tied
the pawning to receipt, which implies that the contract is not binding without
receipt. Moreover, they argued that pawning is a voluntary contribution con-
tract, which requires acceptance. In this regard, delivery and receipt establish
that offer and acceptance have taken place, and that the contract is binding.
This ruling, that bindingness in such voluntary contribution contracts is only
established with receipt, is analogous to the ruling for gifts and loans.
Mālikı̄ ruling
The Mālikı̄s ruled that receipt is a condition of contract completion, and not a
condition of validity or bindingness.40
38 ’Ibn Rushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.270 onwards).
39 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.340 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.137), Abd
c
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.54 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.128), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯ ¯
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.317), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.328).
40 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.271), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.323 onwards), Al-
¯ .
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.313).
70.5. RECEIPT OF THE PAWNED OBJECT 107
Thus, they ruled that once a pawning contract is concluded by offer and
acceptance, the contract is binding, and the debtor may be forced to deliver the
pawned object to the creditor as per that contract. Moreover, they ruled that
if the creditor is lenient in demanding the pawned object, or if he consents to
keeping it in the possession of the debtor, then the pawning contract is deemed
invalid.
Their proof for this ruling is derived by analogy to other binding financial
contracts, based on the verse “fulfill your contracts” [5:1]. Thus, they ruled that
pawning is a financial contract that should be fulfilled. Moreover, they argued
that pawning is a contract meant to ensure a debt, in analogy to guaranty, and
thus it becomes binding upon the conclusion of the contract and prior to receipt.
For all schools of jurisprudence, the receipt condition implies that if a pawn-
ing contract is concluded with a stipulated condition that the pawned object
must remain in the debtor’s possession, the pawning is invalidated. Conse-
quently, if the pawned object were to perish in the debtor’s possession, the debt
is not dropped. Moreover, if a pawning contract is initiated with the stipulated
condition, and then the creditor demands receipt of the pawned object, he is
not granted that right since the pawning was defective at its inception, and may
not become valid after having been defective.41
70.5.1 Means of receipt

Jurists have agreed that receipt of immovable real estate is established either
through physical receipt or through removal of impediments to such receipt.
On the other hand, they differed in their rulings regarding receipt of movable
pawned objects:
• Most H . anafı̄s ruled that removing impediments to receipt of the pawned

object is tantamount to receipt.42 They based this ruling on the view that
convention and law consider giving access to an object to be equivalent to
its receipt. This conventional understanding is extended from the case of
real estate, where receipt can only come into effect through giving access
to the property. Moreover, removal of impediments and giving access to
any property is agreed upon by jurists as a form of delivery, even if the
property is not transported or officially turned over to the new possessor
to complete the delivery. Indeed, this is the most logical opinion, which
agrees with the nature of financial dealings and helps to expedite delivery.
• On the other hand, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that giving access to a movable prop-
erty is not sufficient to establish receipt, and requires transportation and
official transfer of possession rights. He relied for this ruling on the verse
“. . . then use received pawned objects [as insurance of the debt]” [2:283],
41 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.128), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.328), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ . ¯ ¯
42 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.138), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269), Al-Khatı̄b
. ¯ . ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.128), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.232), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305 onwards).
¯
which he interpreted to mean actual physical receipt, which requires trans-

portation of the property. In this regard, he argued that granting access
to a property only results in a legal form of receipt, but not actual receipt,
and thus is insufficient in pawning contracts. Moreover, he argued, receipt
of a pawned object establishes a creditor guaranty of the pawned object,
which did not exist prior to the contract. The establishment of this new
guaranty requires actual receipt rather than mere legal receipt, in analogy
to the guaranty of usurped objects. This case is thus contrasted with the
case of a sales contract, where guaranty for the sold object is transferred
from the seller to the buyer, whereby granting access to the object of sale is
sufficient for that transfer. However, this distinction between the pawning
and sales contracts seems inconsequential.
43
• The Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s agree with the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf. They
¯
based their ruling on the view that the receipt meant in the verse is the
usual type of receipt as expected in sales. Thus, they ruled that receipt in
pawning is the same as receipt in sales, which requires only granting access
for real estate and other immovable objects (including fruits on a tree
or plants I the ground), but requires physical receipt for movable objects
(such as jewelry, coins, clothes, etc.). In this regard, the receipt of movable
goods measured by volume, weight, size, or number must be received by
the appropriate measure. In determining the means of measurement and
receipt of such items is determined by convention (c urf).
Mortgaged real estate

It is clear that the objective of receiving a pawned property is to provide in-
surance to the creditor, who is thus empowered to extract the debt owed to
him from the pawned property in his possession. Thus, delivery and receipt in
pawning should not be viewed in a ritualistic manner that is divorced from the
economic meaning of the contract.
Consequently, any transaction that results in a similar insurance to the cred-
itor may take the place of the classical receipt of pawned property. For instance,
contemporary civil legal provisions to establish a legal mortgage of some prop-
erty by announcing it and documenting it with legal authorities accomplish the
same effect of the pawning contract. Thus, those modern legal proceedings may
replace the type of receipt required in classical jurisprudence. Indeed, that is
the form of legal receipt that the Mālikı̄ jurists permitted in addition to the
physical receipt that all jurists had accepted.
70.5.2 Conditions of receipt

There are three main conditions for validity of the receipt of a pawned object:
¯ . ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.318).
1. Permission of the debtor

Jurists agreed that permission of the debtor is required for the validity of receipt
in a pawning contract.44 This ruling follows from that fact that receipt of
the pawned object renders the pawning binding, and drops the right of the
debtor to demand returning his pawned object, hence requiring his permission
for dropping his right. Thus, if the creditor transgresses by receiving the pawned
object without the debtor’s permission, he is not legally considered in receipt
of a pawned object. Moreover, if the debtor gives his permission to the creditor
to receive the pawned object, and then withdraws that permission prior to the
actual receipt, the permission is legally voided, and the creditor may not take
the pawned object. However, once the creditor receives the pawned object with
the debtor’s permission, the debtor has no recourse.
Jurists differed in opinion regarding the case where a creditor usurps an
object without the debtor’s permission, and then the debtor consents to the
creditor’s possession of the object, qualifying it as a pawning in lieu of his debt:
• ’Imām Mālik ruled that it is valid thus to transform the guaranty from
one of a usurped object to one of a pawned object. Thus, if permission
is given ex post prior to regaining possession of the usurped object, that
object may become pawned with the creditor.
• On the other hand, ’Imām Al-Shāfic ı̄ ruled that such a change of guar-
¯
anty is not permissible, and thus ruled that the object continues to be
guaranteed by the creditor as a usurped object, even if the debtor were
to indicate his consent that the creditor keep it as a pawned object. In
order for the object to become pawned, it must first be given back to the
debtor, who must then give permission to the creditor to take it again,
but this time as a pawned object.
There are two types of permission that a debtor may give; explicit, and
implicit:
• An explicit permission can take place verbally, e.g. if the debtor says: “I
have given you permission to receive the pawned object”, or “receive this”,
etc. In this regard, it does not matter whether such an explicit permission
is given during the contract session or afterwards.
• An implicit permission can take place when the creditor receives the
pawned object during the contract session, without any objection from
the debtor. Such an implicit permission would render the receipt valid,
since the offer to pawn an object implies the debtor’s consent to the conse-
quences of the contract, which can only be satisfied through receipt. Thus,
the offer in the pawning contract may be viewed as an implicit permission
to collect the pawned object during the contract session. However, that
. ¯ . ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.128), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.332), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305 onwards).
¯
permission does not extend beyond the contract session, since the debtor
may change his mind after the conclusion of that session.
One can reason by analogy on the basis of Zufar’s ruling regarding the receipt
of gifts. The ruling thus would require an explicit permission to receive the
pawned object, and even then would only permit receipt during the pawning
contract session, and not afterwards. This ruling follows from Zufar’s view that
receipt is a cornerstone of the pawning contract (and thus the contract is deemed
non-existent if receipt does not take place during the contract session).
2. Eligibility of contracting parties

Both parties to a pawning contract must be eligible at the inception of the time
of delivery and receipt of the pawned object. In other words, they must be
of sane mind and legal age, and for jurists who add legal impediments on the
financial dealings of bankrupt individuals, the parties must not be bankrupt.
This ruling follows from the fact that the consequences of the pawning contract
take effect through receipt, and thus all the conditions of the contract must apply
to receipt. The preceding are the conditions for the Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s. The
¯
H. anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s also permit a discerning child with trading privileges to
engage in pawning contracts, even before reaching legal age, since they view
pawning as a derivative of trading.45
Jurists differed in opinion over the case where a pawning contract is con-
cluded by eligible parties, and then one of the parties to the contract loses his
mind, or dies, prior to receipt:
• The H. anafı̄s rule in this case that the pawning contract is invalidated, since
one of the parties becomes ineligible prior to the contract’s completion.
• The H . anbalı̄s and most Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that the pawning contract is not
¯
invalidated thus, in analogy to a sales contract with an associated option.
Thus, they ruled that the legal guardian of the insane or mentally incom-
petent party, or the heir of the deceased party, may take their place in
the contract. On the other hand, if the debtor is legally restricted in his
dealings due to declaring bankruptcy, then he is not allowed to deliver the
pawned object. Moreover, if the debtor enters into a coma, the creditor is
not allowed to collect the pawned object while he is unconscious.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that prior to receipt of the pawned object, if the debtor
dies, becomes insane, declares bankruptcy, or becomes terminally ill, the
pawning is invalidated. In contrast, they do not consider the pawning to
be invalidated if death, insanity or bankruptcy were to befall the creditor.
The latter ruling follows from their view that the contract was concluded
45 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, pp.135,141), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, pp.268,271),
. ¯ .
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.122,129), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.328 onwards),
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.316), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.319), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.241), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.307).
¯ ¯
through offer and acceptance, and completion of its consequences is ap-

parently beneficial to the creditor, and hence his heir or legal guardian
may take his place in receiving the pawned object.
We also need to consider the various opinions for the case where the debtor
becomes terminally ill prior to delivering the pawned object:
• If the debtor has other creditors and no other properties from which to
pay the other debts, the H . anafı̄s do not permit delivery or receipt of the
pawned object in this case, unless the other creditors agree to such receipt.
This ruling is based on the principle that none of the creditors should be
given priority in collecting their debts at that stage.
• As we have seen previously, the Mālikı̄s agreed with the H

. anafı̄s on this
ruling.
• In contrast, most of the Shāfic ı̄s and some of the H

. anbalı̄s ruled that a
¯
terminally ill debtor may give priority to some of his creditors in repay-
ment, even if his debts exceed the totality of his wealth. They ruled thus
on the basis that by delivering the pawned object, he is satisfying one of
his liabilities, and thus must be allowed. However, other jurists in the two
schools ruled that he is not allowed to deliver the pawned object once he
becomes terminally ill.
3. Permanency of receipt
The H. anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s required the receipt of pawned objects to
be permanent and final, until the debt is repaid or it is used to extract repay-
ment.46 Jurists have differed over the case where a creditor receives the pawned
object, and then returns it to the debtor voluntarily, as a loan, deposit, or with
permission to use (e.g. to ride if the pawned object is a car):
• The Mālikı̄s ruled in this case that the pawning contract is invalidated.
• The H . anafı̄s ruled in this case that the pawning remains valid, but the
pawned object would thus no longer be guaranteed by the creditor, who
retains the right to recollect the pawned item.
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled in this case that the contract remains intact, but the
bindingness of the contract is removed, as if the pawned object was never
received. Then, if the pawned object is delivered to the creditor once
more, they ruled that bindingness is re-instated by virtue of the initial
pawning contract.
This is in contrast to the H
. anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s who ruled that the pawning
may only be reinstated in this case through a new contract. Their proof
46 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.142), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.271 onwards),
. ¯ .
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.241 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
vol.4, p.331), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.228).
for this position was their interpretation of the verse “. . . then use received
pawned objects [as insurance of the debt]” [2:283] to imply the necessity
of a permanent receipt.
• On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the pawned object may con-
¯
tinue to exist even if used (e.g. a car), then permanency of receipt is not a
condition for the validity of that receipt.47 Thus, they ruled that it is per-
missible for the creditor to lend the received pawned object to the debtor,
permissible for the debtor to take the pawned object with the creditor’s
permission, and permissible for the debtor in those cases to use the pawned
object for riding, residence, etc. In all such cases, they still consider the
pawned object to be insurance for the debt. They based this ruling on
the H . adı̄th narrated by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ and AlH
. ākim that “It is permissible
¯
to ride a pawned riding animal, or milk a pawned dairy animal”, and the
H. adı̄th narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ that “It is permissible to ride a pawned
¯ ¯
riding animal in exchange for its expenses”. Moreover, they argued that
receipt is considered only at the inception of pawning, but need not be
permanent as in the case of gifts.
On the other hand, if the pawned object would be consumed if used, the
debtor is not allowed to request regaining possession and using the pawned
item after he had delivered it. In this case, the creditor’s possession of the
pawned object must be permanent to protect his rights from being lost.
Pawning received items

Jurists have differed over the case where an object that is already in the credi-
tor’s possession (through a simple loan, deposit, lease, or usurpation) is pawned
to him in lieu of a debt. In this case, jurists differ in their ruling regarding
whether or not the existing receipt is sufficient. If it is, then the conclusion of a
pawning contract through offer and acceptance would render the contract bind-
ing, since receipt came into effect prior to the contract. However, other jurists
argued that a new receipt is necessary to make the pawning contract binding:
• The H. anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and H

. anbalı̄s ruled that the prior receipt is sufficient,
and there is no need to have a new receipt for the pawning contract.48
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s have established a general juristic principle
that applies to gifts, pawning, and other similar voluntary contribution
contracts. That principle is that if the pawned object was already in
receipt at the inception of the contract, then it substitutes for the receipt
of the pawning contract if the two receipts are of the same genus (i.e. if
they are of equal strength in terms of trust or guaranty). However, if the
47 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.311), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
pp.130-2).
48 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.142; vol.5, p.126 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3,
.
p.236), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.334), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.309), ’Ibn Rushd Al-
¯
H
. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269).
two receipts are of different strengths, then the stronger of the two may
replace the weaker.
For instance, we know that the possession of a deposit is a possession of
trust, while the possession of a usurped object is a possession of guaranty,
which is stronger than the former. In this regard, the possession of a
pawned object is a possession of trust, which is the weakest possible form
of possession.49
Thus, if the prior possession of the pawned object was a possession of trust
(e.g. through deposit, simple loan, or lease), the H . anafı̄s thus rule that
the prior possession is of the same genus as the possession of pawning,
and there is no need for a new receipt. On the other hand, if the prior
possession was one of guaranty (e.g. if the object was usurped), and then
it was pawned to the creditor-usurper, the prior possession of guaranty
would be stronger than the weaker pawning possession of trust, and thus
there is no need for a new receipt to bring into effect the weaker possession.
The Mālikı̄s also ruled that any prior possession of the pawned object is
sufficient, since they consider the objective of receipt to be possession,
which is thus in effect. In this regard, they mentioned explicitly the per-
missibility of pawning a leased item to a lessee-creditor prior to the expi-
ration of the lease period, as well as the permissibility of pawning a garden
to the worker who is in possession of the garden through a crop-sharing
contract.
The H . anbalı̄s also ruled that a pawning contract is valid and binding
through offer and acceptance if the object of pawning was already in
the creditor’s possession through a simple loan, deposit, usurpation, etc.
Thus, they ruled that the creditor’s possession of the pawned object after
the pawning contract is the real condition of that contract, and not the
actual act of receipt.
In this regard, the non-Shāfic ı̄ jurists ruled that if the creditor held the
¯
pawned object previously in a possession of guaranty, that possession be-
comes a possession of trust by virtue of the pawning. This ruling is based
on the view that the reason for guaranty was thus eliminated through the
pawning contract, in analogy to the dropping of guaranty upon returning
usurped items (the H . anbalı̄s and some of the Sh āfic ı̄s also ruled that the
¯
possession of the object of a simple loan is a possession of guaranty). In
this regard, if the creditor had usurped the debtor’s property, and then
the debtor pawned it to him in lieu of his debt, the creditor is no longer
49 In this regard, the fact that the debt or part thereof is dropped if the pawned object were
to perish does not imply a stronger form of possession. In fact that dropping of the debt is
based on the view that the property value of the pawned object is kept with the creditor to
guarantee his right that he may extract it from its value. Thus, it is established that the
debt may be repaid through the pawned object, and an equivalent amount of the debt may
be dropped in exchange for the property value of the pawned object if it perishes. Indeed,
whatever extra value may be inherent in the perished pawned object would thus perish in a
possession of trust, since that excess amount was not held by the creditor for debt repayment.
viewed as a usurper, and hence his possession is no longer a possession of

guaranty.
• The Shāfic ı̄s and the H c

. anbalı̄ Qād.ı̄ ’Abū Ya lā ruled that the prior re-
¯
ceipt is sufficient, but is not considered a received pawned object unless
a sufficiently long period passes during which receipt could have taken
place.50 Thus, if the pawned object is portable, then a sufficient period to
transport it must pass before its receipt as a pawned object is established.
Similarly, if the pawned object is measured by volume, then a sufficient
period to measure it must pass, and if it is immovable, then a sufficient
period to give access to it must pass. In addition, if the pawned object was
not physically in the creditor’s possession, then a sufficient period must
pass during which the creditor or his agent could get to it, and then an
additional period must pass during which receipt could have taken place.
They based this ruling on the view that the pawning contract requires the
act of receipt, which is a process that requires a sufficient period of time.
In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the prior possession of the pawned
¯
object was a possession of guaranty, it remains thus after the pawning.
Thus, contrary to the other jurists, they ruled that if a creditor usurped
the property of his debtor, and then the debtor pawned that property to
him in lieu of the debt, the pawning does not absolve the creditor from
being a usurper (and similarly in simple loans), and his possession remains
one of guaranty.51 In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s see no contradiction between
¯
the two issues of possessing the pawned object as a trust to guarantee the
debt, while holding it in a possession of guarantee by virtue of being a
usurper (or borrower).
As proof, they gave the example of a creditor who transgresses against the
pawned object in his possession, in which case he would thus guarantee it
(thus establishing a possession of guaranty), while the pawning contract
remains intact (thus retaining the possession of trust) since the credi-
tor continues to have priority in extracting repayment of his debts from
the pawned object. Thus, if the weaker possession established through
the pawning contract is not removed or invalidated when possession of
guaranty is established, it is only logical that the stronger possession of
50 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.306), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.334), Al-Khatı̄b
. ¯ ¯ ¯ .
¯ ¯
51 Thus, pawning does not absolve the usurper from being a usurper. This follows from the
fact that even if the owner of a usurped property absolves the usurper of the existing property,
the usurper would not thus be absolved. Indeed, this is an instance of the general rule that
one cannot be absolved of liabilities for non-fungibles, but may only be absolved of fungible
debts established as a liability. Other examples exist where absolution is not possible. For
instance, if the owner of a property absolves another from guaranteeing what is established as
a liability on him if it perishes, the absolution does not take place since absolution requires an
established matured fungible debt from which the liable party may be absolved. In analogy
to the case of pawning, if the owner of usurped property leases it to the usurper, uses it as
capital in a silent partnership with the usurper, or hires the usurper as an agent to deal in it,
the usurper would not be absolved of the act of usurpation.
guaranty is neither removed nor invalidated when the weaker possession

of trust is established through the pawning.
This is to be contrasted with the case of depositing a usurped item with

the usurper. In the latter case, the usurper is absolved of usurpation,
since the trust involved in the deposit contract contradicts the notion
of possession of guaranty. As proof for the different ruling in this case,
notice that if the depositary transgresses against the deposit, he would
not longer be entrusted with it, in contrast to the case of transgression
against a pawned object.
70.5.3 Receivers of pawned objects

Either the creditor or his agent may receive the pawned object. However, it is
not permissible for the creditor to appoint the debtor as his agent in receiving
the pawned object. The latter ruling follows from the fact that the objective of
a pawning contract is to ensure the creditor of repayment of the debt, and thus
the pawned object may not remain with the debtor.
On the other hand, the debtor and creditor may mutually agree that the
pawned object will be kept with a third party who receives it thus. This third
party is thus named “the trustee” (al-c adl). This arrangement may be useful
if the creditor does not wish to leave the pawned object with the creditor, and
the latter does not wish to keep it with him lest he has to guarantee it against
certain types of destruction.52
Trustee rulings
A trustee is by definition a person whom the debtor and creditor trust to hold
and protect the pawned object.53 He thus serves in the capacity of a proxy for
both parties. He is viewed as a proxy of the debtor since he protects his property
at his request and trust in his creditworthiness. Moreover, he is also viewed as
a proxy for the creditor since he acts as his agent in receipt and keeping of the
pawned object. Indeed, such receipt takes place with the consent of the creditor,
to the point of considering his receipt to be a form of receiving debt repayment
in certain respects.
Thus, the trustee satisfies two types of characteristics in terms of trust and
guarantee. As a proxy for the debtor who owns the pawned object, he acts as a
depositary of that object, thus holding the object itself in a possession of trust.
Simultaneously, as an agent of the creditor, he guarantees the financial aspect
of the pawned object.
52 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.321).

53 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.80).
The trustee as an agent
As an agent of the debtor and creditor in a pawning contract, the trustee must
satisfy all the conditions of agents.54 Thus, all jurists agree that the trustee can-
not be a young non-discerning child, or any individual who is legally restrained
due to insanity. Moreover, the non-H . anafı̄ jurists do not permit discerning chil-
dren or individuals who are legally restrained due to mental incompetence to
serve in this capacity.
Moreover, a guaranteed debtor may not act as a trustee in a pawning contract
wherein his guarantor gives a pawned object to the creditor. This ruling follows
lest the debtor be working on his own behalf. Similarly, the debtor’s partner
may not act as a trustee in his pawning contract, and the investor in a silent
partnership may not act as a trustee for an object pawned by the entrepreneur
in that contract, since the possessions of both parties are equivalent.
If the two parties agree that the debtor will act as a trustee, then we consider
two cases. If that agreement was reached prior to receipt of the pawned object,
then all jurists agree that the pawning contract would thus be invalidated by that
defective condition. However, if the agreement was reached after the creditor
received the pawned object, then the non-Shāfic ı̄s render the pawning invalid,
¯
while the Shāfic ı̄s permit the agreement, since they do not stipulate permanency
¯ 55
of receipt as a condition of pawning.
Both parties to a pawning contract must agree on the trustee, whether he is
appointed prior to receipt of the pawned object by the creditor or afterwards.
Appointing a trustee after receipt may be necessary if the debtor does not trust
the creditor to protect his property.
Once a trustee receives the pawned object, his receipt is valid and binding
in the view of most jurists. They based this ruling on the view that receipt of a
pawned object is part of the pawning contract, and thus is eligible for agency in
analogy to other receipts in other contracts. Thus, the trustee will be considered
an agent of the creditor in receipt, guaranteeing the financial property aspect
of the pawned object. As we have seen, he is also viewed as an agent of the
debtor, holding his property in a possession of trust.
On the other hand, a few jurists including ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Laylā, Zufar, and
Qatādah ruled that the trustee receipt is not valid. They based their ruling
on the view that receipt of the pawned object is necessary for contract comple-
tion, and thus must be performed by one of the parties to the contract (in this
case the creditor), in analogy to other conditions like offer and acceptance.56
54 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, 150), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.351), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
. ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.133).
¯
55 Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.133 onwards).
c
56 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah¯ (, vol.4, ¯p.351), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.133), ’Abū-
¯ . ¯ ¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.310), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.220), Al-
¯ ¯
Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.80), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.357), Al-Dardı̄r
.
((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.321).
Multiple trustees
The H . anbalı̄s and most Sh āfic ı̄s57 ruled that it is permissible for the two parties
¯
of a pawning to appoint two joint trustees. In this case, they ruled that the
two trustees must thus hold the pawned object jointly, and neither one may
hold it alone. Thus, if one of the trustees gives the pawned object to the other,
he must thus guarantee half of it, since he is considered to be a transgressor
for that half. This ruling is based on the fact that the two contracting parties
only consented to the joint trusteeship of the two appointed trustees, and thus
neither may keep it alone. For instance, the two trustees may in practice keep
the pawned object in a single storage place with each of them keeping a key. On
the other hand, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that if the pawned object is divisible, then
each of the two trustees may keep half of it, to avoid excessive costs associated
with holding it all jointly. Finally, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that if
one of the two trustees agrees to let the other hold the entire pawned object,
then they may do so.
Relieving a trustee
A trustee may be relieved of his duties in one seven ways:58
1. The trustee may resign and return the pawned object to the contract-
ing parties, in which case his agencies is terminated. This ruling follows
from the fact that the trustee provides his trust and keeping services as
a voluntary contribution, and thus he is not bound to continue providing
such services. In this regard, if the contracting parties refuse to accept
the trustee’s resignation, he may appeal to a judge, who would thus force
them to accept his resignation, and perhaps forward the pawned object to
a different trustee.
2. The two parties may decide to fire a trustee or replace him by another,
in which case his agency is terminated. Similarly, if the pawned object is
held by the creditor, the trustee is implicitly fired, since he must act as
an agent for both parties. If the two parties cannot agree on firing the
trustee or keeping him, they may appeal to a judge to decide whether to
keep him or replace him by another.
3. If the pawned object is sold, and the creditor’s due is paid out of its price,
the trustee is relieved of his duties.
4. Most H . anafı̄s ruled that if the debtor dies, and the trustee was appointed
after the pawning contract was concluded, the trustee is thus relieved
of his duties, since he would be an agent in that case, and agencies are
terminated by the death of the principal. In contrast, if the trustee was
appointed as part of the pawning contract, then he is not relieved of his
57 ’IbnQudāmah (, vol.4, p.134), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.310).
((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.151), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.353 onwards), Al-Kh atı̄b
¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.134 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.307).
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
duties upon the death of either contracting party, since his appointment is
thus attached to the contract, and the pawning contract is not invalidated
by death of either party. Hence, the trustee would not be relieved of his
duties in this case.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s ruled that if the creditor were to die, then
his heirs have the right to keep the pawned object, since it is an insurance
of his property that is transferred to them by inheritance.
The H . anbalı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that a trustee is relieved of his duties if
¯
the debtor dies, but not if the creditor dies.59 They based this ruling on
their view that the trustee is an agent of the debtor, but not an agent of
the creditor.
5. If the trustee dies, his heirs are not entitled to hold the pawned object,
unless the contracting parties of the pawning contract agree to that.
6. If the trustee becomes permanently insane, he is thus relieved of his du-
ties. However, he is not relieved of his duties thus if he is only beset by
temporary insanity, from which he is expected to recover.
60
7. The Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the debtor may fire the trustee,
¯
whether his appointment was agreed upon as part of the contract or af-
terwards. However, they did not permit the creditor to fire the trustee
in either case. This ruling again follows from their view that the trustee
is an agent of the debtor but not of the creditor, as we have seen in the
discussion of death of a contracting party.
61
The H . anafı̄s, on the other hand, ruled that the debtor may fire the
trustee if his appointment took place after the contract, but may not fire
him if he was appointed as part of the pawning contract.
Finally, ’Imām Mālik ruled that the debtor may never fire the trustee.
He based this ruling on the view that upon appointment as a trustee, his
agency becomes one of the rights of the pawning contract. Such a right
of the contract may not be dropped unilaterally by the debtor, in analogy
to its other rights.
In summary:
. anbalı̄s ruled that death of the debtor, or his firing
¯
of the trustee, would result in relieving the trustee of his duties. Those
rulings are based on the view that agency is a permitted but non-binding
contract, and thus the debtor may not be forced to keep the trustee’s
agency against his will.
• On the other hand, the H. anafı̄s ruled in those two circumstances that the
trustee would be relieved of his duties only if he was appointed after the
59 ’IbnQudāmah (, vol.4, p.354).
61 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.151)
.
contract. However, if he was appointed at the time of the contract, he may

not be relieved of his duties upon the death of the debtor, or unilateral
firing by the latter.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that the trustee may not be relieved of his duties in
either of those two cases of death of the debtor or unilateral firing by the
latter. Moreover, they also agreed that the trustee may not be relieved of
his duties in the cases of death of the creditor or unilateral firing by the
latter, since he is viewed as an agent of the debtor who owns the pawned
object. As proof for the latter rulings, they noted that the debtor may
appoint the trustee unilaterally as his agent, and thus the trustee may not
be fired unilaterally by another party.
Trustee rights and obligations

In what follows, we list five rights and responsibilities for the trustee holding a
pawned object:62
1. The trustee must protect the pawned object in the same manner that he
protects his own property. Thus, he must protect it himself, or keep it
with a person with whom he keeps his own property. In other words, his
responsibility for protecting the pawned object is the same as those of a
depositary.
2. The trustee must keep the pawned object in his possession, and may not
give it to the debtor or creditor without the other’s permission. This
follows from the fact that he was jointly trusted by both parties to hold
it, implying that neither party wanted the other to hold it.
Consequently, neither the debtor nor the creditor has the right to take the
pawned object from the trustee, since they both have a right attached to it
(the debtor has the right that his property be protected, and the creditor
has the right of extracting debt repayment from its price if necessary).
In this regard, neither party is entitled to void the other’s right. Thus,
if the trustee gives the pawned object to one of the two parties without
the other’s consent, the other party has the right to regain possession of
the object and return it to the trustee’s possession. In this case, if the
pawned object were to perish in the possession of either party, before it
is returned to the trustee, then the trustee must guarantee its value since
he is considered a transgressor by giving the object to one of the parties
without the other’s consent. Thus, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that the
trustee would guarantee the lesser of the debt and the value of the pawned
object.
62 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.148 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.80
. .
onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.221 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5,
p.358 onwards), Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.57), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B,
¯
vol.3, p.321), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.134), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.353
¯ ¯ ¯
onwards).
Similarly, if the trustee forwards the pawned object to another party prior
to the debt being dropped, without the consent of the debtor and creditor,
he must guarantee the lesser of its value and the value of the debt. If the
trustee were then to offer the value of the pawned object as compensation
to the two parties, they may keep the money with him itself in a pawning
in lieu of his debt. However, the trustee cannot himself establish the value
that he owes as pawned money in his possession, since he is the one who
should pay it, and he cannot take both sides of the new pawning contract.
Then, if the debtor repays his debt, and demands collection of the pawned
object’s value from the trustee, we need to consider two cases:
• If the trustee’s transgression by virtue of which he guaranteed the

pawned object involved forwarding that object to the debtor, then
the latter is not entitled to collect the value of the object. In this
case, the debtor would have received his right, and thus the value
belongs in reality to the trustees.
• If the trustee’s transgression involved forwarding the pawned object
to the creditor, then the debtor has the right to collect the object’s
value from the trustee, as compensation for his property. In this
case, the trustee is not entitled to seek compensation for what he
guaranteed from the creditor, since he is considered to have given
him the pawned object as a simple loan or deposit. In other words,
by paying the object’s value to the debtor, the trustee thus gained
ownership of the pawned object, which he thus is considered to have
given to the creditor to establish a possession of trust through simple
lending or depositing. However, if the trustee forwarded the pawned
object to the creditor as a form of secondary pawning, in analogy to
received items in unconcluded pawning or sales, then the creditor’s
possession would be one of guaranty, and the trustee is entitled to
compensation.
3. The trustee is not entitled to benefit from the pawned object, nor is he
entitled to deal in it through leasing, simple lending, or pawning. This
ruling follows from the fact that he is obliged to hold the object, but not
entitled to use it.
In this respect, we need to consider the cases under which the trustee is
allowed to sell the pawned object. In general, the trustee is not allowed
to sell the pawned object, unless he was explicitly empowered to do so
during the pawning contract or afterwards. However, if the trustee were
to die, his heir does not inherit his right to sell the pawned object, since
agencies are not inheritable.
Similarly, the trustee’s plenipotentiary is may not take his place in sell-
ing the pawned object, since the debtor never indicated acceptance of the
plenipotentiary’s judgment in sales. This is in contrast to ’Abū Yūsuf’s
opinion, which stated that agencies are binding, and hence he ruled that
the plenipotentiary may sell the pawned object in analogy to the permit-
ted dealings of the plenipotentiary of a deceased entrepreneur in a silent
partnership. However, ’Abū Yūsuf’s argument was rejected by other ju-
rists on the basis that an entrepreneur in a silent partnership is entitled to
appoint agents during his life, without the capitalist’s consent, in contrast
to a trustee who is not allowed to appoint an agent without the debtor’s
consent. It is in this regard that the plenipotentiary of a deceased en-
trepreneur may take his place in dealings (in analogy to a father dealing
in his young child’s property), but that ruling does not apply to the case
of a deceased trustee.
If the trustee sells the pawned object, it is no longer pawned. This ruling
follows from the fact that the object thus becomes owned by the new
buyer, and its price takes the place of the pawned object.
In this regard, the trustee is entitled to sell any increases derived from
the pawned object, since they are considered to be pawned as derivatives
of the object itself. ’Abū H
. anı̄fa also ruled that the trustee is allowed to
sell at a price equal to the value of the pawned object, or slightly below
that value as long as the price is within normal variations in price. He
also ruled that the trustee is allowed to sell on a cash-and-carry or credit
basis. Moreover, the trustee is allowed to sell the pawned object before
the debt is matured, in which case the collected price is considered to
be the pawned object in his possession until the time of maturity of the
underlying debt, since the price of a pawned object is considered to be
itself pawned.
. anbalı̄s ruled that the trustee is only allowed to sell the
¯
pawned object on a cash-and-carry basis, and with a price denominated
in domestic currency, in analogy to their rulings for selling agents. They
also ruled that if the trustee sold the pawned object and received its price,
then he must guarantee the price for the debtor (since the object belonged
to him and he serves as his trustee) until he delivers it as debt repayment
to the creditor.
4. If the pawned object perishes in the trustee’s possession, without the latter
being a transgressor, then it has the same legal status as it would if it
perished in the creditor’s possession. This ruling follows from the fact
that the trustee’s possession is equivalent to the creditor’s possession with
regards to the financial property aspect of the pawned object. The H . anafı̄
ruling for this case is that the creditor guarantees the pawned object for
the lesser of its value and the amount of the debt.
On the other hand, if the trustee guarantees the value of the pawned object
due to his transgression, or if a third transgressing party guarantees the
object after it is wrongfully given to him by the trustee, the H. anafı̄s rule
that the trustee is not entitled to keep the value of the object a pawning
in his possession. This ruling follows since in both cases, the value of the
pawned object would be a liability on him, and he is not allowed to take
both sides of a new pawning. In this case, the value of the pawned object
must be delivered either to the debtor or to the creditor, and the two of
them may jointly decide to keep it as a pawning with the same or another
trustee. The Shāfic ı̄ and H
. anbalı̄ rulings differed slightly from their H
. anafı̄
¯
counterpart by allowing the trustee to keep the value as a pawning in the
case where the transgressor was a different party.
If the rightful owner of the pawned object is different from the debtor,
and he demands to regain possession of his property, he should be granted
his demand, and the pawning is thus invalidated. If the pawned object
had perished prior to being demanded by its rightful owner, then the
latter would have the option whether the trustee or the debtor should
guarantee the value of his perished property. If the rightful owner decides
to demand compensation from the trustee, then the trustee may in turn
demand compensation from the debtor who deceived him.
5. The H . anafı̄s ruled that a trustee who is empowered by the pawning con-
tract to sell the pawned object may not resign without the creditor’s con-
sent. This ruling is intended to protect the right of the creditor, for whom
the trustee’s selling agency is thus stipulated as a condition of the pawning
contract. Thus, the trustee may be forced to sell the pawned object once
the underlying debt is matured. Indeed, if he refuses to sell the object
after the underlying debt is matured, the judge may incarcerate him to
force him to sell, and if he continues to resist, then the judge may sell the
object himself. Those rulings follow from the fact that selling the pawned
object becomes a right of the creditor once the debt is matured.
On the other hand, the majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that if the trustee was
appointed as a selling agent after the pawning contract, then he may re-
sign. They based this ruling on the view that his selling agency would
thus be a separate agency contract, which is subject to the standard con-
ditions of agency contracts. However, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled in this case that
the trustee is not allowed to resign.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that a trustee may resign in
¯
all cases. Their ruling was based on the view that the agency contract
is separate from the trusteeship contract and the pawning contract, and
thus the trustee as selling agent may not be forced to continue his agency
against his will.
70.6 Specific consequences of pawning conditions

In addition to the consequences of receipt and other conditions of pawning that
we discussed in previous sections, we list some of the more specific consequences
that need a detailed analysis in this final section. In what follows, we shall
consider eleven of the most important consequences of the pawning conditions:
70.6. SPECIFIC CONSEQUENCES OF PAWNING CONDITIONS 123
70.6.1 Pawning an unidentified property share

Jurists differed in opinion over the permissibility of pawning an unidentified
part of a property (e.g. half of a house), whereby the H . anafı̄s forbade it and
the non-H . anafı̄s permitted it. The divergence in opinion revolves around the
issue of whether or not an unidentified portion of a property can be possessed
in reality.63
The H
. anafı̄ ruling
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s rled that it is not permissible to pawn an unidentified
portion of a property, whether or not the property is divisible, and whether or
not the parties to the pawning contract were in fact partners in the property.64
The correct opinion in this case is to render the pawning defective, but binding
upon receipt. This ruling follows from the fact that pawning is a condition of
the pawning contract’s completion and bindingness, but not a condition of its
permissibility and conclusion.
The H . anafı̄s based their ruling on the view that pawning requires perma-
nency of the creditor’s receipt of the pawned object. However, they reasoned,
permanent possession of an unidentified portion of a property is impossible,
since the possession thereof must be shared with others’ possession of the rest
of the property. In other words, the situation is analogous in their opinion to
the case where the creditor possesses the pawned object on alternate days. This
shared possession led them to invalidate the pawning regardless of whether or
not the pawned object is divisible, and regardless of whether or not the two
parties to the pawning contract jointly owned the object of pawning.
Moreover, possession of an unidentified portion of a property without pos-
session the rest of that property is physically impossible, and possession of the
portion that is not pawned is inadmissible. In this regard, lack of identification
of the pawned portion makes it impossible to locate that portion, whether or not
the object is divisible. In contrast, giving an unidentified portion of a property
is valid, even if the property is invalid. In the latter case, the gift contract’s
outcome is the establishment of ownership of the portion given as a gift, which
ownership does not contradict the lack of identification of the owned portion.
The majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that the pawning of an unidentified portion of
a property is defective, whether the lack of identification of the pawned portion
ensued at the contract’s inception or afterwards. In descent, ’Abū Yūsuf argued
if the lack of identification ensues after the inception of a pawning contract, it
does not render it defective. He based this ruling on the view that the Law may
forgive defectiveness after the inception of the contract that it would not forgive
at the contract’s inception. As proof, he reasoned by analogy to the case of a
gift contract, wherein the object of gift may become unidentified as a portion
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269).
64 Al-Kāsānı̄((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.138), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.203 onwards), Al-
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.68 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
Zaylac ı̄ ((H c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.348),
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.56).
¯ .
of some property after the inception of the contract, but would not render
the gift defective. The majority of jurists rejected ’Abū Yūsuf’s analogy, by
arguing that the instigating factor for the prohibition of pawning an unidentified
portion of a property is the physical impossibility of establishing receipt and
possession, which affects the contract whether the lack of identification ensues
at the contract’s inception or afterwards. This, again, is in contrast to the
case of the gift contract, since the ownership consequences of the gift contract
do not contradict the lack of identification, while the receipt and possession
consequences of pawning contradict it.
The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that it is as permissible to pawn an unidentified
portion of a property as it is to pawn the entire property, and as it is permissible
to give it as a gift or charity, or making it a mortmain.65 They permitted such
pawning whether or not the object is divisible, and whether or not the parties
of the contract shared in its ownership. They based this ruling on the view
that whatever is eligible for sale is thus eligible for pawning. In this regard,
they reasoned that the purpose of pawning is to allow the creditor to collect
his credit by selling the pawned object if he cannot collect otherwise. In this
regard, since the unidentified portion of a property can be sold, that objective
can be fulfilled. Thus, they established the universal juristic rule that whatever
can be sold can be pawned (including unidentified portions of properties).
In this regard, non-H . anafı̄ jurists differed in opinion regarding the nature of
possession of an unidentified portion of a property:
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that the creditor may thus take possession of the entire
portion of the property owned by the pawning debtor, including parts
that may not be pawned. They based this ruling on the need to make
sure that the pawning debtor does not retain any form of possession over
the pawned portion, lest the pawning would thus be rendered invalid. On
the other hand, if the portions that were not pawned was not owned by
the debtor, then they permit possession of the pawned portion only.
The Mālikı̄s also ruled that a pawning debtor need not seek the permission
of his co-owner of the object part of which he pawns. This is the ruling
of ’Ibn Al-Qāsim, and it was accepted by most Mālikı̄s based on the view
that pawning the debtor’s unidentified portion does not harm his co-owner
of the object. However, all Mālikı̄s agreed that seeking the co-owner’s
permission is preferable as a form of commendable courtesy, and ’Ashhab
¯
went as far as to make it an obligation to seek his permission.
• the Shāfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s ruled that possession of an unidentified portion
¯
of immovable objects (e.g. real estate) is established through granting
access to the creditor, whether or not the co-owner’s permission is given.
For movable objects, they ruled that possession requires physical delivery,
65 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.235),’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269), ’Ibn
¯ .
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.323), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.308), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ ¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.122 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.337), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
¯ ¯
printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.312).
and requires the co-owner’s permission, since transporting the property

requires such permission. In this case, it is permissible for the co-owner to
refuse to have the object delivered to the creditor, and if the latter agrees
to keep the property in the co-owner’s possession, who thus serves as his
agent in possession. However, if the co-owner and the creditor cannot
reach an amicable solution, then the judge may appoint a trustee who
keeps the property as a trust, or as a paid agent. Otherwise, alternating
possession between the creditor with whom an object was pawned and the
object’s co-owner can continue in the same manner as it would between
the two co-owners in the absence of pawning.
70.6.2 Pawning connected or occupied properties

The difference in opinions regarding this problem is very similar to the one
discussed in the previous section:
• Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that it is not permissible to pawn an item that
is attached to another (e.g. pawning fruits without pawning the trees to
which they are connected, pawning plants without the land to which they
are attached, etc.). They based this ruling on the fact that connection of
the pawned object to another un-pawned object makes it impossible to
possess the former without possessing the latter, in analogy to the case of
pawning an unidentified portion of a property. Similarly, they ruled that it
is not permissible to pawn occupied properties that contain un-pawned ob-
jects (e.g. pawning a house without pawning the furniture therein), since
it is impossible thus to possess the occupied property without possessing
what is contained therein.
• The non-H . anafı̄ jurists, who permitted pawning unidentified portions of
properties, also permitted pawning properties that are connected to or
occupied by other properties, due to the possibility to deliver the pawned
properties together with whatever is attached to them or occupies them.
In this regard, if a house is pawned, the furniture therein is not considered
a part of the pawning unless that is explicitly stated in the contract, since
the furniture is not considered to be part of the house.
In the case of pawning land or structures, the H
. anbalı̄s consider the prop-
erties that would be included in a sales contract to be included in the
pawning contract. Thus, there are two cases to consider in the case of
pawning land that contains trees, regarding whether or not the trees are
part of the pawning.
However, the H . anbalı̄ ruling is unequivocal if the trees are carrying observ-
able fruits that those fruits are not considered to be part of the pawning,
as they would not be part of a sale of the land. However, if the fruits were
not observable, then they would be considered part of the pawning. In
this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that fruits on the trees are not considered
¯
part of the pawning, whether or not they were manifest.
• This difference of opinion becomes clear in the case where the creditor
is given access to a house to be pawned prior to the pawning, and then
the debtor left the house after the pawning contract was concluded. In
this case, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s render the pawning valid, while the
¯
H. anafı̄s ruled that the pawning is only valid if the creditor is given access
to the house after the debtor had left it.66
70.6.3 Pawning fungible liabilities

The Mālikı̄s permitted pawning certain fungible liabilities, while the majority of
jurists did not permit it. In what follows, we shall discuss in details the opinions
of the four major Sunni schools regarding pawning fungible liabilities:
• The H. anafı̄s rled that fungible liabilities may not be pawned, since they
do not qualify as “property” in the proper sense of māl.67 Moreover, they
argued that fungible liabilities cannot be “received” in the conventional
sense, which only applies to non-fungibles. Thus, if B owes $100 to A, and
A owes B 100 bushels of wheat, one of them may not consider his credit
with the other a pawning in lieu of the other’s debt towards him. If that
were permissible, it would have qualified as pawning the debt with the
debtor.
• The Shāfic ı̄s and the majority of H
. anafı̄s ruled that a pawned object must
¯
be a non-fungible that can be sold.68 Thus, they rendered pawning debts
invalid, even if initiated by the debtor or creditor. They based this ruling
on the view that such debts are undeliverable as pawned objects.
On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s qualified their prohibition of pawning a
¯
debt, but stating that this prohibition applies only at the inception of
the pawning contract. However, the majority of them did permit keeping
a pawning contract intact as insurance for the repayment of his debt.
They based this ruling on the fact that a debt may necessarily become
a pawning, as evidenced by the fact that the pawning debtor may only
absolve the creditor of his liability for the pawned object if the latter
accepts.
However, it is not necessarily in this case to consider the guaranteed lia-
bility a pawning in lieu of the debt. In fact, it is merely a debt tied to the
rights of the creditor, in analogy to the rights a creditor would share with
the other creditors of a deceased debtor.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that any object that may be sold, including debts the
sales of which they allowed, may also be pawned.69 Thus, they permitted
66 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.333,340), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.123).
67 Al-Kāsānı̄ ¯ c ¯ ¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.135), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.69).
68 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.122), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3,
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
p.307), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.347 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.309).
¯ ¯
69 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.323), Al-Dardı̄r
¯ .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.231,237), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.310 onwards).
pawning debts from the debtor or from a third party. In this regard,
we have already discussed the case of pawning a debt from the debtor.
Pawning it from a third party may result thus: A may owe B, and C may
owe A, in which case A may pawn C’s debt (as established as a liability
on C) with B in lieu of the debt he owes the latter. This pawning can
be implemented physically by delivering to B the documentation or bill
authenticating C’s indebtedness to him, in lieu of A’s debt to B.
In this regard, gaining possession of the documentation of C’s debt and
having witnesses thereof is considered a condition of validity for such pawn-
ing of debts. Moreover, whether the debts (the one that is pawned, and
the one in lieu of which it is pawned) ensued from sales or loans, it is
also a condition of validity that the pawned debt have a maturity date
coinciding with or later than the maturity date of the underlying debt.
Thus, if the underlying debt had a later maturity date than the pawned
debt, or if the pawned debt was already matured, the pawning is invalid.
This ruling can be explained in each case separately, taking into account
the fact that keeping a matured debt as a pawned object with the debtor
is considered a loan. Thus, if both debts ensued from loans, then the
pawning in this case would become lending in lieu of a loan. On the other
hand, if the debts ensued from sales, then the pawning would combine a
sale and a loan in one contract. Both such practices are forbidden in the
Mālikı̄ school.
70.6.4 Pawning leased or lent non-fungibles

The major scholars of all schools allow a debtor to pawn his property with the
creditor, even if that property was leased or lent to some party.70 In what
follows, we discuss in some detail the views of the various schools regarding the
means of pawning such leased or lent items.71
• The H . anafı̄s permitted a debtor to pawn a lent or leased item to the
borrower or lessee creditor, in which case they consider the possession
of the simple loan or lease to substitute for the possession of pawning.72
However, they ruled that if the two parties to the pawning contract agree
to it, then the simple loan or lease is thus invalidated, while the pawning is
considered valid. Thus, the object would thus be considered to be pawned
in the creditor’s possession, and neither lent nor leased, since an object
cannot be simultaneously pawned and leased. On the other hand, they
ruled that if a pawned object was leased after the establishment of the
70 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.146), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269), Al-Dardı̄r
. ¯ .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.236), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.306), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
¯ ¯
vol.4, p.334), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.128), Al-Bājūrı̄ (5th printing (Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.127), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.88).
71 Note that pawning debts and pawning lent or leased non-fungibles belong to a more
general principle of pawning legal rights.

72 Note the statement in Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.): “The possession of pawning is weaker
.
than the possession of lease” is questionable, since they are both possessions of trust.
pawning, then the pawning is invalidated and the leasing is valid, since
pawning is not a binding condition while leasing is.
• The Mālikı̄s permit pawning a leased item to the lessee, in which case
they consider the prior possession of lease to substitute for the possession
of pawning. Moreover, they permit the debtor to pawn to his creditor a
property that he had leased to another, provided that the creditor appoints
a trustee to monitor the lessee and take the creditor’s role as legal possessor
of the leased object. In this regard, the lessee’s receipt of the leased object
was on his own behalf, and thus may not substitute for the creditor’s
receipt of pawning. The Mālikı̄s also permitted pawning agricultural land
in the possession of a crop-sharing farmer, in analogy to their ruling on
leased non-fungibles.
• The H . anbalı̄s permitted pawning properties that are leased, loaned, de-
posited, or usurped. In all such circumstances, they consider the prior
receipt to substitute for the pawning receipt. We have already seen in
such circumstances that the H . anbalı̄s do not require a second receipt to
validate the contract.
• The Shāfic ı̄s also permitted pawning leased, lent, or deposited properties,
¯
provided that a sufficient time period for receipt would pass. In this
regard, they ruled that if a lent or leased item is pawned to the borrower
or lessee, both contracts persist since they see no contradiction between
being a lessee and being in possession of a pawned object. On the other
hand, they ruled that if the item were pawned to a creditor other than the
lessee or borrower, then the pawning is valid provided that the creditor
accepts the lessee or borrower as a trustee. Thus, both contracts (the
pawning and the lease or simple loan) would persist, with the borrower or
lessee being viewed as a trustee for both parties of the pawning contract.
On the other hand, if the creditor does not accept the lessee or borrower
as a trustee, then we need to consider two cases. If the lessee permits
the pawning, then the lease is invalidated. However, if the lessee does not
permit the pawning, then the pawning is invalidated. This is in contrast to
the case of a simple loan, which is not binding, in which case the pawning
invalidates the simple loan automatically.
70.6.5 Pawning borrowed items

Note that this case differs fundamentally from the one just discussed. The case
of a pawning lessor, we considered a person who is pawning his own property.
In contrast, we are not considering the case of a pawning lessee, who does not
own the property he is leasing. In this regard, we have already seen that it is
permissible for a debtor to pawn the property of another if he borrowed an item
and decided to pawn it in lieu of his debt, with its owner’s permission.73 In this
73 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.344), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.269), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ .
(3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.309).
regard, the owner of the pawned property is considered to have willingly given
possession rights to the borrower. The owner has a right to give such possession
rights only, as he is permitted to give both ownership and possession rights (e.g.
by giving his property as a gift).
H
. anafı̄ rulings
The H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that if the owner of the pawned item authorized
¯
the loan and pawning without stipulating any constraints, then the borrower
may be unconstrained as to whom he pawns the borrowed item, where he pawns
it, and in lieu of which debt.74 On the other hand, any constraints that the
lender stipulates must be observed by the borrower. Thus, if the lender states
the amount of debt in lieu of which he may pawn the lent object, then the
borrower may not pawn it in lieu of a larger debt, nor for less if the size of the
smaller debt is lower than the pawned object’s value. This ruling follows since
one whose dealings are authorized by another must abide by the conditions of
that authorization, since the lender may have stipulated those conditions for an
economic reason. Moreover, since a pawned item is guaranteed for the amount
of the underlying debt, the owner would thus have decided the amount for which
it may be pawned and thus guaranteed, and the borrower must abide by that
decision.
On the other hand, if the borrowed item was of equal or lesser value than the
pawned item, then the borrower is not considered to have violated the lender’s
condition. In this case, the deviation from the lender’s condition benefits the
latter, since he may recover the full pawned item in exchange for the smaller
debt, and he suffers no loss if the pawned item were to perish, since his loss is
thus smaller than the guaranteed amount.
However, if the lender restricts the borrower to pawn his property only in lieu
of debts of a certain genus, he must abide by the condition. This ruling follows
from the fact that debts in different genera vary in their ease of repayment.
Similarly, if the lender restricts the borrower with regards to the location of
pawning, or the set of creditors to whom he may pawn his property, then he
must abide by that condition.
If the borrower violates one of the lender’s conditions, and then the pawned
property were to perish in the creditor’s possession, then the lender has the
option whether to demand compensation from the borrower or from the creditor.
In the first case, he may consider the borrower to be a guarantor of his property
by virtue of transgressing against it by violating his conditions. In this case,
once the borrower pays the lender his due compensation, he is considered to have
gained ownership of the borrowed item from the time he received it. On the
other hand, the lender may decide to seek compensation from the creditor, by
virtue of the fact that his property perished in his possession. The ruling in this
case follows by analogy to the case of a usurper of a usurped object. Then, if the
creditor compensates the lender, he may seek compensation from the pawning
74 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.136), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.88), ’Ibn
c
c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.365).
debtor. In other words, once the borrower violates the conditions of the lender,
the pawning is invalidated, and the pawning borrower who transgressed becomes
the ultimate guarantor of the property.
Mālikı̄ ruling
The Mālikı̄s agreed with the H . anafı̄ and Sh āfic ı̄ rulings in this case.75 Thus,
¯
they ruled that if the borrower violated the lender’s conditions, and then the
lent object perished, was stolen, or suffered diminution, the borrower guarantees
the object unconditionally by virtue of his transgression. On the other hand,
if the lent object was not affected, then the borrower may return it and thus
invalidate the loan.
Shāfic ı̄ and H. anbalı̄ rulings

¯
. anbalı̄s ruled that a borrower is bound by the conditions
¯
of his lender.76 However, they ruled that the borrower is not considered in
violation of the condition if he was restricted with regards to the amount of the
underlying debt, and pawned the borrowed item in lieu of a smaller debt. They
based this ruling on the juristic ruling that a permission for the larger amount
is implicitly a permission for the smaller. Moreover, they argued that the lender
suffers no harm from the smaller size of the underlying debt, since they consider
a pawned object to be a trust in the possession of the creditor.
Utilizing the borrowed property
The H . anafı̄s considered the borrower of an item to pawn it to be a depositary

prior to concluding the pawning, rather than a standard borrower. Thus, they
ruled that the borrower of a property to pawn it is only permitted to use the
property in the pawning, and may not utilize it otherwise prior to pawning it,
or after regaining possession when the underlying debt is repaid. If he does
utilize the borrowed property during such times, they thus rule that he is thus
a transgressor who must guarantee it for the lender.
However, if the borrower utilizes the object and then pawns it, he is absolved
of his guarantee, since he would thus have once again be abiding by the lender’s
condition. This ruling is based on analogy to the case of a depositary who may
guarantee the deposit if he utilizes it, but then his guaranty is dissolved if he
returns to acting in accordance with the depositor’s wishes. This is in contrast
to the case of a standard borrower, who would not be absolved of his guaranty
if he transgresses and then returns to acting in accordance with the lender’s
wishes.
76 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.129), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.344 onwards),
¯ . ¯ ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.309), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Sh āfic ı̄), vol.3, p.269).
¯
Types of guaranty
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a borrower does not guarantee the property borrowed
for pawning if it perishes in his possession prior to pawning it or after regaining
possession when the underlying debt is repaid. This H . anafı̄ ruling follows from
the fact that the property would thus perish in the possession of a simple loan
rather than the possession of a pawning. In this regard, we recall that the
possession of a simple loan is a possession of trust in the H . anafı̄ school.
This is in contrast to the views of the Mālikı̄s, the Shāfic ı̄s, and most of the
¯
H. anbalı̄s. As we have seen in the chapters on simple loans that most H . anbalı̄s
consider simply loaned properties to be guaranteed, while Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s
¯
considered them to be guaranteed under certain circumstances.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s ruled that if a property lent for pawning
were to perish in the creditor’s possession, then its owner is only entitled to
the guaranteed amount, which is the lesser of its value and the value of the
underlying debt. If the underlying debt was smaller than the value of the pawned
object, then the H . anafı̄s do not allow the owner to seek compensation for the
difference from the borrower. This ruling is based on the H . anafı̄ view that the
difference as a loan, i.e. a trust, which may only be guaranteed if the borrower
transgresses.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the owner may seek compensation from
the borrower for the full value of the property on the day of the loan. On the
other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s and most of the H . anbalı̄s ruled that if the pawned
¯
object were to perish in the creditor’s possession without transgression, then
the pawning borrower must guarantee its value on the day it perished. This
difference in rulings follows from the fact that the H . anbalı̄s consider simple
loans to be guaranteed in all cases, while the Shāfic ı̄s and Mālikı̄s consider it to
¯
be guaranteed in certain cases.
Demands to release the pawned object
The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s ruled that the owner of an object that was
¯
loaned for pawning may demand that the borrower release it from pawning at
any time. This ruling follows from their view that simple loans are non-binding
conditions, in which the lender may recollect his property at any time, even if the
loan was initially timed. Then, once the pawning debtor releases the lender’s
property from pawning, he must return it to the lender. If the borrower is
incapable of releasing the pawned property, then the lender may release it, and
seek compensation from the borrower for the amount he paid the creditor to
release his pawned property.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the best supported ruling gives the
lender the right to recall the object of any unrestricted simple loans. However,
they did not permit such recalling if it occurred in a simple loan that is restricted
with a condition or social custom, as we have seen in the chapters on simple
loans.
Leasing to pawn
Since it is permissible to borrow an item for pawning, it is equally permissible
to lease an item for pawning.77 In this case, if the leased item were to perish
without any transgression, then it is not guaranteed. This ruling follows from
the fact that all jurists view the possession of lease as a possession of trust,
and not a possession of guaranty. In this case, the lessor is bound by the lease
period, and thus does not have the right to release the pawned object prior to
the lease period’s expiration.
70.6.6 Pawning the property of others

We have already discussed some of the cases wherein a debtor may pawn another
person’s property if he acquired it through a lease or loan intended for that pur-
pose. On the other hand, nobody is allowed to pawn another’s property without
being given some level of control over the pawned object. If a debtor pawns the
property of another without first gaining legal control through legitimate means,
then by delivering the pawned object he would be considered a usurper and a
transgressor against the owner’s property rights. The H . anafı̄s thus ruled that
the pawning in this case would be suspended pending the owner’s permission,
and deemed invalid if the owner does not offer his consent. In the latter case,
the pawning debtor would guarantee the pawned object as a consequence of his
transgression.
The H . anafı̄s also ruled that if the pawned object perishes in the possession
of a creditor who did not know that the property was not owned or under the
legal control of the debtor, and then the creditor finds out, then the owner of
the pawned property has the option of assigning guaranty to the debtor or to
the creditor.78 This ruling follows from the fact that both parties are considered
transgressors against the owner’s rights in this case: the debtor by pawning his
property without his permission, and the creditor by receiving and holding the
object.
In this case, if the owner receives compensation from the debtor, the creditor
would thus be considered repaid up to the value of the pawned object, since it
perished in his possession. This ruling follows from the fact that once the
debtor pays compensation to the property’s owner, he is retroactively considered
its owner from the time he usurped it, i.e. before the inception of pawning.
Consequently, he is considered in this case retroactively to have pawned his own
property, and thus the creditor would be considered fully repaid if the pawned
property’s value equals or exceeds the debt, and up to the value of the pawned
object if the latter is smaller than the debt.
On the other hand, if the owner seeks compensation directly from the credi-
tor, the latter may seek compensation from the debtor for whatever compensa-
tion he paid the owner, in addition to seeking repayment of the debtor’s debt.
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.83 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.6,
p.147).
The creditor’s right to seek such compensation follows from the fact that he
received the pawned object in this case through deception. As we know, a de-
ceived party is always given the right to seek compensation from the deceiver for
the effects of his deception. Moreover, the creditor is entitled to seek repayment
of the debt, since the implicit receipt through pawning was negated when the
pawning was proven to be invalid based on the violation of the owner’s property
rights. Thus, the creditor’s right to demand repayment is reinstated after the
pawning is invalidated.
In this case, the H . anbalı̄s differentiated between the two cases where the
creditor knows of the usurpation, and where he does not know:79
• If the creditor knew that the pawned object was usurped, and still ac-
cepted to hold the pawned object which then perished in his possession,
then his guaranty is established irrevocably. Thus, the creditor in fact
should return the pawned object to its rightful owner, otherwise he must
guarantee it against all damage. The owner still has the option to seek
compensation from the debtor or from the creditor. However, if he seeks
compensation from the debtor, then the debtor may in turn seek compen-
sation from the creditor, since the latter’s guaranty was thus established.
• If the creditor did not know that the pawned object was usurped, and
then the object perished in his possession, we need to consider the cause
of perishing. Thus, if the pawned object perished due to the creditor’s
negligence or transgression, then he must guarantee it in analogy to the
previous case.
However, if the pawned object perished in the possession of the deceived
creditor, and not because of his own transgression or negligence, then there
are three reported opinions in the H. anbalı̄s school:
– According to the first opinion, the creditor’s guaranty is still estab-

lished irrevocably. This ruling is based on the view that the creditor
transgressed by possessing the property of another without his per-
mission, and then the property perished in his possession. Thus, this
ruling assigns guaranty to the creditor in analogy to the case where
he knows that the object was usurped. However, we must note that
this view is not well supported, since the creditor in fact was not
a transgressor, but had taken possession of the property with the
debtor’s permission, not knowing that it was usurped.
– According to the second opinion, the creditor is not assigned guaranty
in this case. This ruling is based on the view that the creditor thus
received the pawned object as a possession of trust, not knowing that
the object was usurped. Thus, guaranty is assigned to the debtor.
– According to the third opinion, the owner of the pawned property
has the option of seeking compensation from either party, but the
79 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.397 onwards).
debtor is considered the irrevocable ultimate guarantor. This is the

more reasonable opinion.
The opinion also applies to the case where a legal ruling was issued to
assign ownership of the pawned object to a third party after the pawning
took place. We must also note in all of the above that if the pawned
object that is owned by a third party perishes in the creditor’s possession,
the H. anbalı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s do not consider the debt repaid. This ruling
¯
follows from their classification of the creditor’s possession in this case as
a possession of trust.
70.6.7 Pawning a pawned item

In this subsection, we consider the case of recursive pawning, a pawned object
is pawned again, either all of it or part thereof. In what follows, we list the
rulings of various schools for the two cases:
• If part of a property was pawned, and then another part of it was pawned,
the rules of pawning unidentified portions of a property apply. Thus, the
Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s, all of whom permitted such pawning of
¯
unidentified portions, ruled that if an unidentified part of a property was
pawned in lieu of one debt, then the rest of the property may be pawned
in lieu of the same or another debt, and to the same or another creditor.
However, if the rest of the property was pawned to a different creditor, it
is necessary to obtain the second creditor’s consent to the first creditor’s
possession,80 or to appoint a trustee by mutual consultation of the debtor
and the two creditors.
In contrast, we have seen that the H . anafı̄s do not permit pawning an
unidentified portion of a property, and thus this case is never considered.
In this regard, they would only consider pawning another part of a par-
tially pawned property if the property was already divided, and each part
was delivered separately, thus avoiding the current problem.
• The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and H

. anbalı̄s ruled that it is not permissible to pawn
¯
a property that is already pawned in its entirety in lieu of some debt.81
They based this ruling on the fact that a second pawning of the property
would be financially harmful for the first creditor to whom the financial
aspect of the pawned property belongs. Thus, it is not permissible to give
others (in this case a second creditor) any rights that contradict those of
the first creditor.
However, if the first creditor approves the second pawning, they ruled that
the second pawning is executed, and the first pawning is voided.
80 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.308).
81 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.147), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Sh
¯
āfic ı̄), vol.3, pp.267,305), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.127), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.347 onwards).
¯ ¯
They also ruled that it is valid for a creditor in receipt of a pawned item to
pawn it to another, provided that he has the permission of its owner (the
original pawning debtor). In this case, they ruled that the first pawning is
voided, and the second pawning is considered to be analogous to pawning
an item that was borrowed for pawning. However, if the creditor were
to pawn the object of the first pawning without its owner’s consent, the
second pawning would be deemed invalid, and the owner would thus have
the right to demand the return of his property to the first creditor.
In those cases, if the pawned object were to perish in the possession of
the second creditor, i.e. prior to returning it to the first creditor, then the
H. anafı̄s ruled that the owner/debtor has the option of seeking compen-
sation from either creditor. In this regard, their ruling follows the same
rulings as in the case of pawning the property of another. Thus, if the
owner sought compensation from the first creditor, the first pawning is
deemed valid, since the value of the pawned object is considered to be
pawned with him. However, if the owner decides to demand compensa-
tion from the second creditor, the first pawning would thus be invalidated,
and the first creditor would be considered the ultimate guarantor of the
pawned object. Thus, the second creditor may compensate the debtor,
and then seek compensation from the first creditor based on the fact that
he deceived him.
The Mālikı̄s ruled that it is permissible to pawn a pawned property, pro-
vided that its value exceeds the value of the first underlying debt.82 In this
case, the second pawning is considered to be justified by that excess of the
pawned object’s value over the underlying debt in the first pawning. The
second pawning is thus given a secondary priority, whereby repayment of
the first debt gets first priority if the object is sold, and then the second
creditor becomes a residual claimant for any remaining proceeds. Thus,
we can see that the first debtor’s rights are not harmed, and hence his
consent is not required for executing the second pawning.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if the pawned object was in the
possession of a trustee, then the second mortgage requires the trustee’s
consent to keep the trustee under the new circumstances. This ruling
applies regardless of whether the second creditor is the same as or different
from the first.
The Mālikı̄s have three reported opinions regarding the requirement of the
first creditor’s consent for the case of a second pawning to a second cred-
itor. One opinion stated that the first creditor’s opinion is not required,
a second stated that it is required, and a third stated that the second
pawning is impermissible regardless of whether or not the first creditor
approved it. If the object is held by a trustee, then some of the Mālikı̄s
chose the first of those two opinions, and some chose the second.
82 c.f. Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.238). This permissibility of pawning pawned items (or
having a “second mortgage” or “second lien”) is in agreement with contemporary civil law.
In this regard, if a second pawning is permitted for a second creditor,

then we need to consider the maturity dates of the two underlying debts.
The simplest and most straight-forward case is the one where both debts
have the same maturity date. On the other hand, if the second debt
matured first, then the pawned object should be divided between the two
debts, provided that such division does not reduce its value. Then, the
first creditor should be repaid first, and then whatever remains may be
given to the second creditor. Alternatively, if the pawned object was not
divisible, then it may be sold, and the price may be used to repay the first
debt first and then the second.
However, if the first debt had an earlier maturity date, then the pawned
object may not be sold prior to its maturity. Then, once the first debt
matures, the pawned object may be sold, and then sequentially repaid
as before. Of course, if the object could be divided without reducing its
value, then it may also be sequentially divided between the two debts,
again giving priority to the first debtor.
In this regard, if the pawned object was possible to hide (e.g. clothes or
jewelry), and if it were to perish in the first creditor’s possession, he would
not guarantee the excess of its value over his right to the second creditor,
unless the object perished due to his transgression. This ruling follows
from the fact that the first creditor is considered to hold the excess value
inherent in the pawned object in a possession of trust.
70.6.8 Pawning part of an indebted estate

There are circumstances that prevent a pawning from taking place, such as when
parties other than the pawning debtor have rights to the object of pawning.
Those situations include the case we just studied of pawning a pawned object,
as well as the case in this subsection of pawning part of an indebted estate.
In this regard, we have already seen that pawning the properties of others is
suspended pending the permission of the owner, and that ruling gives us a basis
for the cases studied here. In what follows, we shall discuss the rulings of the
various schools regarding pawning parts of an indebted estate:
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that if an heir pawns part of the inherited estate, and if
the estate was tied to a debt established as a liability on the deceased, then
the pawning is suspending pending relieving the estate from such debts.
Once those debts are repaid, the object of pawning would be free of all
rights other than its owner who may thus pawn it in lieu of his debts. This
ruling is based on the view that debts of the estate prevent establishing
ownership for the heirs. However, H . anafı̄s differed on this ruling if the
debts were smaller than the value of the estate.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled in this case that the pawning is valid, but suspended
upon repayment of the debts of the estate. Thus, if the estate’s debts
are not repaid, the pawning of its components by an heir are voided, since
they agreed that debts established on the estate prevent the establishment
of ownership for the heirs.
• Most H . anbalı̄s ruled that it is valid to pawn or sell components of an in-
herited estates, even if the deceased died with an established liability for
a debt or unpaid zakāh.83 They based this ruling on the view that owner-
ship of the estate is transferred to the heir upon the death of the inherited
party, and hence the heir is entitled to all the privileges associated with
such ownership. In this regard, they distinguish between this case and the
case of pawning an already pawned item, where the latter case involves
the rights of others. In contrast, the debts of the deceased in the case of
pawning parts of an estate were tied to the relevant properties as a matter
of Law, and not due to any actions of the heir. In fact, this ruling applies
in their school for all debts and rights that were established as a matter
of Law (including zakāh and required compensations for various crimes)
rather than through the actions of the heir. In all such cases, they permit
pawning the properties to which such legal rights are attached.
In this case, they deemed the pawning valid, but continue to recognize
the fact that the properties in the indebted estate are tied to the relevant
debts of the deceased. Thus, if the heir were to fulfill the obligations of the
estate from his own money after the pawning is concluded, the pawning
remains intact. However, if the heir does not repay the debts associated
with the estate, then the creditors of the estate may take the pawned
items, since they have priority in collecting their rights.
This ruling is analogous to the case wherein an heir deals in the properties
he inherited, and then an object that was sold by the deceased is returned
based on a defect that was observed after his death. It is also analogous
to the case where a legal right is attached to the estate after the death
of the inherited party (e.g. if an animal falls in a well that he had dug
outside his own land). In all such cases, the dealings of the heir are valid
but non-binding. Thus, if the heir were to fulfill those rights from his own
money, his dealings would thus be validated. Otherwise, if he does not
fulfill those rights, his dealings would be voided.
In all of the preceding, we have been assuming that the heir pawns his
part of the inheritance. Of course, if he pawns another part of the estate,
he would be pawning the property of another person (a different heir),
and the rulings for that case would apply.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that pawning parts of an indebted estate is invalid.84
¯
This ruling follows from the fact that they consider all dealings to be either
valid and executable, or invalid.
For instance, they agree with the H
. anbalı̄s in classifying the dealings of
an un-commissioned agent as invalid. In the context of pawning parts of
83 ’Ibn
Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.350), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.316 onwards).
84 Al-Khatı̄b
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.144 onwards), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.304
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯
onwards).
an indebted estate, the validity and executability of the pawning cannot

be established due to the existence of debts attached to the estate. In this
regard, while the debts do not deny the heirs’ ownership of the estate, the
estate is considered to be legally pawned, even without a formal pawning
contract.
In this regard, most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the issue of whether the debts
¯
exceeded the size of the estate or not was inconsequential. Thus, they
forbid an heir from dealing in any part of an indebted estate, in analogy
to their ruling that a debtor may not deal in the property he pawned in
lieu of a debt as long as the debt is outstanding.
70.6.9 Pawning perishables

The H . anbalı̄s and other jurists ruled it is permissible to pawn highly perishable
items, whether they can be stored if dried (e.g. grapes and fresh dates) or not
(e.g. watermelons and non-storable cooked foods). In this regard, if the property
was possible to store in a dried form, the pawning debtor must dry it to assist
in making it less perishable. On the other hand, a pawned perishable property
that cannot be dried must be sold, whether or not its sale was stipulated as a
condition of the pawning. Then, the debt may be repaid with its proceeds if
the debt matured before or immediately after the sale. If the debt was only
scheduled to mature later, then the price of the perishable property would take
its place as the object of pawning, based on convention. In this regard, the owner
of the property normally strives to protect his property, and such protection
can be accomplished by drying some fruits or feeding animals, or it may be
accomplished by selling the property if it is highly perishable and cannot be
preserved thus.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the permissibility of pawning perishable
¯
items that would be ruined prior to the underlying debt’s maturity depends on
whether or not selling the perishable item was stipulated as a condition.85 Thus,
they ruled that the pawning is permissible if there was a stipulated condition in
the pawning that the perishable pawned goods may be sold to prevent their ruin.
On the other hand, most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if no such condition is stipulated,
¯
then pawning the perishable item is not valid. While some Shāfic ı̄s disagreed,
¯
the majority based their ruling of impermissibility on the view that selling the
perishable goods in lieu of the underlying debt was not possible prior to the
maturity of that debt, in analogy to the case where a condition was stipulated
that the pawned goods may not be sold. However, if it is not known whether or
not the pawned goods would perish prior to the debt’s maturity, most Shāfic ı̄s
¯
ruled that an unconditional pawning is valid in this case. This last ruling follows
from the view that the default case is one wherein the pawned object does not
perish prior to the maturity of the underlying debt.
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.123 onwards).
70.6.10 Pawning fruit juices

It is permissible to pawn fruit juices, since it is permissible to sell them. In this
regard, the fact that fruit juices can be fermented, and would thus cease to be
legal properties, does not affect the validity of its pawning as a juice. Moreover,
if the juices ferment to the point of becoming vinegar, the pawning is deemed
to remain intact. On the other hand, if the pawned fruit juice ferments into
wine or other intoxicants after receipt, it is necessary to throw it away, and
the pawning contract would thus be considered non-binding. Then, once the
intoxicant is disposed-of, the pawning is invalidated. In this case, the creditor
has no options, since the pawned object is deemed to have perished (by becoming
a non-property through fermentation) in his possession.
However, if the juice ferments into a wine prior to receipt by the creditor,
the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the pawning is thus rendered invalid. In contrast, the
H. anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the pawning is not invalidated
¯
in this case. They based that ruling on the view that the Law forgives for the
purpose of maintaining an existing contract more than it would forgive at the
inception of a contract. Moreover, they argued that the juice was a valued
property at the inception of the pawning, and it may yet have a value in the
future [e.g., if it turns into vinegar].86 Indeed, ’Ibn Qudāmah ruled that this is
the best ruling, since it was agreed that the fruit juice would be re-instated as
a valid pawned object upon turning into vinegar.
70.6.11 Pawning religious books

The H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and most Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that it is permissible to pawn
¯
written copies of the Qur’ān (mas.āh.if), books of Prophetic traditions, etc.87
However, they ruled in this case that the creditor is not allowed to read the
pawned books in his possession, since pawning only gives him the right to possess
the pawned objects, but does not give him the right to use them. Thus, if the
creditor uses the pawned objects and then they perish, he must guarantee their
value, since he is considered a usurper by virtue of using them.
Most H . anbalı̄s ruled that pawning written copies of the Qur’ān is not valid,
since selling them is not valid.88 They thus based this ruling on the view that
the purpose of pawning is to allow the creditor to collect repayment from the
price of the pawned object, which requires its sale. Thus, since a copy of the
Qur’ān cannot be sold in their view, there is not point in pawning it, which
is thus deemed invalid. However, they allowed pawning books of Prophetic
traditions and books of Qur’anic exegesis, even to a non-believer, provided that
such religious books remain in the possession of a Muslim trustee.
86 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.342), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.129), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ . ¯ ¯
87 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.146), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.269), ’Abū-
. ¯ .
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.309), Al-Bājūrı̄ (5th printing (Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.126).
¯
88 Al-Buhūtı̄ ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.314), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.343).
Chapter 71
Legal Status and

Consequences
In this chapter, we shall study the legal status of valid pawning contracts, and
those of defective invalid contracts. A valid pawning contract is one that satis-
fies all of the pawning contract conditions, while defective ones are those that
violate some of the pawning contract conditions. In this regard, we recall that
the H. anafı̄s distinguished among non-valid contracts between invalid ones and
defective ones:
• A contract is invalid for the H . anafı̄s if it has a major defect at the foun-
dation of the contract. Examples include contracts in which one of the
contracting parties is ineligible due to insanity or mental incompetence,
ineligibility of the pawned object (e.g. if it does not qualify as property),
if the underlying right or liability is not possible to satisfy financially (e.g.
a preemption right, or the right to exact bodily revenge), cases where
pawning is meaningless (e.g. if it contains a condition that the pawned
object in lieu of a debt may not be sold, or a condition that the creditor
holding the pawned object should not have priority over other creditors).
• On the other hand, a contract is defective for the H . anafı̄s if it has a defect
in its characteristics (e.g. if the pawned object is occupied by another
un-pawned property). Al-Nawādir also listed a pawned object that are
guaranteed by another property (e.g. as in the case of a sold object in
the seller’s possession) as an example of defective pawning. However, we
have seen that most H . anafı̄s consider using the object of sale as a pawned
object prior to receipt as a valid pawning contract.
In contrast, we know that the non-H . anafı̄s do not distinguish between defective
and invalid contracts. Thus, while they differ in their choice of conditions for
the validity of a pawning contract, each group considers contracts that do not
specify their own conditions of validity to be defective and invalid.
141
142 CHAPTER 71. LEGAL STATUS AND CONSEQUENCES
Status of valid pawning

In this subsection, we shall study the juristic opinions regarding the binding-
ness of valid pawning contracts, followed by ten studies of consequences of the
pawning contract.
Bindingness of valid pawning

A valid pawning contract is binding upon the pawning debtor, but not upon the
creditor. Thus, the debtor does not have the right to void the contract, since
it is a form of ensuring his debt to the creditor, while the creditor is permitted
to void the pawning at any time, since it is a contract that is purely for his
benefit.1 All jurists agree that the consequences of the pawning contract are
only realized by virtue of receipt. For instance, the creditor does not have an
exclusive right to the price of the pawned object, and does not have priority
over other creditors, except after he receives the pawned object.
Similarly, the majority of jurists ruled that the pawning contract only be-
comes binding upon the debtor after the creditor receives the pawned object,
while the Mālikı̄s considered the contract binding upon completion of offer and
acceptance, as detailed below:
• The H . anafı̄s, the Sh āfic ı̄s, and most of the H

. anbalı̄s ruled that all valid
¯
pawning contracts become binding only after receipt. Thus, they allow the
pawning debtor the option before delivery and receipt either to void the
contract or to complete it.2 We have previously listed their proof for this
ruling based on the verse “then received pawned objects” [2:283], mean-
ing “then, engage in a pawning wherein the pawned object is received by
the creditor”. Thus, they argued that pawning was legalized based on
the condition of receipt, and thus may not exist without that condition
being satisfied. Further, they argued that pawning only becomes binding
upon receipt based on the view that pawning is a voluntary contribution
contract, and thus the pawning debtor should not be forced to engage in
any action associated with the contract. This is in analogy to other volun-
tary contribution contracts such as gifts and charity, where the contract is
considered non-existent prior to receipt. Thus, it is only through receipt
that the pawning contract gains legal existence, becomes binding, and has
legal consequences.
• In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that a pawning contract becomes binding by

virtue of the conclusion of offer and acceptance, and that receipt completes
the contract.3 Thus, they ruled that the contract is binding upon the
pawning debtor upon the utterance of offer and acceptance, whereby he
1 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, pp.305,307).
. ¯ ¯
2 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.340 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6,
c
p.63), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.305), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vo.4, p.328 onwards).
¯ ¯
3 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.270 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.240
¯ .
onwards).
143
may be forced to deliver the pawned object unless one of the following
four impediments exists:
1. Death of the pawning debtor after the contract conclusion but prior
to delivery.
2. Demands by other creditors prior to delivery of the pawned object
that the pawning debtor repay his debts to them.
3. Declaration of the pawning debtor’s bankruptcy, in the sense that his
debts exceed the total value of his property.
4. Terminal illness or insanity of the pawning creditor.
As we have seen previously, they ruled that the contract is binding upon
its conclusion with offer and acceptance based on the verse “Oh believers,
fulfill your contracts” [5:1]. Since this order makes it an obligation to
fulfill all contracts, including pawning, they thus ruled that the pawning
debtor is obliged to fulfill his obligations under the contract and deliver
the pawned object.
Consequences of the pawning contract

We now turn to ten consequences of the pawning contract that take effect after
the contract is completed through delivery of the pawned object to the creditor:
1. Association of the underlying debt with the pawned object.
2. The right to keep the pawned object.
3. The obligation to safeguard the pawned object.
4. The obligation to pay the expenses associated with the pawned object.
5. Forbidding the pawning debtor to deal in the pawned object.
6. Forbidding the creditor to use the pawned object.
7. Guaranty of the pawned object (or the portion thereof corresponding to

the debt in the H
. anafı̄ school).
8. Selling the pawned object, or demanding that the creditor sell it, to repay
the underlying debt.
9. Giving the creditor in possession of the pawned object priority in repay-

ment over other creditors.
10. The obligation to return the pawned object if the debt is repaid.
71.1 Association of the underlying debt

The general rule is that if a non-fungible property is pawned in lieu of some
debt, the underlying debt is thus associated with the entire pawned object or
all its units, which is not divided. Conversely, the pawned object is associated
in pawning with all units of the underlying debt. Thus, if part of the debt is
dropped through repayment or absolution, the rest of the debt must continue to
be associated with the entire pawned object. In fact, this rule was implemented
in the Egyptian and Syrian civil laws. In this regard, only the debt that was
specified as underlying the pawning is associated with the pawned object, while
other debts remain unattached to that object.
The creditor’s right to keep the pawned object follows from this association
of the object with the underlying debt. Thus, the creditor has the right to keep
the entire pawned object in his possession until he recollects the entire debt,
regardless of the possibility of dividing either.
All jurists agree on this general principle. However, they differed in opinion
regarding its implementation, depending on their varying recognition of the
pawning as a single pawning contract or multiple pawning contracts:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that a contract is considered single if it has a single

language, whether the underlying debts were many or one.4 Thus, if the
debtor in a single pawning contract repays some of the debts underlying
the pawning, he is not entitled to collect a corresponding portion of the
pawned property, even if the latter also consisted of multiple objects. Even
if a single pawning contract were concluded with each of many debts being
named corresponding to each of many pawned objects, they ruled that
the debtor may not recover one of the pawned objects by repaying the
corresponding debt. They based this ruling on the view that the contract
in this case is unitary, and does not become multiple contracts by the
sheer naming of multiple components.
This H. anafı̄ ruling also applies regardless of whether the pawning debtor
was unitary or multiple, and whether the creditor was unitary or multiple
(as partners in one debt, or each being owed an independent debt by the
pawning debtor). Thus, their general ruling is that if the pawning contract
is unitary, no part of the pawned object may be recalled through partial
repayment. In contrast, if multiple pawning contracts were written with
separate contract languages, then each pawned object may be recalled by
repaying the corresponding debt.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that if the pawning debtors were multiple, or if the
creditors were multiple, or both, then a single pawning contract is consid-
ered in fact to be multiple contracts.5 However, if the contract names a
single pawning debtor and a single creditor, then they rule that the pawn-
ing contract is unitary [regardless of the multiplicity of pawned objects
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.153), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
5 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.257, 258).
71.1. ASSOCIATION OF THE UNDERLYING DEBT 145
and underlying debts]. Then, they ruled that if the pawning contract is
unitary, then repayment of some part of the debt would make the entire
pawned property associated with the remaining part of the debt, since
each part of the pawned property was associated with each part of the
debt.
However, if there are multiple pawning debtors, then each debtor may
recollect his corresponding part of the pawned property upon repayment
of his debt. Similarly, if the creditors are multiple, then the debtor may
recollect a corresponding portion of his pawned property for repaying any
one of them. In the latter case, if the pawned property was indivisible,
and only one of the creditors was repaid, then the pawned property may
be put in the possession of a trustee, or kept by the repaid creditor as a
trust.
6
• The H . anbalı̄s agreed with those Mālikı̄ rulings. Thus, they ruled that the
contract is divided into multiple contracts if the offerer or the acceptor of
pawning consists of multiple parties. Thus, if an offer is made by one
debtor to two creditors, or by two debtors to one creditor, there are in
effect two contracts. If two debtors make an offer of pawning to two
creditors, then there are in effect four contracts. On the other hand, if the
debtor is unitary and the creditor is unitary, then the contract is unitary
regardless of the multiplicity of debts or pawned objects.
Thus, if the contract is unitary, the debtor is not allowed to recall any part
of the pawned property by virtue of paying part of the debt. However, if
the contract is multiple by virtue of multiple debtors, then each debtor may
recall his portion of the pawning upon repayment of his debt. Conversely,
if the contract is multiple by virtue of multiple creditors, then the pawning
debtor may recollect his portion of the pawning upon repayment of his debt
to any of them.
Thus, if there are two debtors and two creditors, there are essentially four
contracts. Thus one quarter of the pawned property would be considered
to correspond to each of the four debts. Hence, if any debtor repays one
quarter or more of the overall debt, a corresponding portion of the pawned
property would thus be released from the pawning. This, according to the
Justice ’Abū Yac lā, is the correct ruling.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the pawning contract is considered unitary or mul-
¯
tiple depending upon whether the underlying debt is unitary or multiple,
respectively.7 In this regard, most of them ruled that the debts are multi-
ple if the debtors are multiple, even if they have a common agent. This is
in contrast to sales contracts, wherein the number of individuals directly
involved in the contract determines the multiplicity. They based their
6 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.346,402).
7 Al-Khatı̄bAl-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.141 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.307).
ruling on the view that pawned property is a form of insurance of the un-
derlying debt, and thus multiplicity of the debts would imply multiplicity
of the insurance documents. In this regard, they ruled that in most cases,
multiplicity of the debtors or creditors implies multiplicity of the debts.
The reason this case can be contrasted with the case of sales is that sales
contracts are contracts of guaranty, and thus the directly active parties in
such contracts determine their multiplicity.
The Shāfic ı̄ opinion in this case differs from the Mālikı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s in
¯
the case of pawning in lieu of a single debt to two joint creditors. Since
the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the multiplicity of creditors generally implies the
¯
multiplicity of debts, they ruled in this case that repayment of one of the
two joint creditors would entitle the debtor to recalling a corresponding
part of the pawned property. In this case, the debtor must clearly identify
one of the creditors as the recipient of debt-repayment, otherwise, he would
not have certainly repaid one of them completely. On the other hand, if
a person borrows a property from two people to pawn it, and then repays
half of the debt, then half of the pawned property would be released from
the pawning.
In summary, all jurists agreed that the criterion for judging whether or not
a portion of the pawned property is released from pawning is based on the
multiplicity of the pawning contract. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s ruled that
multiplicity of the contract can only be established through multiple contract
languages, regardless of the number of contracting parties. On the other hand,
the Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s considered the multiplicity of contracting parties to
be the main criterion for judging the multiplicity of pawning contracts. Finally,
the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the main criterion is the multiplicity of underlying debts.
¯
However, the Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that multiplicity of debtors or creditors most
¯
often implies multiplicity of debts, and thus rendered their rulings in this regard
very similar to those of the Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s.
71.2 The right to hold the pawned object

The association of the pawned object with the underlying debt implies the
creditor’s right to hold the pawned object as a means of getting the debt repaid.
In this regard, the association of the underlying debt with the pawned object
is only established in a secure manner if the creditor in fact holds the pawned
object to urge the debtor to repay his debt lest the creditor may sell it to collect
his money. Thus, associating the underlying debt with the pawned object and
the creditor’s holding of the object are equal forms of ensuring debt repayment.
Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that validity of a pawning contract implies estab-
lishment of the creditor’s right to hold the pawned object permanently until the
debt is repaid.8 Thus, the creditor has the right to prevent the debtor from rec-
ollecting his property prior to repaying his debt. They based this ruling on the
8 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H
¯ . anafı̄), vol.21, p.63), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.145), Al-
71.2. THE RIGHT TO HOLD THE PAWNED OBJECT 147
view that pawning is a form of insurance of debt repayment, which insurance

requires holding the pawned property that may be used to extract repayment.
The H . anafı̄s further ruled that the right to hold the pawned object is estab-
lished upon establishment of the creditor’s right to extract repayment from the
pawned object. In this regard, extraction of repayment would normally require
ownership and possession of the object from which repayment is to be extracted.
However, since the valid H . adı̄th : “A pawned object does not become the credi-
¯
tor’s property if the debt is not paid”, ownership of the pawned object cannot
be established for the creditor. Thus, the creditor is only granted possession
of the object from which repayment may be extracted. Indeed, that view is
reflected in the lexical meaning of “pawning” (rahn), which implies possession
of the pawned object. As we have previously seen, the legal characteristics of
contracts often follow their linguistic titles.
Moreover, since the pawned object has a financial property characteristic,
and since repayment is normally extracted from that financial aspect of the
pawned object, the creditor is entitled by virtue of the underlying debt to hold
an equivalent portion of the financial aspect (value) of the pawned property.
Thus, if the property’s value exceeds the underlying debt, the excess amount is
considered to be held by the creditor in a possession of trust.
The Shāfic ı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and H . anbalı̄s ruled that the purpose of pawning is the
¯
same as the purpose of other forms of documentation and insurance of debts,
i.e. to increase the means by which the underlying debt may be repaid. Thus,
the creditor has an established right to associate the underlying debt with the
pawned object, and another established right to extract repayment from that
object’s financial value by selling it and having a first claim on its price.
However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the creditor’s right to hold the pawned
¯
item is not binding on the pawning debtor. Thus, they permit the debtor to
recollect the object he pawned to use it (provided that its use does not harm
it), and then he may return it to the creditor when he extracts the usufruct
he sought. As proof of this ruling, they cite the H . adı̄th : “A pawned object
¯
does not become property of the creditor, and the pawning debtor retains rights
for its output and obligations for its expenses”. This H . adı̄th implies that the
¯
creditor is not allowed to withhold the pawned object from the pawning debtor,
to whom the Prophet (pbuh) referred as the object’s owner entitled to its output
and obligated for its expenses.
Moreover, the Shāfic ı̄s argued that permanent withholding of the pawned
¯
object is contrary to the documentation and insurance objective of the pawning
contract. In particular, they cite the H . anafı̄ ruling that the debt is dropped
if the pawned item perishes, which means that the contract may make debt
repayment less rather than more likely. Moreover, they argued that withholding
the pawned item would make it impossible for any party to extract the object’s
usufruct, which results in a forbidden waste of resources.
In summary, the majority of jurists ruled that the pawning contract estab-
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.64 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.8,
pp.194-6), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.345).
lishes the creditor’s right to permanent withholding of the pawned object until
repayment. However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the contract only gives the creditor
¯
the right to sell the identified pawned object to extract debt repayment.
The opinion of the majority of jurists is more correct. He bases this opinion
on the fact that this majority ruling is more in accordance with the actual
implementation of pawning, which involves the creditor’s withholding of the
pawned object to give the debtor an incentive to repay the underlying debt.
In fact, we have seen in the section on conditions of receipt that this is the
foundation of the Mālikı̄ and H . anbalı̄ requirement of the permanency of receipt
until the debtor repays the underlying debt.9
The juristic difference in opinion between the H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s, with
¯
regards to whether the pawning contract’s essence is withholding of the pawned
object or simply identifying it for the purpose of selling if the debt is not paid,
gave rise to a number of differences in rulings:
1. The H . anafı̄s do not allow the pawning debtor to recollect the pawned
property for use, since they argued that such recollection would contradict
what they view to be the essence of pawning, i.e. the creditor’s withholding
of the pawned object. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s allow such recollection,
¯
since they do not consider it to be contrary to the essence of the contract
in their school, which is identifying the pawned object for possible sale if
the debt is not paid.
2. The H . anafı̄s ruled that any non-contiguous growth in the pawned object
is still considered part of the pawning, and thus ruled that such growth
must be withheld by the creditor. However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that such
¯
non-contiguous growth is not part of the pawning, and thus may not be
sold in lieu of the underlying debt.
3. The H . anafı̄s did not permit pawning an unidentified portion of a prop-

erty, since permanent withholding of such a portion without withholding
un-pawned property is impossible. However, the Shāfic ı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and
¯
H. anbalı̄s all permitted pawning such unidentified portions of properties,
based on the permissibility of their sale, which thus enables the identifi-
cation of such an unidentified portion for sales and the extraction of debt
repayment from its price.
71.2.1 Demanding repayment

The H. anafı̄s ruled that once the underlying debt is matured, creditor may de-
mand repayment of the debt while continuing to withhold the pawned object.10
Then, if the debtor decides to repay the debt, he may demand that the creditor
bring the pawned object to prove that it is intact, provided that it is not too
9 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.272), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, ibid., p.331), Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.131,133).
¯ ¯
10 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, pp.148,153 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.343
. .
onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.58).
¯
71.3. SAFEGUARDING THE PAWNED PROPERTY 149
costly or cumbersome to bring the pawned object (e.g. if it need not be trans-
ported to a different city). On the other hand, if it is costly or cumbersome
to bring the pawned object to the debtor, the creditor is not required to do so
prior to receiving full repayment. In the later case, the creditor is only required
to give the debtor access to the pawned property, without necessarily bearing
the cost of transporting it to the location of debt repayment. However, if the
pawning and the debt recollection all take place in the same city, then the cred-
itor is required to bring the pawned object to the repayment session, since the
cost is minimal in this case. Finally, if the pawned object is held by a trustee,
then the creditor is not required to bring the pawned object, since the trustee
would in fact be forbidden from giving the pawned object to either party of the
pawning, lest he would guarantee it and the party that collects it be considered
a usurper.
In summary, if the debtor seeks repayment in the same city of the pawning,
and demands to see the pawned object, then the creditor must bring it. Other-
wise, the creditor is required to bring it if it can be transported with little cost
and effort, otherwise he is not. In this regard, ’Ibn c Abidı̄n ruled that the main
consideration is the cost of transportation of the pawned object (regardless of
location), whereby the creditor is required to bring the pawned object if the cost
of transportation is minimal, and not required otherwise. This latter opinion
seems to be the best and most accurate.
71.3 Safeguarding the pawned property

The H . anafı̄s ruled that establishment of the creditor’s right to hold the pawned
object implies that he may safeguard it in any manner that he safeguards his
own property. Thus, he may safeguard it himself, have his wife safeguard it,
have a cohabitating child or servant safeguard it, or have his agent safeguard it.
They based this ruling on the view that the possession of the pawned property
is a possession of trust, and thus may be safeguarded it in the same manners
permissible for deposits.
On the other hand, they ruled that the creditor must guarantee the value of
the pawned property if he does not safeguard it in one of the aforementioned
methods. Thus, if he deposits it with someone, or is otherwise negligent in its
safeguarding, he must guarantee its value, no matter how large. If he deposits
the pawned object with another party, and then the object were to perish, then
the H. anafı̄ jurists differed over the object’s guaranty. In this case, ’Abū H
. anı̄fa
ruled that the creditor is the one who guarantees the pawned object, and not
the depositary. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that both par-
ties must thus guarantee the object. The latter two based this ruling on the
fact that the creditor must guarantee the object by virtue of forwarding it to
the depositary, while the depositary must guarantee it by virtue of taking it
from a party other than its owner. However, the latter two ruled that the cred-
itor remains the ultimate guarantor, in analogy to the ruling for a depositary’s
depositary.
Moreover, all H . anafı̄s agree that the creditor may travel with the pawned
object, even if its transportation is costly and burdensome, as long as the travel
route is safe. This ruling was also based by analogy to the corresponding ruling
for deposits.11
71.4 The pawned objects expenses

All jurists have agreed that the pawning owner of a property is responsible for its
expenses, based on the H . adı̄th : “A pawned object does not become property of
¯
the creditor, and the pawning debtor retains rights for its output and obligations
for its expenses”.12 However, jurists differed in their specification of the types
of expenditures for which the pawning debtor is obligated:
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that expenses of the pawned property must be divided
between the pawning owner and the holding creditor responsible for its
upkeep and safeguarding, in the following manner:13
– The general rule is that the pawning owner is responsible for all
expenditures needed for the benefit and upkeep of the pawned prop-
erty, while the creditor is responsible for any expenditures needed for
safeguarding it.
– Thus, the pawning debtor is responsible for the feed and drink, and
the wages of a shepherd, of a pawned animal. Similarly, the pawning
debtor is responsible for watering, pollination, and pruning pawned
trees, watering and upkeeping pawned lands, as well as paying any
taxes associated with the land. All such expenses are necessary to
upkeep the pawned property, and thus must be borne by the owner.
– The pawning debtor may not deduct the pawned property’s expenses
from it or from its growth, unless he first receives the creditor’s per-
mission to do so. This ruling follows from the fact that the entire
pawned property is associated with the creditor’s right of debt repay-
ment, and hence selling any portion to spend on the rest of it would
be considered a transgression against the creditor’s right. Thus, the
creditor’s right is necessary for such deduction of expenses to be per-
mitted.
11 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.345,347 onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄),
. ¯ .
vol.2, p.64 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.202).
12 We have discussed the chains of narration of this Hadı̄th previously. It was narrated
. ¯
by Al-Shāfic ı̄, Al-Dāraqut.nı̄, and others on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah. Al-Dāraqut.nı̄
¯
said that this H . adı̄th had a good and contiguous chain of narrators, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5,
¯ ¯
p.235). Criticisms that the end of this H . adı̄th was in fact not part of what the Prophet (pbuh)
¯
said, but a continuation by ’Ibn Al-Musayyab, were rebuffed by the fact that other narrators
confirmed the full narration through a chain of narrators that reaches uninterrupted up to the
Prophet (pbuh).
13 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.151), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.68), c Abd
. .
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.61), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.346), ’Ibn Al-
¯
71.4. THE PAWNED OBJECTS EXPENSES 151
– On the other hand, the creditor must bear all expenses of safekeeping
the pawned property, including the expenses of its location of storage.
This ruling implies that the pawning contract may not include a
stipulated condition of compensating the creditor for his safekeeping
expenses. This ruling was based on the view that safekeeping the
pawned object is a duty of the creditor, and one should not be paid
a wage to fulfill one’s duty. However, it was narrated that ’Abū
Yūsuf ruled that rental payments for the place used to safeguard the
pawned property must be borne by the pawning debtor, thus arguing
that such expenses are necessary for upkeeping the pawned property.
– If the pawned object is lost or falls sick, then the cost of returning
it or curing it, respectively, must be borne by both the debtor and
the creditor. The cost is thus divided between the two parties based
on their guaranty. Thus, the creditor must bear all such expenses
up to the amount of underlying debt, and then the rest must be
borne by the pawning debtor.14 This ruling follows from the fact
that the creditor guarantees the pawned object up to the value of
the underlying debt, and holds the rest as a trustee.
• The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H

. anbalı̄s ruled that the pawning debtor must
¯
bear all the expenses of the pawned property, including upkeeping ex-
penses, safekeeping expenses, and medical treatment expenses.15 They
based this ruling on the previously listed H . adı̄th that explicitly stated
¯
that the pawning debtor is the object’s owner, who is thus entitled to
its output and responsible for its expenses. However, the three schools
differed in opinion over the course of action to be taken if the pawning
debtor refuses to pay those expenses. Thus:
– The Mālikı̄s ruled that if the debtor does not pay for the upkeeping
expenses of the pawned property, the creditor may pay the necessary
expenses and then seek compensation from him for the full amount
he paid, even if it exceeds the value of the pawned object. Thus,
they ruled that such expenses would be established as a debt on
the pawning debtor, whether or not the pawning debtor gave his
permission to the creditor to pay those expenses. In this regard, the
creditor is considered to be performing a duty of the debtor, and the
liability for those expenses must be established as a liability on the
debtor, and not associated to the pawned object itself.
– The Shāfic ı̄s ruled in this case that the judge must force the pawning
¯
to pay the pawning object’s expenses if he is present and can afford
it. If the pawning debtor was absent, then the judge may take the
14 However, the ruling listed in Al-Fatawā Al-Bazzāziyyah stated that physician and medi-
cation costs must be borne by the creditor.

15 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.251 onwards), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ . ¯ ¯
p.136), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.392), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.326 on-
wards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.314).
¯ ¯
expenses out of his property. On the other hand, if the pawning

debtor cannot afford the pawned object’s expenses, then the judge
may take one of three actions: (i) he may borrow to pay the expenses,
(ii) sell part of the pawned property to pay the expenses, or (iii)
order the creditor to pay the expenses and establish them as a debt
on the pawning debtor. In the latter case, wherein the creditor pays
the expenses, he is thus entitled to demand compensation from the
debtor, provided that he acted with the judge’s permission, or with
witnesses of his expenditure. In the case of relying on witnesses to
establish the pawning debtor’s liability for the expenses, the creditor
must tell the witnesses that he is only paying those expenses with
the understanding that he will seek compensation from the debtor.
– The H . anbalı̄s ruled that if the creditor is capable of seeking the
debtor’s permission to pay the pawned property’s expenses, but pays
them without seeking such permission, then he is considered a volun-
tary charitable contributor and loses his right to demand compensa-
tion. However, if he was incapable of seeking the debtor’s permission
(e.g. if the debtor was absent), then he may seek compensation only
up to the lesser of what he actually spent and the normal expen-
ditures required for similar objects. In the latter case, the creditor
needs only to have the prior intent of seeking compensation for the
expenses, but does not need a judge’s permission or witnesses.
71.5 Utilization of the pawned property

It is not permissible to let the usufruct of the pawned object go to waste. Thus,
the pawned object must be utilized while the object is pawned. Thus, we need
to study rulings related to pawning debtor utilization, and to creditor utilization
of the pawned property.
71.5.1 Pawning debtor utilization

The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the pawning debtor is authorized to utilize the pawned
¯
object, as long as the utilization does not harm the creditor. In contrast, the
non-Shāfic ı̄ jurists ruled that the pawning debtor is not permitted to utilize the
¯
pawned object during the pawning.16 We now discuss the views of each of the
four schools:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that a pawning debtor may only use the pawned prop-
erty with the creditor’s permission. Similarly, they ruled that the creditor
is only allowed to utilize the pawned property with the pawning creditor’s
permission.17
16 ’Ibn Hubayrah ((H. anbalı̄), vol.1, p.238).
17 Al-Kāsānı̄((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.146), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
71.5. UTILIZATION OF THE PAWNED PROPERTY 153
Their proof of the first ruling is the permanency of the creditor’s right to
withhold the pawned object from the pawning creditor, thus forbidding the
debtor from reclaiming the object for use. If the pawning debtor actually
benefits from the pawned object without the creditor’s permission (e.g.
drank the milk of a pawned cow), he must guarantee the value of the
benefits he extracted. In the latter case, he is considered a transgressor
against the creditor’s right. Then, the paid value of the usufruct extracted
by the debtor becomes part of the pawning, and thus becomes attached
to the underlying debt.
If the pawning debtor actually takes the pawned object to use it without
the creditor’s permission (e.g. by riding a pawned animal), the creditor’s
is absolved of his guaranty, and the debtor is considered a usurper of the
pawned property, who thus may be forced to return it to the creditor.
Indeed, if the property perishes in the debtor’s possession in this case, it
would perish in his own property.
However, if the pawning debtor can benefit from the pawned property
without taking possession of it (e.g. if the pawned property was a machine
that is being used), then its output and/or growth belongs to the pawning
debtor.18 Thus, if the creditor were to take such output or growth, it would
be cancelled against a corresponding portion of the underlying debt. Those
rulings are based on the view that all increases of the pawned property are
considered part of it, whether such increases are contiguous or separate.
• The H . anbalı̄s agreed with the H . anafı̄s that the pawning debtor is only
allowed to use the pawned property with the creditor’s permission.19 In
this regard, they ruled that if the debtor and creditor cannot agree on
authorizing one or the other to benefit from the property, then the prop-
erty would remain unused, despite the Law’s aversion to such waste. This
ruling is based on the view that a pawned object is by definition withheld
from the pawning debtor, in analogy to a sold item that is withheld by
the seller until its price is paid. Thus, the H . anbalı̄s rulings are also in
agreement with the H . anafı̄ view that all the usufruct of a pawned object,
or any growth thereof, is considered part of the pawning.
However, the H . anbalı̄s do permit the pawning creditor to care for the
pawned object and protect it. For instance, they allow the pawning debtor
to provide medication to a pawned animal, or to arrange for the fertiliza-
tion of a pawned cow.
• The Mālikı̄ rulings in this regard were more strict than the H . anafı̄ and
20
H
. anbalı̄ rulings. In fact, they ruled that the pawning debtor is not
allowed to use the pawned object in any way, and considered a creditor
permission for such usage to be invalidating for the pawning contract, even
((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.370).
19 ’IbnQudāmah (, vol.4, p.390 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.323).
20 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.241 onwards).
if the debtor does not act upon that permission. They based this ruling
on the view that if the creditor gives the debtor his permission to use the
pawned object, he would thus be abandoning his right.
However, since usufruct of the pawned object is owned by the pawning
debtor, the latter may allow the creditor to extract such usufruct on his
behalf, to ensure that the usufruct is not wasted. In this regard, if the
creditor lets the object’s usufruct to go to waste (e.g. by locking a pawned
house), some of the Mālikı̄s ruled that he must thus compensate the debtor
for the rental value corresponding to the wasted usufruct. A second group
of Mālikı̄s ruled that the creditor is not required to compensate the debtor
in this case, since he is not required to utilize the debtor’s property on his
behalf. A third group of Mālikı̄s ruled that the creditor should compensate
the debtor for wasting his property’s usufruct, unless the debtor knew of
the situation and did not complain.
• The Shāfic ı̄s disagreed with the other three schools by ruling that a pawn-
¯
ing debtor is permitted to extract all usufruct from the pawned object,
provided that his utilization of the property does not diminish it in any way
(e.g. riding pawned animals, living in pawned houses, etc. are allowed).21
They based their ruling on the view that all the usufruct and/or growth
in the pawned object are owned by the pawning debtor, and not associ-
ated with the debt. As proof to this view, they cited the H . adı̄th narrated
¯
by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ and Al-H . ākim: “A pawned riding animal is available for
riding while pawned, and a pawned dairy animal is available for milking
while pawned”, as well as the H . adı̄th narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄: “A pawned
¯ ¯
riding animal can be used for riding, in compensation for its expenses”.
In contrast, they did not permit unauthorized use of the pawned object if it
decreases its value. For instance, they did not permit building on pawned
land or planting trees therein. In this regard, the creditor’s permission is
required to protect his rights, and the creditor is allowed to withdraw his
permission before the debtor proceeds with the authorized action.
Moreover, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the debtor can utilize the pawned
¯
property without recalling it from the creditor (e.g. leasing a pawned
machine while it is in the creditor’s possession), then he should not recall
it. However, if recalling the property is necessary to extract usufruct (e.g.
taking possession of a pawned car to drive it), then he may recall it thus,
since gaining possession is necessary to extract the usufruct. In the latter
case, the pawning debtor must return the pawned property immediately
after extracting its usufruct.
71.5.2 Creditor utilization of the pawned property

The non-H
. anbalı̄ jurists ruled that a creditor is not permitted to utilize the
pawned property in any way. In this regard, they explained the H . adı̄th s re-
¯
¯ . ¯ ¯
garding the right to ride or milk pawned animals in return for their expenses to
the case where the pawning debtor refused to pay such expenses. In the latter
case, if the creditor were to bear those expenses that should have been borne
by the debtor, he may extract an amount of usufruct commensurate with his
expenditure. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the creditor may utilize the
pawned property if it is a riding or dairy animal, in which case he may extract
usufruct equal in value to his expenditures on the animal.22 In what follows,
we shall list the rulings of the four schools in some detail:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor is not permitted to utilize the pawned
property in any way without the debtor’s permission.23 They based this
ruling on the view the creditor’s right to withhold the pawned property,
but not to use it. Thus, if the creditor utilized a pawned object, and then
the latter perished while being used, he is considered a usurper and must
thus guarantee all of its value.
Some H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor is generally permitted to utilize the
pawned object if he is given permission by the pawning debtor, while other
H. anafı̄s forbade such creditor utilization unconditionally, based on the
need to avoid any similarity to ribā, regardless of permissions. A middle
group argued as follows: If the pawning contract stipulates a condition
that the pawning debtor must allow the creditor to utilize the pawned
object, then the contract is rendered forbidden based on ribā. Similarly,
if the contract is forbidden if the condition to permit creditor utilization
is not stated explicitly, but understood conventionally to hold. The latter
ruling is based on the view that conventionally understood conditions are
similar to explicitly stipulated ones. On the other hand, they argued
that utilization based on a pawning-debtor’s permission is permissible if
that permission was not stipulated in the contract. In this last case,
the permission is considered a voluntary contribution from the pawning
debtor.
Indeed, the third H. anafı̄ view that differentiates between the conditional
case and the voluntary case seems to capture the spirit if Islamic Law. In
this regard, we note that most people lend an item with the understanding
of permitting the recipient to use the lent property. This conventional
understanding is tantamount to a stipulated condition, which makes it
necessary for the jurist to forbid the practice, as ’ibn c Abidı̄n said.
In this regard, it is necessary in matters of religion to err on the side
of caution. Thus, the H . anafı̄ juristic rule of “every loan that benefits the
lender is ribā should be applied. Indeed, ’Ibn Nujaym ruled explicitly that
he considers a creditor’s use of the pawned property to be reprehensible to
the degree of prohibition.24 We read the following in Al-Tatārkhāniyyah:
¯
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.273).
23 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.342), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.146), Al-Zayla ı̄
c
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.67), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H. anafı̄), vol.8, p.102).
24 Syrian and Egyptian laws agree with Sharı̄c a in this regard, since both laws state that
¯
“If a person borrows some money, and gives his donkey to the creditor
to use it for two months until he repays his debt, or gives him his house
within which to dwell until repayment, the contract is tantamount to a
defective lease. Thus, if the creditor does in fact use the pawned property,
he must pay the market rental value of the usufruct he extracted, and
the contract is not considered a pawning”. Thus we see that the common
contemporary practice of pawning a house with the creditor of a loan to
use for the duration of the loan in fact renders the loan forbidden for all
schools of jurisprudence. In particular, the contract cannot be viewed as
a trust sale, since those participating in such practices do not intend to
engage in sales.
• The Mālikı̄s stipulated a number of rulings for various different scenar-

ios.25 Thus, they ruled that the debtor’s permission, or the creditor’s
condition, to utilize the pawned object is permissible if the pawning pe-
riod is specified, and the underlying debt was established through a sale
or other commutative contract. If those conditions are satisfied, the two
contracts would be a sale (by virtue of which the debt was established)
and a lease with known term, which is permissible. In this regard, Al-
Dardı̄r ruled that it is permissible for the creditor either to extract the
pawned object’s usufruct without paying any compensation, or with such
compensation deducted from the underlying debt, while the rest of the
debt is repaid as soon as possible.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s ruled that creditor utilization of the
pawned object is not permissible if the underlying debt was established
through a loan. In this case, such utilization would render the underlying
loan one which benefits the creditor, which is a form of ribā. Moreover,
they ruled that if the underlying debt was established through a loan, then
creditor utilization of the pawned object is still not allowed if the debtor
gave it to him as a gift, since the Prophet (pbuh) forbade the gifts given
by debtors to their creditors.26
In summary, one can envision eight scenarios in which the creditor may
utilize the pawned property, of which seven are forbidden and only one is
permissible. Four of the forbidden scenarios involve an underlying loan,
wherein the period of utilization may be known or uncertain, and wherein
the utilization was stipulated as a contract condition or given voluntarily
as a gift from the debtor. Three more forbidden scenarios involve an
underlying debt from sale, wherein the debtor gives the usufruct as a gift
of known or unknown duration, or wherein utilization was stipulated as
the recipient of a pawned property is not permitted to utilize that property without paying a
commensurate compensation.
25 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.246), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.273), ’Ibn
¯ .
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324).
26 Al-Bukhārı̄ narrated in his Tārı̄kh on the authority of ’Anas (mAbpwh) that the Prophet
¯ ¯
(pbuh) said: “If someone lends another, let him not take a gift from the debtor”, i.e. prior to
repayment of the debt, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.231).
¯
a condition but the term of utilization was not certain. Thus, the only
permissible scenario is the one wherein creditor utilization of the pawned
object was stipulated as a condition, and its term was stated explicitly.
In the latter permissible case, the condition must mention whether the
creditor may thus utilize the pawned property without compensation, or
whether the commensurate compensation would be deducted from the
debt, with the rest of the debt repaid as soon as possible.
• The Shāfic ı̄ jurists largely agreed with their Mālikı̄ counterparts27 that the
¯
default ruling is impermissibility of creditor utilization of the pawned prop-
erty, based on the above mentioned H . adı̄th . A translation of the H . adı̄th
¯ ¯
along the explanation given by ’Ibn Masc ūd would read: “A pawned prop-
erty does not become the property of the creditor; and the pawning debtor
remains its owner, thus entitled to all its benefits and responsible for its
expenses”. This is a more reasonable understanding of the H . adı̄th than
¯
the understanding given by Al-Shāfic ı̄ that the owner is only entitled to
¯
any increase in the pawned property, and responsible for any diminution
therein.
The Shāfic ı̄s further ruled that if the creditor stipulated in the underlying
¯
loan any condition that harms the pawning debtor, e.g. that increases
in or usufruct of the pawned property would belong to himself, then the
condition is invalidated, and most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the pawning is also
¯
invalidated. This ruling is based on the H . adı̄th : “Any condition that is not
¯
in the Book of Allāh is invalid”. The jurists who ruled that the pawning
would also be rendered invalid by such a condition based their ruling on
the contradiction between this condition and the nature of pawning, in
analogy to conditions that result in harm for the creditor.
On the other hand, if the usufruct was of known amount, and the pawning
was stipulated as a condition in a sale contract, then it is permissible in
that condition to give the creditor rights to the usufruct. This would be a
case of combining a sale and a lease in one contract, which is permissible.
Another permissible example of such a combination would be selling a
horse for $100 on condition that the buyer would lease his house to the
seller for one year in exchange for those $100. In this example, part of the
horse is given as an object of sale, and the other part is given as a rental
payment in exchange for the usufruct of the house.
Finally, they ruled that if utilizing the pawned property was not stipulated
in the contract, the creditor may still utilize the pawned property by
permission of the pawning debtor. This ruling follows from the fact that
the pawning debtor is the owner of the pawned property, and may thus
give anyone he wishes a permission to use it. In this regard, they argued
that neither party’s rights are wasted in this scenario, since the debtor
27 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄ni ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.61), ’Ibn Hubayrah ((Hanbalı̄), vol.1, p.238),
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.121).
¯ ¯ ¯
maintains ownership, and the creditor maintains possession of the pawned

property.
• The H. anbalı̄s ruled that it is not permissible for the creditor to utilize
pawned properties other than animals that require feeding, unless the
debtor gives his permission for such utilization.28 They based this ruling
on the fact that the pawned object, together with any increases and all its
usufruct, is a property of the pawning debtor, and thus may not be taken
without his consent.
Moreover, they ruled that it is not permissible for the creditor to utilize the
pawned property without paying compensation, even if the debtor gives
his permission thus, if the underlying debt resulted from a loan. The latter
case is clearly forbidden as a loan that benefits the lender. In this regard,
’Imām ’Ah.mad said: “I hate loans in which a house is pawned for use by
the creditor, for it is unadulterated ribā”. In contrast, if the underlying
debt resulted from a sale or lease, then the creditor is permitted to utilize
the pawned property, even if he is given a favorable lease rate.
However, it is permissible for the creditor to utilize the pawned property
in exchange for its market-based rental rate, regardless of whether the
underlying debt resulted from a loan or a sale. In this last case, the lender
would thus be engaged in a lease contract, rather than benefiting from the
loan.
Of course, in the case of pawned animals, they ruled based on the above
listed H. adı̄th that the creditor may ride or milk the animal in compensa-
¯
tion for the feed he spends on it. In this case, they ruled that the creditor
should be careful that the amount of usufruct he extracts is commensurate
with the cost of feeding the animal, since the H . adı̄th stated: “It is per-
¯
missible to ride a pawned riding animal, or to drink the milk of a pawned
dairy animal, and the one who rides it or drinks its milk is responsible
for its expenses”. Moreover, since utilization of the animals in exchange
for feeding them is a form of commutative contracts, it is necessary that
the two compensations be equal. However, ’Ibn Al-Qayyim disagreed with
this final ruling in ’Ac lām Al-Muwaqqic ı̄n, saying: “It is not necessary to
make the two compensations equal in this case, since the Legislator has
deemed the two compensations qualitatively equal, and it is difficult for us
to ascertain quantitative equality between such disparate things as riding
and milking on the one hand and feeding on the other”.
It is noteworthy that the majority of jurists did not accept the above
mentioned H. adı̄th , since they argued that it was abrogated. In this regard,
¯
they argued that the H . adı̄th was abrogated by the H . adı̄th : “It is not
¯ ¯
28 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.385 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.342
.
onwards). In this regard, they explicitly stated that: “the creditor is not permitted to benefit
from the pawned property in any way, unless the pawned property is a riding or dairy animal,
in which case they may ride it or milk it to an extent that matches the amount of feed they
spend on it”.
71.6. DEALING IN THE PAWNED PROPERTY 159
permissible to milk the sheep of any person without his permission”,29 as

well as the H
. adı̄th : “A pawned property does not become property of the
¯
creditor; and the debtor remains its owner, thus entitled to its output and
responsible for its expenses”.
The H . anbalı̄s answered those criticisms by arguing that Sunnah is a fun-
damental source of legislation, which thus cannot be negated by other
sources. Moreover, they argued that the H . adı̄th claimed to abrogate their
¯
proof is general, while the H . adı̄th they cited regarding pawning is more
¯
specific, and thus the more specific should restrict the understanding and
application of the more general H . adı̄th .
¯
The H . anbalı̄ exception to the general H . adı̄th seems reasonable in this case.
¯
In this regard, the H . adı̄th used by the H . anbalı̄s as proof of their ruling is
¯
a valid H . adı̄th , and thus must be observed. However, outside the narrow
¯
scope of that H . adı̄th , we accept the position of all four schools. Indeed, the
¯
H. anbalı̄s themselves ruled that: “If a condition is stipulated in a pawning
contract that the creditor is permitted to utilize the pawned property, then
the condition is defective based on contradicting the consequences of the
pawning contract. On the other hand, if the underlying debt resulted from
a sale, then it is permissible to allow the creditor to utilize the pawned
property, since the situation in this case is in fact a sale and a lease in one
contract, in accordance with the Shāfic ı̄ ruling”.
¯
71.6 Dealing in the pawned property

In what follows, we discuss the dealings of the pawning debtor, as well as dealings
of the creditor, in the pawned property.
71.6.1 Pawning-debtor dealings

Prior to receipt
The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that any dealings of the pawning
¯
debtor prior to delivery of the pawned property may be executed without the
creditor’s consent. They base this ruling on the view that the creditor does not
have any rights attached to that property prior to delivery and receipt.
On the other hand, we have seen that the Mālikı̄s rendered a pawning bind-
ing upon conclusion of the offer and acceptance.30 Thus, they ruled that the
pawning debtor can be forced to deliver the pawned property to the creditor
by virtue of the concluded pawning contract (through offer and acceptance).
However, despite those rulings, the Mālikı̄s still allow the pawning debtor to
deal in the object of pawning prior to its receipt by the creditor. Thus, if the
debtor by virtue of a loan or sale were to sell the object of a stipulated pawning
29 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ in his chapter on types of injustice on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar,
¯
c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.51).
in the underlying contract, the sale is executed if the creditor was not diligent
in demanding receipt of the pawned property. Thus, the underlying debt would
not be insured with a pawning, due to the creditor’s negligence that allowed the
debtor to sell the object of pawning.
However, if the creditor were in fact diligent in demanding receipt of the
pawned property, but the debtor proceeds to sell the pawned property before
delivering it to the creditor, the Mālikı̄s have expressed three opinions:
• ’Ibn Al-Qas.s.ār ruled that if the sold object of pawning remained in the
debtor’s possession, the creditor is entitled to void the sale, which is thus
not executable. On the other hand, if the object was already delivered
to the buyer, the sale is deemed executed, and the object’s price takes its
place as the object of pawning.
• ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Yazı̄d ruled that the sale is executed in all cases, and its price
takes its place as the object of pawning.
• ’Ibn Rushd ruled that the sale is thus executed, but the underlying debt
¯
is thus deprived of insurance through pawning. In other words, he ruled
that the object’s price does not replace it as the object of pawning.
There is also a difference in opinion regarding the case of voluntary pawning
after the underlying contract is concluded. In this case, the Mālikı̄s agree that
if the debtor sells the object of pawning prior to its delivery to the creditor, the
sale is deemed executed. However, the jurists differed in opinion over whether
or not the object’s price replaces it as the object of pawning, in accordance with
their rulings regarding the sale of gifts prior to their receipt.
After receipt
Once the pawned property is delivered to the creditor, the underlying debt be-
comes associated with it, despite the debtor’s maintenance of ownership rights.
Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor is entitled to withhold the pawned
property from the debtor as insurance against the underlying debt, until the
latter is repaid. On the other hand, the non-H . anafı̄s ruled that the pawned
property is thus identified for possible sale to insure repayment of the under-
lying debt. Both rulings imply that the debtor is thus not allowed to deal in
the pawned property without the creditor’s consent. This ruling follows from
the fact that all schools agree that delivery of the pawned property associates
legal rights of the creditor to that property, and hence his permission to drop
that right must be obtained. In what follows, we shall discuss the views of the
various schools in some detail:
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that if the pawning debtor sells the pawned property
without the creditor’s permission, then the sale is suspended due to the
association of its object with the rights of the creditor.31 Then the sale
31 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.146), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.224), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.84), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
((H c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.361), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄
¯
Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.59).
would become valid and executable if the creditor permits it, the debtor
repays the underlying debt, or the creditor absolves the debtor of his debt.
In the two cases not involving debt repayment, most H . anafı̄s ruled that
the object’s price replaces it as the object of pawning, since compensa-
tions in sale generally take the legal status of what they compensated for.
Moreover, this ruling is based on the view that the creditor’s right is at-
tached to the financial aspect of the pawned property, and thus his rights
are not harmed if the object of pawning is replaced by its price.
On the other hand, most H . anafı̄s ruled that if the creditor does not permit
the sale, the latter is not voided, but becomes suspended. In that latter
case, if the buyer did not have prior knowledge of the pawning, he is given
an option of waiting until the pawned property is released from pawning,
or asking a judge to void the sale.
If the debtor were to sell the pawned property for a second time (while
the first sale is suspended), then the second sale is also suspended pending
the creditor’s permission. In this case, the creditor is given the option of
permitting either one of the two sales and voiding the other. On the other
hand, if the second dealing of the debtor (while the first sale is suspended)
was a gift, lease, or second pawning, then the creditor’s consent would
render the first sale executable, voiding the later dealings. This ruling
follows from the fact that consenting to any of the other dealings involves
dropping the creditor’s right to withhold the pawned property, which thus
removes the legal impediments to executing the sale. Moreover, this ruling
transfers the creditor’s rights to the price obtained from the sale, while
the other dealings would not bring any financial benefit to the creditor.
Similarly, if the pawning debtor were initially to lend, lease, pawn, or give
the pawned property as a gift, his dealings are deemed suspended pending
the creditor’s permission:
– In the case of lending a pawned property, the simple loan is executed if

the creditor permits it, and voided otherwise. However, the pawning
contract is not voided if the simple loan is permitted, since simple
loans are non-binding contract, and thus both the debtor and the
creditor have the right to recall the lent property and re-establish its
pawning.
– In contrast, leasing is a binding contract, and thus if the debtor leased
his pawned property and the creditor consented to the lease, then the
pawning is invalidated.
– If the other party to the debtor’s loan, lease, pawning, or gift is the
creditor himself, then the same rulings apply as before. Thus, if the
creditor with whom the property is pawned is the buyer or the gift
recipient, then the pawning is invalidated.
If the creditor is the borrower of the pawned property, the pawning is
not voided, but he no longer guarantees the pawned and lent property
if he utilizes it. Thus, if the property were to perish during his use
in this case, it would perish in a possession of trust. However, if
it perished before or after the property’s use, it would perish as an
object of pawning.
If the creditor is also a lessee of the pawned property, and if the two
parties satisfy the formality of renewing his receipt for the purposes
of leasing, the lease is executed and the pawning is voided. This
ruling follows from the fact that the possession of a pawned property
is weaker than the possession of a leased property, and thus may
not take its place. This fact can be deduced from the fact that the
possession of a pawned property does not authorize the possessor
to use the property, while the possession of lease does authorize the
possessor thus, and hence it is the stronger of the two possessions.
In this regard, if a formal new receipt is established for the lease,
and the pawned object perished afterwards, it would thus perish in
a possession of trust, which is guaranteed only against the holder’s
transgression or negligence. One form of transgression in this case is
forbidding the debtor to regain possession after the end of the lease
period.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that all unauthorized dealings of the debtor in the
pawned property, including sales, leases, gifts, charity, simple loans, etc.
are deemed suspended pending the creditor’s permission.32 Thus, the
creditor would be given the option of voiding the contract, and maintain-
ing the pawning, or permitting the debtor’s dealing. In this regard, most
Mālikı̄s ruled that if the creditor gives his consent to the debtor’s dealing
in the pawned property, then the pawning is invalidated, even if the debtor
does not in fact conclude the dealing. This ruling is based on the view
that such a consent implies dropping the creditor’s rights associated with
the pawning.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the debtor is not permitted to deal in pawned
¯
property (that he had already delivered) in any manner that transfers its
ownership (e.g. sales, gifts, etc.) to a party other than the creditor without
his permission.33 They base this ruling on the view that validating such
dealings would in fact nullify the insurance against the underlying debt.
Similarly, they ruled that the debtor is not permitted to pawn an already
pawned property with a different creditor, or to lease the pawned property
if the debt’s maturity date precedes the end of the lease period. In such
cases, the debtor’s dealings are deemed invalid.
However, the dealings are valid if the other party to the lease, sale, or
other contract is the creditor, or if the creditor gave his permission to
32 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.241 onwards, 248), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2,
¯ .
p.247), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324).
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, pp.309,311).
concluding the contract with a third party. In both cases, the pawning is
thus voided, except in the case of leasing, wherein the pawning remains
intact. In the latter case, we have already seen that the pawning debtor
is permitted to take any actions that do not harm the creditor (e.g. living
in a pawned house, or riding a pawned animal). Consequently, the debtor
is also allowed to lease the pawned property or lend it for a period that
ends prior to maturity of the underlying debt, since the creditor’s rights
to sell the property and collect repayment of the underlying debt remain
intact.
• The H. anbalı̄s agreed with the Sh āfic ı̄s that debtor dealings in the pawned
¯
property without the creditor’s permission are invalid.34 They based this
ruling on the view that such dealings as sales, leases, gifts, establishing
trusts, pawning, etc. would void the creditor’s rights of insuring the under-
lying debt. On the other hand, they ruled that if the creditor permits such
dealings, then the dealings are deemed valid and the pawning is voided,
with the exception of the cases of leasing and simple loans.
Thus, in summary, unapproved debtor dealings in the pawned property is
considered by the H
. anafı̄s to be suspended, and by the other jurists to be
invalid.
71.6.2 Creditor dealings

We have already seen that the pawning-debtor maintains ownership rights to the
pawned property, while the creditor maintains rights to withhold the property,
the financial value of which is deemed to be insurance against the underlying
debt. Consequently, the creditor is not permitted to deal in the pawned property
without the owner-debtor’s consent. Thus, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s consider his
unauthorized dealings in the pawned property to be suspended in analogy to the
dealings of unauthorized agents. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s render
¯
such unauthorized dealings of the creditor to be invalid. In what follows, we
shall discuss the views of the various schools in some detail:
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that that creditor is only entitled to hold the pawned
property, but may not deal in it without the debtor’s consent.35 Thus, if
the creditor were to deal with the pawned property in a sale, gift, charity
or simple loan, his dealings would be suspended pending the debtor’s
permission. Thus, if the debtor approves the dealing, it would be executed,
and if he does not approve it, the dealing would thus be invalidated.
The exception to this rule is the case of leasing the pawned property, in
which case the rent belongs to the creditor if the debtor did not authorize
the lease, and belongs to the debtor if he authorized it. In either case, the
pawning is invalidated.36
34 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.363), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.321 onwards).
35 Al-Kāsānı̄((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.146), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.139,342 onwards).
c
36 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.342,372).
.
Then, if the creditor deals in the pawned object, and then it perishes in
the possession of the party to whom it was dealt, we need to consider
different scenarios:
– The debtor has an option if the creditor had sold the pawned object,
given it as a gift or charity, or lent it. In those cases, the debtor may
seek compensation from the creditor based on his transgression, in
which case he is considered the ultimate guarantor of the property,
who by compensating the debtor is retroactively considered to have
dealt in his property. Alternatively, the debtor may seek compensa-
tion from the recipient of the pawned property, in which case neither
party may seek compensation from the creditor. In the latter sce-
nario, each party is considered to be dealing on his own, with the
recipient of the pawned property being a recipient on his own behalf,
whether or not he was aware of the creditor’s transgression. More-
over, the recipient of the property through a sale or gift thus accepted
guaranteeing the property, whether or not the property was owned
by the creditor. Similarly, a borrower would thus have received the
property to extract usufruct without paying compensation.
– If the creditor leased, deposited, or pawned the pawned property with
another, and then the property perished in the other party’s posses-
sion, the debtor has a different option. He may seek compensation
from the creditor, in which case he is established as the ultimate guar-
antor, who by paying compensation is rendered retroactively as the
property’s owner. Alternatively, he may seek compensation from the
recipient of the property, who may in turn seek compensation from
the creditor. In the latter case, the recipient of the property is not
considered to be acting on his own behalf, but rather acting on behalf
of the depositor, second pawning party, or lessor, and maintaining the
property for the creditor’s benefit. Thus, the creditor becomes the
ultimate guarantor of the property in those cases, unless the property
perished due to the ultimate recipient’s transgression, in which case
the latter is considered the ultimate guarantor.
We note further that once the debtor determines the party from
whom he seeks compensation, he may not revert to seeking compen-
sation from the other. In this context, seeking compensation from
either party is tantamount to giving him ownership rights, which
may not later be transferred to another without the new owner’s con-
sent. Moreover, by seeking compensation from one party, the debtor
would implicitly be testifying that that party is the transgressor on
his rights, and thus absolving the second party irrevocably.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled in agreement with the H . anafı̄s that the creditor is not
allowed to deal in the pawned property without the pawning debtor’s per-
mission, since he would thus be dealing in what he does not own.37 Thus, if
71.7. GUARANTEEING PAWNED PROPERTY 165
the unauthorized creditor were to deal with the pawned property through
sales, gifts, leases, or loans, the dealing would be deemed suspended pend-
ing the debtor’s permission, in analogy to their ruling on the dealings of
unauthorized agents.
On the other hand, if the creditor deals thus with the debtor’s permission,
the contract is executed. However, if the dealing is a sale, a gift, or a lease
that ends after the underlying debt’s maturity, then the pawning is voided.
Also, the pawning is voided if the lease ends prior to the debt’s maturity,
but the lessee is not required by condition or convention to return the
property to the creditor at the end of the lease. However, the pawning
is not voided if the dealing is a lease that ends prior to maturity of the
underlying debt and the lessee is bound by convention or condition to
return the property to the creditor at the end of the lease.
• The H . anbalı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that the creditor is not allowed to deal in
¯
the pawned property without the pawning debtor’s permission, since he is
not the owner of that property.38 Thus, if the creditor were to deal in the
debtor’s pawned property, the dealing is rendered invalid, and the pawning
remains valid. In contrast, if the creditor deals in the pawned property
with the debtor’s permission, his dealing is executed, and the pawning is
voided if the dealing implies transfer of ownership to the recipient (e.g. as
in sales or gifts). However, if the creditor’s dealing is a lease or loan, the
pawning is not invalidated, whether or not the lessee or borrower is the
pawning debtor.
In the meantime, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the bindingness of the pawning
contract is dissolved upon dealing in the pawned property, as if the prop-
erty was never received in pawning. Then, if the property is returned to the
creditor’s possession, the pawning is reinstated. On the other hand, the
Shāfic ı̄s who do not require permanency in receipt consider the pawning
¯
in such cases to continue as if the property was in the creditor’s possession
throughout.
71.7 Guaranteeing pawned property

In this section, we shall discuss three aspects of pawned property guaranty:
• The nature of the creditor’s possession of the pawned property.
• Types of guaranty for the H

. anafı̄s and non-H
. anafı̄s.
• Consumption of the pawned property.
38 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.331), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.131).
¯ ¯ ¯
71.7.1 The creditor s possession

The H . anafı̄s viewed the creditor’s possession of pawned property to be a pos-
session of trust, while the non-H. anafı̄s viewed it as a possession of guaranty. In
what follows, we shall discuss the rulings of the various schools in some detail:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor’s possession is a possession of trust

with regards to the pawned property itself, but a possession of guaranty
and repayment of the underlying debt with regards to the financial aspect
of the pawned property, up to the value of the underlying debt.39 In
other words, the creditor guarantees the pawned object’s value up to the
equivalent of the underlying debt. Thus, if the pawned perishes, the debt
would be considered repaid out of the creditor’s guaranty of an equal part
of the value, and the rest of the value is considered to perish like other
trusts that are guaranteed only by transgression or negligence.
The proof for this ruling is the H. adı̄th : “If a pawned property perishes,
¯
it perishes in cancellation with the underlying debt”.40 They also offer
as proof the narration that a creditor once received a pawned horse, and
then when the horse died in his possession, the Prophet (pbuh) told him:
“Your right has thus perished”.41 In this regard, the H . anafı̄s interpreted
the first H
. adı̄th in the context where neither party could ascertain the
¯
perished pawned property’s value, and thus it would be cancelled against
the underlying debt.42
• The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor’s possession of a pawned prop-
erty is a possession of trust, which is guaranteed only by transgression or
negligence.43 Thus, absent any transgression or negligence, no part of the
debt would be dropped by virtue of the pawning object perishing.
Their proof for this ruling is the previously quoted H . adı̄th of ’Abū Hu-
¯
rayrah: “The pawned property does not become the property of the cred-
itor when the underlying debt matures; and the debtor remains its owner
who is entitled to its output and responsible for its expenses”. Thus, they
interpret this H
. adı̄th to state that all expenses (including the total loss
¯
of value upon perishing) of the pawned property are a liability on the
39 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.342), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.55),
. .
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H c ¯ anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.63), Al-
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.198), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H .
Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.154).
40 There are two narrations of this Hadı̄th in Al-Dāraqutnı̄ and ’Abū Dāwūd,;the first is a
. ¯ .
weak narration on the authority of ’Anas, while the other is a valid H . adı̄th with an incomplete
¯
transmission chain, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.321).
41 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd in his Marāsı̄l and by ’Ibn ’Abı̄ ¯Shaybah in his Musannaf, as
¯ .
a weak H . adı̄th with an incomplete chain of narrators, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition,
c
¯
(H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.321).
¯ c
42 ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.348).
43 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.253-5), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.273),
¯ .
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.136), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.316), ’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah ((H . anbalı̄)a, vol.4,p.35), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.396), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.328).
pawning debtor. This in turn implies that the pawned property must be
perishing in a possession of trust, and not a possession of guaranty, lest
the creditor be the one responsible for the loss. Moreover, they argued
that pawning is a means of ensuring repayment of the underlying debt,
and thus that underlying debt cannot be dropped by virtue of the prop-
erty’s perishing. Finally, they argued that the creditor gained possession
of the property with the pawning debtor’s consent, and thus his possession
is a possession of trust, in analogy to the possession of a depositary. In-
deed, we can see that the non-H . anafı̄ jurists’ proofs are stronger, while the
H. anafı̄ proofs rely on weak H
. adı̄th s. Thus, we find the majority opinion
¯
in this case to be more credible.
Despite this ruling, the Mālikı̄s preferred to consider the creditor a guar-
antor if there is a suspicion of possible transgression or negligence (e.g. if
the pawned property can be hidden, e.g. jewelry, clothes, etc.), and if the
property was in the creditor’s possession. However, they ruled that the
creditor does not guarantee the property if it was in the possession of a
trustee, or if two witnesses (or one witness and the creditor’s oath) can
be provided to testify that it perished without any transgression or negli-
gence on the creditor’s part. Moreover, they ruled that the creditor is not
responsible for any compensation if the pawned property was observable
(e.g. real estate, or an animal).
71.7.2 Types of guaranty

H
. anafı̄ rulings
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a pawned property is guaranteed for the smaller of its
value and its underlying debt. Thus, if the pawned property’s value was smaller
than the underlying debt, the property is considered to be guaranteed up to its
value. In this case, if the pawned property perishes, a part of the debt equal
to its value would be cancelled, and the creditor may demand repayment of the
remaining amount of the debt. If the value of the pawned property was equal to
the underlying debt, then they cancel each other if the pawned property were
to perish. In this second case, the value of the pawned property is considered
a liability on the creditor, which may thus be cancelled against the debtor’s
liability for an equal debt. Finally, if the value of the pawned property was
greater than the underlying debt, then the excess of its value over the debt is
considered to be in a possession of trust, which is only guaranteed against the
creditor’s negligence or transgression.44
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s stipulated three conditions for the types of guar-
anty discussed in the previous paragraph:45
1. The underlying debt must be in existence at the time when the pawned
property perished. Thus, if the debt is dropped through repayment or
44c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.160).
45 Al-Kāsānı̄ ¯((Hanafı̄),
vol.6, pp.155-60), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. . anafı̄), vol.8, p.240).
absolution, and then the pawned property perishes, the pawning debtor
is not entitled to any compensation from the creditor.
2. The pawned property must have perished in the possession of the creditor
or a trustee. Thus, if the pawned property perishes in the possession of
the debtor or a usurper, it would not perish as pawned property. Rather,
the property would thus be guaranteed by the debtor if it perished in his
possession, and by the usurper if it perished in his.
This ruling also applies to the case where the debtor utilizes the pawned
property with the creditor’s permission, and then it perishes while he is
utilizing it. Then, the property would perish as a trust, and no part of the
debt would be cancelled in lieu of its perishing. This ruling is based on the
view that the property would thus perish in the possession of a simple loan
rather than the possession of pawning. However, if the property were to
perish in this case before or after the debtor’s utilization, it would perish
in a possession of pawning. Similarly, if the debtor or creditor lend the
pawned property to a third party, and it perishes in his possession, then it
would perish as the object of a simple loan. Finally, if the creditor deposits
the pawned property with the debtor, and it perishes in his possession,
no part of the debt would be dropped in compensation. In this last case,
the pawning possession would thus be negated by delivering the pawned
property to the debtor.
3. The perished part of the property must be part of the originally pawned
property, i.e. it must not be an increase or output of the pawned property
(e.g. offspring, milk, fruits, wool, etc.) that was associated with it ex
post. Thus, if the increase or output of the pawned property perishes, it
perishes in a possession of trust, since such increases are not part of the
original pawning, and thus the creditor’s possession thereof is derivative
of his possession of the originally pawned property.
The majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that diminution in the price of pawned prop-
erty does not result in its guaranty, in contrast to Zufar who ruled that it does.
The majority opinion is based on the view that dropping any part of the un-
derlying debt is usually determined by the corresponding value of the pawned
property at the time of its receipt, and not at the time it perishes. This ruling in
turn follows from the fact that receipt of the pawned property is tantamount to
a form of repayment, and thus its value at that receipt time is the most impor-
tant consideration. Thus, if that value is subsequently diminished by changes in
market prices, no part of the debt is dropped in compensation for that reduction
in value.46
On the other hand, if the pawned property consisted of multiple units, and
parts of it perished in the creditor’s possession, or if otherwise becomes defective
in the latter possession, an equal amount of the underlying debt is cancelled in
compensation to the reduction in the pawned property’s value. The rest of the
pawned property would thus be considered to remain in pawning corresponding

to the remainder of the underlying debt.
An exception to this rule is the case where the pawned properties were ribawı̄
goods measured by volume or weight, and the underlying debt was denominated
in the same genus (e.g. gold for gold or silver for silver), then ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled
that any perished part of the pawned property would be cancelled against an
equal volume or weight of the underlying debt.47 In this regard, the quality of
the underlying debt and pawned property is irrelevant, since such considerations
are ignored in ribawı̄ goods of the same genus.48
However, if the pawned property and the underlying debt were of different
genera (e.g. one was wheat and the other gold), then the perished pawned
property would be assessed in terms of value, in analogy to all other non-ribawı̄
properties.
Non-H
. anafı̄ rulings
The non-H . anafı̄ jurists ruled that pawned property is only guaranteed against
the creditor’s transgression and/or negligence.49 Thus, barring any negligence
or transgression, no part of the debt would be cancelled against diminution of
the pawned property.
However, we have already summarized the Mālikı̄ views regarding pawned
properties that can be hidden, wherein the creditor must guarantee the pawned
properties unless he can provide proof that it perished due to causes other
than his own transgression or negligence. If the creditor guarantees the pawned
property, he would continue to do so until he delivers it back to the debtor, i.e.
the guaranty would not be dropped through debt repayment or dropping. If
the pawned property perished in the creditor’s guaranty, the underlying debt
would thus be dropped if it is equal to the property’s value. In this regard, some
Mālikı̄s ruled that the value of the pawned property is determined on the day
of its loss, and others ruled that it is determined on the day of the pawning.50
In this regard, they ruled that guaranty would imply that one party should pay
the excess of the debt or the value of pawned property to the other. Thus, if the
debt was larger, the creditor may demand repayment of the remainder of the
47 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.212), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.74),
c
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H anafı̄), vol.2, p.57).
¯ .
48 ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the creditor must guarantee the value of pawned
property if the underlying debt was of a different genus. In this case, they ruled that the
compensation for perished pawned property takes its place as the object of pawning in the
creditor’s possession.
49 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.396), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.137), ’Ibn Juzayy
¯ . ¯ ¯
((Mālikı̄), p.324), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.344), lbn-Rushd Al-Qurt.ubı̄ ((Mālikı̄), vol.2,
¯
p.367).
50 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.253), which stated that there were two decisions in the
school regarding determining the value of the pawned property on the day of its pawning or
the day of its perishing. He then stated that some Mālikı̄s tried to reconcile the two opinions
by saying that the value is considered on the day the property perished if it was observed to
have perished on that day, but considered on the day of its pawning if the object was not
observed between the time of its pawning and the time he claimed that it was affected.
debt, and if the value of the pawned property was larger, the debtor may seek
compensation from the creditor for the excess of that value over the underlying
debt.
71.7.3 Consumption of the pawned property

All jurists agreed that the pawned property is guaranteed if consumed, and
that its value would thus replace it as the object of pawning. However, they
differed over the details of determining the party responsible for guaranty, and
the timing of value determination:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that if the debtor consumed or adversely affected the
pawned property, then he must guarantee its value if it is non-fungible,
and its equal if it is fungible.51 In this regard, the value is determined
on the day of transgression, and the creditor is the party against whose
right of holding the debtor thus transgressed. The creditor should thus
demand compensation from the debtor, and hold the compensation (in
value or equal amount) until the maturity date of the underlying debt, as
replacement of the object of pawning. If the debt was already matured
at the time, then the creditor may take full repayment of the underlying
debt from the compensation of value.
On the other hand, if the creditor consumed the pawned property, or
otherwise affected it adversely through his transgression or negligence, he
must guarantee its value if it is non-fungible and its equal replacement if
it is fungible. In this case, the value of the pawned property is assessed
on the day of its receipt, since his guaranty started on that date. This
is in contrast to the case where a third party transgresses against the
property, whereby he would guarantee the property’s value on the day of
transgression.
In all three cases where the property was affected adversely by the creditor,
the debtor or a third party, the compensation in value or quantity replaces
the pawned property as the object of pawning. Thus, the creditor’s right
would be associated with the compensation in the same manner it was
associated with the pawned property. In the two cases of debtor or third
party transgression, the creditor should demand compensation from the
transgressor, and the compensation should be given to the initial holder
of the pawned property, be it the creditor or a trustee.
• The Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s ruled that the transgressor against pawned
¯
property must guarantee its value or its equal in quantity, as determined
on the day of transgression.52 Thus, the compensation would take the
place of the initially pawned property as the object of pawning, whether
. .
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.60).
¯
52 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.136,138), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.396), Al-
¯ . ¯ ¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.328).
71.8. SELLING PAWNED PROPERTY 171
or not that compensation is received. Thus, the creditor would continue to

have priority over other creditors of the pawning debtor for the amount of
compensation, to be paid out of the transgressor’s estate if necessary. In
this regard, they ruled that the pawning debtor, as owner of the pawned
property, is the one to demand payment of its compensation, but the ac-
tual compensation should be received by the party that held the property
in pawning, i.e. the creditor or trustee.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that if the pawned property is transgressed upon by the
debtor or a third party, then either the debtor compensates the creditor
by pawning an identical property, or the compensation must be calculated
according to the perished property’s value on the day of the transgression
that caused it to be guaranteed.53 On the other hand, if the creditor is the
transgressor against the pawned property, then some Mālikı̄s ruled that
compensation should take into account the value at the time of pawning,
and others ruled that the value should be calculated as of the date of its
perishing.
71.8 Selling pawned property

Our discussion of the sale of pawned property will cover five subtopics: (A)
right of voluntary or compelled sales of pawned property, (B) sales of perishable
pawned property, (C) priority for the creditor with whom the property was
pawned over other creditors, (D) stipulating a condition that the creditor will
own the pawned property if the underlying debt is not paid, and (E) rulings
regarding claims of the property’s original owner after it is sold.
71.8.1 Right to sell

Voluntary sales
Jurists are in agreement that a pawned property continues to be owned by the
debtor after its delivery to the creditor, as per the above listed H . adı̄th . Thus,
¯
only the debtor has the right to sell the property. However, the non-Shāfic ı̄s
¯
highlight the attachment of the creditor’s right of withholding the pawned prop-
erty from the debtor, as well as the creditor’s first claim to the financial value
of the pawned property. Consequently, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s consider the
debtor’s sale of pawned property to be suspended pending the creditor’s per-
mission as long as the latter’s rights of withholding are valid. Then, once the
creditor’s rights are dropped (e.g. if the underlying debt is repaid), the debtor’s
sale would be executable once concluded.
Thus, jurists agree that the debtor is allowed to sell the pawned property
with the creditor’s permission. If the debtor dies with his property pawned in
lieu of his debts, then his plenipotentiary or heir becomes entitled to selling
53 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.244,253).
the property with the creditor’s permission. Moreover, the authorized debtor
is allowed during his life to appoint a selling agent, whether that agent is the
creditor, the trustee, or a third party.
• The H . anafı̄s mentioned some differences between agencies that are stipu-
lated in the pawning contract itself, and those that are established after
the contract’s conclusion.54 Among those differences, they mentioned that
if the agency was stipulated as a condition in the pawning contract, then
the agent cannot be fired by his principal, and he is not automatically
fired upon the death of the debtor or the creditor. Moreover, such agen-
cies cannot be made more restrictive after the fact, and the agent may
be forced to sell the pawned property if he refuses to act according to his
agency. All those rulings follow from the fact that the agency in this case
was one of the conditions of the pawning contract, and thus it becomes
binding in accordance with the bindingness of that contract. In contrast,
a selling agency that is established after the conclusion of pawning may be
terminated by firing, the death of the debtor or creditor, etc. In the latter
case, the agency was never considered a characteristic of the pawning, and
thus the creditor’s rights were not associated with it.
• The Mālikı̄s explained some of the details pertaining to the debtor’s per-
mission to sell his property.55 Thus, they ruled that the creditor or the
trustee is not permitted to sell the pawned property without the debtor’s
permission. This ruling follows from the fact that the debtor is the only
one who is primarily entitled to sell his property. Then, if the debtor
gives the creditor or the trustee his permission to sell the pawned prop-
erty, they considered the cases where the permission was conditional or
unconditional:
– If the permission to sell was tied to a condition of not repaying the
debt before a certain time, then the authorized party may not sell
it before that time, unless a judge rules that the debt is due for
repayment.
– If a trustee is given an unconditional permission to sell the pawned
property, then he may proceed to sell it without seeking a judge’s
ruling.
– If the creditor is given an unconditional permission to sell the pawned
property, then he may proceed without a judge’s ruling if the per-
mission was issued after the contract. However, if the unconditional
permission was given at the inception of the contract, then he must
check with a judge to avoid suspicion that he forced the debtor to
issue that permission.
In all cases, the sale is deemed executed if it contains no injustice in the
price. However, if the item is sold for less than its value, then the debtor
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.81 onwards).
is permitted to take it back from the buyer at the same price at which he
obtained it, even if the object is sold many times in the meantime.
The Mālikı̄s agreed with the H. anafı̄s that the debtor and creditor are not
authorized unilaterally to fire the agent for selling the pawned property,
and he may not relieve himself from his agency. Thus, the agent may only
be relieved of his agency if the debtor and creditor fire him jointly.

. anbalı̄s agreed with the ruling that the debtor is the
¯
only one entitled to sell his property, but then only with the creditor’s
permission.56 Thus, the debtor and his agent are not permitted to sell
the pawned property without the creditor’s permission, unless the latter
refuses to give his permission thus. In this case, the debtor may appeal to
the judge, who would give him an option to give his permission that the
property be sold, or to absolve the debtor of his debt. This would ensure
that the creditor’s rights are protected. Then, if the creditor refuses to do
either, the judge may give his permission to the debtor to sell the property
in order to repay his debt.
Obligatory sale
We have seen that pawning is essentially an insurance of debt repayment,

whereby if the debtor does not pay his debt at maturity, the pawned prop-
erty may be sold and its price may be used to repay the underlying debt. Under
normal circumstances, the pawned property would be sold by the debtor or his
agent, since the debtor continues to be its owner. Thus, upon maturity of the
underlying debt, if the creditor demands repayment of the debt and the debtor
repays, then fine. Otherwise, if the debtor does not repay voluntarily, or due
to financial difficulties or being away, then all jurists agree that the judge may
force him to repay his debt.
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that the judge may force the
debtor’s agent to sell the property, while the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s did not allow
¯
him to do so. The latter two schools ruled that the agent cannot be forced to
sell, since agency is a voluntary and non-binding contract. Thus, they ruled
that if the debtor is absent or refusing to repay his debt, the judge may sell the
pawned property himself.
Procedurally, the judge must first order the debtor to sell the pawned prop-
erty, then if he refuses, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad
¯
ruled that the judge may sell the property. Thus, they ruled that there is no
need to use various penalties and coercion to force the debtor to sell the pawned
property.57 In contrast, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that the judge is not permitted to
sell the pawned property without the debtor’s consent, but ruled that he should
56 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.130), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.362).
¯ . ¯ ¯
57 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.251), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.134), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.1, p.307), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄),
¯
vol.3, p.330).
coerce him until he sells it himself.58

In this regard, if the debtor has property of the same genus as the underlying
debt, then the debt may be repaid from that property without necessarily forcing
him to sell it. On the other hand, if it is necessary to sell the pawned property
to repay the debt, then the debtor must bear all expenses of the sale, since he is
the owner of that property, and he is the one responsible for repaying his debt.
71.8.2 Selling perishable pawned property

We have previously seen that perishable goods may be pawned. In that con-
text, if the perishable pawned goods were fruits that can be dried and stored,
then they should be dried at the debtor’s expense, with or without his permis-
sion. This follows from the fact that the debtor is responsible for all upkeeping
expenses, which include the cost of drying in this case.
On the other hand, if the perishable pawned goods cannot be dried for
storage, then the creditor is permitted to sell it immediately, since its sale is
the only way to protect its financial value. However, the sale in the latter case
must be authorized by a judge, since the creditor is thus selling the property
of another. Thus, if the creditor sells the goods without having the debtor’s or
the judge permission, then he must guarantee the goods.
Then if the goods are sold and the underlying debt is matured, the debt is
immediately repaid from the price. If the debt is not yet matured when the
goods are sold, then the price becomes an object of pawning until the maturity
date.
In this regard, even if it is known that the debt will mature before the
pawned goods perish, the perishable property may still be sold, and the price
replaces it as the object of pawning. This ruling applies whether or not selling
the pawned property was stipulated as a condition of the pawning.59
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s argued in the last case that if the pawned property
¯
was known only to perish after the debt is matured, then the ruling must depend
on whether or not its sale was stipulated as a condition of the pawning. If it was
stipulated thus, then the pawning is valid, and the condition must be satisfied by
selling the property and making its price the object of pawning. However, if the
sale was not stipulated as a condition of pawning, then the majority of Shāfic ı̄s
¯
ruled that the pawning is valid, and the property should not be sold prior to
maturity of the debt. Thus, the pawning would remain the same according to
this decision, and if the property were to perish, then it would not longer play
the role of insurance of debt repayment.60
58 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.148), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.357,359), ’Ibn Al-
. .
59 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol6, p.148), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.157), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
. .
vol.4, p.341), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.308), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
60 The minority opinion of the Shāfic ı̄s, which is the opinion of the majority of Hanbalı̄s, is
¯ .
that the pawning is valid, and the pawned property may be sold when it is about to perish.
The latter was based on conventional practice, and the fact that the pawning debtor certainly
did not intend to waste his property. Thus, since the only way to protect the property in this
71.8.3 Priority claims of the creditor

All jurists with the exception of the Z.āhirı̄s ruled that the creditor has a prior-
ity claim to the price of property pawned with him over other creditors of the
debtor, whether the debtor is dead or alive.61 This ruling is derived from the
attachment of the creditor’s rights to the pawned property, and the establish-
ment of pawning as a form of insurance of repayment of its underlying debt.
Further proofs are provided by the unanimous ruling that the debtor is not al-
lowed to deal in the pawned property without the creditor’s permission, and the
non-Shāfic ı̄ ruling that the creditor has a right to withhold the property from
¯
the pawning debtor.
Thus, if the debtor’s property is insufficient to repay all his debts, or if his
estate is put under legal control (h.ajr, which is allowed for all jurists with the
exception of ’Abū H . anı̄fa) due to declaring bankruptcy, then the creditor is
the first to collect his rights from the price or value of the pawned property.
Similarly, if the pawned property was guaranteed by any transgressor party, the
creditor would have a first claim to the compensation in value or kind.
In this regard, other creditors must act as residual claimants for any increase
of the price over the underlying debt of the pawning. Those other creditors
cannot complain, since the pawned property is tied to that particular creditor’s
right and the debtor’s liability. Thus, the creditor in the pawning has precedence
over other creditors by having a right to the specific pawned property as well
as the debtor’s liability, while the other creditors only have a right established
as a debtor liability.
If the price of the pawned property exceeds its underlying debt, then the
primary creditor is repaid in full, and the excess over the debt is distributed
equally to all other creditors. On the other hand, if the pawned property’s price
was smaller than the underlying debt, then the primary creditor would collect
all of the price, and compete with the other creditors for the rest of the debt.
In this regard, the underlying debt is repaid from the price if it has matured.
However, if the debt is not yet matured, and the pawned property was sold for
some reason (e.g. to prevent it from perishing), then the price is established as
the object of pawning in place of the sold property, until the debt matures.
71.8.4 Transfer of ownership to the creditor

Jurists have agreed that if the creditor stipulates a condition that the pawned
property becomes his (or is thus sold to him) if the debt matures but is not paid,
then that condition is deemed defective based on the explicit H
. adı̄th that forbids
¯
this transaction.62 Thus, ’Imām Mālik said: “The meaning of the H . adı̄th , and
¯
case is by selling it, it is implicitly understood that this is what the contract implies. This
was deemed by Al-Rāfic ı̄in Al-Sharh. Al-S . aghı̄r as the majority opinion, and Al-’Isnawı̄ ruled
¯ ¯
accordingly.
61 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.153), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
. ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.134), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.404 onwards).
¯
62 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.383), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324 onwards), Al-Bājı̄ Al-
’Andalusı̄ (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.5, p.239), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.4, p.235 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b
¯ ¯
Allāh knows best, is that the debtor should not be barred from releasing his
pawned property, and the prohibition in the H . adı̄th implies that the forbidden
¯
practice is defective”. Al-’Azhariy agreed with Mālik’s interpretation of the
H. adı̄th , and so did c Abdul-Razzāq ibn Muc ammar.
¯
Thus, the H . adı̄th means that the creditor does not become the owner of the
¯
pawned property if it is not released from pawning at the date of maturity of
the underlying debt. Then, if the pawned property perishes, the creditor’s right
remains intact, and the debtor bears the loss, since he is entitled to the output
of the pawned property and responsible for its expenses.
In this regard, Al-Nawawı̄ and commentators on Al-Minhāh ruled that if
it is stipulated in the pawning that the pawned property is considered sold to
the creditor when the underlying debt matures, then the pawning contract is
rendered defective by its timing, and the sales contract is rendered defective by
its forwarding. He thus ruled that the pawned property is considered a trust
prior to maturity of the underlying debt, by virtue of the defective pawning
receipt, and then becomes guaranteed after maturity, by virtue of the defective
sale.
In contrast, the H . anbalı̄ jurist ’Abū Al-Kh attāb, and some H . anafı̄ jurists,
¯ ..
ruled that pawning is not rendered defective by this condition. Rather they
interpreted the H . adı̄th to say that the transfer of ownership to the creditor is
¯
negated, but the pawning itself remains valid. Moreover, they argued, if the
debtor accepted the pawning with that condition, he clearly would accept it
without the condition.
However, the H . anbalı̄ ’Ibn Qudāmah supported the earlier opinion by ar-
guing that if the pawning is established with a defective condition, it is itself
rendered defective, in analogy to the case of stipulating a time period for the
pawning. In this regard, he argued that the H . adı̄th does not mention whether
¯
or not the condition is stipulated at the inception of the contract, and thus
cannot be used as a proof against the contract’s defectiveness.
71.8.5 Third party entitlement after sale

The H . anafı̄s ruled that if a pawned property is sold, and then discovered to
belong to a party other than the pawning debtor, then we need to consider two
cases:63
• If the pawned property was intact when the real owner finds out, then
he is entitled to take it if he wishes, since it is his property and he has
no liabilities that prevent him from regaining its possession. In this case,
the buyer has the option of seeking compensation for the price from the
seller, or seeking compensation from the creditor if he received the price.
In this case, the realization that the property belonged to another party
negated the sale, and hence whatever the buyer paid is no longer viewed

63¯ ¯
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.223), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
71.9. DELIVERY OF PAWNED PROPERTY 177
as a price. Thus, since the creditor gained possession of the price as such,
he must thus give it back, and its receipt must be legally nullified.
In this regard, if the seller is a holding trustee, then he may demand com-
pensation for the price from the pawning debtor after the price is returned
to the buyer. This follows from the fact that the trustee is considered the
debtor’s selling agent, and deserves compensation for whatever he paid to
the creditor.
• If the pawned property had already perished, then its owner may demand
compensation from the debtor (who thus usurped his property and pawned
it), demand compensation from the trustee (who thus transgressed by
selling and delivering his property), or demand compensation from the
buyer (since his property perished in his possession). Then, if he seeks
and receives compensation from the pawning debtor, the sale and debt
repayment would be considered valid, since the pawning debtor becomes
retroactively the owner of the property by paying compensation to its true
owner. Thus, he would have pawned his own property, and sold his own
property, rendering those transactions valid.
The sale is also executed if the true owner seeks compensation from
the seller-trustee, since the trustee would be retroactively considered the
owner of the property by paying the compensation to the true owner.
Thus, the trustee would have sold his own property. Then, the trustee
may in turn seek compensation either from the pawning debtor, for whom
he acted as an agent, in which case the sale and the debt repayment are
deemed executed. On the other hand, the trustee may seek compensation
from the creditor for the price (not the value) of the pawned property,
by virtue of having collected an illegal price. The price is illegal for the
creditor since the trustee is now considered the owner of the property,
and hence he is the one entitled to the price and not the creditor. Thus,
the creditor only received the price because the trustee thought that the
property belonged to the debtor rather than belonging to himself, and
that understanding was later negated. Then, once the trustee seeks com-
pensation from the creditor, repayment of the underlying debt is negated,
and the creditor may once more demand repayment of the underlying debt
from the debtor.
Finally, if the true owner seeks compensation from the buyer of the pawned
property, then the buyer may seek compensation from the trustee, since he
sold him that property. The trustee may then, in turn, seek compensation
from the debtor, since he has the ultimate liability. In this case, if the
price was already delivered to the creditor, the debt repayment is valid.
71.9 Delivery of pawned property

We have seen that the non-Shāfic ı̄s recognize a permanent right for the creditor
¯
to withhold the pawned property until the underlying debt is repaid. This
withholding is understood to give an incentive to the debtor to repay his debt

so that he may regain possession of his pawned property, and extract usufruct
thereof. In addition, they recognize the creditor’s right to demand repayment
of the underlying debt when it matures, while continuing to hold the pawned
property.64
Then, if the underlying debt is terminated, or if the pawning is terminated,
the creditor must deliver the pawned property to its owner. In this regard, the
underlying debt may be terminated in one of many ways, including absolution
from the debt, receiving it as a gift, repaying it, using it as a price when buying
another property from the debtor, or transferring it to a third party.
Debt termination
Thus, if the creditor continues to hold the pawned property after the debt or
the pawning is terminated, the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that he would thus
¯
hold it as a deposit.65 In contrast, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that the creditor would
be holding the pawned property thus as a deposit if the debt was terminated
by absolution or gift. On the other hand, he ruled by juristic approbation
that if the debt was terminated through repayment, being used as a price in
buying another property from the debtor, or transfer to a third party, then
the creditor’s possession continues to be a possession of guaranty. Thus, if the
pawned property were to perish after the debt is terminated in one of the latter
ways, it would be cancelled against the smaller of its value and the underlying
debt. ’Abū H. anı̄fa thus differentiated between those two cases based on the fact
that absolution and gifts would terminate the debt irrevocably, thus eliminating
the need for guaranteeing the pawned property. In contrast, repayment does
not drop the debt, but rather establishes an equal debt on the creditor which
thus prevents him from demanding repayment any longer, and the two debts
mutually cancel each other (in a muqās..sah). In this regard, if the debt remains
established as a liability on the debtor, the resulting guaranty of the pawned
property must also remain.66
The Mālikı̄s distinguished in this context between the cases of pawned prop-
erties that can be hidden (e.g. jewelry or sailing ships) and those that are easily
observable.67 In the first case, they ruled that the creditor must return the
pawned property to the debtor as soon as the underlying debt is terminated,
otherwise he must continue to guarantee it. They based this ruling on the view
that the pawned property after repayment of the underlying debt cannot be
considered analogous to deposits, since deposits are meant to benefit the de-
positor alone, while pawning benefits both parties. On the other hand, if the
creditor is willing to deliver the pawned property to the debtor, but the latter
requests that the creditor keep it, then it becomes a trust.
64 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.198).

65 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, p,397), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.136).
66 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, ¯ ¯ ¯
. p.243), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
67 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.253), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324).
Pawning termination
The pawning may be terminated in a number of ways, including absolution,
gifts, repayment of the underlying debt, or voiding of the pawning prior to the
termination or dropping of the underlying debt. Moreover, a pawning may be
terminated if it is discovered that there was in fact no underlying debt at its
inception.
• Once the pawning is terminated, then all jurists agree that the pawn-
ing will have no further consequences if the creditor returns the pawned
property to the debtor.
• However, if the pawned property remains in the creditor’s possession after

the pawning is terminated, then the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that it
¯
would be held as a trust, regardless of how the pawning was terminated
(i.e. regardless of whether or not the underlying debt continues to exist,
and whether or not there was an underlying debt at the inception).
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that the pawned property would be held in a possession
of trust if the debtor and creditor agree that there was no underlying debt
at the inception of the pawning.
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that if the debtor and creditor agree that there was no
debt at the inception of the pawning, but only after the pawned property
had perished, then the creditor’s guaranty of the property must remain
intact.68 On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s differed in opinion for the case
where the debtor and creditor agree thus while the property is still intact,
and then the property perishes. In the latter case, some ruled that the
pawning is voided, and the pawned property is considered to be held by
the creditor in a possession of trust, while others ruled that the creditor’s
guaranty remains as long as the property is in his possession. Of the two
opinions, the first one seems more valid.
We have already discussed under “debt termination” the various opinions
in cases where the pawning is terminated through means other than mu-
tual agreement that the underlying debt did not exist at the inception of
the pawning.
Delivery timing
The debtor must repay his debt first, and then the creditor must deliver the
pawned property to him, in analogy to the case of sales where the price must be
delivered first and then the object of sale. This ruling follows from the fact that
the creditor’s right is satisfied through repayment of the debt, and the pawning
debtor’s right is satisfied through delivery of his pawned property, thus requiring
the above mentioned sequencing to ensure equity between the two parties.69
((H
69 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H. anafı̄), vol.8, pp.198,200).
Thus, if the pawning debtor repays part of the debt, all four Sunnı̄ schools of
jurisprudence agree that the entire pawned property would remain in pawning.70
This ruling follows from the fact that the entire pawned property is considered
to be held by the creditor as insurance for the repayment of the underlying
debt. In this regard, the right to hold that property is not divisible, and is in
fact attached to every part of the debt. Hence, no part of the pawned property
is released from pawning until the entire debt is repaid, regardless of whether
or not the pawned property is physically divisible.
Delivery location
The H . anafı̄s differentiated in this regard between pawned properties that are
costly and cumbersome to transport, and those that are not:71
• Thus, if the pawned property is costly and cumbersome to transport,

and he asked the debtor to repay him in a city other than the location
of the pawning, the debt should be repaid thus, but the creditor is not
responsible to bring the pawned property to that location. In this case, the
creditor is only required to facilitate legal delivery of the pawned property
in the sense of giving the pawning debtor full access to it. This ruling
follows from the fact that transporting the pawned property in this case
is costly and cumbersome for the creditor, and the pawning contract does
not require him to endure such hardship.
• If the pawned property was virtually costless to transport, then the cred-
itor is required to bring it to the debt repayment location. This ruling
follows from the fact that all locations are considered the same for easily
transportable properties with regards to the rights of receipt and deliv-
ery. Thus, the location of repayment is irrelevant in pawning such trans-
portable properties, in analogy to the ruling for salam contracts.
• In addition, the classical ruling if the debt is repaid in the same city as the
pawning is that the creditor must deliver the pawned property, whether
or not it is costly to do so.
However, ’Ibn c Abidı̄n noted that this last ruling is debatable, since the
creditor is in fact required only to give the debtor access to his property,
and not necessarily required to transport it. In fact, he added, that clas-
sical opinion is in contradiction with the statement in Al-Bazzāziyyah: “If
transportation of the pawned property is costless and effortless, then the
creditor must bring it, otherwise if it is costly and cumbersome to do so
(e.g. if it must be transported to another location), then he is not required
to bring it”.
70 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.354), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.63
. ¯ .
onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.153), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.200), ’Ibn
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.272), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.141), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.361).
¯
71 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.198), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.343 onwards).
.
71.9.1 Rulings for defective pawning

We have seen previously that the most important ruling for valid pawning is
the association of the pawned property with the right of the named creditor in
the pawning contract, to the exclusion of other creditors of the named debtor.
The H . anafı̄s also add the important rulings that the creditor thus has the right
to withhold the property from the debtor, and the responsibility to guarantee
it.
On the other hand, jurists of the four schools agreed that invalid and defec-
tive pawning has no legal status if the pawned property continues to exist. In
particular, the creditor would not have the right to withhold the property from
the debtor, who may thus recall it. If the creditor were to prevent the debtor
from recalling his property in this case, he would be considered a usurper who
thus guarantees the property with its equivalent if it is fungible, or its value if
it is non-fungible.
On the other hand, jurists differed in their rulings regarding the object of a
non-valid pawning if it had perished:
• The H. anafı̄s ruled in this case (e.g. in pawning an unidentified part of a

property) that the property would perish as a pawned property.72 In other
words, they ruled that it would cancel against the smaller of its value and
the underlying debt. This is the more correct H . anafı̄ opinion.
However, Al-Karkhı̄ ruled that the property would thus perish in a pos-
¯
session of trust. He based his ruling on the fact that the pawning was
not valid, and hence the creditor’s possession was a possession of trust
in analogy to deposits, since he received the property with its owner’s
consent.
The H . anafı̄s also ruled that the creditor has priority over other creditors
for repayment of his debt from the pawned property if the debtor dies,
whether the pawning is valid or defective.
• The Mālikı̄s generally agreed with the H . anafı̄s in this case. Thus, they
ruled that prior to repayment of the underlying debt, the creditor in a
defective pawning has priority over other creditors to extract repayment
from the pawned property.73 Moreover, they ruled that the status of
pawned property that perishes in the creditor’s possession is the same
whether the pawning is valid or defective. Finally, they ruled that this
priority right establishes the creditor’s right to withhold the object of a
defective pawning. However, that right does not imply that he has the
right to demand receipt of that object of a defective pawning from the
debtor.
• the Shāfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s ruled generally that valid and defective contracts
¯
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.163), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.365,374).
c
73 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.237,241,247).
have the same rulings with regards to guaranty.74 In this regard, they
argued that if a valid contract (e.g. a sale or a simple loan) requires
guaranty after delivery, then the guaranty must also be required in the
defective counterpart of that contract. For instance, the received object
of a sale is guaranteed, whether or not the sale is valid. On the other
hand, if the valid version of a contract (e.g. pawning, gift, or lease) does
not require guaranty, then the defective version does not require it either.
In those cases, the holder of a property would be holding it in lieu of its
owner, and thus those contracts do not impose guaranty on the holder.
Consequently, they ruled that the creditor does not guarantee pawned
property in his possession against perishing, whether the pawning is valid
or defective (e.g. if the pawned property is forbidden, unknown, non-
existent, non-deliverable, or unidentified).
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
p.329), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.381,385).
Chapter 72
Growth of pawned property
While jurists agree that any increase or output of a pawned property belongs to
the pawning debtor, they vary in the degree to which they include growth and
output of a pawned property in the pawning:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that all contiguous increases in the pawned property
(e.g. fruits, wool, milk) and all separate growth thereof (e.g. offspring)
are considered part of the pawning.1 They based this ruling on the view
that both types of growth are derivative of the originally pawned property,
and the creditor’s right to the pawned property is binding, and thus that
right extends to the derivative increases in the pawned property.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that separate
¯
non-derivative growth (e.g. rental payments for real estate or land) belong
exclusively to the debtor, and do not become part of the pawning. Thus,
the underlying debt is not associated with such increases, since they result
from a contractual agreement between the owner of the pawned property
and another party, and thus are not derivative of the property itself. Thus,
the owner alone is entitled to this output or growth in accordance with
the contract.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that all contiguous and non-separable growth in the
pawned property (e.g. fat), as well as all non-contiguous offspring or
product of the property (e.g. offspring, palm shoots), are considered part
of the pawning. Growing wool on the backs of sheep is also considered
part of the pawning if it existed on the back of the sheep at the inception
of the contract.2
On the other hand, they ruled that any increases that are not part of the
same form as pawned property are not considered part of the pawning,
1 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.240), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.365,370), Al-
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.94), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.2,
¯
p.62), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.152).
2 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.244), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.324), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d
¯ .
((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.272).
183
184 CHAPTER 72. GROWTH OF PAWNED PROPERTY
whether they are derivative of the pawned property (e.g. fruits of trees,
milk) or not (e.g. rental payments).
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that contiguous growth such as fat, increase in size,
¯
or growth of fruits, is considered part of the pawning. They based this
ruling on the view that such growth belongs to the pawned property and
cannot be identified in isolation.3 On the other hand, they ruled that any
separate or separately identifiable growth (e.g. offspring, wool, hair, milk,
eggs, and rental payments) are not considered part of the pawning. They
based this ruling on the above mentioned H . adı̄th of ’Abū Hurayrah: “A
¯
pawned property does not become property of the creditor if the debt is
not paid at maturity; and the debtor remains its owner who is thus entitled
to its output and responsible for its expenses”. In this regard, the types of
growth listed here are part of the output of the pawned property, to which
the owner is entitled. Thus, since pawning does not transfer ownership of
the property or its usufruct, separate growth of the property belongs to
the original owner, in contrast to the ruling for lease contracts.
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled that all types of increase in pawned property is con-
sidered a part of the pawning in the possession of the creditor or his agent.
Thus, if and when the pawned property is sold to repay the underlying
debt, all such increases, contiguous or not, are to be sold with it.4 They
based this ruling on the view that the pawned property was tied to the
underlying debt through the pawning contract, and thus any increase in
the pawned property is also tied to that debt, in analogy to the ruling for
sales. In this regard, contiguous and separate growth are treated the same
way since they are both derivative of the pawned property, and hence the
legal status of the latter is extended to the growth.
In summary, the H . anbalı̄ school is the most general in including all growth
and output of the pawned property in the pawning. The second most general
school is that of the H
. anafı̄s, who include all derivative growth, contiguous and
separate, in the pawning. Third come the Mālikı̄s who only include in the pawn-
ing separate growth that cannot be classified as output (e.g. offspring, palm tree
shoots, and wool that had been growing since the inception of pawning), and
exclude separate output that can be viewed as rental payment or product of
land. The most restrictive of the four schools is that of the Shāfic ı̄s, who only
¯
include in pawning qualitative increases, and exclude any separately identified
growth.
72.1 Adding to the pawning or the debt

Most jurists allow the debtor to add a second property to that already pawned
in lieu of his debt, so that both properties would jointly be pawned in lieu of
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.310 onwards).
4 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, p.388 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.326).
.
72.1. ADDING TO THE PAWNING OR THE DEBT 185
that debt. This ruling was based on the view that such an addition to the
pawned property can only increase the insurance of debt repayment, which is
the essential objective of a pawning contract.
In contrast, Zufar ruled that such addition to the pawned property is not
allowed, since it leads to lack of identification of the pawned properties’ shares in
the debt. Thus he reasoned that the second pawned property must be associated
with a portion of the debt, and that portion must thus be released from the
first pawning. But that portion of the debt is by necessity unidentified, and
such lack of identification renders the pawning defective in his view. However,
this argument was refuted by asserting that lack of identification of portions
of the debt does not alter the validity of the pawning. In other words, the
underlying debt may be divided between the original pawned property and the
newly pawned one in proportion to their values on the day of receipt.
On the other hand, there are two different opinions regarding adding a second
debt to the pawning, rendering the received property to be pawned in lieu of
both debts:
• ’Abū H . anı̄fa, Muh.ammad, the H . anbalı̄s, and in one of two opinions, Al-
Shāfic ı̄ ruled that this practice is not permissible. This ruling is based
¯
on the view that adding a second debt to the pawning is tantamount to
effecting a second pawning, i.e. pawning an already pawned property,
which is not permitted since the first debt was associated with the entire
pawned property.
• ’Imām Mālik, ’Abū Yūsuf, ’Abū Thawr, Al-Muznı̄, and ’Ibn Al-Mundhir
¯ ¯
ruled that adding a second debt to the pawning is permissible, based on the
permissibility of adding a second pawned property to the pawning. In this
regard, they ruled that adding the second debt is tantamount to voiding
the first pawning, and establishing a new pawning with the property being
pawned in lieu of the combined debt. This dissolution of the first pawning
and subsequent establishment of a new one is permissible for all jurists.5
5 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.241), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.372), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6,p.95), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.62), Al-
¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.309), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.347 onwards).
Chapter 73
Pawning Contract
Termination
A pawning contract may be terminated in many ways (e.g. absolution, debt

repayment, gift, etc.). In what follows, we enumerate the means by which a
pawning contract may be terminated.
1. Non-Shāfic ı̄ jurists ruled that the pawning is terminated if the creditor
¯
returns the pawned property to the debtor. They based this ruling on
the view that pawning is a form of insurance of debt repayment, which
insurance does not exist if the pawned property is returned to the debtor’s
possession. Thus, the pawning would be deemed terminated in this case.
Similarly, the non-Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the debtor lends the pawned prop-
¯
erty to the creditor, or to a third party, the pawning is thus terminated.
2. If the underlying debt is fully repaid, the pawning is terminated.
3. If the judge forces the debtor to sell the property, or sells it if the debtor
refuses to, then the creditor should be repaid from the pawned property’s
price, and the pawning is thus dissolved.
In contrast, jurists differ over the case of voluntary sale of the pawned
property.
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that if the debtor sells the pawned property with
the creditor’s permission, then the creditor’s right is attached to the
property’s price if the debt had matured. If the property is sold
prior to maturity of the underlying debt, then ’Abū H . anı̄fa and
Muh.ammad ruled that the creditor’s right is also attached to the
price in this case, whereby the price becomes the object of pawning.
They based this ruling on the view that the debtor thus sold the
property with the creditor’s permission, and hence the latter’s right
must be associated with the price, in analogy to the case where the
debt is matured.
187
188 CHAPTER 73. PAWNING CONTRACT TERMINATION
• The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H

. anbalı̄s ruled in the latter case that the
¯
pawning is invalidated if the pawned property is sold with the cred-
itor’s permission. In this case, they ruled that the debtor is not
indebted for the price he receives from the sale, but the underlying
debt remains intact without a pawning to ensure its repayment.1
4. If the debtor is absolved of the underlying debt in any way, including

the transfer of his liability to another creditor, the pawning is terminated.
Also, if the creditor takes some property (other than the pawned property)
as repayment of his debt, then the pawned property is thus released of the
pawning.2
5. The creditor may void the pawning unilaterally, even if the debtor disap-
proves of its voiding. This ruling follows since the right associated with
the pawning belongs to the creditor, and the contract is permissible for
him but not binding on him. In contrast, the debtor is bound by the
pawning, and thus may not void it unilaterally.3
In this regard, the H
. anafı̄s ruled that the pawning is voided by the creditor
after he returns the property to the debtor. They based this ruling on
the view that pawning only becomes binding through receipt, and hence
its voiding also requires receipt, which is accomplished by returning the
pawned property to the debtor.
The Mālikı̄s ruled that if the creditor leaves the pawned property in the
debtor’s possession, until the latter sold it, then the pawning is invalidated.
They based this ruling on the view that leaving the property with him for
such a long time is tantamount to giving him control over the property,
which is the essence of voiding the pawning contract.4 Similarly, they ruled
that the pawning is terminated if the debtor sold the pawned property with
the creditor’s permission after the latter had received it, in which case the
debt will remain intact, but would not be insured by a pawning.
6. The Mālikı̄s also ruled that the pawning is invalidated if the pawned prop-
erty was not yet received, and the debtor dies, is declared bankrupt, comes
under the demands of other creditors to repay their debts, or falls into ter-
minal insanity or illness.5 This ruling follows from their view that pawning
becomes binding following its conclusion through offer and acceptance.
. anafı̄s ruled that a pawning is invalidated if either the
debtor or the creditor were to die prior to receipt. They also ruled that
the contract is voided if the debtor declares bankruptcy.
1 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.403), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.242).
2 Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . Al-Sh ¯
irbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.141).
¯
3 Al-Kh atı̄bAl-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.141).
¯ . ¯ ¯
189

. anbalı̄s ruled that the pawning is not inval-
¯
idated if either the debtor or the creditor dies before delivery, nor is it in-
validated if either party becomes insane or the debtor declares bankruptcy.
On the other hand, all jurists agree that death of either party or the
declaration of debtor bankruptcy does not void the pawning if such events
occur after the pawned property was delivered to the creditor.
7. Jurists agree that the pawning contract is terminated if the pawned prop-
erty perishes, since the object of the contract would thus cease to exist.
This ruling is adopted both by the non-H . anafı̄s who consider the creditor’s
possession of the pawned property to be a possession of trust (guaranteed
only against transgression and negligence) and the H . anafı̄s who ruled that
the financial value of the pawned property is guaranteed for the lesser of
its total value and the underlying loan.
8. The pawning is terminated if either the debtor or the creditor rents the
property, gives it as a gift, or sells it to a third party, with the permission
of the other. Moreover, the pawning is terminated if the debtor leases the
property to the creditor, and a new receipt takes place for the lease.
On the other hand, if the creditor sells the property to the debtor does
not terminate the pawning, since the price takes the place of the sold
pawned property as the object of pawning, as we have seen in the chapter
on dealing in pawned property.6

. anafı̄), vol.5, p.364).
Chapter 74
Debtor-Creditor Disputes
In this chapter, we shall discuss the role of a judge or other arbitrator or au-
thority in determining the standards of evidence if the debtor and creditor have
a dispute regarding the pawned property and the underlying debt.
74.1 Disputes over the underlying debt

The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that if the debtor claims that the
¯
underlying debt is smaller than what the creditor claims it to be, then the
debtor’s claim is accepted if supported by his oath. This ruling follows from
the view that the creditor is thus claiming an increase in the amount of the
underlying debt, and the debtor is denying it. As we know, the denier’s claim
is thus accepted if supported by his oath, following the H . adı̄th : “If people’s
¯
claims were accepted, there would be many groundless claims for the lives and
properties of people; that’s why the denier’s claim is accepted if he backs it with
his oath”.1
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the creditor’s claim is accepted up to the
value of the pawned property, and the debtor’s claim is accepted for the rest.
Despite the creditor being a claimant, they argued that the creditor has a case
if the pawned property’s value was larger than the underlying debt claimed by
the debtor. In this regard, they refer to the theoretical rule of ’Imām Mālik
that the party whose claim is accepted based on his oath is the party with the
stronger case. On the other hand, the non-Mālikı̄s did not find the argument
convincing, since the value of the pawned property may very well be smaller
than the underlying debt.
On the other hand, all jurists agree that a dispute over what is pawned (e.g.
if the debtor claims to have pawned only A and the creditor claims that he
1 Narrated by Muslim and Al-Bukhārı̄ on the authority of ’Ibn c Abbas. Another narration
¯
by Al-Bayhaqı̄ is more explicit: “If people’s claims were accepted, there would be many
groundless claims for the lives and properties of people; that is why the claimant needs to
provide a material proof, and the denier’s claim is otherwise accepted if backed by his oath”,
c.f. Al-’Arbac ı̄n Al-Nawawiyyah.
191
192 CHAPTER 74. DEBTOR-CREDITOR DISPUTES
pawned A and B), then the debtor is considered a denier of the creditor’s claim.
Hence, the debtor’s claim will be accepted in this case if supported by his oath.2
74.2 Destruction of the pawned property

If the creditor claims that the pawned property perished, but does not mention
how or why it perished, then all jurists agree that his claim is accepted if backed
by his oath. This ruling follows from the view that the creditor holds the pawned
property in a possession of trust.3 Similarly, they ruled that the creditor’s claim
regarding the amount of the perished pawned property is accepted if backed by
his oath, since the loss is his.4
On the other hand, they agreed that if the debtor and creditor disagree over
the value of pawned property at the contract’s inception, or over whether or
not the pawned property in fact existed at that time, then the debtor’s claim is
accepted if backed by his oath.5 This ruling is thus analogous to disputes over
the amount of property included in the pawning.
74.3 Disputes over receipt

The H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that if the debtor and the creditor disagree over
¯
whether or not the pawned property was received by the creditor, then the
debtor’s claim is accepted if backed by his oath, whether the property was in
fact in the debtor’s or the creditor’s possession. This ruling follows from the view
that the default status of pawning is non-bindingness, and the non-authorization
for the creditor to take possession of the property.
In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that they accept the claim of the party that
actually has possession of the property. Thus, if the property was in the debtor’s
possession, they accept his claim since the default is non-delivery of his prop-
erty to the creditor. On the other hand, if the property was in the creditor’s
possession, then his claim is accepted, since the default is rightful receipt. How-
ever, if they were to disagree over whether or not the debtor gave his permission
to the creditor to take the property (i.e. the debtor says that he did not give
his permission, while the creditor claims to have taken it with his permission),
then the debtor’s claim is accepted, since he is thus the denier of the creditor’s
claim.6
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.174), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.231), ’Ibn Rushd
. . ¯
Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2 p.274 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.325), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-
¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.142), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.316 onwards), ’Ibn
c
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.398 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.339).
3 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6,p.154), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.275), Al-Dardı̄r
. ¯ .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.260), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.138), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.319), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.340).
4 ibid., ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.398), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.174).
.
5 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6,p.174), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.142).
. ¯ . ¯ ¯
6 ibid., Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.321).
.
74.4. DISPUTES OVER THE TIME OF DESTRUCTION 193
74.4 Disputes over the time of destruction

If the creditor claims that the pawned property perished while it was being
utilized, while the debtor claimed that it perished outside the utilization period,
then the H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor’s claim is thus accepted if backed by
his oath. They based their ruling on the view that the debtor is the claimant in
this case, and thus he needs to provide a material proof, otherwise the creditor’s
claim as the denier will be accepted based on his oath.7
74.5 Disputes over the pawned property

The H . anafı̄s ruled that the creditor’s claim is accepted if he claims that a partic-
ular property is the one pawned with him, while the debtor claims that another
property was pawned. This ruling is based on the fact that the creditor is the
holder of the disputed property.8
Similarly, they accept the claim of the creditor if the debtor disputes the
price obtained upon selling the pawned property, or whether or not they should
rely on the market price of similar goods. They based this ruling on the view
that the pawned property is no longer part of the pawning once it is sold, and
creditor guaranty is thus attached to the price. Hence, the debtor is viewed as
the party claiming that the creditor should guarantee more, while the creditor
is denying his claim. Thus, the creditor’s claim should be accepted if backed by
his oath.9
74.6 Disputes over possession

The Mālikı̄s ruled that if the debtor claims that the pawned property should be
held by a trustee, while the creditor claims that he should hold it, then they
accept the debtor’s claim.10
7 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.364).
8 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.347).
9 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.174).
.
Part XI
Settlement (Al-S.ulh.)
195
197
Preliminaries
We shall discuss settlement contracts in four chapters:
1. Definition, legality, types, and cornerstones.
2. Settlement conditions.
3. Legal status of the contract.
4. Factors that invalidate a settlement contract, and the legal status of an

invalid settlement.
Chapter 75
Definition, Legality, and

Cornerstones
75.1 Definition
Settlement refers linguistically to the resolution of disputes. Juristically, it refers
to a contract that resolves a dispute.1 The H . anbalı̄s expressed it differently by
saying that settlement “is a contract that leads to reconciliation between dis-
puting parties. Settlements often reach their objective by compensating the
claimant with less than the disputed claim.2 We are only concerned here with
settlements of financial disputes among people, rather than settlements of dis-
putes between Muslims and their enemies, national leaders and transgressing
citizens, or two disputing spouses.
75.2 Legality
Settling disputes is a highly recommended practice. In this regard, it is accept-
able for a ruler to advise disputing parties to reach a settlement, provided that
he does not force them or pressure them to do so. Thus, if the ruler cannot
discern which party’s claim is valid, he should encourage them to settle their
dispute. However, if he can determine the party with the valid claim, he should
enable that party.
Proofs of the legality of settlement is available in the Qur’ān, the Sunnah,
and consensus:3
1 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.23), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.29),
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.493), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.177), Al-Khat.ı̄b
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shirbı̄ni ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.70).
c
2¯ ¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.476), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.118).
3 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.123), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ . ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.177), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.476), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.378), ’Ibn
199
200 CHAPTER 75. DEFINITION, LEGALITY, AND CORNERSTONES
• Proof from the Qur’ān can be found in the verse: “If a wife fears cruelty
or desertion from her husband, there is no blame on them if they arrange
an amicable settlement; and such settlement is best. . . ” [4:128].
• Proof is also provided in the Sunnah, based on the H . adı̄th that was nar-
¯
rated with a full chain, and with a chain terminated at c Umar: “Settle-
ment of disputes between Muslims are permissible, provided that they do
not render forbidden something that is permissible, or render permissible
something that is forbidden”.4 In this regard, examples of a settlement
to permit what is forbidden include settlements that permit trading in
wine, or that compensate the claimant for more than his claim. On the
other hand, examples of settlements that forbid what is permissible would
include a settlement between a man and his wife that he will not divorce
her, or that he will not have marital relationships with his other wife.
• Jurists have also reached a consensus on the legality of settlements, since
it is one of the most beneficial contracts that lead to the resolution of
disputes and disagreements.5 In this regard, jurists agree that settlements
most often takes place for less than is claimed in the dispute.
The reason for permitting settlements is clearly to protect brotherhood
among Muslims by removing divisive disputes. In this context, one might quote
the H
. adı̄th : “Do not hate one another, envy one another, or cut your relations
¯
with one another; but be Oh slaves of Allāh as brothers”. In another H . adı̄th ,
¯
he (pbuh) said: “After I die, do not return to being unbelievers, killing one
another”. Indeed, a certain amount of lying is permitted if it assists in resolv-
ing disputes and restoring friendship. In this context, Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim
¯
narrated a H . adı̄th : “The one who tries to remove disputes and animosity by
¯
transmitting good comments to disputing parties is not considered a liar”.
75.3 Types of settlement

Settlements can be used to resolve disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims
with whom they have a truce or treaty, between transgressors and trustees,
between two disputing spouses, between parties of non-financial disputes, and
between parties of financial disputes. In this chapter, we are mainly concerned
with settlements of financial disputes.
The Mālikı̄s classified settlements into two categories: (i) settlements through
absolution and dropping of claims, which is permitted unconditionally, and (ii)
settlements for a compensation, which is permissible unless it leads to forbidden
practices. The second type of settlement inherits the legal status of sales.
4 Al-Tirmidhı̄ considered this a good and valid Hadı̄th. We have given a full analysis of
¯ . ¯
this H . adı̄th in the part on deposit contracts, as narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-H . ākim and ’Ibn
¯
H. ibbān on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, and by Al-Tirmidh ı̄, ’Ibn Mājah and Al-H . ākim on
¯
the authority of Amr ibn Awf, c.f. Al-H
c c
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.122),
¯
’Ibn H . ajar (, p.249), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.254).
5 Indeed, that is why a¯ certain amount of lying is permitted in effecting settlements.
75.3. TYPES OF SETTLEMENT 201
Moreover, financial settlements may be classified into (i) settlements between

the claimant and the claimed debtor, or (ii) settlements between the claimant
and a third party. For each of those two types, the settlement may be classified
into one of three types:
1. A settlement may be reached for less than the contested claim, while the
claimed debtor may admit that the larger claim is valid. Muslims are in
consensus that such settlements are permissible.6
If such settlements are concluded by delivering a less valuable property in
place of the claimed property, then the contract is in fact a sale in which
one property is exchanged for another with both parties’ consent. Thus,
preemption rights (shufc ah) apply if the compensation is real estate, the
¯
compensation may be returned based on defects, conditional options may
be included, ignorance of the compensation would render the settlement
defective,7 and the compensation must be deliverable.
If a claim for property is settled by delivery of usufruct (e.g. the right to
dwell in a house), then the contract is in fact a lease, in which property is
exchanged for usufruct. Thus, the lease must be timed, and it would be
voided if either party dies during the lease period. In this regard, contracts
are classified based on their consequences, rather than their names.
2. Alternatively, the claimed debtor may deny the validity of the claim, but
settle for part of the claim in any case. This is the most common form
of settlements. It is deemed permissible for the Mālikı̄s, H . anafı̄s, and
H. anbalı̄s, and impermissible for the Sh āfic ı̄s and ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Laylā.8 In this
¯
regard, those who permit this type of settlement require that the claimant
believes that his claim is valid, while the other party denies the validity of
the claim, thus settling for part of the claim only to end the dispute and
animosity.9 For instance, A may claim that B owes him a house, while B
denies the claim. Then A may demand that B takes an oath to support
his denial. To avoid taking the oath, and to end the dispute and animosity
between them, A and B may continue to support their respective positions,
but agree to reach a settlement for a sum of money that B delivers to A.10
The majority of jurists rendered this type of settlement permissible based
on the verse “and such settlement is best” [4:128], as well as the H
. adı̄th :
¯
6 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.139), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.40), ’Ibn Al-
¯ . .
Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.23), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.30), ’Ibn Rush d
¯
Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.290), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.309), Al-Kh at.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.177), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.333), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.482), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.118), Abd Al-Gh
¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.2, p.163), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.238).
7 But ignorance of the claim does not render it defective. This follows since ignorance of
the agreed-upon compensation may lead to further disputes, while ignorance of the settled
claim does not.
8 ibid., Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.179 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, p.467).
9 ’Ibn Qudāmah¯ . ¯ ¯
(, vol.4, p.478), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.120).
10 ’Ibn Hubayrah ((Hanbalı̄), vol.1, p.174).
.
“Settlements between Muslims are valid, provided that they do not permit
what is forbidden or forbid what is permitted”. Thus, they ruled that
all settlements are permissible unless there is a proof to the contrary.
Indeed, c Umar (mAbpwh) said: “Encourage settlements among disputing
parties, for legal rulings to settle such disputes can establish animosity”.
Also, ’Abū H . anı̄fa said: “Settlement of denied claims is one of the most
permissible contracts”, meaning that it is permissible and preferred as a
means of settling disputes and ending animosity.
The Shāfic ı̄s and ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Laylā ruled that such settlements are imper-
¯
missible, based on analogy to the impermissible case wherein a man denies
his wife’s claim for divorce in exchange for financial compensation (khulc ),
¯
and then reaches a settlement for a different amount of money. They also
argued that if the claimant was lying, then the settlement would allow him
to take the other party’s property in a “legal” but forbidden way. On the
other hand, they argued, if his claim was in fact valid, and he exchanged
it for something other than what he was entitled to, then the exchange
is invalid in analogy to selling the property of another person. Moreover,
they argued that settlements are in fact a commutative or exchange con-
tract wherein one side never gives a compensation, thus invalidating the
contract in analogy to financial settlement in lieu of the penalty for libel.
Thus, they argued that the claimant in this case would be consuming the
other’s property unlawfully, and falling into his (pbuh) exception of set-
tlements that “permit what is forbidden or forbid what is permissible”. In
the meantime, the other party is seen to give his property only to end the
dispute and animosity, which thus makes the practice similar to paying a
bribe.
The majority of jurists do not agree with this logic. Indeed, they do not
consider settling a disputed claim to be what is meant by “forbidding
what is permitted or permitting what is forbidden”. Rather, this phrase
is understood to refer to settlements that enslave a free person, permit a
forbidden sexual relation, or permit trading in wine or pork. Moreover,
they questioned the minority’s denial of the validity of taking a compen-
sation other than the claim, saying that the claimant is free to take his
established right in any way he wishes.
They also reject the view that the settling party is paying a bribe. Rather,
they view it as a noble means of avoiding the psychological and social trou-
ble of taking the dispute to a court of law. In this regard, Islamic Law does
not forbid people from spending their wealth to protect themselves and
their reputations. Moreover, the claimant is not receiving a bribe, since
he is in fact receiving a compensation for his established right, whether
what the compensation is of the same or different genus, and in the same
or lesser amount than his claim.
3. Finally, the person against whom the claim is made may neither admit
nor deny the claim. In this case, the majority of jurists, including ’Ibn
’Abı̄ Laylā approve of the settlement. However, the Shāfic ı̄s consider set-
¯
tlements in this case to be impermissible. The proofs for each group are
the same as we have discussed in the case of denying the claim. In this
regard, the Shāfic ı̄s do not distinguish between the cases of denying the
¯
claim and saying nothing about it.11
In summary, the H . anafı̄s approve of all three types of settlement. Thus, they
ruled that the compensation given to the claimant in the settlement becomes
his property, and the claim is dropped. This ruling is based on the fact that the
purpose of the settlement contract is legalized as a means of ending disputes,
to fulfill the injunction in the verse: “. . . and do not fall into disputes” [8:46].
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s recognize the right of the claimed debtor to deny
the claim or be silent about it, while agreeing to a settlement to avoid having
to support his denial of the claim with an oath, and to avoid animosity. Thus,
he may keep the claimed property based on his claim that it belongs to him.
In the meantime, the claimant may take possession of what he is given in the
settlement as compensation for what he claims to be his property. Thus, each
of the two parties is treated according to his understanding of the situation.12
75.3.1 Shāfic ı̄ classification

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s classified settlements into two categories, with numerous subcat-
¯
egories thereof. In what follows, we shall discuss those classifications and the
corresponding rulings in some detail.13
Settlement with the claimed debtor

There are two types of such settlements:
1. The person against whom the claim is made may acknowledge the validity
of the claim, and then the two parties may reach a settlement. As we have
seen, all jurists agree that this type of settlement is permissible. However,
there are two further subcategories to be considered:
(a) The claim may be for a non-fungible property. Then, if the set-
tlement involves giving the claimant another non-fungible property,
then there is an implicit sale of the claimed property to the claimed
debtor. Therefore, even though the exchange is given the name “ex-
change settlement”, it is in fact a sale in which all the rulings for sales
apply, including preemption rights, rights to return based on defects,
and prohibition of dealing in the property prior to its receipt. More-
over, if the claimed property and the settlement property are ribawı̄
goods, then all the rules of receipt must be applied. Moreover, other
11 ibid.
12c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.164).
13 Al-Khatı̄b ¯Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.177-182).
¯ . ¯ ¯
rulings for sales apply, such as the various options, becoming defec-
tive based on defective conditions, and becoming defective based on
ignorance or excessive uncertainty.
If the settlement property was usufruct and the claimed property was
a non-fungible, then the contract is in fact a lease, to which all the
rulings of leases apply. On the other hand, if the settlement property
was the usufruct of the very claimed property (e.g. timed usufruct
of a claimed house), then the contract is a simple loan, to which all
of its rulings must apply.
Finally, if the settlement property is a portion of the claimed property
(e.g. a quarter of the claimed car), then the contract is in essence
a gift of the remainder of the property from the claimant to the
possessor. Thus, the rules of gifts (e.g. consent of the recipient, etc.)
must be applied to this case, which is labeled “reduction settlement”,
since the claimant has thus given up part of his claim.
(b) Alternatively, the settlement may be in lieu of a debt. In this case,

the settlement may be validly concluded with a contract name of
settlement, sale, absolution, reduction of debt, or lease. However,
for this settlement to be valid, the claimed debt must be one for
which a compensation (fungible, non-fungible, or usufruct) can be
given. Thus, it is not permissible to settle a liability for the object
of a contract for which no alternative compensation is allowed (e.g.
salam).
The permissibility of settling debts in general is based on the H
. adı̄th
¯
narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of Kac b ibn
¯ c
Mālik (mAbpwh) that “ Abdullāh ibn ’Abı̄ H . adrad (mAbpwh) asked
him in the Masjid to repay a debt he owed him, and their voices got
so loud that the Prophet (pbuh) heard them and opened his door.
The Prophet (pubh) then called for Kac b ibn Mālik, and told him:
‘Give up a portion of the debt’, and Kac b said: ‘I have’. Then the
Prophet (pbuh) said: ‘Then go and collect your debt’.”
2. The Shāfic ı̄s considered a settlement with the claimed property invalid
¯
if the claimed debtor denied the claim, or failed to acknowledge it. For
instance, if the claimant claims that the other party owes him a house,
and the other party does not acknowledge it, but then they settle, the
settlement is deemed by the Shāfic ı̄s to be invalid regardless of which
¯
party gets the house under the settlement. They based this ruling on
the view that if the claimant was lying, then he may get property that
does not belong to him, while if he is truthful, he may be forbidding
himself from taking his rightful property. Thus, they ruled that this case
necessarily qualifies under the category of “forbidding what is permissible
or permitting what is forbidden”.
Settlement with a third party

If one party makes a claim on another, and then a third party comes to settle
the dispute with the claimant, then the settlement may take one of four forms:
1. The third party may claim to be an agent of the claimed debtor, and say
that his principal acknowledges the validity of the claim, but fears mak-
ing his acknowledgement public lest the claimant may take the property
away. Then, they ruled that the settlement between the claimant and
the third party is valid, since claims of agency are permissible in financial
transactions.
2. The third party may settle the claim for a non-fungible property by giving
the claimant a non-fungible property of his own, or by establishing a debt
upon himself. This type of settlement is also deemed to be valid, as if the
third party had bought the claimed property in an explicit sales contract.
3. The claimed debtor may deny the claim, but the third party may say that
he believes the claimant, and proceed to settle the claim himself. This
contract would have the same legal status as buying usurped property
from the usurper. Thus, if the third party is capable of taking the claimed
property from its possessor, the settlement would be valid, otherwise it
would be invalid.
4. If the claimed debtor denied the claim, and the third party did not express
his agreement with the claimant, but proceeded to settle the dispute any-
way, then the settlement is invalid and nugatory. This ruling follows since
that practice is tantamount to buying property from a party for whom
ownership was not established.
Contracts implied by settlements

A settlement may be implicitly classified as one of six contracts:14
1. Implicit sales: If the claimant claims that he owns property in the pos-
session of another, and the claim is settled for money, then the contract
is in fact a sale. The technical term for this contract is “commutative
settlement”.
2. Implicit gifts: If the claim for a property is settled for part of that property,
the rest of the property is in fact a gift from the claimant.
3. Implicit leases: If the claim for a non-fungible property is settled for the
timed usufruct of a different property (e.g. residence in a known house for
a known period of time), then the contract is in fact a lease.
14 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.177-179), ’Ibn Hubayrah ((Hanbalı̄), vol.1, p.169
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
onwards).
4. Implicit simple loans: If the claim for a non-fungible property is settled

for the usufruct of the same property, then the contract is in fact a simple
loan (timed or unconditional).
5. Implicit absolution: If the claim for a fungible debt is settled for a portion
thereof, then the contract is in fact an absolution of liability for the rest
of the debt.
6. Implicit salam: If the claim is settled for a debt established as a liability

(e.g. a dress of specific characteristics permissible for salam), then the
contract is in fact a forward contract (salam).
75.4 Cornerstones of Settlement

The H. anafı̄s stipulate offer and acceptance as the cornerstones of a settlement
contract. Thus, if an offer (e.g. “I settle your claim for such and such”) and
acceptance (e.g. “I accept”) are uttered, then the settlement contract is con-
cluded.15 On the other hand, the non-H . anafı̄s stipulated four cornerstones for
the settlement contract: (i) two contracting parties (settlers), (ii) contract lan-
guage (offer and acceptance), (iii) underlying claim, and (iv) settlement com-
pensation.
15 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.40), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.23), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.493).
Chapter 76
Settlement Conditions
There are a number of conditions for the settlement contract, pertaining to

the contract language, the contracting parties, the underlying claim, and the
settlement compensation.
76.1 Contract Language Conditions

A settlement contract must be concluded with a valid language of offer and
acceptance. The valid language may use the term “settlement”, or if the context
allows it may use the terms “absolution”, “claim reduction”, etc.
76.2 Conditions for the settling party

The settling party must satisfy the following conditions:1
1. The settling party must be eligible to perform the transaction. Thus,
settlements of insane individuals and small non-discerning children are not
valid. However, H . anafı̄s do not require the settling party to be of legal
age, and hence consider settlements by an authorized discerning child to
be valid if they are purely beneficial, or if there is no apparent harm in the
transaction. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s required the settling party to be of
¯
legal age, and thus invalidate settlements of children below the legal age,
even if they are discerning.
2. The settlement must not be clearly harmful for the benefits of a young
child, whether the child is a claimed debtor, or his guardian is a claimant
on his behalf.
Thus, if the father of a child settles a claimant’s claim on the child’s prop-
erty, then the settlement is valid if the claimant can provide material proof,
and the father settled for the value of the claim or slightly more. This
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.40 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
207
208 CHAPTER 76. SETTLEMENT CONDITIONS
ruling follows since this type of settlement is a commutative contract, and

the father is permitted to engage in such contracts at the correct compen-
sation or slightly more. However, if the claimant had no material proof,
then the settlement is not permissible. In the latter case, settlement would
be tantamount to voluntarily contributing the child’s property, which is
purely harmful and thus not permissible for the father. In this case, the
father may settle out of his own property, thus not harming the child’s
property, while benefiting the child by terminating the dispute.
Conversely, if the father of a small child claims that a person owes some
property to his son, then the settlement is not valid if the father has a
material proof (e.g. a bond) of the claim, and the settling party settles
for less than the established claim. This ruling follows since agreeing to
a claim reduction involves a contribution out of the child’s property, for
which the father is not authorized. On the other hand, if the claim is set-
tled at or slightly below the claimed amount or value, then the settlement
is valid. In the latter case, the settlement is tantamount to a sale, and the
father is authorized to engage in sales on behalf of his small child.
3. Any party settling on behalf of a small child must be authorized to deal

in his property (e.g. his father, his grandfather, or his plenipotentiary),
since settlement of claims is a form of dealing in property.
4. ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that the settling party must not be an apostate male,
based on his general ruling that all dealings of an apostate are suspended.
On the other hand, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the settlements
of an apostate male are valid, since they ruled generally that his dealings
are executable. All three agreed that settlements by an apostate female
are permissible.
76.3 Settlement compensation conditions

There are four conditions that the compensation must satisfy. In what follows,
we shall discuss those conditions in some detail.
76.3.1 It must be a property

The settlement compensation must qualify as property.2 Thus, settlement of
claims for pork, dead animals, and other forbidden animals is deemed invalid,
since such items do not qualify as property. This ruling follows from the fact that
settlement constitutes a form of commutative dealing, and hence the settlement
compensation must satisfy the conditions of compensations in sales.
The compensation can be fungible, non-fungible, or the usufruct of prop-
erty, since all such properties qualify as compensations in commutative finan-
cial contracts. However, some settlement compensations require receipt during
. amānāt (p.390).
c
76.3. SETTLEMENT COMPENSATION CONDITIONS 209
the settlement contract, while others do not, and this requires more detailed
analysis.
. anafı̄s recognized that the claim be for one of four types
of property:
• Non-fungible properties that can be identified by genus, type, amount,

characteristics and ownership. Examples include clothes, real estate, ani-
mals, wheat or barley measured by volume, or metals like iron and copper
measured by weight, etc.
• Fungible properties that cannot be identified. Examples include money,

liabilities for goods of certain characteristics measured by weight and vol-
ume, etc.
• Usufruct such as residence in a particular house.
• Legal rights such as retribution for certain crimes.
On the other hand the compensation given in settlement may be non-fungible

property, fungible property, or usufruct. Moreover, as we have seen, the person
against whom the claim is made may acknowledge the validity of the claim, deny
it, or refrain from acknowledging or denying it. In what follows, we discuss the
legal status of the settlement in each of those cases.
Acknowledged claims for non-fungibles

The settlement is valid if the claim is for non-fungible property, the person
against whom the claim is made acknowledges the claim’s validity, and the
settlement compensation is known in amount and characteristics, regardless of
whether the latter is fungible or non-fungible. In this case, the compensation
in settlement has the same status as the price in a sale, and hence all such
compensations are permissible.
In this regard, if the compensation in settlement is an existent, identified,
and owned non-fungible, then the settlement is valid regardless of whether or not
the non-fungible was measured by weight or volume. Similarly, the settlement is
valid if the compensation is a fungible measured by weight or volume, and if it
is known in quantity and characteristics. As we have seen, those rulings follow
from the fact that such compensations can serve as prices in sales contracts.
In contrast, the settlement is not valid if the compensation are clothes es-
tablished as a liability with certain characteristics. This ruling follows from the
fact that the conditions of salam are not satisfied in this case, and clothes can
only be established as a liability if all the conditions of salam are satisfied (e.g.
the amount, characteristics, and term of deferment must all be specified explic-
itly). This is in contrast to the cases of goods measured by weight or volume,
which can be established as a liability in a variety of commutative contracts.
Thus, the latter types of goods can serve as prices without specifying a term of
deferment, and without receipt during the contract session.
If the compensation is an animal with certain characteristics established as a

liability, then the settlement is not valid. This ruling follows from the fact that
such properties are not eligible for establishment as liabilities in commutative
financial contracts, and thus cannot serve as a price.
Acknowledged claims for fungibles

Monetary debts
If the underlying claim is for an amount of money, then the settlement may
involve a compensation of the same genus or one of a different genus. If the
compensation was of a different genus, and specified and known property, then
the settlement is valid, and tantamount to trading a debt for a non-fungible
property. However, if the compensation is itself a liability for money of a dif-
ferent genus, then the settlement is impermissible, lest the parties engage in
trading debts for debts.
On the other hand, if the compensation was of the same genus as the claimed
liability, then the settlement is valid if the compensation is equal to the claimed
liability. The settlement is also deemed valid if the compensation is smaller than
the claimed liability in amount or quality, in which case the claimant is deemed
to have contributed the rest of his right to the settling party.
However, if the claim for a monetary liability is settled for a larger amount (in
quality or quantity) of the same genus, then the settlement is a form of forbidden
ribā and thus deemed invalid. In this regard, the general juristic rule is that
settlement of the same genus as the claim are considered a form of repayment
if possible, otherwise, they are considered commutative contracts and subject
to the conditions of such contracts.3 In this context, the compensation with a
larger amount of the same genus cannot be considered a repayment of part and
dropping of the rest of the debt, and hence the contract must be considered a
commutative contract to be subjected to its conditions.
In this regard, if the compensation was of higher quality but equal amounts,
then the conditions of currency exchange (s.arf) must be applied, thus requiring
mutual receipt during the contract session. This ruling follows from the fact
that quality is disregarded when trading ribawı̄ goods of the same genus. Thus,
if the compensation is not received during the settlement session, the contract is
voided since it is thus tantamount to a currency exchange contract that violates
the receipt condition.
The majority of H . anafı̄s also ruled that if the compensation is of higher qual-
ity but lower amount than the claimed debt, then the contract is impermissible.
They based this ruling on the view that the higher quality might have been
implicitly justifying compensation by a smaller amount. Such substitution of
quality for quantity is not permissible in ribawı̄ goods, since all such goods of the
same genus are considered identical regardless of quality. Indeed, this maxim is
a juristic rule that was also narrated as a H . adı̄th : “higher and lower quality [of
¯
3 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.41), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.21, p.27),
. ¯c .
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.500).
ribawı̄ goods] are the same [when traded for goods of the same genus]”.4 In this
regard, the contract has to be viewed as a .sarf rather than repayment of the
underlying liability, since a liability for low quality goods is not repaid in high
quality goods. Once the contract is classified as currency exchange, it is well
established that trading one thousand low quality silver coins for five hundred
high quality silver coins is forbidden.
In summary, if the compensation is of the same genus and lower amount,
then the settlement is considered a repayment of part of the liability, and an
absolution of the remaining part. On the other hand, if the compensation is of
the same genus and greater quantity, or if it is a fungible or non-fungible of a
different genus, then the contract is considered a commutative contract.5
Consequently, it is permissible to compensate a matured liability for future
with an equal deferred liability of the same genus.
This is thus considered a simple deferment of the debt. It is also permissible
to compensate a deferred liability with a current and equal payment of the same
genus, since the debtor is thus giving up his right of deferment and repaying his
debt earlier.
On the other hand, it is not permissible to settle a deferred underlying debt
with a smaller current payment of the same genus. In this case, the creditor is
not entitled to an immediate payment, and hence the early payment cannot be
viewed as a repayment. Thus, the contract must be viewed as a commutative
contract, in which reduction of the debt is a compensation for the dropped
deferment. Such trading of time for money is not permissible, since time is not
a property. Moreover, trading the smaller amount for the larger amount of the
same genus is not permissible.6
However, the settlement is valid if a smaller amount of the same genus is
paid on the same day of the contract, and the underlying debt was currently
matured. The H . anafı̄s agree that the debtor would thus have repaid part of the
debt, and become absolved of the remaining part. However, if the debtor does
not make the payment on the same day of the settlement contract, ’Abū H . anı̄fa
and Muh.ammad ruled that the settlement is thus invalidated, and the debtor
is responsible for the full amount of the debt. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled
that the settlement would still be executed, and the debtor would only remain
indebted for the part of the debt agreed upon in the settlement.
’Abū Yūsuf based his ruling on the view that the settlement contract im-
plicitly tied absolution of part of the debt to immediate repayment of the other
part. However, he argued, absolution may not be tied to any conditions. Thus,
unless the contract included an explicit condition of voiding if the agreed upon
portion of the debt is not paid in the same day, the contract remains valid in
4 Al-Zaylac ı̄ classified this as a strange Hadı̄th. However, the essence of this Hadı̄th is
. ¯ . ¯
implied by the H . adı̄th of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for
¯ ¯
wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt, same for same, hand to hand, and
any increase or diminution is ribā; the taker and the giver are equal in this”, narrated by
Muslim, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.37).
5 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.44), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H ¯
. . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.42), ’Ibn
.
.
his view. Thus, absolution for the remainder of the debt continues to be valid
even if the debtor does not pay the agreed upon part on the day of the contract.
In contrast, ’Abū H
. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that the implicit condition to
void the contract if the agreed-upon portion of the debt is not paid is as effective
as an explicit condition thereof. In this regard, they ruled in an analogous case
that it is permissible to sell a property to another on condition that the price is
paid on the same day, otherwise the sale is voided. In both cases, the condition
of immediate payment applies to the voiding, and not to the contract itself.
Thus, they ruled that the case under consideration is equivalent to a settlement
contract in which the creditor said: “but if you do not pay me today, then this
settlement is voided”, in which case that condition would be observed.
Thus, we see that the H . anafı̄s agreed on the case where the creditor says: “I
settle your debt of $1000 for $500, provided that you pay me today, otherwise
you still owe me $1000”. In this case, if the debtor does not pay $500 on that
day, the settlement is voided and he still owes $1000. They are in agreement
on this case since the condition of voiding is stated explicitly. Similarly, they
ruled that the settlement is valid if the condition said “. . . provided that you pay
me within a month, otherwise you still ow me $1000”, and that condition must
be observed. In the latter case, the absolution is immediate, but its voiding is
suspended for a month.
It is also permissible for the creditor to accept a guarantor of the debtor’s
$1000 debt, as part of a settlement with for $500, on condition that the $500 are
paid within a month, otherwise the settlement is voided. Then, if the guarantor
does not pay the $500 within the month, he is liable for the full $1000. This
same ruling applies if the guarantor accepted the guaranty separately, and then
engaged in a settlement as stated above. Indeed, the condition would be more
worthwhile of observing in the second case, since it thus pertains to voiding the
reduction of liability only, and does not pertain directly to the contract.
However, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the settlement is invalid if the creditor said
to the debtor who owes him $1000: “If you pay me $500, then you are absolved
of the rest”. This ruling follows from the fact that the creditor’s statement thus
makes absolution suspended pending the condition of payment, which is not
permissible. Thus, the debtor would remain liable for the full $1000, unless the
creditor absolves him of the other $500 at a later time unconditionally.7
Non-Monetary debts
If the underlying debt is a fungible non-monetary good, measured by weight or
volume, then we need to consider two cases, depending on whether or not the
settlement compensation is of the same genus:8
1. If the settlement compensation is of the same genus as the underlying debt,
then the settlement is valid if the compensation is equal to the underlying
7 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.44 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.42 onwards),
. .
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.43 onwards).
8 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.45 onwards), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.21, p.26
. ¯ .
onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.42).
debt in quantity and quality, and if it is received during the settlement

session. In this case, settlement is in fact a repayment of the debt.
It is also permissible to settle the underlying debt for a smaller amount of
goods of the same genus, in quantity or quality. In this case, the settlement
is not a commutative contract. Rather, it is viewed as a partial repayment
of the underlying debt, and an absolution or dropping of the remaining
part if the compensation is smaller in quantity, and dropping the quality
constraints if it is smaller in quality. In either case, receipt during the
contract session is not required in such partial settlements.
On the other hand, the settlement is impermissible if the settlement com-
pensation exceeds the underlying debt in quantity and at least matches
it in quality, since the contract would in fact be ribā. However, if the
settlement compensation matches the underlying debt in quantity, but
exceeds it in quality, then the settlement is permissible, and viewed as a
commutative contract.
2. The settlement is permissible if the non-monetary debt is settled for an
amount of money. In this case, receipt during the settlement session is
required to avoid trading a debt for a debt.
On the other hand, if the settlement compensation is a specified volume
of another fungible, then the settlement is permissible provided, and re-
ceipt of compensation during the contract session is not required in this
case. Similarly, the settlement is valid if the settlement compensation is
a fungible established as a liability on the debtor (subject to quality and
characteristics restrictions), provided that the compensation is received
during the contract session, to avoid trading a debt for a debt.
In this regard, the settlement would be rendered impermissible if one debt
is settled for another debt. For instance, if the debtor owed a volume of
wheat, and settled it for a deferred debt of silver coins, the contract is
invalid trading of debts for debts.9
Liability for an animal

If the debtor owes the creditor an animal (e.g. as compensation for unintentional
killing, dowry, or compensation for divorce at the instance of the wife), then it
is permissible to settle the debt for any non-monetary fungible good measured
by weight or volume. In this case, the contract is considered a commutative
one, and receipt during the settlement session is required to avoid trading debts
for debts.
The settlement is also permissible if the debt is settled for the animal’s value
or slightly more. This follows from the fact that the animal’s monetary value is
determined in a different genus (gold and silver), and thus the settlement is a
commutative contract. In this regard, the compensation would be permissible
regardless of amount, and receipt is not required in this case.
9 Al-Farā’id Al-Bahiyya fı̄ Al-Qawāc id Al-Fiqhiyya by Sh. Mah.mūd H
. amza (p.146).
On the other hand, the contract is permitted but not considered a commu-
tative one if the settlement is established as a monetary deferred debt. In this
case, the contract is viewed as a form of repayment, and thus is not invalidated
on the basis of trading debts for debts. This ruling follows from the fact that
liability for the animal was non-binding, since the creditor is forced to accept
repayment in monetary value, in contrast to most debts. Thus, even though
the settlement results in replacing liability for the animal with liability for an
amount of money, the contract is not really an exchange of one debt for another
in the classical sense.10
Compensating with usufruct
We have already covered the legal rulings associated with the underlying debt
condition if the compensation is a fungible or a non-fungible property. We
now turn to the case where the underlying debt is settled for the usufruct of
a property. Such settlements are permissible. For instance, if the debtor owes
the creditor $10, he may settle it for the right to live a certain period in the
debtor’s house, ride his horse for a certain period, or use his land for a certain
period, etc.11 In this case, the settlement is in fact a lease contract, regardless of
whether the debtor acknowledges the claim’s validity, denies it, or declines to do
either. The validity of this contract follows from the fact that leasing results in
transferring ownership of the usufruct in return for some compensation. In this
regard, the compensation is apparent (i.e. the underlying debt) if the debtor
acknowledges the claim’s validity, and implicitly determined in the other two
cases as the termination of disputes, animosity and the requirement to take an
oath. As a consequence of this classification of settlements of debts for usufruct
as a lease contracts, all four schools of jurisprudence consider those contract to
be valid or defective based on the lease contract rulings.12
10 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.46 onwards).

11 The H
. anafı̄s ruled that all compensations that are permissible in marriage contracts may
be used as a settlement compensation, and vice versa, c.f. Al-Samarqandı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.3,
p.426). In this regard, any commonly valued property is eligible to serve as a dowry, c.f.
ibid. (vol.2, p.201). In this regard, if a property cannot be named as dowry, then it is not
permissible as a settlement compensation. If the underling liability resulted from murder
or manslaughter, or indemnity for criminal acts not causing loss of life, then the settlement
compensation must be monetary.
It is noteworthy that the H . anafı̄s permitted the use of deliverable usufruct (e.g. the right
to dwell in a house, or to ride an animal, etc.) as dowry, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.2,
p.450). However, the usufruct offered as dowry cannot be specified as the free husband’s labor
services (since the status of the husband is thus turned to the status of a servant), and it is
not permissible to specify a dowry in terms of services for which a person cannot collect wages
(e.g. Qur’anic education, which is not a property).
12 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.47), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.31), Al-Dardı̄r
. .
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.4, p.483).
76.4. UNDERLYING LIABILITY CONDITIONS 215
76.3.2 It must be valued property

It is invalid for a Muslim to settle his debts with pork or wine, since such items
are not valued properties for Muslims.13 However, if the settlement is concluded
for such compensation, then it is executed as an absolution of the debt rather
than a commutative contract.
76.3.3 Ownership
The debtor must own the settlement compensation. Thus, if the debt is settled
for a property, and then the owner demands to recollect it from the creditor,
the settlement is rendered invalid.14
76.3.4 Knowledge
The settlement compensation must be devoid of ignorance. This ruling follows
from the fact that such ignorance would lead to disputes, and thus render the
contract defective.15
76.4 Underlying liability conditions

There are a number of conditions that the settled liability must satisfy. We
shall list those conditions in this section.
76.4.1 Liability to man

The settled liability must be towards a human being, rather than towards Allāh,
regardless of whether it is a liability for fungible or non-fungible property, or
for non-properties as in the cases of retribution and chastisement.16 Thus,
settlements of legal punishments (h.udūd) for adultery, theft, and imbibing wine
are invalid. In this regard, no man can demand to settle the transgressor’s
liability for a sum of money to collect, since the right in this case belongs
to Allāh. In this regard, receiving settlement compensations for the rights of
others is impermissible. Moreover, this sort of settlement would be tantamount
to making lawful that which is forbidden, or making forbidden that which is
lawful.
Similarly, it is invalid to pay a settlement compensation in lieu of the legal
punishment for libel. In this regard, even though the insulted person has some
rights, the H. anafı̄s consider the right of Allāh to be primary in libel punishments.
Similarly, it is invalid to settle with a witness so that he would not testify
against the liable party. This ruling also follows from the fact that the witness
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
14 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.48).
.
15 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.493).
. .
16 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.37), ’Ibn Al-
. .
Humām ((H . anafı̄), ibid., p.34), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.493).
is responsible for his testimony that is a right of Allāh, which cannot be set-
tled between people. In this case, if the witness indeed collected a settlement
compensation, he must return it. Moreover, if a judge knows of the witness’s
acceptance of such compensation, he may void his testimony as a transgressor,
unless the witness later repents and then his testimony may be accepted once
again.
On the other hand, the four schools of jurisprudence agree that settlement is
permissible in the rights to retribution for the destruction of life and limb. They
based this ruling on the view that retribution is a right for human beings, and
thus may be settled with a fungible or non-fungible compensation. However,
they ruled that if the compensation is fungible, then it must be received during
the settlement contract session to avoid departing with one debt having been
exchanged for another.17
In the latter cases, the jurists also ruled that the settlement compensation
must be sufficiently known. Thus, if the settlement compensation is simply
named as a dress, an animal, or a house, there would be significant ignorance
regarding the compensation, thus rendering the settlement impermissible. The
tolerated level of ignorance in this case is based on the general rule that lev-
els that invalidate a compensation from serving as dowry (mahr) in marriage
invalidate them from serving in settling retribution rights, and vice versa.
In this regard, if the compensation contains sufficient ignorance to be deemed
ineligible for dowry and settling retribution, then the groom is liable for an
average dowry in the case of marriage. In the case of settling retribution, the
right to exact physical punishment is dropped by the settlement contract, and
proper financial compensation thus becomes a liability on the debtor.
However, there is a fundamental difference between the two cases: If the
retribution right is settled for pork or wine, the right is thus dropped and the
debtor is considered absolved. In contrast, the groom is still liable for an equiv-
alent dowry if he used such ineligible compensations as a dowry. This difference
is based on the view that the very term for “settlement” (Al-s.ulh., in Arabic
meaning reconciliation), implies forgiveness in the case of retribution for crimes.
Thus, if the settlement of such retributions does not name a valued property,
the jurists rule in analogy to the case where no compensation was named at all,
thus implying absolution and forgiveness. In contrast, absolution of the liability
for dowry is not possible, since marriage contracts were only legalized based on
the payment of a dowry. Thus, if the named dowry was not a valued property,
jurists rule that a dowry was not named, and hence a dowry must be assessed by
the average paid in similar marriages. Thus, the fundamental difference is that
settlements may take place without a compensation, while marriage requires a
compensation.18
In this regard, settling retribution rights are permissible for any amount,
regardless of whether the compensation exceeds or fall short of the legally spec-
17 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.21, p.9), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. ¯ .
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.35), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.32), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.317), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.494 onwards).
18 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.33), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.35).
. .
ified financial liability for the underlying transgression. This ruling is based
on the verse: “But if any remission is made by the brother of the slain, then
grant any reasonable demand, and compensate him with handsome gratitude”
[2:178]. ’Ibn c Abbās stated that this verse was revealed regarding pre-meditated
murder. In this regard, the word “any” (shay’) implies that any compensation
¯
is permissible, no matter how small or large.
In contrast, it is not permissible to pay a settlement compensation that
exceeds the legal compensation for unintentional manslaughter. In the latter
case, any increase over the legally ordained amount is considered forbidden
ribā. Thus, this case is contrasted with settlement compensations for the right
to physical retribution for pre-meditated murder, which is not a property. Thus,
the latter case does not involve a legally ordained financial value, and ribā is
impossible.19
Settling uncertain liabilities
The H . anafı̄s and H. anbalı̄s allow the liability underlying a settlement to be un-
known, regardless of whether it is fungible or non-fungible. Thus, they allow a
debtor who acknowledges the creditor’s claim to settle that claim for a known
compensation, although neither party may remember the exact amount of the
underlying liability. This ruling follows from the fact that settlements can be
validated both as a commutative contract, and as a dropping of the creditor’s
right. In this regard, viewing settlement of unknown debts as a form of drop-
ping, it can be validated in analogy to freeing slaves and divorce contracts. In
this regard, since the settlement by repaying known debts is allowed, settlement
of unknown ones would also seem appropriate lest the creditor’s property is
wasted. In the latter case, the settlement is in fact a form of absolution rather
than sale. This ruling is also supported by the narration that two men with
a dispute over perished inheritance came to the Prophet (pbuh), and he told
them: “Share in the loss, being careful to be as fair as possible, and then let
each of you absolve the other of any obligations thereof”.20 Ibn Qudāmah ruled
that this H. adı̄th pertains to settlement of unknown liabilities.
¯
. .
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.36), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.497).
20 This Hadı̄th is narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd and ’Ibn Mājah, and its origin in the
. ¯ .
correct two books of H . adı̄th is narrated on the authority of ’Umm Salamah, who narrated that
¯
two men came to the Prophet (pbuh) to settle a dispute between them over joint inheritance
that had perished. The Prophet (pbuh) said: “You come to me to settle this dispute, but I
am only a man. Indeed, one of you may be more clever in providing proofs for his claim, and
I can only rule according to what I hear from you. Thus, if I give either one of you something
that is rightfully his brother’s, let him not take it, for what I give him thus is a piece of the
hell-fire that he will bring with him on the day of judgment as a red-hot piece of iron around
his neck”. Hearing this, the two men cried, and each said: “I give all my rights to my brother”.
The Prophet (pbuh) then said: “Having said that, go then and give each other an oath to
give him his right, estimate those rights to the best of your abilities and divide them between
you accordingly. Then, let each of you absolve his brother of all responsibilities thereof”.
This H . adı̄th provides a proof of the permissibility of absolution from unknown liabilities, c.f.
¯
¯
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s did not permit settlement of unknown
¯
debts. The Mālikı̄s thus ruled that the creditor must know the size of the debt
c
that he is settling. The Shāfi ı̄s based this ruling on the view that settlement
¯
in this case is a form of sale, and thus would be invalidated if the object of the
21
contract is unknown.
76.4.2 A right of the claimant

The object of settlement must be a right of the claimant. Thus, the settlement
is deemed invalid if the settled right does not belong to the claimant.22
76.4.3 The claimant s right must be established

The claimant’s right must be established in for the settled liability. The fol-
lowing are examples of settlements that are not permitted due to violating this
condition:23
• The settlement is invalid if a divorced woman sought settlement for pa-

ternal lineage on behalf of a child that she claimed to be her divorcing
husband’s. The contract is invalid since paternal lineage is the child’s
right, and the mother has no right to settle the rights of another for any
compensation.
• The settlement is invalid if a person with preemption rights settles his

right (to prevent the sale of a property) with a buyer, thus allowing the
buyer to take possession of the property. The contract is invalid since the
preemption right does not entitle that person to a right in the property,
beyond the right to acquire ownership.24 This is in contrast to settlement
of the right to physical retribution against a murderer, since the right to
such retribution is established at the time of settlement.
• The settlement is invalid if the guarantor of a person settles his liability

under that guaranty with a known amount of property. Thus, the contract
is invalid, and the guaranty remains binding, since the right of the creditor
in the guaranty contract is to seek delivery of the guaranteed party. This
right is thus similar to preemption rights, and may not be settled for
property.
21 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.49), Majmac Al-Damānāt (p.388), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Ju-
. . .
risprudence), vol.5, p.32), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.493), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.490),
Al-Sha arānı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.79), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.310).
c c
22¯ ¯
Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), ibid.).
23 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.21, p.35), Majmac Al-
. ¯ .
D. amānāt (p.358).
24 Since the preemption right is a right to gain ownership, it does not exist prior to such a
transfer of ownership, and thus the possessor of that right may not take any compensation
for that right. Such compensation is thus considered a forbidden bribe, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām
((H. anafı̄), vol.7, p.33).
• The settlement is invalid if a man erected a tent on a public road, and

then settled with a man who wanted to remove it. The contract is thus
invalid since the right of passage through the public road pertains to all
Muslims, and none of them have an exclusive and established right in it
beyond that right of passage. Thus, that right of passage is not established
except through passage, and may not be settled with another. Moreover,
this settlement is useless since all others with a right of passage would still
retain the right to remove the man’s tent from the public road.25
On the other hand, if the tent was erected on a private road that belongs
to a group of people, then it is permissible for the tent’s owner to settle
with any one of the road’s owners to keep the tent. This follows from the
fact that the land is thus jointly owned by a limited group of people, each
of whom thus has ownership for part of the road. Thus, the tent’s owner
may settle with any one of the owners for his right to the road. Indeed,
this settlement can be useful, since it is possible for the tent’s owner to
settle with every one of the road’s owners. This is in contrast to the
case of public roads, wherein settling with all Muslims is an unimaginable
possibility.
• It is valid for a denier of a claim without material proof to settle simply
to avoid swearing an oath, in which case the denier is absolved of the
obligation to take an oath.
• On the other hand, the settlement is invalid if the claimant settles with
the denier that “the denier is absolved of his liability if he swears that
he does not owe the claimant”, and then the denier swears such an oath.
In this case, the settlement is invalidated, and the claimant may renew
his claim if he can provide a proof later. This ruling follows from the
fact that the language of the settlement thus suspends absolution pending
the condition of swearing an oath. Since absolution results in transfer of
ownership, it is invalid to suspend absolution pending any conditions, in
analogy to other transfer of ownership contracts.
In this regard, if the claimant cannot provide a material proof, and he
wishes to seek the denier’s oath to back his denial, he may proceed in one
of two ways:
– If the denier had not taken an oath in front of a judge, that oath may
be disregarded, and the claimant may demand that the denier swear
an oath in front of a judge.
– However, if the denier had already sworn an oath in front of a judge,
then the claimant cannot demand that he swear another oath.
• Similarly, the settlement is invalid if the language of the contract specified

that “if the claimant backs his claim with an oath, then the claim is
25 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.49), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.183), ’Abū-
. ¯ . ¯ ¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.333).
¯ ¯
binding upon the denier”. In this case, even if the claimant does swear
an oath, the denier is not liable to him. This contract is invalid since
it involves suspending liability for property on a probabilistic condition,
which renders the contract a form of forbidden gambling.26
• It is valid for a woman who denies a man’s claim that he married her to
settle his claim for some property. This ruling follows since the claimant
is claiming a valid established right, and the woman may thus pay a set-
tlement compensation for that right in analogy to divorce at the instance
of the wife. Despite the fact that the woman in this case denies the man’s
marital rights, she is permitted thus to spend her property to drop the
dispute.27
On the other hand, if the man claimed that he married the woman for
$1000, and she denies the claim, then the settlement is valid if he says “I
increase the dowry to $1100 if you accept my claim” and she accepts the
marriage thus. In this case, her admission of the marriage at the increased
dowry renders the settlement and marriage contracts valid.28
• In contrast, the settlement is not valid if a woman claimed that a man

married her and the man denied her claim and then settled it for an
amount of money. In this case, the marriage is either established or not
established. If the marriage is not established, then the man’s payment
to drop the claim would not have any compensation and thus would be
viewed as a bribe. On the other hand, if the marriage is established, it
may not be dissolved through such a payment. Indeed, the dissolution of
an established marriage would require that the woman pay the man, not
the other way around. Thus, the money received by the woman is not a
compensation in either case, and the settlement is not permitted.
This is contrasted with the reverse case where he made the claim, since
the settlement of that claim in exchange for money paid by the denying
woman can be viewed as divorce at the instance of the wife on his part,
and a means of ending the dispute on hers.29
• If a man claims that another owes him $1000 an the other party denies
the claim, then it is not valid for the claimant to settle the claim for $100
provided that the other party admits having owed him $1000. In this case,
the claimant is either truthful or lying in claiming the other’s liability for
$1000. If he is truthful, then taking compensation to gain admission of
his right is a form of forbidden bribes. On the other hand, if he is lying,
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.50).
. anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.37), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n
c c
((H
c
. amānāt (p.385).
.
29 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.50), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.35), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.37), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.2, p.165).
¯
then it is not permissible for the claimed debtor to admit that he owed
the $1000 when he did not in fact owe that amount.30
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad differed in opinion regarding the case wherein
a man claims that another owes him property by virtue of a deposit, simple
loan, silent partnership, or lease, wherein the claimed debtor says that
he had returned the property, or that it had perished, and the claimant
contests his claim. ’Abū Yūsuf considers the settlement of such a claim in
exchange for some property to be invalid, while Muh.ammad ruled that it
was valid.
In this case, Muh.ammad reasoned that the settlement was in lieu of a
valid claim, which could be denied with an oath, and thus is a valid set-
tlement. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the claimant’s statements in
this case are self-contradictory, since the other party held his property in
a possession of trust, and thus the claimant must accept his statements.
Thus, from a legal point of view, the claimant is simultaneously making
his own claim and the opposing claim issued by the other party. Such
contradiction renders the claim invalid. However, the claimant may still
demand that the other party backs his denial with an oath. The oath in
this case is not required to remove the claim, since the claim is invalid, but
rather to remove the charge of abuse or negligence. On the other hand,
the settlement is invalidated by the invalidity of the underlying claim.31
Settlement in lieu of defective merchandise

If a buyer finds the merchandise defective, and the seller seeks to settle the
dispute by reducing the price or giving him some other property, then the set-
tlement is valid, provided that the merchandise was returnable based on the
defect, or that the buyer could demand financial compensation for the defect.
The settlement is considered valid since the underlying buyer’s right that the
merchandise be free of defects is well established, and thus may be the basis of
a settlement.32
On the other hand, the settlement is not valid if the buyer was not entitled
to return the merchandise or seek compensation for defects in the merchandise.
Examples include cases where a separate increase in the merchandise occurs, or a
defect takes place in the merchandise while it is in the buyer’s possession. If the
buyer is not entitled to compensation, then the settlement is not allowed, since
the buyer would thus be taking the seller’s property without giving anything in
return.
If settlement in lieu of a defect in the merchandise was valid at inception,
and then the defect was removed (e.g. a sick sold animal was healed), then
30 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), ibid., p.51).
31 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), ibid., p.50).
32 Note that this type of settlement is permissible in normal sales, wherein one of the com-
pensations may be larger than the other. However, if the sale can result in ribā, then the
settlement is considered an increase, and hence impermissible based on the prohibition of
ribā.
the settlement is thus invalidated, and the seller can take back the settlement
compensation. This ruling is based on the fact that once the condition of safety
from defects returns to the merchandise, the latter compensates for the price,
and the seller thus has no more liabilities to the buyer.
If the buyer claims that the merchandise contains a defect, then the seller
may settle with him, on condition on being absolved of the claimed and all other
possible defects. This ruling follows from the fact that the buyer is entitled to
absolve the seller of such defects, thus dropping his right to having merchandise
that is free of all defects.
Even if the buyer does not claim to have found a defect, the buyer may give
him some property to settle against all possible defects. This settlement is per-
mitted since the buyer normally retains the right to claim that the merchandise
is defective, and thus ma settle to drop this right.
On the other hand, the buyer retains the right to seek compensation for
other defects if the seller settles with him for any single claim of a defect,
without specifying that he is settling against all other possible defects. Thus,
settling a single claim does not preclude the buyer from issuing further claims
for other defects, unless the settlement explicitly prevents him from doing so.33
Claimant settlement with a third party
So far, we have considered the case where the settlement is settled between
the claimant and the claimed debtor. However, if the claimant settles with an
interceding or volunteering third party, we need to consider whether the latter
acts with or without the permission of the claimed debtor:
• If the settlement is conducted with the second party’s permission, then

the settlement is valid, with the settling party being considered an agent
of the claimed debtor. This ruling follows since agency is permissible
in settlement contracts. In this case, the agent is not responsible for the
debt, whether or not the claimed debtor acknowledges the claim’s validity.
Thus, the financial responsibility remains with the claimed debtor rather
than the agent. The only exception to this rule is the case wherein the
agent guarantees the settlement compensation, wherein his responsibility
for the compensation is established by virtue of the contract of guaranty,
rather than the settlement contract itself.34
The Shāfic ı̄s agreed with this ruling. Thus, they ruled that the settlement
¯
is valid if conducted by a third party who declares that the claimed debtor
acknowledged the claim’s validity, and appointed him as an agent to settle
it. They also ruled that the settlement is valid if the third party settles
the claim out of his own property, while declaring that the claimed debtor
33 Al-Kāsānı̄((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.51), Al-Sarakh
¯
sı̄ (1st edition (H. anafı̄), vol.21, p.6).
34 Al-Kāsānı̄((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.52), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.38 onwards), Al-
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.39 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
¯
vol.2, p.167).
acknowledged the claim’s validity. In the latter case, the third party is
legally considered to have bought the object of the claimed liability.
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the settlement may be valid if the claimed debtor
¯
denied the claim’s validity, but the third party settles out of his own prop-
erty, declaring that he believes the claimant. In this case, if the claimed
object of liability is non-fungible, then the settlement brings into effect
the rules of purchasing usurped property. Thus, if the settling third party
can take the property from the claimed debtor, the settlement is rendered
valid, otherwise it is rendered invalid. Moreover, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if
¯
the settling third party does not disagree with the claimed debtor in his
denial of the claim, then the settlement is void and nugatory.35
• If the settling third party does not have the claimed debtor’s permission to
settle, then we need to consider five different cases of this un-commissioned
settling agency. In the first four of those cases, the un-commissioned set-
tling party is bound to pay the settlement compensation, and the claimed
debtor is absolved of all responsibility thereof. Those four cases are:
– If the un-commissioned settling party explicitly names himself as the

settling party, e.g. “I settle your claim on so-and-so in exchange for
$x”.
– If he names his own property as the settling compensation.
– If he points to his property as the settling compensation, even if he
does not explicitly say that it is his.
– If he delivers his property as the settling compensation, even if he
does not name it as his or point to it.
In those four cases, the settlement is valid, based on the verse: “The
believers are but a single brotherhood, so make peace and reconciliation
between your two contending brothers” [49:10], as well as the verse “And
reconciliation is best” [4:128]. In such cases, the un-commissioned settling
agent is thus dealing at his own instance and with his own property to
drop another person’s debt if the claimed debtor had acknowledged the
claim. If the claimed debtor had denied the claim, the un-commissioned
settling agent is still viewed to voluntarily give his property to drop charges
against another. In either case, his voluntary contribution is permitted.
In one other case, the settlement is deemed invalid, and suspended pending
the claimed debtor’s approval:
– If the un-commissioned settling agent names the settlement compen-

sation (e.g. $1000), but does not identify it out of his own property,
then he is implicitly settling for that compensation out of the claimed
debtor’s property.
35 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.181), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.333).
In this fifth case, the settlement is executed if the claimed debtor approves
it, and he would thus be responsible for the compensation. This ruling
follows from the view that by approving the settlement, the agency is
validated retroactively, whereby the claimed debtor, and not his agent,
would have to pay the compensation. On the other hand, if the claimed
debtor does not approve the settlement, then it is invalidated. The latter
ruling follows from the fact that dealing on the behalf of another party is
only permitted by his permission, and the contract is primarily pertaining
to the claimed debtor.36
Those rulings apply in the same manner to a third party’s conducting of
divorce at the instance of the wife:
• If such divorce is authorized by the husband or the wife, then the third
party is considered an agent, and the wife is responsible to pay the divorce
compensation. The agent is thus not responsible for any payments, since
he merely represents the principal, but the rights and responsibilities of
the contract continue to pertain to the principal, and are not transferred
to the agent.
• If the third party is not authorized to conduct the divorce, but tells the
man “divorce your wife in exchange for $x that I will pay”, or points to his
own property as the divorce compensation, then the divorce is valid. In
this case, the un-commissioned divorcing agent is considered a voluntary
contributor, who must thus pay the divorce compensation and not seek
any compensation from the principal wife.
• Finally, if the third party says “divorce your wife in exchange for $x”,
without specifying that the payment will be made out of his property,
then the divorce is suspended pending the wife’s permission. Thus, if
she permits it, the divorce is valid and she must pay the compensation,
otherwise the divorce is invalidated.
The same rulings apply equally to third-party settlements of retribution for

murder. Similar rulings also apply to third-party increases of a sales price. In
the latter case, if the increase is authorized by the buyer, then the third party
is considered an agent, and the price increase is binding on the buyer, otherwise
we apply the same rules discussed in settlement contracts.37
. .
((H
.
Chapter 77
Legal Status
A settlement contract results in a number of legal consequences, which are:1
1. Settlement terminates the settled disputes legally. Thus, all later claims
regarding the settled dispute are legally ignored. This ruling is in accor-
dance to the nature of settlement.
2. If the claimed debt is for real estate, and the settlement compensation is
monetary or otherwise different from real estate, then preemption (shufc a)
¯
rights are established in settlements if the claimed debtor acknowledges
the claim’s validity. This ruling follows since settlement in this case is
in fact a sale, and thus preemption rights must be observed. However,
preemption rights do not apply if the claimed debtor denies the claim,
since settlement is a means of terminating the dispute, but not a sale.
On the other hand, if the settlement compensation is real estate, and the
claimed debtor acknowledges the claim’s validity, then preemption rights
for the two properties are established. This ruling follows from the fact
that settlement in this case is tantamount to a sale.
If the claimed debtor denied the claim’s validity, but settled it for another
real estate nonetheless, then preemption rights associated with the set-
tlement compensation are established, while preemption rights associated
with the real estate claimed as a liability are not. The latter ruling follows
from the fact that the claimed real estate is not commutatively exchanged
by the claimed debtor through such settlements, meant only to terminate
the dispute, and hence preemption rights attached to that property are
not observed. In contrast, the settlement compensation real estate is taken
by the claimant as part of a commutative exchange, and thus preemption
rights in that property must be observed.
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.53), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.29), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st
. . ¯
edition (H . anafı̄), vol.20, p.163), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
c
((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.494).
225
3. Both parties of a settlement in which the claimed debt is acknowledged

have an established right of returning defective compensations. This ruling
follows from viewing such settlements as being tantamount to sales.
On the other hand, if the claimed debtor denies the claim, then the
claimant retains the right to return defective compensation, but the claimed
debtor does not have a similar right. This follows from the ruling that set-
tlement in this case is tantamount to a sale from the claimant’s point of
view, but not from the claimed debtor’s.
Those rulings are applied in the case where part of the underlying liability
is found to belong to a third party. In this case, the claimed debtor
may demand compensation from the claimant for that part of the claimed
liability. This ruling follows by analogy to the parallel rulings for sales
contracts.
On the other hand, if the claimed debtor denied or failed to acknowledge
the claim’s validity, and then the property of the underlying liability is
demanded by its true owner, then the claimant’s must transfer his claim
to the true owner of the property and return whatever settlement com-
pensation he had taken.2 In this case, the claimed debtor only paid that
compensation to terminate the dispute. Thus, if the property is found to
belong to a third party, the claimed debtor is seen not to be a valid part
of that dispute, and thus the settlement compensation must be returned
to him. In this regard, if the third party only claimed his rightful own-
ership of part of the disputed property, then the owner must take back
his property, and the claimant must transfer his claim for that portion to
him.
4. The inspection option applies to both types of settlements. This ruling

follows from the fact that the claimant views the settlement compensation
as one side of a commutative exchange of his right, and thus he must be
given an inspection option.
5. If the settlement compensation is portable, then it is not permissible to

deal in it prior to receipt, regardless of the type of settlement. Thus,
the claimant may not sell the portable settlement compensation or give it
as a gift, etc. On the other hand, if the settlement compensation is not
portable (e.g. real estate), then ’Abū H
. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that
the claimant may deal in it prior to receiving it, while Muh.ammad ruled
that he may not. The basis for those divergent rulings is the same as the
one we discussed in the chapters dealing with sales contracts.
In settlements of retribution rights for murder, the recipient of settlement
compensations may trade them or absolve the debtor for them prior to
receipt. This ruling is in analogy to the permissibility of trading in dowries
2 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.29), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.20, p.149
. ¯ .
onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.32,34), Abd Al-Gh
¯
((H
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.164).
227
and compensations for divorce at the instance of the wife prior to receipt.
Those rulings all follow from the view that trading prior to receipt is
forbidden in certain instances to prevent the contract from being voided
if its object were to perish. However, since the right for retribution in
murder cannot be voided, there is no need to rule against dealing in the
settlement compensation prior to receipt.
6. If the settlement takes a form that is tantamount to being a commutative

contract, then a settling agent must be liable for the settlement compensa-
tion, and not the claimed debtor. Similarly, if the settlement compensation
is of a different genus from the claimed right, the settlement is tantamount
to a sale, and all rights and obligation in sales agencies pertain to the agent.
On the other hand, if the settlement is tantamount to debt repayment,
then the agent is responsible for the settlement compensation only if he
guarantees it. Otherwise, the settling agent is in fact a messenger, to whom
the rights and responsibilities of the contract are not attached. In this
regard, if the agent guaranteed the compensation, he would thus guarantee
it by virtue of the guaranty contract, not the settlement contract.
In summary, as the Shāfic ı̄s said, if the claim is acknowledged by the debtor,
¯
and settled for a property other than the claimed liability, then the contract is in
fact a sales contract, despite the use of “settlement” language. Thus, the legal
rules of sales must apply, including preemption rights, rights to return defective
compensations, prohibition of dealing prior to receipt, and mutual receipt if
the underlying liability and its settlement compensations are of the same ribawı̄
genus.3
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.333).
Chapter 78
Invalid Settlements
78.1 Invalidating factors

A settlement may be invalidated by any of the following:1
1. With the exception of settlement of the right to physical retribution for
murder, voiding the contract would invalidate it. This follows since those
other settlements involve exchanging properties for properties, and thus
may be voided in analogy to sales and other commutative contracts. In
contrast, settlement of the right to physical retribution for murder implies
dropping the right for physical retribution, and thus it cannot be voided,
in analogy to divorce and other non-voidable contracts.
2. ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that settlements conducted by an apostate who dies in
that state, or flees to the land of war, are thus invalidated. This ruling is
based on this established juristic rule that dealings of apostate individuals
are deemed suspended. Then, he ruled that his dealings are executed if
he returns to Islam, or invalidated if he dies or joins the land of war and
the ruler ordered him to be chased. In contrast, we have seen that ’Abū
Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the dealings of an apostate person are
executable, and hence they disagree with this ruling of ’Abū H . anı̄fa.
3. If the settlement compensation is returned based on the defect option or
the inspection option, then the contract is voided and invalidated.
4. If the claim was settled in exchange for usufruct, then the settlement is
voided if either party of the contract dies before the lease expiration date.
This follows since settlement in exchange for usufruct is tantamount to a
lease contract, which is invalidated by the death of either party. Moreover,
if the object whose usufruct was named as the settlement compensation
perishes, the settlement is invalidated.
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.54 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
. .
pp.32,34), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.494).
¯
229
230 CHAPTER 78. INVALID SETTLEMENTS
78.2 Legal status after voiding

If a settlement contract is invalidated and voided, and if the claimed debtor
had denied the claim’s validity, then the claimant’s claim is thus restored. On
the other hand, if the claimed debtor acknowledged the claim’s validity, then
the claimant may demand repayment from that debtor and no other party. In
both cases, voiding the settlement thus restores the situation to its original state
prior to the settlement contract.
A notable exception again pertains to the case of settlement of the right to
physical retribution for murder. Voiding of such a settlement would give the
claimant the right to demand financial compensation (diyah), but the right to
exact physical retribution is dropped irrevocably.
A second exception pertains to the case of settlements for usufruct that are
voided during the lease period. In such cases, the claimant may only demand
compensation in proportion to the amount of usufruct that was not extracted
under the settlement.2
78.3 Estate settlements

The jurists recognize a contract by the name of mukhārajah, by virtue of which
¯
one of the heirs may settle with the rest by dropping his right to a share in the
estate for a sum of money that he takes from the estate or otherwise. Jurists
consider this contract a valid one, and enforce the rules of sales to all of its
consequences. In this regard, the legal status of this contract varies according
to whether the estate consists of non-fungible or monetary properties. Thus,
if the estate consists primarily of non-fungibles, the settlement is considered a
valid sale regardless of the amount of compensation. In this regard, c Uthmān
¯
is known to have settled c Abdul-Rah.mān ibn c Awf’s wife’s claim to one-thirty-
second of his estate in exchange for eighty thousand Dinārs.
If the estate consists of gold and silver monies, then the settlement is valid
with any size compensation if the compensation is paid in a different genus from
that of the estate. In such a contract (e.g. of trading gold for silver), equality
is not required, but mutual receipt during the contract session (which is in-fact
a currency exchange) is required to avoid ribā.
If the estate consists of both non-fungibles and monetary assets, and if the
monetary component is larger, then the settlement compensation must exceed
the settling heir’s share of the estate. By following this rule, his share of the
monetary assets can be cancelled against the monetary compensation that he
receives, and any increase in his compensation can be matched to the non-
fungible components of the estate. Moreover, he must receive the part of the
compensation corresponding to his share in the gold and silver component of
the estate during the contract session. Thus, ribā in the currency exchange part
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.55 onwards), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.21, p.34),
. .
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H c¯
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.33), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.495).
78.3. ESTATE SETTLEMENTS 231
of the settlement may be avoided.3

In summary, the H . anafı̄s required the estate underlying a settlement to be
known. Moreover, they consider the settlement to be a sales contract, wherein
the settlement compensation need not be exactly equal to the heir’s share of
the estate. In this regard, knowledge of the estate is required to satisfy the
condition of knowledge of the object of a sale to avoid gharar, while equality
of the two compensations is not required since prices need ¯ not be equal to the
value of sold objects. Finally, if the estate contains gold and silver, immediate
receipt of the compensation is required for the corresponding component of the
settlement compensation to avoid ribā.
3c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.170), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.205
¯ . .
onwards).
Part XII
Absolution (Al-’Ibrā’)
233
235
Preliminaries
We shall study absolution in six chapters:
1. Definition and legality.
2. Cornerstones.
3. Conditions.
4. Objects of absolution.
5. Types of absolution.
6. Legal status.
Chapter 80
Absolution Cornerstones
The H . anafı̄s ruled that absolution has a single cornerstone: an explicit and
clear offer issued by the absolver to indicate that he has thus dropped his right.
They considered this the only cornerstone based on their view that cornerstones
are parts of a contract without which the contract cannot exist. Thus, they
ruled that the offer is the only part of absolution without which the contract
ceases to exist, while all other aspects of the contract (e.g. two parties, object
of absolution, etc.) are not considered cornerstones since they are not parts
thereof.
In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄ jurists enumerated four cornerstones for the
absolution contract: (i) the absolving creditor, (ii) the absolved debtor, (iii) the
contract language, and (iv) the absolved debt. This enumeration is based on the
view that a cornerstone of a contract is any aspect without which the contract
ceases to exist, regardless of whether or not it is part of the contract.
80.1 Is acceptance necessary?

The non-Mālikı̄ jurists ruled that absolution does not require the absolved
debtor’s acceptance. Thus, they ruled that the contract is concluded upon
the conclusion of the absolution offer. This ruling follows from the fact that the
H. anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s viewed absolution primarily as a dropping of the creditor’s
rights. Thus, such dropping of a right does not require acceptance, in analogy
to divorce and freeing of slaves. In this regard, they did not distinguish between
dropping the debt through the language of absolution or the language of giving
the debt as a gift to the debtor. While some H . anafı̄s argued that acceptance
is necessary if the debt is given as a gift to the debtor, the majority ruled that
acceptance is not necessary in this case. Finally, while the Shāfic ı̄s viewed abso-
¯
lution primarily as a transfer of ownership of the debt to the debtor, they still
ruled that acceptance is not necessary, since the objective of the contract is still
acknowledged to be dropping the creditor’s right.
The offer language can take any form, as long as it clearly indicates dropping
239
240 CHAPTER 80. ABSOLUTION CORNERSTONES
the creditor’s right or the transfer of ownership of the debt to the debtor. Indeed,
item #1561 of Al-Majallah stated: “A creditor absolves his debtor if he declares
that he has no claims on him, that he has no rights with him, that he has
dropped his claim on him, that he has left whatever the other owes him, or that
he has received full repayment from him”.
Diverging from the other three schools, most of the Mālikı̄s ruled that ab-
solution requires acceptance of the absolved debtor. They based this ruling on
their view that absolution is primarily a transfer of ownership of the debt to the
debtor as a gift, and thus acceptance is required by analogy to other gifts.
All jurists agree that acceptance is permissible during the absolution session,
with the Shāfic ı̄s ruling further that acceptance should be verbal and immediate
¯
if he is authorized by the creditor or judge to absolve himself.1 On the other
hand, most of the Mālikı̄s ruled that it is permissible to defer acceptance of ab-
solution, saying: “Whoever was silent regarding accepting a charity may accept
it later”.
The H . anafı̄s stipulated that acceptance is necessary in two exceptional cases:
absolution for either side of a currency exchange contract, and absolution for the
price of salam. In both of those special cases, absolution results in non-receipt
of a necessary part of the contract, without which the contract would be deemed
invalid. Neither party can invalidate the contract alone, and thus, absolution
and the resulting voiding of the currency exchange of salam contract requires
acceptance of the other party. In contrast, absolution for the object of salam
or the price of sold merchandise is permissible without acceptance of the liable
party, since receipt of those items is not a condition of the contract. Thus, the
latter cases involve dropping a debt that the creditor is not legally required to
receive, and hence he may absolve it unilaterally.2
80.2 Rejecting absolution

The Shāfic ı̄s and most H . anbalı̄s ruled that absolution is concluded by offer
¯
alone, and cannot be rejected by the debtor. The H . anafı̄s supported this ruling
by analogy to other contracts in which rights are dropped, e.g. dropping the
right to physical retribution for murder, or the preemption right for real estate.
Similarly, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the intent of absolution is to drop the creditor’s
¯
right, and hence the debt is absolved even if the debtor rejects the absolution.
In contrast, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that absolution can be revoked
if the debtor rejects it during or after the absolution session, provided that
he had not previously accepted it. The Mālikı̄s based this ruling on the view
that absolution requires the absolved debtor’s consent, and that it is primarily
a transfer of ownership. While the H . anafı̄s viewed absolution primarily as a
dropping of the creditor’s right, they also recognized its ownership transfer
aspect, which renders the absolution revoked if the debtor rejects it.3 Those
1 Al-Qalyūbı̄
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.340), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152).
((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.203).
3 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.44), Indian Authors ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, pp.365,384),
. .
80.2. REJECTING ABSOLUTION 241
rulings apply to rejection of the absolution by the debtor himself, or by his heir
after his death.
However, the H. anafı̄s enumerated four special cases, wherein absolution can-
not be revoked by rejection:4
1. Absolution in debt transfers (h.awālah).
2. Absolution in guaranty (kafālah), for most H. anafı̄s.

In both of the first two cases, the absolution is a pure dropping of the
creditor’s right, without any transfer of ownership. In this regard, a pure
dropping of one’s right cannot be revoked since the right ceases to exist
as soon as it is dropped. Thus, if the creditor absolves a debt transferee,
the latter cannot revoke the absolution. Similarly, the guarantor cannot
revoke the creditor’s absolution of the debt.
3. If the absolved debtor asked for the absolution, and it was granted by the
creditor, then the debtor may not later revoke the absolution by rejecting
it.
4. If the absolved debtor accepted the absolution at some point in time, then
he may not later revoke it by rejection.
In item #1568 of Al-Majallah, the following H . anafı̄ rulings regarding ac-

ceptance and revocation were listed: “Absolution is not suspended pending
acceptance, but it may be revoked if the debtor rejects it. Thus, the absolu-
tion is concluded by the offer, but if the debtor rejects it, then the contract is
voided and considered non-existent. However, the absolution is not voided if
the debtor first accepted it and then tried to reject it. Moreover, absolution
cannot be revoked in the cases of debt transfers and guaranty”.
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.544), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Sh āfic ı̄), p.152), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯
(H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.336), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.99).
.
Chapter 81
Absolution Conditions
The absolution contract conditions may pertain to the absolving creditor, the
absolved debtor, the language of absolution, or the absolved debt. In what
follows, we shall discuss each set of conditions in some detail.
81.1 Absolving creditor conditions

The absolving creditor must satisfy the following conditions:1
1. He must be eligible to engage in pure contribution contracts. Thus, he

must be sane, of legal age, and discerning, without any legal constraints on
his dealings based on mental incompetence of excessive indebtedness. This
ruling follows from the fact that absolution is a voluntary contribution of
the absolver, for which he receives no compensation from the absolved
debtor. The condition that the absolving creditor must not be under legal
restraint based on excessive indebtedness is an executability condition
for ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad, who allow such legal restraint. Thus,
they ruled that absolutions by such legally restrained debtors is valid, but
suspended pending the consent of his creditors, to protect their rights.
2. The absolving party must either own the right that he drops thus, or he
must be an agent or plenipotentiary for the creditor. In this regard, the
rulings for regular agency in this case applies to un-commissioned agencies
for those who recognize the dealings of un-commissioned agents.
The H. anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that rulings for absolutions conducted
by plenipotentiaries or guardians depend on the factual state of affairs,
rather than the beliefs of acting agents. Thus, the absolution is valid if a
man absolved a debtor for a debt that he owed his father, thinking that
1 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.531; vol.2, p.328), Indian Authors ((Hanafı̄), vol.4,
. .
p.355), Murshid Al-H . ayrān (#s 184,185,197,198), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.98), Al-
¯ c
Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.326; vol.3, pp.159,162), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4,
¯
pp.329,336), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.202), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152).
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
243
244 CHAPTER 81. ABSOLUTION CONDITIONS
the latter was alive at the time, but later discovered that his father was
in fact dead at the time of absolution. This ruling follows from the fact
that the absolved debt thus was owned by the absolving party at the time,
and the absolution is a dropping of his right to that debt. However, for
the majority of Shāfic ı̄s who view absolution primarily as a transfer of
¯
ownership, this type of absolution is deemed invalid.
3. The absolving party must be acting voluntarily of his own volition. Thus,
absolutions by coerced creditors are deemed invalid.
81.1.1 Absolution agency

Agency to conduct an absolution is valid, provided that the principal autho-
rizes the agent specifically to engage in that transaction. Thus, an agent who is
authorized for other contracts is not implicitly authorized to absolve the prin-
cipal’s debtors. Moreover, the H . anafı̄s do not allow an agent who is authorized
to absolve debtors to appoint a secondary absolution agent.
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that an absolution agency is valid if the principal knows
¯
of the size of the absolved debt, even if the agent and the debtor do not know its
2
size. Since most Shāfic ı̄s viewed absolution primarily as a transfer of ownership,
¯
they do not allow the creditor to appoint the debtor as an absolution agent for
himself. They based this ruling on analogy to the impermissibility of appointing
an agent to buy from himself. However, a minority of the Shāfic ı̄s permitted
¯
appointing the debtor as his own absolution agent, on the basis of viewing
absolution primarily as a dropping of the creditor’s right.
81.1.2 Absolution by a dying creditor

The first condition implies that the absolving party cannot be terminally ill.
Thus, if a terminally ill creditor absolves one of his heirs of a debt, the abso-
lution is deemed suspended pending the permission of the other heirs, even if
the absolved debt was smaller than one-third of the ill creditor’s estate. If a
terminally ill creditor absolves the debt of a non-heir, then the absolution of
any portion of that debt exceeding one-thirds the dying creditor’s estate is sus-
pended pending the approval of his heirs. Those rulings follow since absolution
is a voluntary contribution contract that has to obey the rules of inheritance if
the absolving party is dying. Moreover, if the terminally ill person absolves a
debtor, while his own estate is less than the sum of his debts, the absolution is
not executed, to protect the rights of the dying person’s creditors.3
2 Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . Al-Sh ¯
irbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.222), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152).
¯ ¯
3 Indian Authors ((H . anafı̄), [vol.4, p.382), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.281; vol.7,
p.23), Al-Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, pp.159,162), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152), Al-Majallah Al-
¯
c Adliyyah (items # 1570,1571), ¯
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.98).
81.2. ABSOLVED DEBTOR CONDITIONS 245
81.2 Absolved debtor conditions

The H . anbalı̄ jurists agree that the absolved debtor must be known and iden-
tified.4 Thus, if a creditor absolves “one of his debtors”, without specifying
which one, the absolution is rendered invalid. Similarly, they ruled that the
absolution is invalid if the creditor says: “I have absolved all of my debtors”,
unless he means a specific set of debtors or identifies them.
The Shāfic ı̄s also invalidated absolutions in which the absolved debtors are
¯
not known or properly identified. They based this ruling on the view that abso-
lution involves a transfer of ownership, which is not permissible if the transferee
is unknown. Thus, the absolved debtor, to whom ownership is transferred, must
be known, whereas the absolving creditor merely drops his right, and thus need
not be known.
Al-Majallah summarized this condition (item #1567) as follows: “The ab-
solved parties must be known and identified. Thus, if someone says: ‘I have
absolved all of my debtors’, or ‘nobody owes me anything anymore’, the abso-
lution is not valid. However, if he says: ‘I have absolved the residents of this
location’, where those residents are thus an identified set of individuals, then
the absolution is valid”.
The absolved debtor’s denial of the absolved debt does not affect the validity
of the absolution, even if the debtor were to back his denial with an oath.
This ruling follows from the fact that the non-Mālikı̄ jurists consider absolution
concluded by the offer alone, regardless of acceptance of the contract or the
absolved debt by the absolved debtor.
81.3 Absolved debt conditions

The absolved debt must satisfy the following conditions:5
1. The latter Shāfic ı̄ doctrine stipulates that the absolved debt must be
¯
known. Thus, it is not valid to absolve debts that are unknown in genus,
amount, or characteristics, where attaining knowledge thereof is difficult.
This ruling follows from the view that absolution is a transfer of owner-
ship, which thus requires consent. In this regard, ignorance of the object
of the contract negates the possibility of consent. On the other hand, if a
person “absolves another of the silver coins he owes him”, without know-
ing the size of the debt, the debtor is thus absolved of his liability of three
coins, which is the smallest amount for which the Arabic plural form can
be used.
4 Jāmic Al-Fusūliyyı̄n (Al-’Azhariyyah edition, 1300 A.H., vol.1, p.125), Al-Kharshı̄
. ¯ ¯
(1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄), vol.6, p.99), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯
5 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, pp.182-3), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.411), Al-Khatı̄b
. ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.202 onwards), Al-Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.326 onwards),
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.336).
On the other hand, they said that absolution of unknown debt may be
accomplished by absolving the debtor for an amount known to exceed the
size of the debt. Thus, if the creditor wishes to absolve his debtor, but
does not know whether he owes him $5 or $10, he may absolve him of his
debt for $15, thus making sure that the debtor is absolved.
Moreover, they stipulated two exceptions to the prohibition of absolving
unknown debts. The first is absolution from a liability for a certain number
of camels in retribution for killing a relative. In this case, the liability is
unknown in terms of the camels’ characteristics, even though their ages
and number is known. In this case, the absolution is deemed valid, and
the characteristics of the camels of the absolved liability are deemed to be
the average characteristics in the relevant part of the world. As a second
exception, they allowed absolution of unknown debts upon the creditor’s
death, since that can be viewed in fact as part of the creditor’s will.
. anbalı̄s disagreed with the Sh āfic ı̄s, and al-
¯
lowed absolution of liabilities for goods that are unknown in amount and
characteristics, even if it is not difficult to get that information. They
based this ruling on the view that absolution is primarily a dropping of
the creditor’s right without compensation (in analogy to divorce and free-
ing of slaves), and thus it can be executed whether or not the object of
contract is known. Thus, they consider the absolution valid if a creditor
to “absolve his debtor of one of his two debts”, without specifying which
one.
However, the H . anbalı̄s stipulated an exception to this rule if the debtor
intentionally withholds information regarding the size of his debt, for fear
that the creditor may not absolve him if he has that information. In
this case, they ruled that the absolution is not valid, since it involves
unnecessary deception of the absolving creditor.
2. The absolved debt must be fungible. This ruling follows from the fact
that non-fungibles cannot be established as liabilities, and absolution is a
dropping of established liabilities. Thus, if a person usurps a particular
book, absolution from this usurpation is not valid. In contrast, liabilities
for fungibles or vaguely specified non-fungibles (e.g. camels as retribution
for a killing) are valid. Moreover, absolutions from legal rights, such as the
right to level a charge, or the right to demand repayment from a guarantor
or debt-transferee, are valid.
3. The object of absolution must exist at the time of absolution. Thus,
absolution from a right prior to its establishment is invalid. For instance,
absolving a man from a future debt is not permissible. Consequently, the
H. anafı̄s did not allow a wife to absolve her husband from future spending
on her needs, or from alimony expenses if he were to divorce her in the
future. This condition follows from the fact that absolution is a dropping
of a right, and a right cannot be dropped if it is not established. Proof
for this condition was also provided by the H . adı̄th : “You cannot divorce
¯
81.4. ABSOLUTION LANGUAGE CONDITIONS 247
someone to whom you are not married, and you cannot free a slave that
you do not own”.6 Clearly, absolution is similar to those contracts in
terms of its characterization as a pure dropping of rights.
81.4 Absolution language conditions

The absolution contract and its language must satisfy four conditions:7
1. The non-Mālikı̄s ruled that absolution must be immediately executed, i.e.

it cannot be suspended pending a condition, or deferred to a future date.
They based this ruling on the view that absolution implies a transfer of
ownership, which transfer cannot be suspended pending a condition.
• Thus, if the contract language suspends absolution pending a condi-

tion that is in fact satisfied at the time of absolution, the contract is
thus executed. Jurists also agreed that the contract is permissible if
absolution is suspended pending an admissible condition (e.g. “if you
owe me, then you are absolved”, or “if I die, then you are absolved”).
They provided proof for the latter ruling by the statement of the
Prophet’s companion ’Abū Al-Yusr (mAbpwh) to his debtor: “If you
can pay your debt, then pay it, otherwise you are absolved”, and his
action was not criticized. Thus, the H . anafı̄s allow in absolution of
guaranty or debt transfer that the absolving creditor may say: “If
you repay me tomorrow, then you are absolved of your guaranty”,
whereby the guarantor is absolved if he does bring the repayment on
the following day.
• In this regard, the H . anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s permitted absolution to be
suspended pending the creditor’s death, since absolution in this case
is tantamount to being part of the will. In this regard, inclusion of
absolution of debt in a person’s will is permissible. On the other
hand, most H . anafı̄s, with few exceptions, did not permit absolution
pending other types of conditions merely because they are conven-
tional.
• The non-Mālikı̄s ruled that it is not permissible to suspend absolution
pending any conditions other than the ones mentioned above. They
based this ruling on the view that absolution implies a transfer of
6 This is a Hadı̄th Hasan, narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd, and Al-Hākim. It was also narrated by
. ¯ . .
’Ibn Mājah on the authority of Al-Musawwar as: “There is no divorce before marriage, and
no freeing of a slave prior to owning him”.
7 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.41,44 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4,
. .
p.176; vol.2, p.330), Indian Authors ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, pp.378,384), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄),
vol.6, pp.45,50,118), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.307; vol.4, pp.89,99,100), Al-Shaykh
c Elı̄sh ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, pp.229,322,335), Al-Suyūtı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Sh ¯ ¯
. . ı̄rāzı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.10, p.100), Al-Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.292; vol.3, pp.45,83,310; vol.4, p.368),
¯ ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.305; vol.4, p.337), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.483
onwards; vol.5, p.564), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.66).
¯ ¯ ¯
property, which transfer cannot be suspended. However, as we have

seen, suspension pending a condition is permissible for contracts that
involve a pure dropping of a person’s right, with no compensation.
• In contrast, the Mālikı̄s allow suspension of absolution pending a
condition in all cases. The based this ruling on the view of absolution
as a dropping of the creditor’s right.
On the other hand, all four schools of jurisprudence agreed that it is

permissible to tie absolution to a valid condition, and did not permit
tying it to an invalid condition. Thus, if the creditor absolves the debtor
on condition that he has an option, the absolution is deemed valid, and
the condition is invalidated. Similarly, if the creditor absolves the debtor
of all rights associated with him, that absolution would include the rights
associated with options. In this case, the absolution is valid, while the
invalid condition of dropping the option is invalidated. This ruling follows
from the fact that absolution, while it implies a transfer of ownership, is
weaker in this respect than gift contracts.
Jurists also agreed that it is invalid to defer absolution to any future
date (known or unknown) other than a time of death. This ruling follows
from the view that the default in absolution is immediate execution of the
transfer of ownership, which generally cannot be deferred to a future date.
Finally, we consider a partial absolution, in which the debtor is still re-
quired to repay part of the debt:
• All jurists agree that if the language of partial absolution is devoid of

any conditions, then the absolution is valid. Thus, the creditor may
say to the debtor: “I absolve you of one-half of your debt to me, so
pay me the other half”. This contract is thus executed immediately,
since it is neither suspended pending a condition nor deferred to a
future date. Indeed, the absolving creditor in this case voluntarily
drops part of his right, and is acting in accordance with the H . adı̄th
¯
in which the Prophet (pbuh) told Kac b: “Drop part of the debt he
8
owes you”.
• If the absolution is suspended pending payment of the other part of
the debt, then the Mālikı̄s deem the absolution valid, while the non-
Mālikı̄s consider it invalid. Those rulings follow from the previous
views reviewed under the suspension clause.
• If the absolution is tied to the condition of repayment of the other
part of the debt (e.g. “I absolve you of $500, on condition that
you must pay me the other $500”), then the H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and
Shāfic ı̄s deem the absolution valid. They ruled thus based on the
¯
view that the contract is in fact a demand for recollection of part of
the debt, and a dropping of the other part. In this case, the Shāfic ı̄s
¯
8 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of Ziyād ibn ’Abı̄ H
¯ . adrad.
required the creditor to use both the language of absolution and

the language of settlement, to justify the settlement aspect of this
contract. However, they maintained that acceptance of the debtor is
not required in this case, due to the usage of absolution language.
In contrast, the H. anbalı̄s ruled that absolutions tied to conditions are
not valid. They ruled thus since they viewed the previous example
as an absolution of part of the debt in exchange for payment of the
other part. It would thus seem to be a commutative contract in
which part of the right is traded for another part, which they deemed
impermissible.
Of course, the above difference in opinion pertains to tying the par-
tial absolution to the condition of eventual payment of the other part
of the debt. However, as the Shāfic ı̄s showed, it is not permissible
¯
to tie partial absolution to a condition that the other part is paid
immediately, to avoid similarity with pre-Islamic forms of ribā. How-
ever, it is permissible in the first case for the debtor in fact to repay
the other part of the debt immediately, as long as speeding up its
payment was not stipulated as a condition for the partial absolution.
2. Absolution should not violate any Legal requirement. For instance, ab-
solution of the condition of mutual receipt during a currency exchange
contract defies Islamic Law, and is thus invalid. Other invalid examples
include absolution from the woman’s right to a dwelling during her wait-
ing period after divorce (c iddah), or absolution of the obligation to act as
a small child’s guardian.
Moreover, absolution is rendered invalid if it affects adversely the rights of
a third party. For instance, if a divorced mother absolves the husband of
her custody rights, the absolution is deemed invalid, since custody rights
pertain both to the child and his custodian.
3. The absolving creditor must have a prior right to the object of absolution.
This condition follows from the fact that dealing in the property of others
is not permitted except as an agent acting as a proxy for the owner. In
this regard, even the jurists who permit un-commissioned agent dealings
permit them thus if he acts in the guise of an owner, otherwise they would
have forbidden them as dealing in the property of another. Thus, all jurists
agree on this third condition.
In addition, the H. anafı̄s considered as valid the absolution of rights after
they are dropped or debts after they are repaid. They based this ruling on
the view that what is dropped through debt repayment is the right to de-
mand repayment, and not the debt itself. In other words, debt repayment
establishes an equal debt on the creditor, and the two debts cancel each
other out in terms of the respective parties’ rights to demand compensa-
tions from each other. However, the two debts are cancelled out through
the clearing of debts (muqās..sah) rather than the mere act of repayment.
Thus, if the creditor absolves the debtor after he had repaid his debt as a
dropping absolution, then the debtor may thus demand to recollect what
he gave him. On the other hand, the debtor has no such right if the
creditor issued a repayment absolution. In this regard, the type of abso-
lution (dropping vs. repayment) is determined by convention. Thus, the
H. anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s agree that if one person volunteers to repay the debt
of another, and then the creditor concludes a dropping absolution of the
debt, the volunteer may demand to recollect what he paid the absolving
creditor.9
4. Absolution must take place after the underlying right is established. This
follows from the fact that absolution essentially involves dropping an es-
tablished liability. Thus, jurists have agreed that absolutions prior to
the establishment of the underlying rights are invalid. Such dropping of
rights is impossible prior to the establishment of those rights, and thus
the absolution is merely a non-binding promise.
If the absolution is issued prior to the establishment of the right, jurists
differ on its status after the right is established. The non-Mālikı̄s ruled
that the absolution is invalid unless it is issued after the establishment of
the underlying right. As proof, they relied on the previously cited H . adı̄th :
¯
“There is no divorce prior to marriage, and no freeing of a slave prior to
owning it”, thus reasoning that absolution is similar to those two instances
of dropping rights mentioned in the H . adı̄th .
¯
The H . anafı̄s thus provided examples of invalid absolutions based on the
violation of this condition. Those include absolving a husband from his
liability for his wife’s expenses before they are estimated, and absolution
of the buyer from the price of what he has not yet bought.
The Shāfic ı̄s also gave examples of such premature absolutions. For in-
¯
stance, they listed the case of a woman’s absolution of her dowry if her
husband died prior to consummating the marriage, and whose marriage
dissolution compensation was not determined. They also gave the exam-
ple of invalid absolution from alimony payments prior to divorce. In both
cases, the liability underlying the absolution was not established prior to
absolution.
Another example that they provided pertains to the case where a buyer
absolves the seller of his guaranty of the merchandise against perishing
prior to its receipt. In this case, the guaranty was non-existent prior to
absolution, and hence the absolution is invalidated.
However, they also listed some exceptional cases in which premature ab-
solution can be valid. One such exception is the case of a man who digs a
well in another person’s property, and without the owner’s permission. In
this case, if the land’s owner absolves him of his transgression and agrees
9 ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition (H
. anbalı̄), p.120).
to keep the well, the unauthorized digger of the well is absolved of his
responsibility for individuals or animals that may fall in it.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s had two reported opinions regarding the
validity of absolution prior to the establishment of the underlying liability.
Thus, the majority ruled that a woman’s absolution of a future husband
of his responsibility for her future expenses is binding on her. On the
other hand, they divided equally on the bindingness of the dropping of a
preemption right prior to the sale. They also divided somewhat equally
over the absolution for future wounds, and absolution by future heirs of
rights to the estate of a terminally ill person to another future heir or a
third party for more than one third of the estate.
Chapter 82
Objects of Absolution
The object of an absolution may be a non-fungible property, a fungible property,

or a legal right. In what follows, we shall study the three cases in some detail.1
82.1 Non-fungible properties

Absolutions may pertain to the right to demand recollection of a non-fungible
property, or they may pertain to the non-fungible property itself. The former
is in fact an absolution pertaining to a legal right, and we shall see later in
this chapter that all jurists consider it a valid dropping of a legal right. In this
section, we are mainly concerned with the latter case of absolutions pertaining
to the non-fungible property itself.
Jurists agree that absolution regarding the non-fungible property itself is in-
valid, since it would imply dropping the ownership of that non-fungible property.
We have seen previously that such ownership rights of non-fungibles cannot be
dropped. Thus, the absolution is invalid, and ownership of the non-fungible is
not transferred to the absolved debtor. Thus, the owner may recall the non-
fungible property, even if he had absolved its holder for the item itself.
Thus, the majority of H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that a general
¯
absolution of liability for a non-fungible is understood to mean dropping the
right to demand its return to the owner. However, some H . anafı̄ books main-
tained that the owner retains the right to take his non-fungible property after
the absolution if he has an opportunity to do so.
The H . anafı̄s further ruled that absolution of liability for a non-fungible itself
results in dropping its guaranty if it is guaranteed (e.g. due to being usurped),
regardless of whether or not the property had perished at the time of absolu-
tion. Thus, absolution renders the previously guaranteed property to be held
in a possession of trust, in analogy to a deposit in the possession of a usurper.
Thus, if the property was intact at the time of absolution, its holder would only
1 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.182 onwards; vol.4, p.495), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3,
.
p.411), Al-Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.327), ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition (H
. anbalı̄), p.119 onwards).
¯
253
254 CHAPTER 82. OBJECTS OF ABSOLUTION
guarantee it against transgression and negligence. On the other hand, if it had

perished prior to absolution, then its holder is absolved of his liability for its
value. On the other hand, absolution for non-fungible properties that were in
a possession of trust is meaningless. In the latter case, the absolution is still
recognized legally, but has no consequences since the owner of the property may
still take it after the absolution if the opportunity should arise.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s interpreted absolution of liability for a non-fungible
property as dropping the right of demanding compensation for its value if it
perishes in the possession of the absolved party, as well as dropping the right to
demand its return when it is intact.
82.2 Fungible debts

As we have seen, jurists agree that absolutions of established liabilities for fun-
gible debts are valid. This ruling follows immediately from the stated maxim
that the essence of absolution is the dropping of established liabilities.
82.3 Absolution of legal rights

There are three types of legal rights to consider in this section:
• Jurists agree that absolutions of legal rights that pertain only to humans
(e.g. arising from guaranty or debt-transfer) are valid.
• Jurists agree that absolutions are invalid for rights that belong only to
Allāh, e.g. punishment rights for adultery, libel, and theft (for the H . anafı̄s
and Mālikı̄s those rights are established after guilt is established in a court
of law).
• Absolutions in lieu of most rights that pertain primarily to humans are
deemed valid. Examples include rights of retribution for killing or murder,
rights to usufruct, rights to void a sale based on the defect option, rights
to collect compensation for the destruction of one’s property, and similar
personal rights that are established as liabilities on others. Thus, jurists
agreed that it is permissible to absolve a debtor after his death. However,
the H. anafı̄s differed in opinion regarding voiding the absolution if the
debtor’s heir rejects the absolution.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s ruled that absolutions are deemed invalid
if they result in overruling Legal clauses. Thus, they ruled in opposition
to the other schools that the right of recalling a gift cannot be absolved.
However, all jurists agree that the right to change one’s will cannot be
absolved, the right associated with the inspection option cannot be ab-
solved, entitlement rights to property in a trust cannot be absolved, and
the right to inheritance cannot be absolved.
In what follows, we shall study some special cases for which absolution rul-
ings are somewhat special.
82.3. ABSOLUTION OF LEGAL RIGHTS 255
82.3.1 Absolution of alimony

Jurists agree that a wife or soon-to-be-wife may not absolve her husband of her
alimony expenses until they are established as a liability on him. This ruling
follows from the previously stated condition that absolution requires the prior
establishment of a liability.
However, if an invalid premature absolution of future alimony is concluded,
then the H. anafı̄s ruled that the future alimony thus does not become a liability
on the ex-husband unless it is enforced by a court of law, or by mutual con-
sent. Moreover, they ruled that absolution of suspended previously established
alimony may be absolved. Moreover, absolution of alimony for any time period
may be absolved at the beginning of that period (depending on whether the
alimony is established annually, monthly, or daily).
82.3.2 Mutual absolution of spouses

A husband and wife may mutually absolve each other of all marriage rights to
dissolve the marriage. The H. anafı̄s ruled that such mutual absolution results in
an irrevocable divorce of the wife, in analogy to divorce at the instance of the
wife in exchange for financial compensation (khulc ). Thus, the husband may
¯
say: “I offer that we mutually absolve each other of all marriage responsibility,
in exchange for $1000”. Then, if the wife accepts, the marriage is dissolved and
counted as a divorce.
82.3.3 Absolution of the right to level a charge

There are two types of absolution of rights to level a charge against another:
• Jurists agreed that absolutions of the right to level any charge against a
person are invalid. They based this ruling on the fact that such absolution
refers to charges for which no basis existed at the time of absolution. As
we have seen, absolution of rights prior to their establishment is considered
invalid.
However, jurists allow a person to absolve another of all existing charges.2
• Jurists agree that absolution of any given charge is deemed valid. Thus,
the absolver’s charge is not considered were he to level it after having
absolved it.3
Moreover, absolution of a right may be made explicit, or it may be implicitly

inferred from the context. For instance, we have seen that the H . anafı̄s consider
an absolution of liability for a non-fungible property to be implicitly understood
as absolution of its guaranty, or absolution of the right to demand its return to
the owner.
2 Al-Majallah (item # 1565).

3 Al-Majallah (item # 1564).
Chapter 83
Absolution Types
Absolutions may be divided along three different directions pertaining to: (i)
their varying degrees of generality, (ii) the timing of their consequences, and
(iii) languages of dropping vs. languages of repayment.
83.1 Generality of absolutions

Absolutions may be general or specific:1
• General absolutions pertain to all liabilities for fungibles, non-fungibles

and rights that are owed by one party to another. As the H . anafı̄s pointed
out, such general absolutions cover all rights, including non-monetary ones
such as liability for a person in guaranties of individuals, the right to
physical retribution for murder, the penalty for libel. Of course, they also
cover monetary rights as in absolutions of liabilities for prices, wages, and
rents. Finally, they cover non-monetary compensations in commutative
contracts such as dowry, compensation for transgression against life and
limb, as well as guaranteed properties such as usurped ones, and properties
in possessions of trust such as deposits and simple loans.
• Specific absolutions pertain to a specific right. Such specific absolutions

are restricted to the underlying rights, and do not extend beyond them.
Thus, a person may absolve another of a specific debt, or all his debts to
a specific party. Similarly, a person may be absolved for a house, other
non-fungible properties, or a trust.
83.2 Absolution timing

Absolutions can only affect rights and liabilities that existed prior to its con-
clusion, and cannot extend to rights and liabilities that ensue afterwards. This
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.495).
257
258 CHAPTER 83. ABSOLUTION TYPES
follows from the agreed upon condition of absolution validity that the underly-
ing right must exist prior to the contract. Thus, it was stated in the Fatāwā of
Qād.ı̄khān that: “Earlier absolution do not affect later debts”.
¯
However, jurists differed in opinion regarding the effects of prior absolutions
once their underlying right comes into existence. Thus, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Mālik
ruled that a prior absolution of a buyer for part of a price becomes appended to
the sales contract. Thus, if a person had a preemption right to the sold property,
he can benefit by that decrease in its price caused by the partial absolution. On
the other hand, the H . anbalı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that the preemption becomes
¯
valid after the sale comes into place. However, they ruled that only the buyer
can benefit from such a reduction in price, and a person with preemption rights
has either to pay the full price or to allow the sale to be executed.2
83.3 Dropping vs. repayment absolutions

The H. anafı̄s classified absolution contract languages into those that imply a
dropping absolution, and those that imply a repayment absolution:3
• Dropping absolutions cause the established liability to be dropped. The

language of such absolutions often uses the terms for “dropping” or “re-
ducing” the underlying liability, which may be absolved fully or partially.
• Repayment absolutions are basically an acknowledgement for having re-

ceived a repayment of the underlying debt. It only implies that the repaid
creditor is not allowed to demand repayment thereafter. The language of
such absolutions often uses the terms for “receipt” or “repayment”.
The difference between those two types of absolutions becomes apparent

when we consider the right to seek compensation from the absolving creditor.
Thus, jurists agree that if the debtor had repaid his debt, then he can seek
compensation if the debt is latter absolved in a dropping absolution, but not if
it is absolved through a repayment absolution. Consequently, if a man suspends
divorcing his wife pending her absolution of her dowry, and then he pays the
dowry anyway, the suspension is not thus voided. Only if the wife issues a
dropping absolution will she be divorced, and only then will the husband be
entitled to seek compensation for his paid dowry.
Moreover, only dropping absolutions result in the dropping of debts, while
repayment absolutions do not. Also, dropping absolutions are invalid in liabil-
ities for non-fungibles, since their ownership cannot be dropped. In contrast,
repayment absolution can apply to liabilities for fungibles or non-fungibles, since
repayment can take place for both types by delivering the owner’s property to
him.
2 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.271), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.495), ’Ibn
.
.
Chapter 84
Legal Status
If an absolution is concluded satisfying all of its conditions, then the underlying

right is dropped. If that underlying right was specific, then the absolver would
thus have no right to renew his charge regarding that right. If the underlying
right is general, covering all existing rights at its inception, then its effects do
not extend to rights that ensue after the contract’s conclusion.
The H. anafı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that an absolver cannot
¯
withdraw his absolution after it is concluded. This ruling applies by analogy to
the impermissibility of withdrawing a gift after its ownership is transferred to
the recipient.1 Since the Mālikı̄s require acceptance as a validity condition in
absolution, they ruled that the absolver is not allowed to withdraw his absolution
after the absolved party accepts it, also by analogy to the ruling for gifts.2
The H . anafı̄s listed some special circumstances in which an absolver may
renew his charge after the absolution:3
1. If sold property is discovered to have been owned by a party other than

the seller, then the buyer or the original owner may demand the seller’s
guaranty of the merchandise, even if he had absolved him after the sale
and prior to discovering the true owner.
2. If a previously unknown right of an underage person is discovered, then

he may level a charge against his plenipotentiary upon its discovery, even
if he had absolved him of all responsibilities after reaching legal age and
prior to discovering that right.
3. A plenipotentiary may seek repayment of a debt owed to the deceased,

even if he had previously issued a general absolution for all debts owed to
him.
1 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.182), Al-Suyūtı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.152), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
. . ¯
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.346).
2 Al-Qarāfı̄ ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.111).
3 Tanbı̄h Dhawı̄ Al-’Afhām by ’Ibn c Abidı̄n (vol.2, p.91).
¯
259
4. An heir may seek repayment of a debt owed to the deceased, even if he

had previously issued a general absolution for all debts owed to him.
In all of those instances, new information is revealed, which thus authorizes the
issuer of a general absolution to level a charge nonetheless.
Note that the H . anafı̄s view the dropping of a creditor’s right to demand
repayment of a debt upon absolution to pertain only to the claim, but not to
the actual right to take possession of the property. Thus, if the creditor has an
opportunity to regain possession of the property after absolving its holder, he
may take it.4
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that absolution of obligations in this world implies absolu-
¯
tion of all responsibility in the hereafter.5 The Mālikı̄s had two opinions on this
matter, with most of them agreeing with the Shāfic ı̄ view that Allāh will not
¯
punish anyone for a right that he denied but was absolved for by his creditor.6
84.1 Charges after general absolution

We have seen that charges leveled after an absolution are legally ignored. How-
ever, the H. anafı̄s explained this ruling by saying that charges are ignored after
general absolutions of debts, except for debts that ensued after the absolution.
If the absolution was regarding a non-fungible, then the claimant’s charge is
ignored if the claimed debtor denied the claim’s validity. However, if the claimed
debtor admitted the claim’s validity, then the charge can be legally considered
even after its liability is absolved. Finally, if the claim is acknowledged, but the
non-fungible had perished, then the absolution implies that its guaranty was
dropped, and charges thereof are therefore ignored.
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that acknowledgement of a
claim is ignored if it is issued after a general absolution. This ruling follows
from the fact that the debt is thus dropped by virtue of the absolution, and
dropped debts may not be reinstated through acknowledgement or otherwise.7
84.2 Compensated absolution

The H . anafı̄s defined compensated absolution as a settlement in exchange for
some property.8 The Shāfic ı̄s permitted such compensated absolutions.9 Thus,
¯
if the debtor gives some property to his creditor to absolve him of his debt,
the creditor would thus own the property he received, and the debtor is thus
absolved. However, if the debtor pays him part of the debt on condition that he
absolves him of the rest, the payment would not be viewed as a compensation
4 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.495; vol.2, p.182).
5 Al-Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.327).
¯
7 ’Ic lām Al-’Ac lām by ’Ibn c Abidı̄n (vol.2, p.101), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol3, p.411).
.
9 Hāshiyat Al-Jamal c alā Sharh Al-Manhaj, ’Ihyā’ Al-Turāth edition, (vol.3, p.381).
. ¯ ¯ . . ¯
84.2. COMPENSATED ABSOLUTION 261
since the creditor would thus have received part of his right and the rest of
the debt remains a liability on the debtor. In the latter case, the non-Mālikı̄s
consider the absolution to be invalid, as we have seen in the contract language
conditions section.
Part XIII
Entitlement (Al-’Istih.qāq)
263
265
Preliminaries
We shall study entitlements in three chapters:
1. Definition and legal consequences.
2. The effects of entitlement in a set of contracts: sales, barter, pawning, di-

vision of joint property, settlement, leasing, crop sharing, marriage (with
regards to divorce compensations paid by either party), will, and mort-
mains.
3. The legal status of entitlements to animals sacrificed on the day of pil-
grimage.
Chapter 85
Definition and
Consequences
85.1 definition
Entitlement (’istih.qāq) refers lexically to demanding the return of the entitled
party’s right. For instance, a buyer is entitled to the merchandise once he pays
its price.
Juristically, the term refers to discovering that a property belongs to another
party. In other words, entitlement takes place when a person claims ownership
of a property, and a judge rules that he is indeed entitled to it based on the
proofs he provides. Consequently, the entitled party may take his property from
its possessor. In this regard, the Mālikı̄s defined entitlement thus: “It is the
voiding of ownership of a property, due to the establishment of a prior ownership
right”.
85.2 Legal Consequences

Entitlements may be divided into two main categories based on the resulting
voiding of ownership:1
1. Entitlements that void all ownership of the property, so that no party

maintains ownership rights after the entitlement. Thus, the property after
such entitlement has the same properties as free or freed humans.
This type of entitlement voids a contract without the need for a court
ruling. Thus, if a sold slaves can prove that he was free or previously
freed, then everyone in his chain of buyers may demand compensation
for his price from the respective seller. In this regard, every buyer may
267
268 CHAPTER 85. DEFINITION AND CONSEQUENCES
demand such compensation even before buyers further down the chain
demand theirs.
2. Entitlements that transfer ownership from one party to another are the
most common. For instance, if A claims that a property in B’s possession
belongs to him and provides proof for his claim, ownership rights are thus
transferred from B to A.
This type of entitlement need not void a contract. For instance, if C sold
the property to B, and then A made an entitlement claim to the property,
the sale is suspended pending the entitled party’s decision to permit the
sale or to void it. Most H
. anafı̄s ruled in this case that the contract would
only be voided if the buyer demands compensation for the price from the
seller. Moreover, most jurists seem to agree that voiding the sale requires
mutual consent, and does not take effect merely by the establishment of
entitlement.
If this type of entitlement results in voiding a chain of sales, then each
buyer in the chain is only allowed to claim compensation for the price he
paid after the buyer further down the chain demands compensation from
him. This ruling is based on the desire to prevent one party (the middle
buyer) from collecting two prices for the same item of sale.
Entitlement claims apply to the possessor of a property, and anyone from
whom the possessor may have gained ownership. Thus, the author of
Al-Durr Al-Mukhtār said: “The ruling of entitlement is a ruling on the
¯
possessor of a property, and everyone from whom he obtained ownership,
including inheritance. In the case of entitlement of inherited property, the
entitlement effects extend to all the heirs”.
85.2.1 Proofs of entitlement claims

If an entitlement claim is established legally for some property, then the buyer
of that property may demand compensation from the seller for the price he
paid. Thus, the proof of entitlement extends to any party in possession of the
property. Consequently, that proof requires a ruling by a court of law, since
its consequences affect the rights of the public, and thus it must be issued by a
public authority.
In contrast, if a claim of entitlement is only established through an acknowl-
edgement by the buyer or his lawyer, or if they deny the claim but refuse to
support their denial with an oath, then the buyer does not have the right to
demand compensation for the price from the seller. This follows from the fact
that the buyer’s acknowledgement of the claim can only affect him, and thus
cannot be extended to affect the seller, since he has no legal authority over him.2

. anafı̄), vol.4, p.203).
85.2. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 269
85.2.2 Self-contradicting claims

If one party makes two contradictory claims at different points in time, any claim
thereof regarding ownership of property or usufruct is voided.3 For instance,
A would be contradicting himself if denied that B was his brother, to avoid
responsibility for one of his liabilities, and then later claimed to be B’s brother
upon his death, to share in his inheritance. Thus, A’s claims will be rejected
legally due to the self-contradiction.
On the other hand, if the first claim did not establish any legal rights, then
later claims are not rejected. For instance, if a person absolves all the residents
of a town of all debts, he may later claim that a resident of that town owes him
a debt.
Moreover, a latter claim is not rejected if the prior claim related to unknown
circumstances (e.g. a tie of kinship, divorce, or freedom of an individual):
• For instance, a person may claim entitlement of a dress that he had bought
in a wrapping, and thus that he could not identify.
• An example relating to kinship is the following. If a slave was sold and

resold, and then the first seller claimed that the slave was in fact his free
son, his claim is thus accepted. Consequently, both sales will be invali-
dated. This may happen since the first seller may have not been aware at
the time of the kinship tie, and hence he is excused for contradicting his
earlier claim (that the sold individual was his slave).
• An example relating to divorce is the following. A woman and the heirs

of her ex-husband may exchange oaths, and (being adults) they may ac-
knowledge that she was indeed married to him towards the end of his life.
Then, if they can later provide a proof that he had divorced her three
times during his lifetime, they may recollect the portion of the estate that
she was given.
• An example relating to freedom of a human is the following. If either the

buyer or the seller can provide a proof that the slave was freed prior to
his sale, the claim is thus accepted. In this regard, contradiction between
the two claims before and after the sale is permissible in the case of slave
freeing.

Chapter 86
Rulings for Specific

Contracts
86.1 Sales and barter

Entitlement of one of the compensations in a barter sale invalidates the sale.1
Thus, if a house is exchanged for a car, and then a claim of entitlement is proved
for the car, then the sale is voided even if the house was bought by a party with
preemption rights.
There are a number of juristic opinions regarding the effects of entitlement
on regular sales, which we shall discuss in some detail.
86.1.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
The H. anafı̄s stipulated a number of consequences of entitlement, depending on
whether the claim of entitlement pertained to part of the object of sale, all of
the object of sale, or the right to withhold the object of sale.2
(i) Partial entitlement of the merchandise

If a claim of entitlement to part of the merchandise is proved prior to receipt,
and if the entitled party did not permit the sale, then the sale is invalidated
for the entitled portion. This ruling follows from the fact that the proof of
entitlement is a proof that the entitled portion was sold without its rightful
owner’s permission. In this case, the buyer is given an option to take the
remainder of the merchandise in exchange for its portion, or to void the sale.
The buyer’s option is established regardless of whether or not the remaining
portion of the merchandise became defective. This ruling follows from the fact
1 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.211).
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.288 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.175
onwards).
271
272 CHAPTER 86. RULINGS FOR SPECIFIC CONTRACTS
that once the entitled party proved his claim and refused to permit the sale, the
contract was divided for the buyer prior to the contract’s conclusion. Thus, the
buyer is given the described option in analogy to the case of a divided sale.
The sale is voided for the portion of merchandise to which another party is
entitled, regardless of whether the merchandise was partially or fully received.
Then, if the entitlement of a portion implies a defectiveness in the remainder
(e.g. through partnership, if the entitled portion was part of a house or car),
then the buyer is given the option of taking the remaining portion for its share
in the price, or voiding the sale based on that defect.
However, if the buyer had received all of the merchandise and entitlement
to a portion thereof does not render the rest defective (e.g. entitlement was
claimed for one of two sold cars, or one of two sold measures of wheat), then
the buyer is bound by the other portion of the sale. In this case, dividing the
merchandise does not harm the buyer, and hence he is not given an option to
return the merchandise.
In summary, a proved claim of entitlement to part of the merchandise results
in a divided sale for the buyer. Thus, if the buyer had not yet received the
merchandise, he is given the option of taking the remaining part for its share of
the price, or voiding the contract based on its partitioning. On the other hand,
if the buyer was already in receipt of the merchandise, and the partitioning
was viewed as harmless, then the buyer is bound for the remaining portion in
exchange for its corresponding portion of the price.
(ii) Full entitlement of the merchandise

If an entitlement claim to the entire merchandise is approved by a court of law
based on provided evidence, the sale is deemed suspended pending the entitled
party’s permission. Thus, if he permits the sale, the buyer may keep the mer-
chandise, and the entitled party may thus take the price from the seller. This
ruling follows from considering the seller as the owner’s selling agent, since ex
post authorization is considered to be equivalent to ex ante agency authoriza-
tion. On the other hand, if the owner does not permit the sale, then it is voided
(by apparent mutual consent), and the seller must thus return the price to the
buyer.
One notable exception is the case of properties established as a mortmain. In
this case, the sale is necessarily voided if the property is proved to be established
thus, since nobody can authorize the sale of such property.
There are three conditions that must be established so that the buyer is
authorized to demand compensation for the price from the seller:3
1. The entitlement claim must pertain to ownership that preceded the sales
contract, thus transferring ownership from the seller to the entitled party.
Consequently, if a property was sold a year ago, and the entitlement claim
pertains to its ownership a month ago, then the buyer has no claims on
3c Aqd Al-Bayc by Professor Al-Zarqā’ (p.100 onwards).
86.1. SALES AND BARTER 273
the seller. In this case, the entitlement affects the buyer’s ownership of
the property, and not the seller’s.
2. If the buyer agreed with the entitled owner to return the merchandise
in exchange for part of the price, then the buyer would have voided his
right to demand compensation from the seller. On the other hand, if the
agreement was that the buyer would retain the merchandise in exchange
for an amount of money paid to the entitled owner, then the buyer retains
the right to demand compensation for the price he paid to the seller.
3. If the seller had absolved the seller of the price prior to the establishment
of entitlement, then the buyer has no right to demand compensation for
the price, since he did not pay anything for the merchandise.
If the buyer had not yet received the merchandise that is subject to the
claimed entitlement, then the judge must only consider the claim in the pres-
ence of the buyer and the seller. This rule follows since the entitlement claim
thus pertains to a property that is owned by the buyer and held in the seller’s
possession. Thus, both parties must be present.
On the other hand, only the buyer needs to be present if the entitlement
claim is issued after the merchandise was in his possession. On the other hand,
the buyer is entitled to demand that the seller be included as a third party in
the lawsuit, since the right to demand repayment of the price affects him.4
Any increases in the merchandise (e.g. offspring) may similarly be reclaimed
by the claimant of entitlement if he can prove it in a court of law. This ruling
again follows from the fact that a court’s ruling is extended to the rights of all
parties. In contrast, if ownership of the offspring is acknowledged by the buyer,
or by his refusal to support his denial with an oath, does not authorize the
claimant to take the offspring, since acknowledgement only affects the rights of
the acknowledging party.5
(iii) Entitlement to withholding rights

If a claimant can prove his entitlement to withhold the merchandise (e.g. if it
is pawned with him, or leased to him) in a court of law, then:
• If the entitled party permits the sale, the pawning or lease is voided. In
the case of pawning, the price takes the place of the sold property as
the object of pawning, and the pawn-broker is permitted to withhold the
merchandise until he receives the price. In the case of leasing, the lessee is
permitted to withhold the sold property until he receives a refund of any
paid rent for the remaining period.6
• If the withholding party does not permit the sale, he is not authorized
to void it. In this case, the entitled party is only permitted to retain
((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.207).
((H
6 c.f. Al-Majallah (pp.590,747).
possession of the property, and the buyer is given the option of waiting
until the property is released from pawning or leasing, or to void the
contract and have the paid price refunded.
86.1.2 Mālikı̄ rulings

If a person proved his claim of entitlement to a property in the possession of
another, then the Mālikı̄s distinguish between the cases where the entitlement
is partial or total.7
• If the entitled party has a partial right to a sold property, then he may
only demand compensation for the value of his entitlement, and may not
demand to take the entire property.
• If the claimant is entitled to the entire property, or most of it, and if the
property had not changed, then the claimant may take it, and the buyer
may seek a refund of the price from the seller.
On the other hand, if the property had changed in a manner that changed
its value, then the claimant should demand compensation from the buyer
for the value of the property on the day of the sale.
– If the change was a contiguous increase of the property (e.g. if it is
an animal that got larger in size), then the claimant may take the
property with the increase. However, if the increase was caused by
the buyer (e.g. extensions that he built to the house he bought), then
the claimant is given the option of paying for the increase and taking
the full property, receiving a payment for the property and leaving
it with the buyer, or sharing ownership of the larger property with
the buyer, in proportion to the entitlement of each. This opinion is
based on a ruling by c Umar ibn Al-Khat.t.āb.
¯
– If the change was a diminution in the property, then the possessor of
the property is not liable to the entitled claimant for that diminution
if he did not cause it. On the other hand, if he caused the diminution
(e.g. by destroying parts of a house and selling the rubble), then the
entitled claimant may take the price from him.
86.1.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings

¯
In what follows, we shall list some of the Shāfic ı̄ rulings regarding the effects of
¯
entitlement claims:8
• Partial entitlement of sold merchandise result in a partitioning of the con-

tract. Thus, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s referred in this case to their view that
¯
each portion of the merchandise should receive a separate ruling when a
7 ’IbnRushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.320 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.470).
8 ’Abū-’Ish āq
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, pp.269,288), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
. ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.2, pp.40-42,65-66), Al-H . ūt Al-Bayrūtı̄ (, vol.2, p.349 onwards).
86.1. SALES AND BARTER 275
sale is divided. Thus, the sale is deemed invalid for the portion owned by
the claimant, and valid for the rest. The buyer may then seek a refund
for the portion of the price corresponding to the claimed portion.
• If a full entitlement claim is accepted, then the buyer may seek a full
refund from the seller, whether or not he knew of the entitlement at the
inception of the contract. This ruling follows from the fact that ownership
is taken away from the buyer in this case based on a legal reason that
existed while the property was in the seller’s possession. Thus, the sale is
voided.
• If the entitlement claim was made after the sale but before delivery, the
claimant is not allowed to demand compensation for the property from
the buyer, since the latter had not received the property. Moreover, if the
first buyer re-sold the property without ever taking possession of it, the
claimant is not allowed to demand delivery from the first buyer.
In this case, if the buyer placed the property in the buyer’s possession,
the buyer would not guarantee it. Thus, the claimant may not demand
compensation from the buyer, since placement in the latter’s possession is
not considered a receipt if the sale is invalid. Similarly, giving the buyer
access to a property is only considered a receipt by the buyer if the sale
is valid.
• If the buyer acknowledged the seller’s ownership of the property, and then
a third party claimed entitlement to it, the buyer may still demand a
refund from the seller. In this case, the buyer’s acknowledgement was
justified by the apparent ownership of the seller who was in possession of
the property.
• The Shāfic ı̄s agreed with the H . anafı̄s that the buyer is not allowed to
¯
seek a refund if the entitlement was established by the buyer’s explicit
acknowledgement or refusal to support his denial of the claim with an
oath. The Shāfic ı̄s ruled in this case that buyer is not entitled to a refund
¯
due to his contradictory actions of buying the property and acknowledging
the entitlement claim, or by his refusal to support his denial of the claim
with an oath.
• On the other hand, if the claimed entitlement is established with a material
proof, or by the joint acknowledgement of the buyer and seller, then the
buyer is entitled to a refund of the price or equivalent compensation thereof
if the price had perished.
86.1.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
9
The H. anbalı̄s ruled that the buyer is entitled to a refund of the price and any
expenses associated with the sold property (e.g. the cost of building or planting
9 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.216; vol.4, pp.47,112-3, 357).
trees in the sold land) if an entitlement claim to the property is established.

They based this ruling on the fact that the seller thus deceived the buyer by
selling him a property that the buyer presumed was his. The entitled party
may then remove the plants or buildings that the buyer put in his land, without
having to compensate the buyer for them. Thus, the H . anbalı̄s said: “If the
buyer built on the land he bought, and then the entitled owner took the land
and demolished the building, the buyer is entitled to the rubble, since it is his
property. In this case, the buyer may seek compensation for his losses from the
seller, who deceived him by selling him the property of another”. Al-Shaykh
¯ ¯
Al-Taqiyy restricted the latter ruling to the case where the seller was aware of
the entitlement of another to the property, otherwise he ruled that there was
no deception. The general H . anbalı̄ ruling in this case can be useful as a basis
for other rulings regarding compensations for financial loss.
On the other hand, the buyer is not entitled after the claimant’s entitlement
to a refund of expenses he spent on purchased animals or to the paid land-taxes,
since he was bound by the sales contract to the obligation for the expenditures
and taxes associated with the property.
86.2 Entitlement of a pawned object

86.2.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
If ownership of part of a pawned property is established through an entitlement
10
claim, the H
. anafı̄s ruled as follows regarding the rest of the property:
• If the remainder of the property was eligible for pawning by itself, that
part of the pawning is not rendered defective through the entitlement of
the other part.
• On the other hand, the entire pawning would be rendered defective if the
remainder of the property could not have been pawned independently.
This ruling is made by analogy to that regarding pawning an unidentified
portion of a property. The latter ruling is relevant since the invalidity of
the entitled portion of the pawning makes the remaining part an uniden-
tified portion of the property, hence rendering the pawning invalid.

The Mālikı̄s ruled that if entitlement is established for a specified part of a
pawned property, then the remaining part becomes a pawning in lieu of the
entire underlying debt.11 On the other hand, if entitlement is established for an
unidentified part of the pawned property, they ruled that the pawning debtor
10 Al-Kāsānı̄((H. anafı̄), vol.6, pp.141,151).
11 Al-Kharshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄), vol.5, pp.288,298 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r
¯ ¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.238).
86.2. ENTITLEMENT OF A PAWNED OBJECT 277
must give the creditor an equivalent property in lieu of the part that was not
his by entitlement.
On the other hand, they ruled that if the entire pawned property was an
object of entitlement prior to receipt, then the creditor is given the option to
void the contract, or to execute it without a pawning. On the other hand, if the
pawned property was received by the creditor prior to the entitlement claim, the
debt would thus not be insured by a pawning, unless the debtor had deceived
him, in which case he has an option to void the contract.
In this regard, if real estate or an animal was pawned, and then the entitled
party left his entitled share in the property with the creditor, the latter would
not guarantee it against destruction. This ruling follows by the fact that once
that portion was claimed through entitlement, it was no longer an object of
pawning. Hence the creditor would only guarantee the un-entitled part of the
pawned property.

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if pawned property is sold, and then becomes the object
¯
of a valid entitlement claim, then the buyer may seek a refund from the pawning
debtor.12 This ruling follows from the fact that the pawned property was sold
under the assumption that it belonged to the debtor, and hence he must bear
ultimate responsibility for the property. In this case, the buyer is entitled to seek
a refund from the trustee who held the pawned property, but then the trustee
may seek a refund from the pawning debtor, who is the ultimate guarantor of
the property.
86.2.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
13
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the pawn-broker is obliged to give the pawned prop-
erty to its rightful owner if a valid entitlement claim is established. In this case,
they ruled that the pawning was invalid at its inception.
Moreover, they ruled that if the pawned property was sold prior to the
valid entitlement claim, then the buyer may seek a refund from the pawning
debtor. They based this ruling, in agreement with the Shāfic ı̄s, on the view that
¯
the object was sold under the assumption that it was owned by the pawning
debtor, and hence the latter must bear responsibility for it. On the other hand,
they ruled that the buyer is not entitled to seek a refund from a trustee in the
pawning, if the latter informed him that he was merely a selling agent.

.
13 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, ¯
vol.5, p.397), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.334).
86.3 Division of joint property

86.3.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
14
The H . anafı̄s ruled that division of joint property is invalidated from its in-
ception if the property later becomes the object of a valid claim of entitlement.
On the other hand, they ruled in the case of partial entitlement to the divided
property that the division is invalidated only for the entitled portion.

The Mālikı̄s ruled15 that if joint property is divided, and then part of it becomes
an object of entitlement, then:
• If all of the property in the possession of one of them becomes the subject
of a valid entitlement claim, the division is voided, and joint ownership is
restored.
• If one-half, or one-third of the share of one of the co-owners becomes

an object of entitlement, then he is given the option of keeping the rest
and seeking no compensation, or being compensated through co-ownership
with the previous co-owner for half of the entitled amount.
• If one-quarter of the share of one of the previous co-owners becomes the

object of entitlement, then he has no options. In this case, the division
remains final, and he may not return as a co-owner for half of what was
entitled. Instead, he is entitled in this case to seek separate compensation
for that half of the entitled portion.

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled as follows:16
¯
• If an unidentified part of the divided property becomes entitled after di-
vision, then the division is invalidated for the entitled part. For the re-
maining part of the divided property, the two rulings pertaining to the
division of the contract apply. The most widely accepted of those two
opinions is the validity of the division and the establishment of an option
[to void it]. The option is established in this case since the objective of
dividing the property, which is to identify each party’s share, would not
be accomplished. The option is also established since the entitlement may
make the division unfair to some of the ex-co-owners.
• On the other hand, they ruled that if the same amount is entitled out of
each party’s share, the division thus remains intact for the rest. In this
14 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.24).
15 Al-Dardı̄r((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.514).
¯ . ¯ ¯
86.4. EFFECT IN SETTLEMENTS 279
case, each of the co-owners would have taken his due share through the
division.
• However, if the entitlement was divided unequally among the division

shares, then the division is invalidated. This ruling follows from the fact
that the entitlement thus made the division unfair, and each party has
a right to demand compensation from the other. Hence the remaining
property would return to joint ownership.
86.3.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
17
The H
. anbalı̄s ruled as follows:
• The division is invalidated if part of the share of either co-owner became
an object of entitlement. They based this ruling on the fact that the
division would thus become unfair after the entitlement.
• On the other hand, they agreed with the Shāfic ı̄s that if the entitlement
¯
pertained equally to the shares of both co-owners, then the division re-
mains fair and valid.
• However, if the entitlement affects the two parties asymmetrically, by

harming one party more than the other, then the division would thus
become unfair, and therefore it is invalidated.
The H. anbalı̄s also ruled that the division is invalidated if an unidentified
portion of the total property, since the entitled party thus becomes a third
partner. Since that third partner had not approved of the division, it is
thus invalidated.
Finally, if the entitlement is an unidentified share in the share of one of
the co-owners, then the division is unfair and thus invalidated.
86.4 Effect in settlements

86.4.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
The H. anafı̄s ruled as follows regarding the effects of entitlements on settle-
ments:18
• If settlement was concluded in exchange for a financial compensation,

and then the compensation was taken from the claimant due to a valid
entitlement, the settlement is thus invalidated. This ruling follows from
the fact that a condition of validity of the settlement was violated, namely
that the object of settlement was not owned by the settling party at the
time of settlement.
17 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.6, p.376).
. anafı̄), vol.6, pp.58,54), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.29).
• If the claimed debtor settled the claim while acknowledging its validity,
then if part of the claimed debt is appropriated through entitlement, the
claimed debtor may seek a refund of the corresponding portion of his settle-
ment compensation. This ruling follows from the fact that the settlement
in this case was tantamount to a commutative sales contract. Similarly,
if all of the underlying debt was appropriated based on an entitlement
claim, the settling claimed debtor may seek a full refund of the settlement
compensation.
• If the claimed debtor had settled the debt while denying the claimed debt
or failing to acknowledge it, and then the claimed debt was appropriated
through a valid entitlement claim, the claimant may transfer his claim to
the entitled party, who thus takes the place of the claimed debtor. In this
case, the claimant must return the settlement compensation to the initial
claimed debtor, since the latter only paid the compensation to end the
dispute, which is nullified by the entitlement. Thus, the claimant does
not have any reason to continue to hold the claimed debtor’s property, in
analogy to the case wherein a debtor gives his money to the guarantor to
repay his debt, and then repays it himself. In both cases, the debtor must
be refunded since what he paid the claimant or the guarantor no longer
serves its intended purpose.

The Mālikı̄s ruled as follows:19
• If an acknowledged claim is settled with a fungible or non-fungible com-

pensation, and then the settlement compensation was appropriated due to
a valid entitlement claim, then the claimant may renew his original claim
if the original property is still intact. On the other hand, if the property
that was acknowledged as a liability had perished, the claimant may thus
demand its value if it was non-fungible or its equivalent if it was fungible.
• If a denied claim is settled for a fungible or non-fungible compensation, and

then the claimed liability was appropriated based on a valid entitlement,
then the claimed debtor may seek a refund of the settlement compensation
from the claimant, provided that the compensation remained intact. If the
settlement had perished, then the claimed debtor may seek a refund of its
value if it was non-fungible, or its equivalent if it was fungible.
On the other hand, if the claimed debtor had acknowledged the claimed
liability, then he may not seek a refund of the settlement compensation.
In this case, the claimed debtor is understood to be acknowledging that
the property belonged to the claimant, and thus that the entitlement
appropriator usurped it.
19 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.470), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.626).
86.5. EFFECT ON LEASE AND HIRE 281
Consequently, if the buyer of a property concludes the sale knowing that

the seller is the owner, then he may not seek a refund from the seller if
the property is appropriated based on an entitlement. The ruling in this
case is also based on the view that the appropriator is thus a transgressor.

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s rule20 that the settlement is voided if the underlying debt is ap-
¯
propriated based on a valid settlement. In this case, if full appropriation was
impossible due to the diminution in the claimed property, the claimed debtor
may seek a partial refund in proportion to the value of the appropriated portion,
in analogy to the case where the compensation was sold.
86.4.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
21
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that if a settlement compensation was appropriated due
to a valid entitlement claim, then the claimant may renew his initial claim. This
ruling follows from the view that the settlement of an acknowledged claim in
this case is in fact a sale, and that sale is defective if the compensation was
appropriated based on entitlement. Thus, the claimant claim is reinstated.
In contrast, if the underlying claim in the settlement was the right to exact
physical retribution for murder (qis.ās.), the settlement is not seen as a sale. Thus,
if such a claim was settled for valuable property which was later appropriated,
the claimant may only demand compensation for its value from the claimed
debtor.
Moreover, if the claimed debtor had settled the claim while denying its va-
lidity, and then the settlement compensation was appropriated based on a valid
entitlement claim, the claimant may renew his claim. This ruling follows by the
resultant invalidation of the settlement.
86.5 Effect on lease and hire

86.5.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
22
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a lease is valid if the entitlement to the leased property
is established before the extraction of usufruct, and the entitled party permitted
it. In this case, the owner is entitled to the rental value if the leased property
continued to exist. On the other hand, if the entitled owner permitted the lease
after it had expired, the rent would accrue to the lessor rather than to the owner.
The latter ruling follows from the fact that in this case the object’s usufruct
would have perished at the time the permission was issued, and hence the lease
was no longer existent.
20 Al-Hūt Al-Bayrūtı̄ (, vol.2, p.218).
.
.
If the entitled owner gave his permission mid-way through the lease period,
then ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the lessor was a usurper, and the owner is entitled
to all of the rent. On the other hand, Muh.ammad ruled that the usurping lessor
is entitled to all rent prior to the permission, and the owner is entitled to all
the rent thereafter.
The Mālikı̄s ruled23 that a lessor who was in possession of a land for a period of
time (and thus may be its owner) is entitled to all rents prior to the establishment
of entitlement for another owner. Then, the entitled person is given an option of
voiding the remainder of the lease, or to permit it and take the remaining lease
payments. This ruling follows from the fact that the lessor was an apparent
owner (who would have remained thus if the entitlement did not come into
effect), and thus was entitled to the output of the property.

¯
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled24 that the appropriation of leased property based
¯
on entitlement is similar in legal status to the perishing of that property. In this
regard, they ruled that a lease is voided if the leased property perished and its
usufruct ceased to exist, in analogy to the voiding of a sale if its object perished
prior to receipt. Thus, they ruled that a lease is voided if the leased property is
appropriated based on a valid entitlement claim, since the object of the contract
would thus have perished.
86.5.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
25
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the lease is invalidated if a leased non-fungible prop-
erty (e.g. a specific camel leased for transportation) is appropriated based on
a valid entitlement. Thus, the lessor is not responsible to provide the lessee
with an equivalent rental property. However, if the leased property was a non-
fungible described as a liability on the lessor, and then it was appropriated
based on a valid entitlement, the lessor is responsible to provide another object
of lease, and the lease remains valid. In the latter case, the object of the lease
was only determined by its characteristics, and thus continues to exist.

24 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.355-7).
.
25 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, vol.5, p.432).
¯
86.6. EFFECT ON CROP-SHARING 283
86.6 Effect on crop-sharing

86.6.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
26
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a worker may seek an equivalent wage for his work
if the tended palm trees are appropriated based on entitlement while carrying
fruit. Otherwise, if the appropriated trees carried no fruits, then the worker is
not entitled to any wages. This ruling follows by analogy to the ruling that the
worker is not entitled to any compensation if the land is appropriated prior to
being planted. On the other hand, we have seen that the farmer is entitled to
seek compensation for the value of the crop if the land is entitled after producing
one.

The Mālikı̄s ruled27 that the entitled owner of a garden has the option of voiding
a crop-sharing contract for that land, or keeping the worker. The option to void
the contract is given to the owner since that contract was concluded by a party
other than the garden’s owner. If the entitled owner thus chooses to void the
contract, then all existing output of the land belongs to him, and he must pay
a market wage to the worker in proportion to his work, to prevent harming him
unjustly.

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled28 that the crop-sharing worker is entitled to a market wage
¯
for his work if the fruits of his labor are appropriated by another party before
or after his work (e.g. through a will, or a valid entitlement claim). This ruling
is based on the view that the worker’s benefits were wasted by his crop-sharing
principal, and thus the latter must compensate him with a market wage for
his work. However, this ruling applies only if the worker was not aware of the
situation at the inception of the crop-sharing contract. On the other hand, if
the worker was in fact aware of the situation, then he is not entitled to any
compensation.
86.6.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
29
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the entitled owner of the land is also entitled to all
the fruits of the land. In this case, they ruled that the worker is only entitled to
receive a compensation in the form of a market wage that he can only demand
from the usurper, who deceived him through the crop-sharing contract.
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.201).
27 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.547), Al-Kharshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄),
¯ ¯
vol.6, p.261), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.321).
¯
28 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
. ((Sh āfi c ı̄), vol.2, p.331).
29 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, vol.5, p.381).
¯
86.7 Effect on marriage

86.7.1 Appropriation of the dowry
H
. anafı̄ rulings
30
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a specific named dowry (e.g. a specific house) is valid
even if it is appropriated based on a valid entitlement claim prior to delivery.
In this case, the husband has to deliver the value of the named property (rather
than an identical one), since the property itself cannot be delivered due to its
appropriation.
If half of the house named as dowry was appropriated, then the wife has an
option of returning the remaining part based on a major defect (of partnership
with the entitled party), or keeping it. If she decides to return the remaining
part, then she can demand payment of the value of the entire house, and if
she keeps the remaining part, then she can demand payment of the value of
the entitled part. In this case, if the husband were to divorce her prior to
consummating the marriage or paying a compensation, she may keep the part
of the house that was given to her.
Mālikı̄ rulings
The Mālikı̄s ruled31 in accordance with the H . anafı̄s that the wife is entitled
to seek payment of the value of her named dowry (rather than the customary
dowry for the likes of her) if it is appropriated based on an entitlement, or
if she finds a defect in it. This ruling is based on the view that marriage is
based on mutual generosity of the two parties, and thus the wife may demand
compensation with a small portion of the dowry, or for many multiples thereof.
On the other hand, Mālikı̄ jurists differed in their rulings, with some of them
ruling that she may seek compensation with the customary dowry for her likes,
and some ruled that she may seek compensation for that customary dowry or
the value of what was entitled.
Shāfic ı̄ rulings
¯
Most of the Shāfic ı̄s ruled32 that the husband is liable for the customary dowry
¯
for the likes of he prospective wife if the named dowry was usurped property,
or was a non-property like wine. This ruling follows from the fact that the
marriage is deemed valid, but the named dowry (which is owned by another or
a non-property) is defective.
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.278), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, pp.455,462).
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.28), Al-Kh
¯
arshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions
¯
(Mālikı̄), vol.3, p296; vol.6, p.1).
¯ . ¯ ¯
86.7. EFFECT ON MARRIAGE 285
H
. anbalı̄ rulings
33
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the wife is entitled to the value of the named dowry if
that latter was a specific non-fungible (e.g. a named house) that was appropri-
ated based on a valid entitlement claim. This ruling follows from the fact that
she would thus have implicitly accepted the value of the named dowry on the
basis of which she concluded the marriage. On the other hand, if the husband
had said: “I give you as dowry this usurped house”, then the wife would have
accepted to marry with no dowry, and hence she is entitled only to the custom-
ary dowry for her likes. In the latter case, since the wife knew full well that the
husband cannot transfer to her ownership of a property he had usurped, the
naming of that property is immaterial.
They ruled that the wife has an option if part of her dowry is appropriated
based on a valid entitlement claim. Thus, she may take the value of the entire
named dowry, or take the un-appropriated part of the dowry and the value of
the appropriated part. This ruling follows form the view that partnership with
the entitled party is a defect in the property, and thus she must have the option
in analogy to all other defects.
In summary, the non-Shāfic ı̄ jurists ruled that the wife is entitled to the
¯
dowry’s value if it is appropriated, while the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the wife is thus
¯
entitled only to the standard dowry.34
86.7.2 Khulc (divorce at the instance of the wife)

¯
H
. anafı̄ rulings
35
The H. anafı̄s ruled that the divorced wife is liable for the value of any property
that she used in a khulc if it is appropriated based on a valid entitlement claim.
¯
This ruling is based on the fact that the reason for delivery (to compensate the
husband for the divorce) remains, while the possibility of delivering the property
ceased to exist after the appropriation.
Mālikı̄ rulings
The Mālikı̄s ruled36 that a divorced wife must give her ex-husband the value of
the named non-fungible divorce compensation if it is appropriated. The relevant
value in this case is the value of the named property on the day of the khulc . On
¯
the other hand, if the divorce compensation was fungible, then she is responsible
to deliver its equivalent upon the appropriation of the named compensation.
Those are the rulings if the husband was not aware that the compensation
was not her property at the inception of the khulc .
¯
33 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.6, pp.689-90), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3,
.
pp.60,62).
34 Tr.: In all of the preceding, I used “standard dowry” for mahr al-mithl, which is the
¯
standard dowry for a similar couple, as determined in society for other couples of their same
ages, social class, etc.
.
On the other hand, if he knew at that time, or if they both knew, then he is
not entitled to any alternative compensation. If she knew, but he did not know,
then he is entitled to an equivalent compensation if the named compensation
was a fungible liability identified by its characteristics. However, if she knew
and he did not, and the named khulc compensation was a specific non-fungible,
¯
then the divorce at her instance is voided.
The same rulings apply if the named khulc compensation was stolen or
¯
usurped property. Thus, if he did not know at the time, he may demand
compensation in value if the compensation was non-fungible, and equivalent
property if it was fungible.
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled37 that the ex-husband is entitled only to the standard dowry
¯
if the named khulc compensation was a specific non-fungible, and it perished
¯
prior to receipt, was appropriated based on a valid entitlement claim, or was
returned based on missing a stipulated characteristic. In this regard, they ruled
that whatever required compensation in her possession is considered equivalent
to his possession of the dowry. In this regard, both possessions are possessions
of guaranty by virtue of the khulc and marriage contracts, respectively.
¯
H
. anbalı̄ rulings
38
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the kh ulc is valid even if the compensation named in
¯
the contract is discovered not to be the wife’s property. This ruling is based on
the view that khulc is a commutative contract in which property is exchanged for
¯
a dropping of the right to marital relationships. Thus, khulc is not rendered de-
¯
fective if the compensation is defective, in contrast to marriage contracts where
the compensation makes marital relationships lawful. Thus, the ex-husband
may seek compensation from the ex-wife for the value of the named property in
the khulc .
¯
86.8 Effect on wills and mortmain

86.9 H
. anafı̄ rulings
39
The H . anafı̄s ruled that if a plenipotentiary sold a property of the deceased
and spent its price on charity, following the instructions of the deceased, then
the plenipotentiary is a guarantor of the property against any entitlement. This
ruling follows from the fact that the plenipotentiary was the active party in
the sales contract, and thus he is the guarantor of that property for its rightful
.
38 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, ¯
vol.7, p.73).
39 For rulings regarding mortmain properties, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.46
.
onwards); and for rulings regarding wills, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
86.10. SHĀFIC Ī RULINGS 287
¯
owner. In this regard, the buyer only paid the price to get the property, and the
seller is the one who sold the property of another without his consent. Thus,
the entitled party may seek compensation from the selling plenipotentiary. The
latter may then in turn seek compensation from the estate of the deceased,
in analogy to the ruling for the selling agent of a deceptive principal. Thus,
the guaranty compensation is in fact established as a debt on the deceased,
and it may be extracted from any part of his estate. On the other hand, if
the plenipotentiary was in fact an officer of the court, then he should not be
considered a guarantor, lest society may bear the cost.
On the other hand, if the estate had perished, or was not sufficient to com-
pensate the plenipotentiary, then he may not seek compensation from the heirs
or the poor who received the price as charity. This ruling follows from the
fact that the sale was only concluded on behalf of the deceased, and thus the
property’s value becomes established as one more debt on the deceased.
Muh.ammad ruled that the act of establishing a property as a mortmain
(waqf) is invalidated if an unidentified part of it is appropriated based on a valid
entitlement claim. This ruling is based on the view that the entitlement in this
case distributes the ownership of the property without identifying the shares of
the owners, and this lack of identification renders establishment of a mortmain
invalid, in analogy to the ruling that invalidates giving an unidentified portion
of a property as a gift. Then, as the establishment of a mortmain is invalidated
for the portion for the property that was not claimed in the entitlement, that
property is returned to the owner if he is alive, or to his heirs if he had died.
On the other hand, if a specific identified part of the property is appropriated
based on a valid entitlement claim, then the rest would remain in mortmain.
In this case, ownership by the entitled party is not distributed over the entire
property, and hence it was possible at the inception of the mortmain to exclude
the appropriated part from the mortmain.
86.10 Shāfic ı̄ rulings

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled40 that if a man gave in his will one-third of a house to some
¯
recipient, and two-thirds of the house was appropriated based on an entitlement
claim, then the recipient may take the remaining third. This ruling is based on
the view that the intent of the will was to benefit the heir, and hence he should
be given the remainder of the property. A minority view in this case suggested
that the recipient should only be entitled to one-third of the remaining property
(i.e. one-ninth in our example), but Al-’Isnawı̄ corrected that statement. This
ruling presupposes that the remaining one-third of the house does not exceed
the permissible one-third of the estate that the deceased could give to non-
inheritors. However, if the estate of the deceased was too small to allow that,
then the recipient may only take up to one-third of the estate of the deceased.
40 Al-Hūt Al-Bayrūtı̄ (, vol.3, p.62).

.
86.11 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
41
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that if a man gave in his will one-third of a house to some
recipient, and two-thirds of the house was appropriated based on an entitlement
claim, then the recipient is entitled to the remaining one-third if it is part of the
voluntary one-third of the estate given to non-inheritors. Otherwise, he would
be given one-third of the one-third, unless the heirs allow him to take more.
This agrees with the correction of Al-’Isnawı̄ that we mentioned above.
41 Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H

. anbalı̄), vol.2, p.368).
Chapter 87
Entitlement to Sacrificial
Animals
87.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
1
The H . anafı̄s ruled that if a man bought a sheep and sacrificed it on the day
c
of ı̄d-ul-’ad.h.ā, and then a third party appropriated it based on a proven en-
titlement claim to the sheep, it does not serve as the ritual sacrificial ’ud.h.iya
for either party. Thus, each of them is still liable to sacrifice an animal during
the specified days. If the days of sacrificial slaughtering of animals pass without
the buyer sacrificing another sheep, then he must give the value of an average
sheep to charity. In this regard, the appropriation of the first sheep made the
first purchase irrelevant, and hence needs not give the value of the purchased
sheep in charity. In contrast, if a man bought a sheep for sacrificial slaughter
and then sold it, he is compelled to give its value in charity. In the latter case,
the buyer’s ownership of the sheep for the purpose of sacrificial slaughter was
concluded and valid, and hence he must give its value in charity.
On the other hand, if the entitled party leaves the sheep to the slaughtering
buyer, and only seeks compensation for its value, the slaughter requirement is
fulfilled for the buyer. This ruling is in analogy to the case where a person usurps
a sheep that another had bought for sacrificial slaughter, and slaughtered it on
his own behalf without the owner’s permission. In the latter case, the usurper’s
requirement to slaughter a sheep would be fulfilled if the owner only demanded
a compensation for its value when it was alive. In this case, the usurper’s
ownership of the sheep is established retroactively based on the guaranty, and
hence he is considered to have slaughtered a sheep that was his property. While
the usurper’s religious obligation to slaughter a sheep is satisfied thus, he is still
considered a sinner, since his actions were forbidden at their inception. Hence,
he still must repent and seek forgiveness for his sin of usurping the property of
another. Thus ruled all the major H . anafı̄ jurists with the exception of Zufar.
289
290 CHAPTER 87. ENTITLEMENT TO SACRIFICIAL ANIMALS
87.2 Mālikı̄ rulings

The Mālikı̄s ruled2 similarly that the buyer of a sheep would have satisfied his
religious duty of sacrificial slaughter if the sheep he bought and slaughtered was
later proven to belong to someone other than the seller, but the latter approved
the slaughter. They based this ruling on the view that the buyer would thus
guarantee the sheep with the compensation he has to pay to the entitled owner,
and this guaranty of the animal he sacrificed satisfied his religious obligation.
87.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled3 that if an animal was identified and designated by intention
¯
as an animal for the ritual sacrifice (’ud.h.iya), then he is required to slaughter
it during the ritual sacrificial days. Then, if the animal was destroyed (and did
not perish on its own), he must substitute another by buying an animal of equal
value and slaughtering it during the designated period. Appropriation of the
animal seems similar to its destruction in this regard.
In this regard, the if a man first established a sacrificial animal as a liability
on himself, and then identified that animal, then if that animal were to perish,
the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the liability for a sacrificed animal is restored
¯
but identified with the perished animal. In this regard, even though the perished
animal ceased to exist, his guaranty thereof continued to exist.
87.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
4
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that if a man bought an animal and identified it for sacri-
ficial slaughter, and then the animal was appropriated based on an entitlement
claim, then he must slaughter an equivalent animal. However, if the entitlement
was established prior to its identification as his sacrificial slaughter, then he
does not need to slaughter its equivalent, since the identification of the property
of another for sacrificial slaughter is invalid.
2 Al-Kharshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.50).

¯
3 Al-Kh ¯
atı̄b
. Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.289).
¯
Part XIV
Debt-Clearance
(Al-Muqās..sah)
291
293
Preliminaries
We shall study the debt clearance contract in four chapters:5
2. The object of debt clearance.

3. Types of debt clearance.
4. Legal status.
5 See the article on muqāssah by Professor Muhammad Salām Madkūr in Journal of Eco-
..
nomics and Law, issues 1 and 2 of the twenty-seventh year, and issue #4 of the twenty-ninth
year.
Chapter 88
Definition and Legality
88.1 Definition
The term muqās..sah has a lexical meaning of equality. A number of juristic
definitions were provided for the term:
• Ibn Juzayy1 defined muqās..sah as: “The subtraction of one debt in lieu of
another. This contract may involve mutual dropping of rights, a commu-
tative transaction, or a debt transfer”.
• Al-Dardı̄r defined it thus:2 “muqās..sah is effected when you drop what

another owes you in exchange for what you owe him, subject to some con-
ditions”. This latter definition covers debt-clearance by mutual consent,
as well as a call for debt-clearance by one party that is rejected by the
other.
• The H . anbalı̄s defined muqās..sah as the equality of two debts in genus,

characteristics, maturity date, and amount. Thus, ’Ibn Al-Qayyim defined
it as: “The dropping of one debt in exchange for another that is equal in
genus and characteristics”.3 Thus, if A owed B one gold coin, and B owed
A one gold coin, then the two debts may be cleared, and both creditors’
rights to demand repayment of the debts are dropped.
88.2 Legality
Jurists of all schools agree that clearing of debts through muqās..sah is permis-
sible, based on the following H. adı̄th narrated on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar:
¯
“I came to the Prophet (pubh), and said that I sell camels in Baqı̄c for a price
named in gold coins, but collected in silver, and vice versa. The Prophet thus
1 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.292).
2 Al-Dardı̄r((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.227).
3 ’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah ((Hanbalı̄)a, vol.1, p.321).
.
295
296 CHAPTER 88. DEFINITION AND LEGALITY
(pbuh) said: ‘There is no harm to do so if the exchange is carried out accord-

ing to the exchange rates of that day, and as long as you part without any
debts between you’.”4 The Prophet’s statement that “there is no harm” in this
transaction is proof that a price established as a liability on one party may be
exchanged for another. In this regard, Al-Bābartı̄ said in a footnote of Fath. Al-
Qadı̄r: “This H . adı̄th is a proof of the permissibility of muqās..sah of a fungible
¯
liability for a non-fungible, based on juristic approbation. This ruling is based
on the fact that a debt cannot in fact be received, since a debt is a legal entity
established as a liability on one party, and it thus cannot be made specific by
identification. Hence, the receipt of debt repayment is accomplished through
the receipt of an exchange, which in this case is the non-fungible. However, the
ruling based on analogy would not allow this type of clearance of a debt for a
non-fungible, since they are not of the same genus”.5
It is also logical to permit the clearance of debts, since it is in fact the
only means by which debts can be repaid. In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s and
¯
H. anbalı̄s ruled that debt-clearance is automatically established once two equal
but opposite debts are established on two parties. In this regard, mutual consent
of the two debtors/creditors is not required, since it would be a waste of time
for either one to demand repayment of the other’s debt.6
4 Narrated by ’Ahmad, and the four authors of Sunan on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar, c.f.
.
¯
5 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, footnote p.380 onwards).
.
6 Tuhfat Al-Muhtāj (vol.2, p.396), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, pp.253,257).
. . .
Chapter 89
The Object of
Debt-Clearance
The default in a debt-clearance contract is that its object is a pair of debts.

Thus, muqās..sah normally would not be applicable between two non-fungibles,
or between one debt and one non-fungible.
However, we have seen that the H . anafı̄s ruled that muqās..sah between a
fungible liability and a non-fungible is possible. Thus, they ruled that if a
creditor for ten silver coins bought a gold coin from the debtor in exchange
for the liability, receiving the gold coin during the contract session, then the
currency exchange contract was simultaneously a debt clearance contract.
A closer analysis of this example illustrates that the debt clearance was in
fact concluded with two debts of the same genus, rather than one debt and a
non-fungible of a different genus. In fact, once the creditor received the gold
coin, he had it in a possession of guaranty in exchange for the agreed upon price
of ten silver coins. Thus, the buyer’s liability for ten silver coins after receipt
was identical in genus and amount to the seller’s liability, and the two debts
were cleared. Consequently, while this and other examples may be conjured to
argue for the clearance of a fungible liability in exchange for a non-fungible, our
analysis shows that they can all be reduced in fact to the clearance of two equal
debts. However, the distinction between the different cases may be made thus:
Debt clearance is only obligatory for two debts, while clearance of a fungible
debt for a non-fungible is permissible based on mutual consent.1
1 The article on muqāssah by Professor Muhammad Salām Madkūr in Journal of Economics

..
and Law, issues 1 and twenty-seventh year (pp.9-13).
297
Chapter 90
Types of Debt-Clearance
There are two main types of debt-clearance: permissible and impermissible. In

this regard, permissible debt-clearance may be obligatory or optional.
90.1 Obligatory debt-clearance

If two parties have two identical corresponding debts, in genus, characteristics,
amount, and date of maturity, then the two debts are automatically cleared.
This type of obligatory debt-clearance is not predicated on either party making a
request, or on either party’s consent. Thus, if A was indebted to B for a fungible
debt, and then B bought from A merchandise for a price equal to the debt, the
two debts are automatically cleared as soon as the second one is established on
B for the price of the merchandise. The two debts are thus cleared regardless
of the parties’ consent or lack thereof, and automatically without either party
requesting the clearance.
The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s permitted this type of debt clearance
¯
provided that it satisfies all of the conditions listed below.1 In contrast, the
Mālikı̄s only permitted this type of debt clearance if one party asks for it, or
if both parties consent to it. Thus, most of the Mālikı̄ definitions of muqās..sah
relate to voluntary debt clearance.2
90.1.1 Conditions of obligatory debt-clearance

There are four main conditions for obligatory debt-clearance:3
1 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.250), Al-Shāfic ı̄ (, vol.7, p.388 onwards), Mashrūc Taqnı̄n
. ¯ ¯
Al-Sharı̄c ah c alā Madhhab ’Ah.mad (item #154), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄),
¯ ¯
vol.2, p.114), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.296 onwards).
2 Al-Hattāb (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.4, p.549).
. ..
3 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.250), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3,
. .
pp.296,373), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.114), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄),
p.292), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.227 onwards), Fath. Al-c Azı̄z Sharh. Al-Wajı̄z (vol.18,
¯
p.241), Al-’Anwār (vol.2, p.528), the previously cited article on muqās.s.ah.
299
300 CHAPTER 90. TYPES OF DEBT-CLEARANCE
1. Correspondence of the two debts or rights

The two cleared rights or debts must correspond to one another, in the sense
that each party is simultaneously a debtor and a creditor to the other. Thus, if
a buyer is owed a debt by a principal in a selling agency, and the price is equal
to the debt he is owed, the two debts cancel each other. On the other hand, the
liability of a guardian or plenipotentiary of a child cannot be cleared against the
debt of the young child, since the two debts do not correspond to one another
in the specified manner. In contrast, the debt of woman towards a child in her
custody is cleared for an equal debt that the child owes her. Finally, a debt that
A owes B is not thus cleared for a debt that C owes B, since the correspondence
condition is thus violated.
Moreover, it is not possible for obligatory debt clearance to be simultane-
ously a transfer of debt (h.awālah). This ruling follows from the fact that the
majority of jurists view the latter as a transfer of liability from the debtor to
the transferee. However, if the debtor is owed an equal debt by the creditor,
the two debts are automatically cleared for one another, and there is no longer
a debt to be transferred. On the other hand, if the debt of the creditor to the
debtor is only established after the debt of the latter was transferred to a third
party, then debt clearance is not possible, since the correspondence condition is
thus violated by designating the transferee as the debtor.
2. Equality of the two cleared debts

The two cleared debts must be of the same genus, type, characteristics, and
date of maturity.4 Thus, the H . anafı̄s rule that debts cannot be cleared if they
differ along any of those dimensions. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that debt
clearance can take place for debts of different genera (e.g. where one liability is
for money or food, and the other is for a different non-monetary and non-edible
property).
In this regard, it is well known that the H . anafı̄s, and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s and
¯
H. anbalı̄s consider different monies (e.g. gold and silver coins) to be of different
genera. However, some of the H . anafı̄ jurists argued that different monies can
be considered to be of the same genus for the purpose of debt clearance. Thus,
it was stated in Al-Fatāwā Al-Z . uhayriyyah: “If two debts of different genera
are cleared, e.g. if A owes B 100 golden coins and B owes A 100 silver coins,
then A’s debt can be cleared in exchange for its value in gold coins, and the
remainder continues to be a debt on A”.
Consequently, since fiat money has become the most common form of cur-
rency in our time, the opinion of those H . anafı̄ jurists would extend to considering
all currencies to be of the same genus in debt clearance. This ruling is based on
the important status of convention in financial transactions, and the fact that
4 The Hanafı̄s consider a debt as a liability for a property of certain characteristics, but they
.
do not consider a debt to be itself a property from a formal point of view. In this regard, a debt
is sometimes informally discussed as a property, they argue, because it becomes property after
its receipt. Consequently, a debt must be for fungibles, to ensure that it can be established
as a liability with certain characteristics.
90.1. OBLIGATORY DEBT-CLEARANCE 301
the value of money is what matters, and not the actual physical currency. On
the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that fiat monies are considered
¯
to be of different genera, in analogy to treating silver and gold coins as two
different genera. Thus, they do not allow the clearance of two debts if one is in
gold and the other is in silver, due to the difference in genus.
The H . anafı̄s and H . anbalı̄s also required the two cleared debts to have the
same characteristics, as they pertain to value and usage.
Moreover, the H . anafı̄s ruled that obligatory debt clearance is only legalized
for matured debts. Thus, if either debt was deferred, they do not allow oblig-
atory debt clearance, even if the two dates had the same maturity date. In
contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that the two debts must have the same
¯
date of maturity if they are deferred, or they must both be matured at the time
of debt-clearance.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s ruled that debt clearance is valid if the
two debts have the same date of maturity. However, they ruled that the debt
clearance is not permissible if either of the two debts was deferred and they
were for different genera (e.g. one debt in gold and the other in silver). But
if both debts were of the same monetary genus (e.g. both gold or both silver),
the debt clearance is valid if both are matured. Moreover, most of the Mālikı̄s
ruled that the debt clearance is permissible even if either of the two debts of the
same monetary genus (gold or silver) was deferred. The latter majority opinion
is based on the view that debt clearance is a mutual dropping of rights to clear
the debtors’ liabilities. They further argued that such debt clearance is free of
any suspicion of ribā.
However, if the two debts were of the same genus but were both foodstuffs,
then the Mālikı̄ rulings depend on the origin of the debts. Thus, they permit
clearance of debts for foodstuffs if they originated from loans, regardless of
the dates of maturity. On the other hand, they ruled that the debt clearance
is impermissible if the debts for foodstuffs originated from sales, regardless of
the maturity dates. The second ruling is based on the prohibition of selling
foodstuffs prior to receiving them. Finally, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if both debts
were of the same genus, and were neither monetary nor foodstuffs, then debt
clearance is permissible regardless of maturity dates.
Jurists also required for debt clearance that the underlying properties of the
two debts have the same quality. Thus, if one debt was for high quality goods
and the other for low quality goods, they do not allow the two debts to be
cleared. Furthermore, the H . anafı̄s required the two debts to share in strength.
For instance, a debt for a wife’s alimony cannot be cleared for a debt on the wife
unless they clear them with mutual consent. This ruling is based on their view
that the debt for alimony is weaker than other debts. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s,
Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s did not consider the respective strengths of the two debts
¯
to be a factor in the validity of debt clearance.
The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s also argued that the two debts can only
¯
be cleared automatically if the underlying goods are similar in marketability and
market value. Thus, they do not permit an automatic clearance of one debt for
good silver coins and another for broken silver coins that cannot be redeemed
from the treasury.5

In general, two debts can be cleared even if they had different origins. Thus,
it is permissible to clear one debt that originated from a loan for another that
originated from a sale. Moreover, it is not a requirement in debt clearance
that the origins of both debts are legitimate. For instance, it is permissible to
clear a debt that originated from a valid sale for a debt that originated from
a forbidden usurping or destruction of another’s property. In this regard, the
reason for the debt is irrelevant, and once both debts are established, they can
be cleared regardless of origin.
3. The no-harm clause

Obligatory debt clearance must have no adverse consequences for any party,
6
otherwise it is not legalized. Thus, the H . anbalı̄s ruled: “If a woman is entitled
to alimony payments, and owes a debt of the same genus, then the two debts are
not cleared if the woman is in need of the alimony payment. This ruling follows
from the fact that alimony payments are more important than debt repayment.
Thus, debt clearance is not allowed if it harms one of the debtors”.
Similarly, the expenses for burial have a higher priority over debts. Thus,
if a debtor sold part of the estate of a deceased person to his creditor, and the
property was of the same genus as the debt, the two debts are not cleared. This
ruling is intended to protect the rights of the deceased, and to ensure that debt
clearance does not harm the debtor.
Moreover, debts insured with a pawned property have a higher priority for
extracting repayment from the pawned property. Thus, if the pawning debtor
sold the pawned property to another creditor, and if the price is of the same
genus as the second debt, the second debt is not cleared with liability for the
price. This ruling is made to protect the rights of the creditor to whom the
property was pawned.
We have thus seen that debt clearance is not allowed if it results in a financial
harm to the debtor or to a person who has a right associated with sold property.
It is also true that debt clearance is not allowed if it results in a financial harm to
any of the other creditors. Thus jurists with the exception of ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled
that a judge may forbid a bankrupt debtor from dealing in his property upon
the request of his creditors. Thus, the judge may forbid him from selling his
property below the market price, acknowledging any other debts, or otherwise
engaging in any financial dealings. The judge would rule thus to protect the
rights of the creditors.
In summary, it is not permissible to clear two debts if a third party has a
right attached to either one. Thus, the right of a creditor to whom the debtor’s
property was pawned prevents the clearance of another debt for the price of the
pawned property. In the other example, the rights of all other creditors prevent
the bankrupt debtor from selling any of his property to one creditor in exchange
for his debt to that creditor. In both cases, one or more creditors have a right
5 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.381).
associated with the pawned or sold property, and thus the debt clearance is not
allowed.
On the other hand, if a non-bankrupt debtor sold his property to repay one
of his creditors, but the selling debtor was indebted to the buyer for a debt of
the same genus as the price, then the mutual debts of the buyer and seller must
be cleared. This follows from the fact that the dealings of unrestricted debtors
are executed, and thus the debtor is permitted to repay some of his creditors
before others. Even if the non-bankrupt debtor was otherwise restricted from
financial dealings, there is usually no impediment to selling his property, or to
the clearance of his debt for the price owed by the buyer if that buyer was not
a creditor to whom that property was pawned.
4. Avoidance of prohibitions
Obligatory debt clearance may only take place if it does not result in forbidden
actions such as parting prior to receiving the price of a salam, or dealing in
object of salam prior to receipt. Other legal requirements like mutual receipt in
currency exchange contracts must also be observed, and the majority of jurists
did not allow clearance of debts that can result in reduction of a debt being tied
to speeding up its payment.
90.1.2 Voluntary debt clearance

Jurists permit debt clearance by mutual consent, regardless of unity of genus and
characteristics, etc., provided that it does not result in a forbidden transaction.
90.1.3 Forbidden debt clearance

Debt clearance is not permissible if it violates any of its conditions. For instance,
debt clearance that results in a violation of any Islamic laws is forbidden. We
shall list some examples of such forbidden debt clearances in currency exchange
contracts, salam contracts, and any transaction that is suspiciously similar to
ribā. In those examples below, the debt clearance is forbidden regardless of the
debtors’ consent.
1. Currency exchange
The debt clearance is invalid if it is conducted between the two sides of a cur-
rency exchange contract after its session. This ruling follows from the fact that
the currency exchange is itself invalid if both compensations were not paid dur-
ing the session. Hence, no debt is established by virtue of that contract, and the
debt clearance is invalid since at least one of the two debts is not established.
Otherwise, a debt clearance is valid during the session, regardless of whether
one of the compensations was established through a guaranteed receipt during
the contract session, before or after. In what follows, we shall discuss each of
the possibilities in some detail: .7
• It is permissible for two individuals to engage in a currency exchange

program appended to a prior debt. Thus, if one man owed another ten
silver coins, the debtor may sell the creditor one gold coin in exchange for
his liability. Thus, by appending the contract to that debt, the contract
results automatically in clearing the two debts, without being predicated
on their consent. This ruling is based on the consensus that the price of the
gold coin can be named as silver coins that are not necessary to receive or
to be identified through receipt during the contract session. In this regard,
the condition of identification through receipt in currency exchange is put
in place to avoid the possibility of deferment ribā. However, there can
be no ribā in dropping a debt, since the possibility of ribā is restricted to
debts whose consequences are yet to be known. Consequently, a currency
exchange wherein a debt for silver coins is exchanged (or cleared) for a debt
for gold coins, the exchange is valid since both debts are thus dropped,
and there is no danger of ribā.
• H. anafı̄ jurists ruled by juristic approbation that it is permissible for the

debtor who owes ten silver coins to sell the creditor a gold coin for ten
silver coins, without identifying them with his debt, and then to clear
the two debts for silver coins after the creditor receives the gold coin.8
They ruled thus that receipt voids the first contract, and append a new
exchange contract to the debt. In other words, once the consequences of
the contract are altered, the currency exchange contract is voided, and the
new contract replaces it, in analogy to the case where a sale is renewed
at a higher price (and thus voided and replaced by another sale). Thus,
by clearing the two debts, the currency exchange contract is voided, and
replaced by the debt clearance contract appended to the existing debt.
Both cases considered so far pertain to the clearing of an existing debt.
• There are two opinions in the H . anafı̄ school pertaining to clearance of

debts that ensue after the currency exchange. The majority opinion is
that such debt clearance is permissible. Thus, if one party sells another
one golden coin for ten silver coins, and then the buyer of the gold coin
sells the other party a dress for ten silver coins and delivers the dress
during the same contract session, then they may clear the two debts for
ten silver coins during that session. The ruling is based on the view that
the first currency exchange contract was thus voided and replaced by the
debt clearance contract.
7 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.19 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5,
¯ . .
p.379 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.206,218), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.249
onwards).
8 Zufar ruled by analogy that this contract is not permissible, since he viewed it as exchang-
ing a compensation in a currency exchange contract prior to its receipt.

• If specific coins were exchanged for unspecified ones during a currency

exchange contract, and then the creditor became indebted to the debtor
during the same session due to a guaranteed receipt, then the debts are
cleared automatically regardless of consent. The second debt may be
established in this case if the creditor borrows the equivalent of the price
during the session or usurps it from the debtor, in which case receipt and
the currency exchange contract is considered concluded, and then followed
by the debt clearance.
Note that in all but the first of those cases, the debt clearance must take
place during the currency exchange contract session. Otherwise, if the
currency exchange session ends first, the contract is invalidated, and the
debts to be cleared are not considered to be established.
2. The price of salam

c
According to all H . anafı̄ books with the exception of Al-Badā’i , the H . anafı̄s
c
agree with the Shāfi ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s that it is not permissible to clear the price
¯
of salam with any other debt.9 This ruling applies regardless of whether the debt
preceded or followed the salam contract, and regardless of the parties’ consent.
The ruling is based on the view that such debt clearance would be tantamount
to dealing in the price of salam prior to receiving it, which is invalid since that
price must be received in full during the salam contract session.
3. The object of salam
It is also not permissible to clear a debt for the liability for an object of salam,
as shown in Muh.ammad’s Al-’As.l.10 Thus, if two people engaged in two salam
contracts, whereby each owed the other a volume of wheat of the same or dif-
ferent type, and the same delivery date, the two liabilities may not be cleared.
This ruling is based on the view that such clearance would be tantamount to
selling that which they had not yet received. In this regard, the buyer in each of
the salam contracts was only permitted to take either the wheat or the price he
paid for it, but neither is allowed to take a debt in lieu of the object of salam.
Moreover, if the first contract was a salam and the later one was a matured
loan, then the two debts may not be cleared, since they are not equal. The
inequality in this case arises because one compensation is matured (and therefore
more valuable) and the other is deferred. However, on the date of delivery
specified in the salam contract, the two debts will be matured, and thus may
be cleared for one another. On the other hand, if the loan contract preceded
the salam contract, the two resulting debts may not be cleared for one another,
regardless of the parties’ consent.
9 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.140), Al-’Anwār (vol.1, p.265), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
.
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.296 onwards).
10 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.12, p.168).
¯ .
4. The price of a voided salam

The legal status of the price of a voided salam is the same as that of the object
of salam. Thus, since debt clearance of the latter is not allowed (as a movable
object of sale that cannot be resold prior to receipt), it is not allowed for the
former. Thus, if a salam contract is voided, the buyer is not allowed to use the
salam price for buying anything else from the seller until he receives it back in
full.11 This ruling is based on the H . adı̄th : “Do not take anything other than
¯
the object of your salam or a refund of its price” (if it is voided).12 Thus, since
what the buyer is entitled to the salam object of sale, or the price refund as a
replacement thereof, dealing in the object of the price prior to their receipt is
forbidden in analogy to dealing in the object of sale prior to its receipt.
5. Suspicion of ribā
All jurists have agreed on the prohibition of any transaction suspiciously similar
to ribā. Thus, they established the juristic rule that any loan that benefits
the lender is forbidden ribā, and they used the rule of avoidance of means
for circumventing the law (sadd al-dharā’ic ) to varying degrees in this regard.
¯
Consequently, they ruled that debt clearance contracts that can lead to any
degree of ribā are forbidden.
Examples of such contracts were provided by the Mālikı̄s under the title of
deferred sales.13 Thus, if A sold B ten measures of food with a deferred price of
ten coins, and then after the food was consumed, B sold A twenty measures of
the same type of food for ten coins, it is not permissible to clear the two debts
for ten coins each. In this case, the two prices cancel each other out, but A
in fact sold B ten measures of food that he consumed and repaid with twenty
measures of the same food. That is a loan that benefited the lender, and it is
forbidden ribā.
11 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.345).

12 Narrated by c Abdul-Razzāq on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar, ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Shaybah on the
¯
authority of c Abdullāh ibn c Amr, and by ’Abū Dāwūd and ’Ibn Mājah with a complete chain
of narrators on the authority of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy as follows: “The buyer in a salam may
¯
not take another good in place of its object”, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ),
¯
vol.4, p.51).
13 Sharh Al-Risālah (vol.2, p.140).
¯ .
Chapter 91
Consequences of
Debt-Clearance
The effect of clearing two debts is dropping both of them. However, each of
the debts in this case is in a sense dropped by repayment, i.e. both debts are
dropped with the compensation of dropping the other debt. This type of mutual
dropping is similar to divorce in exchange for absolution of all responsibilities,
where both parties mutually drop their respective rights as a form of exchange.
Thus, the Mālikı̄s said that the objective of debt clearance is an exchange that
results in absolution of both parties. The H . anafı̄s went further by saying that
debt clearance involves a form of debt repayment, and in fact repayment can
only take place through the clearance of debts. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s ruled
that the mutual dropping of rights is obligatory, even in debt clearance that
requires mutual consent.
However, jurists differed in opinion regarding the dropped right in debt clear-
ance, some arguing that the debt itself is dropped and others arguing that only
the right to demand repayment is dropped:
• The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that debt clearance drops both debts if they are
equal, and drops the lesser of the two if they are unequal. Thus, the abso-
lution resulting from debt clearance is in their view a dropping absolution
not merely absolution of the liability to be asked for repayment.
• In contrast, the H
. anafı̄s ruled that debt clearance only drops the right to
demand repayment, but does not drop the debt itself. Thus, they ruled
that the debts continue to exist as liabilities after the debt clearance,
even though the creditor is no longer entitled to demand repayment. In
this regard, they argued that the liability is similar to rights that are
disregarded in court due to the elapsing of their statute of limitations.
Thus, they ruled that it is possible after the clearance of debts to absolve
them with a dropping absolution, give them as a gift, or reduce them.
307
308 CHAPTER 91. CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT-CLEARANCE
Thus, if a person had volunteered to repay a debt, and then the credi-
tor offered the debtor a dropping absolution, the H
. anafı̄s ruled that the
volunteer may thus seek compensation from the debtor.
However, this is a strange and unjust ruling since the debtor clearly repays
his debt, or clears it with another debt, to clear his liability completely, and
not just to negate the creditor’s right to demand repayment. Moreover,
when a debt is repaid with specific goods, the repayment is clearly superior
to the debt, since the latter is not guaranteed. Thus, justice dictates that
a debt should be terminated once it is repaid with such goods. Even
if we follow the H . anafı̄ logic and say that debt repayment establishes a
liability on the receiving creditor for an equal debt, why would one argue
that the two debts will only cancel each other in terms of the right to
demand repayment. Why, in other words, would we not rule that the
debts themselves cancel each other out?1
91.1 Voiding debt clearance contracts

If a debt clearance contract is concluded in a valid form, then it cannot be
voided voluntarily or otherwise. This ruling follows from the fact that a valid
debt clearance drops the two debts, and there is no way to reinstate such dropped
debts.
However, it may be possible after the conclusion of a valid debt clearance
contract that one of the parties loses the right for full repayment of his part in
the clearance contract, or any repayment thereof. In the first case, the clearance
is diminished by an amount corresponding to the diminution in the contracting
party’s right, and in the latter case the contract is voided. In what follows, we
shall give some examples of the two cases:
• Case 1: If a man borrowed $1000, and then he sold his lender a property for
a deferred price of $1000, then if the borrower falls sick and has other debts,
his debt for $1000 is cleared for his deferred credit of $1000 once at the
deferment date. However, if the borrower died because of the same illness,
then his other creditors would share in the $1000 credit that the lender
owed to him. In other words, a full clearance for $1000 would take place
if the borrower recovered from his illness, and the other creditors have no
right to protest. However, if he died from the same illness, the creditors
can thus claim that he was in fact terminally ill, and that they had a right
in his property during his terminal illness, established retroactively. Thus,
the lender must share equally with the other creditors. In other words, the
debt clearance that was concluded in a valid manner by the deceased is
thus partially invalidated after his death, for the difference between $1000
and the actual share of the lender in his estate.
1 The article on muqāssah by Professor Salām Madkūr in Majallat Al-Qānūn, fourth issue
..
of the twenty-ninth year (p.34).
91.1. VOIDING DEBT CLEARANCE CONTRACTS 309
• Case 2: If a buying agent owed his principal a debt, the buyer’s liability
for the price is cleared with that debt. However, if the agent kept the
merchandise until it perished in his possession, the debt clearance is thus
invalidated. This ruling is based on the view that the sale was voided
once the object of sale perished prior to receipt, and hence there was no
liability for the price to be cleared against the buying agent’s debt.
Part XV
Coercion (Al-’Ikrāh)
311
313
Preliminaries
We shall study coercion in four chapters:2
1. Nature and types.
2. Conditions.
3. Consequences in physical dealings.
4. Consequences in legal dealings.
2 There is some overlap and similarity between coercion and interdiction of someone’s deal-
ings (h.ajr), since both involve the negation of a person’s authorization and freedom choice in
his dealings, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.309).
Chapter 92
Nature and types
92.1 The nature of coercion

Coercion refers literally to forcing another to accept what he would not oth-
erwise. In other words, it negates the coerced party’s consent. In this regard,
Allāh (swt) compares liking (h.ubb) or consenting to something on the one hand
with hating (kurh) or being coerced in some sense in the verse: “But it is possi-
ble that you dislike a thing that is good for you, and that you love a thing that
is bad for you” [2:216].
The juristic definition of coercion is: “Forcing another to perform an act to
which he does not consent, and that he would not have performed if left to his
own devices”. In this regard, Al-Sarakhsı̄ defined coercion as: “An act that one
¯
man performs towards another, by means of which the consent and freedom of
choice of the latter is negated”. In this regard, the jurists distinguish between
consent (al-rid.ā), which is willingness to do something and liking it, and choice
(al-’ikhtiyār), which is selecting one action out of a set of possible actions.
¯
The H . anafı̄s distinguished between two main types of coercion: total (mulji’)
and partial (nāqis.):
• Coercion is total if the coerced party has no ability to make a choice or

act in a different manner. For instance, if a person is threatened that he
will be harmed physically (by beating, killing, breaking of limbs, etc.) if
he does not comply with an order, he is considered to be totally coerced.
This type of coercion negates the consent of the coerced party, and renders
his choices defective.
• On the other hand, coercion through threats that fall short of harming the
coerced party physically (e.g. threats of incarceration or light beating)
are considered partial. Legally, this type of coercion negates the coerced
party’s consent, but does not render his choices defective.1
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.181), Kh usrū (1304H (H
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.269 onwards),
¯
315
316 CHAPTER 92. NATURE AND TYPES
There is also a third weaker type of coercion, which the H . anafı̄s labeled virtual
coercion (al-’ikrāh al-’adabı̄). This type of coercion also negates consent but
does not void the coerced party’s choices. It takes effect if the coerced party is
threatened with the incarceration of a parent, child, sibling, etc. As stated by
the H . anafı̄ jurist Al-Kamāl ibn Al-Humām, this type of coercion is considered
a legal coercion based on juristic approbation, in opposition to its status based
on analogy.
This third type of coercion renders the coerced party’s dealings non-executable.2
In contrast, Al-’Imām Al-Shāfic ı̄ recognized only total coercion, ruling that
¯
its partial counterpart cannot be given the legal status of coercion. Thus, the
c
Shāfi ı̄s ruled: “A person is coerced if he is threatened with severe beating,
¯
prolonged incarceration, or the destruction of his property”. They further ruled
that the consequences of coercion depend on the circumstances. Thus, they do
not recognize a threat of future harm (e.g. “I shall beat you tomorrow, unless
. . . ”) to be coercion. Moreover, threats of applying legal penalties (e.g. a person
with a right of physical retribution against a killer saying “Do such and such,
otherwise I shall have my retribution”) is not considered coercion. Moreover,
they stipulated a condition that the threat does not qualify as coercion unless the
coercing party’s threat is viable, and that the coerced party is unable to avoid
the threatened harm in any way other than doing what the coercer demanded
of him. In this regard, the dealings of a person who is coerced unlawfully are
not executed, while those who are liable for a legal punishment are punished
thus.3
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.88 onwards), Al-Wası̄t. fı̄ ’Us.ūl Al-Fiqh Al-’Islāmı̄ by Dr. Al-
Zuh.aylı̄ (p.185 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.2, p.546 onwards).
2 See the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄
¯
(p.372).
3 Tuhfat Al-Tullāb by Al-’Ansārı̄ (p.272). This appears to be the opinion of the Mālikı̄s
. . .
and H . anbalı̄s as well.
Chapter 93
Coercion Conditions
There are eleven conditions that must be satisfied for coercion to be established:
1. The coercer must be capable to follow through on his threats. Thus,
’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that only the ruler can coerce, since others are not
capable of following through with their threats. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf,
Muh.ammad, ’Al-Shāfic ı̄, Mālik and ’Ah.mad ruled that the ruler as well
¯
as other parties may be coercers, since physical harm to the coerced party
may be caused by any number of able people.
The difference in opinion between ’Abū H . anı̄fa on the one hand and ’Abū
Yūsuf and Muh.ammad on the other is primarily a difference based on the
circumstances under which they lived, rather than a difference in their
juristic sources and methods. Thus, ’Abū H . anı̄fa’s ruling was valid for his
time, but circumstances changed thereafter and dictated a change in the
juristic ruling. Al-Baghdādı̄ summarized the later H . anafı̄ position thus:
¯
“The legal status of coercion is established if a viable threat is issued by a
capable coercer, regardless of whether the coercer is the ruler or another
party”.1
2. The coerced party must be convinced that the coercer will most likely
follow through with his threats if he does not comply, and must be unable
to protect himself from the threat by escaping, seeking help, or personal
resistance.
3. The threat underlying coercion must involve the destruction of the life,
limb, or property of a close relative (e.g. the coerced party himself, his
wife, his parents, etc.), or some other hurtful action. In this regard, while
some people are only hurt if beaten heavily, others can be severely hurt
with harsh language.
4. The coerced action must be one that the coerced party would not have
performed if he was not coerced. This includes actions that pertain to his
1 Majmac
. amānāt (p.204).
Al-D
317
318 CHAPTER 93. COERCION CONDITIONS
own right (e.g. selling his property), the rights of others (e.g. destroying
the property of another), or the rights of the Law (e.g. imbibing wine or
committing adultery).
5. The threat must be considered worse than the coerced action. Thus, if
a person is threatened with a slap on the face if he does not destroy
the property of another, and if he considers a slap on the fact to be less
serious than the destruction of another’s property, he is not considered to
be coerced.
6. Performance of the coerced action must imply safety from the threat.
Thus, the non-H . anbalı̄s and most of the H. anbalı̄s ruled that a person is
not coerced if he is told: “Kill yourself, otherwise I shall kill you”. This
ruling is based on the fact that obeying the first order does not free him
from being killed, and hence he cannot be considered a coerced party if
he does kill himself.
7. The H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and some of the H

. anbalı̄s ruled that the threat
¯
must be for immediate punishment. In this regard, the threat of a future
punishment allows the threatened party room to seek the protection of the
state and other individuals. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the threat
may be for future punishment, as long as the fear of that punishment is
immediate. The Mālikı̄ opinion to be the most appropriate in this case.
8. The Shāfic ı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that only the actions ordered by the coercer
¯
are subject to the legal status of coerced actions. Thus, if the coerced
party’s action exceeds, falls short of, or is different from the coercer’s
demand, his action is executed and not considered coerced. For example,
if a person is coerced to divorce his wife once, and he divorced her thrice,
or vice versa, his action is executed and not considered coerced. Similarly,
if he is coerced to divorce his wife, but he sells his house instead, the action
is not considered coerced, and thus deemed executed.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that if the coerced
party performs less than what he was ordered to do by the coercer, he
is considered to be coerced. However, they agree with the Mālikı̄s and
Shāfic ı̄s that he is not considered coerced if his actions exceeded or differed
¯
from those ordered by the coercer.
9. The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that an action is considered coerced only if it was clearly
¯
identified in the order of the coercer. Thus, if a person is coerced to divorce
one of his two wives or kill one of two people, without specifying which
one, whichever action he takes is not considered coerced. However, if the
person is named, then he is considered to be coerced.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled in the case
of coercion to perform one of two actions, without specifying which, that
either action taken by the coerced party is considered legally to be a
coerced action. This seems to be the most appropriate opinion.
319
10. The H . anafı̄s and later Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that an action is not considered co-
¯
erced if the threat involved the coercer exercising a legal right of his, and
the ordered action would give him something that is not his right or the
coerced party’s obligation. For instance, they ruled that threatening a wife
to divorce her if she does not absolve him of her debt is not considered
coercion. However, some of them ruled that this is indeed considered co-
ercion since the husband has authority over his wife, and thus this threat
results in coercion.
’Imām ’Ah.mad did not consider this to be a condition for coercion. Thus,
he allows coercion to take place where the coercer threatens to use a legal
right of his.2 This seems to be the most logical opinion.
11. The action must not be an obligation of the coerced party in order to be
considered legally a coerced action. For instance, threatening a bankrupt
person of selling his property, threatening a killer of execution, and threat-
ening a person who had sworn never to touch his wife with divorce, are
not considered instances of coercion.
In summary, the Shāfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s agreed on three conditions for coer-
¯
cion:
1. The coercer’s ability to follow-through with his threat.
2. The coerced party’s inability to avoid the threatened harm, and being
convinced that the coercer will follow through with his threat if he does
not comply.
3. The threatened harm must be major, e.g. loss of life, severe beating, pro-
longed incarceration, loss of property, etc. However, they did not consider
a threat of verbal abuse to be a valid threat in coercion.
The Shāfic ı̄s further ruled that the coercer must have no legal right to perform
¯
the threatened action.
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.176), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.293), c Abd Al-
. .
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.107), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
¯ c
’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.89 onwards), the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sh arı̄c ah wa Al-
¯
Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (p.7 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.289 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.7, p.120), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.227 onwards).
Chapter 94
Coerced Physical Actions
A coercion may be for taking or avoiding a physical action or a legal action,

and the coerced action may be uniquely identified or specified as an unidentified
member of a set of actions. In this regard, coercion of identified physical actions
has two sets of consequences pertaining to this life and the hereafter.
94.1 Rulings for the hereafter

The consequences of coerced physical actions for the hereafter vary according
to the nature of the action. In this regard, we distinguish between three types
of physical actions: (1) permissible (mubāh.) based on coercion, (2) allowed
(murakhkhas..s) with a license based on coercion, and (3) forbidden. In what
¯ ¯
follows, we shall discuss the legal status of coerced physical actions of each type
in some detail.
94.1.1 Permissibility due to coercion

Actions under this category include eating forbidden meats such as dead ani-
mals, blood, and pork, as well as drinking otherwise forbidden wine. The legal
status of such actions depends on the type of coercion. Thus, total coercion
with a threat to life and limb render such actions permissible based on coercion.
Proof for this ruling is provided in the verse: “. . . except under compulsion of ne-
cessity” [6:119]. In this regard, if the coerced party refused to act and was killed
by the coercer, he is responsible before Allāh for not preventing his death, for
which he was ordered in the verse: “. . . and make not your own hands contribute
to your destruction” [2:195].
On the other hand, such actions are not rendered permissible and are not
licensed if the coercion was partial, i.e. if the threat was merely for incarceration
or light beating. Thus, performing the ordered actions in such partial coercion
is considered a sin, since the actor should give the rights of Allāh (swt) a higher
321
322 CHAPTER 94. COERCED PHYSICAL ACTIONS
priority than his own rights.1 Thus, the consumption of such forbidden foods
and drinks are only rendered permissible for persons under a total coercion.
94.1.2 Licentious allowance due to coercion

Actions under this category include declaring disbelief with a believing heart,
cursing the Prophet (pbuh), praying at the cross, and the destruction of a
Muslim’s property. Such actions are never made permissible, but a totally
coerced person is given a license to commit them. However, if the coerced person
persists in refusing to commit such actions and is killed due to his resistance, he
is credited for having died while striving in the way of Allāh (jihād). The latter
ruling follows from the fact that such actions remain forbidden, even though a
license is issued to one who is threatened with a loss of life, limb, or property.
The non-Mālikı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s based this license in the case of total coercion on
the verse: “Anyone who, after accepting faith in Allāh, utters disbelief, except
under coercion with his heart remaining firm in faith, but those who open their
breast to disbelief, on them is wrath from Allāh, and theirs will be a dreadful
penalty” [16:106]. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s only allowed expressing disbelief
with the tongue if the person is threatened with death. However, they did not
consider threats of cutting the person’s limbs to be sufficient for issuing such a
license.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s do not allow the coerced a license
to perform such actions if the coercion is incomplete. If a Muslim commits such
actions based on compliance with an incomplete coercion, he is deemed to be
an unbeliever, even if he continued to profess faith in his heart. In contrast,
the Shāfic ı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, and Z.āhirı̄s allowed a license to the incompletely coerced
¯
Muslim to express disbelief with his tongue. They based this ruling on the fact
that many of the instances of coercion in early Islam were incomplete. Thus,
the latter ruling seems to be more appropriate.
In general, it is clearly better to refuse expressing disbelief. As proof, one
might refer to the narration that Musaylama the Liar took two of the Prophet’s
(pbuh) companions as hostages. He asked one of them: “What do you call
Muh.ammad?”, the companion said: “The Messenger of Allāh”. Musaylama
then asked him: “And what do you call me?”, and he answered “you too”, and
thus he was released. When the second companion was asked, he professed that
the Prophet (pbuh) is the Messenger of Allāh, but when asked what he called
Musaylama, he professed three time that he did not hear the second question.
Consequently, Musaylama killed the second companion. When the Prophet
(pbuh) heard of the incident, he (pbuh) said: “The first one took a licentious
allowance. The second, on the other hand, insisted to say nothing but Truth,
and he has indeed won a great deal”.2
1 Al-Kāsānı̄((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.176), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.185), ’Ibn
c
c Ābidı̄n((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.92), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.7, p.198), Abd Al-
c c

¯ 2
Tafsı̄r Al-Qurt.ubı̄ (vol.10, p.189), ’Ibn H . ajar (, p.371).
94.1. RULINGS FOR THE HEREAFTER 323
Moreover, there is proof of a licentious allowance of cursing the Prophet

(pbuh) under coercion, based on the narration regarding c Ammār ibn Yāsir
(mAbpwt). He was coerced by the unbelievers to curse the Prophet (pbuh), and
returned with great sadness. When the Prophet (pbuh) saw him, he asked him:
“What is upsetting you c Ammār?”. He answered: “A great evil, O Messenger
of Allāh; they did not let me go until I cursed you”. The Prophet (pbuh) then
said: “If they force you again, do it again”.3
On the other hand, there is proof that if the coerced person refuses to curse
the Prophet (pbuh) and dies consequently, he is rewarded for it. The proof is
provided by the story of Khubayb, who was taken hostage by the unbelievers
¯
and sold in Makkah. He was then tortured repeatedly to praise the Meccan
idols and curse the Prophet (pbuh), but he persisted in cursing their idols and
praising the Prophet (pbuh). When they gave up on him, they decided to kill
him. He then asked them to pray two rakc as, and did not prolong them so that
the unbelievers will not think that he was afraid of death. Finally, he asked
them to kill him while his forehead was on the ground, in a state of prostration
before Allāh, but they refused that request. Thus, he raised his hands to the
sky, and prayed: “O Allāh, I see only the faces of enemies, so send my salām
to the Prophet (pubh)”. He then prayed: “O Allāh, encompass them all with
Your Power, disperse them and take their powers, and then let not one of them
survive Your Wrath”. He then recited a verse of poetry: “As long as I die as a
Muslim; I care not in what manner I am killed”. Then, when they killed him
and crucified him, his face turned towards the qiblah. The Prophet said about
him: “He is the master of all martyrs, and he is my companion in paradise”.4
This H . adı̄th provides ample proof that it is better to desist from cursing the
¯
Prophet (pbuh), even under extreme coercion.5
Moreover, a licentious allowance is given to destroy the property of a Muslim
if one is totally coerced. This ruling is based on the permissibility of taking and
destroying the property of another in cases of necessity, and total coercion is
a form of necessity. However, the licentious allowance means that the coerced
party is absolved of his sin on the day of judgment, but does not drop the pro-
hibition of destroying the property of another Muslim. Indeed, that prohibition
is established irrevocably by the H . adı̄th : “A Muslim is forbidden from trans-
¯
3 Narrated by Al-Hākim, Al-Bayhaqı̄, ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Shaybah, ’Abū Nuc aym, c Abdul-Razzāq,
. ¯
and ’Ish.āq ibn Rāhawı̄h. Al-H . ākim further ruled that the H . adı̄th is valid according to the
¯
criteria of Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim, even though they did not narrate it, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-
¯
Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.4, p.158).
4 The story of his martyrdom ¯
was narrated by ’Ah.mad, Al-Bukhārı̄, ’Abū Dāwūd, and
¯
Al-Nasā’ı̄ on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ),
¯
vol.4, p.159), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.7, p.253 onwards). The statement of the Prophet “He is the
¯
master of all martyrs, . . . ” is a strange H . adı̄th as Al-Zayla ı̄ stated, since we know from the
c
¯
H. adı̄th of Al-H. ākim that H . amzah (mAbpwh) is the master of all martyrs.
¯
5 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), ibid., p.176 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), ibid., p.299), Al-
Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), ibid., p.186), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), ibid., p.93), Abd Al-
c
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.110), Al-Muwāfaqāt (vol.1, p.325), Al-Zuh.aylı̄’s ’Us.ūl
¯
Al-Fiqh (vol.1, p.113), Al-Qād.ı̄ c Iyād.’s Al-Shifā’, and the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah
¯ ¯
wa Al-Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (p.59 onwards).
gressing against another Muslim’s life, property, or honor”.6 In this context, the
H. anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s and most of the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the types of destruction
¯
of another’s property thus allowed for a totally coerced person includes burning
the property, and similar means of its destruction.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s did not recognize a licentious allowance
to burn the property of another, since the rights of the owner are thus harmed.7
This ruling is based on the Legislator’s prohibition of harming others, as ex-
pressed explicitly in the Prophet’s (pbuh) H . adı̄th : “Do not harm other Muslims
¯
(lā d.arara wa lā d.irār)”.8
One exceptional case is that of coercion to accept Islam. Such coercion is
Legally forbidden. However, if it does take place, the coerced Islam is considered
valid, and he receives the same treatment as all other Muslims. This ruling
follows from the fact that this type of coercion is for the benefit of the coerced
from the point of view of the True religion of Islam.
94.1.3 Forbidden actions

It is forbidden to kill a Muslim or cut any part of his body, no matter how
small, regardless of coercion. This ruling follows from the fact that murder
is a pure forbidden evil, forbidden in the verse: “Nor take life which Allāh
has made sacred except for a just cause” [17:33]. Further, harming a Muslim
physically short of killing him is also forbidden by the verse: “And those who
harm believing men and women undeservedly bear on themselves a calumny and
a glaring sin” [33:58]. Thus, everyone is prohibited from killing or harming a
Muslim physically, regardless of whether or not he is coerced totally or partially.
Another example of actions that are forbidden regardless of coercion is phys-
ical violence against one’s parents. In this regard, the verse: “Say not to them
a word of contempt, nor repel them” [17:23] clearly forbids transgressions that
are much less than physical violence. Thus, inflicting any physical pain on the
parents is forbidden regardless of coercion.
A third example is adultery, which can never be deemed permissible or al-
lowed for a man with or without coercion. The prohibition of adultery is logically
established from the verse: “Nor come near to adultery, for it is shameful and
evil, opening the road to other evils” [17:32]. Al-Kasānı̄ also chose the opinion
that no woman is allowed to commit adultery, even under total coercion.9
6 Narrated by Muslim on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-’Arbac ı̄n Al-Nawawiyyah
(p.76 onwards).
7 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.302), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.93), the article
. .
Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (p.53 onwards), ibid.
8 Narrated by ’Ibn ¯
Mājah, Al-Dāraqut.nı̄, and others on the authority of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-
Khudriy, and narrated by Mālik with an incomplete narration. There are also many other
¯
chains of transmission of that H . adı̄th on the authorities of a number of companions that
¯
enforce one another, c.f. Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.110), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.84),
¯
’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (, p.363), Al-Sakhāwı̄ (, p.468).
¯
9 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.177),
. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, pp.302,306), Al-
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.186-9), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.93 onwards),
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.112 onwards).
¯ .
94.2. RULINGS FOR THIS WORLD 325
In summary, disbelief, murder, and adultery cannot be permitted in any

way, and whoever commits such actions is considered a sinner regardless of
coercion. In this regard, the licentious allowance to express disbelief with the
tongue is different from permissibility, for a licentious allowance only removes
responsibility for the act, but does not render it permissible. In contrast, if
an action is rendered permissible, the actor is relieved both of the sin and the
responsibility for that action.
94.2 Rulings for this world

We shall now consider the consequences of coercion for the same three categories
considered in the previous section.
94.2.1 Permissibility due to coercion

In this category, we shall study two main actions and the rulings thereof:
1. Coerced drinking of wine: Jurists agree that a totally coerced drinker

of wine is not subject to the Legal punishment for drinking. This ruling
follows from the fact that the punishment was legalized to dissuade the
punished drinker from transgressing against the Law in the future.
However, the coerced drinker is not transgressing against the Law, since
his action is permitted. On the other hand, the majority of jurists ruled
that the dealings of coerced drunk individuals are not executed. In this
regard, those who deemed the dealings of a drunk individual executed
legalized it as a way of further punishing him (by executing his irrational
dealings) and dissuading him from drinking again. However, in the case
of coercion, there is no point in dissuading the coerced drunk, since he
should in fact be treated like an insane individual.10
The H . anafı̄s ruled that Legal punishment must be applied to the coerced
drinker if the coercion was incomplete. They thus ruled that drinking wine
in this case is forbidden, and hence the punishment must be applied as
in the case of voluntary drinkers. In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄s ruled that
the punishment for drinking wine should not be applied to the partially
coerced drinker, based on the H . adı̄th : “Allāh has disregarded three types
¯
of sins for my nation: those they commit by mistake, those they commit
in forgetfulness, and those for which they were coerced”.11
10 The majority of Shāfic ı̄s agree with the opinion of ’Ahmad that all voluntary actions of
¯ .
a drunk individual are executed. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the voluntary actions
of a drunk individual are executed, with the exception of apostasy and admission of guilt to
punishable crimes (e.g. adultery). The majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that the dealings of drunk
individuals are executed with the exception of all admissions of guilt and indebtedness, and
all contracts concluded while intoxicated. The Z.āhirı̄s agree with another narrated opinion of
’Ah.mad that the dealings of a drunk individual are not executed.
11 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ in Al-Kabı̄r on the authorities of Thawbān and ’Abū Al-Dardā’.
. ¯
Also narrated with a full chain of narrators by ’Ibn Mājah and ’Ibn H . ibbān on the authority
2. Coerced theft: Jurists agree that a totally coerced thief is not considered
a sinner, based on the previously cited H . adı̄th , and the fact that Legal
¯
penalties may only be applied if there is no doubt. The non-H . anafı̄s also
argued that the H . adı̄th pertains to all types of coercion and thus ruled that
¯
a thief is not considered a sinner if he was partially coerced. In contrast,
the H. anafı̄s ruled that partial coercion does not make theft a necessity,
and thus there is a sinner and subject to the Legal penalty for theft.
94.2.2 Licentious allowance due to coercion

We shall consider two specific instances of the actions in this category:
1. Coerced expression of disbelief: Jurists agree that if the expression of

disbelief was under total coercion, then the coerced man is not considered
an apostate, and his wife is not divorced from him. However, the Mālikı̄s
restricted this ruling to coercion with a threat to kill the coerced. However,
if the threat was for anything less than death, they consider the coerced
party to be an apostate if he expressed disbelief. The Mālikı̄s based this
ruling on the view that any loss short of losing one’s life is less harmful
than loss of faith.
The Shāfic ı̄s, H . anbalı̄s, and Z.āhirı̄s ruled that a person who expresses
¯
disbelief or prays at the cross under partial coercion is not considered
an apostate, based on the verse: “Anyone who, after accepting faith in
Allāh, utters disbelief, except under coercion with his heart remaining firm
in faith, but those who open their breast to disbelief, on them is wrath
from Allāh, and theirs will be a dreadful penalty” [16:106]. In contrast, the
Mālikı̄s and H . anafı̄s ruled that a partially coerced person is considered an
apostate if he expresses disbelief or prays to a cross or idol. They based
this ruling on the view that such partial coercion does not qualify as a
necessity, but a mere inconvenience and pain. However, it is apparent
that the Shāfic ı̄ and H . anbalı̄ ruling is more appropriate, and closer to the
¯
meaning of the Qur’anic text.
While coerced apostasy is not considered apostasy, we have seen that
coerced conversion to Islam renders the coerced party a Muslim. The
difference between the two cases is that conversion to Islam is belief in
the Truth, while apostasy is denial of the truth, both of which are mat-
ters of the heart. However, there can be no coercion in matters of the
heart. Thus, in the case of acceptance of belief, the outward expression
is accepted as a reflection of what is in the heart. However, in matters of
of ’Ibn c Abbās. ’Ibn Mājah has a second narration on the authority of ’Abū Dharr. ’Abū
¯
Nuc aym narrated it on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar with the language: “Allāh has dropped
. . . ”. It was also narrated with slightly different language by ’Ibn udayy on the authority
c
of ’Abū Bakrah, and by Al-T . abarānı̄ in Al-’Awsat. on the authority of Uqbah. However, the
c
latter narration has ’Ibn Luhayc ah in its chain of narrators, and is thus considered a weak
narration. C.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), pp.64-65), ’Ibn H
. ajar (, o.109),
¯
Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.6, p.250).
¯
denial, outward expression under coercion is not accepted as an expres-

sion of what is in the heart. Thus, when a person converts to Islam under
coercion, we have to rule that he is a Muslim, even if there is a probability
that his heart did not accept the faith. This ruling gives priority to the
True religion, and such prioritizing is required,12 following the H . adı̄th :
¯
“Islam must have the highest priority over all other considerations”.13
In this regard, the non-H . anafı̄s only permit the coerced conversion of
enemies of Islam, to the exclusion of Jews, Christians, and people with
whom the Muslims signed a treaty of protection. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s
permitted the coerced conversion of all of the above mentioned groups of
people. Proofs for each party’s rulings can be found in expanded books
of Islamic jurisprudence. The best supported ruling is the prohibition
of coercing the conversion of Jews and Christians to Islam. Moreover,
coercion of enemies of Islam to convert seems also impermissible, following
the group of jurists who cited in this regard the verse: “Let there be no
coercion in religion” [2:256].14
2. Coerced destruction of property: The H . anafı̄s, most of the H

. anbalı̄s,
and some of the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if a person totally coerces another to
¯
burn the property of a third party, then the coercer must guarantee com-
pensation for the owner. This ruling is based on the view that the coerced
party is a mere instrument of the coercer’s will, without any freedom of
choice.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s, the Z.āhirı̄s, and some of the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the
¯
coerced party is still responsible to compensate the owner for his destroyed
property. They based this ruling by analogy to the case of eating the food
of others due to necessity. In both cases, the act is permitted, and the
actor out of necessity is responsible for compensation.
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s, and most of the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that both the
¯
coercer and the coerced are responsible for the compensation of the owner
whose property was destroyed. This ruling is based on the fact that the
coerced actor caused the destruction in reality, while the coercer caused
it ultimately. Thus, both parties are seen to have caused the destruction
in some sense, and must share in the responsibility for compensation.
However, the best supported opinion renders the coercer as the ultimate
guarantor of the destroyed property.
On the other hand, if the coercion was partial, the H
. anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s,
12 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.178), the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-Qānūn
. ¯
by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (pp.61-67), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.307), ’Ibn
Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.145), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.114).
13 Narrated by Al-Dāraqutnı̄ on the¯ authority on c A’idh and c Amr ibn Al-Muznı̄, with two
. ¯
unknown narrators in its chain of narration. It was also narrated by Al-Bayhaqı̄ and Al-
T. abarānı̄ on the authority of Umar, and by Nahsh
c al on the authority of Muc ādh. There is
¯ ¯
also an incomplete narration on the authority of ’Ibn c Abbās; c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st
c
edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.3, p.213), Al-S. an c ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.4, p.67).
14 See Al-Zuh ¯
. aylı̄’s ’Ath
¯ . arb fı̄ Al-Fiqh Al-’Islāmı̄, second edition (p.78).
ār Al-H
Z.āhirı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s ruled that the coerced actor is responsi-
¯
ble for the compensation of the owner. They based this ruling on the fact
that a partially coerced person is not without free will. Hence, the coerced
party is not a mere instrument of the coercer’s will in this case, and thus
the cause of destruction and resulting guaranty are attributed to him.15
94.2.3 Forbidden actions

We consider two cases in this category of actions:
1. Coerced murder: The jurists agree that a person is a sinner if he kills

based on coercion. However, they differed in opinion regarding applying
the murder penalty in the case of total coercion:
• ’Abū H . anı̄fa, Muh.ammad, Dāwūd, and ’Ah.mad and Al-Sh āfic ı̄ in one
¯
reported opinion of two for each, ruled that the coercer, and not the
totally coerced killer, is subject to the penalty for murder (qis.ās.).
According to this ruling, the coerced killer in this case only receives
a verbal penalty (tac zı̄r). The ruling is based on the above listed
H. adı̄th indicating that coerced actions are legally forgiven. In this
¯
regard, forgiveness of the coerced action implies forgiveness for its
consequences. Thus, the murderer is seen in fact to be the coercer
who must be punished thus, while the coerced killer is seen as a mere
instrument of the coercer, and it is not appropriate to punish the
instrument.
• Zufar and ’Ibn H . azm ruled that the totally coerced killer is subject to
the penalty for murder. They based this ruling on the fact that the
coerced killer is the actual and observable killer, who thus performed
a forbidden act, and must be punished accordingly. On the other
hand, the coercer is merely viewed as the ultimate cause of the mur-
der, and they do not consider the causer of murder to be subject to
its penalty. Al-T.ah.āwı̄ found this ruling to be the most appropriate
one.
• The Mālikı̄s, the H
. anbalı̄s, and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that both
¯
the coercer and the coerced must be subjected to the murder penalty
in this case. They based this ruling on the view that the coerced
party in fact performed the act of killing, while the coercer caused
the killing. According to their school, both the actor and the causer
are equal in guilt, and the murder penalty must be applied to both.
15 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.179), Majmac Al-Damānāt (p.205), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-
. .
Maydānı̄ ((H c¯
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.112), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.302), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄
Jurisprudence), p.186), ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.8, p.281), Al-Suyūt.ı̄ ((Sh āfic ı̄), p.179), Qawāc id Al-
¯
’Ah.kām (vol.2, p.132), Tahdhı̄b Al-Furūq (vol.2, p.203), Al-Furūq (vol.2, p.208), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.98), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.444), ’Ibn Rajab (1st
edition (H. anbalı̄), p.286).
• The first ruling (according to ’Abū H

. anı̄fa) seems to be the most
appropriate in this case.
On the other hand, all jurists agree that the coerced killer is subject to
the murder penalty if the coercion is partial. This ruling is based on the
view that partial coercion does not negate freedom of will, and hence the
default ruling of punishing the murderer is not negated.16
The H. anafı̄s had two rulings, the better supported of which is the obli-
gation on the coercer to pay financial compensation for the deceased
(diyyah).
The major H . anafı̄ jurists, with the exception of Zufar, ruled that a coerced
killer is not denied his rightful inheritance if he is coerced to kill the person
he inherited.
The same differences in opinion regarding coerced killing apply to coerced
cutting of a person’s hand. Moreover, jurists agreed that the act of killing
a person or cutting his arm is not rendered permissible by permission
from the killed or amputated person. However, if a coerced person cut a
person’s arm with his consent, no party is responsible for compensation,
based on the permission. However, in the case of murder, most jurists
ruled that the coercer is still liable for a financial compensation if he
coerced a person to kill another with the permission of the latter, while
few jurists ruled that no compensation is required in that case.17
2. Coerced adultery: We need to consider the jurists’ rulings regarding

coerced adulterers, be they women or men:
• The majority of jurists ruled that a coerced women is not punished

for committing adultery under total or partial coercion. They based
this ruling on the verse: “But force not your maids to prostitution
when they desire chastity, in order that you may make a gain in the
goods of this life. But if anyone coerces them, yet after coercion
Allāh is oft forgiving, most merciful” [24:33]. This verse proves that
a woman who commits adultery under coercion is not considered a
sinner, and hence she is not subject to the adultery penalty.
• The majority of H . anbalı̄s ruled that a man who commits adultery
under partial or total coercion must be subjected to the penalty of
adultery. They ruled thus based on the view that adultery may only
take place if he attains an erection. They thus reasoned that a man
cannot attain an erection while he is frightened, and thus committing
adultery for them is a sign of his volition. However, this reasoning
is fallacious, since men normally have an involuntary erection when
16 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.7; vol.3, p.289), Qawāc id Al-’Ahkām (vol.2,
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
p.132), ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition (H . anbalı̄), p.187), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.7, p.645).
17 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.180), Majmac Al-Damānāt (pp.204-5), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-
. . ¯
Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.112), Al-T . ah.āwı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), p.409 onwards).
they approach a woman, and men are known to have involuntary

erections during their sleep.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that an adulterer is not subject to the penalty
¯
of adultery if he committed the act under partial or total coercion.
They based their ruling on the view that any suspicion is sufficient to
prevent the application of Legal penalties, and all types of coercion
establish a level of reasonable doubt.
• ’Abū H
. anı̄fa initially ruled that a coerced adulterer must be subjected
to the penalty of adultery. He later ruled that the penalty should not
be applied if the adulterer was totally coerced. Recall in this context
that he ruled for his time that total coercion was only possible by a
threat of the ruler.
’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the totally coerced adulterer
is not subject to the adultery penalty, regardless of the source of
total coercion. However, if the coercion was partial, then they ruled
that the coerced party’s free will was not negated by coercion, and
he must be made subject to the penalty. This is the general H . anafı̄
ruling: the coerced adulterer is subject to the penalty of adultery if
the coercion is partial, but not subjected to it if the coercion is total.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that the penalty of adultery must be applied if
both the man and woman were coerced. On the other hand, if the
woman was unmarried and willing, she is considered to have dropped
her right by her consent, and the only the right of Allāh remains in
this case. Thus, if only the right of Allāh is remaining, the penalty is
dropped by virtue of coercion. Hence, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled
in this case that the man is not subject to the penalty of adultery if
he was threatened with death, and subject to the penalty otherwise.
However, the majority opinion in the Mālikı̄ school remains to be
the application of the penalty of adultery to both the man and the
woman.
• The H. anbalı̄s also ruled that coerced adulterers must be subjected
to the penalty of adultery.
• The Shāfic ı̄ ruling is the most appropriate in this case, based on their
¯
proof that Legal penalties (h.udūd) are not applied in the presence of
reasonable doubt (shubha).18
¯
94.3 Coercion to take one of two actions

So far, we have considered coercion to take a specified physical action. On the
other hand, if the coerced party has a choice of actions within some specified
18 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.180), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.306), Al-Tahāwı̄
. . . .
((H
c
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence),
vol.5, p.189), the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-
¯
Bardı̄sı̄ (p.56 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.318), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.251).
94.3. COERCION TO TAKE ONE OF TWO ACTIONS 331
set, the legal rulings pertaining to the hereafter remain the same for the three
categories of permissible, allowable, and forbidden actions. However, the coerced
party in this case is required to choose the least sinful of the possible actions
under coercion. Thus, if he is coerced to kill a Muslim or eat the meat of a
dead animal, eating the meat is rendered permissible, and the killing is not
considered allowable. In this case, if he refuses to eat and is consequently killed
by the coercer, he is considered a sinner for having allowed himself to be killed.
Similarly if a person is coerced either to destroy the property of another or to
kill him, destroying his property becomes allowable.
However, if he is coerced to kill a person or to commit adultery, neither
action is rendered allowable, and he is not considered a sinner if he is killed
for refusing to do either. On the other hand, if he is coerced to kill a person
or profess a denial of the faith, the latter becomes allowable provided that he
continues to accept the faith in his heart.
In contrast, the legal status for this world may differ when there is an option
in the coercion. Thus, if a person is coerced to eat the meat of a dead animal or
to kill a Muslim, and he decided to kill rather than eat, the H . anafı̄s ruled that he
is thus liable for the penalty of murder (qis.ās.). This ruling follows from the fact
that the coerced party in this case had the opportunity to avoid the necessity
by eating permitted food, and hence the murder is considered voluntary.
Similarly, reasoning by analogy dictates the murder penalty should apply to
a person who was coerced to kill a Muslim or profess disbelief, and chose killing.
This ruling is based on the fact that he would have thus chosen the forbidden
action over the allowable, and thus the killing is deemed voluntary. However,
the ruling based on juristic approbation is that he should not be subjected to
the physical murder penalty (qis.ās.), but should pay the financial compensation
(diyyah) if he did not know that it is allowable in this case to profess disbelief
with his tongue.19
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.181).
Chapter 95
Legal Actions
We start with an analysis of specific verbal and legal actions, which may be
initiating a new legal relationship (’inshā’), or acknowledging one (’iqrār). In
¯
turn, initiating legal actions may be divided into two groups: those that can be
voided, and those that cannot. Examples of initiating legal actions that cannot
be voided include divorce, marriage, separation, oath taking, and absolution
from the physical penalty for murder. Some H . anafı̄s counted twenty types of
legal actions in this category, but closer analysis shows that there are in fact
only fifteen.1 On the other hand, initiating legal actions that can be voided
include all actions that lead to ownership, such as sales, leases, etc.
95.1 Binding legal actions

Binding legal actions are those that cannot be voided. The H . anafı̄s ruled that
coercion has no effect on such actions, which are thus binding regardless of co-
ercion. For instance, if a man is coerced to divorce his wife, make a pledge, take
an oath, separate from his wife, marry, return a divorced wife to the marriage,
absolve a killer of the physical penalty, etc., the initiated contract is binding.
This ruling follows from the fact that such dealings are concluded regardless
of the seriousness of intent of the actor. In this regard, coercion is similar to
lack of seriousness of intent, since the actions of a coerced person lack valid
consent and expression of intent. The formal proof of this ruling is the H . adı̄th
¯
of H. udh ayfah ibn Al-Yamān (mAbpwh) that “the unbelievers took him as a
¯
hostage, and coerced him to swear that he will never support the Messenger of
Allāh (pbuh) in any military forays, and he swore thus. The Prophet (pbuh)
told him: ‘fulfill your promise to them, and we shall seek the help of Allāh
against them’.” Moreover, c Abdul-Razzāq narrated in his Mus.annaf that ’Ibn
c
Umar recognized the divorce of a coerced husband,2 which is further supported
((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.96).
2 Narrated by c Abdul-Razzāq in his Mus.annaf that ’Ibn c Umar, c.f. Al-H
. āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄
c
(1st edition, (H
. adı̄th ), vol.3, p.222).
¯
333
334 CHAPTER 95. LEGAL ACTIONS
by the generality of the verse: “So if the husband divorces his wife (irrevocably),
he cannot after that remarry her until after she had married another husband
and he has divorced her” [2:230]. In summary, dealings in this category are
considered valid and binding on the coerced actor.
In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄ jurists ruled that coercion renders such dealings
defective. For instance, they do not consider the divorce or marriage of a coerced
husband to be concluded. This seems to be the more appropriate ruling. The
non-H . anafı̄s based this ruling on the fact that coerced verbal profession of dis-
belief has no legal consequences, as per the verse “Anyone who, after accepting
faith in Allāh, utters disbelief, except under coercion with his heart remaining
firm in faith, but those who open their breast to disbelief, on them is wrath
from Allāh, and theirs will be a dreadful penalty” [16:60]. Thus, they ruled that
any coerced verbal action has no legal consequences.
In this regard, it is narrated in the Sunnah that Khansā’ bint Khuzām
¯ ¯
was married by her father without her consent after she had been previously
married. She thus complained to the Messenger of Allāh (pbuh), and he nullified
the marriage.3 In another supporting incident from the Sunnah, it is narrated
that a man married off his daughter to his nephew against her will, and the
Prophet (pbuh) gave her the option.4 There is also a narrated H . adı̄th that the
¯
Prophet (pbuh) said: “Divorce in a state of ’ighlāq is not concluded”.5 In this
regard, Al-Shāfic ı̄ explained ’ighlāq as coercion.¯ In another H . adı̄th , the Prophet
¯ ¯ ¯
(pbuh) said: “Allāh has disregarded my nation’s mistakes, forgetfulness, and
coerced transgressions”.6 In other words, the Legal status of a coerced action
is negated. It is also logical that coerced actions in this category should be
invalidated, to protect the rights and property of people.
Consequently, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that coercion in divorce, freeing of slaves,
¯
sales, leases, marriages, remarriage, and similar dealings, renders such dealings
invalid. In this regard, the negation of the legal status of the coerced con-
tract implies that the consequences of the contract (e.g. the validity of divorce,
3 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ on the authority of Khansā’ bint Khuzām, c.f. Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄
¯ ¯ ¯ . .
(1st edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.3, p.191).
¯
4 Narrated by Al-Nasā’ı̄ and ’Ah.mad on the authority of A’isha, who said that a woman
c
¯
came to her, and said that her father had married her to his nephew against her will to improve
his social status. A’isha asked her to wait until the Prophet (pbuh) came. When the Prophet
c
¯
(pbuh) learned of the story, he called for the father, and gave the woman the choice. The
woman then said that she consents to what her father did, but that she wanted to contest his
action simply to let other women know that fathers do not have any control in this matter.
Al-Bayhaqı̄ said that this H . adı̄th had an incomplete transmission. It is supported by other
¯
H. adı̄th s with incomplete transmissions narrated by ’Ah.mad, ’Abū Dāwūd and ’Ibn Mājah on
¯
the authority of ’Ibn c Abbās, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.122), Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄
c

5 Narrated by ’Abū ¯
Dāwūd, ’Ibn Mājah, and Al-H . ākim (who said that it met the authen-
ticity conditions of Muslim) as: “Divorces and freeing of slaves in a state of ’ighlāq are not
concluded”. ’Abū Dāwūd said that the term (’ighlāq) means anger, but most analysts ¯ ruled
that the term encompasses coercion, anger, insanity, ¯ and any other condition that compro-
mises the actor’s ability to judge and control the consequences of his actions, c.f. Al-H . āfiz.
Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.3, p.223).
¯
6 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ on the authority of Thawbān, and considered by Al-Suyūtı̄ to
. ¯ .
be a valid H . adı̄th , c.f. Al-Suyūt.ı̄ (a, vol.4, p.35).
¯
95.1. BINDING LEGAL ACTIONS 335
marriage, sale) do not take place. However, they noted one exception to this
general ruling, indicating that a coerced killer is still subject to the physical
penalty for murder. The latter ruling is based on the grave subject matter of
murder, which requires protecting the prohibition of murder at all expenses.7 In
this regard, they rejected the H. adı̄th : “Three contracts are serious, even when
¯
uttered lightly, marriage, divorce, and remarriage”,8 upon which the H . anafı̄s
based their ruling as weak. Moreover, as ’Ibn H . azm pointed out, the H . adı̄th of
¯
H. udh ayfah is invalid.
¯
In response to the narration regarding ’Ibn c Umar’s recognition of the divorce
of a coerced husband as valid, they referred to the citation of ’Ibn H. ajar in Fath.
Al-Bārı̄ of c Abdul-Razzāq’s narration that ’Ibn c Umar ruled in the story of
Thābit Al-’Ac raj that coerced divorce is not permissible. There are further
¯
narrations in Al-Bayhaqı̄’s Sunan, Al-Bukhārı̄’s Sah.ı̄h., and Mālik’s Muwat.t.a’
¯
that indicate that ’Ibn c Umar considered coerced divorce to be invalid.
Finally, the H . anafı̄ understanding of the verse “So if the husband divorces
his wife (irrevocably), he cannot after that remarry her until after she had
married another husband and he has divorced her” [2:230] contradicts the verse
“Allāh will not call you to account for thoughtless oaths, but for the intention
in your hearts” [2:225]. Also, the verse [2:230] refers to the third divorce, while
the coerced husband in our example is assumed never to have divorced his wife
before. Finally, the H . anafı̄s argued that the H. adı̄th “A coerced divorce is not
¯
concluded” is probabilistic (z.annı̄), and thus cannot restrict the import of a
certain (qat.c ı̄) text (the verse of divorce [2:230]). However, the correct opinion
for the Shāfic ı̄s is that the probabilistic text can in fact restrict the certain text,
¯
since that very verse was restricted by the well-known H . adı̄th : “Three are not
¯
responsible for their actions: a child until he grows older, a sleeper until he
wakes up, and an insane person until he regains his sanity”.9 Thus, the import
of the verse is in fact probabilistic, and may be restricted by a probabilistic
account.10
7 Takhrı̄j Al-Furūc c alā Al-’Us.ūl (p.149).

¯
8 Narrated by the four authors of Sunan with the exception of Al-Nasā’ı̄, and the narration
on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah was deemed valid by Al-H . ākim. However, another narration
by ’Ibn Udayy is weak, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.175), ’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (, p.423
c
onwards), Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H

c
. adı̄th), vol.3, p.293 onwards).
9 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the four authors of¯Sunan with the exception of Al-Tirmidhı̄,
. ¯
and deemed valid by Al-H . ākim. It was also narrated by ’Ibn H . ibbān on the authority of
c A’isha and by others on the authorities of c Alı̄ c Umar, ’Ibn c Abbās, ’Abū Hurayrah, and
¯
others, c.f. Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.6, p.251), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.180), ’Ibn Daqı̄q
¯
Al-c Īd (, pp.66,421).
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.188), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
c
Al-D . amānāt (p.206), ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.8, p.383 onwards), Al-Kh at.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.3, p.289), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.367), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.7, p.118), the article
Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (sec.2, p.2 onwards).
¯
95.2 Non-binding actions

The majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that actions that require consent and can be
voided (e.g. sales, gifts, leases, etc.) are rendered defective if the actor was par-
tially or totally coerced. Thus, they consider the dealing executed but defective.
For instance, if the action was a sale, the buyer would attain ownership rights
if he receives the merchandise of the coerced sale. However, the sale or simi-
lar dealing is considered defective since consent is an executability condition in
such contracts. In this regard, coercion negates the actor’s consent, and hence
would normally render the contract non-executable and give the coerced actor
the option of voiding or executing when he is no longer coerced.
The Mālikı̄s and the H . anafı̄ jurist Zufar ruled that coerced dealings of the
type discussed here are considered suspended pending the actor’s consent. This
ruling follows from their view that consent is a condition of validity for the con-
tract, and not a condition of its conclusion. Then, if the coerced party consents
to the contract after the coercion is removed, the contract becomes valid. In
this regard, they disagree with the majority of H . anafı̄s in their classification of
the contract as defective, since defective contracts for them cannot be rendered
permissible through the actor’s consent. Thus, they compared coerced sales to
un-commissioned agent sales that are suspended, rather than comparing them
to defective sales. In this regard, since the sale is suspended, it only results in
the establishment of ownership through receipt.
In summary:
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad ruled that coercion renders
voidable dealings defective but not invalid. Thus, they apply the rulings of
defective contracts to coerced dealings, with the exception that they render
the contract valid and binding if the coerced party permits it after the
coercion is removed. They ruled thus based on the view that defectiveness
was established in this case only to protect the rights of the coerced party,
rather than to protect any public interest.
• On the other hand, Zufar considers the coerced contract to be non-executable,

in analogy to contracts concluded by an un-commissioned agent. Thus,
the contract is considered suspended pending the approval of the coerced
party after the coercion is removed. He further argued that considering the
contract valid and binding upon approval implies that the contract was
only suspended, and not defective, since defective contracts are voided
and cannot become validated through approval. Note that Zufar’s proof
is formally stronger and logically more reasonable. However, the accepted
11
H. anafı̄ opinion is that of ’Abū H
. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad.
• All other jurists ruled that coerced dealings in this category are considered
invalid.12
11 Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhı̄ by Professor Al-Zarqā’ (p.364).
¯
12 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.186), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.293 onwards),
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.108), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
¯ . .
95.3. COERCED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LIABILITY 337
Thus, we may enumerate four rulings for the sales of a coerced person:
1. ’Abū H. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad ruled that coerced sales are
defective in a manner similar to the defectiveness of sales based on igno-
rance, ribā, etc. The defectiveness in this case is established due to the
lack of consent. However, they made this case an exception from other
defective sales by considering the sale valid and executable if the coerced
seller approves it after the coercion is removed. On the other hand, the
coerced seller also has the option of voiding the contract and recalling the
property he was forced to sell, regardless of whether or not it was resold.
This ruling is established to protect the seller’s rights and property.
This ruling is in contrast to other defective sales, based on ribā or similar
factors, in which later permission is immaterial. In those other defective
sales, the defectiveness pertains primarily to a right of the Law against
prohibitions of ribā and such factors. Moreover, the resale of the object
of a defective sale is normally executed, and the original seller in this case
is not given an option to void the original sale, to protect the rights of
the second buyer. This latter ruling is based on the higher priority of the
buyer’s right over the Legal rights of Allāh, since Allāh is not in need of
protection of his rights, while men need their rights to be protected.
2. Zufar ruled that a coerced sale is suspended pending the coerced seller’s
permission after the coercion is removed.
3. The Mālikı̄s ruled that a coerced sale is not binding, since the coerced
seller is given an option to void the contract or execute it. This opinion
is also in accordance with the H. anafı̄ jurist Al-Qadūrı̄’s rulings regarding
a coerced person’s sale, purchase, and acknowledgement of liability.
4. The Shāfic ı̄s, H

. anbalı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s ruled that coerced sales are invalid.
¯
95.3 Coerced acknowledgement of liability

There are two main juristic rulings regarding unjust coercion to acknowledge
false liabilities:
1. The H. anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, H

. anbalı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s ruled that such false coerced
¯
acknowledgement is legally disregarded, regardless of whether the acknowl-
edgement pertains to voidable dealings (e.g. sales and leases) or non-
voidable ones (e.g. divorce and remarriage).
The H. anafı̄s based their ruling on the view that acknowledgement of rights
and liabilities constitutes a statement that may be true and maybe false.
p.182), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.89 onwards), ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.8, p.380), Mar ı̄ ibn
c
Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.5), the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄ c ah wa Al-
¯
Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (sec.2, p.25).
In this regard, acknowledgements of liability that are not coerced are ac-
cepted as truthful, since a man’s admission of his own liability cannot be
self-serving. In contrast, the default is falsehood of admissions of liability
made under coercion, by virtue of the threat due to which the admission
is made.
The non-H . anafı̄s justified their ruling on the basis of the H
. adı̄th : “Allāh
¯
has disregarded for my nation their mistakes, forgetfulness, and coerced
actions”, which refers to all types of coercion. Thus, they reasoned that
the legal status of all coerced actions, including acknowledgements, are
thus disregarded and inconsequential.
2. The Mālikı̄s ruled that coerced acknowledgements of false liabilities are

considered non-binding. Thus, the coerced party is given an option after
coercion is removed either to reaffirm the acknowledgement or to negate
it. Their proof for this ruling was based on analogy to coerced divorces,
which are non-binding.
They Mālikı̄s and most other jurists further ruled that coerced admission
of committing adultery, drinking wine, stealing, slandering, or killing, are
automatically voided. Thus, no Legal penalties may be applied based on
such coerced admissions of guilt. This ruling is based on the general rule
that the application of Legal penalties is prevented if there is reasonable
doubt, and coercion gives rise to reasonable doubt (shubha).13
¯
95.4 Coercion with some choice

We have seen that all legal actions can be classified as voidable or non-voidable.
There are two main rulings regarding coercion to perform one of a number of
legal actions that are non-voidable:
1. The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that there is no coercion if the coerced party is given a
¯
choice. Thus, if a person chooses from the coerced set of available actions
one that is non-voidable, the action is thus executed and binding.
• Thus, they ruled that if a man is coerced to divorce either a wife

with whom he had consummated the marriage or a wife with whom
he had not, the coercion is disregarded, and whichever divorce he
concludes is executed. They ruled thus based on the view that he
had a choice not to divorce the woman he did divorce.
2. The non-Shāfic ı̄s ruled that it is possible for a person to be given a certain
¯
degree of choice, but to be considered coerced nonetheless. Thus, they
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.182), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
c
Al-D. amānāt (p.206), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.397), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.196), Al-
Bājūrı̄ (5th printing (Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.4), the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-
¯ ¯
Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (sec.2, p.44 onwards).
95.4. COERCION WITH SOME CHOICE 339
apply the same rulings in this case as in the case where the coerced action
was uniquely specified.
• Thus, they agreed that coercion plays a role in their rulings, e.g. in
the divorce example. However, they differed in their rulings based on
that coercion. Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the divorce is executed,
since they ruled that coercion has no effect on verbal actions that
are non-voidable. On the other hand, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled
that whichever divorce the man chooses is not binding, and the co-
erced husband has the option after coercion is removed to void the
divorce or to permit it. Finally, the H. anbalı̄s ruled that the divorce is
executed, since they do not differentiate between uniquely identified
coerced actions and coercion with a limited choice.
There are also two main rulings regarding coercion of voidable legal actions:
1. We have seen that the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that coercion is disregarded if the
¯
coerced party is given any choice.
• Thus, if a man is coerced to sell one of two buildings that he owns, the
Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the sale is executed for whichever one he chooses
¯
to sell, since they do not consider the sale to be coerced.
2. We have also seen that the non-Shāfic ı̄s allow for the possibility of coercion
¯
with some degree of choice.
• Thus, the H . anbalı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s consider the sale of either building
to be invalid in our example, the majority of H . anafı̄s consider that
coerced sale to be defective, and the Mālikı̄s and Zufar consider it to
be suspended. The proofs for those rulings are the same as we have
seen in the previous section.14
14 ibid., Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.289), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.367),
¯ . ¯ ¯
the article Al-’Ikrāh Bayna Al-Sharı̄c ah wa Al-Qānūn by Sh. Zakariyya Al-Bardı̄sı̄ (sec.2,
¯
p.60 onwards).
Part XVI
Interdiction
341
343
Preliminaries
We shall study interdiction in four chapters:
2. Reasons for interdiction.

3. Removal of interdiction.
4. Associating debts with a deceased person’s estate.

Chapter 96
Definition and Legality
96.1 Definition
The Arabic word h.ajr refers literally to a limitation of actions. Thus, the term
h.ijr is sometimes used to mean forbidden actions, as in the verse: “The day
they see the angels, no joy will there be for the sinners that day, and they will
say: ‘there is a barrier (h.ijr) forbidden (mah.jūr) for you altogether’ ”[25:22].
Moreover, the mind was called a (h.ijr), as in the verse: “Is there not in these an
evidence for those with understanding (h.ijr)” [89:5], since it forbids its possessor
to commit harmful deeds. Similarly, the area known as Al-H . at.ı̄m is called a h.ijr,
since it was kept out of the Kac bah.
Juristically, h.ajr or interdiction is the prevention of an individual from deal-
ing in his property. The opposite of interdiction is permission (’idhn), which
¯
drops the interdiction and reinstates a person’s right to deal in his property.1
Jurists gave a variety of similar definitions to interdiction, which we shall list
below:
• The H . anafı̄s defined interdiction as making the contracts and verbal deal-
ings of the interdicted party non-binding.2 For instance, the sales and gifts
of an interdicted person are not binding or executable, and hence the con-
sequences of the contract (transfer of ownership) can only be established
through receipt. In this regard, interdiction applies to contractual and
verbal activities, since the executability of such actions may be prevented.
However, physical activities cannot be interdicted, since physical actions
cannot be made to disappear after having taken place. However, interdic-
tion as it relates to contracts and verbal actions is effective by preventing
contracts from being legally concluded or executed. In this regard, the
H. anafı̄s gave a more precise definition of interdiction thus: “It is a specific
prevention of a specific person from performing specific actions, or allow-
1 Al-Zaylac ı̄
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.203), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.108).
c
((H anafı̄), vol.5, p.99), Al-Zayla c ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.190),
. .
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2,p.66).
¯ .
345
ing such actions to be binding and executable, by rendering the contracts

of the interdicted individual suspended”.3
Thus, interdiction may render the dealings of small children and insane
individuals non-concluded if they are purely harmful (e.g. a divorce). In-
terdiction also renders the dealings of a discerning child suspended pending
the permission of his guardian or plenipotentiary, and render the dealings
of undiscerning children invalid.
However, interdiction against physical actions is meaningless. Thus, a
small child or an insane person is deemed a guarantor of the property of
others if he destroys it. Thus, the price of property destroyed by such in-
dividuals must be taken from their wealth, and demands of compensation
must be addressed to the guardian or plenipotentiary. This ruling follows
from the fact that the situation thus dictates that the transgressor must
compensate the owner for his destroyed property. However, such non-
discerning individuals are not subjected to physical Legal punishments,
since a valid intent cannot be attributed to them. Thus, if a non-discerning
child or an insane person kills a Muslim, they will be responsible for fi-
nancial compensation (diyah), since the killing is thus considered to be
wrongful manslaughter.
• The Mālikı̄s defined interdiction as a legal characteristic that prevents

the dealings of the characterized individual from being executed beyond
obtaining sustenance, or prevents him from giving his property in charity
beyond the first one-third.4 The first category applies to interdictions of
small children, the insane, the mentally incompetent, and the bankrupt.
Those types of individuals are prevented from dealing in their property
through sales or contributions beyond obtaining sustenance, and all their
dealings are thus suspended pending the permission of their guardian. The
latter type of interdiction applies to a terminally ill person or a man’s wife,
both of whom are not prevented from trading, but are banned from giving
more than one-third of their wealth to charity.

. anbalı̄s defined interdiction as a prevention of engaging
¯
in financial dealings.5 Thus, they include in their definition the legal
prevention of small children and the insane from trading, as well as the
prevention of a buyer from dealing in his property until he pays the price he
owes. In this regard, they ruled that an interdicted person is not prevented
from engaging in non-financial dealings, such as divorce, admission to
crimes for which the Law dictates physical punishment, performing various
obligatory and encouraged acts of worship. In this regard, the obligatory
financial forms of worship of an interdicted individual are executed, to the
exclusion of encouraged financial forms of worship. However, all dealings of
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.99).
4 Al-Dardı̄r((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.381).
¯ . ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.404).
96.2. PROOF OF LEGALITY 347
small children and insane individuals in properties, liabilities, and marital

affairs, are deemed invalid.
96.2 Proof of legality

There are three verses in the Qur’ān that indicate the permissibility of the
principle of interdiction:
1. The first verse states: “To those weak of understanding, make not over
your property which Allāh has made a means of support for you, but
feed and clothe them therewith, and speak to them words of kindness and
justice” [4:5]. In this verse, Allāh (swt) forbade guardians and plenipo-
tentiaries from allowing mentally incompetent individuals to take control
over their properties, to prevent them from wasting it. Thus, the Text
indicates that those mentally incompetent are forbidden from dealing in
their property, which is the nature of interdiction.
2. The second verse states: “Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty, if
then you find them of sound judgment, release their properties to them”
[4:6]. Thus, Allāh (swt) ordered the guardians to test the orphans, by
allowing them to deal in a small portion thereof to test their financial
abilities. Then, if the orphan is found to be discerning prior to reaching
puberty, they may be given control over their property. This Text implies
that prior to attaining discernment, the children are not allowed to deal
in their property, and are thus under interdiction.
3. The third verse says: “If the liable party is mentally deficient or weak, or
unable to dictate himself, let his guardian dictate faithfully” [2:282]. Al-
Shāfic ı̄ (mAbpwh) explained the mentally deficient in this verse to refer
¯
to the spendthrift, the weak to refer to children and demented old people,
and the one who cannot dictate to refer to the insane. Thus, Allāh (swt)
ordered the guardians of such people to take their place in the documen-
tation of debts, implying that such individuals are under interdiction.
It is also established in valid H

. adı̄th s that the Prophet (pbuh) interdicted
¯
Muc ādh and forced him to sell his property to repay his debt,6 and c Uthman is
¯ ¯
reported to have interdicted c Abdullāh ibn Jac far for overspending.7
96.3 The wisdom in permitting interdiction

Interdiction does not in reality compromise the dignity of the interdicted. In
fact, it is a form of mercy, protection, and cooperation. Indeed, it is out of
6 Narrated by Al-Dāraqutnı̄, Al-Bayhaqı̄ and Al-Hākim who deemed it valid, on the au-
. .
thority of Kac b ibn Mālik, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.244 onwards).
¯
7 Narrated by Al-Shāfic ı̄ in his Musnad on the authority of c Urwah ibn Al-Zubayr, c.f.
¯
¯
mercy for the interdicted that interdiction is legalized to protect his property
from his own abuse. Moreover, it protects the benefits of individuals as well as
society as a whole, by training the interdicted gradually until they are capable
to deal in their property wisely, so that wealth is not wasted. Finally, it is
a commendable form of assistance given by the guardian to ensure that the
property of the interdicted child or incompetent person is preserved. In the
case of children, the guardian further trains them to be responsible members of
society who use their wealth optimally. In the cases of mentally incompetent
people, the guardian protects their interests against their own inability to make
beneficial purposive choices. In the case of interdiction of debtors, the intention
is clearly to protect the rights of creditors, and thus to encourage the extension
of credit in society.
Thus, we see that interdiction is beneficial to the interdicted individual, by
protecting his property, as well as to society as a whole, by preventing poverty.
In this regard, property is the very lifeblood of a society, and its proper spending
avoiding going to either extreme is a necessity, as Allāh (swt) said: “Verily
spendthrifts are brothers of devils” [17:27].
Society also benefits from the fact that Allāh (swt) has ordered guardians
and plenipotentiaries to look after the benefits of orphans and the destitute with
honesty and justice. This is of great help to all members of society, since no
person can be immune from the possibility that his offspring will be weak and
will need the assistance of others. Allāh (swt) said in this regard: “Let those
disposing of an estate have the same fear in their minds as they would have for
their own if they had left a helpless family behind. Let them fear Allāh and
speak words of appropriate (comfort). Those who unjustly devour the property
of orphans eat a fire into their own bodies, and they will soon be enduring a
blazing fire” [4:9-10].
In this regard, ’Imām ’Ah.mad, Al-Nasā’ı̄, ’Abū Dāwūd, and others narrated
on the authority of ’Ibn c Abbās that when the verse: “Come not near to the
orphan’s property except in the best of ways” [17:34], all Muslims separated their
wealth from the wealth of orphans, until foodstuffs started perishing. Shortly
after the Prophet (pbuh) was told about this, he received the verse: “If you
mix their affairs with yours, they are your brothers, and Allāh knows the man
who means mischief from the one who means good” [2:220]. Moreover, Allāh
(swt) ordered the guardians to test orphans before giving them control over
their property: “Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty, if then you find
them of sound judgment, release their properties to them” [4:6], and forbade
them from giving the mentally incompetent control over their property: “To
those weak of understanding, make not over your property which Allāh has
made a means of support for you, but feed and clothe them therewith, and
speak to them words of kindness and justice” [4:5]. Those injunctions protect
the interests of the interdicted party as well as the general interests of society.
We have also listed the established H . adı̄th s that legalized interdiction of
¯
debtors to protect the rights of creditors. The two H . adı̄th s we listed in this
¯
regard was the one narrated by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ on the authority of Kac b ibn
Mālik regarding the interdiction of Muc ādh and selling his property to repay his
¯
96.4. TYPES OF INTERDICTION 349
debt, as well as the one narrated by Al-Shāfic ı̄ on the authority of c Urwah ibn Al-
¯
Zubayr that c Uthmān interdicted c Abdullāh ibn Jac far due to his overspending.
¯
96.4 Types of interdiction

There are two main types of interdiction, classified according to the type of
benefit that interdiction protects:8
1. Interdictions of young children, the insane, the mentally incompetent, and
the spendthrift, only benefit the interdicted party and nobody else. Hence,
those interdictions were legalized for their individual benefits.
2. Interdiction of a bankrupt debtor benefits his creditors, interdiction of a

terminally ill person benefits his heirs for two-thirds of the estate after
payment of debts, and interdiction of a pawning debtor benefits the cred-
itor whose right is associated with his pawned property. In those cases,
the interdiction was legalized for the benefit of a party other than the
interdicted.
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
p.404 onwards).
Chapter 97
Reasons for Interdiction
There are many reasons for interdiction, some of which are unanimously rec-
ognized due to lack of eligibility(e.g. young age, and insanity), and some are
subject to juristic differences in opinion (e.g. mental incompetence, loss of con-
sciousness and religion, etc.). In the latter set, jurists differ in opinion regarding
the need to protect the interdicted individual or others, rather than disagreeing
over the eligibility considerations. The consequences of interdictions depend on
the reason for its establishment. In this chapter, we shall discuss specific reasons
for interdiction, and their legal consequences.
97.1 Young children

Every human being goes through a period of young age, and jurists have agreed
that young orphans must be interdicted.1 This ruling is based on the verse:
“Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty, if then you find them of sound
judgment, release their properties to them” [4:6], as well the ineligibility of small
children for financial dealings due to their lack of discernment. However, jurists
have differed in opinion regarding the consequences of this interdiction for the
dealings of small children.
97.1.1 Consequences of a child s dealings

The Mālikı̄s and H. anafı̄s distinguished between the dealings of discerning chil-
dren and those of non-discerning children, while the Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s did
¯
not differentiate thus:
2
• The H
. anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that a child is non-discerning if he has not
1 ’Ibn Rushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.275).
2 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.101), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.191),
c
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.310 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.171), Abd Al-
c
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.67), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.294-6), Al-Dardı̄r
¯
((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.384), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.320), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2,
¯
p.278).
351
352 CHAPTER 97. REASONS FOR INTERDICTION
reached the age of seven, and discerning otherwise. This ruling is based
on the H. adı̄th : “Order your children to pray once they reach the age of
¯
seven”.3
They ruled that interdiction has no consequences for physical activities
such as usurping or destroying property. Thus, a child or insane individ-
ual who engages in such activities is responsible for the compensation of
the property’s owner. This ruling follows from the fact that interdiction
pertains only to verbal, and not to physical, actions.4
They further ruled that the verbal dealings of a non-discerning child are
invalid, since he lacks eligibility for any such dealings. Thus, his consent
and intent cannot be considered legally, and his dealings are invalidated
regardless of whether they are purely beneficial, merely harmful, or mixed
in benefit and loss. In this sense, a non-discerning child’s contracts, ac-
knowledgements of liability, and divorce, are legally disregarded in analogy
to the rulings for the insane.
On the other hand, they differentiate between the three types of dealings
in which discerning children may engage:
– Purely beneficial dealings of discerning children, such as accepting

gifts and inheritance, and accepting Islam, are deemed valid and
executed without need for his guardian’s of plenipotentiary’s consent.
This ensures the maximal benefit for the child.
– Merely harmful dealings of discerning children, such as giving charity
and loans, and divorce, are deemed invalid and non-executable. Such
dealings do not become valid even if approved by the child’s guardian,
since such approval cannot reverse the invalidity of a contract. Thus,
the H. anafı̄s established a juristic ruling: “All divorces are concluded,
except for the divorces of children and mentally incompetent men”.
Some of them narrated it as a H . adı̄th , but it does not have a valid
5 ¯
origin in H. adı̄th .
¯
– Dealings of a discerning child that may be harmful or beneficial,
e.g. trading, leasing, and marriage, are deemed suspending pending
the permission of his guardian. This ruling is based on the view
that discernment implies understanding the nature of trading, and is
sufficient to establish serious intent. In this case, the guardian has an
option to permit the transaction if he deems it beneficial, or to void
it. However, the guardian is not allowed to permit any transaction
with gross injustice in exchange.
3 Narrated by ’Ah.mad, ’Abū Dāwūd and Al-H
. ākim on the authority of Abdullāh ibn
c
c Amr.
4 Only verbal actions can be subject to interdiction, since physical actions cannot be made
to vanish after witnessing them. In contrast, verbal actions are legal rather than physical
entities, and they require a valid intent for their legal consequences to be considered, c.f. ’Ibn
Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.311).
5 Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4, p.161).
. . . ¯
97.1. YOUNG CHILDREN 353
6
. anbalı̄s ruled that he financial dealings of all children
¯
are invalid, regardless of discernment.
In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the actions of a discerning child are
¯
accepted in giving permission to enter a house, and delivering gifts. They
also considered a discerning child’s state of ritual purity for pilgrimage
(’ih.rām) valid if approved by his guardian, and considered his acts of
worship valid. Moreover, they ruled that discerning children get rewarded
the same as adults for removing impediments from the road, and may join
Islām at an early age like c Alı̄ (mAbpwh).
The H. anbalı̄s ruled that the dealings of a discerning child are valid if
authorized by his guardian. Thus, his interdiction is released to the extent
for which he is authorized to trade or acknowledge liability.
All four schools agreed that young children are responsible for monetary
compensations for any property or life they may destroy.
In summary, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s render the contracts and acknowl-
edgements of the young and the insane as non-executable, while the Shāfic ı̄s
¯
and H. anbalı̄s render them invalid.
97.1.2 Withholding the child s property

Jurists are in agreement that the young should not be given control over their
property until they reach puberty and discernment.7 This ruling is based on
the two conditions of attainment of legal age and discernment stipulated in the
verse: “Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty, if then you find them
of sound judgment, release their properties to them” [4:6], both of which must
thus be observed.
In this regard, a child may reach puberty with or without attaining discern-
ment:
• If the child reaches puberty and discernment with which he can guard
his property, his interdiction is released, and he is thus given control over
his property.8 This ruling is based on the above cited verse [4:6], which
also dictates that the act of forwarding the child’s property to him must
be witnessed: “When you release their property to them, take witnesses
in their presence” [4:6]. However, jurists differed in opinion regarding
whether or not a court ruling is required for the removal of interdiction:
6 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.166,170), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
vol.3, p.431).
7 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.457 onwards;471), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
. ¯ ¯
p.330), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.7,p.170), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.277).
¯
8 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.331),
. Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
pp.166,170), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.457), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.154; vol.7, p.170
onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.195), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄),
¯
vol.2, p.277).
– The H . anafı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, and most Sh āfic ı̄s ruled9 that the interdiction
¯
of a child is removed upon attaining puberty and discernment, with-
out the need for a court order. This ruling is based on the view that
interdiction is established without a court order, and thus may be
removed without one, in analogy to interdiction of the insane. The
minority Shāfic ı̄ opinion was that a court order is necessary, since re-
¯
moval of interdiction requires judgment and testing of the interdicted,
in analogy to the interdiction of the mentally incompetent. In this
regard, the majority opinion seems more appropriate for existing cir-
cumstances, and it avoids unnecessary complications of procedure.
– The Mālikı̄s distinguished between the rulings for males and those
for females.10 For males, they considered three cases:
∗ If the child’s father is alive, then his interdiction is removed once
he reaches puberty, without need for a court order, provided that
he is not deemed mentally incompetent and his father does not
interdict him.
∗ If his father died and he has a plenipotentiary, then he may only
be released from interdiction through a test of discernment. In
this regard, if the plenipotentiary was selected by the father, then
he may test the child without a need for court permission. This
ruling follows from the fact that interdiction in this case would
have been established without a court order, and thus may be
removed without one. On the other hand, ’Ibn Juzayy stated
that if the plenipotentiary was appointed by a judge, then he
may not test the child for discernment without the judge’s per-
mission. On the other hand, the better opinion is that chosen
by Al-Dardı̄r, which stipulates that a court order is not neces-
sary regardless of whether the plenipotentiary was appointed by
the father or a judge. The plenipotentiary then needs to say be-
fore respected witnesses that he had tested the child, determined
that he was discerning, and thus released him from interdiction.
On the other hand, it is always possible for a judge to release
any individual from interdiction if he has sufficient proof of his
discernment.
∗ If the child reaches puberty without having a father or plenipo-
tentiary, then he is assumed to be discerning until proven other-
wise.
In summary, a court order is not required for releasing a child
from interdiction once he reaches puberty, whether he is inter-
dicted by his father or the father’s chosen plenipotentiary. How-
ever, a public announcement of discernment is necessary if he
was under the supervision of a plenipotentiary, but not required
9 ibid.
10 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.296-8), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.383), ’Ibn Rushd
¯
Al-H
. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.277), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.321).
if his father was alive. In the case of a court-assigned plenipoten-

tiary, ’Ibn Juzayy ruled that a court order is necessary to remove
the interdiction, while the more appropriate ruling issued by Al-
Dardı̄r stipulated that such a court-order is not necessary.
– If the child is female, then:
∗ If her father is alive, then she is released from interdiction if her
father declares her discernment, if she attains puberty and wit-
nesses declare that she is discerning, or if she is married and the
marriage is consummated. In the first instance, the father may
simply tell the girl that he has determined that she is discerning
and thus removed her interdiction, without need for witnesses.
∗ If the interdicted girl is under the supervision of a plenipoten-
tiary, then she may only be released from interdiction unless five
conditions are attained: (i) reaching puberty, (ii) attaining dis-
cernment, (iii) having proof of discernment, (iv) having married
and consummated the marriage, and (v) being officially released
by the plenipotentiary through an official declaration of discern-
ment. This ruling applies regarding of whether the plenipoten-
tiary was appointed by the girl’s father or by a court order.
Thus, no court order is required for a woman to be released from
interdiction
In this regard, the majority opinion agrees with that of the
Mālikı̄s, since they stipulated that a court order is required to
release a child from interdiction only if the child was under the
judge’s supervision. In the latter case, the child’s discernment
must be declared by the judge, in the same manner that a child
under the supervision of a plenipotentiary needs his plenipoten-
tiary to declare his discernment to be released from interdiction.
In summary, the non-Shāfic ı̄s stipulated two conditions for a child to
¯
be released from interdiction: (i) permission of his guardian to trade,
and (ii) attaining puberty and discernment. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s
¯
require only that the child reaches puberty.
• On the other hand, if the child reaches puberty without attaining discern-
ment, then he should not be given control over his property. In this case,
jurists of all schools agree that the non-discerning man or woman would
be interdicted on the basis of mental incompetence, following the verse:
“Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty, if then you find them of
sound judgment, release their properties to them” [4:6].
11
However, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that if a child reaches puberty without at-
taining discernment, he remains under interdiction only until he reaches
the age of twenty-five. At that age, he is then given control over his prop-
erty, since interdicting him past this age would compromise his dignity. He
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.69).
¯
also based this ruling on the verse: “Come not near to the orphan’s prop-
erty except in the best of ways, until he attains the age of full strength”
[17:34]. In this regard, the man would certainly have attained full strength
at the age of twenty-five (when he could biologically be a grand-father).
Moreover, he argued that interdiction is mainly for education and dis-
ciplining, which are inappropriate beyond that age. Hence, there is no
benefit to withholding the man’s property beyond that age, and it must
thus be given to him.
On the other hand, ’Abū Yūsuf, Muh.ammad, and the principal jurists of
all schools ruled12 that reaching puberty without attaining discernment is
not sufficient to release the child from interdiction. Thus, they ruled that
he must remain under interdiction until his discernment is ascertained,
even if he were to reach sixty years of age under interdiction. They based
this ruling on the verse: “ If then you find them of sound judgment, re-
lease their properties to them” [4:6], which stipulates two conditions: (i)
reaching puberty, and (ii) attaining discernment. Thus, a ruling with two
preconditions cannot take effect without both conditions being satisfied.
Further proof is provided by the previous verse: “To those weak of under-
standing, make not over your property” [4:5], meaning “their property”.
97.1.3 Reaching puberty

Puberty may be ascertained through physical signs, or through attaining a par-
ticular age. In this regard, different schools of jurisprudence stipulated different
physical signs that establish puberty:
13
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that a male child is known to have reached puberty
once he starts ejaculating in his sleep or otherwise, and thus may impreg-
nate a woman. As proof, they relied on the verse: “But when children
among you being to ejaculate, let them ask for permission” [24:59]. They
found further proof in the H . adı̄th : “Three are not accountable for their
¯
actions: a boy until he begins to ejaculate. . . ”.14 In this regard, ’Abū
Dāwūd narrated that c Alı̄ ibn ’Abı̄ T . ālib said: “I memorized a saying of
the Prophet (pbuh) that ‘A child is no longer an orphan once he begins
to ejaculate’.”
For girls, puberty is determined on the basis of menstruation (or preg-
nancy). This ruling is based on the H. adı̄th narrated by the five major
¯
¯ .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.298), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.331), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ ¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, pp.166,170), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.457 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄
c
¯ ¯
13 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.171), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.107), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.203), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.323).
14 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Nasā’ı̄, ’Ibn Mājah, and Al-Hākim on the authority
. .
of c A’isha as: “the boy until he grows up”. However, another narration in ’Ah.mad, ’Abū
¯
Dāwūd, and Al-H . ākim on the authorities of Alı̄ and Umar explicitly state “the boy until he
c c
begins to ejaculate (yah.talim)”, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H

c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.161
¯
onwards).
narrators of H
. adı̄th with the exception of Al-Nasā’ı̄: “Allāh does not ac-
¯
cept the prayer of a woman who has begun menstruating but prays with
an uncovered head”.15
The H. anafı̄s stipulated that the minimum age of puberty for boys is twelve,
and the minimum age of puberty for girls is nine. The majority of H . anafı̄s
ruled that children (boy or girl) are considered to have reached puberty
by age fifteen, regardless of whether or not they have shown physical signs
thereof. However, ’Abū H . anı̄fa stipulated the age of eighteen for boys, and
seventeen for girls for legal puberty, since he argued that those are the ages
by which it is determined whether the child is incapable of ejaculating or
menstruating.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled16 that there are seven physical signs of reaching puberty,
five of which pertain to boys and girls, and two of which are specific for
girls. The two signs for girls alone are menstruation and pregnancy. The
five common signs are ejaculation (asleep or awake), rough pubic hair,
body odor in the pubic area, flaring of the nostrils, and changes in the
voice. A proof for using pubic hair as a sign of puberty is provided by
the H. adı̄th narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Samurah that the
¯ ¯
Prophet (pbuh) said: “Kill the grown men among the polytheists, but
spare their children who have not yet grown pubic hair”.
The majority of the Mālikı̄s further ruled that if no physical signs of pu-
berty have appeared by age eighteen, the child is deemed to have reached
puberty. A minority specified the default age as that of seventeen.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled17 that puberty is ascertained either by reaching the
¯
age of fifteen lunar years, ejaculation after the age of nine, or the growing
of rough pubic hair that requires removal. On the other hand, they did
not specify the growth of armpit hair or facial hair as signs of puberty,
since they are rare in children under the age of fifteen. In addition, they
specified menstruation and pregnancy as signs of puberty in women.
Their selection of age fifteen as a demarcation is based on the narration
on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar that the Prophet (pbuh) did not authorize
him at the age of fourteen, ruling that he had not yet reached puberty;
and then authorized him on the day of the battle of the ditch at the age
of fifteen, ruling that he had reached puberty”.18
15 Also narrated by ’Ibn Khuzaymah in his Sahı̄h on the authority of c A’isha, and the
¯ . . . ¯
reference to acceptance of prayers is indication that this is the physical sign determining
puberty and Legal accountability, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.2, p.67).
16 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.293). ¯
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.330).
18 Narrated by ’Ibn Hibbān, and it was also narrated in Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim and the
. ¯
major narrators of H . adı̄th . Al-Shāfic ı̄ said that the Prophet (pbuh) returned seventeen com-
¯ ¯
panions at the age of fourteen, ruling that they had not reached puberty, and then authorized
them when they were fifteen. Among them, he said, were Zayd ibn Thābit, Rāfic ibn Khudayj,
¯ ¯
and ’Ibn c Umar.
• The H
. anbalı̄s ruled exactly in accordance with the Sh āfic ı̄ rulings.19
¯
97.1.4 Discernment
20
The H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and H. anbalı̄s defined discernment as the ability to pro-
tect and manage one’s property to one’s benefit, even if the discerning individ-
ual does not act in accordance with Islamic Law. They based this ruling on
the verse: “If then you find them of sound judgment, release their properties
to them” [4:6], which ’Ibn c Abbās explained as referring to their ability to use
their property to their benefit. Thus, interdiction is established to protect the
property of the interdicted, and once he is capable of protecting and managing
his own property, he must be given control thereof.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled21 that discernment refers not only to the ability
¯
to manage one’s property for one’s own benefit, but also refers to adherence
to Islamic teachings. Thus, a person is considered non-discerning if his sins
outweigh his good deeds, if he wastes his property in excessively unjust trades,
or if he spends his property in forbidden ways. Thus, a child must remain under
interdiction if he fails to satisfy the financial or the religious requirements of
discernment. On the other hand, most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that excessive spending
¯
on charity or spending on food and clothes that do not suit the person’s social
status do not render the person a spendthrift who should be interdicted.
In this regard, they ruled that a guardian or plenipotentiary must test the
child’s discernment as per the verse [4:5] in both respects: the financial and the
religious. In this regard, discernment in religious matters can be ascertained
by observing the child’s performance of obligatory acts of worship, avoidance
of forbidden and suspicious acts, and keeping good company. Discernment in
financial affairs can be ascertained by testing the child in the area wherein he is
most likely to work; e.g. agriculture, trade, etc. In this regard, the test should
be repeated twice or more before and/or after reaching puberty.
97.1.5 Guardians and plenipotentiaries

The guardian or plenipotentiary of an interdicted individual has the legal power
to deal in that individual’s property without seeking anyone’s permission. In
this regard, jurists of all schools agree that the father of an interdicted person
is his guardian if he is alive. However, jurists of the different schools differed in
the order of guardianship if the father is not alive:
22
. anafı̄s ruled the order of guardianship is: the child’s father, then
• The H
19 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.359-461), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.432).
20 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.7, p.170), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.105), ’Ibn Rush d
c
¯
Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.278), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.467), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.433).
21 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.169-170), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.331).
22 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.122), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.220),
. .
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.155).
his plenipotentiary when he dies, then the plenipotentiary’s plenipoten-

tiary, then his paternal grandfather, then his plenipotentiary, then his
plenipotentiary, then the ruler, then the judge or his plenipotentiary. This
order was based on the degree of care for the child’s wellbeing. Thus, the
father is deemed as the most caring for the child, and his plenipotentiary
is assumed to be more caring than the grandfather since he is selected
by the father. Moreover, the grandfather’s degree of care is considered
higher than that of a judge, due to being a family member. This is the
ordering for financial affairs, but there is another ordering of guardianship
in matters pertaining to marriage.
On the other hand, brothers, uncles, mothers and their plenipotentiaries,
and other similar relatives are not permitted to supervise the property of
the interdicted, or to authorize a young child to trade.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled23 that the order of guardianship for a child or a men-
tally incompetent person whose incompetence did not ensue after reaching
the age of puberty24 is thus: his discerning father, then his plenipoten-
tiary, then the ruler if there is one, otherwise the Muslim society as a
whole. Thus, they do not establish guardianship in financial affairs to
grandfathers, brothers, or uncles, unless the father appoints one of those
individuals as a plenipotentiary.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled25 that the order of guardianship of a child is thus: his
¯
father, then his grandfather, then the plenipotentiary of the father or the
grandfather whoever is later to die, then the judge or his deputy. The last
category is based on the H . adı̄th : “The Ruler of Muslims is the guardian of
¯
anyone who lacks a guardian”.26 Thus, they do not establish guardianship
for siblings, uncles, or mothers in the opinion of most Shāfic ı̄s. This order
¯
applies both for guardianships in financial matters as well as marriage.
This Shāfic ı̄ ordering seems to be the most appropriate, since he questioned
¯
the H. anafı̄ assumption that a father’s plenipotentiary who is not a relative
cares more for the child than his grandfather. He asserted that family
relations are the strongest incentives to care for the wellbeing of young
children.
27
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled in agreement with the Mālikı̄s that the order of
guardianship of interdicted individuals is: his father, then the father’s
plenipotentiary, then the ruler. However, they ruled that if interdiction
is renewed after a person reaches puberty, then guardianship goes to the
23 Al-Dardı̄r((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.299), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.389 onwards).
24 On the other hand, if mental incompetence ensued after reaching puberty, guardianship
goes to the ruler rather than the father.
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.328).
26 Narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄ who deemed it good (hasan), and Al-Hākim who deemed it
¯ . .
valid.
27 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.471), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.434).
.
ruler. The final ruling is based on the view that establishing or dissolv-
ing interdiction after having reached puberty requires a court-order, and
thus all financial affairs during interdiction must also require a court’s
supervision.
97.1.6 Guardian dealings in a child s property

Jurists agree that a guardian must only deal in the child’s property in ways that
benefit and do not harm the child. This ruling is based on the verses: “Come
not near to the orphan’s property except in the best of ways, until he attains
the age of full strength” [17:34], and “If you mix their affairs with yours, they
are your brothers, and Allāh knows the man who means mischief from the one
who means good” [2:220]. Moreover, they agreed that a rich guardian should
not consume any of the property of an orphan, and a poor guardian must only
consume a modest amount, following the verse: “If the guardian is well off, let
him claim no remuneration, but he is poor, let him have for himself what is just
and reasonable” [4:6]. In this regard, Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim narrated on the
¯
authority of c A’isha that she ruled that the guardian of an orphan must only
¯
consume a reasonable compensation for his efforts of guardianship. It was also
narrated that a man told the Prophet (pbuh): “I have no property, and I am
the guardian of an orphan”. The Prophet (pbuh) then told him: “Consume out
of the property of the orphan for whom you care, without overspending or using
it to enrich yourself, and do not use his property instead of using your own”.28
In what follows, we shall list the rulings in each juristic school for the meaning
of dealing in the child’s property only for his benefit.
H
. anafı̄ rulings
29
The H . anafı̄s ruled that guardian is not permitted to give any of the child’s
property in charity, since that is a pure financial loss for the child. They thus
ruled that the child’s guardian is banned from using the child’s property in all
pure contributions without compensation, such as lending it, naming it in a
will, giving in charity, divorcing his wife, etc. ’Abū H
. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf also
ruled that the guardian is not allowed to give the child’s property as a gift for
which there is a compensation. The latter ruling is based on the view that a
compensated gift begins as a gift, for which the guardian is not authorized, and
only becomes a commutative transaction later. In contrast, Muh.ammad ruled
that compensated gifts are permissible, since they are in reality a form of sale.
However, a judge is authorized to lend the property of an orphan, since such
practices help member of society to repay their debts.
On the other hand, a guardian is authorized to accept gifts, charity and
inheritance on behalf of the child, since such dealings are of pure financial benefit
28 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Nasā’ı̄, ’Ah.mad, and ’Ibn Mājah on the authority of
c Abdullāhibn c Amr, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.251).
¯
29 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5,
. p.153 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.499 on-
wards), Majmac Al-D . amānāt (p.408).
to the child. Thus, bringing benefit to the child is good, since the Prophet
(pbuh) said: “The best of people are those who are of the most benefit to other
people”.30 It is also ruled by juristic approbation that a guardian is authorized
to give the child’s property as a simple loan, and he is authorized to deposit it or
pawn it in lieu of his own debt. The latter ruling follows from the fact that the
pawned property will thus remain intact in the creditor’s possession. However,
if the pawned property were to perish, then the guardian must compensate the
child for the value of the pawned property with which he insured his own debt.
A guardian is also allowed to sell the child’s property for more than its value,
or to buy property on his behalf below its value. All such dealings are allowed
since they are of pure financial benefit to the child. Moreover, the guardian is
allowed to sell the child’s property at or slightly below its value, and to buy
on his behalf at or slightly above the property’s value. In this regard, slight
variations in price are determined by convention.
Similarly, the guardian is allowed to lease the child’s labor or properties for
its market rate, above it, or slightly below it as determined by convention. He is
also allowed to lease properties on behalf of the child at the market rate, below,
or slightly above as determined by convention. If the guardian leased the child’s
labor after he reaches puberty, then the child has the option to allow the hire
contract or void it. On the other hand, the child is not given any option in
the leasing of properties, since the guardian’s actions are assumed to be for the
child’s benefit, and thus are executed.
The guardian is also allowed to travel with the child’s property, use it in
silent partnerships, and assign agents to trade in it or lease it. This ruling
follows since all such dealings are derivative forms of trading.
However, only guardians who are known to be of good character and suffi-
cient wealth are allowed to sell a child’s immovable property (e.g. real estate),
and then only if he sells it for its value or above. Moreover, the guardian may
not sell the child’s immovable property to himself unless it is necessary to re-
pay a debt that could not be paid otherwise. This is indeed the best accepted
opinion. In this case, the guardian’s sale requires a judge’s permission to be
executed, and the judge may void the sale for the benefit of the child.
If the guardian is the child’s father or grandfather, then he may buy or sell
the child’s property to himself, as long as the price is in the child’s favor or very
close to the property’s value. Such trading also requires a judge’s permission
to be executed, and the judge is allowed to void the sale for the benefit of the
child.
Muh.ammad ruled that a plenipotentiary is not allowed to buy or sell the
child’s property to himself. On the other hand, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf
allowed such trading only if it is beneficial to the child, in the sense of buying
from him at a higher, and selling him at lower, than the market price.
30 This is a good H
. adı̄th
¯
, narrated by Al-Qad.āc ı̄ on the authority of Jābir ibn c Abdullāh.
Mālikı̄ rulings
The Mālikı̄s ruled31 that a guardian may deal in the child’s property as long as
the dealings are beneficial to the child. Thus, a father is allowed to trade in any
property of his interdicted child, movable or immovable, and he does not need
to justify the trade to anyone. He is also allowed to give the child’s property as
a compensated gift. Those rulings follow from the fact that a father is assumed
by default to deal only in the best interest of his child.
In contrast, they restrict a plenipotentiary from selling a child’s immovable
property unless there is good reason for it. Similarly, he is only allowed to use
the interdicted individual’s property in a compensated gift unless there is good
reason for it. The latter ruling follows from the fact that were the property
given in gift to perish, the guardian would only be responsible for its value on
the day it perished, which may be lower than its value on the day it was given in
gift, hence harming the orphan financially. The Mālikı̄s also ruled, in agreement
with the H . anafı̄s in principle, that the ruler like the plenipotentiary may only
sell the property of interdicted individuals out of necessity (e.g. to spend on
him or repay his debts).
The Mālikı̄s enumerated eleven reasons that may justify a plenipotentiary
or ruler to sell immovable property of a young child:
1. If there is a clear need to sell the property in order to spend on the child,
or to repay a debt that cannot be paid without selling the property.
2. Fear that a transgressor may usurp the property or its income, and there
is no way of protecting the property from the transgressor.
3. An obvious benefit by selling the property at a price that exceeds its

market value by one third or more.
4. Selling a property with excessive taxation to replace it with one with lower
taxation, unless the former also yields a higher income.
5. If the child co-owned a property with others, and his share was sold to
buy him another property in which he does not share with others.
6. If the property yields small or no income, and is sold to buy one that
yields a higher income.
7. If the child’s property was adjacent to bad or non-Muslim neighbors, and

was sold to buy him another with good Muslim neighbors.
8. If the child shared ownership of indivisible property, and the partner sold
his share, then the child’s share will have to be sold simultaneously.
9. If the property was subject to fast deterioration, and the child had no
money with which it can be restored, the property may thus be sold.
31 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.299,302 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.390,393-
5), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.322).

10. If the property was subject to fast deterioration, and it was deemed more
economical to sell it than to restore it.
11. If the property was a house and the area became subsequently deserted.
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled32 that the guardian must deal in the child’s property only for
¯
the latter’s benefit. Thus, he must protect the child’s property and invest it to
protect it from diminution due to expenditures on the child. In this regard, the
Arabic language of the verse: “To those weak of understanding, make not over
your property which Allāh has made a means of support for you, but feed and
clothe them therewith, and speak to them words of kindness and justice” [4:5]
explicitly suggests that the guardian should feed the child out of the income
from his property, rather than consume the property itself. In this regard, the
Prophet (pbuh) is narrated to have said: “If someone becomes the guardian of
an orphan, he must trade with his property to prevent it from being eaten up by
the obligatory charity payments”.33 In this regard, the guardian must invest the
child’s wealth in the best possible way, attempting to secure investments with a
guaranteed stream of income. He must thus avoid buying perishable goods on
his behalf, even if the trade is profitable. Moreover, the guardian is allowed to
travel with the wealth of the interdicted child or insane person, provided that
travel is safe and beneficial for the latter.
They also ruled that the guardian is allowed to sell immovable property of
the child in one of two conditions. The first is if the income stream is insufficient
to feed and clothe the child, and it is not possible or beneficial to borrow for
that purpose, or if the guardian fears that the property’s destruction is eminent.
The second condition under which a guardian may sell the child’s property is
when it can be sold for a significantly higher price than its comparables, or if
the price can be used to buy a similar property with lower taxes and equal or
greater income.
The guardian is allowed to exchange the child’s property for other property
both immediately and with deferment, provided that deferment is beneficial
financially or due to increased security. If the guardian does sell the child’s
property with deferment, the sale must be witnessed, and sufficient pawning
must be secured. It is further required that the buyer in this case be creditwor-
thy, and that the term of deferment is short. All of the above requirements are
intended to protect the rights of the interdicted party. If the guardian deviates
from those security measures, he must guarantee the property for the child, and
most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the sale would be considered invalid.
¯
The guardian is also not permitted to deposit the child’s property or lend
it unless it is necessary to do so. This ruling follows form the fact that such
actions would put the property in the possession of another, and thus endangers
32 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.174-6), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
pp.328-30).
33 Narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of c Abdullāh ibn c Amr ibn Al-c Āss.
¯ ..
it. On the other hand, the guardian is required to pay the obligatory charity tax
(zakāh) from the child’s property, since he takes his place in such obligations.
Finally, the guardian must spend moderately on the child’s food and clothing
out of his property and its income, earning sins if he under-spends on him, and
earning sins and guaranteeing the property if he over-spends.
If upon reaching puberty the child claims that his father or grandfather
sold his property without any benefit to him, the father or grandfather’s claim
is accepted if they support it with an oath. In this case, the default view is
that fathers and grandfathers act in the best interest of the child, and thus
their denial of an accusation to the contrary is accepted based on their oath. In
contrast, the child’s charge is accepted if the accused party was a plenipotentiary
or a judge’s appointee. The same distinction underlies the ruling that a father
or grandfather is permitted to trade the child’s property for their own, while the
same is not permitted for other guardians or plenipotentiaries. Proof for this
ruling is provided by the H. adı̄th : “A plenipotentiary is not allowed to trade the
¯
orphan’s property for his own”.34
H
. anbalı̄ rulings
35
The H . anbalı̄s ruled in a very similar manner to the Sh āfic ı̄s. Thus, they ruled
¯
that a guardian may only trade in the property of a child or insane person
to their advantage, as per the verse [17:34]. Thus, if the guardian gives their
property in a gift or charity, or if he buys for a high price or sells for a low
price, he must compensate them in analogy to one who deals in the property of
another without his permission. On the other hand, the guardian is authorized
to pay for the expenses of the interdicted child or insane person out of their
property without need of a court permission.
They also ruled that guardians, plenipotentiaries, and rulers are not allowed
to trade or pawn the property of an interdicted child or insane person for them-
selves. This ruling is based on suspicion regarding the intentions of all such
parties. The only exception is that of the guardian who is a father, for fathers
are authorized to conduct such dealings since their concern for their children is
beyond suspicion.
A guardian is also responsible for the payment of obligatory charity from the
property of the interdicted. However, he is not authorized to acknowledge their
liability for property or compensation, since that would be deemed acknowledg-
ing the liability of another.
A guardian is also allowed to travel with the property of the interdicted
to trade for their benefit, provided that it is safe to do so. The guardian is
also allowed to trade with the property of the interdicted himself, but he is not
entitled thus to any wage of profit-share. This permissibility is necessary to
allow the wealth to grow and prevent it from being eaten by obligatory charity,
as stated by c Umar. The guardian is also allowed to give the property to an
34 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ with a good chain of narrators on the authority of ’Ibn Zufar
.
on the authority of ’Ibn Masc ūd, c.f. Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.214).
35 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, ¯pp.435-9).
.
entrepreneur in a silent partnership, and the profit share for the capital should
all go to the interdicted owner.
A guardian is also allowed to sell the property of the interdicted with de-
ferment, provided that the debtor is creditworthy and the trade is beneficial in
the sense of being at a high price, or if keeping the property would expose it
to dangers of theft or destruction. In this case, the guardian does not need to
collect a pawned property or have a guarantor as insurance against the debt in
lieu of the deferred price. However, if a loss were to ensue from that dealing,
the guardian is not responsible to compensate the interdicted, even though he
did not take a pawning or a guaranty in lieu of the debt, since the bad outcome
was not likely at the outset.
A guardian is also allowed to deposit the property of the interdicted with
a trustworthy party, or to lend it to a creditworthy party if that protects it by
putting it in the possession of guaranty of a creditworthy party. In such cases,
the guardian is not responsible to compensate the interdicted if the property
were to perish, since he is not considered negligent in those cases. In this regard,
a father is allowed to lend the child’s property to himself, while a plenipotentiary
or ruler is not allowed to do so, since the former is beyond suspicion while the
latter are.
A guardian is also allowed to give the interdicted property in a gift for which
a more valuable compensation is given. He is also allowed to pawn it with a
trustworthy party if that is necessary to ensure a debt. Moreover, the guardian
is allowed to buy or build real estate on behalf of the interdicted for usage.
The guardian of a child may further teach him writing, marksmanship, and
other beneficial skills. He may thus collect wages for his teaching from the
property of the interdicted, since such education benefits him.
He may also deliver the interdicted for work, or to medicate him if he gets
sick, without need for the ruler’s permission to engage in such dealings.
Finally, they ruled that a guardian may sell an immovable property of the
interdicted if the sale is beneficial financially or otherwise. In this regard, the
list of benefits that can justify selling an immovable property of the interdicted
includes:
• The need to spend on the child’s food and clothing, or to repay his debts,
if that requires selling the property.
• If the immovable property was exposed to a realistic risk of destruction.
• If the property is sold for a price that is significantly higher than its
market value. In this regard, the H
. anbalı̄s did not use the one third rule
to determine what prices are considered “significantly” higher.
• If the interdicted property was at a location that limited its usefulness,

and was thus sold to buy a better located and more useful property.
• If the guardian recognizes a bargain purchase that he can make on behalf

of the interdicted, but can only afford its price by selling the property.
• If the property was a house in a bad neighborhood, or was otherwise

limited in its benefits, and can only be sold at its market price.
97.1.7 Authorizing the interdicted

Authorization of an interdicted person implies releasing him from interdiction,
thus allowing him to deal in his property freely, and dropping the guardian’s
right to prevent such dealings. Jurists agree that authorization of an interdicted
person based on attaining puberty and discernment requires testing, as per the
verse: “Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty” [4:6]. Testing children
is accomplished by giving them temporary permission to deal as his equals do,
in trading or agriculture, etc.36
On the other hand, jurists differed in their rulings regarding an underage
child who is authorized by his guardian to trade, and the consequences of the
permission:
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled37 that an underage child cannot be authorized to trade.
¯
However, they said that he may be given some of his property to test his
financial understanding. Then, if the child wishes to conduct a contract,
the guardian must conduct the contract on his behalf. This ruling follows
form their view that the dealings of the underage child are rendered invalid
by his lack of discernment. In contrast, they ruled that when a mentally
incompetent person is tested, he may be authorized to conduct his own
contract if he can prove his discernment.
38
• The H . anafı̄s, the majority of Mālikı̄s, and the majority of H. anbalı̄s ruled
that a guardian may authorize a young child to trade if he is satisfied with
his level of understanding, to train him thus. They based this ruling on
the verse [4:6], and argued that the children can only be tested by being
authorized to trade. Thus, they argued that a discerning child may be
authorized to trade, and his dealings then become valid. However, if the
young child were to deal without his guardian’s authorization, the H . anbalı̄s
render his dealings invalid, while the Mālikı̄s and H. anafı̄s render them non-
executed. The latter opinion is the more appropriate and logical, since it
agrees with the nature of training a person to conduct rational dealings.
. anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s allow the guardian’s authorization
to be explicitly verbal, or implicit (e.g. by noticing the child trading, and
not forbidding him). The latter ruling means that the guardian’s silence
in this case is considered an implicit consent and authorization, lest his
silence may be financially harmful to the other side in the transaction he
witnessed. On the other hand, the H . anafı̄ jurist Zufar and the H
. anbalı̄s
37 Al-Khatı̄b
. Al-Sh irbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.170).
38 ’Ibn ¯c Ābidı̄n ((H
¯ ¯
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.108-111), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
c
p.203 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.194 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3,
pp.294,303 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.384,396), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.468),
ruled that only explicit authorizations are established, since silence may
indicate consent or rejection.
The different juristic schools also differed in opinion regarding the effects of
authorization in this context:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that authorization of the interdicted is a release from

interdiction, and not a mere agency. Thus, even if the interdicted child is
authorized to perform a specific trade (in terms of time, type, or place),
the authorization is considered unrestricted. This follows from the view
that authorization is a drop of the guardian’s right, and dropping of right
cannot be restricted. Thus, once an interdicted party is authorized to
perform a single trade, he is thus free to engage in all trades and other
dealings that may result in gains or losses, including investment, pawning,
and leases. However, the interdicted who was authorized to trade remains
to be barred from engaging in purely harmful dealings such as gift-giving,
charity, lending, and guaranty.
’Abū H. anı̄fa further ruled that an interdicted party who was authorized
to trade is allowed to trade at prices that differ significantly from mar-
ket prices. He based this ruling on the view that once authorized, he
becomes fully eligible to trade at any prices. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf
and Muh.ammad ruled that the newly authorized party is not allowed to
trade at prices that differ markedly from the market. They based their
ruling on the view that the difference between the trading price and the
market counterpart may be viewed as a pure contribution, for which the
authorized trader was not authorized. The latter dealing seems most ap-
propriate, since such trading away from market prices involves a significant
harm to the trader, and he was not thus authorized.
• The Mālikı̄s agree with the H

. anafı̄s regarding the dealings of an interdicted
party who was authorized to trade. However, they agreed with ’Abū Yūsuf
and Muh.ammad that the person thus authorized is not authorized to trade
at prices that differ markedly from their market counterpart.
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled that authorization of an interdicted person to trade is

tantamount to an agency. Thus, they consider the interdicted person to
be released from interdiction only for the task that his guardian autho-
rized. For instance, if the guardian authorizes him to trade up to $100,
all dealings beyond that amount are deemed invalid. Similarly, if he is
authorized to trade in a specific commodity, trading in any other would
be deemed invalid. However, they ruled that the authorized trader in this
case differs from agents in the fact that he is authorized to trade with
deferment or non-monetary non-fungibles, in analogy to entrepreneurs in
silent partnership rather than trading agents. This ruling follows from the
view that the objective of authorization is profit, which is the foundation
of analogy to silent partnerships.
Moreover, they ruled that a discerning child who was authorized to trade
up to a certain amount is thus authorized to acknowledge liability up to
that amount. However, he is not allowed to appoint an agent to perform
the authorized task.
Guardian wages
A guardian is not entitled to a wage for his guardianship, care, and investment
of the property of the interdicted if he has other sources of wealth. However,
if the guardian is poor, and the guardianship activities occupy time he could
have used to earn an income, then he may collect a reasonable wage for his
activity. In the latter case reasonable wages are determined by convention in
the society. This ruling is based on the verse “If the guardian is well off, let him
claim no remuneration, but if he is poor, let him have for himself what is just
and reasonable” [4:6].
97.2 Insane individuals

There are two types of insanity: permanent, and intermittent. While a person
is insane, he is treated in the same manner as a non-discerning child, thus
losing all legal authority to marry, write wills, trade, etc. Hence, all the legal
actions of the insane, worldly and religious, are invalidated due to the lack of
valid intent. For instance, his contributions to charities and given gifts are
disregarded, and all his trading, acknowledgements of liability, divorces, and
other contracts are invalidated based on lack of eligibility. On the other hand, his
physical activities are considered. Thus, he is deemed responsible for fathering
children, and destroying the property of others. However, in the case of killing
an individual, the insane individual is only responsible for paying the financial
compensation thereof.
In the case of intermittent insanity, the person’s legal activities are valid
and executed during his episodes of sanity. If he is not fully discerning during
his episodes of sanity, e.g. if he understands some things but not others, then
his actions during such episodes are rendered suspended pending the approval
of his guardian, in analogy to the ruling for discerning children. This ruling
follows from the fact that his dealings may be harmful or beneficial, and they
must be executed if beneficial and invalidated if harmful. The preceding rulings
were agreed upon in the H . anafı̄ and Mālikı̄ schools.
97.3 Idiots
An idiot (al-mac tūh) is an individual whose mental condition renders his under-
standing weak, his speech confused, and his decisions unsound. In this regard,
a person may be born as an idiot, or the idiocy may be caused by some disease.
Moreover, there are levels of idiocy:
97.4. THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT 369
• In extreme cases of idiocy, the idiot is non-discerning. Thus, idiots at that

extreme share the same legal status of the insane and non-discerning chil-
dren, and thus all of their dealings are deemed invalid. That is why many
books of jurisprudence have discussed idiocy under the general category
of insanity.39
• On the other hand, minor idiocy may leave the individual discerning. For
such individuals, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s render all purely harmful deal-
ings of such individuals invalid, while their beneficial dealings are deemed
valid. Dealings of such individuals that may be beneficial or harmful (e.g.
trade) are rendered suspended pending the guardian’s permission. All
H. anafı̄ rulings in this regard are thus deduced by analogy to discerning
children.40
97.4 The mentally incompetent

All schools of jurisprudence agree that mentally incompetent (safı̄h) individuals
must be interdicted, just as children and insane individuals are interdicted. In
this regard, the general definition of mental incompetence in financial affairs is
well-understood. A mentally incompetent person is someone who does not han-
dle his property appropriately, overspends, or spends in unlawful ways. Thus,
the Mālikı̄s designated as mentally incompetent any individuals who spend their
money on wine or gambling, trade at unreasonable prices, spend excessively on
worldly pleasures, or destroy their property.41 However, a full discussion of the
definition of mental incompetence and its legal consequences in the different
schools requires a more elaborate study, which we now undertake:
97.4.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
42
The H. anafı̄s defined mental incompetence (al-safah) as overspending and wast-
ing property in unreasonable or unlawful ways, even in good causes such as the
building of mosques. Such overspending and inappropriate spending include
overspending on oneself, performing dealings with no religiously and logically
acceptable purpose, and dealing at unreasonable prices without hoping for other
benefits from the transaction.43
39 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.170), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.191 on-
. .
wards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, pp.310-313), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.100
onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.66 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A,
¯
vol.3, p.292), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.382,388), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.165 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.328), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯ ¯
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.430 onwards).
40 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.100), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.311).
. .
42 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.169,171), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.102 onwards),
. .
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.195 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7,
p.310 onwards), Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
c
¯
43 Note that the default ruling is permissibility of most dealings, and being generous to
others is lawful. However, overspending in any way is forbidden, based on the verse: “Those
They further defined a mentally incompetent person as one whose mind

is weak, resulting in wasting his property without a valid beneficial purpose.
However, The H . anafı̄s differed in their rulings regarding the legal status of
mentally incompetent individuals:
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that a free and sane individual of legal age may not be
interdicted based on mental incompetence, severe indebtedness, acting in
non-religious ways, or absent-mindedness. Thus, he renders the financial
dealings of mentally incompetent individuals permissible, even if he wastes
or overspends his wealth in unbeneficial ways. He based this ruling on the
view that interdicting such a sane and free adult degrades his humanity
and treats him like an animal. He reasoned in this regard that such a
reduction of human beings to the status of animals is more harmful than
the financial waste that his dealings may cause. He provided proof for
this view through the verse: “To orphans restore their property [when
they reach their age], and do not substitute the bad for the good” [4:2].44
However, if a child reaches puberty without attaining discernment, ’Abū
H. anı̄fa ruled that his property should only be given to him when he reaches
the age of twenty five. Moreover, he ruled that if he performs any dealings
after puberty and before becoming twenty five, his dealings should be
executed based on his eligibility. Once he reaches the age of twenty-five,
’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that he should be given full control over his property,
even if he was not found to be discerning. He based this ruling on the view
that interdiction in this case would be meant as a tool of discipline, and
it is uncommon to discipline a person above that age (by which time he
can physically be a grandfather), and thus interdiction serves no purpose
above that age, in his view. This is not the accepted view in the H . anafı̄
school.
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the mentally incompetent, the
severely indebted, and the absent-minded may be interdicted, but did not
allow interdiction of a sane individual by virtue of violating Islamic Law.
Their ruling is the accepted one in the H. anafı̄ school, as a means of pro-
tecting the property of the mentally incompetent or absent-minded, or the
rights of creditors. The major scholars of the other schools agreed with
’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad, and based the permissibility of interdicting
mentally incompetent individuals on the verse: “To those weak of under-
standing, make not over your property which Allāh has made a means of
support for you, but feed and clothe them therewith, and speak to them
words of kindness and justice” [4:5]. Thus, Allāh (swt) forbade guardians
from giving the mentally incompetent control over their property, which
who, when they spend, are not extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just balance between
those extremes” [25:67].
44 Note that this verse is restricted by the later verse: “To those weak of understanding,
make not over your property which Allāh has made a means of support for you, but feed and
clothe them therewith, and speak to them words of kindness and justice” [4:5].
implies preventing them from dealing thereof. Clearly, if they were per-
mitted to deal in their property while it was under the control of their
guardians, there would be no purpose in withholding the property, since
they would still be able to waste it. Another proof is provided by the
H. adı̄th narrated by Al-T.abarānı̄ with a valid chain: “Control the dealings
¯
of the mentally incompetent among you”.
Moreover, interdicting the mentally incompetent protects their property
and thus protects them from poverty. Moreover, interdiction of such indi-
viduals protects society by protecting all others who deal with him, as well
as preventing the wasting of society’s resources. In this regard, the pre-
vention of harm of any kind is a Legal requirement based on the H . adı̄th :
¯
“No harm is permitted (lā d.arara wa lā d.irār)”.45
The H . anafı̄s ruled according to the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad.
Thus, they ruled that mentally incompetent individuals have the same rulings
as discerning children in all voidable dealings. For instance, trading of mentally
incompetent individuals is deemed suspending pending the permission of their
guardians. Thus, if a mentally incompetent person trades, his trade is not
executed initially, but if it is proven beneficial to him, the ruler or judge may
permit it.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s rendered the non-voidable activities of men-
tally incompetent individuals (e.g. marriage and divorce) valid. This ruling in
the case of marriage is based on the view that marriage is a basic need for ev-
eryone, and cannot be invalidated if the contract language lacked a valid intent.
However, if a mentally incompetent person marries and pays an unreasonably
high dowry, the excess over the average dowry for similar marriages is voided,
since it is not necessary. On the other hand, if he divorces the wife prior to
consummation of the marriage, he is bound by one half of the named dowry.
They also ruled that a mentally incompetent person’s will is valid for one-
third of his property, provided that it is designated for a good cause such as
benefiting the poor, building mosques or schools, etc. This ruling follows from
the fact that the will is only executed after the person’s death.
Moreover, they permitted a mentally incompetent person to admit commit-
ting crimes with physical punishments (e.g. theft and murder). On the other
hand, once interdicted, he is not permitted to acknowledge liability for a finan-
cial debt.
A mentally incompetent person is also responsible for the expenditures of
his children and wife, as well as any other relatives for whom he is financially
responsible. Moreover, he must pay the obligatory wealth tax (zakāh). Those
rulings follow from the fact that all such payments are rights of other people,
which are not invalidated by the person’s mental incompetence.
45 This is a good Hadı̄th, narrated by ’Ibn Mājah, Al-Dāraqutnı̄, and others on the authority
. ¯ .
of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy. It was also narrated by Mālik in Al-Muwat..ta’ with an incomplete
¯
transmission on the authority of c Amr ibn Yah.yā on the authority of his father. In this regard,
the multiple chains of narration enforce one another.
Finally, all acts of worship performed by a mentally incompetent person

are valid, including the obligatory pilgrimage. However, the judge should not
allow a mentally incompetent person to handle his own pilgrimage expenses, but
should appoint a trustworthy pilgrim to handle his expenses for him, to ensure
that his pilgrimage money is not wasted on unnecessary expenditures.
Note that the H. anafı̄s ruled that mentally incompetent and severely indebted
individuals may only be interdicted by court order. This is in contrast to the in-
terdictions of small children, insane individuals, and idiots, which do not require
a court order.

The Mālikı̄s defined46 a mentally incompetent individual as one who spends his
wealth inappropriately, either because of following his desires without regard to
religion, or if he is religiously observant but unable to determine which actions
are beneficial to him. Thus, they defined mental incompetence (al-safah) as
any expenditure of wealth in a manner that disagrees with Islamic Law. In this
regard, they ruled that the father of a mentally incompetent child may interdict
him around the age of puberty, but a court order is necessary to interdict an
adult if his mental incompetence ensued more than a year after reaching puberty.
The majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that the dealings of an adult male who is
known to be mentally incompetent are executed without need for a permission
if he was not interdicted and has no appointed guardian. This ruling applies
even if he dealt in his property without receiving compensation, and regardless
of whether his mental incompetence ensued before or after puberty. Moreover,
all Mālikı̄s agree that if mental incompetence was not known with certainty,
then his dealings are executed.
In contrast, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that the dealings of a mentally in-
competent child who has no guardian are not executed until he reaches puberty.
They also ruled that the dealings of a mentally incompetent adult woman who
has no guardian are not executed until she reaches menopause (specified as the
age of forty for some, and between fifty and sixty for others) without getting
married, or after one year of the consummation of her marriage.
They further ruled that the will of an interdicted mentally incompetent
person is executed. His divorce is also executed, whether it is initiated by
him or by his wife (in khulc ). Moreover, they ruled that his admission of guilt
¯
for crimes with physical punishments is deemed valid. However, his gifts and
charities are not binding on him.
Finally, they ruled that any compensated dealings of an interdicted mentally
incompetent individual are thus suspended pending his guardian’s permission,
in analogy to such dealings in the case of a discerning child. In this regard, the
guardian must act on behalf of the interdicted person for the latter’s benefit,
both in immediate trades and with deferment. Thus the guardian is permitted to
46 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.296 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.387 on-
wards,393), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.279), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.321).
¯
forego a preemption right, or a right of physical retaliation for murder. However,

the guardian is not permitted to forgive any transgression against the interdicted
without collecting the appropriate financial compensation.

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s defined47 mental incompetence as unwise spending of wealth, e.g.
¯
by dealing at possibly unreasonable prices, destroying his property, or spending
it in religiously inadmissible outlets. In contrast, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled
¯
that spending any amount of property on charity or food and clothing does
not qualify as unwise spending in this strict sense. In the case of spending on
charity, they ruled that such spending has a valid purpose of attaining other-
worldly rewards. Moreover, they argued that it is very difficult to rule that a
person spent “too much” on food and clothing, since the purpose of wealth is
to derive permissible utility from it.
They ruled that a court order is required for the interdiction of mentally in-
competent adult. Thus, the father or grandfather is not authorized to interdict a
mentally incompetent son or grandson, since the determination of incompetence
requires a legal analysis. Moreover, the judge must witness the interdiction, and
if the person were to regain his mental competence, removal of the interdiction
also requires the judge’s ruling thus. In this regard, the guardian of a mentally
incompetent adult is the judge, since the guardianship of his father elapsed
once he attained puberty and discernment. The judge must thus take over as a
guardian to protect society’s interests from the mentally incompetent person’s
unwise dealings.
They further ruled that a number of dealings of a mentally incompetent
adult are valid if authorized by the ruler. Those include marriage, divorce,
remarriage, divorce at the instance of the wife for a compensation less than
or equal to the dowry, abandonment of his wife, admitting having fathered a
child, or denying having fathered a child and exchanging oaths with the wife
who claims his fatherhood.
On the other hand, most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that financial dealings of the mentally
¯
incompetent are not valid, even if authorized by his guardian. They based this
ruling on the view that his eligibility for such dealings is negated by interdiction,
in analogy to the case of non-discerning children. Thus, if a person is interdicted
based on mental incompetence, his trading and gifts are invalid. Thus, if he buys
or borrows a property and it perishes in his possession, he is not required to
compensate the seller or lender.
Moreover, they also ruled in analogy to the case of children that a mentally
incompetent person’s admission of debts or other financial liabilities due to
transgression, before or after his interdiction. In contrast, they ruled that his
admission of physically-punishable crimes is valid, since this does not involve
financial compensations and thus his incompetence in financial matters does not
47 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.168,170-3), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.332).
pose any problems. In this regard, if he admits to having committed murder,

he may be killed for it, but if the family of the murdered individual demand
financial compensation instead, they may not get it from him, since liability for
that money is established by their choice rather than his valid admission.
In matters of worship, the legal rulings for his obligatory and physical su-
pererogatory acts of worship are all the same as those of competent adults,
since he meets all the conditions for such acts. On the other hand, he does
not share the same rulings with competent adults for financial supererogatory
acts of worship (e.g. voluntary charity). Moreover, the mentally incompetent is
not allowed to distribute his obligatory zakāh himself, since that is a financial
dealing. However, if his guardian points out to whom he should give how much,
and authorizes him to make the payment thus, it is deemed valid in analogy to
the case of a discerning child. In the latter case, the spending of zakāh money
should still be supervised by the guardian to ensure that the mentally incom-
petent individual does not squander the wealth or lie about having spent it
appropriately.
Finally, they ruled that a mentally incompetent person is allowed to pledge
an amount of wealth as a liability on him, but is not allowed to pledge any spe-
cific property. Moreover, they ruled while performing any obligatory pilgrimage
(his principal h.ajj, a compensation for one that was corrupted, or to fulfill a
pledge made prior to interdiction), the guardian must appoint a trustworthy
pilgrim to make his expenditures (in agreement with the H . anafı̄ ruling in this
regard). In this regard, if an interdicted person begins a voluntary pilgrimage,
or one that he pledged after interdiction, and then his expenses during pilgrim-
age travel exceed his normal expenses at home, his guardian may prevent him
from completing the pilgrimage to protect his property. In this case, the in-
terdicted person’s pilgrimage is compared to that of one who was physically
prevented from completing the pilgrimage, and thus he should end his state of
ritual purity and compensate with fasting since he is not allowed to compensate
financially. In contrast, if the interdicted pilgrim was able to make a profit on
his trip that compensates for the difference between his expenditures at home
and those during pilgrimage travel, then he should not be prevented from com-
pleting the pilgrimage. In the latter case, completion of the pilgrimage without
wasting his property is possible, and thus the guardian has no right to interfere
with his act of worship.
97.4.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
48
The H. anbalı̄s defined a mentally incompetent individual as one whose actions
are not good or wise. Thus, they agree with other schools of jurisprudence
that mentally incompetent persons must be interdicted by the ruler. To remove
the interdiction based on mental incompetence, a court order is also necessary,
since the initial interdiction is established with one, in analogy to the case of
interdiction of a bankrupt debtor. In this regard, the H . anbalı̄s agree with the
48 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.469-75), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, pp.440-3).
Shāfic ı̄s that once the ruler interdicts a mentally incompetent person, it is highly
¯
recommended that the interdiction is witnessed and made known, so that others
will avoid dealing with him. If anyone were to deal with an interdicted mentally
incompetent person after the public announcement of his interdiction, he would
thus be exposing his own property to ruin.
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the order of guardianship of a mentally incompetent
child when he reaches puberty is: his father, then the father’s plenipotentiary,
and then the ruler in their absence. On the other hand, if the interdiction is
established or renewed after reaching puberty, only the ruler may manage his
financial affairs, since the ruler’s order is required for establishing and removing
interdiction in this case.
They agreed with the H . anafı̄s that a mentally incompetent interdicted per-
son’s marriage is valid if he needs to marry, whether or not it is authorized by
his guardian. This ruling follows from the view that marriage is a pure ben-
efit to the interdicted. However, he is only allowed to pay the average dowry
for similar marriages, since any increase thereof would be a voluntary financial
contribution, from which he is not eligible. On the other hand, they ruled that
if the mentally incompetent person did not need to marry, then his marriage
is only valid if authorized by his guardian. The latter ruling is based on the
fact that marriage requires a financial payment, and thus requires his guardian’s
authorization in analogy to trading.
In contrast, we have seen that all jurists agree that an interdicted mentally
incompetent person’s divorce is valid, since it does not involve a financial pay-
ment. Moreover, divorce at the instance of the wife, for which he receives a
financial compensation (khulc ), is valid since it is beneficial from a financial
¯
point of view.
Moreover, they ruled that abandoning his wives, and the exchange of oaths
to support and negate an accusation of adultery or fathering children, are valid.
An interdicted mentally incompetent person is also allowed to acknowledge fa-
therhood of a child. Jurists also agree that the will of such an individual is
valid, since it is beneficial to him, and brings him closer to Allāh if he gives up
to one-third of his estate to charity upon his death.
They also agreed with other jurists that his admission of guilt for physically-
punishable crimes (e.g. adultery, theft, drinking wine, slander, murder, etc.) is
valid. On the other hand, if he admits having committed murder, and the rel-
atives of the victim absolve him of the physical penalty and demand financial
compensation, the H . anbalı̄s agree with the Sh āfic ı̄s that the financial compen-
¯
sation is not payable at that time, but becomes binding once interdiction is
removed. This ruling was based on the fact that the interdicted may agree with
the victim’s family that he will admit guilt and they will absolve him of the
physical penalty. But that would involve admitting responsibility for a financial
compensation, for which the interdicted is not eligible.
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that all admissions of financial liability by the interdicted
are invalid, including debts and liability for compensation due to usurping, steal-
ing, or destroying property. In this regard, the rulings for mentally incompetent
individuals requiring compensation for destroyed property are the same as those
for children and insane individuals.

If he admits to any such liability, the admission is not binding upon him as
long as he is interdicted. However, the majority of H . anbalı̄s ruled that once his
interdiction is removed, all admitted financial liabilities become binding upon
him.
They also agreed with other jurists that pure voluntary contributions such
as gifts and the establishing of mortmainss are not valid for the mentally in-
competent. This ruling is based on the view that such actions are financially
harmful, and thus the mentally incompetent is not eligible to engage in them,
in order to protect his property.
Moreover, they ruled that the mentally incompetent is not allowed to enter
into partnerships, debt transfers, or guaranties of others. Those rulings pertain
to financial dealings, and thus may be inferred by analogy to trading. In this
regard, the trading of a mentally incompetent individual is deemed invalid if it
is not authorized by his guardian, to protect his property. On the other hand,
there are two rulings regarding trading that is authorized by his guardian:
• The first ruling is that such authorized trading is valid. This ruling is
based on the view that trading is a commutative contract, and thus is
valid if authorized by the guardian, in analogy to the ruling for marriage.
This is the majority opinion among the H . anbalı̄s.
• The second ruling is that the authorized trading is invalid. This ruling is
based on the view that interdiction is established on the basis of the per-
son’s inability to make good financial decisions. Thus, the authorization
to engage in potentially harmful dealings is invalid, and so is the trading.
This is the majority opinion among the Shāfic ı̄s.
¯
A mentally incompetent individual is liable for all legal responsibilities such
as paying the expenses of his wife, servants, and other dependents. He is also
responsible for all religious financial obligations such as zakāh. However, he is
not allowed to distribute his zakāh, which should be distributed by his guardian
who manages all of his financial dealings. Moreover, while he is allowed to
pledge any physical acts of worship, he is not allowed to pledge financial acts of
worship such as charity and slaughter or animals to give to the poor.
A mentally incompetent individual may go on the obligatory pilgrimage, and
his travel and other expenses should be handled by a trustworthy co-pilgrim.
On the other hand, they agreed with the Shāfic ı̄s regarding the invalidity of
¯
supererogatory pilgrimage if its expenses exceed his expenses at home, unless
the excess costs are offset by profits that he can make on his trip.
Overall, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the guardian of a mentally incompetent per-
son must deal in his property to maximize his benefits. This ruling is analogous
to the dealings of the guardian of a child or an insane individual.
In summary, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s render trading of a mentally incompe-
tent individual to be suspended pending the approval of his guardian. In con-
trast, the Shāfic ı̄s deem his trading invalid even if authorized by the guardian,
¯
while the majority of H . anbalı̄s deem it valid and executed if authorized thus.
97.5. STUPID INDIVIDUALS 377
97.5 Stupid individuals

Stupid individuals are ones who can be fooled in trading, due to lack of expe-
rience and intelligence, and despite his purity of heart. In this regard, we can
distinguish between a stupid person and one who is mentally incompetent. The
stupid may destroy his property unintentionally, while a mentally incompetent
person is one who destroys his property intentionally by following his whims.
Moreover, a stupid person may be distinguished from an idiot by the fact that
the speech of the latter is often incoherent, while that of the former is lucid
(though unintelligent).
’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that stupid individuals should not be interdicted in lieu
of their stupidity. On the other hand, the majority of H . anafı̄s and jurists of
the other schools agree with the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad that a
stupid person should be interdicted to protect his interests. The latter majority
ruling renders the status of all dealings of a stupid person identical to their
counterparts for the mentally incompetent.49
97.5.1 Commencement and end of interdiction

50
Muh.ammad ’ibn Al-H . assan, and ’Ibn Al-Qāsim Al-Mālikı̄ ruled that a men-
tally incompetent or a stupid person must be interdicted at the time signs of
mental incompetence or stupidity are observed, and the interdiction must be re-
moved once those respective signs disappear. Thus, they ruled that a court order
is not necessary for the establishment or dissolution of interdiction, since the
latter should start and end with its reason. Thus, all dealings of such individuals
are deemed invalid and non-executable as soon as signs of mental incompetence
or stupidity are observable, and they are thus considered interdicted even before
a court order is issued to that effect.
In contrast, the majority of H
. anafı̄s and jurists of other schools agreed with
the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf that a court order is necessary for establishing or
removing interdiction of a person based on mental incompetence or stupidity.51
This ruling is based on the view that mental incompetence and stupidity are
not easily observable, in contrast to insanity and idiocy. Rather, they argued,
the determination that a person is mentally incompetent or stupid is a matter
of opinion, and thus requires a court order to preempt possible disputes of
conflicting claims. Such a settlement of potential disputes is crucial to minimize
uncertainty and potential loss to those who may deal with such individuals on
the assumption of mental competence. Thus, a publicized court order is required
to settle any future claims that a person is mentally incompetent or stupid.
The latter opinion seems to be more logical, and more conducive to mini-
mizing uncertainty and deception. Thus, he favored the ruling that the dealings
49 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.102 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
. .
p.198 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.169).
50 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.103,106), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.297 onwards).
.
51 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.321), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.103), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A,
.
vol.3, p.388), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.170), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.469).
¯ ¯ ¯
(e.g. trading) of a mentally incompetent or stupid person that are concluded

prior to interdiction by court-order are deemed executed.
97.6 Muslim sinners

The H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s agreed that a Muslim
¯
who does not act according to the rulings of Islam (a fāsiq) cannot be interdicted
purely on the basis of being a sinner. Thus, if the person is a sinner but does not
spend his property inappropriately, he is deemed eligible to handle his financial
affairs and those of his family, and may not be interdicted.52 They based this
ruling on the view that interdiction was legalized to prevent inappropriate use
of property. They also argued that there is no incident in the early days of Islam
that sinners were interdicted merely by virtue of being sinners. In this regard,
a person may not be interdicted for deviating from Islamic teachings, regardless
of whether he started sinning prior to reaching puberty or afterwards.
Note on absent individuals

The H. anafı̄s ruled that it is permissible to interdict an absent person, provided
that he is informed of the interdiction. This is in contrast to their general rule
that legal judgments may not be issued against absent persons.53
97.7 Public interest

54
The H . anafı̄s ruled that it is permissible to interdict a person to protect public
interests. This ruling is based on the general rule that an individual interest
may be compromised to protect a social interest, and a smaller harm may be
tolerated to avoid a larger one. Thus, it is permissible to interdict (i.e. limit
the activities of) an ignorant physician, a devious jurist who teaches people
illegal means of circumventing Islamic Law, and bankrupt individuals who lease
properties that they do not have (and cannot obtain due to their bankruptcy).
Interdicting such individuals and others whose actions pause a public nui-
sance is required to protect public interests, even if the interdiction implies
limiting their freedom and usurping their rights. Indeed, interdiction in such
cases is a commensurate punishment for their actions, and a means of protecting
people thereof. ’Abū H . anı̄fa is narrated to have restricted interdiction to those
three categories of people, arguing that the ignorant physician harms people’s
bodies, the devious jurist harms people’s religion, and the bankrupt lessor harms
people’s property.
. ¯ .
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.320), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.292), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.170), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
c
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.440).
¯
54 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.193), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.102
. .
onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.169), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.316), Abd
c
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.68).

¯
97.8. THE TERMINALLY ILL 379
However, we must note that interdiction of such individuals is not the same
type of interdiction discussed earlier. The term is used metaphorically in this
case to refer to a Legal prohibition of the execution of their actions. Thus, if a
devious jurist issued a legal opinion after being interdicted, the opinion would be
permissible if it is Legally accurate. Similarly, the doctor’s sale of medication is
executed after his interdiction. Thus, those types of individuals are interdicted
in the sense of being prevented from pursuing the physical activities that are
harmful for the bodies, religion, and properties of others.
97.8 The terminally ill

A terminal illness is one that often leads to death, even if it does not necessarily
lead to death in most cases.55 The definition of a terminal illness in Majallat
Al-’Ah.kām Al-c Adliyyah (item # 1595) is thus: “an illness that prevents the
sick man or woman from conducting their usual activities, neither increases nor
decreases, and is followed by death within the year. If the illness was increasing,
it is considered a terminal illness from the time it got more severe, even if its
duration exceeded a year”. In this regard, if a person gets sick and then recovers,
he is not subject to the rulings for terminal illness. Moreover, if the person is
subject to a severe illness, but one that does not restrict him to bed, then he is
not considered terminally ill.
Thus, the Mālikı̄s classified sick individuals into two categories:56
• Individuals who suffer from a disease that rarely leads to death (e.g. lep-
rosy, conjunctivitis, etc.) are not considered terminally ill, and thus they
are not interdicted.
• Individuals who suffer from an illness that usually leads to death (e.g.
the plague, tuberculosis, etc.) are considered terminally ill. However, the
determination of whether or not an illness is fatal must be assessed on the
basis of medical science of each age. For instance, he argued, tuberculosis
is not as fatal in our era as it was in the past.
Jurists of all schools agreed that a terminally ill individual may be interdicted
to protect the rights of his heirs.57 The Mālikı̄s further ruled that the same
applies to individuals who are feared to die shortly, such as soldiers on the
front lines, individuals who are waiting on death-row, and women in advanced
pregnancy beyond the six months. The Mālikı̄s varied in their rulings regarding
sea-travelers during severe storms, with most jurists ruling that they are not
subject to the rulings of the terminally ill.
57 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.480 onwards), Sharh Al-Sirājiyyah (p.5), Al-Dardı̄r
. ¯ .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.306 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.399-402), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.165), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.322 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
¯ ¯
A terminally ill individual is only interdicted in the sense of being prevented

from giving more than one-third of his estate after deducting debts as uncom-
pensated contributions.
Thus, a terminally ill person is not allowed to give gifts, charity, inheritance,
mortmain, selling at excessively low prices, or buying at excessively high prices,
for more than one third of his estate after subtracting debts. Thus, the dealings
of a terminally ill person are executed for one third of his estate, and suspended
pending the permission of the would-be-heirs for the rest, in analogy to the
ruling for wills. However, if the person thought to be terminally ill recovers
from the illness, the H. anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that all of his dealings
¯
would thus be executed. On the other hand, if terminally ill had debts that
exceeded the full value of his estate, then he would be fully interdicted (with no
regard to the one-third rule) to protect the rights of his creditors.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the dealings of a terminally ill individual
are executed up to one-third of his estate only if the property thus dealt with
is unchanging (e.g. real estate, land, or trees). On the other hand, if the con-
tributed property was variable in form and value, they ruled that the dealings of
the terminally ill thereof are deemed suspended until the person dies or recovers,
even if they are within one third of his estate. Then, if he dies, his dealings are
executed up to one-third of his estate, and if he recovers from the illness, all of
his dealings are executed.
The Mālikı̄s further ruled that a terminally ill person is prevented from
spending excessively on food, drinks, clothing and medicine, and prevented to
marry if the dowry exceeds one third of his estate. However, they ruled that a
terminally ill person is not prevented from commutative financial contracts, such
as trading, borrowing and lending, leasing, and engaging in silent partnerships
and crop-sharing. They based the latter ruling on the view that such commuta-
tive dealings do not contain a purely contributory component, and thus do not
affect the rights of the heirs adversely.
In this regard, the H. anafı̄s ruled that all the necessary personal and family
dealings of a terminally ill person are executed without need for any permission.
This includes expenses on food, clothing, lodging, medical expenses, etc. More-
over, they ruled that a terminally ill person is allowed to marry, since marriage
can provide him with comfort and company, provided that he does not pay an
excessively high dowry. If he does marry with a dowry that exceeds the social
average for similar brides, the increase is considered a voluntary contribution,
and subjected to the rules of wills.
Finally, a terminally ill person is allowed to acknowledge a debt to one of

his heirs, or to a third party. If he acknowledged a debt to a non-inheritor, the
acknowledgement is valid and executed without any need to get the permission
of his heirs. However, debts that he acknowledged in a state of good health are
given precedence in repayment over debts acknowledged while terminally ill.
97.9. MARRIED WOMEN 381
97.9 Married women

One of two recorded opinions of ’Ah.mad agrees with the Mālikı̄ ruling58 that
a free and discerning married woman is prevented from engaging in uncompen-
sated dealings (e.g. gifts and guaranty) for more than one-third of her wealth,
to protect the interests of her husband. This ruling was derived in analogy to
the rulings for terminally ill individuals. However, most of the Mālikı̄s ruled
that her uncompensated contributions beyond one-third of her wealth is con-
sidered executed until the husband demands its return. In this regard, if the
wife gave more than one-third of her wealth in an uncompensated contribution,
the husband is permitted to do one of three things: (i) void the full contribu-
tion, (ii) allow the full contribution, or (iii) allow the portion up to one-third
of her wealth and return the rest. If the husband returns any part of the wife’s
contribution, the majority view it as a return by virtue of that part having
been suspended, while ’Ashhab ruled that this return is by virtue of the inval-
¯
idation of that contribution or portion thereof. In this regard, the majority of
Mālikı̄s ruled that the decision as to whether or not the wife contributed more
than one-third of her wealth is determined based on the sum total of all her
uncompensated contributions within a six-month period.
Moreover, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that all of her uncompensated con-
tributions are executed if the husband only learns of her actions after they are
divorced, if he learns of them and does not object, or if either the woman or her
husband dies.
However, a wife is not prevented from spending her wealth on her parents.
In this regard, Mālik ruled that the husband may recall any expenditures on
her parents beyond one-third of her wealth, if her intent in this expenditure was
to hurt him. In contrast, ’Ibn Al-Qāsim ruled that the one-third rule does not
apply to spending on her parents, even if her intent was to harm him.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s allowed a wife to give all of her wealth, or
any portion thereof, as a gift to her husband. They ruled that no party has a
right to object to such a donation to her husband.
All of the above pertains to uncompensated contributions of the wife. How-
ever, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the wife is permitted to deal unconditionally with her
property in commutative contracts (e.g. trading). The Mālikı̄ rulings regarding
uncompensated contributions is based on narrations including the H . adı̄th : “A
¯
woman is not allowed to give her property in charity without her husband’s
permission, since his marriage rights are inviolable”.59
In contrast, the H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and the majority of H
. anbalı̄s ruled that a
¯
discerning woman is allowed to deal in her property with or without compen-
58 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.307 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.402), ’Ibn
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.323), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.464), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄),
vol.3, p.405).
59 Narrated by the five major narrators of Hadı̄th with the exception of Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the
. ¯ ¯
authority of c Amr ibn Shuc ayb, his father, and his grandfather, that the Prophet (pbuh) said
¯
in a sermon: “A woman is not allowed to deal in her property if her husband is given inviolable
marriage rights”. There are other narrations of this H . adı̄th in ’Ibn Mājah, c.f. ’Ibn Qudāmah
¯
(, ibid.), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.6, p.18).
¯
sation.60 They based this ruling on the verse: “If then you find them of sound
judgment, release their properties to them” [4:6], which implies that discerning
women are not interdicted in any way. Moreover, there is an established H . adı̄th
¯
wherein the Prophet (pbuh) said: “O women, give charity, even by giving away
your jewelry . . . ”, and then he (pbuh) accepted their charities without asking
them for any details.61 This opinion of the majority of jurists seems to be the
more reasonable, since Islam recognizes the woman’s juristic personality to be
separate from her husband’s. Indeed, he argued, all Muslims are proud of the
fact that Islamic Law gave women full eligibility to own property and to deal in
it.
97.9.1 Digression on charitable contributions

There are two reported opinions of ’Imām ’Ah.mad regarding the eligibility for a
woman to give a small amount of her husband’s property in charity without his
permission. Those two opinions encompass all the rulings given in the classical
books of jurisprudence:62
• The majority of H . anbalı̄s agree that a woman is allowed thus to give a

small part of her husband’s wealth in charity. This seems to be the ap-
propriate opinion. This ruling is based on the H
. adı̄th narrated by c A’isha
¯ ¯
(mAbpwh) that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “If a woman spends from her
husband’s household, she gets the reward for that spending, as long as
she does not spend inappropriately. Moreover, the husband gets an equal
reward, and the treasurer gets an equal reward. Thus, the reward that
each of them gets does not diminish the reward that the other gets”.63
In this regard, c A’isha (mAbpwh) did not mention in this H . adı̄th that
¯ ¯
the husband’s permission is required. Indeed, this is natural, since it is
expected that a husband implicitly gives his wife the permission to make
such charitable contributions.
However, if the husband explicitly forbade his wife from giving in char-
ity, or if she suspected that he would object to her spending due to his
miserliness, then she is not allowed to give any of his property in charity.
The same rulings apply to others who may take care of the man’s wealth
in a manner similar to his wife (e.g. his sister or servant who handles
his household spending). Such individuals may also give small amounts
of the man’s wealth in charity, but only if it is customarily and implicitly
understood that he approves such spending.
61 Narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Zaynab the wife of c Abdullāh ibn Masc ūd,
¯
c.f. H . adı̄th # 635 of Al-Tirmidhı̄’s Sunan.
¯
62 ’Ibn Qudāmah ¯
(, vol.4, p.465 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.448
onwards), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.6, p.16).
¯
63 Narrated by the major narrators of Hadı̄th. There are a number of other Hadı̄ths to the
. ¯ . ¯
same effect, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.6, p.15 onwards).
¯
97.10. THE BANKRUPT 383
On the other hand, a husband is not allowed to give his wife’s food in
charity, since that is not customary.
• The other ruling is the impermissibility of spending any amount of the hus-
band’s property in charity without his permission. This ruling is based
on the narration by ’Abū ’Umāmah Al-Bāhiliy that he heard the Prophet
(pbuh) say: “A woman is not allowed to spend anything out of her house-
hold without her husband’s permission. He (pbuh) was asked: Not even
food, O Messenger of Allāh. He replied: That is the best of our wealth”.64
Moreover, those who ruled thus based their ruling on the view that the wife
would thus be giving the husband’s property away without his consent,
which is not permissible for anyone.
The H. anbalı̄ jurist ’Ibn Qudāmah ruled that the first opinion is more correct.
He based his selection on the fact that the H . adı̄th s upon which the first ruling
¯
was based were valid and specific (khās..sah). In this regard, specific narrations
¯
are always given precedence over general ones, and understood as explanations
of the meaning of the general narration within the specific context. Moreover,
he argued, the H . adı̄th of Al-Bāhiliy has a weak chain of narration. Finally,
¯
he argued that it is not appropriate to determine whether or not a wife is
allowed to spend her husband’s property by analogy to third parties, since a wife
customarily deals in her husband’s property and gives some of it in charity. In
this regard, he argued that the implicit permission of the husband is equivalent
to an explicit permission to spend.
97.10 The bankrupt

97.10.1 Definition of bankruptcy
Bankruptcy literally refers to the declaration that an individual has very little
wealth left. Legally, the term refers to a court-order that forbids the declared
bankrupt individual from dealing in his property, and thus enabling his creditors
to protect their rights thereof.
Conventionally, a person is called bankrupt if he has no property. Legally,
the term is often applied if the volume of a person’s matured debts exceeds the
value of his property. In this regard, a person may be legally bankrupt despite
having some properties, since whatever he owns is claimed by one or more of
his creditors. Thus, were he to repay as much as he can of his debts, he would
in fact be penniless. Such bankrupt persons are often forbidden from all but
the very basic transactions required to sustain his living. Thus, the permissible
dealings and the net worth of a bankrupt individual can be measured in the
smallest of denominations (fulūs or copper pennies), thus the Arabic term for a
bankrupt individual (muflis) is derived from the term for copper pennies.65
64 Narrated by Sac ı̄d ibn Mansūr in his Sunan. There are many other Hadı̄ths that have a
. . ¯
similar meaning, forbidding any individual from spending the property of another without his
consent.
¯ .
97.10.2 Interdiction of the bankrupt

66
’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that a bankrupt individual is not interdicted by virtue of
his debt. He based this ruling on the view that money comes and goes, but
interdiction of an eligible discerning individual degrades his humanity and free-
dom. Thus, he ruled that both the bankrupt and idiots cannot be interdicted,
since he viewed the loss of dignity resulting from interdiction to be more harmful
than the potential loss to creditors.
Hence, he ruled that the dealings of a bankrupt individual are executed,
and his property is not sold without his consent. Instead, the bankrupt debtor
should be ordered to repay his debts, and he should be incarcerated if he refuses
to repay them. In this regard, incarceration is an appropriate penalty for his
transgression by refusing to repay the portion of his debts that he can repay if
he sells his property.
Thus, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that the court cannot sell the property of a bankrupt
individual, but can only order his incarceration until he repays his debts volun-
tarily or dies in jail.
The majority of H . anafı̄s ruled in accordance with the opinions of ’Abū Yūsuf,
Muh.ammad, and the majority of jurists, that a bankrupt debtor may be inter-
dicted in financial matters, to protect the rights of his creditors. They based this
ruling on the H . adı̄th narrated by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ and Al-Khallāl, and rendered
¯ ¯ c
valid by Al-H . ākim, that the Prophet (pbuh) interdicted Mu ādh (mAbpwh)
¯
and sold his property to repay his debt, thus repaying five-sevenths of the total
debts he owed. The Prophet (pbuh) then told the creditors that that is all they
can get in lieu of Muc ādh’s debts. The different schools of jurisprudence agreed
¯
on this general ruling, but differed on some of the details regarding the need for
a court order to establish interdiction, and other similar questions.
97.10.3 The need for a court order

Mālikı̄ rulings
The Mālikı̄s classified67 bankrupt debtors into three categories:
1. Before the bankrupt person’s property is taken from him to repay the
creditors, the latter are allowed to forbid him from engaging in uncom-
pensated dealings with his property, regardless of the maturity dates of
the debts he owes them. Thus, they may preempt any of his dealings
that may harm their interests in the future, and void any gifts, charities,
guaranties, or loans on his part. Moreover, they may forbid him from
acknowledging suspicious debts to his child or his wife, but they cannot
forbid him from acknowledging other debts if there is no suspicion that
¯ ¯ ¯
66 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.324 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence),
. .
vol.5, p.199), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.72).
¯
67 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.261-4), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.345-53), ’Ibn
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.280 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.318 onwards).
¯
he is evading repayment. Moreover, they are not allowed at that stage

to forbid him from engaging in commutative transactions such as trading,
etc., which are thus executed.
2. The creditors may try to approach the bankrupt debtor without resorting
to courts. In this case, if he evades them, they may shield his property
from his dealings, thus forbidding him from all dealings, including gifts,
trading, and even marriage. In this case, they may divide his property in
proportion to the debts that he owes each of them.68
3. If a judge ruled that the debtor is bankrupt, he may confiscate his property
and divide it among his creditors.69 This type of court order may only
be issued upon the request of some or all of the creditors, whose debts
must be matured at the time of the court order, and must exceed the
value of his property. Thus, it is not permissible to declare someone’s
legal bankruptcy by virtue of deferred debts. If the court order is issued
upon the request of some of the creditors, all creditors would still share in
the distribution of his property.
The legal declaration of bankruptcy in this third case has four conse-
quences that are tantamount to interdiction: he is thus forbidden from
(i) making uncompensated contributions, (ii) engaging in commutative fi-
nancial contracts, (iii) and marrying more than one woman; and (iv) his
deferred debts become matured and his property is divided among his
creditors. Thus, he is interdicted from all compensated and uncompen-
sated dealings. Moreover, his creditors may forbid him from traveling for
trade or other reasons if his debts are matured or about to mature while
he is away if he travels. They may also ask the judge to incarcerate him,
and the judge may incarcerate him to ensure that he cannot violate the
interdiction court order.
Non-Mālikı̄ rulings
The non-Mālikı̄s ruled70 that a debtor may only be interdicted by a court order.
Thus, prior to a court declaration of bankruptcy, all of his dealings would be
executed. Then, if he is interdicted by the judge, he is thus prevented from
engaging in any compensated or uncompensated financial dealings, or any ac-
knowledgements of debt that may affect his creditors adversely. Thus, the judge
may confiscate and sell his property, and distribute the proceeds to the creditors.
The accepted opinion among the H . anafı̄s, which was first expressed by ’Abū
Yūsuf and Muh.ammad, is that two conditions must be satisfied to interdict a
68 This is called bankruptcy in the general sense.
69 This is called bankruptcy in the specific sense.
70 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.199), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.103),
. .
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.73), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.327
¯ . .
onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, pp.147-9), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
c
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.320), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.409,471), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3,
pp.407-11).
debtor: (i) his debt must equal or exceed the value of his properties, and (ii) his
creditors must request his interdiction. The Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s also agreed
¯
with the necessity of those two conditions for interdiction of bankrupt debtors.
It is permissible for a bankrupt man to marry, provided that he pays the
average customary dowry for the likes of his prospective wife. He is also allowed
to divorce his wife, accept divorce at her instance and financial compensation
thereof, or remarry her. He is allowed to exact physical retribution for the
murder of a family member of his, or to absolve a killer of such retribution, even
without demanding a financial compensation. He is also permitted to return
merchandise that he bought prior to interdiction due to defect or revocation, if
returning the merchandise is beneficial.
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that interdiction rulings extend to prop-
¯
erties acquired after interdiction as a gift, inheritance, credit purchase, and
hunting. They based this ruling on the view that the purpose of interdiction
is to protect the rights of the creditors and repay as much of the debts owed
to them as possible. Thus, interdiction applies to all of the debtor’s properties,
and not only those that he possessed at the time of interdiction.
On the other hand, the personal and family needs of the bankrupt debtor
have priority over the rights of his creditors. Thus, he is allowed to spend on
his own needs, and those of his family and dependents, while interdicted.
The H . anafı̄s distinguished between the two types of interdiction legalized
for bankrupt debtors on the one hand, and mentally incompetent individuals
on the other:71
1. The mentally incompetent are interdicted due to personal characteristics

that make him unable to make sound decisions. In contrast, the interdic-
tion of bankrupt debtors is intended to protect the rights of his creditors.
Both types of interdiction require a court order in the H
. anafı̄ school.
2. The acknowledgements of debt by an interdicted bankrupt debtor are ex-
ecuted after his interdiction is removed, even if it pertains to properties
that he acquired after the acknowledgement. In contrast, an interdicted
mentally incompetent person is not allowed to acknowledge debts before
or after his interdiction, and for properties that he had already owned or
those that he acquired later.
The Shāfic ı̄s, H

. anbalı̄s, and Mālikı̄s also agree on those two distinguishing fea-
¯
tures of the different types of interdiction.
Jurists also argued that the interdiction of bankrupt debtors is stronger than
the interdiction due to terminal illness. As proof, they noted that an ill person
is permitted to deal in one-third of his estate prior to dying, and the rights of
his heirs get associated to the state only upon his death. In contrast, the rights
of creditors are associated with the property of the interdicted bankrupt debtor
in a manner analogous to pawning.72
71 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.103), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.196).
c
¯ . ¯ ¯
97.10.4 Travel of a bankrupt debtor

Jurists differed slightly in their opinions regarding the prevention of bankrupt
debtors from traveling:
• The H. anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled73 that creditors are not allowed to prevent
¯
the debtor from traveling before their debts are matured, regardless of the
maturity date. This ruling follows from the fact that the creditors may
only demand repayment on that maturity date, and not before. On the
other hand, once their debts are matured, they have the right to prevent
the debtor from traveling until he repays those matured debts.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled74 that a creditor is allowed to prevent a debtor from
traveling, for trade or other purposes, if the debt is matured or if it is
expected to mature during his absence. They stipulated this ruling re-
gardless of whether the debt is less, equal, or greater than the value of the
debtor’s property. On the other hand, they allow the debtor to appoint an
agent to repay his debt during his absence, or to find a wealthy guarantor
to guarantee his debt, in which case the creditor is not allowed to prevent
him from traveling. Moreover, they did not allow the creditor to prevent
him from traveling if the maturity date of the debt is after the debtor is
expected to return from his travel.
75
• The H . anbalı̄s agreed with the Mālikı̄s in this regard. Thus, they said
that if the debtor is expected to return from his travels after the debt
matures, then the creditor is allowed to prevent him from traveling a
distance that would allow him to shorten his obligatory prayers. They also
agreed with the Mālikı̄s that he is not allowed to prevent the debtor from
traveling if the latter is expected to return prior to the debt’s maturity
date. However, if the debtor is traveling to fight with the army, then the
creditor is allowed to prevent him unless the debt is guaranteed with a
pawning or guarantor. In the latter case, it is likely that the debtor dies
in his trip, and thus the creditor needs a means of guaranteeing his right.
Thus, we see that the Mālikı̄ and H . anbalı̄ opinion is stricter and more aggres-
sive in protecting the rights of creditors. Thus, in contrast to the H . anafı̄s and
Shāfic ı̄s, they allow the creditor to prevent the debtor from traveling if the debt
¯
is about to mature during the debtor’s absence, unless the debtor can provide
guarantee through pawning of third-party guaranty.
97.10.5 Consequences of interdiction

There are a number of consequences of the legal interdiction of bankrupt debtors.
In what follows, we shall discuss them in some detail.
73 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.137), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.329), c Abd Al-
. .
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.74), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Sh ı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.319),
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.157).
c
74 ¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.262), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.348).
75 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.455), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.405 onwards).
.
1. Creditor rights
When a bankrupt debtor is interdicted, the rights of the creditors are attached
to his property, and he is thus forbidden from dealing in that property.76 In
this regard, it is highly recommended that the declaration of legal bankruptcy
and interdiction be witnessed by a judge, so that everyone will know of his
state of bankruptcy, and thus would only deal with him with full knowledge
of his financial situation.77 Then, once interdiction is established, the rights of
creditors are attached to his property in a manner analogous to the pawning of
that property. Thus, jurists agree that all dealings of his that would harm the
interests of the creditors (e.g. uncompensated contributions such as gifts and
charity, or acknowledgement of debt) are not invalidated.
However, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the interdicted bankrupt debtor is allowed
to acknowledge debts to a non-family member, if there is no suspicion of foul-
play. In contrast, acknowledgement of debts to family members is not accepted
after interdiction, since there is then suspicion of trying to cheat his creditors.
Moreover, they ruled that acknowledgements of debts after interdiction must
take place at or near the location of interdiction.
The H . anbalı̄s, and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s, ruled that all trading and other
¯
commutative financial dealings of interdicted bankrupt debtors are deemed in-
valid. This ruling is based on the fact that the rights of creditors are attached
to the property, and that the debtor is interdicted by a court order. Thus, they
reasoned that trading or dealing in his property would be contrary to the inter-
diction court-order. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s ruled that an interdicted bankrupt
debtor’s trading is valid if he trades at or near market prices. However, if he
trades away from market prices, the H . anafı̄s ruled that his trading is suspended
pending the approval of his creditors. Finally, the Mālikı̄s ruled generally that
commutative financial dealings of interdicted bankrupt debtors are not inval-
idated, but deemed suspended pending the approval of the judge and/or the
creditors.
Moreover, dealings of the interdicted bankrupt debtor that pertain to his
juristic liability, e.g. engaging in salam or selling an item established as a liability
on him, are deemed valid since such dealings do not harm the interests of the
creditors. Moreover, all of his non-financial dealings are deemed valid, including
marriage, divorce, exacting or dropping the right for physical retribution for
murder with or without financial compensation.
Finally, the bankrupt debtor’s acknowledgement of liabilities that were es-
tablished prior to interdiction are deemed valid. In contrast, all acknowledge-
ment of liabilities attached to his property after interdiction are deemed invalid,
76 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.105), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.328), Al-Dardı̄r
. .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.265), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.352,355), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄),
p.318 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.147), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
c
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.321), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.411), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
¯
vol.4, pp.409,471).
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.148), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.440), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.411).
regardless of the source of such rights.78
2. Maturity of deferred debts

The H . anafı̄s and most of the Mālikı̄s ruled that once interdiction is established
for a bankrupt debtor, all of his deferred debts are matured at the date of
interdiction, in analogy to the maturity of debts upon the debtor’s death.79
The instigating factor for ruling by analogy in the cases of bankruptcy and
death of the debtor is the fact that his juristic personality ceases to be eligible
for debts in both cases. The Mālikı̄s qualify their ruling in this case by excluding
the case where the debtor stipulated a condition that his deferred debts do not
become matured upon death or bankruptcy, and the case where the creditor
kills the debtor on purpose.
80
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s, and the majority of H . anbalı̄s ruled that deferred
¯
debts are not matured upon the declaration of the debtor’s bankruptcy. They
based this ruling on the view that deferment is a legal right of the debtor,
which is not dropped by bankruptcy, like his other debts. In this regard, they
distinguished between the bankruptcy of a debtor and the case of his death by
virtue of the fact that death obliterates the juristic personality of the deceased.
Consequently, they ruled that upon bankruptcy, deferred debts remain deferred,
and the property of the bankrupt is used to pay as much as possible of the
already matured debts. On the other hand, if the creditors with matured debts
choose not to divide the debtor’s property until other debts become matured,
then all creditors with matured debts at the later date should share in the
repayment. The latter ruling includes such debts as those established after
interdiction by transgressing against the property of another.
3. Precautionary incarceration and monitoring

Jurists differed in their rulings regarding the constant monitoring and accom-
paniment of a bankrupt debtor. On the other hand, they agreed on the permis-
sibility of incarceration by court-order, but only under certain conditions. We
first deal with the issue of constant monitoring of the debtor:
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, and Muh.ammad ruled that the creditors may
monitor and constantly accompany the debtor. Thus, they may go with
him wherever he goes. If he goes to his house, they may join him there
if he allows them, otherwise they may wait at his door and continue to
accompany him once he leaves. On the other hand, they ruled that the
creditors are not allowed to prevent him from financial dealings, earning
a living, and traveling while they accompany him. Thus, they are not
allowed to incarcerate him or restrict his movement otherwise, but are
only allowed to go with him wherever he goes. They ruled thus to give
¯ . ¯ ¯
79 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.352), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.318), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d
((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.282), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.265 onwards).
¯ . ¯ ¯
creditors some leverage in demanding repayment of the debts owed to

them. They provided proof for that ruling based on the H . adı̄th : “The
¯
possessor of a right can demand his right physically and verbally”, thus
designating monitoring and accompaniment as a form of physical demand
of repayment.81 However, they did not allow accompaniment of a debtor
woman, to avoid the possibility of allowing a man other than her husband
or family member to be alone with her.
82
• Zufar, the Mālikı̄s, the Shāfic ı̄s, and the H . anbalı̄s ruled that nobody
¯
has the right to demand repayment or accompany the debtor if he can
prove in court that he is unable to pay. In this case, the debtor must be
given leeway until his financial situation improves, as per the verse: “If the
debtor is in difficulty, grant him time till it is easy for him to repay” [2:280].
In this regard, they questioned the authenticity of the H . adı̄th upon which
¯
’Abū H. anı̄fa and his companions relied, and its relevance. Its authenticity
was questioned by ’Ibn Al-Mundhir, and its relevance may be limited to
¯
the cases of debtors who are capable of repaying their debts. Indeed, that
limitation of the scope of applicability of the H . adı̄th is justified based on
¯
the other H . adı̄th wherein the Prophet (pbuh) told the creditors of a man
¯
whose debts grew once some fruits that he bought perished: “Take what
you find, and you have no rights beyond that”.83 This latter opinion seems
to be the more appropriate one.
We now move to the issue of incarcerating a bankrupt debtor. It is a well

known Islamic ruling that a debtor who is capable to repay his matured debts
must do so, while a debtor who is incapable to repay must be given a grace period
until he can. Thus, if the debtor has property with which he can repay matured
debts, but he refuses to repay them, then the ruler may incarcerate him to force
him to repay. This latter ruling is based on the H . adı̄th : “A lingering debtor
¯
who refuses to pay despite his ability is a transgressor, and thus it is permissible
to complain about his transgression, and to punish him” [by incarceration].84
However, the jurists of the different schools stipulated various conditions for the
permissibility of incarcerating a debtor who lingers despite his ability to repay
his matured debts:
81 Narrated by ’Ibn c Udayy in Al-Kāmil on the authority of ’Abū c Utbah Al-Khawlānı̄. It
¯
was also narrated by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ on the authority of Makh.ūl with an incomplete chain of
narrators. In a similar H . adı̄th , Al-Bukhārı̄ narrated on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah that
¯ ¯
a man came to demand repayment of a debt that the Prophet (pbuh) owed him, and spoke to
the Prophet (pbuh) in a rough manner. When the companions were about to accost the man,
the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Let him be, for the possessor of a legal right has verbal license”,
c.f. Al-H. āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th), vol.4, p.166).
82 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,¯ p.156), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.449 onwards),
¯ . ¯ ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, pp.406,430), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.370),
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.317), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.280 onwards).
83 Narrated by Muslim and Al-Tirmidh ¯
ı̄.
84 Narrated by the five major narrators ¯
of H
. adı̄th with the exception of Al-Tirmidhı̄. It was
¯ ¯
also narrated by Al-Bayhaqı̄ and ’Ibn H . ibbān, and deemed valid, on the authority of Amr
c
ibn Al-Sharı̄d and his father, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.240).

¯ ¯
85
• Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that a judge is allowed to incarcerate the debtor,
man or woman, if he knows or suspects that he or she is capable of repaying
a debt established by a contract (e.g. marriage or guaranty), provided that
he has no proof to the contrary. If the judge was unsure about the debtor’s
financial situation, and incarcerated him or her for two or three months,
but could find no property during that period, he must thus release him
or her. Moreover, if the debtor can establish inability to repay, the judge
must release him or her, as per the verse [2:280]. Moreover, the debtor
cannot be physically or emotionally harmed during incarceration, should
not be chained, should not be undressed or embarrassed in public, and his
labor services may not be leased.
They further stipulated three conditions for incarcerations, pertaining re-
spectively to the debt, the debtor, and the creditor:
1. The debt must be matured. Thus, it is not permissible to incarcerate

a debtor by virtue of a deferred debt. This ruling follows from the
fact that incarceration is meant to provide a disincentive for harming
the interests of the creditor by deferring repayment. However, if the
debt is deferred, there is no legal foundation to providing such a
disincentive.
2. The debtor must satisfy three conditions to be incarcerated:
(a) Ability to repay the debt. Thus, if he is incapable of repayment,
he must be given a grace period, and cannot be incarcerated
thus, as per the verse [2:280].
(b) He must be lingering and refusing to pay a matured debt, to
establish his transgression as per the H . adı̄th : “A rich person
¯
who lingers in repayment of a matured debt is a transgressor”.86
Thus, incarceration may be legalized to prevent that injustice,
and punish the transgressor. Thus, if it is not apparent that the
rich debtor is evading repayment, he may not be incarcerated.
(c) The debtor cannot be a parent of the creditor. Thus, a debtor
may not be incarcerated if he is refusing to repay a debt to his
or her child, by virtue of the verses “Yet bear them company in
this life with justice and consideration” [31:15], and “And that
you be kind to your parents” [17:23]. In this regard, incarcer-
ating a parent in lieu of a debt is neither kind nor considerate.
However, if a father refuses to support a child that he is legally
bound to support, the judge may incarcerate him to punish him
thus. Moreover, if the plenipotentiary of a child-creditor is the
reason the child’s debt is not being repaid in time, he may be
incarcerated thus.
85 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.173), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.329-30), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.199).
86 Narrated by the major narrators of Hadı̄th on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-
. ¯
Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.346).
¯
3. The creditor must ask the judge to incarcerate the lingering debtor.
Thus, the judge is not allowed to incarcerate the debtor without such
a request coming from the creditor, since incarceration is a means of
satisfying the latter’s rights and thus may only be initiated by his
expressed will.
The H . anafı̄s ruled that once incarcerated, the debtor is forbidden from
leaving the place of incarceration for worldly, religious, or social affairs.
Thus, he is not allowed to attend meetings, religious festivities, or funer-
als, to visit others who are sick or well, etc. The purpose of preventing
the debtor from engaging in any of those affairs is to give him an incen-
tive to repay the matured debt. On the other hand, they ruled that the
incarcerated debtor’s relatives may visit him, and he may engage in legal
dealings such as trading, gifts, charity, and acknowledgement of debts to
non-relatives. Finally, the majority of H. anafı̄s ruled that the incarcerated
person should also be prevented from his normal work, so as to pressure
him into repaying the debt.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled87 that a debtor may be preemptively incarcerated if

he is known or suspected to be able to repay his matured debt. He may
thus be incarcerated until he provides proof of his inability to pay, or until
someone provides him guaranty, in which cases he may be released.
However, if the debtor asks for a short grace period (say two days) to
repay him, he should be given that grace period. Moreover, if a guarantor
guarantees the debtor’s debt, then the latter may not be incarcerated in
lieu of the guaranteed debt. In contrast, if a rich creditor does not ask for a
short extension, and does not provide a guarantor, he may be incarcerated
in lieu of his matured debt until he repays it. However, the judge is not
authorized to sell the rich debtor’s property to repay his debts in this
case, in contrast to the case of a bankrupt debtor. This is a difference
between the rulings for a transgressing rich debtor, and an interdicted
bankrupt debtor who is prevented from dealing in his own property. If the
incarcerated debtor is a woman, she should be incarcerated in the company
of a trustworthy woman. Moreover, a grandfather may be incarcerated in
lieu of a debt owed to his grandson, and a child may be incarcerated in
lieu of a debt owed to his father, but a father may not be incarcerated in
lieu of a debt he owes to his son.
If the debtor can prove his inability to repay, through accepted testimony
that he is not known to have any manifest or hidden properties, and he
swears that he has none, then he should be given a grace period until his
financial situation improves. In this case, he may not be incarcerated, and
the creditors may not demand repayment until his financial situation does
improve. Moreover, he may not be forced to work or borrow to repay the
87 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.368-71), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.278-82), ’Ibn

debts, even if he is capable to work or borrow. The latter rulings follow

from the fact that the debt was established as a liability on him, and
repayment may only be demanded after he accumulates sufficient wealth
to repay it, and not before.
Finally, if the judge could not prove that the debtor was rich or poor,
but incarcerated him on the assumption that he was wealthy, the debtor
may be released after a sufficient period of incarceration to ascertain that
had he had any wealth he would have paid the debt rather than stay
incarcerated. However, if there are signs that suggest that the debtor is
rich, then he may only be released from incarceration if he can provide
material proof of poverty. Moreover, if a person is known to be rich, then
he may be incarcerated indefinitely until he repays his debt and/or provide
a guarantor for his debt.
88
. anbalı̄s ruled that a rich debtor must repay his debt
¯
as soon as possible after repayment is demanded. Then, if he refuses to
repay his debt, and he happened to have manifest property of the same
genus as the debt, the debt may thus be repaid from that property. If
the manifest property was of a different genus, then the judge may sell his
property with or without his permission. If the judge cannot gain access
to the rich debtor’s property to sell it, then he may incarcerate him or
coerce him otherwise to sell it. Moreover, if he is known to be rich, but
his property was hidden and his creditor demanded his incarceration, the
judge may incarcerate him to release his property and enable him to repay
his debt. If incarceration proves to be insufficient penalty to convince the
debtor to repay his debt, the judge may have him beaten or punished
otherwise, even if the cumulative penalties prove to be excessive.
If the debtor claims that he is incapable of repaying his debt, but the
creditor disbelieves him, then the debtor may be incarcerated until he
provides material proof of poverty. Then, if it is established that he is
incapable of repaying his debt, he must be given a grace period until he
is able to repay, as per the verse [2:280].
In contrast, if there is proof that the debtor is able to repay his matured
debt but refuses to do so, the judge may incarcerate him89 based on the
above cited H . adı̄th : “A lingering debtor who refuses to pay despite his
¯
ability is a transgressor, and thus it is permissible to complain about his
transgression, and to punish him”. In this regard, the judge is not allowed
to release the incarcerated debtor until he receives proof that he is poor,
88 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.154,157), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
vol.3, pp.406-9), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.447-50), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.320).
89 Shaykh Taqiyyu-ddı̄n ’ibn Taymiyyah said: “Incarceration does not necessarily mean
¯
keeping him in a specific place. What is meant by incarceration in this case is preventing him
from engaging in dealings until he fulfills his obligations. Thus, he may be incarcerated in
his own home, thus being prevented from leaving it”, c.f. Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄),
vol.3, p.408).
or until the debt is absolved by repayment, absolution, transfer, etc. In

the latter cases, the debtor’s liability would cease to exist, and the creditor
would thus not object to ending his incarceration.
They also ruled in agreement with the Mālikı̄s that the debtor may not
be forced to work in order to repay his debt. This ruling is based on the
above cited H. adı̄th : “Take what you find, and you have no further rights”.
¯
Similarly, the debtor may not be forced to accept a gift, charity, or loan
to repay his debts.
4. Selling the debtor’s property

Jurists are in agreement90 that an interdicted bankrupt debtor’s property may
be sold, and its price may thus be distributed among his creditors in proportion
to their debts. In this regard, it is preferable that the debtor’s property is sold
immediately following his interdiction, to minimize the period of interdiction,
and to clear his liabilities and repay his creditors as soon as possible. Moreover,
the Prophet (pbuh) interdicted Muc ādh, thus immediately selling his property
¯
and distributing the price among his creditors. Thus, if the debtor’s property
was of the same genus as the debts, the judge may repay the debts directly
without his permission, otherwise he may sell it and repay the debts from its
price.
It is recommended that the judge or his agent be in attendance at the time
of sale of the debtor’s property, to assure the debtor that the sale will be done
fairly and properly. It is also recommended that the creditors be in attendance,
since the sale is in fact performed on their behalf, and they may very well be
willing to buy some of the property themselves. In the latter case, they may
thus bid-up the price of the debtor’s property, which may help him. Moreover,
their attendance also assures them that the sale is done property, and if any of
them finds that he can get repaid in kind (if his debt is of the same genus as
some of the debtor’s property), some parts of the sale may be bypassed.
In contemporary times, the debtor’s property should be sold in public auc-
tions. It is also preferable that each type of property is sold in its appropriate
market, provided that sales take place at the market price, with the price paid
in cash in the currency of the country.
Moreover, jurists listed the order in which properties should be sold as fol-
lows:
1. Perishable items (e.g. fruits and vegetables), then
2. Properties to which rights are attached (e.g. through pawning), then

. .
vol.5, p.199 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.357 onwards, 366), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.269-71), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.319), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.150 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.322), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd print-
¯ ¯
ing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.420 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, pp.441-6), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H. afı̄d
¯
((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.287).
3. Animals (since they are somewhat perishable, and require a cost to up-
keep), then
4. Movable properties (since they may be sold or otherwise lost), giving

clothes priority over copper pots and other movable objects, then
5. Immovable properties, giving priority to buildings over land. Those come

last since they are lease likely to perish or get stolen. Moreover, immovable
assets are typically bought as long-term investments, and thus must only
be sold if absolutely necessary.
To ensure that immovable assets are not sold too cheap, the Mālikı̄s stip-
ulated that a two-month period should be allowed for selling such assets.
’Abū H
. anı̄fa went further by not allowing a judge to sell the personal
belongings and immovable objects of the debtor, but ’Abū Yūsuf and
Muh.ammad disagreed with this ruling.
Jurists agreed that a bankrupt debtor must be spared his normal wardrobe.
. anbalı̄s further ruled that he should be allowed to keep food-
¯
stuffs to feed himself and his dependents (e.g. his wife, his servant, and depen-
dent relatives) for a day. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s ruled that expenditures on
such dependents may be taken out of the debtor’s property after interdiction
and before the declaration of bankruptcy. The Mālikı̄s were more lenient, allow-
ing the bankrupt debtor to keep enough food for a number of days. Moreover,
jurists ruled that the debtor should be allowed to keep the tools of his trade
(and the scholars should be allowed to keep his books). However, the Mālikı̄s
allowed the sale of books and fancy clothes if they are valuable. With regards
to the sale of books, they argued that knowledge should be kept in the heart.
However, Al-c Allāmah Al-c Adawı̄ argued that scholarship was no longer tied to
memorization, and thus some Mālikı̄s treated the scholar’s books the same as
the worker’s tools.
Some jurists also allowed the debtor to keep his primary residence and his
necessary servant, provided that they are not excessive for people of his socio-
economic class. They based this ruling on the view that those are basic ne-
cessities, similar to his food and clothing, and thus may not be sold to repay
his debts. In contrast, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the debtor’s house,
¯
means of transportation, and servants that in the past were possible to sell.
Their counter-argument was that residence, transportation, etc. were indeed
basic needs, but ones that can easily be obtained through leasing. Regarding
servants, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if the debtor had a servant, then he should be
sold if he can be sold for a price, otherwise if he cannot be sold, the labor of
that servant can be leased.
5. Taking repayment in kind

The non-H. anafı̄ jurists ruled that if the creditor had access to the property that
the bankrupt debtor owed him, then he may take it, thus taking repayment
91
in kind. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s ruled that if the judge declares a person’s
bankruptcy, and he was in possession of a specific property that he bought
but whose price he had not paid, that creditor/seller is equal to all others in
repayment rights. On the other hand, if the debtor’s bankruptcy was established
prior to his receipt of that property, or after receiving it without the seller’s
permission, the seller may thus recall the property or may incarcerate him in
lieu of liability for the price prior to receipt.
Thus, in the case of bankruptcy that is declared after the debtor received
the goods but before paying their price, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the seller is
not entitled to recall the merchandise. They based this ruling on the view
that bankruptcy makes delivery of the merchandise impossible in commutative
contracts (but not in others). In this case, they argued, the seller has no basis
on which to void the sale and recall the merchandise, since the buyer at that
time only owes him the price, established as a debt. Thus, even if the bankrupt
buyer had not yet received the object of the sale that was concluded prior to
bankruptcy, he remains entitled to receive the merchandise, thus exchanging it
with the established liability for the price.
92
In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄s ruled in this case that the seller is allowed to
void the sale and recall the merchandise. They based this ruling on the view that
the buyer was declared incapable of paying the price, by virtue of bankruptcy,
and thus the seller’s right to void the contract is established in analogy to the
buyer’s right to void a sale if the seller is unable to deliver the merchandise.
In general, they argued, a commutative contract may be voided if one of the
compensations (e.g. the object of salam) proves to be undeliverable. Moreover,
they provided proof for this ruling by the H . adı̄th narrated on the authority of
¯
’Abū Hurayrah: “Whoever has access to his property in the possession of a
bankrupt person, he is most worthy to take that property”.93
The H . anafı̄s argued that this H . adı̄th used by non-H . anafı̄s as proof for their
¯
ruling is contradicted by what Al-Khas.s.āf narrated, that the Prophet (pbuh)
¯
said: “If a man becomes bankrupt, and another finds his property in his pos-
session, the latter is equal to all the creditors of the former”. They thus rein-
terpreted the H . adı̄th of ’Abū Hurayrah by restricting it to the case wherein the
¯
buyer received the merchandise with an established option for the seller.
It is clear that the opinion of the non-H . anafı̄s in this regard is more solid,
since the H . adı̄th of ’Abū Hurayrah is valid, and not contradicted by other
¯
H. adı̄th s. Moreover, the reinterpretation of this H . adı̄th by the H . anafı̄s seems
¯ ¯
unfounded, since the H . adı̄th is irrelevant in the case where the seller has an
¯
option to void the sale. Moreover, their reinterpretation is even weaker if the
91 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.106), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.330 onwards),
. .
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.201 onwards).
92 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.283 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.373),
¯ .
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.282), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.322), Al-Khat.ı̄b
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.157 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.409 onwards), ’Ibn
c
¯ ¯
93 This is a valid Hadı̄th narrated by the major narrators of Hadı̄th on the authority of ’Abū
. ¯ . ¯
Hurayrah. There are other supporting narrations on the authorities of Samurah, and ’Abū
Bakr ibn c Abdul-Rah.man ibn Al-H . ārith ibn Hish ām, c.f. Al-Sh awkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.242).
¯ ¯ ¯
property was a deposit, simple loan, or found object, since the H

. adı̄th is clearly
¯
tied to the case of bankruptcy.
There are a number of other issues pertaining to taking one’s property from
the possession of a bankrupt individual. In what follows, we shall discuss the
most important issues mentioned by jurists:
1. The Shāfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s have two reported opinions regarding whether
¯
the owner of the property has the option to take it only immediately, or
whether that right remains indefinitely.94 The more correct of the two
opinions is that the option to take or recall property in this case is only
valid if executed immediately. This ruling is made in analogy to the ruling
for the defect option, since both options are legalized to prevent harming
anyone’s rights. In this regard, allowing the option to recall one’s property
to hold indefinitely would harm the rights of other creditors by holding
their rights hostage to the decision of the option-holder.
2. The Shāfic ı̄s ruled95 that the owner of the property in this case has the
¯
right to recall it if the debtor obtained it through any purely commutative
contract such as sales, leases, loans, and salam. They based this ruling
on the generality of the H . adı̄th of ’Abū Hurayrah cited above. Thus,
¯
if a man leased his property to another and had not yet received due
rent, then if the lessee’s bankruptcy is declared, the lessor has the right
to void the lease (thus treating the usufruct of property as an object of
sale). Similarly, loans and salam may be voided if the debtor’s liability for
repayment or delivery is matured and his bankruptcy is then declared.
On the other hand, non-commutative contracts (e.g. gifts) and partially
commutative ones (e.g. marriage and accepting a financial compensation
instead of physical retribution for murder) may not be voided by virtue of
bankruptcy.
3. The Shāfic ı̄s stipulated three conditions for the owner of a property to
¯
recall or take it from the bankrupt debtor:96
(a) The price must be due at the time of recalling the merchandise. Thus,
it is not permitted to recall the merchandise if the price was deferred,
since it is not appropriate to demand repayment of a deferred debt.
(b) Bankruptcy must make payment of the price impossible. Thus, the
sale is not voided if the bankruptcy is removed and the debtor refuses
to pay despite his ability to, or if he escapes or dies and his heirs refuse
to pay the price or return the merchandise. In all such cases, receipt
of the price is possible through legal means.
If receipt of the price is indeed impossible due to bankruptcy, the
seller is not obliged to accept a monetary compensation from the
¯ . ¯ ¯
95 Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.158).
.
96 ibid.¯ ¯ ¯
creditors in lieu of the merchandise. Rather, the Shāfic ı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s
¯
ruled that he retains the right to void the sale, since his right is
attached to his own property, and receiving compensation from other
creditors may be viewed as a favor to him. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s
ruled that if the creditors wish to compensate the seller financially,
he has no right to recall the merchandise, since he would receive the
price in full. Thus, the latter ruling is reasoned by analogy to the
case of defective merchandise from which the defect is removed, in
which case the buyer’s option to return the merchandise is voided.97
(c) The buyer must continue to own the merchandise at the time of recall.
Thus, if the buyer had died, re-sold the merchandise, given it as a
gift, or established it as a mortmain, the seller is no longer capable
of recalling the merchandise by virtue of the buyer’s bankruptcy.
From all of the preceding, we can thus enumerate nine conditions for
recalling a property from a bankrupt debtor:98
(a) The property must have been obtained through a purely commutative
contract (e.g. sale).
(b) The property recall must be demanded immediately after interdiction
becomes known to the owner.
(c) The owner may recall the property by saying: “I have voided the
sale”, or something to that effect, without necessarily receiving a
court order.
(d) No part of the compensation for the property (e.g. price) must be
received. If the seller had received part of the price prior to inter-
diction, he may recall a portion of the property corresponding to the
un-received part.
(e) The non-payment of the compensation must be caused by bankruptcy.
(f) The un-received compensation must be fungible. Thus, if the com-
pensation was non-fungible, he will have a priority over other credi-
tors in his claim to that non-fungible property of the debtor/buyer.
(g) The debt must be due.
(h) The sold property must still be owned by the bankrupt debtor.
(i) There must be no other rights associated with the property (e.g. it
must not be pawned in lieu of another debt).
The H . anbalı̄s listed five main conditions for a seller to recall his merchan-
dise from a bankrupt buyer, and Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄)) added
two more:99
97 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.283), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.373 onwards), Al-
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.159), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.411).
¯98 ¯ ¯
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.160).
99 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah¯(, vol.4, pp.413,419,430,431,434,453),
¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄),
vol.3, pp.414-7).
(a) The merchandise must be intact. Thus, if any part of it had perished
(e.g. the fruits on sold trees), the seller becomes equal in priority
to all other creditors. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s ruled
¯
that he may recall the remaining part of the merchandise, and share
with other creditors in his compensation for the perished part. This
condition corresponds to the eighth condition of the Shāfic ı̄s.
¯
(b) There must be no contiguous increase in the merchandise (e.g. fat-
tening, or aging). In contrast, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s did not make
¯
this a condition for recall.
(c) The seller must not have received any part of the price. Thus, if he
had received part of the price, his right to recall the merchandise is
dropped. This corresponds to the fourth Shāfic ı̄ ruling. In contrast,
¯
the Mālikı̄s ruled that the owner/seller has the option of returning
the part of the price he had received and recalling the entire property,
or sharing with other creditors in his demands with no priority for
the merchandise.
(d) There must be no rights of others attached to the property. Thus,
if the buyer had pawned the property or given it as a gift, the seller
has no right to recall the merchandise, in analogy to the case where
the merchandise was re-sold. This is the ninth Shāfic ı̄ condition, on
¯
which the Shāfic ı̄s, Mālikı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s are in agreement.
¯
(e) The bankrupt debtor/buyer must be alive. Thus, if he had died,
the seller will have no priority over other creditors, regardless of
whether bankruptcy and interdiction preceded death or vice versa.
The Mālikı̄s agreed with this ruling, based on the H . adı̄th of ’Abū
¯
Bakr ibn c Abdul-Rah.mān: “If the buyer dies, then the seller/owner
has the same priority as other creditors”.100 In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s
¯
ruled that the seller has the right to void the sale and recall the
merchandise, based on the above cited H . adı̄th of ’Abū Hurayrah.
¯
(f) The buyer must have continued to own the merchandise, without
transferring its ownership through a sale, gift, etc.
(g) The seller must be alive at the time of recalling the merchandise.
The Mālikı̄s listed three conditions in this regard:101
(a) The other creditors must not have offered to compensate the seller
financially for the price of merchandise. Thus, if they pay him from
their own property or that of the debtor, or if they or others guarantee
the price for him and they are deemed trustworthy, then he is not
allowed to recall the merchandise.
100 Narrated by Mālik in Al-Muwatta’, and by ’Abū Dāwūd, with an incomplete chain of
..
narration. The latter narration is also weak, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.242).
¯
101 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.283), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.374 onwards).
(b) The property must be possible to recall. Thus, if a woman’s husband

declares bankruptcy, and she demanded her dowry after the marriage
was consummated and his bankruptcy was declared, she has no pri-
ority over other creditors. This follows since it is impossible for her
to “recall” what she had given her husband. On the other hand, if
the husband’s bankruptcy is declared prior to consummation of the
marriage, she may void it at that time.102
(c) The property must be in the same state, without change from the
date of sale. Thus, if the merchandise had changed (e.g. if sold
wheat was ground, or sold cloth was made into a dress, etc.), the
seller has no priority over other creditors. This includes the mixture
of the merchandise with a different property, even if it was possible
to separate them (e.g. if honey was mixed with oil). However, if
the merchandise was mixed with similar goods, or the change was
reversible (e.g. dying of sold cloth or leather, or weaving of thread
into cloth), or if the merchandise was changed by natural causes or
the actions of the buyer or a third party, and was then the change
was reversed, the seller may thus recall it. If the defect continued
to exist, the seller has the option to recollect the defective property,
and share with other creditors in demanding compensation for the
difference, or to share with the creditors with a claim for the full
price.
4. If the merchandise increased in the bankrupt buyer’s possession, we need
to distinguish between multiple cases:
(a) The increase may be contiguous, e.g. the sold property may grow in
size, age or abilities. The Mālikı̄s, the Shāfic ı̄s, and one of the nar-
¯
rated opinions of ’Ah.mad stated that such contiguous increase does
not prevent the seller from recalling the merchandise. The Mālikı̄s
exclude from this ruling the case wherein other creditors offer to pay
him the price. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄ jurist Al-Kh arqı̄ ruled that
¯
such contiguous increase does prevent the seller from recalling the
merchandise. The latter appears to be the accepted opinion among
103
H. anbalı̄s, since all their books list it thus.
(b) The increase may be separate, e.g. fruits or offspring that mate-
rialized while the merchandise was in the buyer’s possession. The
. anbalı̄s agree that such increases do not pre-
¯
vent the seller from recalling the merchandise if the buyer’s bankruptcy
is declared. In this case, the seller may recall the original merchan-
dise without the increase. Thus, the increase remains with the buyer,
102 This is only a parenthetical digression, since the main topic here pertains to merchandise
that was received prior to bankruptcy. In the latter case, the husband received nothing prior
to the declaration of his bankruptcy.
103 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.283), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.161), ’Abū-
¯ . ¯ ¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.324), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.419), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
¯ ¯
printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.416), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.320).
since the Legislator only established the seller’s right to recall the
merchandise that he sold, and he may not take more than that.104
(c) An increase may ensue in the merchandise due to dying. For instance,
if a man bought cloth from another, dyed it, and then his bankruptcy
was declared, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s agree that the seller
¯
retains the right to recall the merchandise. In this case, the bankrupt
buyer becomes a partner of the owner of the cloth for the increase
in its value due to dying, the increase belonging to the buyer.105
Another reported opinion among the H . anbalı̄s stipulates that the
seller is not allowed to recall the merchandise increased in value due
to the dying. The latter ruling is based on the view that this type
of increase is contiguous, and the increase belongs to the buyer, and
thus the situation is analogous to fattening of a sold animal.
(d) The increase may be the erection of buildings or planting of crops in
a sold land:
• The Mālikı̄s ruled106 in this case that the seller is not allowed to
repossess the land after buildings were erected on it or crops were
planted in it. Thus, he must participate with other creditors in
demanding compensation for his credit.
107
. anbalı̄s ruled in this case that it is permis-
¯
sible for the seller to recall the land, provided that the bankrupt
buyer and his creditors agree to remove the buildings or crops
from the land. The buyer and his creditors have the right to
remove such additions, and if they do, then the seller may repos-
sess his land. In this case, the expenses of returning the land to
its original state should be paid from the bankrupt buyer’s prop-
erty. On the other hand, if the buyer and his creditors refuse to
remove the additions, they may not be forced.
Another reported opinion in their schools is that the seller has
the right to repossess the land with the additions, and he may
then remove the additions and compensate the bankrupt buyer
for the diminution in his wealth due to that removal. The lat-
ter ruling is based on the view that all of the property of the
bankrupt individual is subject to sale in any case, and the loss
to his property can be compensated in both ways. Thus, he may
be regarded as a partner with the land owner for the increase he
put in the land, in analogy to the case of leather or fabric that
increased in value due to dying.
104 ibid., Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.418).
105 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.283), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.164), ’Abū-
¯ ¯ ¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.325), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.417), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
¯ ¯
106 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.285).
¯ .
107 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.162 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.325), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.426 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3,
p.427).
However, the best supported opinion among the Shāfic ı̄s and
¯
H. anbalı̄s is the impermissibility of repossession of the land in the
case of added buildings or trees, and thus the increase remains
intact as the bankrupt buyer’s property. They based this ruling
on the view that the bankrupt buyer and his creditors would
be harmed if the seller is allowed to repossess the land, and it
is not appropriate to remove one harmful set of consequences
(the seller’s potential loss) with another (the potential loss to
the buyer and his creditors). Instead, they ruled that the seller
should demand payment of the price on equal footing with all
the creditors. Thus, the majority opinion of the Shāfic ı̄s and
¯
H. anbalı̄s agrees with the Mālikı̄ ruling.
On the other hand, if the increase was a crop, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled108
¯
that the seller may repossess the land. They based this ruling on
the view that the seller’s property (the land) was intact, and sim-
ply occupied by a movable object (the crop). Thus, they ruled in
analogy to the case where the sold object was a house, and the
increase was movable furniture belonging to the buyer. Thus, if
the crop was reaped, it must be moved out of the land. If the
crop was not yet reaped, it may be left until harvest time, with-
out payment of rental for the land since the buyer planted the
crop in his own land. The last ruling follows by analogy to the
case where a person sold his land after planting a crop, wherein
ownership of the land is transferred, but the crop is kept until
harvest time without payment of rent.
(e) The change may be a transformation of the merchandise, e.g. grind-
ing of wheat, baking of flour, oil used to make soap, etc. In all such
cases and similar transformation instances, the merchandise is trans-
formed to the point where its name changes (e.g. wheat becomes
flour, flour becomes bread, oil becomes soap, etc.). The Mālikı̄s, and
the H. anbalı̄s and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s agreed in this case that if the
¯
buyer’s bankruptcy is declared after he transformed the merchandise
thus, the seller no longer has the right to repossess it, provided that
the transformation increased the value of the merchandise. On the
other hand, if the transformation does not add to the value of the
merchandise, then the seller may repossess the merchandise, and the
bankrupt buyer is not entitled to any compensation.109
(f) The merchandise may be mixed by another property to the point
where the two are indistinguishable (e.g. oil with oil, etc.). In this
case, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the seller is not
¯
allowed to recall the merchandise. However, the Mālikı̄s said that if
108 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.326).
. ¯ ¯
109 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.283), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.374), Al-Khat.ı̄b
¯
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.163), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.325), ’Ibn
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
the merchandise was mixed with identical property, then the seller
is allowed to recall what he sold. The Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that if
¯
the merchandise was mixed with the same or lower quality property,
then the seller is allowed to take the sold amount of the mixture.
However, they ruled that if the merchandise was mixed with higher
quality goods, then the seller cannot recall the merchandise, and may
only demand payment of the price on par with the other creditors.110
(g) If the merchandise is diminished in quality or characteristics, the
Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the seller may still recall
¯
the merchandise, since such diminution does not disqualify the latter
from being the seller’s property. The Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled in
¯
this case that the seller is given the option of taking the diminished
property and dropping his claim for the price, or sharing his demand
for the full price on par with all the other creditors. This ruling
is based on the rule that price cannot be decomposed into quality
portions, and thus the ruling must be made in analogy to the case
where the merchandise declined in value due to a movement in market
prices. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the seller has the option
of taking the diminished merchandise and sharing his demand for
the diminished amount on par with the other creditors, or sharing
his demand for the full price on par with the other creditors. The
latter opinion is also shared by the Shāfic ı̄s in the case where the
¯
merchandise is partly destroyed due to the transgression of a third
111
party.
110 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, ibid.), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, ibid.), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄

¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.415), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.326).
111 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, ibid.), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, ibid.), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
. ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.324), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.414), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.320).
¯
Chapter 98
Ending Interdiction
It is well established in Islamic Law that a legal ruling is predicated upon its
instigating factor. Thus, interdiction is only legalized by its instigating factors,
and must thus be ended if those instigating factors cease to exist. We have
studied the issue of ending interdiction in the chapter on the legal consequences
thereof. In this chapter, we shall summarize the rulings pertaining to the ending
of interdiction.
98.1 Mental incompetence & insanity

An interdiction based on mental incompetence is ended if proof or signs are pro-
vided to show that the interdicted attained discernment. The majority of jurists
in this case required a court order to end the interdiction, since they ruled that
the establishment of such interdiction required a court order. Muh.ammad ibn
Al-H. asan and ’Ibn Al-Qāsim held the minority dissenting opinion that a court
order is not required to remove interdiction in this case. On the other hand, all
jurists agree that interdiction based on insanity or idiocy can be removed if the
person returns to sanity and discernment, without need for a court order.
98.2 Interdicted children

Jurists differed in their rulings for interdicted children. The H
. anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s
allow interdiction to be removed for some of the dealings of a non-discerning
child when he reaches the age of seven. On the other hand, interdiction of
discerning children may be removed in one of two ways:1
1. The non-Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the child’s guardian authorizes him to trade,
¯
he is thus released from interdiction in all dealings that may be benefi-
cial or harmful. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the interdiction of a
¯
discerning child is not removed, even if he is authorized to trade.
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.171), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.457).
405
406 CHAPTER 98. ENDING INTERDICTION
2. The non-Mālikı̄s ruled that if the child reaches puberty in a state of sanity
and discernment, he is thus released from interdiction without need for
testing by the guardian or a court order.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if the child’s father was alive when
he attained discernment and puberty, then his interdiction may be re-
moved without need for a court order. However, if the child is under
the supervision of a father’s plenipotentiary, then his interdiction is re-
moved if the plenipotentiary witnesses in public his conviction that the
child is discerning, without need for a court order. The Mālikı̄ jurist ’Ibn
Juzayy ruled that a court permission is required in addition if the child
was under the supervision of a court-appointed guardian. However, the
more correct opinion is that stipulated in Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A) and Al-
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B), that a guardian does not need the judge’s permission
to declare the discernment of the child upon reaching puberty.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s also ruled that the judge is always allowed
to declare that he is satisfied with the discernment of any interdicted
individual, thus removing his interdiction. This applies to cases where
the interdicted is under the supervision of a guardian, as well as to cases
where he is not.
The majority of Mālikı̄s further ruled that a female must remain under
the guardianship of her father until one of three conditions is satisfied:
(a) Either she marries, the marriage is consummated, and witnesses tes-
tify to her discernment in financial dealings,
(b) Her father may declare that she is discerning, either before or after
the consummation of the marriage, or
(c) Her chosen guardian declares her discernment after the consumma-
tion of her marriage.
However, they ruled that a court-appointed guardian is not authorized to

declare her discernment unless material proof can be provided to support
that claim, as we have seen in previous chapters.
98.3 The bankrupt

We now consider the case where a bankrupt debtor’s property was used or
sold to repay his creditors. Would his interdiction thus end? The Shāfic ı̄s and
2 ¯
H. anbalı̄s listed two opinions in this regard:
1. The first opinion stipulated that interdiction ends once the property of
the bankrupt debtor is distributed among his creditors. This ruling is
based on the view that the reason for interdiction is non-existent after the
distribution of his property, and thus the interdiction must be removed
2 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid., p.327), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.449).
. ¯ ¯
in analogy to the case of an interdicted insane person whose sanity is

restored.
2. The second opinion stipulated that interdiction in this case may only be
removed by a judge, since it could only have been established with a court-
order, in analogy to interdiction of incompetent individuals. This opinion
was defended by arguing that the case of an insane individual is different,
since interdiction in that case is caused by a fault in the person, and thus
may be removed when that fault is no longer existent.
The court-order to interdict a bankrupt debtor should specify the objectives

of interdiction explicitly. In this case, the objective of interdiction is to liquidate
the assets of the interdicted and repay his debts. Then, once the objective is
attained, the interdiction would be automatically revoked without need for a
second court-order.
Chapter 99
Indebted Estates
We shall study three issues in this final chapter:

1. Do deferred debts become current upon the debtor’s death?
2. The manner in which debts may be attached to the estate of a deceased
individual.
3. Does indebtedness of an estate prevent its transfer to the heirs of the
deceased?
In what follows, we shall study each of those issues in some detail.
99.1 Deferred debts

The majority of jurists, including ’Abū H. anı̄fa, Al-Sh āfic ı̄, Mālik, and according
¯
to one reported opinion of ’Ah.mad, ruled that deferred debts become matured
upon the debtor’s death.1 The other case we have seen in bankruptcy was more
contention, wherein the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that deferred debts become
matured upon declaration of the debtor’s bankruptcy, while the other schools
disagreed. Regarding the case of death of the debtor, Al-Zuharı̄ said that the
Sunnah clearly illustrates that deferred debts become current upon the debtor’s
death.2 This majority ruling was based on the view that Allāh (swt) did not
allow heirs to take their inheritance until after all debts were paid. In the other
reported opinion of ’Ah.mad, he is said to have ruled that deferred debts do not
become current upon the incidence of death or insanity if the heirs can insure
the deferred debt with a pawning or a wealthy guarantor.
1 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.282), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.435), ’Abū-’Ishāq
¯ . .
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.327), Manār Al-Sabı̄l (vol.1, p.354).
2¯ ¯
This statement is supported by the H . adı̄th narrated on the authority of ’Ibn Umar
c
¯
(mAbpwh) that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “If a man dies owing a deferred debt and being
owed a deferred debt, then the one that he owes becomes current, while the one that is owed
to him remains deferred to its original term”, c.f. ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.327).
409
410 CHAPTER 99. INDEBTED ESTATES
The majority opinion is also logically sound. For if deferred debts did not
become current upon the debtor’s death, then we must reason that the debt:
(i) remains a liability on the juristic personality of the deceased, (ii) becomes a
liability on his heirs, or (iii) becomes attached to the property. The first possi-
bility is impossible, since the juristic personality of the deceased is obliterated
upon his death, and it is impossible to demand repayment from a dead person.
The third possibility is also unacceptable, since the heirs never accepted to un-
dertake that liability, and the creditor never accepted them as his debtors, and
they may not be as creditworthy as the deceased was during his life. Finally,
it is not appropriate to attach the debt to the specific properties of the estate,
or to defer it, since that harms the interests of the creditor and the deceased,
and does not provide the heirs with any benefit. In this regard, the harm to the
deceased in attaching the debt to his property is based on the H . adı̄th : “The
¯
soul of a believer remains tied to his debts until they are repaid on his behalf”.3
In the meantime, the creditor would be harmed if the debt is attached to
specific properties and remains deferred, since that delays his collection of re-
payment. Moreover, this attachment exposes him to the risk that the specific
property to which the debt is attached may perish, thus dropping his right. In
the meantime, the heirs are harmed since the continued deferment and attach-
ment of the debt to specific properties prevents them from dealing in those prop-
erties. In this regard, death was never meant to void people’s rights. Rather,
death is meant to be a demarcation of transfer of authority and inheritance of
property. In this regard, the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Whoever dies and leaves
legal rights or properties behind, they thus belong to his heirs”.4
99.2 Attaching debts to the estate

The majority of jurists ruled5 that the debt remains a liability on the deceased,
and is attached to his estate in analogy to the attachment of creditor rights to
the property of a bankrupt debtor upon his interdiction, and also in analogy to
the attachment of a debt with pawned property. This attachment protects the
rights of the deceased to have his debts repaid prior to the distribution of his
estate among the heirs. In this regard, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that this
¯
attachment of the estate to the debts of the deceased is established regardless
of whether or not the debt exceeds the value of the estate, thus the entire estate
is considered pawned in lieu of the debts of the deceased, and all dealings of the
heir thereof are not executed prior to repayment.
Consequently, if a man sold a good and then the buyer died prior to paying
the price, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the seller has a priority over other creditors to
¯
3 This is a valid Hadı̄th narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Tirmidhı̄, ’Ibn Mājah, and Al-Hākim, on
. ¯ . ¯ .
the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah.
4 Narrated by ’Ahmad and ’Ibn Mājah on the authority of ’Ibn Karı̄ mah, c.f. Al-Jāmic
.
Al-Kabı̄r (vol.3, p.178).
5 Sharh Al-Sirājiyyah (p.4 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.284), ’Ibn
¯ . ¯ .
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.319 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.144 onwards),
¯ ¯ ¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.436), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.327).
¯ ¯
99.3. INHERITANCE 411
repossess his goods, in analogy to the case of buyer bankruptcy. They based this
ruling on the narration of ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Dhi’b on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah
¯
that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “If a man dies or if his bankruptcy is declared,
the owner of property in his possession has priority for that property over other
6
creditors”. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s, and Mālikı̄s ruled that the
. anbalı̄s, H
owner of the property must compete on par with all other creditors of the
deceased. They based this opinion on the H . adı̄th narrated by ’abū Bakr ibn
c ¯
Abdul-Rah.mān on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah: “If a man dies or if his
bankruptcy is declared, then if any of his creditors finds his property in his
possession, he has no priority for that property over other creditors”.
99.3 Inheritance
There are two reported opinions in each of the Shāfic ı̄ and H . anbalı̄ schools
¯
regarding the transfer of ownership of the indebted estate to theirs.7
99.3.1 Preferred ruling

The more correct of those two opinions is that the attachment of debt to the
estate does not prevent inheritance. In this regard, they argued that this attach-
ment of debt to the estate is no stronger than the attachment of a creditor’s
right to a pawned property, a creditor’s right to the property of a bankrupt
debtor, and the right of the transgressed upon in the property of the transgres-
sor. All such attachments of rights to property do not remove property rights
for the pawning debtor, the bankrupt debtor, or the transgressor. Thus, the at-
tachment of a debt to the estate does not prevent the transfer of its ownership
to the heirs.
Thus, if the heirs deal with the estate through sales or other means, the
dealing is valid, and the repayment of the attached debt becomes a liability on
them. On the other hand, if it is not possible for them to repay the debt after
dealing in the estate, then their dealing will thus be voided.
Any increase in the estate after the debtor’s death (e.g. product, offspring,
etc.) must belong to the heirs, since the increase thus was produced by property
that they owned.
If a man died with no debts, and his heirs dealt in the estate, and then a debt
on the deceased ensued, e.g. by returning defective merchandise, the majority
of jurists ruled that the dealing would thus remain executed. However, if the
heirs do not repay the resulting debt, their dealing in the estate is voided to
protect the rights of the buyer/creditor.
6 This is the report in ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄)), wherein he distinguished between
¯ .
the cases of bankruptcy and death. In the first case, the owner has a priority, whereas in the
latter, the owner is on par with all other creditors. On the other hand, ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄))
considered the two cases to be equivalent if the sold good was intact, but ruled that if it had
diminished or perished, then the seller should be on par with other creditors.
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.327), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.437).
412 CHAPTER 99. INDEBTED ESTATES
All jurists agree that the heirs have the right to keep the properties of the
estate to themselves and repay its debts from their own property. This ruling
is based on the view that the heir inherits all the rights and privileges of the
deceased, and the latter had the right to keep his property and repay the debt
monetarily during his life.
If the property of a deceased or bankrupt person was distributed among his
creditors, and then another creditor appeared, the latter may demand his fair
proportional share of repayment from the other creditors. This ruling follows
from the fact that the original division in this case was made based on the faulty
assumption that there were no other creditors. Thus, when another creditor is
found, the first division must be voided.
99.3.2 Minority ruling

The second and less favored opinion stipulates that indebtedness of the deceased
prevents the transfer of ownership of the estate to the heirs. The proponents
of this opinion cite as proof the verse: “. . . after the payment of legacies debts”
[4:11], which dictates that inheritance shares are calculated after all debts are
repaid and all contributions up to one-third of the estate are given. They thus
argue that inheritance is not established until after the execution of the will and
repayment of debts, and not before. Thus, they ruled that if the heirs deal in
the properties of the estate prior to the repayment of debts, they are considered
to be dealing invalidly in the property of others, unless the creditors permit
them to do so.
Part XVII
Ownership and its

characteristics
413
415
Preliminaries
Ownership and its characteristics is at the heart of any economic system,

past or present. Indeed, the main distinction between the two main economic
systems of the past century (capitalism and socialism) revolves around issues of
ownership. Thus, understanding the Islamic notion of ownership is crucial to
understanding Islam’s reaction to any world economic system.
In this regard, the reader will find that Islamic economic objectives agree
in large part with the higher objectives served by secular economic systems,
especially as they pertain to regulating ownership rights. Indeed, Islamic Law
strikes the right balance between maximizing individual and social benefits.
Thus, Islam protects the principle of private ownership, but regulates it to
ensure social benefits.
For instance, allowing for juristic differences, public properties such as crude
oil and minerals tend to be considered owned by society as a whole, represented
by the national government. Moreover, many of the man-made technical le-
galities associated with ownership, contracts, torts, and protection of various
property rights, can be traced back to the classical sources of Islamic jurispru-
dence. This is ample proof that the Islamic principles and the inherent justice in
their juristic applications transcend time and space. May Allāh guide us always
to the right path.
In this part, we shall discuss ownership and its characteristics in six chapters:
1. Definition of ownership.
2. Eligibility for ownership.
3. Types of ownership.
4. Types of limited ownership.
5. Types of unlimited ownership.
6. Constrained vs. unconstrained ownership.

Chapter 100
Definition of Ownership
Ownership (al-milkiyyah) is an Islamic Legal relationship between a human

being and property, which renders the property specifically attached to him,
and which gives the owner the right to deal in that property unless there is
a legal impediment to a specific dealing.1 In this regard, Al-Majallah (item
#125) defined owned property as: “anything owned by a human being, be it
a specified property, or usufruct of a property”. Thus, we may understand the
H. anafı̄ dictum: “usufruct and legal rights are owned items, but they are not
property”, which rendered ownership a more general concept than property.
Jurists have given a number of similar definitions of ownership.2 Perhaps
the best of those definitions of ownership is: “an exclusive association of the
owned item with its owner, which gives the owner the right to deal in what he
owns in any way that is not Legally forbidden”.
Thus, if an individual acquired a property in a legal manner, that property
becomes associated with him exclusively. Thus, he may use that property or
deal in it, as long as there is no Legal impediment to such dealings (e.g. in-
sanity, idiocy, mental incompetence, childhood, etc.). Moreover, the exclusivity
of ownership forbids others from using the property or dealing in it without a
Legal authorization such as guardianship, agency, etc.
In the latter cases, the rights of a guardian, plenipotentiary, or agent to deal
in the property is not primitive. Rather, such rights can only be derived for such
individuals who thus act as a proxy for the owner. Thus, a young child or an
insane person are still considered to be the legal owners of their properties, to
whom the right to deal in that property is reinstated once the Legal impediment
to their legal rights is removed.
1 Ownership and other legal rights can only be established through an Islamic Legal (sharc ı̄)
¯
recognition of that right. This follows from the fact that Islam does not recognize “natural”
rights. Rather, all rights must be derived from the sources of Islamic Law, as established by
Allāh. Thus, legal rights are viewed as divine gifts given to individuals, with provisions to
protect the best interests of society as a whole.
2 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.74), Al-Qarāfı̄ ((Mālikı̄), vol3, p.208 onwards).
.
417
Chapter 101
Eligibility for Ownership
The default for all properties is their eligibility for ownership. However, there
may be factors that make certain properties ineligible for ownership in some or
all cases. Thus, there are three types of properties with regards to eligibility for
ownership:
1. Properties that are ineligible for ownership: This category includes

properties that are specified for public usage, such as public roads and
bridges, castles, railways, rivers, museums, public libraries and gardens,
etc. Such items cannot be privately owned since they were specified for
public usage. However, if the specification for public usage (say of a road)
is nullified, then such properties return to their default state of eligibility
for private ownership.
2. Properties that can only be owned through legal means: This
category includes properties established as a mortmain, or properties of
the national treasury. For instance, properties established as a mortmain
may not be sold or given as a gift unless they are ruined or their expenses
become higher than their income. In the latter cases, a court may give
permission to replace such properties of the mortmain with other proper-
ties.1
Similarly, the properties of the national treasury or government may only
be sold if the government decides that they must be sold to meet a ne-
cessity or social benefit. This ruling follows from the statement of c Umar
(mAbpwh): “I have appointed myself for the Muslim Treasury in the same
legal status as a plenipotentiary in the possession of an orphan’s wealth”.
Thus, in both cases, the plenipotentiary or government official may deal
1 The Hanafı̄s allowed replacing properties of a mortmain with other properties as benefit
.
dictates. Thus, they ruled that “a just and trustworthy judge who does not have any conflict
of interest may allow the property of a mortmain to be sold near its market price, provided
that it did not generate enough income with which it could be restored, and provided that it
is exchanged for a non-fungible non-monetary property”, c.f. ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.3,
p.425).
419
420 CHAPTER 101. ELIGIBILITY FOR OWNERSHIP
in the property under his control for the benefit of the child or public,
respectively.
3. Properties that are unconditionally eligible for ownership: This

category includes all properties save for those in the previous two cate-
gories.
Chapter 102
Types of Ownership
There are two fundamental types of ownership: total and partial.

• Total ownership is the ownership of both a property and its usufruct. This
type of ownership gives the owner all possible legal rights associated with
the owned property, and it is unconditional and has no time limit as long as
the property continues to exist. Moreover, ownership of such properties
cannot be dropped (thus rendering the property ownerless). Thus, if a
property is usurped, and the owner tells the usurper that he has dropped
his ownership, it is not dropped thus. Thus, the owner remains thus
despite dropping his ownership, since the property must have an owner.
Various contracts (e.g. sales, inheritance, etc.) may be utilized to transfer
ownership from one person to another, but such properties must have some
owner at all times.
An owner in this case has full rights of using the property, investing it or
in it, and dealing in it through sales, gifts, specification in a will, estab-
lishment as a mortmain, lending, leasing, etc. Thus, since the owner owns
the item itself as well as its usufruct, he may deal in both (e.g. through a
sale), or in the usufruct alone (e.g. in a lease or loan).
If the owner were to destroy his own property, he is not required to pay
a compensation, since he cannot compensate himself. However, he may
be religiously accused since the destruction of property is forbidden, and
he may be interdicted legally if there is sufficient proof of his mental
incompetence.
• Partial ownership is ownership of the property but not of its usufruct, or
vice versa. In this regard, ownership of usufruct may be a personal right
tied to the individual rather than the property (e.g. if a person inherits
the right to use a property for the rest of his life). On the other hand,
ownership of usufruct may be attached perpetually to the property, re-
gardless of the individual extracting the usufruct, such as easement rights
that are established only for real estate and land.
421
Chapter 103
Partial Ownership
There are three types of partial ownership, which we shall discuss in this chapter
in some detail.
103.1 Ownership of the property alone

The property may be owned by one person, and its usufruct may be owned by
another. For instance, a person may give another as part of his will the right to
live in his house or to cultivate his land for the rest of his life, or for a fixed time
period. In this case, after the will-writer’s death, the property will be owned
by his heirs through inheritance, while its usufruct will be owned by the person
named in the will for the period specified therein. Then, when that specified
period ends, the heirs’ ownership of the inheritance becomes complete.
In this case, while the usufruct of one’s property is owned by another, the
owner of the property is not allowed to use the property himself, deal in the
usufruct, or deal in the property itself. Moreover, the property’s owner is re-
quired to deliver the property to the owner of its usufruct, and may be coerced
if he refuses to do so.
This example illustrates the fact that ownership of the property itself is
always perpetual, and always ends in total ownership. In contrast, ownership
of usufruct is most often timed (with few exceptions such as mortmains), since
the H . anafı̄s ruled that usufruct is not eligible for inheritance.
103.2 Personal usufruct ownership

Ownership of usufruct may be established through one of five means: (i) a
simple loan, (ii) a lease, (iii) a mortmain, (iv) a will, or (v) a permission.1
1 The Hanafı̄s viewed the right to use a property as equivalent to ownership of its usufruct.
.
Thus, they allow the owner of usufruct to extract it himself, or to transfer its ownership to
another, unless such transfer is prevented explicitly by the property’s owner or implicitly by
convention. Thus, if a person establishes his house as a mortmain for housing travelers, a
423
424 CHAPTER 103. PARTIAL OWNERSHIP
103.2.1 Simple loans

The H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that simple loans give the borrower ownership
of the lent property’s usufruct without compensation. Thus, they allowed the
borrower to extract usufruct himself, or to re-lend the property to a third party.
However, they ruled that he is not allowed to lease what he borrowed, since
loans are non-binding (i.e. the lender may recall the property at any time),
while leases are binding. The latter ruling follows from the view that a weaker
contract may not serve as a basis for a stronger one, as well as the fact that
leasing borrowed items may harm their owner.
. anbalı̄s defined simple loans as an uncompensated permis-
¯
sion to use the lent property. Thus, they did not allow the borrower to re-lend
the object of a simple loan to another.
103.2.2 Leases
A lease gives the lessee ownership of the leased property’s usufruct in exchange
for a compensation (called rent or wages). The lessee is thus entitled to extract
the usufruct himself, or to have another extract the usufruct with or without
compensation, provided that usage does not vary with different users. Thus, if
usage does not vary with users, the lessee is allowed to sublease the property
even if the lessor forbids him to. In contrast, the lessor’s permission is necessary
if usage varies with users.
103.2.3 Mortmains
When a property is established as a mortmain (waqf), it becomes impossible
for anyone to own, and its usufruct is given to a named group of individuals.
Thus, the named individuals in a mortmain are given ownership of its usufruct.
Those individuals may thus extract the usufruct themselves, or to give others
the right to extract usufruct if that is not disallowed in the mortmain contract
or convention.
103.2.4 Bequeathed usufruct

If someone is given the usufruct of a property in a will, he is only entitled to
the usufruct named in the will. In this regard, the recipient of such a right
traveling student may only live in that house, but may not transfer that right to others. The
same applies to rights to usufruct of public properties, which may not be transferred or sold.
This is the opinion that has been enacted in civil laws.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s distinguished between the right to use a property and
ownership of its usufruct. Thus, they ruled that ownership of usufruct gives the owner the
right to extract the usufruct himself, or to transfer it to another with or without compensation.
In contrast, they ruled, the right to use a property is simply a license to the person to use
it, be it a public property or a private one. In the latter case, the person with the public
license or private permission to use a public or private property, respectively, is not allowed to
transfer that right to another. Thus, they ruled that ownership of usufruct is more general,
c.f. Al-Qarāfı̄ ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.18, diff.#30), and ’Ibn Al-Qayyim’s Badā’ic Al-Fawā’id.
103.2. PERSONAL USUFRUCT OWNERSHIP 425
may extract the usufruct himself, or allow another to extract it with or without
compensation if the will allows him to lease the property.
103.2.5 Permission
A person may be given permission to use a property. Examples include permis-
sions to eat various foods, general permissions to use public roads and gardens,
etc. They also include private permissions to use the property of a person, e.g.
ride his car or live in his house.
We have seen that the H . anafı̄s consider a permission to use a property to
be tantamount to ownership of its usufruct, while the Mālikı̄s view it as a
limited permission for the person himself to use the property. Regardless of
this distinction, all jurists agree that if a person is given permission to use a
property, he may not transfer that right to another through loans, permissions,
or other means.
The distinction in this regard is that ownership gives the owner the right
to deal in what he owns unless there is a legal impediment, while a personal
permission to use some property is simply that. Thus, jurists agree that a
permission to use a simple thing (’ibāh.ah) does not entail ownership of the
property or its usufruct.
Personal usufruct ownership

We now list some of the most important characteristics of partial ownership in
the form of a personal right to use some property:
1. At its inception, partial ownership may be restricted spatially, temporally,

and in characteristics, in contrast to total ownership which may not. Thus,
if a person lends his car to another, he may restrict the time and distance
for which the lender may ride the car, and he may specify who is entitled
to ride in the car to the exclusion of others. Similarly, if a person gives
the usufruct of his house in his will, he may specify a time period for that
right.
2. The H . anafı̄s ruled that partial ownership cannot be inherited, since they
only allow existent properties to be inherited, and they do not consider
usufruct to be a property. In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄s allow the remain-
ing period of usufruct to be inherited, since they consider usufruct to be
property. Thus, the latter ruled that if a person was given the right to live
in a house for one year, and died after six months, his heirs are permitted
to live in the house for the remainder of the year. The non-H . anafı̄ rulings
in this regard seems to be more appropriate, since he agreed that usufruct
is a form of property.
3. The person with a right to usufruct has the right to receive the property,
even if its owner must be forced to give him access to it. Once received,
the property is considered to be in a receipt of trust. Thus, the receiver
must protect the property the way he protects his own property, and he
must guarantee it only against his own transgression or negligence.
4. If the extractor of usufruct does not pay a compensation for the usufruct
(e.g. as in a simple loan), then he must bear the property’s expenses. On
the other hand, if he pays compensation for the usufruct (e.g. as in a
lease), then the owner is responsible for the property’s expenses.
5. Once the usufruct is extracted, the property’s user must return it to its
owner upon the latter’s request, unless that return would harm the user.
For instance, if agricultural land is leased or borrowed, then the farmer
may keep the land until harvest time. However, in the latter case, the user
of the land is responsible to pay the market rental value of similar land to
the owner.
Expiration of the usufruct extraction period

We have seen that the right to extract usufruct is temporary. In what follows, we
enumerate the conditions that usher the termination of the usufruct extraction
period:
1. A pre-specified period of rights to the property’s usufruct may expire.
2. The property from which usufruct was to be extracted may perish or
be otherwise damaged in a manner that prevents extraction of usufruct.
Examples of such cases include the destruction of a house or increased
salination of the soil of agricultural land. If such destruction is caused by
the owner’s transgression, then he is responsible to provide an alternative
property.
3. The H . anafı̄s ruled that permission to extract usufruct expires upon the
death of the permitted party, since they did not allow usufruct to be
inherited.
4. If the usufruct is given through simple loans or leases, then the H . anafı̄s
ruled that the right to extract usufruct expires upon the death of the
property’s owner. In the case of simple loans, this ruling follows from the
fact that loans are voluntary contribution contracts, which thus expire
upon the death of the contributor. In the case of leases, they ruled thus
based on the fact that ownership of the leased property is transferred to
the lessor’s heirs upon his death.
In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that simple loans are non-
¯
binding contracts, and thus the lender or his heirs have the right to termi-
nate it whether or not it was timed. On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s ruled
that timed simple loans are binding contracts. Thus, they ruled that if
a person loaned another an animal to take to a certain location, he may
only retake it after the borrower reaches that location or keeps it for a
customary period of time.
103.3. EASEMENT RIGHTS 427
Consequently, the majority of jurists ruled that simple loans are not ter-
minated upon the death of the lender or the borrower. Similarly, they
ruled that leases do not expire upon the death of the lessor or lessee, since
leases are binding contracts, like sales.
On the other hand, if the right to extract usufruct was obtained through
a will or a mortmain, then all jurists agree that the right does not expire
upon the death of the will-writer or the mortmain-establisher. In the case
of wills, the ruling follows from the obvious fact that the will only becomes
effective upon the will-writer’s death. In the case of mortmains, they are
either perpetual, in which case they never expire, or they are timed, in
which case they only expire at the specified time.
103.3 Easement rights

An easement right (h.aqq al-’irtifāq) is a right associated with one immovable
property (c aqār) and assigned to another immovable property belonging to an-
other owner. It is a permanent right as long as both immovable properties exist,
regardless of owners. Such rights include the right to water (al-shirb), the right
¯
to water-flow and drainage (al-majrā and al-ması̄l), the right of passage, the
right of neighboring, etc. In what follows, we shall discuss those specific rights
in some detail.
103.3.1 Water rights

Water rights include the right for a specific amount of water to irrigate land and
crops, or for human and animal drinking as well as domestic uses. With regards
to those water rights, water can be classified into one of four categories:2
1. The waters of major rivers such as the Nile, the Tigris, the Euphrates,
etc. are available for anyone to use personally or for his animals and land,
provided that his usage does not harm others. This ruling is based on the
two H . adı̄th s: “People are partners in three: water, public pastures, and
¯
fire”, and “No harm to others is allowed”.
2. For the waters of private rivers and streams, everyone is allowed the right
of personal drinking and providing drinking water for his animals. How-
ever, parties other than the river or stream’s owner are not afforded the
right to use them for watering their land without the owner’s permission.
3. The same ruling for private rivers applies to privately owned springs and
wells. If the owner of a spring or well prevents people from drinking and
allowing their animals to drink from his water, they have the right to fight
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.188 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.888, p.144),
. .
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.339), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.255), ’Ibn Qudāmah
¯ ¯ ¯
(, vol.5, p.531).
him for the water if they cannot find other nearby sources of drinking
water.
4. In contrast, nobody has a right to owned waters that are put in special
containers (such as tanks, bottles, etc.) without the owner’s consent.
This ruling follows from the Prophet’s (pbuh) prohibition of selling water
unless it was possible to carry (i.e. in a container). On the other hand, if
a person is in dire need of such waters and would die of thirst otherwise,
he may take whatever he needs, even by force if necessary. This ruling
follows from the general rule that “necessity does not overrule the rights
of others”. However, if the person takes the owner’s water in this case, he
must pay him a compensation for its market value.
103.3.2 Water-flow rights

The owner of a land that is far from water sources has a right to run water
from the source to his land through the lands of others. The owners of land
between the water-source and the ultimate user do not have the right to block
the water-flow to the land of the latter. If a land-owner tries to block water-flow
to his neighbor, he may be forced to remove the blockage to prevent harm to
his neighbor.
103.3.3 Drainage rights

Similarly, a land owner has a right to run drainage (excess or used water) over-
land or in pipes through the land of his neighbors. The rulings for drainage
(water-outflow) rights are the same as those for water-inflow rights. Thus
landowners may not prevent their neighbors from running their drainage through
their land to avoid their apparent harm.
103.3.4 Passage rights

If the owner of a piece of land needs to pass through a public or private road to
get to his land, then he has the passage right in both cases. Thus, the owners
of private roads that are necessary for the passage of others are not allowed to
block others from their use.
103.3.5 Neighboring rights

Neighboring rights may pertain to the upper neighbor on his lower neighbor, or
may pertain to side-neighbors on one another.
In this regard, the upstairs neighbor has a permanent right on his downstairs
neighbor. This right does not perish even if the entire building is destroyed or
the lower part is destroyed. Thus, the upstairs neighbor and his heirs have the
right to rebuild the building whenever they wish. Moreover, both the upstairs
and the downstairs neighbors are forbidden from dealing with their portion of
the building in a manner that harms the other.
103.4. MORE ON EASEMENT RIGHTS 429
In this regard, if the lower floors of a building were destroyed, their owners
are responsible to rebuild them, and may be legally forced to do so. If they
refuse to build the lower floors, then the owners of the upper floors may rebuild
them with the downstairs neighbors’ or the judge’s permission, and may then
demand reimbursement for the rebuilding expenses. On the other hand, if the
upstairs neighbor rebuilds the lower floors without permission, he may only
demand reimbursement for the value of the building after it is finished, rather
than for his actual expenses, since he was not in this case an agent to spend on
rebuilding.
In comparison, a side-neighbor only has the right that his side-neighbor does
not take any actions that cause him obvious and significant harm. Such obvious
and significant harms include those that would prevent the principal use of the
building (e.g. for residence), or those that constitute a structural damage to the
building.
Thus, we see that all harmful neighbor actions are forbidden. However, some
actions in vertical neighborhood may or may not be harmful (e.g. opening a
window or door in the lower floor, or putting heavy furniture in the top floor).
Jurists have differed with regards to such potentially harmful neighbor actions:3
• ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that such possibly harmful actions are forbidden unless
the neighbor approves them. He based this ruling on the view that the
default is prohibition of dealings in one’s property to which the rights of
others are attached, since his ownership is not unadulterated. Thus, he
ruled that the neighbor is only allowed to take actions that are known to
cause no harm to his neighbor, and all other actions require the neighbor’s
consent. This is the accepted opinion among the later H . anafı̄s.
• In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the default is per-
missibility of the dealings of a neighbor, unless the dealing is known to
be harmful to the neighbor. This seems to be the more appropriate and
logical ruling. Thus, according to this ruling, all neighbors, vertical or
horizontal, have equal rights of dealing with their property in any manner
that is not obviously and significantly harmful to their neighbors. Then,
if the action were to result in a harm to the neighbor, the transgressor
is required to compensate his neighbor for the damage he caused directly
or indirectly. This is also the opinion of the Mālikı̄s and other schools of
jurisprudence.4
103.4 More on Easement Rights

In this final section of the chapter, we shall discuss three issues related to ease-
ment rights:
3 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.503), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.373), Al-Kāsānı̄
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.264), ’Ibn Nujaym (1334H H . anafı̄, vol., p.32), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurispru-
dence), vol.4, p.186).
4 Al-Bājı̄ Al-’Andalusı̄ (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.6, p40 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄),
p.341), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.261).

¯
103.4.1 Easement vs. personal usage rights

Easement rights differ from the personal right to extract usufruct in four aspects:
1. Easement rights are permanently attached to immovable properties, and

thus reduce the value of properties to which they are attached. In con-
trast, the right to personally use a property may be associated with an
immovable object (e.g. leased or borrowed real estate) or a movable object
(e.g. in lent books or leased cars).
2. Most easement rights pertain to immovable objects, with the exception of

neighborhood rights which may pertain to an individual or a moving ob-
ject. In contrast, rights to usufruct always pertain to a specific individual,
specified by his name or characteristics.
3. Easement rights are permanently attached to the immovable object, re-

gardless of the multiplicity or succession of owners. In contrast, we have
seen that rights to usufruct are temporary.
4. All jurists agree that easement rights are inherited. Even the H . anafı̄s
accept this ruling despite their ruling that it is not property, since they
still recognize it to be attached to the immovable property. In contrast,
we have seen that jurists differed in opinion regarding the eligibility of
rights to usufruct for inheritance.
103.4.2 Special rulings for easement rights

There are general rulings and specific rulings for easement rights. The specific
rulings for each easement right will be discussed in great detail in later sections
devoted to each of them.
The general ruling pertaining to all easement rights is permanency as long
as it does not cause harm to others. However, if easement rights are found
to cause harm to others, then they must be removed. Thus, drainage rights
may be overruled if filthy drainage harms travelers on a public road. Similarly,
drinking rights may be overruled if they harm one or more of the beneficiaries.
Also, passage rights through public roads may be overruled if the driver of a
vehicle over-speeds or does not follow traffic regulations. Thus, the right of
passage through public roads is constrained by the condition of public safety
to the possible extent.5 This general ruling is again based on the H . adı̄th : “No
¯
harm to others is allowed” (lā d.arara wa lā d.irār).
103.4.3 Origins of easement rights

Easement rights may originate in many different ways, among which we enu-
merate three:
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.427).
103.4. MORE ON EASEMENT RIGHTS 431
1. Joint access: All immovable properties close to public roads, rivers, or

sewages, have established passage, watering, and drainage rights, respec-
tively. This ruling follows from the fact that such usufruct of the public
properties are shared by all individuals, and thus they all should be given
access thereof as long as no harm is done to others.
2. Stipulation in a contract: If a seller stipulates as a sale condition that

the buyer must give him passage access or watering rights in the sold land,
such rights will be established by virtue of the stipulated condition.
3. Status-quo: If an easement right is known to exist for some immovable

property (e.g. watering or drainage rights for an agricultural plot of land
with regards to its neighboring plot), then it is assumed to have originated
legally unless proof can be provided to the contrary. This ruling is based on
the assumption that the status-quo is legally valid unless proven otherwise.
Chapter 104
Establishment of Total
Ownership
There are four Islamic Legal means for establishing total ownership: (i) claiming
commonly accessible property, (ii) contracts, (iii) succession, and (iv) derivation
from owned property.1 In civil law, there are six means of establishing total
ownership: (i) claiming ownerless movable or immovable properties, (ii) inher-
itance, (iii) naming in a will, (iv) adherence to immovable or movable objects,
(v) contracts, and (vi) possession through status-quo.2
Those means of acquiring ownership agree with Islamic Legal principles,
with the exception of the notion of acquiring ownership through possession of
a property for a long time. In this regard, Islam only recognizes statutes of
limitations as a reason for not legally considering a claim of property that has
been in the possession of another for a long time, for reasons of legal expediency
and to avoid difficulties and suspicions regarding the distant past. However, the
original ownership rights remain intact, and religious responsibility thereof does
not have any statue of limitations.
Similarly, Islamic jurisprudence does not require the passage of time without
claiming one’s property as legal proof of dropping ownership rights. Indeed, if
that were the case, usurpers and thieves could become owners after a sufficiently
long time period, which would defy Islamic notions of justice. However, ’Imām
Mālik is reported in Al-Mudawannah to have ruled, in disagreement with most
of his colleagues, that possession for a long time period can drop ownership
rights and/or establish new ones. In this regard, he did not specify the length of
possession necessary for that ruling to take effect. Rather, he left its specification
to the ruler, who may choose to base his ruling on the incompletely transmitted
H. adı̄th narrated on the authority of Zayd ibn ’Aslam: “Whoever is in possession
¯
1 Note that Al-Majallah (item #1248) only mentioned the first three reasons listed in the
beginning of this chapter, but it was necessary to add the fourth one, since it is independent
of the other three.
2 c.f. the second chapter on origination of ownership rights, items #828,836,876,879,894,907
onwards in Syrian civil law.
433
434 CHAPTER 104. ESTABLISHMENT OF TOTAL OWNERSHIP
of the property of another for ten years becomes more worthy of that property”.3
Moreover, if a property becomes physically adherent to another due to heavy
rains, flooding, or sandstorms, the adherence is considered a natural increase in
the property. Thus, it is accepted under the category of “derivation from owned
property”.
104.1 Claiming ownerless property

ownerless property may be eligible for ownership, e.g. water in its spring, trees
and tree-wood in the ownerless land, wild animals, and fish in the sea. Claiming
ownership of previously ownerless property is characterized by the following:
1. It is the only means of establishing ownership of previously ownerless prop-

erty. All other means of acquiring ownership involve transfer of ownership
from one party to another.
2. It takes place through taking physical possession of the previously owner-

less property, without need for language. Thus, any individual, including
those who lack eligibility to conduct contracts (e.g. children, the insane,
and the interdicted), may acquire ownership of property thus. In contrast,
acquiring ownership through contracts and their necessary language may
not be possible, or may be suspended pending the approval of another
person, depending on eligibility.
There are two conditions for claiming ownership of previously ownerless

property:
1. No other Muslim should have owned that property, since the legality of this
form of acquiring ownership is based on the H
. adı̄th : “Whoever possesses
¯
a property that no Muslim possessed before, it is thus his”.
2. Possession of the previously ownerless property must be taken with the

intent of acquiring ownership. Thus, if the person takes possession of such
property unintentionally (e.g. if a bird accidentally becomes trapped in
his property), he is not considered its owner. For instance, if a person
spread a net with the intent of hunting, then he owns whatever it traps,
but if he spread it with the intent of drying it, then he is not considered
to own its catch. This ruling follows from the general rule: “affairs are
judged based on intent”.
There are four ways of acquiring previously ownerless property, which we

shall discuss in some detail:
3 See
the study Al-H. iyāzah wa Al-Taqādum fı̄ Al-Fiqh Al-’Islāmı̄ by Dr. Muh.ammad
c Abdul-jawwād
(pp.18, 50 onwards, 60, 108, 150 onwards), based on references such as Al-
Mudawwanah (vol.13, p.23), Al-Shaykh c Elı̄sh ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.362 onwards).
¯ ¯ ¯
104.1. CLAIMING OWNERLESS PROPERTY 435
104.1.1 Land reclamation

Wasteland or uncultivated land (al-’ard. al-mawāt) that qualifies for this cate-
gory must be uncultivated land that is not owned or utilized by anyone, and
that lies outside urban areas. Thus, this category excludes lands within the
perimeters of a town, or external lands that are utilized as grazing grounds.
The majority of jurists ruled that reclaiming wasteland, with or without
official permission, results in ownership based on the H . adı̄th : “Whoever revives
¯
wasteland owns it”. In contrast, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Mālik ruled that a legal
permission is required for land reclamation to result in ownership. In this regard,
land reclamation may involve making it useful for agriculture, e.g. by digging
a well, or for construction. Jurists specified the period allowed for a person to
reclaim a piece of land and own it based on the statement of c Umar (mAbpwh):
“A land reclaimer has no rights if he has not reclaimed the land after three
years”.
104.1.2 Hunting
Hunting may refer both to taking physical possession of a captured animal, bird,
or fish, or through virtual capturing by means of nets or trained hunting animals
and birds.4 Hunting of all its forms is permissible to man as long as he is not
in a state of ritual purity for pilgrimage, and as long as he does not hunt in the
holy mosques of Makkah and Madı̄nah. The latter ruling follows from the verse:
“Lawful to you is the pursuit of water game and its use as food for yourselves
and travelers; but forbidden is the pursuit of land-game as long as you are in
the sacred precincts or in pilgrimage garb” [5:96].
Hunting results in ownership provided that it takes effect through physical
capturing, or through virtual capturing with the intention of gaining ownership.
Thus, as we have seen, animals, birds, or fish caught in one’s net, house, or other
trap is only considered one’s if one entrapped it with the intention of gaining
ownership. Otherwise, if an animal, bird or fish is caught by accident and
without intent of gaining ownership, it would belong to the first person to take
it afterwards with such an intention.
104.1.3 Grass and forests

Grass cannot be privately owned, even if it grows in owned land. Thus, all
people have the right to allow their animals to eat grass in public as well as
private land, and the landowners are not allowed to prevent them thus. This
is the preferred opinion among the four schools of jurisprudence based on the
H. adı̄th : “People are partners in three things: water, grazing grass, and fire”.5
¯
4 In this regard, Allāh (swt) said: “They ask you what is lawful to them (as food). Say:
Lawful unto you are all things good and pure, and what you have taught your trained hunting
animals to catch in the manner directed to you by Allāh: Eat what they catch for you, but
pronounce the name of Allāh over it, and fear Allāh, for Allāh is swift in taking account” [5:4].
5 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.193 onwards), Al-Majallah (item #1257).
.
Thick forest trees in ownerless lands are available to all. Thus, everyone has
the right to take as much wood from such forests as he wishes, and nobody has
the right to prevent others from access to such forests. Thus, whatever a person
takes from such public forests becomes his. On the other hand, the government
may prevent the cutting of trees, or put other restrictions on the use of forests
to preserve natural resources.
In contrast, trees in owned land are not accessible to the public. Such trees
belong to the landowner, and nobody is allowed to take anything from his land
without his permission. In this regard, trees and grass are treated differently,
since land may be bought to gain access to the trees, but jurists argued that
land is never bought to access the grass therein.
104.1.4 Mining and treasure-hunting

H. anafı̄s group minerals in the ground and buried treasures under the name
al-rakāz, which literally means “whatever is underground”. The treatment of
valuable properties in the ground symmetrically whether they are placed there
by Allāh or by the action of man is based on the H . adı̄th : “There is a one-fifth
¯
right in rakāz”.6 The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the term rakāz
¯
only refers to what was buried in the ground in pre-Islamic times, while mac dan
(literally: metal) refers to that which was buried by Muslims.
Rulings for minerals

Jurists have differed in opinion regarding ownership of minerals through physical
possession, and whether or not the state has a right to such minerals if they are
extracted from ownerless land. On the first issue, jurists expressed two opinions
regarding ownership of mined minerals:
• The majority of Mālikı̄s ruled7 that minerals are not owned by those who
take physical possession through mining. They also ruled that minerals
are not automatically owned by the owners of the land under which they
are found. Rather, they ruled that minerals belong to the state, and the
ruler must decide how to deal in it. They based this ruling on the view
that the land was originally owned by virtue of Islamic conquest of the
land, and also on the view that benefit dictates giving the state control of
such minerals.
8
. anafı̄s ruled that minerals are owned by the owner of
• In contrast, the H
the land. They based this ruling on the view that the owner of a land
owns every part thereof. Thus, if minerals are found in public lands, they
belong to the state, but if they are found in private property, then they
6 Narrated by the major narrators of Hadı̄th on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-
. ¯
¯ 7
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.102), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.1, p.486 onwards).
8 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.1, p.61 onwards), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
. . ¯ ¯
p.162), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.3, p.28; vol.5, p.520).
104.1. CLAIMING OWNERLESS PROPERTY 437
belong to the owner. Finally, if minerals are found in ownerless land, then
they belong to whoever found them.
We shall discuss those rulings in greater detail in the chapter on mining-
rights and land distribution. We shall see there that the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that
¯
a land reclaimer owns any hidden minerals therein, and that the H . anbalı̄s
ruled that he would own only the solid minerals therein.
There are also two opinions regarding the government’s rights to minerals:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that whoever mines extractable solid metals such as
gold, silver, iron, copper, and lead, must give one-fifth to the state, and
keep the rest. This follows from the above mentioned H . adı̄th and H
. anafı̄
¯
classification of minerals under rakāz. On the other hand, they ruled
that the miner may keep whatever he finds if he extracts diamonds and
precious stones, coal, or liquid minerals such as crude oil. In this regard,
they argued that the government only deserves a fifth in mercury, but
noting in precious stones and coal that are similar to stones, or in crude
oil that is similar to water.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the government is not entitled to any portion of
¯
extracted minerals. They thus relied on a narrow interpretation of the
H. adı̄th : “A man is not liable for his animal, his well, or his mines on his
¯
property or public property, and there is a right of one-fifth in rakāz”.9
As we have seen, they interpreted rakāz narrowly to mean only buried
treasures of pre-Islamic times, and ruled that there is no right of the
state in minerals, including gold, silver, etc. On the other hand, they
ruled based on the other proofs of Zakāh that minerals are subject to the
proscribed percentages in the Zakāh literature.
Treasure rulings
A treasure may have some sign that indicates having been buried by Muslims
(e.g. a written name or Qur’anic verse), have signs that it was buried in pre-
Islamic times (e.g. an idol), or it may contain neither. The early H . anafı̄s ruled
that treasures with no sign to indicate whether it is Islamic or pre-Islamic is
automatically assumed to be pre-Islamic, while the latter H . anafı̄s ruled that the
default ruling after many years of Islam renders a treasure of unknown source
to be Islamic.
The H. anafı̄s ruled in this regard that Islamic treasures belong to their own-
ers, and thus ownership is not transferred to whoever finds it. Instead, it is
considered a luqat.ah (lost and found). Thus, whoever finds an Islamic treasure
must announce that he found it. Then, if the owner is found, it must be given
to him, otherwise, it must be given as charity to the poor.10 In contrast, the
9 Narrated by the six major narrators of Hadı̄th on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f.
. ¯
Al-H. āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.2, p.380), Sharh. Muslim (vol.11, p.226).
¯
10 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.207), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H ¯
. . anafı̄), vol.6, p.202), Al-Sarakh
¯
sı̄
(1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.11, p.4), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.351).
.

. anbalı̄s ruled that one is allowed to own and benefit
¯
from a found Islamic treasure. However, they ruled in this case that if the trea-
sure’s Muslim owner is found, the one who consumed his treasure is required to
compensate him.11
On the other hand, the major scholars of all schools agreed that one-fifth of
any found pre-Islamic treasury must belong to the Islamic (or state) treasury.
However, they differed in opinions regarding the other four-fifth. Thus, some
ruled that the rest belongs to whoever found the treasure, whether or not the
land wherein it was found was owned. Others ruled that the finder only keeps
the rest if he found the treasure in previously ownerless land or land that he
reclaimed, otherwise the rest of the treasure must belong to the first owner of
the land, or to his heirs if they can be found, or else it must all be given to the
treasury.
In this regard, Syrian civil law (item #830) gave three-fifths of any found
treasure to the owner of the land or building wherein it is found, one fifth to
the one who found it, and one-fifth to the state treasury.
104.2 Ownership-transferring contracts

Perhaps the most important and most commonly used means of establishing
ownership are contracts such as sales, gifts, wills, etc. There are two types of
obligatory contracts that result directly in ownership:12
1. Obligatory contracts that legal authorities perform on behalf of the owner,

such as selling the property of a debtor to repay his debts, or confiscating
illegal property. In such contracts, the buyer gains legitimate ownership
of the property through an explicit legal sales contract.
2. Obligatory nullification of ownership, which may occur in one of two cases:
(a) Preemption rights: The H . anafı̄s give a partner or adhering neighbor

the right to gain ownership of sold real estate against the will of its
buyer, provided that they compensate him for the price and expenses
that he paid. The non-H . anafı̄s only allowed such preemption rights
to partners, excluding neighbors.
(b) Public appropriations: The state may take possession of privately
owned property in exchange for its fair market price to meet a need
or public benefit (e.g. building a public road, enlarging a mosque,
etc.).
The state thus establishes ownership to a party in such cases based on an

obligatory sales contract.
¯ .
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.430), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.415), ’Ibn
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
12 Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhı̄ Al-c Āmm by Professor Al-Zarqā’ (p.105).
¯
104.3. SUCCESSION 439
Thus, ownership-transferring contracts may be conducted by mutual con-

sent, or they may be obligatory. We have shown that the obligatory sale may
be explicit (e.g. in selling the property of a debtor to repay his debts), or im-
plicit (e.g. in the case of exercising pre-emption rights or public appropriation
of property).
104.3 Succession
Succession ownership may take one of two types:
1. We may have a succession of ownership of the same property, which is in-

heritance (al-’irth). This is an obligatory means of establishing ownership
¯
of the estate of a deceased person for his heirs, as proscribed by Islamic
Law.
2. We may have a succession of properties owned by the same individual,

which is compensation (tad.mı̄n) for destroyed, usurped, or adversely af-
fected property. This category includes compensations for various crimes,
wherein the transgressor must compensate the transgressed-upon by giv-
ing him ownership of some property.
104.4 Derivation from owned property

The owner of a property automatically becomes the owner of all new properties
that are derived from it, whether the derivation of the new property from the
old resulted from the owner’s actions, or by natural causes. Thus, fruits belong
to the owner of the tree, offspring belongs to the owner of the animal, and milk
and wool of sheep belong to their owners (even if the owner’s property was
usurped at the time).
On a controversial issue, the non-H . anbalı̄ jurists ruled that if a person
usurped land and planted a crop therein, then he owns the crop, which is viewed
as derivative of the seeds that he owned. Thus, they ruled that he would own the
crop, but must pay the owner of the land the market rental rate, and guarantee
for the latter any diminution in the land due to growing his crop. In contrast,
the H. anbalı̄s ruled that the owner of the usurped land owns the crop, based on
the H. adı̄th narrated by the five major narrators with the exception of Al-Nasā’ı̄
¯
on the authority of Rāfic ibn Khudayj that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Whoever
¯
plants a crop in a people’s land without their permission, he has no valid claim
to the crop, but he may be compensated for his expenses”. Al-Bukhārı̄ rendered
¯
this a good (h.asan) H . adı̄th .13
¯
13 Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.318 onwards).

¯
Chapter 105
Is Private Ownership
Absolute?
It is well known that sales, which are contracts legalized to enable the trans-
fer of ownership, are Legally regulated in ways that protect people’s natural
rights regarding their property. Thus, Islamic law ensures that ownership can
only be transferred in an orderly and just manner, avoiding cheating, exploita-
tion, disputes, and unnecessary ignorance and uncertainty. Indeed, the rules
that govern the defectiveness and invalidity of various contracts, thus making
them forbidden in Islam, ensure that such corrupting factors are absent from
ownership-transfer contracts.
This makes it necessary to ask whether private ownership is itself absolute
or regulated in Islamic Law. If it is regulated, what are the constraints on the
rights of owners to deal in their properties and use them in various way.
105.1 introduction
Economic systems through the past century, and into the current one, are usu-
ally classified into capitalist and socialist systems. The capitalist system ac-
knowledges private property rights as well as public property, both for consumer
goods and productive properties. The capitalist system tends to favor individ-
ual freedoms in the economic sphere to the highest level possible. The combined
emphasis on private property rights and individual freedoms has caused capi-
talist systems to generate a large degree of wealth inequality between the richer
groups of society (landowners, investors, etc.) and the poorer ones (farmers,
wage laborers, etc.). The resulting concentration of wealth in a few hands, and
various degrees of monopoly power in markets, became sources of criticism of
this system, which is thus viewed to have failed in providing a better life for all
of humanity. Some countries, thus, went to the other extreme, increasing the
441
442 CHAPTER 105. IS PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ABSOLUTE?
role of states in the economic sphere, and spreading socialist ideals.1

The socialist system adopted by many countries moved closer to the other
extreme, giving the state or community associations ownership of most produc-
tive resources, and limiting individual ownership and economic freedoms.
Thus, the socialist system did not abolish ownership altogether, but limited
private ownership to a small set of consumer products, and limited the rights
of private agents in making economic decisions. The stated goal of this system
was the maximization of social equity and meeting the minimum needs of all
individuals of society in order of importance. However, the implementation of
this system in the Soviet Union proved to be excessively repressive to individual
rights in ownership and economic decision making. Indeed, that is why most
of the world today is drifting closer to the western (capitalist) system that
emphasizes individual rights and freedoms.
The Islamic socio-economic system provides the happy middle between those
two systems. Indeed, it is an independent system, with its own social vision
that strikes a balance between the value and rights of individuals and those
of society. In this regard, Islamic Law recognizes individual private ownership
rights, and gives individuals a high degree of freedom in dealing with and using
their property. Thus, Islam gives the individual many more economic rights
and freedoms than does the socialist system. On the other hand, Islamic Law
also forbids ribā and various forms of monopolistic and exploitative behavior
to much higher degrees than does the capitalist system, thus ensuring a higher
degree of socio-economic equity. Thus, the Islamic system combines the best of
the socialist and capitalist systems, while avoiding their worst traits. However,
we must note that Islam is not derived in any way from either system. Indeed,
it is an independent system that may agree with some of the positive traits of
other systems, only because the architects of those other systems saw some of
the benefits of those points that are shared with the Islamic system.2
105.2 Property and ownership in Islam

We have seen before that H . anafı̄s define property (al-māl) as any good that in-
dividuals like naturally, and can save for some time. We have also seen that the
non-H . anafı̄s defined it as anything with a value according to which it may be
sold, and for which a transgressor must compensate the owner, to the exclusion
of items discarded by all people, as stated by Al-’Imām Al-Shāfic ı̄ (mAbpwh).3
¯
The H . anafı̄ definition renders rights and usufruct non-properties with the excep-
tion of the usufruct of a leased property. In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄ definition
renders usufruct a valued property that may be inherited.
On the other hand, ownership is an exclusive association of an item with
1 See ’Us.ūl Al-’Iqtis.ād by Professor Dr. Muh.ammad H . elmy Murād (pp.151-183).
2 c.f.Al-Fikr Al-’Islāmı̄ Al-H by Dr. Muh.ammad Al-Bahayy (p.387), Shubuhāt H
. adı̄th
¯ ¯ . awla
Al-’Islām by Professor Muh.ammad Qut.b p.27), and Naz.ariyyat Al-’Islām Al-Siyāsiyyah by
Al-Mawdūdı̄ (p.57).
3 Al-Suyūtı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.258).
. ¯
105.3. CONSTRAINING OWNERSHIP 443
an owner who has the right to deal in it in all manners, unless there is a Legal
impediment.4 In reality, all property is ultimately owned by Allāh (swt), as per
the verse: “To Allāh does belong the dominion of the heaven and the earth, and
all that is therein” [5:120]. Thus, when we only call a human being the owner
of a property as a metaphor for being a trustee and vice-gerent in charge of the
property: “And spend out of that whereof He has made you heirs” [57:7].
In this regard, c Urwah (mAbpwh) said: “I bear witness that I heard the
Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) ruling that all land belongs to Allāh, and all humans
are slaves of Allāh, and that whoever reclaims wasteland is most worthy of
owning it”. Thus, man must follow the orders of Allāh (swt) in all dealings
related to his property, since the property is ultimately owned by Allāh (swt)
Himself. In this regard, all humans are equally given the divine gift of the right
to hold private property. However, it must always be remembered that property
is not an end in itself, but a means towards the end of satisfying the needs and
wants of humans.5
In this context, it is noteworthy that never in the history of Islam was the
property of a rich person taken and given to the poor without the consent
of the rich, despite the hardships that were faced by Muslims at some times.
Instead, the Prophet (pbuh) always urged Muslims to spend their property in
charity, and reminded them of rewards in the hereafter to encourage them to
spend. Thus, ’Abū Bakr once gave all of his property in charity, c Umar once
gave half of his wealth, and c Uthmān once funded an entire army with all its
¯
needs, prompting the Prophet (pbuh) to say: “Nothing that c Uthman does in
¯
the future can harm him after what he did today”.6
105.3 Constraining ownership

Some writers have argued that since all property belongs to Allāh, all mankind
are slaves of Allāh, life itself belongs to Allāh, all property - even if associated
by name to one person – must in fact belong to all mankind and be used for
the benefit of all. They based this view on a reading of the verse “It is He who
created for you all things that are in earth” [2:29], as “It is He who created all
things that are in earth for all of you”. Thus, they argued that the main task of
the institution of property is social, and private ownership must be subordinated
to the social objectives of property.7
In this regard, Professor Muh.ammad ’Abū Zahrah said that there is no
objection to saying that ownership is a social function. However, he added, we
must acknowledge that it only became thus by order of Allāh (swt), and not by
4 Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhı̄ by Professor Mus.tafā Al-Zarqā’ (vol.1, p.220).
5 c.f. ¯
’Ishtirākiyyat Al-’Islām by the late Dr. Mus.t.afā Al-Sibāc ı̄ (p.77 onwards), and Al-
¯
Takāful Al-’Ijtimāc ı̄ fı̄ Al-’Islām by Professor Sh. Muh.ammad ’Abū Zahrah (p.14 onwards).
6 c.f. “Al-Milkiyyah Al-Fardiyyah fı̄ Al-’Islām” by Professor Muhammad c Abdullāh Kanūn,
.
published in the Proceedings of the First Conference of Al-’Azhar’s Majmac Al-D . amānāt Al-
c
Buh.ūth (p.186). The H . adı̄th of Uthmān may be found in ’Ibn H

c
. ajar (, p.278).
¯
7 c.f. ¯ ¯
Sh. Mah.mūd Shaltūt’s article in the newspaper Al-Jumhūriyyah (Dec. 22, 1961
¯
C.E.), as well as Al-Sibāc ı̄ (op. cit., p.80).
order of political rulers, who are not always just.8 However, I think that Islam
has a clear system, and borrowing such socialist-communist-Marxist terminology
unfairly pushes Islam into the arena of Marxist thought, and includes an implicit
denial of the natural right to private ownership.
Thus, I would not say that ownership is a social function, since the individual
owner is not simply an agent of society. I would rather say that ownership has
a social function as well as a private function, since the individual in Islam
cares both for his individual benefit as well as for social benefits. Indeed, Islam
vehemently protects the natural urges for individuals to own property for their
own good, but regulates their ownership and dealings to protect social benefits
while satisfying the natural individual urges.
In other words, Islam neither forbids private ownership, nor allows it to exist
unconstrained. In this regard, Allāh (swt) said: “O you who believe: Eat not up
your property among yourselves in vanities, but let there be among you traffic
and trade in good will” [4:29], “And in their wealth and possessions are rights
of the needy” [51:19], “Allāh has bestowed his gifts of sustenance more freely on
some of you than on others” [16:71], and “That is the grace of Allāh which He
will bestow on whom he pleases” [5:54]. In this regard also, the Prophet (pbuh)
said: “A Muslim is forbidden from taking another Muslim’s blood, property,
or honor”.9 He also said (on the day of the farewell pilgrimage): “Your blood
and property are as sacredly protected among you as the sacredness of this city
and this month”,10 and “It is not permissible to take the property of a Muslim
without his consent”.11
Thus, it is forbidden to transgress on private property that is acquired
through legal means, and the Prophet (pbuh) said in this regard: “Whoever
commits an injustice equal to one foot of earth, Allāh will put around him a
chain the length of seven earths”.12
Consequently, Islam stipulated various punishments for theft, usurpation,
cheating, and other injustices, and ordered transgressors to compensate the
owners of damaged properties.
However, the state has a right to intervene, confiscate, and return illegally
acquired properties to their rightful owners, whether those properties are mobile
or immobile. Indeed, that is what c Umar (mAbpwh) did when some of his
governors gave him some property that did not belong to them. Thus, he
returned those properties to protect society and to avoid having his governors
8 Al-Takāful Al-’Ijtimāc ı̄ fı̄ Al-’Islam (op. cit., p.23).
9 Narrated by Muslim and others on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-Targhı̄b wa
Al-Tarhı̄b (vol.3, p.609 onwards). ¯
10 Narrated by Muslim, ’Abū Dāwūd, and Al-Nasā’ı̄ on the authority of Jābir ibn c Abdullāh,
c.f. Jamc Al-Fawā’id by ’Ibn Sulaymān Al-Ridwānı̄ (vol.1, p.474).

11 Narrated by Al-Dāraqutnı̄ in his Sunan as “Nobody is allowed to take his brother’s prop-
.
erty without his consent”. It was narrated in many different forms, including those by Al-
H. ākim and ’Ibn H . ibbān in their S . ah.ı̄h.s on the authority of ’Abū H . amı̄d Al-Sā idı̄ as “Nobody
c
is allowed to take even the stick of his brother without his consent”, c.f. Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4,
¯
p.171), Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.169), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing,
¯
vol.3, p.60), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.152).
12 Agreed upon¯ by Al-Bukhārı̄, Muslim, and ’Ahmad on the authority of c A’isha, c.f. Al-
¯ . ¯
¯
105.3. CONSTRAINING OWNERSHIP 445
acquire riches in this manner.13 Thus, true ownership may be only acquired
through legitimate and legal means.
The state is also allowed to limit or eliminate legally acquired private owner-
ship rights if equity and social benefits dictate it. Thus, the state may put limits
on the rights of owners (e.g. who acquire property through land reclamation)
at the inception of ownership. It may also confiscate legal private property and
pay a fair compensation for it to meet social needs of the Muslims.14
In this regard, jurists are in agreement that political rulers may limit own-
ership rights if he finds that beneficial to society. Once such orders are issued,
their violation is considered religiously forbidden, since Allāh (swt) said: “O you
who believe: Obey Allāh, obey his messenger, and obey those charged with au-
thority among you” [4:59]. In this regard, ’Ibn c Abbās and ’Abū Hurayrah said
that those charged with authority in politics are the political rulers, governors,
princes, etc. Al-T.abarı̄ also found this ruling to be correct.
As an example of rulers who intervened to alter ownership rights, it was
narrated by Muh.ammad Al-Bāqir on the authority of his father c Alı̄ Zayn Al-
c
Ābidı̄n that he said: “Samurah ibn Jundub owned palm trees in an orchard
owned by one of the ’Ans.ār, and he used to enter that man’s orchard with his
family, which upset the ’Ans.ārı̄. The latter thus complained to the Prophet
(pbuh), who ordered the owner of the palm trees to sell them. However, the
man refused to sell it. Then the Prophet (pbuh) ordered him to cut it, but he
refused. Then the Prophet (pbuh) told him to give it as a gift, and promised
him its equal in paradise, but the man refused again. Then the Prophet (pbuh)
said to the man: ‘You are a nuisance’, and told the ’Ans.ārı̄ to go ahead and
remove the man’s palm trees”.15 Thus, the Prophet (pbuh) did not respect
ownership rights that harmed others, and he is (pbuh) the one who ruled in
easement rights that “No harm is allowed”.16 In this regard, we also cite the
narration by ’Abū Hurayrah that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “A neighbor should
not prevent his neighbor from erecting a beam in his wall”.17 Moreover, it is well
known that Islam legalized preemption rights to prevent harms and maximize
social and individual benefits.
Another instance is narrated by ’Imām Mālik in Al-Muwat..ta’ A man by the
name of Al-D . ah.h.āk ibn Kh alı̄fah wanted to dig a ditch through the land of
¯
Muh.ammad ibn Maslamah, and asked c Umar ibn Al-Khat.t.āb for permission to
¯
13 See ’Ibn H . ajar (, p.254).
14 See “Al-Milkiyyah Al-Fardiyyah wa Tah.dı̄diha fı̄ Al-’Islām” by Professor c Alı̄ Al-Khafı̄f
¯
in the proceedings of the first conference of Majmac Al-Buj.ūth Al-’Islāmiyyah (pp.113, 128
¯
onwards).
15 ’Abū Yac lā ((Hanbalı̄), p.285).
.
16 Narrated by Mālik in Al-Muwatta’ with an incomplete chain on the authority of c Amr
..
ibn Yah.yā on the authority of his father, and also narrated by ’Ah.mad in his Musnad and
’Ibn Mājah and Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ in their Sunan on the authority of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy. It
¯
has many chains of narrations that enforce one another. The text of the H . adı̄th : “lā d.arara
¯
wa lā d.irār” refers both to causing harm to others, and to responding to the harm caused by
others with harm of one’s own making.
17 Narrated by Muslim, Mālik, ’Ahmad, and ’Ibn Mājah, c.f. Sharh Muslim. In fact, it was
. ¯ .
narrated by the major narrators of H . adı̄th with the exception of Al-Nasā’ı̄ on the authority
¯
of ’Abū Hurayrah (mAbpwh).
do so. c Umar asked Muh.ammad ibn Maslamah to allow him to dig his ditch to
water his land, but Muh.ammad said no. Then c Umar said: “Do you prevent
your brother from doing something that benefits him and benefits you, since
you too can use the ditch to water your land, and that does not harm you in
any way?”, but Muh.ammad insisted on his rejection and said: “I swear by Allāh
that I will not allow him”. Then c Umar said: “Then, I swear by Allāh that he
will dig his ditch even if he has to dig through your belly”. Then c Umar ordered
18
Al-D. ah.h.āk to dig his ditch, which he did. This instance provides proof that
not only is it important to prevent harming others, but it is also a responsibility
on each Muslim to use his property in a manner that benefits others as long as
he does not have to harm himself by doing so.
The general methodology of determining the boundaries and limitations of
private ownership may be based on the jurist rule: “Necessities override prohibi-
tions”, the rule of maximizing social benefits, and the rule of preventing means
of circumventing the Law. The latter rule may be utilized to prevent property
owners from using them to prevent the rights of Allāh (swt), to spend unwisely
or unlawfully, to cause disputes among people, to exploit others through mo-
nopolies and the like, to deprive society of its output by smuggling it abroad,
etc. The rules may also be used to end extreme poverty, and to confiscate
monies collected through ribā.19 However, it must be noted that confiscations
and other limitations on property rights must only be established as temporary
exceptions whenever the need arises. Such restrictions should not be written
into permanent law, and should not be allowed to go as far as destroying the
principle of ownership of capital.
105.4 Specific ownership constraints

There are three types of constraints on ownership:
1. Constraints meant to avoid harm to members of society.
2. Constraints on certain types of properties that render them ineligible for

private ownership.
3. Society and the state have certain rights towards privately owned proper-
ties.
In what follows, we shall discuss those three types of constraints in some

detail.
18 c.f. Al-Muwatta’ (vol.2, p.218 onwards), wherein there is another similar case with a
..
similar ruling by c Umar.
19 Ribā and monopoly are the two catastrophies that were brought along by exploitative
capitalism. Those two tools gradually collect all wealth in a few hands and deprive others
thereof, c.f. Jāhiliyyat Al-Qarn Al-c Ishrı̄n by Muh.ammad Qut.b (p.278).
¯
105.4. SPECIFIC OWNERSHIP CONSTRAINTS 447
105.4.1 Avoidance of harm

Private ownership rights are restricted by two injunctions:
1. Avoidance of harming others. Indeed, all rights in Islam are constrained

to avoid harming others.
2. Providing benefits to others if that does not cause the owner any harm.20
In this regard, jurists distinguish between four types of potential harm to

others that the use of private property may cause:21
1. Certain harm: If some of the private owner’s uses of his property are
known to cause harm to others, and if the owner is capable of using his
property otherwise in a way that does not harm others, then he is forbid-
den from using it in the harmful manner. This ruling follows from the fact
that an individual harm may be tolerated to avoid a more general social
harm. On the other hand, if use of one person’s private property harms
only one other person, then the owner’s rights have precedence.
2. Likely harm: The same ruling applies to the uses that are known to
cause harm to others, and those that are most likely to cause harm to
others, since most likely circumstances inherit the legal rulings of certain
ones in practical matters.
3. Unlikely but significant harm: Jurists differed in their opinions if

certain uses of the property are likely to cause harm, but such uses are
sufficiently infrequent. The Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled in this case based
on the juristic ruling: “Avoidance of harm takes precedence over securing
benefits”. Thus, the very probability of significant harm is sufficient for
them to forbid the actions that can cause it. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s and
Shāfic ı̄s ruled that use of private property is permissible by default, and
¯
the mere probability of its causing harm is not sufficient proof that harm
will be done. Thus, jurists of the latter two schools did not forbid actions
in this class.
4. Insignificant harm: If the probability of harm is very small, or the

potential harm was minimal, then the default permissibility of using one’s
private property is not affected by the potential of causing harm to others.
105.4.2 Ineligibility for private ownership

Certain types of properties are ineligible for private ownership. For instance,
there are three types of property specified as social property that cannot be
owned by any individual.22 Those three types of property are:
20 Al-Takāful Al-’Ijtimāc ı̄ by Professor Muh.ammad ’Abū Zahrah (p.24).
21 ibid. (pp.64-66).
22 ibid. (p.29 onwards).
1. Public property providing social services, such as mosques, schools, roads,

rivers, charitable mortmains, and others that would not serve their pur-
pose unless they are publicly owned.
2. Properties that exist without human intervention, such as minerals, crude

oil, rocks, water, grass, and fire. Such properties were created by Allāh,
and mankind cannot claim to have helped bring them about. Thus, the
Mālikı̄s ruled that all minerals should be viewed as state property to be
used for public purposes. The H . anbalı̄s ruled similarly but only for easily
accessible or liquid minerals, including salt, water, sulfur, crude oil, and
certain types of gems. On the other hand, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that solid
minerals that require mining are owned by the owner of the land within
which they are found.23 The H . anafı̄ opinions in this regard are very elab-
orate, and the details of which can be found in their books. However,
suffice it here to say that they too gave a big share to the state in most
types of minerals.
The H . anbalı̄ opinion in this regard was summarized by ’Ibn Qudāmah: “In
summary, apparent minerals, which are those that are easily accessible
and beneficial, such as salt, water, sulfur, tar, some medications, crude
oil, rocks and precious stones, and similar minerals, are not owned by
the one who reclaims the land within which they are found. Indeed, it
is impermissible to give private ownership of any such minerals to any
individuals or to prevent Muslims from having access to such minerals,
since that would be harmful and restrictive for them”.24
3. Properties that return to the state, or that are under state su-
pervision: The first category includes lost and found properties that
reach the Muslim treasury, and for which no heirs can be found, following
the rule: “The Muslim treasury is the inheritor of everyone who has no
heir”.
The second category includes agricultural lands captured in Islamic con-
quests, which are considered state-owned like minerals. For such lands
(e.g. those of the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, etc.), whoever controls such
land is not considered to own it completely, but only to own its usufruct.
Since most Muslim lands fit into this category, the state has a right to con-
fiscate such lands whenever necessary. However, if the state confiscates
such property, it must compensate the landowners fairly.
In this regard, it is established in Sunnah that the Prophet (pbuh) made
public and individually inaccessible (h.imā) the area of Naqı̄c in Madı̄nah
and made it a public grazing ground for the horses of Muslims.25
23 ’IbnQudāmah (, vol.3, p.28; vol.5, p.520).
25 Narrated by ’Ahmad and ’Ibn Hibbān on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar. It was also narrated
. .
by ’Ah.mad and ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority of Al-S.ac b ibn Juthāmah, adding that “Only
¯
Allāh and his Apostle can make land sacred or privately inaccessible”. However, Al-Bukhārı̄
¯
has a similar narration in which he stated that the Prophet specified Al-Naqı̄c as h.imā, and
It is also narrated that c Umar (pbuh) specified areas of land between

Makkah and Madı̄nah, known as Al-Rabadhah and Al-Sharaf, similarly as
¯ ¯
public pastures. Then, the owners of that land complained to him saying:
“This is our land, for which we fought prior to Islam, and which we became
Muslims while owning. Why do you make it public?”. Then c Umar bowed
his head and said: “All property belongs to Allāh, and all humans are the
slaves of Allāh. But I swear by Allāh that were I not preparing those
horses for jihad in the way of Allāh, I would not have nationalized a single
square-foot of land”. It appears from this narration that the land thus
nationalized by c Umar was of use to neighboring landowners. However,
he did not hesitate to nationalize those lands for public good.26 This is
a precedent for the contemporary nationalizations of public utilities (e.g.
water and electricity), crude oil wells, transportation roads, railroads and
rivers, and other vital public utilities.
105.4.3 Social rights in private property

Society, or the state, has rights in private properties. Those rights have some-
times been used to destroy financial empires constructed through amassing
wealth to a degree that is abhorable to Islam.27 Thus, the rich must con-
tribute to social welfare by redistributing part of their wealth to the poor, and
contribute to economic stability by contributing to the state. The general social
rights in the private property of the rich may be summarized in the following
categories:28
1. Zakāh: Islam stipulated the Zakāh as an obligation on the rich, to be

collected by the state that may force them to pay it. In this regard, it
is important to answer some journalists who claimed that Zakāh was an
insignificant charity that degrades the receiving poor. In fact Zakāh is a
valid right of the poor, and a religious and legal obligation on the rich, to
be collected from growing and productive properties. The Muslims have
known four main categories of property that are subject to Zakāh:
c Umar specified other areas called Al-Sharaf and Al-Rabadhah similarly, c.f. ’Ibn Al-’Athı̄r
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Jazarı̄ (, vol.3, p.331), Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.171), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.308).
¯
26 ’Abū c Ubayd’s Al-’Amwāl (pp.294-302), ¯
Prof. Al-Khafı̄f’s article “Al-Milkiyyah Al-
¯
Fardiyyah wa Tah.dı̄duha fı̄ Al-’Islām”, op. cit. (p.108).
27 There are many Qur’anic verses that clearly admonish those who amass wealth. Examples
include “Those who horde gold and silver and do not spend it in the way of Allāh, announce
upon them a most grievous penalty” [9:34], “If Allāh were to enlarge the provision for His
servants, they would indeed transgress beyond all bounds through the earth; but he sends
it down in due measure as he pleases” [42:27], “Nay, but man transgresses all bounds when
he feels self-sufficient” [96:6-7], “In order that it may not merely make a circuit between the
wealthy among you” [59:7], “But seek with the wealth which Allāh has bestowed on you the
home of the hereafter. nor forget your portion in this world, but do good, as Allāh has been
good to you, and seek not mischief in the land, for Allāh loves not those who do mischief”
[28:77].
28 See ’Ishtirākiyyat Al-’Islām by Al-Sibāc ı̄ (pp.121, 126 onwards), Al-Takāful Al-’Ijtimāc ı̄
¯
fı̄ Al-’Islām by Professor Muh.ammad ’Abū Zahrah (p.79 onwards).
• Livestock such as camels, cows, and sheep, which use public pastures
for grazing. The appropriate percentages of zakāh from this category
can be found in all books of Islamic jurisprudence.
• The two monies: gold and silver, of which 2.5% percent are taken in
Zakāh. Contemporary paper monies also fit in this category.
• Commercial properties are subject to a 2.5% Zakāh.
• Fruits and plants are subject to a 10% Zakāh if naturally watered,
and subject to a 5% Zakāh if watered artificially.
2. National defense: The state is empowered to collect taxes to finance the
army if the treasury does not have enough resources from its other sources
of funds. Many Muslim jurists ruled thus, including Al-Ghazālı̄, Al-Qarāfı̄,
c c ¯ c 29
. azm, Al- Izz ibn Abdul-Salām, and ’Ibn Ābidı̄n.
Al-Shāt.ibı̄, ’Ibn H
¯
3. Meeting the basic needs of the poor: The state is also a representa-
tive of the poor as well as the rich, and thus may ask the rich to give part
of their wealth to the poor. In this regard, c Alı̄ (mAbpwh) narrated that
the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Allāh has proscribed a portion of the wealth
of the rich sufficient to support their poor. Thus, if the rich allow the
poor to suffer hunger and nakedness, Allāh will punish them severely”.30
The Prophet (pbuh) was also narrated to have said: “If the people of an
area allow one of them to wake up hungry, then Allāh (swt) denounces
them”.31
In this regard, it was also narrated that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “There
is a right in property other than Zakāh”.32 In the same vein, c Umar
(mAbpwh) said: “If I could do it all over again, I would take the excess
wealth of the rich and give it to the poor”.
29 See ’Usūl Al-Fiqh by Dr. Al-Zuhaylı̄ (vol.2, p.765), Al-’Ic tisām (vol.2, p.121), Al-Qarāfı̄
. . .
((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.141), Al-Mustas.fā (vol.1, p.313), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.42), ’Ibn
H. azm (, vol.6, pp.156-9).
30 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ in Al-’Awsat and Al-Saghı̄r, and said that it had one narra-
. . .
tion through Thābit ibn Muh.ammad Al-Zāhid. Al-H ¯
¯ . āfiz. ’Ibn H . ajar said that Th ¯
ābit is a
trustworthy source, whose narrations were used by Al-Bukhārı̄ and others, and the rest of its
¯
narrators are acceptable. It was also narrated with a truncated chain on the authority of c Alı̄,
c.f. Al-Targhı̄b wa Al-Tarhı̄b (vol.1, p.538), Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.3, p.62).
¯ by Al-Hākim and ’Ahmad as “Whoever
31 Narrated ¯
. . hordes food for forty nights has severed
his link with Allāh, and if the people of any area allow one of them to wake up hungry, then
Allāh denounces them”. Its chain of narrators includes ’As.bagh ibn Zayd and Kuthayr ibn
¯ was unknown to ’Ibn ¯
Murrah, the first of whom is controversial and the second of whom H. azm
but known to others. The H . adı̄th was also authenticated by ’Ibn Sa c d, narrated by others,
¯
and used as legal proof by Al-Nasā’ı̄, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.221). It was also narrated
¯
by ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Shaybah and Al-Bazzār.
32 Narrated ¯ by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Fāt.imah bint Qays, saying that the Prophet
¯
(pbuh) followed the statement by reciting: “It is not righteous that you turn your faces
eastward and westward, but it is righteousness that you believe in Allāh and the last day . . . ”
[2:177]. However, he said that this is not the proper chain of narrations, c.f. ’Ibn H . ajar (,
p.177), ’Ah.kām Al-Qur’ān by Al-Jas.s.ās. (vol.1, p.153). It was also narrated by ’Ibn H . azm as
a saying of ’Ibn Umar, Al-Shu abiyy, Muhāhid, T
c c
. āwūs, and others, and said that the only
¯
disagreement with this view is based on the view of Al-D . ah.h.āk ibn Muzāh.im, whom he did
not consider to be an authority.
Consequently, ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.6, p.452 item #725) said: “The rich of
every country are responsible for the wellbeing of its poor, and their ruler
may force them to do so if their Zakāh and other sources of the treasury
were insufficient to support the poor. Thus, the poor must be afforded
sufficient food, clothing for the winter and summer, and lodging to protect
them from rain, heat, sun, and exposure”.33
4. Supporting the extended family: All jurists agree that one is respon-
sible to support needy parents, grandparents, children and grandchildren.
However, jurists differed with regards to supporting extended family mem-
bers, including siblings, uncles and aunts, etc. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s
made it an obligation to support all relatives who are forbidden for mar-
riage, such as siblings, uncles and aunts, and nephews and nieces. The
H. anbalı̄s ruled that one is responsible for the support of any heir, includ-
ing not only brothers and paternal uncles, but also paternal male cousins,
but excluded nieces, maternal uncles, and maternal aunts.
5. S.adaqat al-fit.r: Men are responsible to pay the obligatory charity of

breaking the fast at the end of Ramadan for all dependents, including his
wife, his children, and his servants.
6. Ritual animal sacrifices: ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that one ritual sacrificed
animal is required each year, and all other jurists considered it a confirmed
Sunnah.
7. Pledges and expiatory gifts: Muslims are required to fulfill all their
pledges to spend money in the way of Allāh. They are also required to give
expiatory gifts of food for the poor to atone for various sins and negligence
in religious responsibilities for which such atonement is proscribed (e.g.
lying under oath, separation from one’s wife, breaking the fast before
sunset, copulation during the day while fasting, etc.).
There are many other ways in which Allāh (swt) has urged Muslims to
spend in His way. The state may also use other sources of wealth such
as mortmains and spoils of war to assist the poor. Moreover, the state
may observe economic activities to enforce the Islamic ethical and reli-
gious restrictions on markets, thus prohibiting ribā, monopoly, gambling,
cheating, exploitation, etc.
In summary, some of the Islamic restrictions on private property are legally
binding, while others are ethical and religious in nature. In this regard,
33 ’Ibn Hazm is considered the most socialist Muslim thinker after ’Abū Dharr Al-Ghaffārı̄
. ¯ ¯
(mAbpwh). Indeed, he was among the first to derive legal rules to deal with the problem of
poverty in society, and stipulated that Zakāh was only part of the financial responsibilities of
the rich. Thus, he ruled that the rich are not absolved of their responsibility until poverty is
eradicated, establishing minimum living standards as a right of the poor that may be enforced
by the state, c.f. the paper by Dr. ’Ibrāhı̄m Al-Labbān on the rights of the poor in the wealth
of the rich, published in the proceedings of the first conference of Majmac Al-Buh.ūth Al-
¯
’Islāmiyyah (p.249 onwards).
it must always be remembered that Islam is a full system of life, with

provisions that deal with social problems in every time and place.
Part XVIII
Ownership-Related Topics
453
455
Preliminaries
In this final part, we shall study topics related to ownership in twelve chap-
ters:
1. Land-related rulings.
2. Land reclamation.
3. Minerals, public lands, and land distribution.
4. Easement rights.
5. Crop sharing arrangements.
6. Division and distribution of property.
7. Property usurpation and destruction.
8. Preventing transgression.
9. Found property.
10. Lost property.
11. Prizes and rewards.

12. Preemption rights.
Chapter 106
Land-Related Rulings
Lands under Islamic control may be newly acquired through conquest, or may
have been within Islamic land for some time. In what follows, we study the
rulings pertaining to each case in some detail.
106.1 Conquered land

There are three types of land that Muslims may have acquired: (i) Those con-
quered by force, (ii) those abandoned by their owners, and (iii) those acquired
through a treaty.
106.1.1 Land conquered by force

The majority of Mālikı̄s, the H. anbalı̄s, the ’Imāmı̄ Sh ı̄c ı̄s, and the Zaydı̄s ruled
¯
that ownership of land conquered by force is automatically transferred to the
conquerors. They based this ruling on the view that such lands are properties
the owners of which were defeated. Thus, the defeated owners are no longer
considered its owners, and the lands become ownerless and eligible for ownership
by whoever can gain physical possession. The Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that lands and
¯
movable properties become the property of conquerors upon taking possession
and dividing those properties among themselves. The H . anafı̄s clarified their
ruling in this regard, by stipulating that ownership of the property is only
transferred to the conquerors after the land is physically possessed and made
part of the official “land of Islam”. The above rulings apply to immediately
useful land. In contrast, all jurists agreed that conquered wastelands may only
be owned through reclamation.1
1 Al-Kharshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.128), Al-Dabbūsı̄’s Ta’sı̄s Al-
¯ ¯
Naz.ar (p.57), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.234), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.241), ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition (H . anbalı̄), pp.189,411 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8,
p.422), Al-H. usaynı̄ Al-c Āmilı̄ ((Shı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), vol., p.7), ’Ibn Al-Murtadā (1st edition
.
¯
(Shı̄c ah Zaydiyyah), vol.2, p.215).
¯
457
458 CHAPTER 106. LAND-RELATED RULINGS
However, jurists differed in opinion regarding the division of ownership of

such lands once they are seized:
• Most of the companions of the Prophet (pbuh), the Shāfic ı̄s, and the
¯
Z.āhirı̄s ruled2 that ownership of such lands are transferred to Muslims in
the same manner as other spoils of war. Thus, a fifth must be distributed
according to the verse: “And know that out of all the booty that you may
acquire in war, a fifth share is assigned to Allāh and his Messenger . . . ”
[8:41], and the other four-fifths belong to the booty-winners. However, if
the booty-winners agree to leave the land with or without compensation,
then the ruler may establish them as public mortmain to benefit Muslims.
• The majority of Mālikı̄s and the ’Imāmı̄s ruled3 that such lands automat-
ically become established as public mortmains for Muslims upon being
seized, without need for political orders. Thus, the land does not become
private property for anyone, and their output is to be spent on Mus-
lim armies as well as infrastructure, religious buildings, and other good
sources. However, if the ruler feels that social benefit dictates dividing
such captured lands, then he may do so.
4
• The H. anbalı̄s ruled according to the preferred reported opinion of ’Ah.mad
that the ruler may decide whether to divide the land or to establish it as
a mortmain. If he divides it, then the new owners must pay a permanent
annual kharāj or tax similar to rent. Thus, the land may be subject to
¯
the kharāj tax, which is permanently levied on the land, and payable by
¯
whoever exploits it in any given year.
5
• The H . anafı̄s and Zaydı̄s ruled that the ruler has the option of dividing
the land among Muslims (as the Prophet (pbuh) did in Khaybar, or to
¯
acknowledge its existing owners, who are thus subjected both to the jizyah
tax for non-Muslims, as well as the kharāj tax on the land. In this regard,
¯
’Ibn c Abidı̄n ruled that it is preferable to distribute the land if the Muslims
need it, and preferable to leave it with its existing owners if the land is not
needed, so that it may be available for Muslims at a later time of need.
2 Al-Shāfic ı̄ (, vol.4, pp.103,192), Al-Nawawı̄’s Makhtūt Al-Rawdah (vol.2, #24b), ’Ibn

¯ ¯. . .
H. azm (, vol.7, p.241).
3 Al-Kharshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.128), Al-Mudawwanah (vol.3,
¯ ¯
p.27), Al-H . at.t.āb (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.336), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.148), Al-Kulı̄niy
((Shı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), vol.1, p.626), Al-H . usaynı̄ Al- Āmilı̄ ((Sh
c ı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), vol.4, p.239
¯ ¯
onwards), Al-Sharh. Al-Rad.awı̄ (p.310), Al-Rawd.ah Al-Bahiyyah (vol.1, p.222), Al-Mukhtas.ar
¯ ¯
Al-Nāfic fı̄ Fiqh Al-’Imāmiyyah (p.138).
4 Zād Al-Mac ād (vol.2, p.173), Al-Maqdisı̄’s Al-Sharh Al-Kabı̄r (vol.1, p.538), Al-Muharrar
¯ . .
(vol.2, p.178), ’Ah.kām ’Ahl Al-Dhimmah by ’Ibn Al-Qayyim (p.102).
5 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H¯anafı̄), vol.10, pp.15, 37)], Khusrū (1304H (Hanafı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ .
p.285), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.303), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.3, pp.31,353),
’Ibn Al-Murtad.ā (1st edition (Shı̄c ah Zaydiyyah), vol.2, p.912).
¯
106.1. CONQUERED LAND 459
Proofs
It is clear thus that jurists agree on the permissibility of dividing spoils of war
among the winners, based on the generality of the verse: “And know that out of
all the booty that you may acquire in war, a fifth share is assigned to Allāh and
his Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer . . . ”
[8:41]. Thus, one-fifths of the spoils of war are specified to those mentioned in
the verse, or to the state. All jurists then agree that the remaining four-fifths,
by implication, go to those who captured the booty, since Allāh (swt) referred
to the booty as said: “what you acquired in war” [8:41].
There is further proof in the actions and sayings of the Prophet (bpuh). In
this regard, it is narrated that he (pbuh) said: “If you dwell in a village, then
you should take a stake therein; but if a village disobeys Allāh and messenger,
then one-fifth of its property belongs to Allāh and his messenger, and the rest
is yours”.6 The first village mentioned in the H . adı̄th refers to booty captured
¯
without fighting, while the latter refers to that which is captured by force.
The Prophet’s (pbuh) actions also support this opinion, since it is established
that he divided Khaybar between the winners of booty after it was captured by
¯
force. It is also established, as ’Ibn Al-Qayyim said in Zād Al-Mac ād that he
divided the properties of Banū Qurayz.ah and Banū Al-Nad.ı̄r.7 In contrast,
Madı̄nah was conquered by Qur’ān, and thus its people reverted to Islam and
their property rights were protected. Finally, Makkah was conquered by force,
but the Prophet (pbuh) did not divide its property among the Muslims. Thus,
we have examples of all three types of behavior in the Sunnah of the Prophet
(pbuh).
In this regard, c Umar ibn Al-Khat.t.āb (mAbpwh) said: “I swear by the One
¯
who holds my soul in his hand, that were I not afraid that the wealth of Muslims
will become distributed too unequally, I would divide the booty of every village
among the fighters as the Prophet (pbuh) did in Khaybar.8 Instead, I left it
¯
as a treasure for all Muslims, so that they may divide it among them fairly”.9
c
Thus, Umar chose not to divide the captured lands.
Is the ruler bound to divide the land?

Jurists differed in opinion regarding whether or not the ruler is bound to divide
the land among the winning Muslim fighters, like other booty:
• The Shāfic ı̄s and the Z.āhirı̄s ruled that lands should be divided like other
¯
booty. They ruled thus that there is no difference between movable and im-
movable captured property in the application of the Qur’anic verse [8:41],
6 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Muslim, and ’Abū Dāwūd, c.f. Al-Nawawı̄’s Sharh Muslim (vol.1,
. ¯ .
p.69), ’Abū c Ubaid’s Al-’Amwāl (p.57).
7 Sharh Muslim (vol.12, pp.91,164), c Aynı̄ Bukhārı̄ (vol.15, p.46), ’Abū Dāwūd’s Sunan
¯ . ¯
(vol.3, p.217), Zād Al-Mac ād (vol.2, p.68), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.12).
8 Meaning, if some get spoils of war and others ¯
don’t, thus leading to gross inequality of
wealth; c.f. Fath. Al-Bārı̄ (vol.7, p.395), ’Ibn Al-’Athı̄r’s Al-Nihāyah (vol.1, p.69).
9 Al-Bukhārı̄’s Sahı̄h (vol.4, p.86). ¯
¯ . . .
and the Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh), who divided the booty.10 In this
regard, they ruled that the verse “What Allāh has bestowed on His messen-
ger and taken away from them . . . ” [59:6] apparently refers to properties
that Muslims captured without fighting.
They further ruled that if the ruler chooses not to distribute the land
among the winner fighters, then he should compensate them otherwise
as the Prophet (pbuh) did on the days of H . unayn, Kh aybar, and Banū
¯
Qurayz.ah.11 This prescription is also similar to the action of c Umar
(mAbpwh), who compensated the warriors in the conquest of Iraq, when
he established the conquered land as a public mortmain. This ruling fol-
lows from the fact that winning fighters are entitled to four-fifths of the
booty, and the ruler does not have the authority to void those rights for
immovable or movable property. Thus, if any of the fighters is not satisfied
with his compensation, he is entitled to his share in the land.12
• The majority of the Mālikı̄s, and the ’Imāmı̄s ruled13 that captured land
becomes a mortmain as soon as it is seized, without need for an adminis-
trative decision or compensation for the fighters. They provided as proof
of their opinion the fact that c Umar established the conquered lands of
Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq as mortmains.
• The H . anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the ruler has the option of dividing
the land or establishing it as a mortmain. Thus, they argued that c Umar
exercised his right and chose to make it a mortmain, whereby it is owned
by the Muslims at large (as represented by the state), with its usufruct
alone being owned by those given control over it at any time.
Proofs of the option to establish land as a mortmain

The latter actions of c Umar, and the juristic opinion based on those actions,
are based on the following juristic proofs:
1. The verses [8:41] on spoils of war captured by force, and [59:6] on lands
captured without force, apply to the same topic. In this regard, the latter
verse restricts the ruling of the first to all properties other than land.
With regards to land, the second verse gave the ruler a choice to divide it
or establish it as a mortmain, whichever he deems to be most beneficial
for Muslims. In this manner, one can combine the rulings of both verses,
the first of which dictates giving one-fifths to the state, while the second
dictates dividing among all Muslims without a one-fifths share for the
10 ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.388), Al-Hayth amı̄ (, vol.5, p.340).
11 Narrated¯ ¯
by Al-Bukhārı̄, Al-Bayhaqı̄, and others, c.f. Al-Bayhaqı̄’s Sunan (vol.9,
¯
pp.74,136), Al-Bidāyah wa Al-Nihāyah (vol.4, p.352).
12 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.234), Al-’Imām Al-Nawawı̄/Al-Subkı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.1,p.274).
13 Al-Hattāb (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.366), Muhammad c Elı̄sh (1294H (Mālikı̄), vol.1,
. .. . ¯
p.735), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.387), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.148), Al-H
. usaynı̄
¯
Al-c Āmilı̄ ((Shı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), vol.7, p.6).
¯
state.14 In this regard, most Islamic legal theorists prefer combining the
rulings in two verses to claiming that the latter one abrogates the first, as
some jurists have argued.15
In this regard, the Prophet (pbuh) implemented the ruling in [8:41], while
c
Umar (mAbpwh) implemented the ruling in [59:6], and the Prophet’s
(pbuh) action thus did not negate the validity of c Umar’s. In this regard,
the Prophet’s (pbuh) action was either meant to make the act permissible,
or to make the option that faced c Umar an obligatory one. In this regard,
c
Umar used both verses to infer what his obligation was at the time.16 In
this regard, c Umar said that the verse [59:6] applies to all people to the
day of judgment.17 He also said: “I swear by Allāh that every Muslim has
a right to this property, including shepherds in Aden”.18
Thus, the verse [59:6] is understood to give all Muslims, including one’s
who were not yet born at conquest time, in their rights to the land. Since
those rights would be lost if the land is divided among the fighters, the
Mālikı̄s argued that this is the basis for establishing the land as a mort-
main. In this regard, it must be noted that this is not the type of mortmain
that makes the land ineligible for sale. Indeed, such sales are permissible,
and have been observed in the history of Islam. Moreover, jurists have
agreed that such captured lands can be inherited, while mortmains cannot
be inherited. Those are two among many differences between this type of
public mortmain and other more traditional mortmains.19
2. The Prophet (pbuh) left some villages without distributing its lands, and
he (pbuh) did not distribute the properties of Makkah even though he
captured it by force.20 He also captured many other Arab lands, includ-
ing Banū Qurayz.ah and Banū Al-Nad.ı̄r, but only distributed the land of
Khaybar. Thus, the Prophet (bpuh) established a Sunnah both for divid-
¯
ing the land and for not dividing it, giving later rulers the option to follow
the one action or the other.21
3. The companions of the Prophet (pbuh) approved of c Umar’s choice to leave

the conquered land of Iraq in the possession of its owners, charging them
14 The majority of jurists disagreed with the Shāfic ı̄s and Zaydı̄s, and ruled that there is
¯
no one-fifths share for the state in land captured without force, c.f. ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d
¯
((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.321), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), pp.147,150), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.5, p.106), ’Ibn Al-Murtad.ā (1st edition (Shı̄c ah Zaydiyyah), vol.5, p.443).
15 c.f. ’Ibn RushdAl-Muqaddimāt Al-Mumahhidāt ¯
(vol.1, p.271 onwards).
16 c.f. Al-Durrah ¯ ˘
Al-Yatı̄mah fı̄ Al-Gh anı̄mah, manuscript by Al-Shaykh Al-Fizzārı̄ (#102).
17 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd, c.f. his ¯ ¯ ¯
Sunan (vol.3, p.195), see also Al-Qast.allānı̄ (vol.5,
p.201).
18 Narrated by ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Shaybah and Al-Bayhaqı̄, c.f. the latter’s Sunan (vol.6, p.351).
19 Al-Bājı̄ Al-’Andalusı̄ (1st ¯
edition (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.223 onwards), Zād Al-Mac ād (vol.2,
p.69).
20 As narrated by Muslim in his Sahı̄h, which is the chosen opinion among jurists, c.f. ’Ibn
. . .
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.388).
¯
21 Al-Qastallānı̄’s Sharh Al-Bukhārı̄ (vol.5, p.202), Zād Al-Mac ād (vol.2, p.69), ’Abū Yūsuf’s
.. ¯ . ¯
Al-Kharāj (p.68), ’Ibn Taymiyyah’s Al-Qiyās (p.40).
¯
the jizyah tax for non-Muslims, and charging their land the 10% land tax
for conquered agricultural lands. He (mAbpwh) took those actions in the
presence of the Prophet’s companions, and gave proof from verse [59:6].
Since none of the companions questioned his reasoning and his actions,
that constitutes a consensus (’ijmāc ) among them on the validity of his
choice. In this regard, even the companions who disagreed with c Umar’s
choice initially (including Bilāl and Salmān), later accepted that opinion.22
4. It is also logical that had captured lands been divided in the early days
of Islamic conquests, which lands encompassed most of the known world
of that time, what would be left for later Muslims. Such division of land
would have left the Muslim treasury too poor to support the needs of
Muslims. Thus, c Umar recited [59:6-7], and then said: “Allāh made all
Muslims, including later ones, as partners in such lands. If I were to
divide the land among you, there would be none left for later generations
of Muslims. However, if I keep the land thus, even a poor shepherd in
Sanaa would get his share of this booty in a dignified manner”.
c
Umar also said in support of his opinion: “Those borders required pro-
tection, and those great cities of the Levant, the Arabian subcontinent,
Kufa, Basrah, and Egypt require many armies to protect. How could all
such armies be financed if the land is distributed here today?”. Those
present were convinced by his logic, and thus accepted his opinion.23
It is also logical that dividing the land among the winning fighters would
give them incentive to leave the army and become farmers, thus weakening
the Muslim nation. Moreover, the winning Arab fighters have a compar-
ative disadvantage in farming the land relative to those who have been
farming it, and who have great expertise in matters of agriculture. Thus,
it is more beneficial from the point of economic efficiency to leave the land
to be toiled by its experienced owners.
Thus we have provided many proofs from the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, and
’Ijmāc that the ruler has the option to divide captured lands or to leave it with
its current owners and charge them a kharāj tax. In this regard, both types
¯
of captured lands (those captured by force and those captured without it) fall
in the same category as far as this option is concerned, and should be decided
based on the greater benefit of Muslims, as c Umar (mAbpwh) did.
106.1.2 Abandoned lands

Jurists know this second category of lands, which were captured without force, as
al-fay’, and it includes all properties taken from non-Muslims without fighting or
the threat of war, such as the payments of the jizyah tax, and the one-tenths tax
22 ’Abū Yūsuf’s Al-Kharāj (pp.27,35), Sharh Al-Siyar Al-Kabı̄r (vol.3, p.254), Al-Qastallānı̄
¯ ¯ . ..
(vol.5, p.200), Al-’Amwāl (p.58).
23 Sharh Al-Siyar Al-Kabı̄r (vol.3, p.254), ’Abū Yūsuf’s Al-Kharāj (p.24 onwards), ’Abū
¯ . ¯
c Ubaid’s Al-’Amwāl (p.57), Futūh. Al-Buldān (p.275).
on international commerce.24 The legal status of such properties is transfer of

ownership to the Muslim treasury upon being seized, which the jurists expressed
in terms of establishing the land as a public mortmain for Muslims. The political
ruler must thus make such lands subject to the kharāj tax on its output, which
¯
is tantamount to a rental to be paid by whoever farms the land, be he a Muslim
or covenantor.
This land was established as a mortmain automatically since it is not tech-
nically classified as spoils of war (ghanı̄mah) that are captured by force or the
threat of force. Thus, they are subject ¯ to the verse [59:6] regarding fay’, and
it is considered the property of all Muslims. All jurists agree on this ruling for
immovable properties captured without fighting. The Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s said
¯
that an order from the ruler was still required to establish such captured lands
as a public mortmain, but the majority of jurists did not even require that order
for its establishment.25
The majority of jurists ruled similarly for movable property captured without
force, that the ruler has the option of dividing the booty or establishing it as
a public mortmain. This majority opinion seems to be more valid than the
Shāfic ı̄ opinion stated below. They provided as proof the narration of ’Anas ibn
¯
Mālik that c Umar said: “The properties of Banū Al-Nad.ı̄r were among those
captured without fighting, and the Prophet (pbuh) dealt with them personally,
supporting his family for a year, and using the rest to support the army.26
This statement clarifies that booty captured without force was not subject to
the one-fifth rule. In this regard, the verses [59:6], [59:7] clearly stipulate that
booty captured without force (fay’) is not distributed in the same manner as
that captured with force (ghanı̄mah), as it is well known that the property of
Banū Al-Nad.ı̄r was put under ¯ the exclusive control of the Prophet (pbuh).27
Further proof is provided by the fact that the verse [59:7] further clarifies the
ruling by stating “so that it will not be merely a circuit between the rich among
you”.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that such movable fay’ must be treated the
¯
same as booty captured by force (ghanı̄mah), thus giving one-fifths to the state
¯
and distributing the remaining four-fifths. They based this ruling on the view
that the verse [59:6] dealing with booty captured without force is general, while
the verse [8:41] dealing with booty captured by force is specific. Thus, the two
rulings may be reconciled by restricting the general whenever appropriate.28
24 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.389), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ . . ¯ ¯
p.247), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.5, p.105), ’Ibn Al-Qayyim’s ’Ah.kām ’Ahl Al-Dhimmah (p.106).
¯ ¯
25 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.353), Al-Kharāj (p.23), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A,
. vol.2,
¯
p.175), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.66), Al-Māwardı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.133), ’Abū Yac lā ((H . anbalı̄),
¯
p.132), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.99), Al-Maqdisı̄’s Al-Sharh. Al-Kabı̄r (vol.10,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.542), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.75), ’Abu Al-Barakāt ((H. anbalı̄), vol.2,
p.179).
26 Sharh Muslim (vol.12, p.70). Al-Nawawı̄ said that this statement referred to most of the
¯ .
properties of Banū Al-Nad.ı̄r.
27 ’Ibn Hishām’s Sı̄rah (vol.2, p.337).
28 Zād Al-Ma ¯ c
ād (vol.3, p.220), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.148), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.93).
¯
According to the more correct majority opinion, thus, the ruler has the
option of distributing booty captured without force or establishing it as a mort-
main. In this regard, the ruler must keep special bookkeeping records of booty
thus captured, so that Muslims may be paid from its proceeds monthly or oth-
erwise.29
106.1.3 Lands captured by treaty

The treaty according to which lands are acquired by Muslims determine the
legal status of such lands. In particular, the contract may specify that the land
becomes property of Muslims, or it may specify that the existing owners of the
land keep it (as was the case in Yemen and Al-h.ı̄rah).
If the contract renders the land property of Muslims, then it should become a
public mortmain for Muslims, in analogy to land captured by force and inducted
thus into the land of Islam. This ruling is based on the tradition that the Prophet
(pbuh) conquered Khaybar and agreed with its people that they should toil the
¯
land in exchange for half of its output, implying that the land thus became
property of the Muslims. In this regard, ’Ibn c Umar (mAbpwt) said: “The
Prophet (pbuh) settled with the people of Khaybar that they would get half
¯
of the agricultural produce of the land they toil”.30 It is also narrated that
the Prophet (pbuh) agreed with Banū Al-Nad.ı̄r (who were conquered without
fighting) that they would leave Madı̄nah, and take with them all their camels
and movable properties with the exception of weapons.
Such lands must thus be made subject to the kharāj tax. This tax is thus
¯
permanently attached to the land, so that even if a Muslim were to buy it, he
must still pay that kharāj. All jurists agree on this ruling, viewing the kharāj
¯ ¯
tax as a form of paying rent for the land to the Muslim treasury.31
In the second case, where the contract specifies that the owners of the land
may keep it, jurists agree that Muslims must be bound by those terms of con-
tract. In this case, the original owners of the land may keep it, but the land is
still subject to the kharāj tax, to be paid to the Muslim treasury.32
¯
29 ’Ibn Al-Murtadā (1st edition (Shı̄c ah Zaydiyyah), vol.5, p.442), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
. ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.248).
¯
30 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄, Al-Bayhaqı̄ and ’Abū Dāwūd, c.f. Al-Bukhārı̄’s S ah ı̄h
. . . (vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.105; vol.5, p.140), Al-Bayhaqı̄’s Sunan (vol.6, p.113), and ’Abū Dāwūd’s Sunan (vol.3,
p.357).
31 Al-Mudawwanah (vol.3, p.219), Al-Bājı̄ Al-’Andalusı̄ (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.219),
Al-Kharshı̄ (1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.149), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd print-
¯ ¯
ing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.75), ’Abu Al-Barakāt ((H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.179), ’Ah.kām ’Ahl Al-
Dhimmah (p.106), Al-H . usaynı̄ Al-c Āmilı̄ ((Shı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), vol.4, p.249), Al-H . illı̄
¯ ¯
((Shı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), p.114).
¯
32 Al-Kharāj (p.63), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.3, p.274), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n
c
¯
((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.53), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.175), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.148),
Al-Shāfic ı̄ (, vol.4, pp.103,193), Al-Maqdisı̄’s Al-Sharh. Al-Kabı̄r (vol.10, p.543), ’Ah.kām ’Ahl
¯ ¯
Al-Dhimmah (p.105), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.1, p.467). Note that those
¯
H. anbalı̄ references specify that the kh arāj thus belongs to Muslims. However, Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
¯
printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.686) states that there is no kh arāj on lands that were specified in
¯
a treaty to belong to its original owners (e.g. those of Yemen and H . iyarah), and there is no
kharāj on land reclaimed by Muslims, such as the land of Bas.rah.
¯
106.2. LANDS WITHIN THE ISLAMIC STATE 465
The majority of jurists, and the ’Imāmı̄ Shı̄c ı̄s ruled in this case that kharāj
¯ ¯
is tantamount to a jizyah or tax on non-Muslims. Thus, they ruled that if they
c
revert to Islam, that tax must be dropped, based on the order of Umar ibn
c
Abdul-c Az¯īz that no kharāj will be collected on locals who convert to Islam.33
¯
In contrast, the H . anafı̄s and Zaydı̄s ruled that kh arāj in this case is a type of
¯
penalty, which may not be exercised on a Muslim at its inception, but which
may remain in place if its subject was initially non-Muslim.34
The Shāfic ı̄s and some H . anbalı̄s consider the lands of those subject to a
¯
treaty to keep their land a “land of treaty”.35 In contrast, the majority of
jurists that such lands are considered “lands of Islam”, and its non-Muslim
inhabitants must thus be considered ’Ahl Al-Dhimmah, and subjected to the
¯
jizyah tax for non-Muslims dwelling in Muslim lands.
106.2 Lands within the Islamic state

There are four types of land, according to whether or not the land is owned,
and whether or not the land is useful (e.g., in agriculture or dwelling if owned,
grazing or tree-cutting if ownerless). We shall give a general summary of the
legal rulings of the different types of land in the remainder of this chapter.
106.2.1 Owned useful land

Such lands are protected by the owner’s property rights. Thus, nobody is al-
lowed to use such land or deal in it thereof without its owner’s permission.
106.2.2 Owned wasteland

If owned land loses all access to water, its ownership still remains intact regard-
less of the length of period that passes without its use. Thus, if the owner is
known, has the right to sell it, give it as a gift, leasing it, bequeathing it, etc.
If the owner of such land is unknown, then it is treated like found land the
property status of which is unknown (al-luqat.ah).
Grazing grass that grows in any owned land is accessible to all people, unless
the landowner cut it from the ground. This ruling is based on the aforementioned
H. adı̄th specifying that all men are partners in fire, grass, and water.36 Thus, if
¯
33 Lubāb Al-Lubāb (p.73), Al-Bayhaqı̄’s Sunan (vol.9, p.141), ’Abu Al-Barakāt ((Hanbalı̄),
.
vol.2, p.179), Al-H . usaynı̄ Al- Āmilı̄ ((Sh
c ı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah), vol.4, p.239), Al-H . illı̄ ((Sh ı̄c ah
¯ ¯
’Imāmiyyah), p.114).
34 Al-Talwı̄h c Alā Al-Tawdı̄h (vol.2, p.152), Al-Muntazac Al-Mukhtār (vol.1, p.575).
. . . ¯
35 Al-Māwardı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.133), ’Abū Yac lā ((Hanbalı̄), p.133), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯ .
(H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.75).
36 Narrated by ’Ahmad and ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority of some of the Prophet’s (pbuh)
.
companions. It was also narrated by ’Ibn Mājah on the authority of ’Ibn c Abbās whose
narration also stated that the price for those goods is forbidden. It was also narrated by
al-Al-T . abarānı̄ in his Mu jam on the authority of ’Ibn Umar, and also narrated by others,
c c
c.f. Al-Samarqandı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.3, p.430), Al-H āfiz

. . Al-Zayla c ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4,
. ¯
p.294), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.86).
the landowner cuts grass and stores it, it becomes his, in analogy to the ruling
for bottled water and other accessible properties possessed in containers. This
follows from the other previously mentioned H . adı̄th : “Whoever takes accessible
¯
property that was not taken by any other Muslim thus owns what he took”.37
Ownerless pastures, gardens, and forests have the same legal status as grass.
Other accessible goods such as fish in the sea and birds in the sky also inherit
the same legal rulings.
In contrast, wood and reeds in owned land are not deemed accessible without
the landowner’s permission. This follows from the view that people may buy
forest-lands for the sole reason of owning the wood and reeds therein. However,
it is assumed that land is never assumed to be bought for the sole reason of
owning the grass therein, since such land would normally be bought for agricul-
tural purposes.38 As an exception to the above ruling, jurists stipulated that if
the owner of a land purposefully grew grass and watered it, then it becomes his
private property.
106.2.3 Used and unused wastelands

We have seen that some wastelands are used for grazing and wood-cutting,
cemeteries, etc. inside the city, or nearby. Such lands are not considered waste-
land in the sense of “dead”, and its neighboring users are considered to have a
right to that land. Thus, the ruler is not authorized to give that land to anyone,
lest he thus hurt its users. On the other hand, those users do not have the right
to exclude others from its use, since it is not technically their property. Uses for
such lands within the city or nearby may also include using them as a source
of salt, tar, crude oil, and other useful materials. The demarcation for lands
that are considered nearby and those considered faraway is determined by the
farthest distance that can be reached by voice.
We have also seen that jurists consider land “wasteland” in the sense of
“dead” if they are ownerless lands not near a city or village, are not being used
due to having very little or too much water. ’Abū Yūsuf applied the distance
demarcation in the previous paragraph for determining if the land is far from
cities and villages, but the H. anafı̄s ruled according to the majority view that
distance is immaterial in this case, where the land is not used and not owned by
a Muslim or Dhimmı̄. On the other hand, owned properties are not considered
¯
dead, and those whose owner are considered found (luqat.ah), and given to the
ruler to deal with as he sees fit.
Reclamation of such wasteland may be accomplished by building on it, plant-
ing in it, digging a well, etc., so that it can be of use.39 Wasteland may only
be owned by reclamation, and may not simply be owned by building fences or
37 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority of Samurah ibn Mudarras, and deemed valid
.
by Al-D . iyā’ in Al-Mukh tārah. Al-Baghawı̄ said that this is the only H . adı̄th for which he is
¯ ¯ Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.302 onwards).¯
familiar with this chain of narrators, c.f.
¯
38 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.192 onwards).
.
39 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.194), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.136 onwards), ’Ibn
. .
.
marking it otherwise. However, jurists agreed that by marking land thus, a per-
son may have priority for that land over others.40 This ruling is based on the
above mentioned H . adı̄th that whoever takes a property that was not previously
¯
taken by a Muslim becomes its owner, as well as a similar H . adı̄th that states
¯
that the pilgrimage lands of Minā may be taken for dwelling on a first-come
first-served basis.41
However, if a man marks a land for three years without reclaiming it, then
the ruler may take it and give it to another. In this regard, marking the land is
just a demarcation of its limits, but ownership can only be justified by actual
reclamation. The three year grace period given to a potential land reclaimer is
based on a statement of c Umar to that effect.42 Clearly, such a grace period is
needed since land cannot be reclaimed overnight.
Official permissions for land reclamation
Jurists differed in their opinions regarding the need for official permission to
reclaim land. Thus:
43
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa and the Mālikı̄s ruled that an official permission from the
ruler or his deputy is required for land reclamation. They based this
ruling on the H . adı̄th : “No person is permitted to take something without
¯
his ruler’s approval”.44 Thus, if the ruler does not give his permission, the
land reclaimer does not acquire ownership.
45
• ’Abū Yūsuf, Muh.ammad, the Shāfic ı̄s, and the H . anbalı̄s ruled that land
¯
may be owned upon its reclamation, with or without the ruler’s permis-
sion. They based this ruling on the H . adı̄th : “Whoever reclaims land, it
¯
becomes his; and a transgressor’s sweat does not grant him any right”.46
40 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.138), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid., p.195), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
. .
((H. anafı̄), ibid., p.307), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.70), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.377), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.518,538), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.425).
41 Narrated by ’Ahmad, as well as ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Tirmidhı̄, ’Ibn Mājah, and Al-Bayhaqı̄
. ¯
in the their Sunan on the authority of c A’isha (mAbpwh). It was deemed a good H . adı̄th
¯ ¯
by Al-Tirmidhı̄, c.f. Takhrı̄j ’Ah.ādı̄th Tuh.fat Al-Fuqahā’ by Dr. Al-Zuh.aylı̄ and Al-Muntas.ir
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Kittānı̄ (vol.3, p.442), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.22).
42 Narrated in ’Abū Yūsuf’s¯ Al-Kharāj on the authority of Sac ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyib (p.65),
¯
c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th), vol.4, p.290).
43 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.194), ’Ibn¯Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.136), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
. .
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.309), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.69).
44 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ on the authority of Muc ādh ibn Jabal. However, its chain of
. ¯
narration is weak, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th), vol.3, p.430; vol.4, p.290).
45 c.f. the previously cited Hanafı̄ sources, as well as Al-Khat¯ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.361), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.513 onwards).
46 Narrated on the authority of eight authorities: c A’isha, Sac ı̄d ibn Zayd, Jābir, c Abdullāh
¯
ibn c Amr ibn Al-c Ās., Fud.ālah ibn c Ubayd, Marwān ibn Al-H . akam, Amr ibn Awf, and ’Ibn
c c
c Abbās. Al-Bukhārı̄ and others narrated the version on the authority of c A’isha (mAbpwh),
¯ ¯
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.288), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3,
¯
p.83).
Inviolable areas for wells and rivers

Jurists are in agreement that wells and rivers have inviolable surrounding areas
forbidden for others to use or reclaim. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s agreed that
the inviolable land surrounding a water spring is five-hundred cubits, based on
the H. adı̄th : “A water spring has a five-hundred cubits’ inviolable area, and that
¯
area for a well in a camel dwelling area, whose water is accessible by hand, is
forty cubits”.47
On the other hand, jurists differed in opinion regarding the inviolable area
surrounding wells and rivers. Thus:
• The H . anafı̄ ruled that wells in animal-dwelling areas, whose water is ac-
cessible by hand, have an inviolable perimeter of forty cubits. They based
this ruling on the H . adı̄th : “Whoever digs a well has a right to an inviolable
¯
area of forty-cubits for his animals to kneel down”.48
• ’Abū H
. anı̄fa also ruled that the same forty cubit rule applies to wells whose
water can only be accessed by using the workforce of animals. He based
this ruling on the generality of the above mentioned H . adı̄th .
¯
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the inviolable perimeter for wells
whose water require the workforce of animals is sixty cubits, in accor-
dance with the continuation of the above-mentioned H . adı̄th , which dis-
¯
tinguished between the two types of wells (al-c at.an and al-nād.ih.), and
specified the forty-sixty rule, respectively. They also reasoned that the
longer distance may be necessary to give the working animals distance to
walk when pulling water up from the well.
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad differed in their estimation of the inviolable

perimeter of a river. Muh.ammad ruled that the perimeter should be the
same as the width of the river-bed, on each of its sides. ’Abū Yūsuf, on
the other hand, ruled that it should be on-half of the river-bed width on
each side. The opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf in this regard is the accepted one
49
among the H . anafı̄s.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that the inviolable boundary of any well is the area
that may affect its water, or a sufficient area for drinking and kneeling
47 Al-Zaylac ı̄ said that this is a strange Hadı̄th, and that the first part of it was added by
. ¯
Al-Zuharı̄, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th), vol.4, p.292).
48 Narrated by ’Ibn Mājah and Al-Tabarānı̄ on the ¯ authority of c Abdullāh ibn Mughaffal.
.
’Ibn H ¯
. ajar said that its chain of narrators is weak, since it includes ’Ismā ı̄l ibn ’Aslam. It
c
was also narrated by ’Ah.mad in his Musnad on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah as follows:
“The inviolable perimeter of a well is forty-cubits on all sides, for camels and sheep to sit,
and for travelers and those seeking to drink from it. The excess water of such wells may
not be forbidden others to prevent grass from growing”, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition,
c
(H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.291 onwards), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.85).
¯
49 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.195), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.139 onwards), ’Ibn
c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.308 onwards).
.
down in the case of wells used for animal and human drinking, whichever
is larger.50
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the inviolable boundary of a well dug in deal land
¯
is whatever area is sufficient for a person to stand to take water, or for
work animals to walk if they are needed to pull the water up for irrigation.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the inviolable boundary of a river is the extent
¯
to which its silt is deposited, which is determined by local convention.51
They based this ruling on the above mentioned H . adı̄th , as well as an in-
c¯
completely transmitted H . adı̄th on the authority of Sa ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyib:
¯
“The inviolable boundary of a new well is twenty five cubits, that of an
old well is fifty cubits, and that of wells for irrigation is three-hundred
cubits”.52
• Finally the H . anbalı̄s ruled on the basis of the last mentioned H
. adı̄th that
¯
the inviolable boundary of a new well is twenty-five cubits, and that of an
old well is fifty.53
It is forbidden to use the inviolable perimeter of a river or well, etc. Thus,

the owner may prevent others from using that land. Moreover, if a person
were to dig a well in the inviolable perimeter of the river, well, or spring of
another, the latter may cover it up and seek compensation for his labor from
the transgressor. We shall discuss the inviolable perimeters of springs, wells,
and rivers in greater detail in the following chapter on land reclamation.

51 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.424), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.363).
52 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd in his Marāsı̄l on the authority of Al-Zuhariy and Sac ı̄d ibn Al-
Musayyib. It was also narrated by Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ and Al-Khallāl with the same two narrators
¯
on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah with a complete chain of narrations. However, the latter
narration is weak due to containing ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Jac far. It was also narrated by ’Ah.mad on
the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.292
¯
onwards), Takhrı̄j ’Ah.ādı̄th Tudhfat Al-Fuqahā’ (vol.3, p.439).
¯
53 ’Ibn Qudāmah ¯
(, vol.5, p.540).
Chapter 107
Land Reclamation
We shall study this topic in five sections:
1. Definition, legality, and desirability.
2. Land eligible for reclamation.
3. Means of reclamation and enclosure.
4. Conditions of land reclamation.
5. Legal status of reclaimed and inviolable land.
107.1 Definition, legality, and desirability

The Arabic term for land reclamation literally means “revival of wasteland”
(’ih.yā’ al-mawāt). The term legally refers to reclaiming any ownerless and
unused land by making it ready for agriculture, or building on it.1 For the
H. anafı̄s, the wasteland that can be reclaimed is any ownerless land, far away
from civilization, that has too much or too little water, so that it cannot be used
for agriculture, or land that was made useful for agriculture through reclamation
efforts.2 The Shāfic ı̄s similarly defined “dead land” eligible for reclamation as
¯
that which is not populated or within the inviolable boundaries of populated or
3
used areas.
The most common type of land reclamation involves enclosing a lot of land
and making it ready for agriculture, by removing rocks and weeds and making
water and fertile soil available, or by building on it. In this regard, the Legislator
legalized land reclamation without specifying its means. In such cases, we rely
1 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.339), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.66), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.361), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.205).
¯2
Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄),
¯
3 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.).
¯ . ¯ ¯
471
472 CHAPTER 107. LAND RECLAMATION
on convention to specify the general legalization. In this regard, convention

dictates five ways in which land may be reclaimed: (i) clearing the land of
plants, (ii) clearing it for agriculture, (iii) fencing, (iv) digging deep ditches, or
(v) extracting water.4
107.1.1 Legality
There are numerous H . adı̄th s that legalize land reclamation. Those include:
¯
“Whoever revives wasteland owns it thus”,5 “Whoever revives a wasteland owns
it thus, and whoever plants in land under reclamation has no right in it”,6
“Whoever revives a land that does not belong to anyone becomes most worthy
of owning it”,7 , and “Whoever takes what no other Muslim had taken before
owns it; following which people quickly went out laying claims to ownerless lots
of land”.8
Those H . adı̄th s clearly establish the permissibility of reviving ownerless and
¯
unused lands, allowing for all types of land reclamation mentioned above. c Urwah
also narrated that c Umar ibn Al-Khat.t.āb and major jurists ruled that the one
¯
who reclaims ownerless wasteland owns it thus, although they differed in their
conditions for land reclamation.
The H. adı̄th s cited above do not only indicate the legality of reclaiming waste-
¯
land, but also implies that such land reclamation is desirable. Indeed, land recla-
mation increases agricultural output, and enhances the economic well-being of
all members of society.
107.2 Reclaimable Wastelands

Not all lands are eligible for reclamation. We have seen that all jurists agree
that ownerless and unused wasteland may be owned by whoever reclaims it.
They all agreed as well that any land that has a known owner (who bought it or
received it as a gift, etc.) cannot be reclaimed by anyone other than its owner,
thus protecting the perpetual rights of landowners.
However, jurists differed over a variety of intermediate cases, as detailed
below:9
1. Jurists differed in opinion regarding land that was reclaimed and owned
4 Al-Sanc ānı̄(2nd printing, vol.3, p.82).
.
5 Narrated by ’Ah.mad and Al-Tirmidhı̄, who deemed it good and valid, on the authority
¯
of Jābir ibn c Abdullāh. It was also narrated by eight different companions of the Prophet
(pbuh).
6 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd, and Al-Tirmidhı̄, who deemed it a good Hadı̄th.
. ¯ . ¯
7 Narrated by Mālik in Al-Muwatta’, and also narrated by ’Ah.mad, Al-Bukhārı̄, and ’Abū
.. ¯
Dāwūd on the authority of c A’isha (mAbpwh). ’Ibn c Abdul-Barr deemed it a valid H . adı̄th
¯ ¯
with a good and complete chain of narrators, which was accepted by the jurists of Madı̄nah as
well as others. c Ubayd narrated a similar H . adı̄th on the authority of c A’isha in Al-’Amwāl.
8 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority¯of Samurah ibn Mudarras,¯ c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄
. ¯
(, vol.5, p.302), Al-H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.288 onwards).
9 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.513), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing ¯
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.206).
107.2. RECLAIMABLE WASTELANDS 473
thus, and then was left until it died again. For such lands, jurists ruled
thus:
10
. anbalı̄s ruled that such lands cannot be owned
¯
through (a second) reclamation. They based this ruling on the fact
that all the cited H. adı̄th s restrict ownership through reclamation to
¯
the case of ownerless land. Thus, they ruled that land that was once
owned through reclamation remain the property of their owners in
analogy to all other owned properties that were left.
11
• the H. anafı̄ jurist ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that such lands may be owned
through (a second) reclamation, provided that the owner is far away
(applying the voice test) and unknown. In contrast, Muh.ammad
ruled that if land was owned by reclamation under Islamic rule, then
it may never be considered wasteland again. Thus, he ruled that if
the owner is unknown, the land becomes by default a public property
of all Muslims. The accepted opinion among the H . anafı̄s seems to
be considering such lands dead and reclaimable if they are far away
from towns, as we shall show later.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled12 that wasteland was originally accessible to all,
and by being left to die again, it becomes available again for own-
ership by whoever reclaims it. They also based this ruling on the
generality of the H
. adı̄th : “whoever reclaims wasteland owns it thus”.
¯
2. Jurists of the four schools ruled that wastelands may be owned by recla-
mation even if they included ruins of pre-Islamic homes, fortresses, etc.
Most Shāfic ı̄s accepted this ruling based on the view that appropriation of
¯
pre-Islamic properties is not forbidden, based on the H . adı̄th : “The prop-
¯
erties of past nations belong to Allāh and His messenger, and then they
become yours”.13 On the other hand, there is another reported opinion of
’Imām Al-Shāfic ı̄ that such lands are not considered dead, and thus may
¯
not be owned by reclamation.
3. The H . anafı̄s, the Mālikı̄s, and (according to one narration) ’Ah.mad ruled
that wastelands that were owned under Islamic rule by an unknown Mus-
lim or protected non-Muslim may be owned by reclamation. They based
this ruling on the generality of the H . adı̄th s legalizing land reclamation. In
¯
this regard, they argued that since the subject of reclamation is wasteland
with no known owners, it is sufficiently similar to the case of ownerless
wasteland.
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
11c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.219), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence),
¯ . .
vol.6, p.35), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.307).
12 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, pp.66,68); Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.4, p.87).
13 Narrated by Sac ı̄d ibn Mansūr in his Sunan on the authority of Tāwūs, and by ’Abū
. .
c Ubayd in Al-’Amwāl, c.f. ’Ibn Qudāmah (, ibid.).
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that such land must be considered lost
¯
property, and the ruler has the option of keeping it until its owner is found,
or selling it and depositing its price as a trust with the Muslim treasury.
However, they ruled that such land cannot be owned by reclamation.
The H . anbalı̄s also ruled that such lands may not be owned by reclamation.
Instead, they consider it analogous to booty captured without use of force
(fay’), which must be designated for public welfare uses.
107.2.1 Detailed rulings by school

H
. anafı̄ rulings
14
The H . anafı̄s defined wasteland as ownerless land that is out of inhabited areas,
for which no individuals or groups have usage rights. Thus, if the land is inside
an inhabited area, or if it is outside that area but commonly used by inhabitants
for grazing or wood-collection, etc., ’Abū H . anı̄fa, ’Abū Yūsuf, Muh.ammad, and
later H. anafı̄s agree that the land is not considered dead, regardless of its distance
from inhabited areas.
Mālikı̄ rulings
The Mālikı̄s defined15 wasteland as that which is not an inviolable perimeter
to lands of common use for grazing, wood collecting, etc., and which was never
owned before through reclamation or otherwise, unless it was fallowed until it
died once more. In this regard, they did not distinguish between such lands
that are near inhabited areas and those that are far away, except to the extent
that reclamation of nearby lands require permission from the ruler.
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled16 that wastelands are those that are not inhabited or useful,
¯
or included in the inviolable boundaries thereof, and which were never reclaimed
before under Islamic rule. Thus, useful lands and the perimeter needed for their
use (e.g. room for animals to roam, etc.) may not be owned by reclamation.
H
. anbalı̄ rulings
17
The H. anbalı̄s defined wastelands as those that are not owned, contain no
water and no construction, and which are not used by people. Thus, they
14c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.219 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6,
¯ . .
p.194), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.34), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), bol.5, p.307),
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.136).
15 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.66), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.4, p.87 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy
((Mālikı̄), p.339).
16 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, pp.361,363), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.423).
17 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.4, p.205), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.513 onwards,
.
p.516).
107.3. MEANS OF RECLAMATION 475
excluded lands neighboring inhabited or useful areas, where the distance desig-
nating “neighborhood” is determined by convention.
107.3 Means of Reclamation

The Shāfic ı̄s said that reclamation or revival of dead or wasteland is determined
¯
by local conventions and habits. However, different schools of jurisprudence
expressed varying opinions in this regard.
18
Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that land reclamation may take the form of erect-
ing buildings, planting trees or crops, or seeding, turning the soil to ventilate it
for agriculture, building dams, digging rivers or other means of irrigation and
water containment. However, Muh.ammad ruled that if the land reclaimer dug
a river without actually irrigating the land, his action is considered to be equiv-
alent only to land enclosure for reclamation, rather than actual reclamation.
The Mālikı̄s ruled19 that land reclamation may take one of seven forms:
1. Land will be automatically owned by reclamation if the reclaimer digs a
well or water spring, and the well or spring is automatically owned as well.
2. If the land was covered with water (i.e. a swamp), removing the excess
water is considered reclamation.
3. Erection of buildings on the land.
4. Planting trees.
5. Tilling the soil and turning it for ventilation.
6. Removal of trees with the intention of possessing the land.
7. Breaking and removing rocks to level the land.
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled20 that the type of land reclamation that leads to owner-
¯
ship varies according to the use intended for the land, which is determined by
convention. They based this ruling on the view that the Legal permissibility
of land reclamation was general, and thus may be made specific by local con-
vention, which typically indicates the most productive and beneficial use of the
land. In this regard, many other general rulings are determined by convention
(e.g. receipt of purchased goods and gifts, possession of stolen items, etc.) when
the Legal Texts are general in nature. In the area of land reclamation, the main
criterion is the intended use to which the land is to be put.
Thus, if the land is to be used for residence, then the land must be enclosed
by the customary type of fence, and a building must be erected with at least
18 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.36), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.139),
¯ .
19 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.4, p.93), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.69 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy
((Mālikı̄), p.339).
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.424).
part of the building being covered by a roof. The building must also have a
door, since that is customary for homes. On the other hand, if the land is to
be used for keeping animals, then mere enclosure may be sufficient, and if it is
intended for agriculture, then the land must be leveled and arrangements must
be made for irrigation, etc.
21
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that reclamation of land may be established by enclo-
sure with a wall, regardless of the purpose of use. They based this ruling on
the H. adı̄th : “Whoever encloses a land with a wall, it becomes his”.22 They also
¯
ruled that land is considered reclaimed if trees are planted therein, or if water
is secured for irrigation by digging a well or otherwise. However, the H . anbalı̄s
ruled that the mere tilling of the soil or planting of a crop are not sufficient
for reclamation, since they are temporary measures unlike planting trees. They
also did not consider enclosure by digging a ditch around the land reclamation,
in contrast to enclosure by building a wall.
107.3.1 Land enclosure

Land may be enclosed by mere demarcation with a series of rocks or other
movable objects placed at its boundaries (al-tah.jı̄r). Jurists agree that simple
demarcation of land is not sufficient to own it by reclamation. However, they
also agree that one who encloses land thus has priority to reclaim it over all
others.
23
In this regard, the H . anafı̄s ruled that simple marking of land by rocks does
not qualify as reclamation (which requires preparation for agriculture), and thus
does not result in ownership. Thus, the enclosed land remains accessible, but
the one who enclosed it is given a three year grace period to reclaim it before
it is taken from him. The three-year period is based on the saying of c Umar:
“The one who merely encloses a land with stones has no right in it after three
years”.24 However, the grace period is religious rather than legal. From a legal
standpoint, if one person enclosed land and the other reclaimed it within the
three years, the reclaimer would own the land rather than the encloser.
The Mālikı̄s ruled25 that land enclosure with a line of stones, or allowing
one’s sheep to graze therein, does not constitute reclamation. Moreover, they
ruled that digging a drinking well for men or animals is not sufficient for recla-
mation unless the digger claims ownership of the well and the land when he digs
it, in which case the land is considered reclaimed and owned.
26
. anbalı̄s ruled that if a person began reclaiming a land
¯
22 Narrated by ’Ah.mad and ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority of Jābir, and also no the authority
of Samurah ibn Jundub.
23 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.35), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.138),
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.307).
24 Narrated by ’Abū Yūsuf in Al-Kharāj on the authority of Sac ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyib, but its
¯
chain of narrators includes a weak link (Al-H . asan ibn Imārah) and a questionable one (Sa ı̄d
c c
ibn c Umar), c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H

c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.290).
25 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.70), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, ¯
vol.4, p.93).
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
107.4. RECLAMATION CONDITIONS 477
but had not finished it, and enclosed it with a line of stones, wooden fence,
barbed wires, or a small wall, then he would not own it thus, since that is not
considered reclamation. However, he is considered the one with the highest
priority to reclaim and own the land, in accordance to the H . adı̄th narrated
¯
by ’Abū Dāwūd: “Whoever takes a property before any other Muslim takes it
becomes most worthy to own it”.
However, if another were to reclaim the land while it was enclosed by the first,
the reclaimer would own the land. Moreover, if the encloser does not reclaim
the land within three years, the judge must give him an option of reclaiming
it or giving others access to do so. If the encloser asks for an extension of the
grace period, and he has a valid excuse for seeking that extension, he may thus
be given three months or less, as the judge sees fit. However, if he had no valid
excuse, then no extension should be granted. Thus, we see that the H . anbalı̄
rulings in this case are similar to the H
. anafı̄ rulings.
107.4 Reclamation Conditions

There are three sets of reclamation conditions, pertaining to the reclaimer, the
reclaimed land, and the act of reclamation, respectively. In what follows, we
shall discuss each set of conditions in some detail.
107.4.1 Reclaimer conditions

A reclaimer is defined as someone who reclaims land with the intention of owning
it. In this regard, reclamation by whoever owns the property is permissible, since
reclamation is similar to hunting in causing ownership.
27
. anbalı̄s ruled that the reclaimer of land does
not need to be Muslim. Thus, both Muslims and protected non-Muslims (dhimmı̄s)
¯
may own wasteland by reclaiming it, as per the general H . adı̄th : “Whoever re-
¯
vives wasteland owns it”. In this regard, reclamation is a means of gaining
ownership, and Muslims and non-Muslims are equally entitled to acquire prop-
erty through this as well as other means.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s stipulated a condition that the reclaimer of land
¯
must be Muslim.28 Thus, they ruled that a protected non-Muslim is not autho-
rized to reclaim wasteland, even if the ruler permits him to do so. They based
this ruling on the view that reclaiming land gives the reclaimer a high social
status, which is not allowed for protected non-Muslims under Islamic rule. Con-
sequently, they ruled that if a non-Muslim reclaimed land, it may be taken from
him without need to compensate him. Moreover, they ruled that if a Muslim
takes it from him and revives it, he would thus own it even if the ruler does
p.425), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.518,543 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4,
p.214).
27 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.138), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.69), ’Ibn Qudāmah
.
(, vol.5, p.517).
28 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, pp.361-2), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.423 onwards).
not authorize him to do so, since they considered the act of the non-Muslim
inconsequential in this case.
107.4.2 Reclaimed land conditions

The reclaimed land must satisfy the following conditions related to ownership,
usage, and location, respectively:
• The land must not be owned by a Muslim or protected non-Muslim, and

must not be attached to any individual. Thus, the jurists said that land eli-
gible for reclamation must be dead from pre-Islamic times, without anyone
having owned it in Islamic history. All jurists agree on this condition.29
• The land must not be used by residents of nearby or far away inhabited
areas, e.g. as grazing lands, room for animal roaming, etc. Most schools
of jurisprudence either have unanimity over this condition, or declare it
30
as the majority view, e.g. in the case of the H
. anafı̄s.
• The Shāfic ı̄s stipulated that the reclaimed land must be under the control
¯
of Islamic rule, i.e. within “the land of Islam”. However, they ruled
that a Muslim may revive lands outside Muslim rule if the authorities
controlling it do not prevent Muslims from doing so. However, if the
rulers of the land prevent Muslims from owning lands under their control,
then Muslims cannot own such lands by seizing them.31 In contrast, the
non-Shāfic ı̄ jurists did not distinguish between lands under Islamic control
¯
and those that are not, arguing that all properties outside Muslim lands
may be seized by force, including land.32
107.4.3 Reclamation conditions

Some jurists stipulated two conditions for the reclamation process:
33
1. ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that reclamation requires a permission from the ruler.
He based this ruling on the H . adı̄th : “Nobody is entitled to any property
¯
without his ruler’s permission”.34 He further reasoned that such lands
. ¯ .
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.66), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.361), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.423), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
c
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.205).
30¯ ¯
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.136), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.194), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n
c
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.306 onwards), Abd Al-Gh

c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Dardı̄r
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.5, pp.516,525), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.208).
.
32 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, vol.5, p.515),¯
and the previous references.
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.35), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.307), ’Abū
Yūsuf’s Al-Kharāj (p.64).
34 Narrated ¯
by Al-T. abarānı̄ on the authority of Mu ādh
c , with a weak chain of narration,
¯
c.f. Al-H . . Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
āfiz c
. adı̄th ), vol.3, p.430; vol.4, p.290).
¯
107.4. RECLAMATION CONDITIONS 479
were originally under non-Muslim control, and thus became fay’ once they
were captured without fighting, and the ruler is responsible for distributing
such booty that is captured with or without fighting. This ruling was
deemed analogous to the Prophet’s declaration: “Whoever kills an enemy
owns his weapons and possessions”.35 The latter was an action of the
Prophet (pbuh) as a political leader and ruler, not as part of Legislation
and Prophecy.
The Mālikı̄s ruled in this regard36 that the ruler’s permission is required
if the land is close to inhabited areas, but not for those far away. The
majority of Mālikı̄s further ruled that a permission to reclaim land may
only be issued to a Muslim. They further ruled that non-Muslims are
not allowed to reclaim land in the Arabian subcontinent, near Makkah or
Madı̄nah.
37
’Abū Yūsuf, Muh.ammad, the Shāfic ı̄s, and the H . anbalı̄s ruled that who-
¯
ever revives a wasteland owns it thus, even without a permission from the
ruler. They defended this ruling by saying that there is ample permission
in the above cited H . adı̄th from the Prophet (pbuh) and the Law, which
¯
supersedes the permission of any ruler. They further reasoned that waste-
land is accessible property like dead wood in ownerless land, and ownerless
animals that may be hunted. Thus, they argued, whoever captures such
property becomes its owner. Finally, the ruler’s permission is clearly not
stipulated as a condition of the H . adı̄th narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ on the au-
¯ ¯
thority of c A’isha: “Whoever revives a land that is not owned by anyone
¯
is most worthy of owning it”. However, they said that it is preferable that
the ruler’s permission is sought, to avoid unnecessary juristic and legal
disputes.
2. The H . anafı̄s limited the grace period for reclaiming an enclosed land (with
a line of stones or other fence) to three years, after which the ruler may
take the land from him and give it to another. They based this ruling on
the view that the purpose of giving him priority for that land is to reclaim
it and help Muslims by paying the one-tenths or kharāj tax, otherwise
¯
allowing him to keep it is of no benefit.38 We have seen that the three-
c
year rule was derived from the saying of Umar (mAbpwh): “The encloser
of a wasteland has no right in the land unless he reclaims it within three
years”.39
35 Narrated by the major narrators of Hadı̄th with the exception of Al-Nasā’ı̄ on the authority
. ¯
of ’Abū Qatādah Al-’Ans.ārı̄, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.3, p.428).
36 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.339), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.94). ¯
37 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.361), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), ’Abū-
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.423), ’Abu Al-Barakāt ((H . anbalı̄), vol.1, p.367), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
38 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.35).
.
39 We have seen that the chain of narrators of this tradition is weak. It was also narrated by
Al-Nasā’ı̄ in the chapter on properties on the authority of c Amr ibn Shuc ayb that the Prophet
¯
(pbuh) gave some people a share in the land of Juhaynah. The recipients of the land left it
dead, and it was then taken by others who revived it. Then those who were given the land
Indeed, the three year period is a reasonable period for land reclamation.
However, it must be noted that the above is the religious ruling. Legally,
if a person reclaims enclosed by un-revived land within the three year
period, he would own it and the encloser will not. This is the H . anafı̄
ruling, and Shāfic ı̄ and H
. anbalı̄ rulings are very similar in this regard.
¯
107.5 Consequences of land reclamation

There are four main consequences of land reclamation:
1. Establishment of ownership.
2. Establishment of the one-tenth or the kharāj tax.

¯
3. The non-establishment of ownership of the inviolable boundaries of inhab-
ited or used areas.
4. The establishment of ownership for the inviolable boundaries of wasteland.
In what follows, we shall discuss each of those consequences in some detail.
107.5.1 Ownership of reclaimed land

The main juristic question with regards to reclaimed land ownership is whether
the reclaimer only owns the usufruct of the land, or the land itself. In other
words: is the ownership total or partial?
The jurist ’Abū Al-Qāsim ’Ah.mad Al-Balkhı̄ said that ownership of re-
¯
claimed land is only ownership of usufruct. He compared this ruling through
analogy to one who chooses to sit in an accessible area, whereby he has a right
to its usufruct, but that right is voided once he stands up.40
In contrast, the majority of jurists ruled that land reclamation results in
total ownership. They based that ruling on the H . adı̄th : “Whoever reclaims
¯
wasteland, it becomes his”. Thus, for the reclaimer, the land “becomes his”,
and that ownership is not removed if he leaves the land.41 Consequently, the
majority of H. anafı̄s ruled that if a man reclaims some land and then leaves it,
and another plants a crop in it, the first owner continues to have priority over
the land.42
by the Prophet (pbuh) complained to c Umar ibn Al-Khat.t.āb, who said: “Had I, or had ’Abū
¯
Bakr, given this land to you, I would not have given it back to you; but it was the Prophet
(pbuh) who gave it to you”. He then said: “Whoever has a piece of land and leaves it fallow
for three years without reviving it, then if another revives it, the latter becomes more worthy
of owning it”, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.290).
40 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.137). ¯
.
41 ibid., Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.35), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.194),
. .
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.87), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.423 onwards),
¯ ¯
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.261), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.513), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
c
¯ ¯ ¯
42 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.307), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.137), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.35).
107.5. CONSEQUENCES OF LAND RECLAMATION 481
107.5.2 The established tax

The state has a right of tax collection on reclaimed land. However, jurists
differed whether that tax is the one-tenths tax or the kharāj tax. Thus:
¯
• ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that if the land was reclaimed by a Muslim, then it is
subject to the one-tenths tax or the kharāj tax depending on the type of
¯
land (as discussed below).
• Muh.ammad ruled that if the land was watered by rain or water from a
large river, then it is subject to the one-tenths tax, and if it was watered
from a river dug by non-Muslims, then it is subject to the kharāj tax. This
¯
was the chosen opinion of Al-Mirghyānı̄ (c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄))).
In this regard, land is generally considered subject to a one-tenths tax if it
belongs to one of five categories:
1. Land in the Arabian peninsula.
2. Land whose people reverted to Islam willingly.
3. Land that was conquered by force and divided among the winning Muslim
warriors.
4. The land of a Muslim who used it as an orchard or vineyard.
5. Land that was reclaimed by permission from the ruler, which belongs to or
is watered by rain, rivers, or springs emanating from one-tenth tax lands.
In contrast, lands traditionally viewed as being subject to the kharāj tax are
¯
those that fit in one of the following four categories:
1. The H. anafı̄s include in this category all of the fertile land of Iraq, and any
other land that was conquered by force and left with its original owners.
Such non-Muslim owners are made subject to the jizyah, and their land is
made subject to the kharāj tax, whether or not they become Muslims.
¯
2. Lands conquered by force, and whose owners were replaced by others.
3. Land reclaimed by a Muslim or protected non-Muslim, which is watered
from a river dug by non-Muslims.
4. The land of a protected non-Muslim, who made it an orchard.43
In contrast, the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that no kharāj tax is levied on land that was
¯
conquered by force, and reclaimed by Muslims (e.g. in Egypt, the Levant, or
Iraq). However, if the land was reclaimed by a protected non-Muslim, then it
is automatically subjected to the kharāj tax.44
¯
43 Al-Samarqandı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.1, pp.492-5).
44 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.195), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.37), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.207).
107.5.3 Inviolable boundaries
The inviolable boundaries (al-h.arı̄m) of an inhabited or utilized area is the area

of land needed for its full utilization. Such areas include the area surrounding
a well, the front-yard of a house, side-walks, water drainage ducts, grazing
areas, trash dumps, etc. Jurists agree that inviolable boundaries of inhabited or
utilized lands belong to those lands, and thus may not be reclaimed or owned, to
protect the interests of the inhabitants.45 Similarly, areas that are customarily
considered part of the inhabited or utilized area (e.g. roads, sitting areas around
markets, etc.) are thus excluded from the category of “wasteland”, and may
not be reclaimed.
On the other hand, the one who reclaims a piece of land owns it as well as its
inviolable boundaries. Thus, if he built a house, he would own its front yard, if
he dug a well he would own its inviolable perimeter, etc. He thus has the right
to forbid others from trespassing over this additional property that he acquired
by reclaiming his land. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall discuss the
legal basis for establishing inviolable boundaries of land, and the size of those
boundaries as established in Islamic Law.
Legality
Inviolable boundaries are legally based on the fact that the Prophet (pbuh)
established inviolable boundaries for water wells.46 Jurists also agree that water
springs have an established inviolable boundary, based on other H . adı̄th s that
¯
establish inviolable boundaries for different types of land.47
Jurists differed slightly in their estimates of the inviolable boundaries of
various entities. In what follows, we shall list the estimates according to each
of the four Sunni schools. The owner of an inviolable boundary of his property
has the right to prevent others from digging in it, and if he does, then he may
seek compensation from the transgressor, or he may reverse his actions.
45 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.195), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.36), Al-
. .
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.67), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.4, p.88), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.363), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.423), ’Ibn Qudāmah (,
c
¯ ¯ ¯
46 The Hadı̄th narrated by ’Ahmad on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah is: “Whoever digs
. ¯ .
a well, he owns a forty cubits’ perimeter around it, room for his animals to kneel down”, c.f.
Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.291).
47 ’Abū Dāwūd narrated in his Marāsı̄l ¯
on the authority of Al-Zuharı̄ on the authority
of Sac ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyib that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “The inviolable boundaries of a
normal well is fifty cubits, and that of a new well is twenty-five”. Al-H . ākim also narrated
on the authority of c Ubādah ibn Al-S.āmit that the Prophet (pbuh) established an inviolable
boundary for palm trees equal to the span of their branches, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st
c
edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.4, p.292 onwards). It is also known that Al-Zuharı̄ added: “And the
¯
inviolable boundary of a water-spring is five-hundred cubits on each side”.
H
. anafı̄ boundary estimates
The H. anafı̄s ruled as follows for the inviolable boundaries of various sources of
water and for trees:48
1. The majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that the inviolable boundary of a water
spring is five-hundred cubits on each side, where a cubit (or arm-length
from elbow to finger tips) is equal to six fists, and each fist is equal to the
width of four fingers. They based this ruling on Al-Zuharı̄’s report.
2. The H . anafı̄s agree that the inviolable boundary of a well for animal drink-
ing, the water of which is accessible by hand, is forty cubits on all sides,
based on some narrations that are not well established.49 ’Abū H . anı̄fa
ruled that the inviolable boundary of a well that requires animal labor to
access the water is also forty cubits, while ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad
ruled that it is sixty based on a H . adı̄th to that effect. The majority of
¯
later H. anafı̄s agreed that the inviolable boundary of a well is determined
by utilization needs. They also stipulated that ownership of the invio-
lable boundary is predicated on the well being dug in wasteland with the
ruler’s permission, or being dug in the owner’s property, otherwise he is
not entitled to an inviolable boundary.
3. The H . anafı̄s did not specify a particular size for the inviolable bound-
ary for under-ground water channels. Rather, they specified its inviolable
boundary as whatever area is necessary to maintain the channel by throw-
ing accumulated mud, etc. Many opinions exist, including Muh.ammad’s
opinion that a water channel should be given the same size inviolable
boundary as a well. Since there is no explicit Legal text in this regard,
the size of the inviolable boundary should be left to the consideration of
the ruler.
4. The H . anafı̄s differed in opinion regarding the inviolable boundaries of
rivers:
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that there is no inviolable boundary for rivers
that run through the property of another. He based this ruling on
the view that the land surrounding a river apparently belongs to the
land owner through which the river runs. Thus, the river-owner’s
claim is not sufficient to establish ownership of that land that is
contiguous with and of the same genus as the land-owner’s property.
In such cases, the ruling is based on the apparent ownership, unless
the claimant can provide proof to the contrary.
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the owner of such a river still
owns inviolable boundaries on both sides, since the river banks are
48 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.308-310), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.139 on-
. .
wards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, pp.36-8), Abd Al-Gh
¯
((H
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.221 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.195).
49 Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4, p.292).
. . . ¯
as necessary for the river owner as the inviolable boundaries of wells

and springs are for their owners, since river banks are necessary for
walking, throwing away silt and mud, etc. However, they differed in
their estimate of the size of a river’s inviolable boundary. Thus, ’Abū
Yūsuf estimated the inviolable boundaries of a river as one-half the
river-bed’s width on each side, while Muh.ammad ruled that it is a
full river width on each side.
• Later H
. anafı̄s ruled that the inviolable boundary of a river should be
estimated based on need for dumping silt, etc., if the river was dug
through a wasteland.
• With regards to the debate between ’Abū H . anı̄fa and his two com-
panions regarding a river that runs through the property of another,
Al-Zaylac ı̄ said that the best opinion is that the inviolable boundary
of such a river is given to the river owner, provided that the latter
does not exceed reason in estimating the size of the boundary that
he needs.
5. The inviolable boundary of a tree planted in wasteland is five cubits on

each side. Thus, people other than the tree owner are not allowed to plant
trees within that circle of five-cubits radius, to allow the tree owner access
to the tree and its fruits. This ruling is based on a H . adı̄th .50
¯
Mālikı̄ estimates
The Mālikı̄s ruled51 that the size of the inviolable boundary of a well is deter-
mined based on the size of the well, and the nature of the surrounding land in
terms of solidity. They also ruled that the inviolable boundary of a well extends
under the surface, thus forbidding people from digging another well that would
dry up the first one, or contaminate it with impurities. This is in addition to
including the surface, which forbids others from building or planting trees too
close to the well.
They ruled that the inviolable boundaries of a house include its entry and
exist ways, as well as neighboring areas needed for dumping dust and draining
rain waters. They also ruled that the inviolable boundary of a plot of agricultural
land reaching 5760 square meters includes the necessary areas for entry and exit,
and the boundaries of a village must also include its grazing areas and fire-wood
collection areas.
Finally, they ruled that the inviolable boundaries of a tree must be deter-
mined by convention to protect the benefits of its owner. Thus, they ruled
that a tree owner may prevent others from any action in its neighborhood (e.g.
building, planting other trees, digging wells, etc.) if the action would harm the
tree.
50 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd in his Sunan on the authority of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy, c.f.
¯
Al-H
c
. adı̄th), vol.4, p.293).
51 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.89), ¯ ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.339).
Shāfic ı̄ estimates
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled52 that estimation of the size of inviolable boundaries is usually
¯
determined by convention. Thus, they reasoned that the specific sizes listed in
Legal Texts (H . adı̄th ) were in fact determined by the needs and conventions of
¯
their time. In this regard, the rule used must take into account that an inviolable
boundary must include the area needed to ensure full utilization of the property,
even if some degree of utilization may in fact take place without that boundary.
Thus, they listed, among other things, the inviolable boundary of a village
as containing its congregation areas, room for the horses to run and camels to
sit, areas for dumping trash, areas for drainage, playgrounds, etc. They also
listed the inviolable boundary of a well dug in wasteland as the area needed
for its users to stand, including room for animals if they are needed, as well as
the area in which water is collected, etc. For drinking wells, they specified the
boundary as simply the area for drinkers to stand.
They also specified the inviolable boundaries of a river as the area needed
for depositing silt, as determined by local convention. Similarly, the inviolable
boundaries of water channel wells was determined based on whether or not
digging in that area would reduce its water, threaten its structural stability, or
otherwise affect it adversely.
The inviolable boundary of a house built in wastelands was specified to
include room for trash and dust dumping, storage, and passage towards entries
and exits. In contrast, they ruled that a house surrounded by other houses has
no inviolable boundaries. In the latter case, each homeowner is entitled to act
within his property, but if any of them were to transgress against another’s, he
must thus compensate him for his losses.
Finally, they ruled that it is permissible to revive wastelands surrounding
the Holy Mosque in Makkah, since its surrounding utilized land can be owned
through sales and other means. However, they ruled that the wastelands of
c
Arafāt, Muzdalifah, and Mina, may not be revived, since they are needed for
the performance of pilgrimage rituals. Thus, the latter lands are considered of
public use in analogy to roads, desert areas used for c ı̄d prayers, and public
sources of water.
H
. anbalı̄ estimates
The H . anbalı̄s specified the inviolable boundaries for many properties as fol-
lows:53
• For an old well that dried and was re-dug, the boundary is fifty cubits on
all sides.
• For a new well, the boundary is twenty-five cubits on all sides. The two
rulings for wells are based on the H
. adı̄th narrated by ’Abū c Ubayd in
¯
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
53 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.4, p.212 onward), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.542).
.
Al-’Amwāl that Sac ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyib said: “The Sunnah is to establish
an inviolable boundary of fifty feet for an old well, twenty-five for a new
well, and three-hundred for a well used to irrigate crops”.
• The boundaries of water springs and channels surrounded by wasteland is

five-hundred cubits.
• The boundary of a river is whatever area is needed to deposit its silt to

allow it to flow quickly, and any area needed to access the river, or to
protect it from harm.
• The boundary of a tree or palm tree is the span of its branches. This ruling
is based on the above mentioned H . adı̄th of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy that
¯ ¯
“People brought their dispute regarding the inviolable boundary of a palm
tree to the Prophet (pbuh), and he (pbuh) ordered one of its branches to
be measured, and ruled according to its length (which was seven or five
cubits)”.
• The boundary of agricultural land is whatever is needed for its irrigation,

keeping of its work animals, dumping of its manure, water drainage, and
other natural functions necessary for agriculture.
• The boundary of a house is the area needed for dumping its dust, sweeping,
drainage of rainwater, and passage to its entries and exits. However, there
is no inviolable boundary for a house surrounded by the properties of
others. The latter ruling follows from the fact that the property of another
cannot be used for dumping trash and dust or drainage water. Thus, the
ruling in this case is that each owner should use his property as custom
dictates, and each may be prevented from exceeding the customary use of
his property.
For instance, the H. anbalı̄s ruled that if a man dug a well in his land,
and that led to drying the well of his neighbor, the latter is required to
compensate the former for the lost water. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s ruled
in this case that the owner of the new well is not responsible for any
compensation, since they considered subterranean waters to be ownerless,
as stated in Al-Majallah (item #1288).
Chapter 109
Easement Rights (H
. uqūq
Al-’Irtifāq)
We shall study easement rights in two sections:
1. The first section defines easement rights, and distinguishes them from
rights to usufruct. That section will also deal with the juristic character-
ization of easement rights, and enumerate their general legal status.
2. The second section will discuss in some details the types of easement rights.
109.1 Definition and legal status

109.1.1 Definition
Easement rights (h.uqūq al-’irtifāq) are legal forms of partial ownership, literally
referring to a right of usage of a property.1 Further, an easement right is a right
attached to a specific immovable property (c aqār), giving rights of usufruct to
the owner of another immovable property belonging to another owner.2
Easement rights are thus established irrespective of the owner. Those rights
include the right to run water through a neighbor’s property, the right to run
1 We have seen that there are two types of ownership: (i) Total ownership, which includes
ownership of the property and its usufruct, and (ii) partial ownership, which is ownership
of usufruct. In this regard, ownership of usufruct may be associated with the individual
who has that right, and may be associated with the property itself (h.aqq c aynı̄). The latter
type remains perpetually attached to the property, and is thus transferred from one party to
another.
2 Legalists distinguish between rights attached to a property and rights attached to an
individual. The former is a direct relationship between an individual and a specific property
(e.g. ownership rights or easement rights). The latter is a legal relationship between two
individuals, one of whom is obliged to take an action, and the other is prevented from taking
an action. For instance, the debt relationship between a creditor and a debtor obliges the
debtor to repay his debt. Conversely, the relationship between a depositor and a depositary
obliges the depositary not to use the deposited property.
501
502 CHAPTER 109. EASEMENT RIGHTS (H
. UQŪQ AL-’IRTIFĀQ)
sewage and drainage water into a ditch, passage through the property of an-
other, or building over another individual’s home. Such rights are established
regardless of whether the relevant land is privately or publicly owned, and ir-
respective of the identities of the owners of the two properties. In this regard,
easement rights are rights attached to properties. Hence, if two neighboring
properties belong to the same owner, no easement rights are established for
either property over the other.
109.1.2 Easement rights vs. rights of usage

Both easement rights and usage rights are attached to properties rather than
individuals. However, there are some differences between the two types of rights,
which we enumerate below:3
1. An easement right is established for an immovable property, while a usage

right is established for an individual. Thus, the right to pass through one
land to get to another is an established right for the second land, to be
used by any owner of that land. In contrast, a usage right is established for
an individual, and expires upon that person’s death, whether it resulted
from a contract among the living (e.g. leasing and simple loans) or among
the living and the dead (e.g. wills and mortmains).
2. Easement rights are always attached to immovable properties, and thus

affect its market value. In contrast, usage rights may be attached to
immovable properties (e.g. loaned land) or movable ones (e.g. loaned
book).
3. Easement rights do not expire, and thus juristic schools agree that they
may be inherited. In contrast, usage rights have expiry dates. For in-
stance, if a deceased gave usage of his land to an individual in his will,
that right would expire upon the death of the beneficiary.
109.1.3 Juristic characterization

The H . anafı̄s ruled that easement rights constitute an economic right of usage,
but do not constitute a property. As a consequence, they ruled that4 easement
rights are transferred when the land is sold, but they may not be sold indepen-
dently of the land, or given separately as a gift or charity. Such actions would
transfer ownership of the easement right to another, and mere legal rights are
not eligible for such transfers. Moreover, they ruled that easement rights may
not be used as compensations in any commutative transaction, including debt
settlement or compensation for any crime. Similarly, easement rights may not
be given as dowry in a marriage contract, since its ownership cannot be trans-
ferred thus, and in this case the groom is obliged to pay the bride the average
3 See Mukhtas.ar ’Ah.kām Al-Muc āmalāt Al-Sharc iyyah by Professor c Alı̄ Al-Khafı̄f (pp.15-
¯ ¯ ¯
16).
. anafı̄), vol.6, pp.189-190), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
109.1. DEFINITION AND LEGAL STATUS 503
dowry for similar marriages. Finally, a woman may not use an easement right
as compensation to her husband for getting divorced, and she must in this case
simply pay the ex-husband whichever part of her dowry she had not spent.
The establishment of easement rights as legal economic rights has juristic
consequences as well.5 The H . anafı̄s thus ruled that easement rights may be
inherited, since they allow inheritance for some rights (e.g. the defect option)
as well as properties. Similarly, they allow the owner of an easement right to
pledge it to another in a will (e.g. giving a person the right to use his water
rights after his death). However, the will is invalidated in the latter case upon
the death of the named beneficiary.
They also permitted the sale of a land without the easement rights belonging
to it. In this regard, easement rights (e.g. water rights) are not considered part
of the sale unless they are listed explicitly or implicitly (e.g. “I sold you this
land with all of its easement rights”) in the sale contract.
109.1.4 General legal status rulings

The legal status of easement rights includes general rulings and specific rulings.
We shall discuss the specific rulings in the following section dealing with types
of easement rights. We now enumerate the general legal status rulings for such
rights:
1. Exercising easement rights must not result in harm to others. This ruling
is based on the juristic “no harm to others” principle. For instance, the
owner of a passage right may not abuse it to harm the property or person
of others, and the owner of watering rights may not abuse his right to the
detriment of down-stream farmers.
2. Easement rights may be attached to public properties (e.g. large rivers

and public roads) or private properties. The non-H
. anafı̄ jurists ruled that
easement rights that are attached to public properties are established for
all people, without need of seeking any permission.6 In contrast, the
establishment of easement rights on private property requires the owner’s
permission or consent.
3. If an easement right is conventionally recognized, but it is not known how

the right was initiated, it is assumed to be an old legitimately established
right. Thus, previously established rights are respected, provided that
they do not result in harm to others. If a right is found to be harmful,
the juristic rule of respecting old rights is overruled by another stipulating
that legitimately established old rights cannot be harmful.7
5 ibid., ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.316).
6 In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s said: “The usufruct of a public road is passage through it,
¯
sitting there to rest, and doing business there as long as others have space to pass. The ruler’s
permission is not required for any such utilization of public roads”, c.f. Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.369).
¯7
See Al-Madkhal Al-Fiqhı̄ Al-c Āmm by Professor Al-Zarqā’ (p.596 onwards).
¯
109.2 Types of Easement rights

The H . anafı̄s enumerated six main types of easement rights: (i) water rights, (ii)
passage rights, (iii) water access rights, (iv) water drainage rights, (v) vertical
neighborhood rights, and (vi) horizontal neighborhood rights. They further
ruled that it is not permissible to establish other types of easement rights. They
based that ruling on the view that such rights put restrictions on ownership.
However, they reasoned, ownership rights should be unrestricted with the few
named exceptions. Thus, they argued that no further restrictions should be
added.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that easement rights are not restricted to the
six mentioned above. Thus, they allowed other easement rights to be established
by the owner’s consent. For instance, a landowner may agree to a restriction on
where he can plant trees or erect buildings, or he may agree to a restriction of
the maximum height to which he may build.8
109.2.1 Water rights (h.aqq al-shirb)

¯
The Arabic term shirb refers to a an allotted amount of water, as evidenced by
¯
the verse: “Here is a she-camel: she has a right of watering, and you have a
right of watering, on a specific day” [26:155]. The term is also used to designate
the allotted time for watering, and jurists use it interchangeably in both senses.
Legally, the term is applied by most jurists to refer to a water right for watering
plants and trees, and some use it for the timing thereof. A special case of h.aqq
al-shirb is h.aqq al-shafah, or drinking rights for humans and animals.
¯ ¯
There are four types of water with regards to watering and drinking rights:
(i) water in containers, (ii) spring and well water, (iii) water of private rivers and
streams, and (iv) public waters. In what follows, we shall discuss the rulings for
each type of water in some detail.
1. Water in containers
This category includes water whose owner put it in any special storage contain-
ers, such as pots, tanks, pipes, etc. Such waters are considered privately owned
by their possessor, in analogy to all permissible properties of which a person
may take ownership by possession. Thus, the owner of such water may sell it
or deal in it as he sees fit, and others have no rights to that water without
his permission.9 Those rulings are based on the H . adı̄th : “The Prophet (pbuh)
¯
forbade selling water, except for that carried in containers”.10 In this regard,
8 See Al-Haqq wa Al-’Illtizām by Professor c Aı̄ Al-Khafı̄f (p.64), and Nazariyyat Al-c Aqd
. ¯ .
by Yūsuf Mūsā (p.171 onwards).
. .
p.39), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.144 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5,
pp.311-3), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.339), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.427), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.536 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.222), Al-Kh arāj
¯
by ’Abū Yūsuf (pp.95,97).
10 See Al-’Amwāl by ’ibn Sallām.
109.2. TYPES OF EASEMENT RIGHTS 505
the H . adı̄th that forbade selling excess water11 was restricted by analogy to the
¯
H. adı̄th that permitted the sale of forest wood in the possession of a wood-cutter.
¯
In the latter H . adı̄th , the Prophet (pbuh) ordered a man to collect and cut wood
¯
in order to secure an income and save himself the need to beg.12
Despite the fact that such water is considered owned by its possessor, the
ownership rights are superseded by drinking need. Thus, a person who fears
dying of thirst if he cannot drink that water may take what he needs of it, even
by force, provided that the owner did not himself need the water to survive.
However, if the person thus takes the owner’s water, he must still compensate
him for it, based on the juristic ruling that “necessity does not invalidate the
rights of others”. If the water owner does not need the water for survival but
refuses to give it to the person who needs it for drinking, the latter may fight
him, but it is best to fight him with non-lethal weapons as a form of chastisement
for the sin of preventing him from drinking.
2. Water of wells and springs

This category refers to water that a person extracts from the well or spring
13
for his own usage. The H . anafı̄s ruled that such water is not owned by the
extractor. Rather, they ruled that such water is still available to all, but that
the extractor has a special priority right for the water, whether or not the land
from which it was extracted was owned or ownerless. This ruling is based on
the general principle that water is fundamentally accessible to all people, as per
the H . adı̄th : “People are partners in three things: water, grass, and fire”.14
¯
Thus, drinking rights are established for such water, but watering rights are
not. In this regards, nobody has priority rights over others with regards to
drinking water. Consequently, anyone may use that water to drink, allow his
animals to drink, or use for household necessities. If the possessor of the water
refuses to give others drinking rights, then one who needs that water may take
it, even by force, provided that he does not have access to other nearby water.
As proof of the drinking rights established for those who need the water,
jurists cite the following tradition. It is narrated that a group of travelers
reached a well, and asked its owners to allow them to drink and give water to
their animals to avoid dying of thirst. The owners of the well refused them access
to the water, and when they informed c Umar ibn Al-Khat.t.ab of the incident,
¯
he said: “You should have fought them for it with lethal weapons”.15
11 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the authors of the four —it Sunan, with the exception of ’Ibn
.
Mājah. It was deemed valid by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of ’Iyās ibn c Abd.
12 Agreed upon (by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim)¯
on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah.
13 ibid. ¯
14 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd, by ’Ibn Mājah on the authority of ibn c Abbās, and by Al-
T. abarānı̄ in his Mu jam on the authority of ’ibn Umar. It was also narrated by ’Ah.mad.
c c
In another H . adı̄th , the Prophet (pbuh) is narrated to have said: “Excess water may not be
¯
withheld”, i.e. if a person has water in excess of his watering and drinking needs, then he may
not sell it or prevent others from using it, unless he owns that water. In this regard, some
jurists ruled that water may never be owned.
15 Al-Kharāj by ’Abū Yūsuf (p.97).
¯
We thus notice that the rulings for privately owned water in containers and
waters of wells and springs are similar. The main difference between the two
categories is that the first is privately owned while the second is not. Thus, one
who needs water may fight the first owner for excess water, but without using
lethal force. In contrast, the use of lethal weapons is allowed in the second case.
Thus, the easement right is clearer in the latter category of water.
In this regard, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled16 that one who digs a well in
¯
ownerless wasteland thus owns the well, and one who digs a well in his own
land also owns it thus as growth of his property, in analogy to trees and fruits
that grow in his property. However, the Shāfic ı̄s distinguish between the two
¯
categories by noting that a landowner is not required to give access to fruits and
trees that exceed his needs, while he is required to give access to water in excess
of his need to drink, allow his animals to drink, and water his land. The latter
ruling is based on the necessity to protect the lives of other humans and animals
that need the water for drinking. It is also based on the H . adı̄th in Al-Bukhārı̄
¯ ¯
and Muslim: “Do not prevent others from water access to prevent their animals
from grazing near your water”. This H . adı̄th refers to public access wells, the
¯
waters of which may not be considered the property of any person unless the
latter puts it in containers, and owns it thus.
3. Private rivers
The legal status of water of small rivers and streams that are privately owned
is the same as the water of wells and springs.17 Thus, drinking rights are
established for all, while watering rights are not. In other words, anyone may
use this water to drink or allow his animals to drink, even if that causes a minor
harm to the river or stream owner. This latter ruling is based on the juristic
rule of “accepting the lesser of two harms”. However, nobody has the right to
use this water to water his plants and trees without the owner’s permission.
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the owner of a river or stream may not sell watering
rights for a given period independently of the river itself. This ruling follows
from their general view that legal rights are not properties that can be sold
independently. On the other hand, they allowed the sale of watering rights in
conjunction with a sale of land. In this regard, we have seen that watering
rights are not considered part of the sale of land unless it stated in the contract
explicitly or implicitly. They also allowed the sale of known quantities of water
in containers for watering, but not for drinking.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s permitted the sale of owned
¯
water independently of the land. However, they ruled that it is juristically
preferable for the water owner to give it at no charge. If the owner refuses to
¯ . ¯ ¯
17 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.189), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.311 onwards), Al-
c
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.39), Al-Kh arāj by ’Abū Yūsuf (p.95), ’Ibn Al-Humām
¯
((H
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.145), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.339), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Sh ı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.427 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.79; vol.5, p.536), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄),
vol.4, p.221), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.257), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.375).
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
give his water at no charge, then the use of force is only allowed in cases of
need for drinking water to prevent the death of humans or animals. In the cases
where they permitted the sale of water, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled18 that water must
¯
be sold by weight or volume, not based on the number of drinking animals or
irrigated area.
4. Water of public rivers

This category includes the waters of all major rivers that run through public
lands (e.g. the Nile, the Tigris and the Euphrates, and other major rivers). The
legal status of such rivers is that the river, its water, and its path are all publicly
owned.19 Thus, all people have the right to use those waters for drinking as well
as watering plants and trees, digging ditches and streams, installing devices to
redirect some water to his land, etc. In this regard, the ruler has no right to
prevent anyone from using such water unless the user’s actions result in harm
to the river itself or to others. This is the general ruling reasoned by analogy
to the utilization of all public roads and public facilities.
If someone’s usage of the river water causes harm to others, then every
Muslim has the right to stop him or limit his actions to avoid such harm. This
ruling is based on the fact that usage of public properties is always restricted
by the general juristic ruling against “causing harm to others”.
The establishment of public rivers as public properties is based on the
H. adı̄th : “People are partners in three things: water, grass, and fire”.20
¯
General rulings on watering rights
In what follows, we enumerate the most important general rulings regarding
watering rights:21
1. The person exercising water rights must maintain the borders of the well,
spring, or river from which he extracts water. Thus, if the potential user’s
methods threaten the owner’s property, he may prevent him from wa-
tering based on the H . adı̄th forbidding “doing harm to others”. In this
¯
18 Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.257).
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.192), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.144), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.211), ’Ibn Juzayy
.
((Mālikı̄), p.339), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.428), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5,
¯ ¯
p.531), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.205), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.373).
c
20 This Hadı̄th refers ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
. to water that is not owned through possession in containers. In analogy
¯
to other publicly accessible properties, water becomes owned once its possession is established
(by placement in special containers). Moreover, the grass mentioned in this H . adı̄th refers to
¯
grass that grows on its own without planting of seeds or watering by humans. Such grass
belongs to whoever cuts it and possesses it thus, even if it grew in land owned by another.
Finally, the fire mentioned in the H . adı̄th refers to the utilization of fire by using its light and
¯
heat, and using it to light other fires. The owner of a fire may not forbid others from utilizing
his fire in those manners. However, he does have the right to forbid others from taking his hot
coals, since they are viewed as his property, which may thus be protected like other properties,
provided that it has some value; c.f. Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.39).
21 c.f. Al-’Amwāl wa Nazariyyat Al-c Aqd fı̄ Al-Fiqh Al-’Islāmı̄ by Dr. Muhammad Yūsuf
. .
Mūsā (p.175 onwards).
regard, harming the property of another may result from diverting the
water path from its usual pattern. If the user does in fact cause harm
to the land of another by failing to maintain the boundaries of the water
source, he must thus compensate the affected landowner for the damage
caused by his negligence. On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s restricted the
need to compensate the affected party to the case of unusual utilization
of water. However, they ruled, if a neighboring land is flooded during
normal watering of one’s land, then causing it to flood is not considered
a transgression, and no compensation is required.22
2. The user of water should use public property for watering passage if such
public passages are available. However, if there is not public passage for
water, then owners of private properties must give him permission to run
his water through their property. This ruling is based on the ruling by
c
Umar (mAbpwh) regarding the complaint of Al-D . ah.h.āk ibn Kh alı̄fa, who
¯
wanted to run his water through the land of Muh.ammad ibn Maslamah.
When the latter refused his request, c Umar told him: “I swear by Allāh
that he will run his water through your property, even if he has to do it
over your very abdomen”.23
3. Watering rights may be inherited, or specified in a will. This ruling is

accepted even by the H . anafı̄s who otherwise do not allow legal rights and
usufruct to be inherited. Moreover, the non-H . anafı̄s allow the sale of
watering rights independently of the land. However, the H . anafı̄s did not
allow such sales since the object of the sale would be unknown in quantity,
thus resulting in harm and injustice. Moreover, the H . anafı̄s based their
ruling on the view that legal rights are not valued properties, and thus
may not be given independently in a sale, gift, lease, or charity.24 The
non-H. anafı̄ ruling is more appropriate, thus treating usufruct and legal
rights as valued properties, in agreement with social convention (c urf).
4. If water has a single owner, then he may use it as he wishes. On the other
hand, if the water has multiple owners, few or many, then it must be di-
vided among them fairly. For instance, they may rotate watering days,
thus dividing watering rights temporally. Alternatively, they may dig
ditches of proportional size to the lands to be watered. The Shāfic ı̄s agreed
¯
with those provisions for fair distribution of watering rights.25 Thus, eq-
uity in water rights is determined in proportion to the size of land to be
watered, in contrast to rights of usage of public roads, which usage is the
same for all individuals.
22 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.149), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.317).
c
23 Tanwı̄r Al-H arh. Al-Muwat..ta’ (vol.2, p.218 onwards).
. awālik Sh
¯
24 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.316 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6,
p.43), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.150), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.189).
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.375).
Justice also dictates that any change in water right apportionment must
be conducted with mutual consent. Thus, no party is allowed to install
watering machines, dig or widen ditches, etc. without the consent of oth-
ers with whom he shares watering rights. Similarly, if the distribution
is determined temporally, then changing the distribution to a special one
requires mutual consent, and vice versa. Finally, adding more lands to
be watered by an individual’s watering rights, in the case of special ap-
portionment, could potentially result in harm to others, and thus requires
their mutual consent.26
27
5. The H . anafı̄s ruled based on juristic approbation that it is permissible to
claim watering rights without owning land. They based this ruling on the
view that watering rights are beneficial and desirable goods. They also
reasoned that such rights may be inherited or received in a will without
owning any land. Finally, they reasoned that land can be sold without the
watering rights, in which case the original owner of the legal right retains
it after the sale of land. Thus, if another were to take this legal right from
him, he may sue in a court of law to prove and protect his rights.
6. The order of watering from rainwater or the water of small rivers with
limited supply is top-to-bottom. Thus, the highest plots of lands should
be watered first until the water is a few inches high, and then the water
should be sent to the second highest plot of land, and so on.28 This ruling
is based on the H . adı̄th narrated by c Ubādah that “The Prophet (pbuh)
¯
ruled with regards to watering palm trees from rain water thus: The higher
lands are to be watered first until the water reaches ‘the heels’ of the palm
trees. Then, the water should be sent to the second lowest land, and so
on, until all the trees are watered or water runs out”.29
In this regard, c Abdullāh ibn Al-Zubayr also narrated that Al-Zubayr and
one of the ’Ans.ār disputed over a small river used to water palm trees.
The ’Ans.ārı̄ asked Al-Zubayr to let water flow to his land, and the latter
refused. They took their dispute to the Prophet (pbuh), who ordered Al-
Zubayr to water his land and then send the water to his neighbor’s. The
’Ans.ārı̄ said: “Is this your ruling because he is your cousin, O messenger
of Allāh?”. Thus, the Prophet’s face changed in color, and he told Al-
Zubayr: “Water your land, until the water reaches ‘the heels’ of your
. .
p.42), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.148 onwards), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Sh āfic ı̄), vol.4, p.258),
¯
’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.428), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.533-6).
c
27 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n¯ ((Hanafı̄),
¯
vol.5, p.314), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.40),
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.147).
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.373), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.219 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5,
p.531).
29 Narrated by ’Ibn Mājah and c Abdullāh ibn ’Ahmad. It was also narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd
.
with a good chain of narrators.
palm trees”.30 Al-Zubayr said that he thought that this ’Ans.ārı̄ was the
subject of the verse: “No, by your Lord, they have no faith unless they
make you judge in all disputes between them” [4:65].
Mālik also narrated in Al-Muwat..ta’ on the authority of c Abdullāh ibn ’Abı̄
Bakr ibn Muh.ammad ibn c Amr ibn H . azm that he heard that the Prophet
(pbuh) ruled regarding watering with rain water that “they may be held
until they reach the heels of the palm trees, and then allowed to flow to
lower lands”.31
Maintenance and grafting of rivers

This category includes all changes in rivers used for watering, including grafting
(removing mud and silt from the bottom), digging, repairing the banks and
bridges, etc. Rulings pertaining to the costs of such activities depend on the
type of river. In this regard, there are three types of rivers:32
1. The first type includes major public rivers that are not privately owned,
e.g. the Nile and the Euphrates. Expenses of maintaining such rivers
should be taken from the Muslim treasury, and financed by revenues from
kharāj and jizyah, to the exclusion of revenues from c ushr and zakāh. This
¯ ¯
ruling follows from the view that such repairs are intended for public
benefit, and thus must be encumbered by the Muslim treasury, as per
the H. adı̄th : “Output belongs to one who bears the risk” (al-kharāju bi-l-
¯ ¯
d.amān).33
If the Muslim treasury lacks sufficient funds, the ruler may force people to
maintain the river if they refuse to do it voluntarily. This ruling is meant
to avoid free-riding and ensure public benefits. In this regard, c Umar
(mAbpwh) indicated that people generally may be too greedy to do what
is right, saying: “If left to your own devices, you would probably sell your
own children”.
If the public is forced to maintain the river themselves, then the rich should
be taxed sufficiently to fund the operation, and the able bodied poor
should be required to perform the work, and they can thus be compensated
by the funds (taxes!) collected from the rich. This ruling is analogous to
the division of responsibilities in preparing Muslim armies.
2. The second type includes rivers that are neither public (in the sense of
belonging to everyone), nor privately owned (in the sense of belonging
to a known group of individuals). The maintenance costs for such rivers
30 Agreed upon by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim. It was also narrated by Mālik in Al-Muwatta’
¯ ..
on the authority of c Abdullāh ibn Al-Zubayr.
31 Al-Suyūtı̄ (b, vol.2, p.217).
.
32 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.46 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.313 on-
. .
wards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.7, p.191 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6,
p.40 onwards).
33 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the authors of the four Sunan books on the authority of c A’isha,
. ¯
but rendered a weak H . adı̄th by Al-Bukhārı̄, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.30).
¯ ¯
should be encumbered by those who benefit from its waters, based on the
rule of “benefits being justified by risks and other costs”. If anyone who
benefits from the river refuses to contribute to its maintenance, he may
thus be forced to do so, in order to protect the general benefit of all other
beneficiaries.
3. The third and final type of rivers are those owned by a known finite group
of individuals. The maintenance costs of such rivers are also encumbered
by their owners who benefit from their waters. However, if all the owners
decide not to maintain the river, the ruler may not force them to do
so. The latter ruling is in analogy to other private properties, which the
owner is not required by law to maintain. On the other hand, if some of
the owners choose to contribute to the river’s maintenance, while others
refuse, jurists disagreed over whether or not those who refused should be
forced to contribute. Those who ruled that the non-contributing owners
may be forced to contribute relied on the view that the benefits from the
river affect all the owners. In contrast, those who ruled that they may
not be forced argued that forcing them to contribute harms them, and
that the harm caused to other partners may be removed by allowing them
to maintain the river by court order, and establish the non-contributing
partners’ shares as debts to be collected later.
Jurists also differed over the division of maintenance costs if the river’s
path requires repairing areas other than its source:
• ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that owners of land between the source and the
area to be maintained are not required to share in the maintenance
cost. He based this ruling on the view that the purpose of mainte-
nance is to allow owners to water their land. Thus, since the up-
stream landowner can water his land without need of maintaining
downstream stretches of the river, he should not contribute to main-
tenance that will only help others.
• ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that all partners must share in
the cost of maintenance in proportion to the sizes of their lands and
the water requirements thereof. They based this ruling on the view
that the upstream landowner still benefits from maintaining the river
downstream to ensure proper drainage. This opinion seems to be
more reasonable than that of ’Abū H. anı̄fa.
All three H
. anafı̄ masters agreed that the cost of repairs near the source
should be borne by all partners, since all their benefits depend on such
repairs.
109.2.2 Drinking rights

“Drinking rights” include the rights for humans to drink, allow their animals to
drink, and obtain sufficient water for domestic usage such as cooking, washing,
etc.34 The rulings for drinking rights are very similar to those of watering rights,
with some minor differences indicated below.
The rulings for drinking rights depend on the type of water involved. In this
regard, jurists considered four types of water:35
1. Sea water is considered ownerless. Thus, everyone has watering and drink-
ing rights in this water, and is authorized to use it in anyway. In this
regard, using sea water is the same as using the sunlight, moonlight, and
air.
2. All people have drinking rights and watering rights in the water of major
rivers such as the Nile, the Euphrates, Tigris, etc., provided that the
usage does not harm society. This ruling follows from the permissibility of
acquiring and using such ownerless property. Such permissibility is always
restricted by the provision of causing no harm to any members of society,
e.g. by destroying river banks and thus causing flooding of villages and
agricultural lands.
3. All people also have drinking rights in the waters of small rivers owned
by various communities. This ruling is based on necessity, and the default
ruling of partnership in water, based on the H . adı̄th : “People are partners
¯
in water, grass, and fire”. Moreover, since carrying large amounts of
drinking water is not feasible, it is necessary to establish drinking rights
to all people to avoid major harm.
However, if the owned river or well was located in owned land, the landowner
may forbid others their drinking rights by preventing them from entering
his land, provided that there is other water nearby.36 If there is no water
nearby, then the landowner must either take the water out to the one who
needs to drink, or allow him to get to the water in a manner that does
not harm the river or well. This ruling is again based on the universal
establishment of drinking rights for those who need water for their own
survival or the survival of his animals.
If the landowner prevents one in need of water from accessing it, then
the latter may fight him using lethal weapons, and he may then take as
much water as he needs to avoid perishing. This ruling is based on the
previously cited statement of c Umar authorizing those in need of water
to fight for it if necessary. The ruling is further supported by the view
that the needy person thus has an established drinking right in the water,
and the landowner is considered a transgressor by preventing him from
exercising that right.
34 Mukhtasar Al-Muc āmalāt Al-Sharc iyyah by Sheikh c Alı̄ Al-Khafı̄f (p.18).
. ¯c
35 ’Ibn¯ Al-Humām ((H
¯
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.144 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence),
vol.6, p.40), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.188 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.311
onwards).
36 Nearness of water is determined by a circle of one-mile radius, as in the case of using dust
for ritual ablution when water is not available.

109.3. WATER PASSAGE RIGHTS 513
Most jurists go further by authorizing people to take some of that water

with them to perform ritual ablutions and wash their clothes. This ruling
is based on the view that forbidding people access to water for such func-
tions is a form of lowliness. The Prophet (pbuh) said: “Allāh likes high
moral standards, and hates lowliness”.37 In contrast, most jurists agree
that the water owner is allowed to prevent others from taking his water
for tree and plant watering at his home, unless he is willing to permit him
to do so.
Finally, if the landowner had a small water stream and felt that the in-
coming livestock would drink all the water if allowed, most jurists agreed
that the owner may thus prevent the animals from drinking his water.
This ruling is made in analogy to the case of using his water for watering
plants, since both cases may cause significant harm to the owner.
4. Water possessed in special containers is considered owned by its possessor.

Thus, no person other than the owner has any drinking, watering, or other
rights to this water without the owner’s permission.
However, we have previously seen that one in need of the water for drinking
to avoid perishing may fight the owner (without the use of lethal weapons)
for the water, provided that he cannot find other water nearby, and that
the owner himself does need the water for survival.
109.3 Water passage rights

The owner of land that is far away from a water source has the right to pass
water through the property of another to enable him to water his land. The
actual water passageway may be owned by the owner of the far away land, the
owner of the intermediate land, by both, or by a larger group of people.
The general ruling in this regard is that the owner of an intermediate land
is forbidden from preventing his neighbor from running water through his prop-
erty, as per the above mentioned ruling of c Umar. Moreover, the landowner
is not allowed to move the water passageway without the full consent of its
beneficiaries, who also have the right to repair the passageway or modify it to
improve its function. The landowner is also allowed to demand that the bene-
ficiaries repair their water passageway, to ensure that water does not seep into
his land and ruin his crops.
If the water passageway is shared by a number of people, none of them is
permitted to plug it without their mutual consent to alternate plugging it to
water their respective lands sequentially. This condition is based on the juristic
rule: “A private harm is tolerated to avoid public harm”. If a person’s partners
forbid him from stopping the water flow to water his land, then he is permitted
to use a machine to pump water to his land.38
37 A
good H. adı̄th narrated by Al-T . abarānı̄ on the authority of Al-H
. usayn ibn Alı̄.
c
((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.190 onwards), Al-’Amwāl wa Naz. ariyyat Al-c Aqd (p.176
onwards), Mukhtas.ar Al-Muc āmalāt Al-Sharc iyyah (p.20).

¯ ¯
If a right to water passage historically applied to some land, it should be

maintained,39 based on the juristic rule: “Old rights are left in place” (grandfa-
ther rule). An exception to this case exists if retaining the existing rights causes
harm to the landowner, based on another juristic rule: “Old rights cannot be
harmful”.
If a new water passageway needs to be constructed through public property,
then its construction requires an official government permission, to avoid harm-
ing public interests. On the other hand, if a new passageway needs to be built
through a private property, the owner’s permission should be sought. However,
the landowner is not allowed to prevent the building of such water passageways,
as shown by the above mentioned ruling of c Umar empowering Al-D . ah.h.āk to
dig a water passageway through the land of Muh.ammad ibn Salamh, even if by
force.40
109.4 Drainage rights
The difference between water passage rights and drainage rights is that the
former pertains to passing good water from a water source to one’s land, while
the latter refers to passing used or polluted water from one’s land to a ditch
or other disposal area. Drainage rights may be established through a covered
pipe, or through an uncovered drainage passageway. Such passageways may be
owned by the beneficiary, the owner of the land through which it runs, or it
may be a public utility.
If a land is designated for the passage of drainage of a neighbor, the landowner
is not allowed to object to that designation unless such drainage causes a demon-
strable harm to his property. Moreover, such designation for drainage passage
remain intact even if the land changes its nature (e.g. from agricultural land to
residential or industrial property).
Old drainage rights are respected as long as they do not cause public or
private harm to others. As we have seen the latter qualification is based on the
juristic rules that “causes of harm must be removed”, and “old rights cannot
be harmful”.
Finally, the costs of maintaining drainage must be encumbered by the ben-
eficiary, whether the drainage passageway runs through his property or the
property of another. If the drainage passageway runs through public property,
then its maintenance should be paid out of the Muslim treasury.41
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.314), Al-Kh
¯
arāj by ’Abū Yūsuf (p.99).
40 Narrated by Mālik in his Muwat..ta’ (vol.2, p.218), and by Yah.yā ibn ’Adam in his Al-
Kharāj (p.110).
¯ 41
Lecture notes: Mukhtas.ar Al-Muc āmalāt Al-Sharc iyyah by Sh. c Alı̄ Al-Khafı̄f (p.20
¯ ¯ ¯
onwards).
109.5. PASSAGE RIGHTS 515
109.5 Passage rights

People have the right of passage to get to their property, whether by passing
through public property, the private property of another, or property jointly
owned by one and another. The ruling pertaining to passage rights depend on
the type of road:
1. All people may use public roads for passage, opening windows or alleys
that lead to it, parking animals and automobiles, or establishing centers
for trading. Those freedoms are unrestricted except for two conditions:42
(a) Safety and avoidance of harming others. This is based on the H

. adı̄th :
¯
“lā d.arara wa la d.irār”.43
(b) Obtaining the ruler’s permission.
All jurists agree that actions that harm others are not permitted in public
roads. ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that even if the user does not cause harm to
others, he still needs the ruler’s permission to use the public road, while
’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that this permission is not necessary.
The Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s also ruled that an official permission to use
¯
public roads is not required.44 They based this ruling on the H . adı̄th :
¯
“Whoever beats other Muslims to any ownerless property thus has priority
for that priority”.
The Mālikı̄s, ruled further that it is not permissible to build on public
roads or make any additions to one’s own property causing incursion into
the public roads.45 In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled46 that any building
¯
or incursion into a public road is deemed to harm the rights of other users
of the road, and are thus forbidden.
2. Only the owners of a private road and their families are entitled to use
it. Thus, others are not permitted to open a door or window leading to
that road. However, if the public roads are crowded, then all people have
a right of passage through the private road. Consequently, the owners of
a private road are not permitted to block or remove it, in order to protect
the public benefit it provides to others.
If the private road has multiple owners, then none of them has the right
to build, or cause incursions into the road by opening a window or door,
without the mutual consent of all owners. If one of the partners is given
. .
p.142 onwards), Jāmic Al-Fus.ūlayn (vol.2, p.197), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.330
onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.182).
43 Meaning no ¯ ¯ ¯
initial causing of harm, and no excessive punishment that amounts to causing
new harm.
.
45 ’Ibn ¯Juzayy ((Mālikı̄),
¯ ¯
p.341).
¯ . ¯ ¯
such a permission, and then sells his interest to a new partner, the latter
needs to seek a new permission to build a new room, window, etc.47
109.6 Vertical neighborhood rights

The H . anafı̄s ruled that an upstairs neighbor always has the right to maintain the
structure of the downstairs neighbor, without owning the latter’s roof. Thus,
they ruled that this right does not perish if either the upstairs structure, or
the downstairs structure, or both, perish. Thus, this right for the upstairs
neighbor continues to exist, and is thus transferred to heirs upon the death of
its possessor.
The Mālikı̄s ruled48 that the roof of the downstairs neighbor belongs to that
neighbor, who thus is required to repair or rebuild it if necessary. However, they
agree with the H . anafı̄s in establishing the right of the upstairs neighbor to live
above that roof.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled49 ruled that the downstairs neighbor’s roof
¯
is jointly owned with the upstairs neighbor. They based this ruling on the
view that both neighbors share in using that entity as a roof for the downstairs
neighbor, and a floor for the upstairs neighbor, in analogy to common walls
shared by horizontal neighbors. Hence, they ruled that neither neighbor has
the right to make an opening, attach a beam, to otherwise, to that roof/floor
without the consent of the other. They further ruled that the upstairs neighbor
should use the roof/floor according to social custom. Finally, they ruled that if
the roof/floor was destroyed, then neither party may force the other to rebuild
it. They based the latter ruling on the juristic rule that “harm cannot be
removed through another harm”, and the fact that the forced party would thus
be harmed by bearing an expense of rebuilding.
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the upstairs neighbor’s right may not be sold in-
dependently of the property itself. They based this ruling on their view that
such legal rights do not constitute valued properties, and thus may not be sold.
In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄s ruled that that right may be sold independently,
since they considered legal rights to be properties. The non-H . anafı̄ ruling in
this case seems to be more logical, more appropriate juristically, and closer to
social customs.
’Abū H. anı̄fa differed in opinion with ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad over the
scope of actions permissible for the upstairs and downstairs neighbors:50
47 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.320), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), ibid.), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.341), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ . ¯
((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.184).
c
¯
49 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.193), Al-Nawawı̄’s Rawdat Al-Tālibı̄n (vol.4,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . .
pp.219,226).
50 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.4, pp.194-196), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.5,
. .
pp.502 onwards,506), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.264 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄),
vol.4, pp.375-7).
109.7. HORIZONTAL NEIGHBORHOOD RIGHTS 517
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that the default ruling is lack of freedom in dealing with
one’s property if rights of another are attached to it. Thus, he ruled that
a neighbor is not allowed to deal in his property without the approval
of his neighbor whose rights are attached to the property, whether or
not the dealing may affect that neighbor adversely. In particular, the
downstairs neighbor is not allowed to make any changes to his structure
(e.g. opening a window, moving a wall, putting a beam, etc.) without
his upstairs neighbor’s approval, even if the change does not harm the
latter. On the other hand, the upstairs neighbor is not allowed to add any
building that may weaken the lower structure.
• In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the default ruling is
permissibility of actions in one’s property, unless his actions are harmful to
others. Consequently, they ruled that the downstairs neighbor is allowed
to change his property in any manner that does not harm the upstairs
structure. Their opinion was selected by latter H . anafı̄s based on juristic
approbation,51 and this is the more logical and more appropriate opinion
in this case.
109.7 Horizontal neighborhood rights

Each neighbor has an easement right towards the property of his immediate
horizontal neighbor, provided that he does not cause any harm to that property.
In this regard, avoiding any action that may harm one’s neighbor is a religious
duty on Muslims, as per the H . adı̄th : “If a man’s neighbors are not safe from
¯
his evil deeds will not enter paradise”.52 Despite that general ruling, jurists
stipulated a number of rulings that prevent harming one’s neighbor, as detailed
below.53
’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled by analogy, and the Sh āfic ı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s agreed with the
¯
ruling, that a property owner is allowed to deal in his property as he wishes,
even if his action causes harm to others. Thus, he has the right to open any
windows he wishes, remove any walls, digs any wells, erect any factories, and
use the building as a house or store as he wishes. However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled
¯
according to the latter Shāfic ı̄ opinion54 differently regarding joint walls between
¯
neighbors. Neither partner is allowed to make any changes or otherwise affect
the joint wall or use it for support without his neighbor’s permission. However,
they allowed such usage of a third party’s wall as long as the usage does not
affect that wall’s owner adversely.
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled by juristic approbation that
the owner of any immovable property is forbidden from taking any actions that
51 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H. anafı̄), vol.4, p.375).
52 Narrated by Muslim on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah.
. .
Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.15, p.21), Al-’Umm (vol.3, p.222 onwards), Al-Muh.allā
¯
(vol.8, p.241; 1355 C.E.), Mukhtas.ar Al-Muc āmalāt Al-Sharc iyyah (p.23).
54 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Sh ¯ c ¯
āfi ı̄), vol.2, p.189).
¯ . ¯ ¯
may cause a demonstrable and significant harm to his neighbor. This is the
opinion accepted by the later H . anafı̄s, and adopted in Al-Majallah. It is based
on the H . adı̄th : “No harm, and no excessive counter harm”. The determinant
¯
of whether a harm is demonstrable and significant is whether it can weaken
the neighbor’s structure, cause part thereof to fall, or otherwise harm him in a
permanent manner. This category of harm also includes any outcome that makes
it impossible for the neighbor to use all of his property (e.g. if he blocks the
light from his neighbor’s yard or increases the level of air and sound pollution
in the neighborhood). If a neighbor undertakes any action that causes such
demonstrable and significant harm to his neighbor directly or indirectly, he is
ordered to remove the causes of harm and to pay compensation for that harm.
55
The Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled similarly that the owner of a property is
not allowed to use it in any way that harms others, even if he only intended
to harm them without actually doing so. Thus, if there is no apparent benefit
that he may derive from his action, or if it is obvious that the action is meant
to harm others, the owner may thus be prevented from undertaking the action.
This ruling is based on the fact that Muslims are forbidden from intentionally
causing harm to others.
However, most of the Mālikı̄s ruled that a person should not be prevented
from raising his building in a manner that may block the light from reaching
his neighbor. In contrast, the majority ruled that he would be forbidden from
building in a way that blocks air from his neighbor. Moreover, all Mālikı̄s agreed
that ways of causing new harm (e.g. making a hole in the wall that exposes the
neighbor’s home) are forbidden. Similarly, uses of one’s property that increase
the level of noise or air pollution in the property of one’s neighbor are not allowed
(e.g. establishing an iron-smith shop in a residential neighborhood), unless he
can use pollution-abatement devices to protect his neighbor. Finally, they ruled
that allowing water to flow in ways that harm the neighbor’s property is also
forbidden.
In summary, the main thrust of Islamic jurisprudence allows owners to use
their properties in any manner that does not harm their neighbors in a sig-
nificant manner. Similarly, if any rights or patterns of usage existed prior to
neighborhood, they are left in place unless they harm the new neighbor.
55 Al-Muwāfaqāt (vol.2, p.349), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.341).

Part XIX
Share-cropping
Arrangements
519
Chapter 110
Muzāraca or Mukhābara
¯
In this chapter, we shall study this contract in terms of its definition, legality,
cornerstones and contract characteristics, conditions, types and states, legal
status, termination and various voiding cases. Those sub-topics will be covered
in five sections.
110.1 Definition, legality, and cornerstones

110.1.1 Definition
Muzāarac a refers literally to joint acts of planting. The term refers legally to
a contract for planting compensated with part of the produce.1 The Mālikı̄s
defined it as a partnership in crops.2 The H . anbalı̄s defined it as a landlord
giving a farmer access to work his land or plant it, with an agreement to share
the crop.3
The contract is also called mukhābara, derived from khabār, meaning fertile
¯ ¯
land, or muh.āqala. In Iraq, the contract is called qarāh.. In this regard, the
c
Shāfi ı̄s defined mukhābara as working the land in exchange for part of the
¯ ¯
produce, where the worker/farmer provides all seeds. In contrast, they defined
muzāara a as a similar contract, where the landlord provides the seeds.4
c
In summary: muzārac a is an investment contract involving agricultural land.

The two parties to the contract are the landlord and the worker/farmer. The
contract specifies that crop is to be shared between the parties according to
agreed-upon shares.
1 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.175), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.278), ’Ibn
c
c Ābidı̄n((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.193), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.32).
3 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.382), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.523).
.
¯ . ¯ ¯
521
522 CHAPTER 110. MUZĀRAC A OR MUKHĀBARA
¯
110.1.2 Legality
c
’Abū H. anı̄fa and Zufar rendered muzāra a impermissible and defective. In other
words, they considered muzārac a contracts for one-third or one-quarter of the
produce to be invalid.5
Similarly, Al-Shāfic ı̄ deemed muzārac a to be impermissible. In this regard,
¯
the Shāfic ı̄s later permitted the contract as a derivative of the musāqāh contract
¯
(discussed below) if the need should dictate it. Thus, if there were empty
spaces between palm trees subject to a musāqāh contract, then they deemed
muzārac a with the same worker/farmer over the land to be valid if it is difficult
to water the palm trees to the exclusion of the adjacent spaces. In this case,
it is commonly assumed that the farmer’s watering and aeration of the land
between palm trees benefits those trees. However, the Shāfic ı̄s argued that it
¯
is better to stipulate both contracts simultaneously, and avoiding stipulation
c
of the muzāra a contract prior to the musāqāh contract, since the former is
derivative of the latter. Finally, the Shāfic ı̄s deemed mukhābara derivative to
¯ ¯
musāqāh to be invalid, since they do not recognize the validity of the former.6
’Abū H. anı̄fa, Zufar, and Al-Sh āfi ı̄ based their ruling of invalidity of muzārac a
c
¯
on the Prophet’s (pbuh) prohibition of mukhābara (which is the same as muzārac a.7
¯
In addition, they reasoned that the wages of the farmer (his share of the land’s
produce) is non-existent at the inception of the contract, and its future amount
is uncertain. The former non-existence of one compensation of the contract,
and the latter ignorance of its future amount, render a lease or hiring contract
defective.
In this regard, the Prophet’s (pbuh) dealing with the people of Khaybar,
¯
which we shall discuss below, was taking a fixed percentage of the produce
(e.g. one-third or one-quarter of its output) as a tax (kharāj) based on mutual
¯
agreement, which is permissible.8 However, many Shāfic ı̄ jurists ruled that this
¯
dealing of the Prophet (pbuh) with the people of Khaybar was sufficient proof
¯
to legalize muzārac a as a separate contract. Moreover, they deemed mukhābara
c ¯
to be akin to muzāra a.
The majority of jurists, including ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad, Mālik, ’Ah.mad,
and Dāwūd Al-Z.āhirı̄, ruled that muzārac a is permissible, based on the above
5 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.32). In this regard, they mentioned one-third or one-
.
quarter shares since those were the conventional share-cropping shares during their time.
Moreover, they specified specific shares to highlight the source of their disagreement with the
contract’s validity, since everyone agrees that the contract would be defective if the shares
were not specified.
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.349).
7 Narrated by Muslim on the authority of Jābir ibn c Abdillāh and ’Ibn c Umar, that Rāfic
ibn Khudayj narrated that the Messenger of Allāh forbade the contract (c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-
¯
Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.4, p.180). Muslim also narrated on the authority of Thābit
¯ ¯
ibn Al-D . ah.h.āk that the Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) forbade muzāra a. ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-
c
Nasā’ı̄, ’Ah.mad, and Al-Bukhārı̄ also narrated the H . adı̄th of Rāfi forbidding the rental of
c
¯ ¯
agricultural land, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.6, pp.275,280).
8 There are two types of¯agricultural land taxes (kharāj): (i) a fixed known amount for each
¯
fixed area of open land, and (ii) a fixed share of the land’s produce, c.f. Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄
Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.278).
110.1. DEFINITION, LEGALITY, AND CORNERSTONES 523
mentioned dealing of the Prophet (pbuh) with the people of Khaybar for a share
¯
in their crops or fruits.9 In addition those jurists reasoned that the contract
is a partnership between property and work, which is thus deemed permissible
in analogy to mud.āraba, to meet people’s needs. In this regard, the landowner
may not be skilled in agriculture, and thus cooperating with a farmer can be
mutually beneficial.
In this context, the H
. anafı̄s accept the opinions of ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad,
based on need for such contracts, and their common usage in convention. This
opinion seems to be most appropriate since the contract is similar both to part-
nerships and to leasing. Similarity to partnerships arises from sharing the pro-
duce according to agreed-upon ratios, while similarity to leasing arises from
jointly using the land, and compensating the worker with a share of the crop.
On the other hand, the contract differs from partnerships in that the landlord’s
share is a percentage of the land’s produce rather than a percentage of the net
profits. Similarly, the contract differs from simple leasing since the rent is spec-
ified as a fixed share of the output. Indeed, were the rent specified as a fixed
amount (e.g. a ton of wheat or rice), the contract would be a standard lease
rather than share-cropping.
110.1.3 Cornerstones and characteristics

c
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the cornerstones of muzāra a are offer and acceptance.
For instance, the landlord may give the farmer access to the land, saying: “I give
you this land under a contract of muzārac a according to such-and-such shares”,
and the worker states his acceptance of that offer. Thus, with the offer and
acceptance, the contract would be concluded.10
The three parties to the contract are: the landlord, the farmer or worker,
and the object of the contract, which may be seen as either the land’s usufruct,
or the farmer’s labor. In this regard, the H . anafı̄s considered the contract a least
at its inception, and a partnership at its conclusion. Moreover, they ruled that
the object of the contract is the land’s usufruct if the farmer provided the seeds,
and the farmer’s labor if the landlord provided the seeds.
c
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that muzāra a and musāqāh do not require a verbal
acceptance of the offer. Thus, they ruled that if the farmer commences working
the land, that is considered an implicit acceptance, in analogy to the agency
contract.11
c
The H . anafı̄s characterized the muzāra a contract as a non-binding contract,
in analogy to other forms of partnership. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that once
the seeds are sown, or seedless bulbs are planted, the contract becomes binding.
This is similar to the accepted opinion among Mālikı̄s that property partnerships
9 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the six major narrators on the authority of ’Ibn c Umar. Also
.
narrated on the authorities of ’Ibn c Abbās and Jābir ibn c Abdillāh, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5,
¯
p.272).
.
11 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.528 onwards).
.
¯
become binding by virtue of the contract language.12 The H . anbalı̄s, on the other
c
hand, agreed with the H. anafı̄s and ruled that muzāra a and musāqāh are non-
binding contracts that may be voided by either party, and that are deemed void
and invalid upon the death of either one.13
110.2 Muzārac a conditions

In the H. anafı̄ school, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad stipulated conditions for
the contracting parties, the crop, the plant, the land, the contract object, the
method of planting, and the period of muzārac a.14
110.2.1 Contracting party conditions

There are two general conditions in contracts:
1. Each contracting party must be sane and discerning. Thus muzārac a is

not valid if conducted by an insane person or a non-discerning child, since
sanity and discernment are eligibility conditions for all dealings.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s do not require contracting parties in
muzārac a to be of legal age, thus allowing the muzārac a of a permitted
discerning child, in analogy to their ruling in leasing and hire contracts.
This ruling by analogy is based on the view that muzārac a is a form of
leasing in exchange for a share in the output. On the other hand, the
Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled in accordance to their view in other contracts
¯
that being of legal age is a requirement for the validity of a muzārac a
contract.
c
2. ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that validity of muzāra a requires that the contracting
party is not an apostate male, since he deemed all dealings of an apostate
to be suspended. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad deemed the
muzārac a of an apostate male valid and executed. On the other hand, all
c
H. anafı̄s agreed that muzāra a is valid for an apostate female.
110.2.2 Crop conditions

The crop must be known to all parties. This ruling follows from the fact that
different crops affect the land differently. On the other hand, the ruling based
on juristic approbation does not render disclosure of the type of crop a condition
of the contract, giving the farmer full discretion in selecting the crop.
12 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.278), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.492
.
onwards).
13 Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.2, p.154).
.
14 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, pp.176-180), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.34 onwards),
. .
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.230), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
¯ . .
p.279), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.193).
110.2. MUZĀRAC A CONDITIONS 525
110.2.3 Plant conditions

The planted crop must be eligible for growth in standard agricultural conditions.
In other words, it must be a kind of plant that conventionally grows as farming
labor is applied.
110.2.4 Produce conditions

The contract is deemed defective if the following conditions are not met:
1. Nature of the produce must be specified in the contract, since it resembles
rent, ignorance of which would render the lease defective.
2. The produce must be shared between the contracting parties, thus the
contract is deemed defective if all of the produce is given to one of them.
3. Shares in the produce must be specified (e.g. one-half, one-third, etc.),
otherwise the contract would contain ignorance that may lead to dispute.
4. The produce must be divided according to un-identified shares. Thus, if
one of the parties is guaranteed a fixed amount, or the output of a fixed
part of the land, the contract would not be valid, since that may be equal
to the total produce.
Similarly, it is not valid to specify that the produce near a waterwheel or
a water-stream belongs to one of the contracting parties, since the entire
crop may come from those areas. Finally, it is not permissible to specify
that the kernels belong to one contracting party and the chaff belongs
to the other, since it is possible for all kernels to be destroyed by some
natural cause, making the entire output chaff.
The Mālikı̄s stipulated a condition that both parties must share equally
in the produce. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s agreed with the
¯
H. anafı̄ ruling allowing the pre-specified ratio to be different from one-half.
110.2.5 Agricultural land conditions

The following conditions pertain to the land:
1. The land must be fertile. Thus, if the land is a swamp or otherwise
infertile, the contract would be deemed impermissible. This ruling follows
from the fact that muzārac a is a form of lease in exchange for a share of
output, and swamps and similar lands may not be leased, and therefore
do not qualify for muzārac a.
2. The land must be known for the muzārac a to be valid, since ignorance
may lead to disputes.
3. The worker/farmer must be given full access to the land. Thus, if the
contract includes a condition that the landlord must work the land, or
must share in the work, the muzārac a would be deemed invalid.
¯
110.2.6 Object of contract conditions

The object of a muzārac a contract must be legally and conventionally accepted
as an agricultural activity. This follows from the fact that the object of the
contract is either the land’s usufruct (if the worker provided the seeds) or the
farmer’s labor (if the landlord provided the seeds).
Thus, if the object of the lease contract is both the land’s usufruct and the
farmer’s labor (by violating the above listed two conventions), the muzārac a
would be deemed defective. The muzārac a would also be defective if the nature
of labor is non-agricultural (e.g. quarrying or paving roads), the muzārac a.
110.2.7 Means of production conditions

The usage of tools or livestock in agricultural production must be derivative
of the contract, and not its purpose. Thus, if the contract is written for the
express purpose of using such tools or animals, the muzārac a would be deemed
defective.
110.2.8 Contract period conditions

The period of muzārac a must be known, since the contract is in essence a lease
in exchange for a crop-share. Since leases are invalid if their period is not
known, so is muzārac a. In this regard, the period of muzārac a is determined by
convention. Thus, the contract would be deemed defective if the farmer is not
given access to the land for part of the period, or if either party dies prior to its
expiration.
c
On the other hand, the accepted opinion in the H . anafı̄ school is that muzāra a
is valid even if the period is not specified. The period of the contract is thus
implicitly defined as the time it takes for one crop to grow.15
In summary, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad deem a muzārac a to be valid if it
satisfies eight conditions:
1. Eligibility of the contracting parties.
2. Specification of the contract period (the accepted opinion in the H

. anafı̄
school does not require this condition).
3. Fertility of the land, and possibility of tilling it.
4. Giving the farmer access to the land.
5. Produce must be shared according to un-identified shares, to effect the

essence of partnership.
6. Identification of the party responsible for providing the seeds, to avoid dis-
putes, and identify the object of the contract as either the land’s usufruct,
or the farmer’s labor.
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.193).
110.2. MUZĀRAC A CONDITIONS 527
7. Specifying the shares of both parties, the one providing the seeds and the
one not providing them.16
8. The genus of the seeds must be known so that the genus of the wages
is known, and since different types of seeds require different amounts of
labor to yield a significant crop. On the other hand, the ruling according
to juristic approbation does not stipulate this as a condition.
As for the period of the contract, the H . anafı̄s and apparent opinion of
’Ah.mad do not stipulate its specification as a condition. In contrast the Mālikı̄s
and Shāfic ı̄s stipulated that the muzārac a period must be known.
¯
Mālikı̄ conditions
The Mālikı̄s stipulated three conditions in muzārac a:17
1. Avoidance of leasing land for a forbidden rent. For instance, the land or
part thereof must not be exchanged for seeds, foodstuffs (grown on the
land or otherwise, e.g. honey), or land output (e.g. cotton) other than
wood. In other words, validity of a muzārac a requires that land is leased in
exchange for a rent paid in gold, silver, tradable goods, or animals. They
further stipulated that seeds must be provided jointly by the landlord and
farmer. Thus, if one party provides the seeds and the other provides the
land, the muzārac a would be deemed defective. They based this ruling on
the prohibition in Sunnah of leasing land for rent that it produces.18
2. Both parties must share equally in all inputs (excluding seeds) and out-
puts, otherwise the muzārac a is deemed defective. After the partnership
is binding, it is permissible for either party to donate an increased share
in costs or profits if they so wish.
3. Both parties must provide the same type of seeds (e.g. wheat, barley, etc.).
Thus, if one provides one type of seed and the other provides another, the
muzārac a is deemed defective, and each is entitled to the output of the
genus he provided.
On the other hand, the majority of Mālikı̄s accepted the opinion of Mālik
and ’Ibn Al-Qāsim that the seeds provided by the two parties need not
be mixed physically or legally. Thus, they ruled in analogy to other prop-
erty partnerships that even if the seeds provided by the two parties were
separate, the partnership is valid.
16 In Al-Hidāyah, the author states that the share of the one not providing seeds must be
specified since he deserves a compensation according to contract conditions, which should thus
be known. However, Qādı̄ Zādah said regarding this condition that specifying the share of
the one not providing the seeds is the important condition, but it is of no great significance
to say that the other share does not need to be specified [since the two shares must add to
one!, tr.], c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.34).
17 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.372 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.494 onwards),
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.280).

18 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukhārı̄, and Al-Nasā’ı̄ on the authority of Rāfic ibn Khudayj,
. ¯ ¯
¯
¯
The Mālikı̄ conditions of (i) both parties providing seeds of each genus, (ii)
sharing equally in all other costs and in profits, and (iii) not paying rent out of
the land’s produce, are very strict conditions in disharmony with the realities
of muzārac a usage.
Shāfic ı̄ conditions
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s did not stipulate for valid muzārac a (validated as a derivative of
¯
musāqāh) that contracting parties share equally in costs or output. In addition,
they restricted the prohibition of leasing land with rents paid from its output to
the case where the rent is specified as the output of a specific part of the land.
In this regard, they defined muzārac a as working land in exchange for a share
of its produce, where the landlord provides the seeds.19
H
c
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that it is permissible to conduct muzāra a in exchange for
part of the produce, and did not require equal sharing of the produce between the
contracting parties. On the other hand, they agreed with the Shāfic ı̄ condition
¯
that the landlord must provide the seeds, even though one narration states
that ’Ah.mad allowed the farmer to provide the seeds. They further ruled that
the output shares must be specified in the contract, otherwise the muzārac a is
deemed defective. Finally, they ruled that the genus and amount of seeds must
be known, since muzārac a is a contract for work, and thus genus and amount
must be known in analogy to lease and hire contracts.
In summary, the H . anafı̄s allow either party to provide the seeds, the Mālikı̄s
require both parties provide the seeds, while the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled
¯
that the landlord should provide the seeds and the farmer should provide his
labor.
110.3 Types of muzārac a

’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad considered four types of muzārac a, of which they
classified three as valid and one as invalid:20
1. One party may provide the land and seeds, while the other provides labor
and livestock and other tools. The muzārac a is valid in this case, consider-
ing the landlord an employer of the farmer, and the animals and tools are
considered derivative of the hiring contract since they are tools required
for the labor.
2. One party may provide the land, while the other provides labor, animals,
and seeds. The muzārac a is valid in this case as well, where the farmer is
19 Al-Khatı̄bAl-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.323-325).
¯ . ¯ ¯
20 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.179 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.35 on-
wards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.281 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄),
vol.5, p.195 onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.229 onwards).
¯
110.4. LEGAL STATUS 529
viewed as a lessee of the land, and a portion of its output is considered

rent.
3. One party may provide the land, animals, and seeds, while the other
provides only labor. The muzārac a is valid in this case, whereby the
landlord would have hired the farmer, with part of the produce paid as
wages.
4. One party may provide the land and animals, while the other provides
labor and seeds. The apparent ruling in this case is that the muzārac a is
defective. If the contract is considered a lease of the land, then requir-
ing the landlord to provide the animals for production would render it
defective, since the animal cannot be made derivative to the land due to
their different usufruct (land’s usufruct is growth of plants, and animals’
usufruct is work). On the other hand, if the contract is considered to be
hiring the farmer, then requiring him to provide the seeds would render
the contract defective, since the seeds cannot be derivative of his labor.
Similarly, the muzārac a is deemed defective if the landlord is required to
provide tools, animals, or labor for production. It is also deemed defective
if one of the parties is entitled to all of the produce. Finally, the contract
is defective if the farmer is required to harvest and thresh the produce, or
to provide transportation and storage thereof, since such actions are not
conducive to producing a good crop.
110.4 Legal status

110.4.1 Valid muzārac a for the H
. anafı̄s
c 21
The H
. anafı̄s listed a number of legal status rulings for valid muzāra a:
1. The farmer is responsible for all costs of producing a good crop (e.g. cost
of seeds, protecting the crop, etc.), since such costs are covered by the
contract.
2. All costs associated with the crop (e.g. fertilizers, removal of weeds and
grass, plowing, threshing, etc.) must be borne by both parties in propor-
tion to their shares of the produce.
In this regard, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the farmer is responsible for all costs
including watering, plowing, transportation, threshing, and separation of
grains. Then, the two parties would divide the net grains according to
measures of volume.22
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.2,
¯
p.231 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.199).
22 Al-Tāj wa l-’iklı̄l (vol.3, p.177).
¯
3. Produce must be divided according to the agreed upon ratios, following

the H . adı̄th : “Muslims are bound by their conditions”.23 Thus, if the
¯
land produces nothing, neither party would owe the other anything. The
farmer in this case was a hired worker in exchange for a share of the
non-existent output. Thus, this distinguishes this case from a defective
muzārac a, where the worker would be entitled to the market wage for his
work if the land produces nothing. The difference is that the landlord’s
obligation in a valid contract is what is named in the contract, in this case
a share of nothing. In contrast, the landlord’s obligation in a defective
muzārac a is established as a liability for the market wage, which is not
nullified by the non-existence of output.
4. We have seen that the muzārac a contract is deemed non-binding by the

H. anbalı̄s, and binding upon sowing the seeds by the Mālikı̄s. In contrast,
the H. anafı̄s ruled that the contract is non-binding on the party providing
the seeds, binding on the other party. Thus, they ruled that muzārac a
may only be voided if there is a valid excuse, as we discussed below.
Thus, if the provider of seeds decides not to work, he may not be forced
to perform. However, if the party not providing the seeds decides not to
work, the authorities may force him to do so. This ruling follows from
the view that the contract does not harm the worker, and the latter in
this case is bound by the contract in analogy to the case of being hired.
The exception to this ruling is the case where a valid excuse that would
allow the worker to void the hiring contract exists, in which case the same
excuse would allow him to void the binding muzārac a.
The distinction between the two parties based on who provided the seeds
follows from the fact that the provider of seeds may only execute the
contract by destroying his property (the seeds) in the land. Thus, he is
not bound by the contract to sow the seeds, since no individual should
be forced to destroy his property. In contrast, the other party does not
destroy his property by performing his part of the contract, and thus the
contract becomes binding upon him.
5. If one party is required by the contract to plow the land or water it,
then honoring that condition is required. If no agreement was reached,
then the parties are bound by conventional agricultural procedure. In this
regard, if the land is watered by rain, no party may be forced to water
it, otherwise watering responsibility is determined by convention. If one
party to a valid muzārac a was responsible for watering, and was delinquent
in doing so to the point of destroying the crop, he would thus be required
to compensate the other party, in analogy to other compensations for
23 A valid Hadı̄th narrated by Al-Hākim on the authorities of ’Anas and c Ā’isha. It was also
. ¯ . ¯
narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd and Al-H . ākim on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, and narrated by
Al-Tirmidhı̄ and ’ibn Mājah on the authority of c Amr ibn c Awf, c.f. Al-H . . Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st
āfiz c
¯
edition, (H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.112).
¯
negligence in possessions of trust. On the other hand, no compensation is

required if the muzārac a was defective.
6. It is sometimes permissible to increase or reduce the stipulated output
shares to the two parties. The demarcation for permissibility in this case
is that whatever may be possible at the contract’s inception may be in-
creased, and whatever is not possible may not be increased. In both cases,
reduction is permissible, in analogy to increasing the price in a sales con-
tract.
To illustrate: if the farmer provided the seeds then it is not permissible
for him to increase the landlord’s share after harvest relative to what was
stated in the contract. This ruling follows since the increase in rent would
thus have taken place after the conclusion of muzārac a and extraction
of usufruct from the land. Thus, this increase is not allowed, since the
contract cannot be initiated after harvest.
In contrast, if the farmer provided the seeds, and the landlord gave him
a larger share of the output in the above case, the increase is permitted.
The increase in this case is in effect a reduction in the rent to which the
landlord is entitled, which does not require the object of the contract to
be in existence.
On the other hand, if the landlord provided the seeds, and then decided to
increase the farmer’s share of the output after harvest, the increase would
not be permitted. In this case, the contract is concluded, and its object
(the farmer’s labor) has been given in full. However, the farmer in this
case is permitted to increase the landlord’s share, as a reduction in the
wages to which he is entitled.
Before harvest, any increase from either party in the other’s share would
be deemed permissible.
7. If one of the contracting party dies prior to harvest, the crop may be kept
until harvest time. In this case, the other party is not required for any
further compensation since the lease or hire contract would continue to
the harvest time.
In summary, the landlord is responsible for two obligations: (i) giving the
farmer access to the land and its easement and other associated rights, and
(ii) maintaining the tools of tilling the land in good order. The farmer, on his
part, is responsible for two corresponding obligations, which are: (i) taking care
of the agricultural production process and bearing its conventional costs and
labors (including plowing, watering, etc.), and (ii) preserving the land and crop
in good condition.
110.4.2 Shāfic ı̄ status rulings

¯
We have seen that Shāfic ı̄s only deem muzārac a (seeds provided by the landlord)
¯
permissible as a derivative of musāqāh. Moreover, we have seen that they do
¯
not allow mukhābara (seeds provided by the farmer) as a derivative of musāqāh.

¯
Thus, they ruled that if a land is made object of muzārac a contract without
an underlying musāqāh contract being in place, they ruled that the landlord is
entitled to the entire produce, since it is a growth of his property. In this case
the farmer is entitled to a compensation for the market wages for his labor, and
rents for his animals, and tools.
In this regard, sharing the produce between the two contracting parties, with
no wage or rental payments by either party to the other, may occur in one of
two forms if the landlord provided the seeds:
1. The landlord may hire the farmer for a defined portion of the seeds as an
unidentified share, where the farmer is responsible to plant the landlord’s
share in his land and is lent a corresponding share of the land to plant his
own share. Then, the worker may work the land, and the output may be
divided between them in proportion to the seeds. This is a combination
of an employment contract and a loan contract.
2. The landlord may hire the farmer for a defined portion of the seeds as an
un-identified share, as well as a defined portion of the land’s usufruct as an
un-identified share. Thus, the farmer would plant the landlord’s portion
of the seeds to utilize the un-paid portion of the usufruct, and then uses
the paid portion of the usufruct to plant his own seeds.
Thus, the two parties would become partners according to the specified
shares of the crop, and neither would owe the other an independent wage or
rental payment. In this case, the farmer utilizes his portion of the usufruct
in proportion to his portion of the seeds, and the landlord is entitled to the
other portion. Therefore, this contract is a pure employment contract.24
If the farmer provided the seeds, then he may lease a specified portion of
the land as an un-specified share, with the rent being paid as a known but
unspecified common share in the seeds in addition to his own labor in the other
share. Alternatively, the farmer may lease a portion of the land for a portion
of the seeds, and volunteer his labor for the other portion of the land. In
either case, each party would be entitled to his specified share in the produce
in proportion to his ownership of seeds and usufruct of the land.
110.4.3 Defective muzārac a rulings

c 25
The H
. anafı̄s stipulated the following legal status rulings for defective muzāra a:
1. The farmer is not obligated to perform any farming tasks, since such
obligation would only arise from the contract, which is not valid.
24 Al-Khatı̄bAl-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.325).
¯ . ¯ ¯
25 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.182 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.39 on-
wards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.282), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5,
p.196), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.231).
¯
2. All produce belongs to the provider of seeds, be it the landlord or the

farmer. This ruling follows from the view that the output belongs to the
one whose property produced it as a growth, and the defective contract
conditions are irrelevant.
26
The Mālikı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s agree with the H
. anafı̄s in this ruling.
3. If the landlord provided the seeds, the farmer is entitled to the market
wage for his labor. On the other hand, if the farmer provided the seeds,
then the landlord is entitled to the market rental rate for his land. In both
cases, the contract is deemed a lease or employment.
In the first case, the landlord is entitled to all of the output, since it is
a growth of his property (the seeds) in his property (the land). In the
latter case, the farmer is only entitled to the equivalent of the seeds he
sowed plus the equivalent of the market rent of the land, any excess must
be given away in charity.
4. The market rent or wages are required obligations in defective muzārac a,

even if the land produced nothing after its tilling. This ruling follows from
the view that muzārac a is in fact a leasing or hiring contract, and rent or
wages in such contracts are only made obligatory by virtue of usage of the
property or labor. We have already covered the distinction between this
case and the case of valid muzārac a (where no wage or rent payments are
required) in item #3 of the legal status rulings of valid muzārac a.
5. The obligation for market rents or wages in a defective muzārac a are de-
termined by ’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf on the basis of what is estimated
in the contract. They based this ruling on the view that the contract was
concluded by mutual consent. Thus, the interests of both parties should be
considered, especially since the worker by agreeing to the contract agreed
to forfeit any excess of his wages over his named share.
In contrast, Muh.ammad ruled that the going market wages or rents must
be paid in full, regardless of amount. He based this ruling on the view
that the rents or wages to be paid are compensations for the usufruct or
labor, which were collected in full by virtue of a defective contract. Thus,
the market value of the usufruct or labor must be paid, since it has no
equivalent to be given as compensation.

The Mālikı̄s ruled that if a muzārac a contract was known to be defective prior
to commencement of work, then the contract should be voided. On the other
hand, they ruled that the contract should not be voided if its defectiveness is
discovered later. In the latter case, the two parties should share the produce
based on what each one provided in terms of land, labor, and seeds. If one
26 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.498), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.392).
¯
party provided two of the three inputs (land, labor, and seeds), then he would
be entitled to the full produce, and the other is entitled to the market wage or
rental for his one input if it is labor or land, respectively, and the equivalent
amount of seeds if seeds are all that he supplied.27
110.5 Termination and voiding

A muzārac a may be terminated after it has served its purpose. On the other
hand, it may be terminated earlier than that. The H. anafı̄s listed the following
conditions for such termination of a muzārac a.
110.5.1 Expiration
c
A muzāra a may end when its contract period elapses. This is the default
meaning of contract voiding.28 In this case, if the crop is harvested at the end
of the contract period, and each of the contracting parties collects his share
according to the agreement, the contract would end without any problems. On
the other hand, if the contract period expired before the crop was harvested,
the farmer must continue to work until the crop is harvested, to safeguard the
interests of both parties to the extent possible, in analogy to the hiring contracts.
In the latter case, the farmer is responsible for the market rental of his share
in the land, until the crop is harvested, in analogy to the lease contract. This
ruling follows from the fact that he is utilizing the usufruct of part of the land
to grow his share of the crop. During that period, all expenses (including crop
protection and watering costs) must be borne by both parties in proportion to
their shares in the crop. This ruling follows from the fact that the contract
is terminated when its stipulated period elapsed. Thus, while the farmer was
responsible for such costs while the contract was intact, both parties have to
share the costs after the contract’s termination, since the crop is jointly owned.
This ruling is contrasted with the case where one of the parties dies prior to
harvest, in which case the crop is kept until the harvest time, but the farmer
must continue to bear all associated costs. This ruling followed from the H . anafı̄s’
determination based on juristic approbation that the lease contract should re-
main intact for its duration. Thus, the farmer or his heir should continue the
work. In contrast, in the case of contract expiration when its stipulated period
elapses, it is not possible to keep the contract intact.
110.5.2 Death of one party

c
The H. anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled muzāra a contract is terminated or voided upon
the death of one of its party, in analogy to the ruling for leases and hiring
27 Sharh Majmūc Al-’Amı̄r (vol.2, p.178), Al-Taqnı̄n Al-Mālikı̄ (item #464), ’Ibn Juzayy
¯ .
((Mālikı̄), p.281).
28 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.184), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.43), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄
. . ¯
Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.232), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.197).
110.5. TERMINATION AND VOIDING 535
contracts.29 This ruling applies regardless of whether the death occurs before
or after the seeds are sown, and before or after harvest.
In the event that the landlord dies prior to harvest, the farmer or his heir
is deemed responsible for continuing the work, since the latter is responsible
for seeing the crop through until its harvest. As we have seen previously, the
contract is maintained in this case based on juristic approbation, until the crop
is harvested. In this case, the farmer is not liable to pay rent for the land.
Then, upon harvest, the contract is voided for its remaining duration, since
there would be no necessity to maintain it. Thus, maintenance of the contract
was predicated upon the preservation of both parties’ interest in seeing the crop
through to harvest, which also required the continuation of work by the farmer
or his heir.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s ruled that a muzārac a, unlike ’ijārah is
¯
not terminated upon the death of one of its parties.
110.5.3 Voiding based on a valid excuse

A muzārac a is terminated if the contract is voided prior to becoming binding
on either party. In this regard, we have seen that the H . anafı̄s ruled that the
provider of seeds is not bound to the muzārac a by virtue of the contract. We
have also seen that the Mālikı̄s ruled that a muzārac a only becomes binding
upon commencement of the farmer’s work, and the contract may be voided
before that.
c
The H . anafı̄s ruled that either party may void a muzāra a after it becomes
binding, provided that he has a valid excuse. The list of valid excuses that allow
such voiding of a binding muzārac a include:30
1. If the landlord is afflicted by a massive debt that requires him to sell the
land of the muzārac a contract to meet his obligations, then he may void
the contract and sell the land, in analogy to the ruling in leases. This
ruling follows from the fact that the contract can only be maintained in
this case by exposing the landlord to significant harm. Thus, to avoid this
harm, the judge may sell the land to repay its owner’s debt first, and then
void the muzārac a. However, the muzārac a is not automatically voided by
virtue of the excuse itself.
In this regard, if at all possible, it is better to void the contract either
before the commencement of farming, or after harvest. However, if it is
not possible to void the contract because a crop already exists but is not
ready for harvest, then the land should not be sold, and the contract should
not be voided, until after the harvest. This ruling follows from the fact
29 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.184), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.42), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄
. . ¯
c
c
. anafı̄
Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.282), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.568,572).
30 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.183 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.42), ’Ibn
. .
c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.196 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.282),
. .
¯ .
¯
that selling the land voids the farmer’s right, while delaying the land sale
until harvest time is a mere postponement of the creditor’s right. Thus,
postponement of a right is more appropriate than the terminal voiding
of another, as the lesser of two evils when considering the rights of all
concerned parties.
In cases where the contract is voided and there is a need to compensate the
farmer legally (for his work), the H. anafı̄s stipulated three compensation
schemes for three sets of circumstances:
(a) If the contract is voided after the farmer had plowed the land and
dug ditches, then the farmer is not entitled to any compensation for
his work. In this case, the farmer’s work is only counted against the
landowner by virtue of the contract, and the latter pertains to the
land’s produce, which had never materialized. However, this legal
ruling does not absolve the landlord of his religious obligation before
Allāh to compensate the farmer for his work.
(b) If the crop had begun to grow, but was not ready for harvest, the
land should not be sold in lieu of the debt until the crop is harvested.
This ruling follows from the above mentioned view that postponing
the creditor’s right of repayment is better than voiding the farmer’s
right in the crop.
(c) If the farmer had planted the crop, but the crop had not yet sprung,
the H. anafı̄ scholars differed regarding the possibility of selling the
land to repay a large debt and thus void the contract. In this case,
some scholars ruled that the landlord in this case is allowed to sell
the land, since the provider of the seeds in this case has no estab-
lished property associated with the land. In this regard, they ruled
that planting of the seeds is tantamount to their destruction, thus
rendering the seeds non-property, and the land may be sold. In con-
trast, some other scholars ruled that planting the seeds increases their
property value (rather than destroys them), and thus the farmer has
an established property inside the land, which thus may not be sold
until harvest time. Perhaps the latter is the chosen opinion of the
author of Al-Hidāyah.
2. If the farmer becomes sick and unable to work, needs to travel away from
the land, or needs to change professions to sustain his family, or if he
cannot work due to joining the army in the way of Allāh, then he is excused
from his obligations in analogy to the case of being hired, necessity due
to theft, etc. Thus, the contract may be voided.
In this case, the H
. anafı̄s differed in this case whether the voiding requires
a court order, or mutual consent. Some ruled that it is necessary to have
a court order or mutual consent to void muzārac a, in analogy to the ruling
c
for ’ijārah. However, the majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that the muzāra a may
be unilaterally voided in this case, without need of a court order of mutual
consent.
Chapter 111
Musāqāh or Mucāmalah
In this chapter, we shall discuss the musāqāh contract with regards to its def-
inition, legality, cornerstones, type of eligible trees, differences from muzārac a,
conditions, and legal status.
111.1 Definition, legality, cornerstones, and source

111.1.1 Definition of musāqāh
Musāqāh is literally derived from the Arabic verb saqā (to water), and the people
of Madīnah called it muc āmalah. It refers legally to giving a worker access to
trees that he maintains and waters, with the fruits being shared between the
owner of the trees and the worker. In other words, it is a contract exchanging
work for a specified ratio of the output of trees. The Shāfic ı̄s restricted the
¯
contract specifically for palm trees and grapevines, whereby the worker will
maintain the palms or vines and water them, and share the fruits with the
owner.1
111.1.2 Legality
c
The H . anafı̄s’ rulings for musāqāh are identical to their rulings for muzāra a as
pertaining to legal status, differing opinions, and permissible conditions. Thus,
’Abū H . anı̄fa and Zufar ruled that the contract is invalid, since it constitutes a
version of the forbidden leasing of agricultural land for part of its output. Their
proof is the H . adı̄th : “Whoever owns land, let him plant it, and let him not lease
¯
it for a third or a quarter of its output, or for a named amount of food”.2
1 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.284), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.185), ’Ibn
c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.200), Abd Al-Gh anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H anafı̄), vol.2, p.233), ’Ibn
c
¯ .
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.279), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.322), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd print-
¯ ¯ ¯
ing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.523).
2 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of Rāfic ibn Khudayj. However, it
¯ ¯
is a very controversial H . adı̄th , c.f. ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.383,385).
¯
537
538 CHAPTER 111. MUSĀQĀH OR MUC ĀMALAH
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf, Muh.ammad, and the majority of jurists including

Mālik, Al-Shāfic ı̄, and ’Ah.mad, ruled that musāqāh is permissible subject to
¯
certain conditions. Their proof was the dealing of the Prophet (pbuh) with the
people of Khaybar, as narrated by the major narrators on the authority of ’Ibn
c ¯
Umar: “The Messenger of Allāh (pbuh) dealt with the people of Khaybar for a
¯
specific portion of their output of fruits. They also reasoned based on people’s
need for such contracts, since the owner of trees may need a worker to tend his
trees, and the worker may need the owner to provide him that work.
In this regard, the majority of H . anafı̄s accepted the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf
and Muh.ammad. They based their ruling on the Prophet’s (pbuh) dealings, and
the dealings of his wives, Guided Caliphs, and the people of Madı̄nah, as well
as the consensus of his (pbuh) companions’ on the permissibility of musāqāh.3
Thus, the Mālikı̄ jurist ’Ibn Juzayy stated that the contract is permissible as an
exception to two forbidden contracts from which it is derived: (i) a lease with
unknown rent or work with unknown wages, and (ii) a sale of objects prior to
their creation.4
111.1.3 Cornerstone
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that the cornerstones of musāqāh are offer and accep-
tance, as they ruled for muzārac a. The offer in this case is made by the
tree owner, and acceptance is issued by the worker. The object of sale in
this case is deemed to be unequivocally the worker’s labor, in contrast to
the case of muzārac a.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled that musāqāh becomes binding based on contract lan-
guage, rather than the commencement of work.
c
• The H. anbalı̄s ruled that musāqāh, like muzāra a, does not require a verbal
acceptance, and the worker’s commencement of work is sufficient to imply
acceptance, in analogy to agency.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that verbal acceptance is required in the musāqāh con-
¯
tract, without necessarily listing all the activities for which the worker is
responsible.
Details that are not specified in the contract language are deemed to be
implied by predominant conventions.5
• The non-H. anbalı̄ jurists deemed musāqāh to be a binding contract. Thus,
they ruled that neither party is allowed to void the contract after its
conclusion without the other’s consent.6
3 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.384), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.45 onwards), Al-Khatı̄b
. ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.322 onwards).
¯ ¯
4 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.279), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.242).
¯ .
5 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.185), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.528), ’Ibn
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.1, p.247), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.712), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), p.328).
c
¯ 6 ¯
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.713), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.284),
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.328), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.4, p.372 onwards).
¯ ¯ ¯
111.1. DEFINITION, LEGALITY, CORNERSTONES, AND SOURCE 539
111.1.4 Eligible trees

H
. anafı̄ rulings
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the type of trees eligible for musāqāh are fruit-bearing
trees.7 Thus, they validated musāqāh for palm trees, grapevines, clover, fruit-
bearing trees, and the roots of eggplant. They based this ruling on the view
that the contract is legalized to meet a need, which applies to all such plants.
Later H . anafı̄s also allowed musāqāh for non-fruit-bearing trees such as willow
trees and trees grown for their wood, since such trees also require watering and
maintenance. On the other hand, they ruled that any trees that do not need
watering and maintenance are not eligible for musāqāh.
Mālikı̄ rulings
The Mālikı̄s allowed musāqāh for grains, beans and nuts as well as permanent
and fruit-bearing trees such as palms, grapevines, and apple trees, subject to
two conditions:8
1. The contract must be concluded prior to the fruit’s ripening and permis-
sibility of its sale, and the tree must not be one that can grow offspring
(e.g. like banana and fig trees). In the latter case, the trees can only be
subject to a musāqāh contract as derivative of another.
2. The term of the contract must be specified, even if for years, but it is not
permissible for the term to be too many years. The maximum allowable
period is determined by convention to be a period sufficiently long for
trees and areas to change substantially. This ruling is made in analogy to
the case of ’ijārah, to avoid potential harm. Moreover, the contract is not
allowed if the area subject to the musāqāh contract changes substantially
one year after the next.
’Ibn Al-Qāsim further stipulated that the contract must use the term
“musāqāh” to deem the contract valid. He further allowed musāqāh in
plants with no fixed root (e.g. watermelons) subject to four conditions;
the two listed above plus:
3. The contract must be concluded after the plant is observable above the
ground.
4. The plant’s owner must be unable to tend to the plants and water them
himself.
They also ruled that the portion of the fruits given to the worker in compen-
sation for his work must be an unspecified but fixed common ratio of the overall
. .
((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.200 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.284), Abd Al-
c

¯ 8
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.279), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.713-718), ’Ibn Rushd Al-
¯
H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, pp.243-246).
fruits of the garden. Thus, it is not valid to specify the payoff as the fruits of a
specific group of trees, or a specific amount of fruit. Finally, the ratio must be
specified explicitly.
H
. anbalı̄ rulings
9
The H. anbalı̄s ruled that musāqāh is only valid for trees with edible fruits. Thus,
they ruled that it is not valid for non-fruit-bearing trees such as willow trees,
rose trees, etc.
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled in the new opinions of the school that musāqāh is only valid
¯
for palm trees and grapevines.10 They based the permissibility for palm trees
on the above mentioned H . adı̄th in Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim that the Prophet
¯ ¯
(pbuh) dealt accordingly with the people of Khaybar. They also ruled thus
¯
for grapevines since they are treated in the same manner in matters of zakāh.
c
On the other hand, Al-Shāfi ı̄ in his old school permitted the contract for all
¯
fruit-bearing trees.
111.1.5 Musāqāh vs. muzārac a

c 11
The H
. anafı̄s ruled that musāqāh is similar to muzāra a except for four issues:
1. If either contracting party decides not to fulfill his obligations under the
contract, he must be forced to perform unless continuation of the contract
causes him a loss. This is in contrast to muzārac a, where the provider of
seeds may decide not to perform prior to sowing the seeds, and he may
not be forced to continue with the contract to avoid his loss of the seeds.
Moreover, musāqāh is deemed a binding contract for the non-H . anbalı̄s,
while muzārac a is deemed to be binding only after the seeds are sown.
. anbalı̄s stated that agency, silent partnerships, musāqāh,
muzārac a, deposits, and promises of gifts are non-binding on either party,
and thus may be voided unilaterally by either.12
2. A musāqāh continues after its contract period expires, letting the worker
work without obliging him to pay rent. Thus, the worker may continue to
work until he collects the fruits, without having to pay rent to the tree-
owner after the expiration of the contract period. This ruling follows from
the H. anafı̄ view that trees are not eligible for rent, and since the worker
is responsible for all labor input. In contrast, the case of a muzārac a for
10 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.323), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.390).
11 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.201), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.284).
. .
12 Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.3, p.154), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄),
. .
vol.3, p.528 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.372 onwards).
111.2. CONTRACT CONDITIONS 541
which the period had expired requires the worker to pay the landlord a
rent for the share of land proportional to his share of the output. In the
latter case, the land can be leased, and it is an input in the production
process, and thus the landlord is entitled to the rent of the portion of
the land corresponding to the output that belongs to the worker. In this
latter case, the worker is not obligated to work on the portion of the land
corresponding to the landlord’s share of the output after the expiration of
the contract.
3. If fruit-bearing palm trees are found to belong to an individual other than
the landlord, the worker may demand compensation for the market value
of his share of the fruits. In this case, the worker’s wages become a non-
fungible part of the trees, and thus he may demand the market value of the
non-fungible entitlement which was found to be in the property of a third
party. On the other hand, if the trees produced no fruits, then the worker
is not entitled to any compensation. In contrast in the case of muzārac a,
if the land is found to belong to a third party after planting the crop, the
worker may demand his share of the plants. However, if the land is found
to belong to another after the worker commenced his labor but prior to
planting the crop, then the farmer is not entitled to any compensation for
his work.
4. Jurists ruled based on juristic approbation that specification of the period
of a musāqāh contract is not required. Thus, they relied on conventional
knowledge of the usual period needed for fruits to grow, which is usually
known with a sufficient degree of precision. This is in contrast to the case
of farming, where harvest times vary with the time of sowing seeds.
In the case of muzārac a contract, we have seen that the original opinions
in the H. anafı̄ school was the necessity of specifying the contract period,
but that the accepted later opinion is not to stipulate that as a condition
of validity.
The H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s staed that musāqāh and muzārac a are considered
¯
leases at their inception, and partnerships at their conclusion. Similarly, the
H. anbalı̄s found musāqāh to be a sub-category of silent partnerships (mud.āraba
contracts).13
111.2 Contract conditions

111.2.1 H
. anafı̄ conditions
All the relevant conditions of muzārac a apply to musāqāh. Thus, there are no
conditions in musāqāh relating to the (i) genus of seeds, (ii) providers of said
seeds, (iii) fertility of the land, or (iv) specification of the contract period. The
rest of the eight conditions of muzārac a do apply to musāqāh: (v) eligibility
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.529).
of contracting parties, (vi) specification of the worker’s share in output, (vii)

giving the worker access to the trees, and (viii) partnership in the output. The
final condition includes the stipulation that the worker’s portion of the output
must be a common share thereof.14
We may state the conditions of musāqāh in more detail as follows:15
1. Eligibility: The two contracting parties must be sane and discerning. In

this regard, the H. anafı̄s also required contracting parties to be of legal
age, while the other schools did not stipulate that condition.
2. Object of the contract: The trees for which musāqāh is contracted must
be fruit-bearing. Disagreements over this condition were listed in detail
above. Moreover, the trees must be known to all parties.
3. Access: The worker must be given full access to the trees made subject
to a musāqāh contract. Thus, if a condition is stipulated that both par-
ties should tend to the trees, the contract would be deemed defective for
violating the full access condition.
4. The output must be jointly owned by the two parties, with the share of
each being a common share specified as a known percentage of the whole.
Thus, the contract would be deemed defective if all of the output is given
to one party, if one party is guaranteed a fixed amount, or if the ratios for
sharing were unspecified.
We have seen that the H . anafı̄s ruled according to juristic approbation and
based on convention that the period of a musāqāh contract need not be
specified. In this regard, convention dictates that the period of musāqāh
ends with the first ripening of fruits in that year. In clover and similar
crops, the period of musāqāh is considered to last until the first cut. If
an entire year/season passes without the tree producing any fruits, the
musāqāh would be deemed defective.
Moreover, the musāqāh would be considered defective if it stipulates a
contract period too short for bearing and ripening of fruits. In this case,
the intent of the partnership (the fruits) would not exist during the con-
tract period. This is in contrast to the case of a valid contract for which
the trees do not bear fruits within the otherwise acceptable period. In
the latter case, neither party owes the other anything, but the contract
continues to be deemed valid.
If the contract specifies a period which may and may not be sufficient
for the fruits to grow and ripen, then the fruits should be distributed
according to the contract ratios if they appear, otherwise the musāqāh is
deemed defective. In the latter case, the worker would be entitled to the
15 Al-Kāsānı̄((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.185 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.8, p.47), Al-
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
market wage rate for his work due to the contract defectiveness discovered
when its period is found to be too short.
In contrast, we have seen above that the Mālikı̄s ruled that the period of
musāqāh must be known, in analogy to their ruling for ’ijārah.
111.2.2 Non-H
. anafı̄ musāqāh cornerstones
. anbalı̄s, and Mālikı̄s listed five cornerstones for the musāqāh
¯
contract: (i) two contracting parties, (ii) object of tending and watering, (iii)
fruits, (iv) work, and (v) contract language.16
1. Contracting parties
Anyone who is able to deal on his own behalf (i.e. sane and of legal age) may
participate in a valid musāqāh contract. This ruling follows from the fact that
musāqāh is a commutative contract compensated with property. Thus, it is
analogous to silent partnerships, and the same eligibility criteria for engaging
in sales must be applied. If the benefits of a child, an insane person, or a
mentally incompetent person were to dictate engaging in a musāqāh contract,
his guardian may engage in this contract on his behalf.
2. Object of watering and tending

The Shāfic ı̄s restrict valid objects to be named in the musāqāh contract to palm
¯
trees and grapevines. The H . anbalı̄s allow musāqāh for all planted and observable
trees with edible fruits. The worker would thus water and tend to the trees for
a known portion of the fruits as an common share of the total produce. As
we have seen, the contract would be deemed invalid if the trees made object of
musāqāh were unknown.
3. Fruits
All fruits must be distributed between the owner of the trees and the worker,
and no portion may be given to a third party. Moreover, they should each have
a non-zero and known share of the total fruits, in analogy to silent partnerships.
The H . anbalı̄s, and the majority of Sh āfic ı̄s ruled in this regard that musāqāh
¯
is only valid if the fruits are observable but not yet ripened. Thus, it is not
permissible to have a musāqāh contract to plant small palms and share them
with the owner. Thus, musāqāh requires a fixed capital of trees to already be
in place, and planting such trees would not be part of the labor of musāqāh.
It is permissible to engage in a multi-year musāqāh contract (e.g. for five
years if fruits are expected to appear on the fifth year) even if there are no
expected fruits for the first few years, provided that the trees are already planted
16 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.323-328), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯c ¯
vol.1, pp.390-392), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, pp.523-529), Mar ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st
printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.2, pp.183-185), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.368,372 onwards, 375,380).
at the inception of the contract. Then, if no fruits grow through the entire
multi-year period, the worker is not entitled to any compensation, in analogy
to a one-year musāqāh for fruit-bearing trees that do not bear fruits that year.
However, if the specified period of musāqāh is too short for fruits to occur
customarily, then the jurists of all schools deem the contract defective due to
lacking a compensation for the worker. This ruling is mae in analogy to musāqāh
for non fruit-bearing trees.
4. Work
The worker must provide all the labor, and must be given full access to the
trees to work as he sees fit. Thus, if the owner retains the right to work with
the worker or to retain joint possession of the orchard, the contract is deemed
defective. The contract would also be deemed defective if the worker is required
to perform tasks not commonly considered part of musāqāh (e.g. digging a
well). The latter ruling follows from the fact that the unconventional work thus
required would constitute a hire contract with an unknown wage, as well as
stipulating one contract as a condition in another contract.
The Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that the amount of work must be known by stipu-
¯
lating the contract period for a year or more. They further ruled that there
is no upper limit on the number of years that may be specified provided that
the trees continue to exist and yield fruits, but a minimum period that would
normally allow fruits to grow is required. Thus, they consider the contract in-
valid if its period is unspecified, made indefinite, or made too short for the trees
customarily to produce fruits. They ruled thus since they consider musāqāh a
binding contract, and thus require its period to be specified in analogy to the
hire contract. On the other hand, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that it is
¯
not permissible to specify the contract period as whatever period is sufficient
for fruits to grow, since that makes its period uncertain.
c
In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the period of musāqāh and muzāra a
need not be specified. They ruled thus based on the fact that the Prophet
(pbuh) did not specify a period for his dealing with the people of Khaybar, and
¯
his Caliphs followed the same practice after his death. Moreover, they reasoned
c
that musāqāh and muzāra a are permissible but non-binding contracts, and thus
either party may void the contract whenever he wishes. However, the H . anbalı̄
jurist ’Ibn Qudāmah ruled that musāqāh is a binding contract, and thus required
its period to be specified, in analogy to ’ijārah.
In this regard, he agreed with the Shāfic ı̄ ruling that there is no upper limit
¯
on the contract period to be specified (provided that the trees continue to exist
and yield fruits that long), but a minimum period is required to ensure growth
of fruits.
5. Contract language
The contract language must contain an offer that specifies either the name of
musāqāh or its substance: giving the worker access to the trees so that he may
water them and tend to them, and in return earns a known percentage of the
fruits.
However, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the musāqāh is invalid if the
¯
offer uses the name of ’ijārah, since the latter is a different explicitly defined
contract. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the contract is valid whether the
offer utilizes the name musāqāh, muc āmala, mufālah.a, or ’ijārah. The H . anbalı̄s
also deemed a muzārac a valid if the offer uses the name of ’ijārah (leasing the
land for a known percentage of its output as a common share of the total), since
they said that the essence of the contract is what matters. In this regard, any
name may be used if that essence of the contract is understood, in analogy to
sales (bayc ), which is also deemed valid under the name of muc āt.āh.
The Shāfic ı̄s further require the worker to accept the offer verbally, or by sign
¯
language or writing for a mute, without necessarily listing all the specific tasks
for which the worker is responsible. They based this ruling on their requirement
of an explicit acceptance in hiring contracts. With regards to the details of the
worker’s responsibilities, those need not be spelled out in the contract, since
they are known by convention.
c
In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that musāqāh and muzāra a do not require
an explicit or verbal acceptance. Thus, they ruled that commencement of work
is sufficient to conclude the contract as an implicit acceptance, in analogy to
their ruling in agency contracts.
Chapter 112
Legal Status
A musāqāh that satisfies all of its conditions is valid. Otherwise, the musāqāh
is deemed defective. In this chapter, we shall discuss in details the legal status
rulings for valid musāqāh and those for defective musāqāh.
112.1 Valid musāqāh rulings

112.1.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
The H. anafı̄s made the following rulings regarding the legal status of a valid
musāqāh:1
1. The worker is responsible for all the tasks associated with musāqāh, in-
cluding all maintenance of trees, vines, bulbs, watering ditches, pollina-
tion, etc. All such acts are derivative of the object of the contract, which
is the worker’s labor.
In contrast, all financial expenses that benefit the trees, e.g. plowing the
land, treating the trees for infections, etc., must be borne by both parties
in proportion to their output entitlement. This sharing follows from the
fact that such expenses are not covered by the object of the contract.
2. Output must be shared according to the agreed-upon ratio.
3. If the trees do not produce any output, neither party owes the other any-
thing.
4. The contract is binding upon both parties. Thus neither party is allowed
to refrain from performing or to void the contract unilaterally, unless he
has a valid excuse. This ruling is in contrast to the case of muzārac a,
which the H . anafı̄s ruled to be non-binding on the provider of seeds.
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.187).
547
5. The landlord has the right to force the worker to perform if the latter has
no valid excuse.
6. Increase and diminution of the output shares may be allowed according

to the same rules established for muzārac a: that increases are allowed
for cases that could be established at the inception of the contract, and
diminution is allowed in both cases.
Thus, if fruits had not yet reached full size, then either party is allowed
to increase the share of the other, since the contract would allow for the
higher ratio at its inception. If the fruit had reached full size, then the
worker may increase the share of the landlord, but the latter is not allowed
to increase the share of the former. This ruling follows since the worker
may reduce his wages, regardless of what is permissible at the inception of
the contract. On the other hand, the landlord cannot increase the worker’s
wages after the work is done, since the object of the contract no longer
exists after the fruits reach their full size.
7. The worker in a musāqāh is not allowed in turn to subcontract by engaging

in a secondary musāqāh with a third party, unless the landlord explicitly
allowed him to do so. Thus, if the worker were to subcontract without the
landlord’s permission, all fruits would belong to the owner of the trees, the
first worker would not be entitled to any compensation, and the second
worker is entitled to demand compensation for his market wages from the
first worker.

The Mālikı̄ rulings for the legal status of a valid musāqāh largely agree with the
H
. anafı̄ rulings. In this regard, the Mālikı̄s considered three aspects of work in
an orchard:2
1. Work that does not relate to the fruits is not binding upon the worker by
virtue of the contract, and thus it is not permissible to stipulate performing
such work as a condition of the contract.
2. The worker is also not required to perform any work that relates to the
fruits, but establishes capital that remains after their growth, e.g. digging
a well or spring, erecting a watermill, building storage structures, or plant-
ing trees. Conditions of performing such tasks are also not permissible in
musāqāh.
3. Otherwise, the contract obliges the worker to perform all tasks pertaining
to the fruits that do not build permanent capital. Thus, he is responsible
for pruning, watering, providing tools and animals, and bearing any ex-
penses that are normally required in tending to trees. In this regard, the
2 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.279), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.717 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd
¯
Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.244 onwards).
112.1. VALID MUSĀQĀH RULINGS 549
worker is not automatically obliged in musāqāh to fortify an existing wall

or fix a water ditch, but it is permissible to stipulate in the contract that
he is responsible for such simple tasks.
In return, the worker is entitled to a determined percentage of the fruits

as agreed upon in the contract. In this regard, the Mālikı̄s ruled that it is
permissible to specify that all of the fruits belong to the worker.
If the trees produce no fruits, then neither party owes the other anything.
In this case, the non-existence of fruits is considered to have occurred due to
natural causes, rather than a defect in the contract.
Finally, they ruled that it is not permissible for either party to stipulate an
extra side payment (e.g. in monetary terms) in addition to his share of fruits.

. anbalı̄ rulings
¯
. anbalı̄s agreed largely with the Mālikı̄s with regards to the
¯
worker’s duties and rights under the contract. In this regard, they ruled that
any work that must be repeated each year is the worker’s responsibility, while
any work that is not repeated annually is the landlord’s responsibility.3 Thus,
the worker would be responsible for all annual tasks for growing fruits, such as
watering, cleaning water sources, pollination, removal of weeds, picking the ripe
fruits, etc. The majority of Shāfic ı̄s also considered drying the fruits part of the
¯
responsibility of the worker, since it sustains the fruits.
In contrast, all tasks that aim primarily to sustain the trees, and that are not
necessarily repeated annually, would not be the worker’s responsibility. Such
tasks include building walls around the orchard, digging new ditches, fixing
doors, etc. The expenses for all such tasks must be borne by the landlord, as
dictated by convention. The owner is also responsible for agricultural taxes if
his orchard is subject to the kharāj tax.
¯
It is noteworthy that the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that picking
¯
the fruits is the worker’s responsibility. In contrast, the H . anafı̄s ruled that
picking the fruits is the joint responsibility of the worker and the landlord in
proportion to their entitlements to fruits.
Bindingness
. anafı̄s, and Mālikı̄s ruled that musāqāh is a binding contract
¯ 4
on both parties. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that it is not binding. The
H. anbalı̄s based this ruling on the narration of Muslim on the authority of ’ibn
c
Abbās that the Prophet (pbuh): “we will accept this arrangement of as long
as we wish”. This distinguishes musāqāh from muzārac a, since the latter was
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.392), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.369 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3,
pp.528-531).
4 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.713), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.372, 376), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd
printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.528), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H

¯
deemed binding according to the H . anafı̄s and H

. anbalı̄s, and binding upon sowing
the seeds for the Mālikı̄s.
According to the majority ruling that musāqāh is binding (the Shāfic ı̄s also
¯
ruled the same way for muzārac a as a derivative contract), if the worker escapes
prior to finishing his work, and the landlord volunteered to bear the cost of
finishing it, the worker’s entitlement to fruits is maintained. This ruling follows
by analogy to the case of a third party volunteering to pay someone’s debt. On
the other hand, if the landlord does not volunteer to bear the cost of finishing
the work, the ruler may hire someone to finish it, and charge the cost to the
worker. If resorting to the authorities is not possible or denied, the landlord
may bear the costs of finishing the work, declaring in front of witnesses that he
intends to demand compensation for such expenses from the worker.
In contrast, the H. anbalı̄s ruled that if the worker escapes prior to finishing
the work, the landlord is allowed to void the contract. This follows from their
classification of the contract as non-binding.
Worker possession
In musāqāh, muzārac a, and mughārasah, the worker’s possession is a possession
of trust. Thus, if he claims that ¯part of the fruits, plants, or trees were destroyed
without his transgression or negligence, his claim is accepted if supported by
his oath. This claim is accepted if supported by the worker’s oath, even if
the landlord charges him with transgression or negligence, as per the rules of
possessions of trust.
112.2 Defective musāqāh rulings

A musāqāh contract may be deemed defective if any of its legal conditions is not
met. In what follows, we list the legal rulings of defective musāqāh contract.
112.2.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
The following is a H
. anafı̄ listing for the most important cases of defective
musāqāh:5
1. If all of the output is designated for one of the contracting parties, the
essence of partnership would be absent, and the contract is defective.
2. If one of the parties is promised a fixed amount of fruit (e.g. half a pound),
or promised any compensation other than a portion of the fruits (e.g. a
financial compensation), the contract is defective since musāqāh is only a
partnership in the fruits.
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H c
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.202, 205),
¯ .
112.2. DEFECTIVE MUSĀQĀH RULINGS 551
3. If the contract stipulates that the landlord must participate in the work,
the worker thus does not have full access to the trees, and the contract is
deemed defective.
4. If the worker is required by the contract to cut the fruits, the contract
is deemed defective. This follows from the H . anafı̄ ruling that picking
the fruits is not part of musāqāh, and not conventionally considered to be
part thereof. Thus, their default ruling is that all work prior to ripening of
the fruit (e.g. watering, pollination, protection, etc.) must be performed
by the worker, but work after ripening (e.g. picking and storage) is the
responsibility of both parties.
5. Similarly, if the contract requires the worker to transport or store the fruits
after they are divided between the two parties, the contract is defective
since that is not part of the recognized set of musāqāh tasks.
6. Requiring the worker to perform any tasks that benefit the landlord after
the end of musāqāh (e.g. plowing the land, planting trees, etc.) renders
the contract defective, since such tasks are not part of musāqāh.
7. Specification of a contract period that is customarily too short for fruits to
grow harms the worker, and voids the intent of the contract which is part-
nership in the fruits, thus rendering the contract defective. Conversely,
the contract would be deemed defective if ripe fruits were already in ex-
istence, since the worker is only entitled to a share by virtue of his work,
and the work of musāqāh is non-existent once the fruits are ripe and reach
full size.
8. If an orchard is jointly owned by two parties, and they engage in a musāqāh
contract between them, the contract is defective. This follows from the fact
that the essence of musāqāh is a hiring contract, and it is not possible for
one person to be simultaneously a partner and an employee of his partner.
The basis of this ruling is that an employee must work exclusively in the
property of the one who hires him, and thus may not work in a property
of which he is a co-owner.
In this case, if the partner/worker does perform the tasks of musāqāh,
he is not entitled to any wages, and his work is considered to be for his
own benefit. The H . anbalı̄s accepted the H
. anafı̄ ruling of defectiveness
of this contract of musāqāh with a partner, not because of the above
mentioned H . anafı̄ reasons, and the fact that the worker would not receive
any compensation for his work.
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s deemed this contract permissible if the worker is
¯
given a larger share than what he would be entitled to under the partner-
ship. Thus, if the worker is given a larger share as compensation for his
6
work, the Shāfic ı̄s and the H. anbalı̄s would deem the contract permissible.
¯
6 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.327), Al-Muhallā c alā Al-Minhāj (vol.3, p.63),
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.580), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3, p.533).
For instance, if each partner has a half-ownership of the trees, then one
of them may be a worker under musāqāh, thus earning two-thirds of the
output with the one-sixth increment being the compensation for his work.
However, the language of the musāqāh must specify that it pertains only
to the portion of the trees not owned by the worker (or not specify the
trees at all). Thus, if one partner tells the other that he is engaging him
in a musāqāh for all the trees, the contract would not be valid.
7
The H
. anafı̄ legal status rulings for defective musāqāh are as follows:
1. The worker may not be forced to perform the work under the contract.
This ruling follows from the fact that his obligation to perform derives
from the contract, and the latter is not valid.
2. All of the output would belong to the tree-owner, since it is a growth in his
property. In contrast, the worker’s entitlement derives from the contract,
which is not valid.
3. In this case, the worker is entitled to his market wage, in analogy to the
ruling in defective ’ijārah.
4. ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the worker’s compensation should be the smaller of
the market wage for his work and the value of his share as named in the
contract. In contrast, Muh.ammad ruled that the worker is entitled in a
defective musāqāh to his full market wage, regardless of how large it may
be.

The Mālikı̄s ruled8 that if a musāqāh is found to be defective prior to the
commencement of work, it is automatically voided. If defectiveness is discovered
after the commencement of work, then it is voided at that time, and the worker is
entitled to his market wage, to ensure that he is not harmed by the voiding. The
latter ruling follows from the view that the musāqāh thus becomes a defective
’ijārah or defective sale.
If the contract promised an additional compensation to the worker, the con-
tract becomes a defective ’ijārah, whereby the landlord would have hired the
worker to work in exchange for a portion of the fruits together with the addi-
tional compensation. Thus, the ’ijārah is defective, and the worker should be
paid the market wage less the additional promised compensation, and he would
not be entitled to any portion of the fruits, even if defectiveness is discovered
after the work was done.
On the other hand, if the worker promised the landlord an additional com-
pensation, the contract becomes a defective sale of fruits prior to their ripening.
Thus, the ruling renders the worker a buyer of the named portion of the fruit
7 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.188).
8 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.280), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.722), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d
((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.248).
112.2. DEFECTIVE MUSĀQĀH RULINGS 553
in exchange for the additional compensation and the market value of his work.
Thus, the worker should be given back whatever he paid, as well as his market
wage, and he would thus have no right to the fruits.
Finally, the defectiveness of the musāqāh need not turn it into another con-
tract. For instance the defectiveness may arise from a harmful situation, non-
compliance with one of the validity conditions, or significant uncertainty (e.g.
in musāqāh over multiple orchards). In such cases, the musāqāh would continue,
with conditions being determined by conventionally similar musāqāh. For in-
stance, if a musāqāh over ripened and un-ripened fruits, the contract would
implicitly contain the sale of an unknown (the worker’s portion of the fruits) for
an unknown (the amount of work). Similarly, the defective musāqāh may arise
due to conditions that the landlord participate in the work or provide tools of
production in a small orchard (to the exclusion of providing animals for work in
a large orchard, which may be required of the landlord). Thus, ’Ibn Al-Qāsim
ruled in all such cases that the musāqāh would be replaced with an equiva-
lent musāqāh. In contrast, ’Ibn Al-Mājashūn ruled that all defective musāqāh
¯
automatically become equivalent ’ijārah contracts.

. anbalı̄ rulings
¯
9
. anbalı̄s ruled that if the work of musāqāh is done, and the
¯
fruits ripened, the true owner of the trees is found to be a party different from the
landlord in the musāqāh, the latter must pay the worker his market wage. This
ruling follows form the fact that the landlord must thus compensate the worker
for his work, since the promised compensation with fruits became defective.
They ruled thus for all defective musāqāh, that all fruits belong to the rightful
owner of the trees, since they are a growth in his property, and the worker is
entitled to his market wage. In this regard, they listed many conditions under
which the musāqāh would be deemed defective, including: (i) ignorance of the
contracting parties’ shares, (ii) stipulating an unknown share to one party or a
known financial compensation or amount of fruit, (iii) stipulating a condition
that the landlord must share in the work, (iv) or the worker’s tending to tasks
other than watering and tending to the trees made subject to the musāqāh
contract.
In summary, all jurists agree that a musāqāh that is found to be defective
prior to commencement of work must be voided. The non-Mālikı̄ jurists further
ruled that if defectiveness is discovered after the commencement of work, then
the worker is entitled to his market wage. In contrast, the Mālikı̄s only ruled
in the latter case that the worker would be entitled to his market wages if the
musāqāh contract became a different type of contract by virtue of the defec-
tiveness. However, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if the contract does not change to a
different type, then the musāqāh continues through an equivalent musāqāh.
9 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.326-7,331), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.393), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.381,392), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.3,
pp.532,502).
112.3 Contract termination

112.3.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
c
The H. anafı̄s ruled in analogy to muzāra a that musāqāh may be terminated in
one of three ways: (i) if its specified period expired, (ii) if one of the contracting
party died, or (iii) if the contract is voided in a manner similar to ’ijārah through
an explicit revocation or a valid excuse.10
Among the valid excuses recognized by the H . anafı̄s as legitimate bases for
terminating a musāqāh are the following:
• The worker may be found out to be a known thief who is thus feared to
steal the fruit or branches of the tree prior to distributing the fruits. Thus,
the landlord should not be bound to this potentially harmful contract, and
he is allowed to void the contract to avoid such harm.
• The worker may fall sufficiently sick that he cannot perform the work
himself, and it may be financially harmful to hire others to do his work
(whether or not this obligation to hire others is stipulated in the contract).
Thus, his sickness becomes a valid excuse for terminating the contract to
avoid causing him harm for which he had not contracted.
• The H. anafı̄s had two opposing opinions with regards to the worker’s travel
as an excuse for terminating musāqāh. The majority opinion is to reach
a compromise between the two opinions by making the worker’s travel a
valid excuse for termination if he is required to do the work himself, but
not a valid excuse if he is allowed under the contract to hire others to do
the work.
If the worker dies, his heirs are permitted to perform his tasks and see the
fruits to ripening, even if the landlord does not wish them to do so, in order to
protect everyone’s best interest. Similarly, if the landlord dies, the worker should
continue his work, even if the landlord’s heirs do not wish him to do so. If both
parties were to die, the worker’s heirs have the option to continue the work.
Then, if the worker’s heirs decide not to continue working, the landlords are
given the option [to void the contract, or finish the work at their own expense].
The ruling based on juristic approbation is that the musāqāh would continue
if its period expired before the fruits ripened. In this case, the worker is given the
option to continue working without paying a rent, or leave. This is in contrast
to the case of muzārac a, where the farmer would have to pay the landlord a rent
for his portion of production. The difference in rulings follows from the fact
that trees may not be leased, while land may be. Another difference between
the two contracts is that the worker would be responsible for all work after
expiration in musāqāh, but the two parties would share in this responsibility
in muzārac a after the establishment of the worker’s responsibility to pay rent.
10 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.188), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8,p.48), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H c
c anı̄
¯
Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol., p.234).
112.3. CONTRACT TERMINATION 555
In other words, the worker is either responsible for the work or the rent, but
cannot be held responsible for both at the same time.
If the worker decides not to work in this case, then the landlord or his heirs
can choose one of three options: (i) share fruits according to the conditions of
the contract, (ii) give the worker the value of his share of fruits, or (ii) bear the
expenses of the remaining work until the fruits are ripe. In the final case, the
landlord or his heirs may demand compensation from the worker in proportion
to his share of the fruits. This latter ruling follows since the worker is not
permitted to cause harm to others.
Al-Zaylac ı̄ took issue with the last ruling to seek compensation from the
worker only in proportion to his share of the fruits. Indeed, he reasoned, the
landlord or his heirs should be entitled to full compensation of the cost of all
the work, since the worker earned his share in the fruits as compensation for
performing all of the work. Thus, the above ruling of seeking compensation from
the worker only in proportion to his share of the fruits would be tantamount to
giving the worker compensation for part of the period during which he did not
work.

The Mālikı̄s ruled11 that the musāqāh contract is inherited. In this regard, if
the heirs of a worker in musāqāh are deemed untrustworthy, they may provide
trustworthy workers to take their place and retain the contract. Conversely, if
the landlord does not wish to allow the worker’s heirs to work or hire others out
of his estate, then the landlord is responsible for the work himself.
They further ruled that a musāqāh is not voided if the worker is a thief or
transgressor, or if he is incapable of working. In such cases, the worker should
hire an alternate worker, and pay him out of his share of the fruits if he has no
other way of paying him.
Those rulings follow from the Mālikı̄ view that musāqāh is a binding contract,
which may only be voided if there is a valid excuse. Thus, neither party is
allowed to void the contract unilaterally without the other’s consent.

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled12 that musāqāh may not be voided based on excuses. For
¯
instance, they ruled that if a worker was found to be untrustworthy, a monitor
may be appointed to watch him until the work is done, since the work continues
to be an obligation on the worker. Alternatively, the worker may be replaced
by hiring another to complete the work if it is not possible to force the original
worker to meet his obligation.
The Shāfic ı̄s further ruled that a musāqāh is terminated upon the expiration
¯
of its period. Thus, if the contract period was ten years, and the fruits of the
11 ’IbnRushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.247), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.713).
12 Al-Khatı̄b
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.331), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.391 onwards).
tenth year appeared after the contract expired, the worker would not be entitled
to any share in those fruits that appear after the contract expiration.
On the other hand, if the fruits appeared prior to the contract’s expiration,
but only ripened after the contract expired, then the worker has a right associ-
ated with such fruits. This ruling follows from the fact of appearance of the fruit
prior to contract expiration, and the worker would thus be obliged to continue
working.
If the musāqāh named a specific worker, then it is terminated upon the death
of that worker. However, a musāqāh is not terminated upon the death of the
landlord during its period. In the latter case, the worker must continue his work
and take his share of the fruits. However, if the worker happened to be the heir
of the landlord, the musāqāh is thus voided, since the heir cannot become his
own employee.
If the worker dies prior to finishing the work for which he had contracted,
then his heirs may use his estate to finish the work. This follows from the fact
that the obligation to complete the work is established upon the worker, and
this obligation must be satisfied out of his estate, in analogy to all other debts
and obligations. However, the heir is permitted to complete the work himself
or use his own wealth to hire someone who does. If the heir is skilled and
trustworthy, the landlord must thus allow him to finish the work. Otherwise,
he may resort to the ruler to hire a skilled and trustworthy worker out of the
estate of the deceased worker. Finally, if the deceased worker left no estate, it is
not permissible to make his estate indebted for the cost of the remaining work,
since the worker’s juristic personality ceases to exist following his death.
Thus, we see that the Shāfic ı̄s find musāqāh when established as a liability
¯
not to be terminated upon the death of either party. Similarly, we have seen
that they do not consider the contract terminated if the worker transgresses,
escapes, is incarcerated, or becomes sick before ending his work. In all such
cases, a monitor is appointed or an alternate worker is hired to complete the
work at the original worker’s expense.
The Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that if the landlord and the worker disputed over the
¯
shares of fruit given to each of them, each of them should take an oath that his
claim is true and the other’s is false. Both their claims in this case are given
equal priority since each is denying the other’s claim. Thus, if each of them
takes an oath against the other’s claim, the contract is voided. In this case, all
fruits would belong to the landlord, and the worker would be entitled to the
market wage for his work.
112.3.4 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
13 c
The H. anbalı̄s ruled that musāqāh, like muzāra a, is a permissible but non-
binding contract. Thus, either party may unilaterally void the contract. Thus,
if a musāqāh is voided after fruits are observable, the fruits must be shared
between the landlord and the worker according to the ratios specified in the
13 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.372-7), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.3, p.528-30).
112.3. CONTRACT TERMINATION 557
contract, since it would thus have grown in their joint property. In this case,
the worker must continue to perform the work, in analogy to an entrepreneur
in a defective silent partnership who is required to continue with the sale of
merchandise. Thus, they agreed with the Shāfic ı̄ ruling in this regard.
¯
They further ruled that musāqāh is not voided by the worker’s death. In
this case, the worker’s heirs must continue the work which was established as a
liability on the worker in exchange for his right to the fruits. If the heirs refuse
to continue the work and take the fruits, they are not forced to do so. In the
latter case, the ruler may hire a worker to complete the work and pay for it out
of the worker’s estate. If the worker has no estate, part of his share of fruits
may be used to hire someone who would finish the work.
If the worker voided the contract, or left prior to appearance of the fruits,
then the worker is not entitled to any compensation. In this case, the worker is
deemed to have voluntarily dropped his right, in analogy to an entrepreneur who
voids the contract prior to realization of profits, and the worker for a promise
of reward who voids the contract prior to finishing his task.
If the landlord voids the contract after the worker commenced work but prior
to appearance of fruits, he had to pay the worker the market wages for his work.
This is in contrast to the case of silent partnership, since profits in the latter do
not grow out of the property alone, but through the work of the entrepreneur,
which may not have generated any profits and thus the entrepreneur would not
be entitled to any compensation. However, fruits grow out of the tree, and the
worker’s efforts affect the chance of growth of the fruits after the contract is
voided.
If the worker dies, becomes insane, or is interdicted due to mental incom-
petence, then the H . anbalı̄s agree with the Sh āfic ı̄s that the contract would be
¯
voided if the contract specified the worker by name. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s
differed from the Shāfic ı̄s by ruling that the musāqāh is voided if the landlord
¯
dies, becomes insane, or is interdicted due to mental incompetence.
The H . anbalı̄s also considered cases where an excuse is recognized but the
contract is not voided. For instance, if the worker is trustworthy but his health
does not allow him to do the work, another worker may be added to assist
him. This ruling, in agreement with the Shāfic ı̄s, is based on the view that the
¯
worker is still liable to do the work, and there is no harm in allowing him to
do part of it. However, if the worker is totally unable to do the work, then the
landlord may replace him with one who can. In either case, the original worker
is responsible for the wages of the second, since he is obliged to get the work
done.
The H . anbalı̄s also agree with jurists of the other schools that if a period of
the contract is specified, then the contract is terminated upon the expiration of
that named period. However, they ruled that if the period of the contract was
sufficient for fruits to grow under usual circumstance, but the trees produced no
fruits that year, then the worker is not entitled to any compensation, in analogy
to silent partnerships.
Chapter 113
Mughārasa or Munās.aba
¯
This chapter contains two sections: (i) definition of mugharasa, and (ii) its legal
status. ¯
113.1 Definition
Mugharasa is a contract whereby a landlord gives a worker access to his land
¯
to plant trees therein.1 The Shāfic ı̄s defined the contract as a landlord giving
¯
a man access to his land, so that the latter would provide the small trees, and
the two will share ownership of the trees.2
People of the Levant called the same contract munās.aba or mushāt.ara.
¯
113.2 Legal status rulings

The non-Mālikı̄ jurists forbade the mugharasa contract whereby the land and
¯
trees are shared between the original landlord and the worker, while the Mālikı̄s
allowed the contract subject to certain conditions. On the other hand, for
the mugharasa contract that only results in joint ownership of the trees, the
H ¯
. anafı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that the contract is permissible, while the Mālikı̄s
and Shāfic ı̄s ruled that is impermissible. The Shāfic ı̄s, who disallowed the con-
¯ ¯
tract whether the trees alone or the land and the trees are shared, based their
ruling on the view that such contracts are not needed.

¯ . ¯ ¯
559
560 CHAPTER 113. MUGHĀRASA OR MUNĀS.ABA
¯
113.2.1 H
. anafı̄ rulings
3
The H . anafı̄s ruled that it is not permissible for a landlord to give clear land
(with no trees or plants therein) to another for a fixed number of years to plant
trees, whereby the land and the trees will be jointly owned at the end of the
contract. They argued that this contract is impermissible for three reasons:
1. The contract condition thus makes the land, which existed prior to part-
nership and did not need the worker’s labor, jointly owned. Thus, the
contract is akin to the forbidden transaction of giving a miller some wheat,
with the price being paid as part of the flour he produces.4 The author
of Al-Hidāyah accepted this opinion as well, agreeing with the author of
Al-c ināyah that it is equivalent to hiring a person to die his cloth and take
part of it as his wages. This renders the contract and the partnership
defective.
2. The landlord would thus have made a part of the land compensation for
all of the planted trees, and a portion of the loss a compensation to the
worker’s labor. In other words, the worker would have bought part of
the land with an unknown amount of planted small trees, rendering the
sale defective. ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n found this a compelling argument for the
defectiveness of the contract. Indeed, he reasoned that the analogy to
giving the miller part of the flour as wages is harmless, and commonly used
in muzārac a and musāqāh. Indeed, while ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled thus based
on analogy to the H . adı̄th , ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad abandoned this
¯
ruling based on analogy in favor of following the precedent of the Prophet’s
(pbuh) dealing with the people of Khaybar. Since the latter reasoning is
¯
more valid, rendering the above mentioned mugharasa contract defective
¯
based on the defective sale argument is more appropriate.
3. The contract is also tantamount to having the landlord hire a worker to

turn his land into an orchard full of trees, using the worker’s own tools, in
exchange for half of the orchard that would come to existence through his
work. This renders the contract a defective ’ijārah, since the wages are
unknown, and contain gharar.
¯
Regardless of the reasoning, once the mugharasa is deemed defective, the
landlord is entitled to all fruits and trees. The ¯worker in this case is entitled for
3 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.49), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.286),
c
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H anafı̄), vol.2, p.234), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
¯ . ¯ . anafı̄),
4 In fact, the contract is tantamount to hiring the worker with part of the price being
a portion of the land in which he worked. This type of transaction is forbidden based on
the narration of Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ on the authority of ’Abū Sac ı̄d Al-Khudriy, who said that the
¯
Prophet (pbuh) forbade paying the owner of a male animal with part of the offspring, or
paying the miller with part of the wheat. ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Al-Sh āfic ı̄ used this H
. adı̄th as
¯ ¯
proof that it is not permissible to hire a worker with part of the material in which he works
being considered a wage, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.292 onwards).
¯
113.2. LEGAL STATUS RULINGS 561
a compensation equal to the value of what he planted on the way he planted it,
plus the market wages for his labor.
The H. anafı̄s developed a juristic trick (h.ı̄lah) to legitimize mugharasa as
follows: the landlord may sell part of the land for part of the trees.¯ Then, he
may hire the worker to work for a number of years with a minimal wage, so that
the worker may work in both his own land and the landowner’s.
The H. anafı̄s also allowed mugharasa if the worker is rewarded with part-
nership in trees and fruits only, ¯to the exclusion of the land, as reported in
Al-Fatāwā Al-Khāniyyah.
¯

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled5 that mugharasa is not permissible, since it is not allowed for
¯
a worker to labor in a land ¯in exchange for part of its output. Moreover, they
reasoned that planting trees is not part of the labor of musāqāh, and thus would
trying to legitimize the contract thus would render it defective. Finally, they
said that there is no need for such contracts, since hiring the worker or leasing
the land (’ijārah contracts) can produce the same warranted result.
In contrast, they argued that trees cannot be leased, and thus musāqāh
was legitimized to meet the need that would not be fulfilled using the ’ijārah
contract.
Thus, they ruled that if mugharasa did in fact take place, then the worker
¯ would thus be required to compensate the
is entitled to all trees. The worker
landlord with the market rent for equivalent pieces of land. This ruling is made
in analogy to the ruling in muzārac a in exchange for part of the produce that
the worker would be responsible to pay rent for any part of the land that he did
not cultivate.
113.2.3 H
. anbalı̄ rulings
6
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the contract where a worker plants trees in a landlord’s
land, on condition that they would thus jointly own the trees and the land, is
defective. They ruled thus based on the condition that the two parties would
become partners in the original property (the land and the trees), which is
defective in analogy to the contract where a landlord gives the worker access to
his trees on condition that both the trees and the fruits would be jointly owned,
or gave him access to his land on condition that both the land and the crop
become jointly owned. Thus, the contract is deemed defective, and the worker
is entitled to the market wages for his labor.
On the other hand, they ruled that a musāqāh contract, wherein the worker
would plant the trees and tend to them and then have a defined percentage of
the fruits, is valid. In this case, they ruled that there is no defectiveness in
5 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.324), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄ni ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3,
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.167).
6 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.380 onwards).
562 CHAPTER 113. MUGHĀRASA OR MUNĀS.ABA
¯
the contract, merely the worker’s labor is increased, and his compensation is
reduced.
Thus, we have reviewed the opinions of the three schools that forbade mugharasa
¯
based on protecting the rights of contracting party and avoidance of uncertainty
associated with the growth of trees. Moreover, those jurists objected to partner-
ship in the original property, which is tantamount to making the entrepreneur
a partner in the capital of a silent partnership. Moreover, they reasoned that
planting trees is not a conventional part of the work of musāqāh which was le-
galized in the Prophet’s traditions, and musāqāh is not valid for small trees for
a period that is insufficient for the production of fruits.

The Mālikı̄s ruled7 that work to grow trees may be accomplished through one
of three contracts: (i) an ’ijārah contract, whereby the worker is paid a known
wage, (ii) a juc ālah, whereby the worker would be given a share of the growth,
or (iii) a mugharasa.
¯
A mugharasa, whereby the worker would be entitled to a share of the trees,
¯
the fruits, and the land, would be valid in the Mālikı̄ school if it satisfies the
following five conditions:
1. The worker must be planting trees that stay in the land, to the exclusion
of crops, beans, etc.
2. The trees must be similar in the period required to bear fruit, otherwise
the contract would not be permitted.
3. The term of mugharasa should not be a large number of years. Thus,

if the term of the¯ contract exceeds the time it takes for fruits to grow,
the contract would not be permitted. The contract is permissible if its
duration is just long enough for fruits to grow, and there are two opposing
views for the case where its period is shorter.
4. The worker must be given a share both in the land and the trees. However,
the contract is not permitted if the worker is only given a share in one
or the other. An exception is allowed whereby the worker would be given
ownership of the land occupied by his trees, and no other land.
5. Mugharasa is not allowed in lands established as mortmains, since the

¯
contract is similar to sales.
The Mālikı̄s forbid two types of conditions in mugharasa, musāqāh, and

muzārac a: ¯
1. If one party to the contract stipulates a condition that gives him a sub-
stantial exclusive benefit (but minor such exclusive benefits are tolerated).
2. Stipulating a salam contract as a condition of the contract, or ordering

the worker to uproot the planted trees.
In summary, the H . anbalı̄s consider mugharasa valid if the worker is only

¯
given a share of the fruits, in analogy to musāqāh. The H . anafı̄s consider it valid
if the worker shares the trees and fruits with the owner, and allowed sharing in
the land as well by a trick using a sale contract and an ’ijārah contract. The
Mālikı̄s allowed mugharasa for a share of the land and trees subject to some
conditions. Finally, ¯the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that mugharasa is not needed, and hence
¯
deemed it invalid regardless of the conditions. ¯
Part XX
Division Agreements
(Al-Qisma)
565
Chapter 114
Division of Physical
Properties
The topics concerned with the division of non-fungible (’ac yān or riqāb) will be
covered in six sections:
1. Definition, legality, cornerstones and characteristics.
2. Types of division agreements.
3. Contract conditions.
4. Means of division.
5. The implementer of division.
6. Legal status.
114.1 Definition, legality, and cornerstones

114.1.1 Definition
Dividing a property refers to distributing it among the various entitled parties.
Jurists of the different schools gave it similar definitions. Thus, the H. anafı̄s
defined it as receiving one’s common share in a specific non-fungible property.1
The Majallah (item #1114) defined it thus: “qisma refers to specifying portions
of a jointly owned property for ownership by each of the partners, i.e. sepa-
rating the shares through measurement by size, weight, or volume”. In other
words, division of a jointly owned property exchanges each partner’s ownership
1 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.264), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.178),
. .
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.2), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.91).
¯
567
568 CHAPTER 114. DIVISION OF PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
in the remaining property for the others’ ownership in the share given to him
exclusively.2
This notion of exchange is clear in mutually consensual division of properties.
Moreover, obligatory division that is implemented by a judge upon the partners’
request implies their mutual consent to exchange of ownership. Thus, a division
includes an element of exchange of one’s ownership for another’s, as well as an
element of sorting and separation of the property’s components. The sorting
aspect is clearer in the cases of homogeneous properties measured by weight or
volume, while the exchange aspect is clearer in the case of non-fungibles. We
have also seen that obligatory division is permissible, for instance in the case of
selling a debtor’s property to repay his debts.
The Mālikı̄ definition is very similar to the H . anafı̄ counterpart. Thus, they
defined division as specifying each partner’s previously unspecified share in a
jointly owned property (be it real estate or otherwise). In this regard, it is
possible to division the usufruct rights of a property, while maintaining joint
ownership of the property itself. The Mālikı̄s further distinguish between three
types of division: (i) accommodation division, (ii) mutual consent division, and
(iii) random division.3
4
The Shāfic ı̄ and H
. anbalı̄ definition are the clearest: “division is separation
¯
of entitlements to various parts of the property, and sorting them away with
demarcations, by dividing the entitlements through measurement by volume or
otherwise”.
114.1.2 Legality
Jurists are in consensus that division is permissible, based on the Qur’ān and
Sunnah:
• Proof in the Qur’ān is provided by the verse: “And tell them that water
is to be divided between them; each one’s right to drink being brought
forward by suitable turns” [54:28], which establishes the legality of ac-
commodation division. Further proof is provided by the verse: “But if at
the time of division, other relatives or orphans or poor are present, feed
them out of the property” [4:8], referring to the division of an inheritance.
Finally, the division of spoils of war is specified in the Qur’ān as follows:
“And know that out of the booty that you may acquire in war, a fifth
share is assigned to Allāh and his Messenger ” [8:41], which separation of
a fifth from the other four-fifths requires a division.
• Proofs from the Sunnah include the Prophet’s (pbuh) division of the spoils
of war from Khaybar and H. unayn between the fighters, and he (pbuh) also
¯
divided inheritance between heirs, illustrating the legality of division.5
2 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), vol.7, p.17).
4 Hāshiyat Al-Bājūrı̄ c alā ’ibn Qāsim (vol.2, p.351), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.114), Al-
. ¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.6, p.364).
5 Review the relevant Hadı̄ths in Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4, p.178).
. ¯ . . . ¯
114.1. DEFINITION, LEGALITY, AND CORNERSTONES 569
The contract is also needed to meet the needs of people, thus allowing each
partner to deal in his independent share of the property. Thus, division allows
the partners to avoid the disadvantages of joint ownership such as distributed
control among a multiplicity of partners.6
114.1.3 Cornerstone and reason

The cornerstone of division is the act by means of which the separate entitle-
ments are demarcated through measurement by size or volume. The reason
for dividing a joint property is the request by some or all of them to be given
access to their exclusive share of the property to allow him to benefit or deal
in it accordingly. Thus, division is invalid unless the joint partners, or some of
them, request it. Once one or more of the partners ask for dividing a property,
the division only becomes binding if the division does not reduce the property’s
conventional usufruct. For instance, a wall, bathroom, or a small house may
not be divided according to this condition.7
114.1.4 Characteristics
We have seen that jurists at times recognize dividing a property as an act of
sorting and separation, and at other times recognized as an exchange akin to
sales. In what follows, we shall list the views in each school.
H
. anafı̄ views
8
The H . anafı̄s stated that the division procedure, when discussed generally both
for fungibles and non-fungibles, involves a sorting aspect (by giving each partner
full control of his property), and an exchange aspect (by compensating each for
the ownership he forfeits in other partners’ properties).
They further said that the sorting aspect is more manifest in dividing fun-
gible properties measured by weight, volume, size, or count. In such cases, one
partner may take his share in the absence of his partners. In contrast, they said
that the exchange aspect is more dominant in non-fungibles (e.g. animals, real
estate, etc.) with non-homogeneous components. In the latter cases, no partner
is allowed to take his share in the absence of his partners.9
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s ruled that if jointly owned property had a
single genus, then obligatory division is permissible, and a judge has to division
such properties upon the request of any single partner. This ruling follows from
the dominance of the sorting aspect of this division. Moreover, forced exchange
can be valid under certain circumstances, e.g. in the case of selling a debtor’s
property to repay his debts.
. ¯ .
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.2), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.26).
9 This distinction between the two aspects was central to items #1116, 1117, 1118, 1119 of
Al-Majallah.
Mālikı̄ views
The Mālikı̄s ruled10 as follows for the three types of division that they recog-
nized:
1. Division by mutual consent is concluded without randomization, and it is
analogous to sales.
2. Division by lottery identifies separate rights to the partners in their prop-
erties, and it is not akin to sales.
3. Division for accommodation applies to the division of rights to the usufruct
of various parts of a property, and it is thus akin to leasing.
Shāfic ı̄ views
¯
The Shāfic ı̄s stated11 that division sorts shares in property, and separates rights
¯
thereof, unless it involves a side-compensation with property other than the one
divided. In the latter case, they deemed the contract a sale. For instance, if
the joint property was a water-well, which cannot be divided, then one of the
partners may take it by lottery, and the other partners may be paid the value
of their shares monetarily.
Similarly, they ruled that division is tantamount to sale if the distributed
portions are assessed by market value (rather than size). For instance, if part
of the land is twice as valuable as another, one partner may be given one third
(the more valuable part per acre) and the other two thirds (the less valuable
part per acre), and they would thus have received an equal part in value each.
This seems to be the most accurate opinion among the various juristic schools.
H
. anbalı̄ views
12
The H . anbalı̄s stated that division is a sorting of rights and demarcation of one
partner’s entitlement from that of another. However, they reasoned, it cannot be
seen as a sale, since it does not use the language of transfer of ownership, it does
not allow for preemption rights, it can be enforced without some parties’ consent,
it can be determined by lottery, and one partner’s entitlement is affected by that
of another. All such aspects are alien to sales contract, wherein they would be
impermissible. Moreover, the H . anbalı̄s reasoned that division is contrasted from
sales by giving it its own name and legal status rulings, and thus is a distinct
contract of its own right.
This distinction between sales and divisions is juristically significant. For
instance, by distinguishing the contract from sales, it is possible to division
ownership of fruits that are measured by volume in sales based on weight in
division, and vice versa. Moreover, since the contract is not a sale, parting prior
to receipt is permissible even for properties in which a sale would be voided
10 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.660-664).
11 Hāshiyat Al-Bājūrı̄ (vol.2, pp.352-4), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.306).
. ¯ ¯ ¯
12 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.114,129), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.6, p.365).
114.2. TYPES OF DIVISION 571
by such parting. However, if the contract is deemed to be a sale, those rulings

would have to be reversed.
Moreover, if division is viewed as an exchange, wherein each partner com-
pensates the other for part of his ownership, it would indeed be viewed as a sale
for the compensated part, and a sorting of the remainder. Thus, the H . anbalı̄s
recognized division in general to be simply a sorting of property rights, unless
there is implicit compensation, in which case the compensated part is deemed
to be part of a sale.
114.2 Types of division

114.2.1 H
. anafı̄ classification
13
The H
. anafı̄s classified divisions into two main types:
1. Obligatory division, which is implemented by a judge based on the request
of one or more of the partners. In this case, if the judge or his deputy
division the property by lottery, no partner has the right to object to the
outcome.14
2. Voluntary division, which is implemented by mutual consent. This type
of division is considered a contract, which requires the standard contract
cornerstones of offer and acceptance. The object of the contract in this
case is the jointly owned property that is eligible for division.15
Each of the two H
. anafı̄ categories of division is further divided into two
types:
1. Division by division, in which specific portions of a jointly owned property
is designated for each partner. Such divisions are allowed for properties
that can be divided without harm, such as homogeneous properties mea-
sured by weight, volume, or count, or non-fungible but divisible such as
large houses. Division by division can be either voluntary or obligatory.
2. Division by consolidation, in which each partner’s entitlements are col-
lected together and associated with a single non-fungible property.16 For
instance, if two partners shared ownership of a heap of cotton, the cotton
may be divided physically into part that belongs to one and part that
belongs to the other. Such division is only allowed for properties of a uni-
form genus. Thus, it applies to homogeneous goods measured by weight,
volume, or count. It can also be applied to individual camels, cows, or
sheep, within one genus. However, it does not apply to mixtures of two
13 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), vol.7, pp.19-22).
14 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.184).
15 Al-Majalla item #1121 refers to voluntary division, and #1122 refers to obligatory or
legal division.
16 This distinction between division by division and division by consolidation is discussed in
Al-Majallah (item #1115).

or more genera, since differences in genera may make the division unequal
and thus harm one of the partners.
’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that real estate and land cannot be divided by consolida-
tion to avoid potential harm, since real estate and land can vary significantly
in value. Thus, he reasoned by analogy to the case of properties of different
genera.
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad allowed real estate and land to
be divided by consolidation, allowing for side-compensations for differences in
value. On the other hand, all H . anafı̄s agreed that if the joint property included
both a piece of land and a house, then there is clear difference in genus, and
each should be divided separately.
114.2.2 Mālikı̄ classification

The Mālikı̄s recognized two main types of division for physical properties:17
1. Division by mutual consent, which they deem to be akin to sales. Thus,

whoever takes property as part of such division owns it thus, and may
only return it based on mutual consent, in analogy to revocation of sale.
Moreover, properties taken in such division may not be returned based on
claims of injustice, unless an assessor is brought to verify the claims. This
type of division applies to properties of a single genus (e.g. clothes), or of
different genera (e.g. clothes and an animal).
2. Division by lottery sorts the joint ownership of a property, and it is not

akin to a sale. Thus, one partner may return what he was given based on
a claim of injustice, without need for a professional assessor. Otherwise,
such division is binding on all parties. It applies only in cases of joint
property of a single genus, and it cannot be implemented so that the
rights of two of the partners remain joint.
114.2.3 Shāfic ı̄ classification

¯
The Shāfic ı̄s recognized three types of division,18 depending on equality in shape
¯
or value, and whether or not a side-payment is necessary:
1. Sorting divisions are merely the demarcation and distribution of each part-
ner’s right, thus it does not contain any element of sale. This type of
division is possible as long as the sorting causes no harm, e.g. in dis-
tributing grains, fat, similar buildings, or uniform land. Such divisions
may be obligatory, in which case each partner is bound by the division if
another partner requests it. The property in this case would be divided
by using the appropriate measure for its genus: volume, weight, size, or
count. If the shares are equal, the property would first be divided into
17 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.662-4), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.284 onwards).
18 Hāshiyat Al-Bājūrı̄ (vol.2, pp.352-4), cite[vol.4, pp.341-4]R32.
. ¯
114.2. TYPES OF DIVISION 573
equal parts based on the appropriate measure, and then a lottery would
determine each partner’s allocated share.
2. Division by value would take place if the parts of a divided property are
unequal in value, and different size shares must be given to equate the
value of their distributed shares. The above referenced example of giving
one partner the fertile one-third of the land and the other the infertile two-
thirds, where the two parts are thus equal in value, would be an instance
of this type of division. In this case, the land would first be divided into
the one-third and two-thirds portions, and then a lottery would determine
which partner gets which piece of land.
This type of division is also eligible for obligatory division, whereby each
partner is bound by the division if his partner requests it. On the other
hand, if it were possible to perform the division by dividing the good
property alone and the bad property alone, the partner cannot be forced
to accept this unequal division by value. However, if the property consists
of multiple movable objects of equal value (e.g. clothes of the same type
but of different characteristics, or small similar adjacent shops), then both
partners must accept the division by value.
3. Division with compensation may be required, whereby one of the part-

ners may have to compensate another financially for part of the value, if
the above two types of division are impossible. For instance, if the joint
property is an indivisible well, then one party would take the well, and
compensate the other for half its value. This type of division cannot be
used without the partners’ mutual consent.
The first type of division mentioned above is a pure sorting of rights, and
contains no element of exchange or sale. In contrast, the latter two types do
qualify as forms of sale.
We note that the Shāfic ı̄s have thus recognized, along with the other schools,
¯
two major categories of divisions: obligatory and voluntary.
114.2.4 H
. anbalı̄ classification
The H . anbalı̄s agreed with the H
. anafı̄s in their twofold classification of divisions
into:19
1. Voluntary division, which requires the mutual consent of all partners. Such
divisions are used in all cases where harm may be done to one or more
of the partners, or where one partner needs to compensate another. It
applies to the division of small homes, mills, baths, and stores. Thus,
no obligatory division can be allowed for such unique properties, and one
partner’s request is not sufficient to force the others to accept division.
. anbalı̄), vol.6, pp.364-9).
This type of division is very similar to the Shāfic ı̄ notion of division with
¯
compensation. Proof for this assertion is provided by the H . anbalı̄ state-
ment that whatever cannot be divided into parts of equal value and size,
or parts of equal value and unequal size, may only be divided with the
mutual consent of all partners.
The H. anbalı̄s also agreed with the Sh āfic ı̄ view that this type of division is
¯
similar to sales, and inherits the legal status of sales. This ruling follows
from the fact that each partner receives his property and pays the other
a compensation out of his own property, which is the essence of sales.
In this regard, part of the division is a mere sorting of rights, and the
compensated part is viewed as a sale. For the portion that is classified
as a sale, all the prohibitions that apply to sales must therefore apply.
Moreover, if a partner refuses to engage in such a division, he may not
be forced to do so, based on the H . adı̄th narrated on the authority of ’Ibn
¯
c
Abbās: “No harm is allowed”.20
2. Obligatory division may be applied to cases where no partner is harmed

by the division, and no compensation is required. Thus, it applies to large
lots of land, large orchards, large homes, large stores, etc., whether or not
it has equal parts. It also applies to fungibles of a single genus that are
measured by weight, volume, etc.
Obligatory division is also possible if the sizes of the portions given to
each partner can be altered to make them of equal value. Otherwise, if
the essence of exchange is required, then obligatory division is not allowed.
In cases where obligatory division is allowed, if one partner requests the
division, the other partners or their guardians may be forced to accept
it. This ruling follows since the division removes disadvantages associated
with joint ownership, thus benefiting all partners by giving them more
discretion in using or dealing in their respective properties.
114.3 Contract conditions

In what follows, we shall discuss the conditions of voluntary division and oblig-
atory division separately in two subsections.
114.3.1 Voluntary division conditions

21
The H
. anafı̄s stipulated the following conditions for voluntary division:
1. The contracting party must be eligible, i.e. they must be sane and dis-
cerning. This ruling follows from the fact that division may result in a
20 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Ibn Mājah, and Al-Dāraqutnı̄, deemed Hadı̄th hasan by Al-Nawawı̄.
. . . ¯ .
It has a number of chains of narration that support one another.
21 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.18-22).
.
benefit or a loss, and thus the condition of sanity and discernment is im-
posed in analogy to the eligibility condition for sales. In this regard, the
H. anafı̄s did not require the contracting parties to be of legal age, thus
allowing a discerning child to engage in division with his guardian’s per-
mission. Moreover, being a Muslim, male, or free are not requirements for
this contract, also in analogy to sales.
2. Ownership or guardianship of part of the property is required to be part

of a division.
If the ownership condition is invoked, each party to the division must be
co-owner of the divided property. This follows since division is a sorting
of rights and exchange of rights, all of which apply only to owned proper-
ties.22 Thus, the H. anafı̄s deem division of debts to joint creditors prior to
receipt to be invalid. This ruling follows from the fact that such debts only
become owned upon receipt. Moreover, debts are only legal entities, and
division applies to physical properties. The H . anafı̄s also reasoned from
this condition that division by an un-commissioned agent is suspended
upon approval of the owner.
If the guardianship condition is invoked, then the party to a division con-
tract must be a guardian allowed to deal in property, e.g. by being the
father or his plenipotentiary, or grandfather or his plenipotentiary, of a
child, an insane person, or a mentally incompetent individual. The de-
marcation in this case is as follows: guardians allowed to engage in sales
is allowed to engage in division, and others are not.
In this regard, the plenipotentiary of a mother, brother, or uncle, may
only division movable objects to the exclusion of immovable ones, since
such plenipotentiaries are allowed to sell movables only.
On the other hand, the plenipotentiary of a deceased person has no guardian-
ship rights over someone named in the will, and thus may not division his
property. Similarly, the heirs of a deceased do not have guardianship over
such a named person, and thus may not division his property (indeed his
status is equivalent to that of the heirs). Finally, no heir may division the
property of another heir, since none of them is a guardian over the others.
3. The partners or their representatives must be present at the time of di-

vision. If some of the partners division the property while others are
absent, the division is voided. This follows in division by mutual consent,
and must be contrasted with the case of division by a judge, which is not
voided if some of the partners are absent.
4. The partners or their representatives must consent to the division. Thus,

if one of the partners was a child with no guardian, the division would be
invalid. This follows from the H. anafı̄ view of voluntary division as akin to
sales, and thus it requires mutual consent in analogy to sales.
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.24), Al-Majallah (items #1123,1125,1126).
If one of the partners is incapable of expressing his legal consent, e.g. a

child or an insane person, his guardian or plenipotentiary may take his
place in expressing consent. If the child or insane person has no guardian,
then the division would be suspended pending approval of the ruler, who
may appoint a plenipotentiary to witness the division.23
24
The Shāfic ı̄s mostly agreed with the H. anafı̄ conditions. Thus, they ruled
¯
that the partners’ consent in voluntary division is necessary even after the lottery
determines the shares each will be given. They also ruled that if proof of an
intentional or unintentional injustice is provided after a voluntary or obligatory
sorting division, the division would thus be voided. On the other hand, they
ruled that if the division involved adjustment for value or compensation, it
would not be voided thus, in analogy to the rulings for sales.
114.3.2 Obligatory division conditions

H
. anafı̄ conditions
The H
. anafı̄s stipulated four main conditions for obligatory division:
1. One or more of the partners must request division from the judge. In
this regard, division cannot take place without a request of some partner,
since it would otherwise constitute a forbidden dealing in the property of
another without their consent.25 In this regard, if one partner requests a
division and others refuse, then if the property is divisible,26 it would thus
be made subject to an obligatory division to remove the harm caused by
joint ownership. This ruling is made in analogy to the preemption rules
that are instituted to prevent harm to the entitled preemptor of a sale.
If the property is indivisible, then its usufruct is divided temporally, by
making the partners take turns in extracting its usufruct.
In summary, division is automatically granted upon request, unless the
petitioner’s intent is to harm his partners. In the latter case, division is
not mandated, as we shall see in the second condition.
2. There must be no harm caused by division, otherwise the essence of prop-

erty being beneficial would not be realized. This condition becomes clearer
when we distinguish between two types of properties:27
(a) Fungible properties measured by volume, weight or count can be

divided without causing any harm. Thus, such properties can be
23 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.180), Al-Majallah (item #1128).
24 Al-Khatı̄b
. Al-Sh irbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.344).
25 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), ¯vol.5, p.179), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.18,22,28), Al-
¯ ¯
. .
Majallah (items #1129,1130).
26 Divisible properties are those the common usage of which is not affected by division, c.f.

27 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.19-21), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.268
. .
onwards).
made subject to obligatory division, and the judge may force object-
ing partners to accept such division to guarantee the benefits of all
concerned.
(b) Some indivisible properties, such as books, jewels, small buildings,
animals, etc. cannot be divided without causing harm to all partners.
Obligatory division is not permitted for such properties, since the
judge is not allowed to cause harm to them.
In some cases, division may harm one partner but not the other, e.g.
if a land is jointly owned and one partner’s share is small. In such
cases, the division may be mandated if petitioned by the majority
owner, to remove the harm of joint ownership and allow the majority
owner to benefit thus. In this regard, the right of the majority owner
cannot be voided based on the fact that exercising that right may
harm another (the minority owner).
The H . anafı̄s had two opinions regarding the previous case if the mi-
nority owner petitioned the division:
• Al-H. ākim Al-Sh ahı̄d in his Al-Mukhtas.ar Al-Kāfı̄ ruled that the
¯ ¯
property would be divided in this case, since the minority owner
would have indicated his consent to his loss, while the other
partner only benefits from the division. Thus, the latter may be
forced to accept it.
• In contrast, Al-Qaddūrı̄ ruled in Al-Kitāb that the property should
not be divided in this case, since the minority owner would seem
to be stubbornly transgressing by insisting on a division that
harms his own interests. Thus, his request to division is ignored,
and without that request no obligatory division would be possi-
ble. This is the better of the two opinions.
In this regard, if both partners had a small share of the property,
the judge may only division their joint ownership by their mutual
consent. This ruling follows from the view that mandating a division
may only be legitimized based on maximizing benefits, while the
division considered here reduces benefits. On the other hand, if they
mutually agree to the division, then they have a right to do whatever
they jointly agree to.28
3. The division must be fair. This follows from the sorting and exchange
aspects of division, both of which require fairness and consent. Moreover,
if the sorting is not fair, that implies that some portion of the partnership
remains, and thus the division must be re-done.29 Thus, if it is discovered
that a division included a major error or injustice, it is automatically
voided.
28c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.94 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7,
¯ . .
p.28).
29 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.26), Al-Majallah (item #1127).
.
4. In divisions of consolidation, the joint property must be of a single genus.

Thus, if the properties included different genera, divisions of consolidation
would be deemed invalid, since differences in genera would result in losses
of usufruct.
Similarly, ’Abū H
. anı̄fa ruled that houses, lands, and grapevines may not
be divided by consolidation, based on major heterogeneity that is tanta-
mount to differences in genus. Thus, he ruled that such properties must
be divided individually.
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that houses and such prop-
erties may be divided by consolidation, since they are of the same genus
by virtue of their apparent form, even though their usufructs may differ.
In this regard, heterogeneity may be corrected by adjustments for value,
and the judge can determine what is most beneficial to the partners.
On the other hand, all three major scholars of the H . anafı̄ school agreed
that a two-room house must be divided by consolidation, whether the two
rooms are adjacent or disjoint.30 However, this early H . anafı̄ ruling does
not apply in our current times, since homes today differ substantially and
thus should be divided individually rather than by consolidation.
Shāfic ı̄ conditions
¯
The Shāfic ı̄ conditions for obligatory division are very similar to the H . anafı̄
¯
conditions. Thus, they ruled31 that the ruler may forbid partners from dividing
any property if that division would cause great harm (e.g. dividing a jewel,
which would ruin it). In this case, they may sequentially benefit from the
property, thus sharing its usufruct.
If the property’s usufruct is only partially destroyed by division (e.g. break-
ing a sword or splitting a small bathroom or mill) the ruler may not forbid them
from dividing, but he may not accept their request either, since such division is
wasteful.
Finally, they ruled that if one partner has a majority share and the other a
minority share, the minority owner may be forced to division the property upon
the request of the majority owner, but the latter may not be forced to accept a
division upon the request of the former.
H
32
The H . anbalı̄s also agreed to the conditions stipulated above. Thus, they also
ruled that divisions are valid only if they do not cause harm, based on the
H
. adı̄th : “No harm is allowed”, and that the ruler is required to division the
¯
property if it is divisible and can be used by the partners after division. In this
. .
p.270), Al-Majallah (items #1132-1142).
.
32 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, vol.5, p.115
¯
onwards).
114.4. METHODS OF DIVISION 579
regard, Al-Shāfic ı̄ and ’Ah.mad defined the harm that prevents division as any
¯
diminution in the value of any partner’s share, whether or not the partners can
use the divided property.
Mālikı̄ conditions
The Mālikı̄s ruled33 that if jointly owned property is divisible without causing
harm (e.g. land), then some partners may be forced to accept division if others
request it. On the other hand, if the joint property is not divisible, then it
should be sold, and its price may be divided among the partners in proportion
to their shares. In this case, dissenting partners may be forced to sell if others
requested division, provided that four conditions are satisfied:
1. The partner requesting the sale must not be able to sell his share of the
property separately without losing any part of its value. If the partner
was able to sell his share alone and get its full value, then other partners
may not be forced to sell, in order to avoid causing them harm. This
ruling is in analogy to the case of fungible property, in which case the
other partners may not be forced to sell their property.
2. The dissenting partner must not be willing to guarantee his partner com-
pensation for any loss caused by selling his share separately.
3. The partner requesting the sale must not have full ownership of his share
of the property. Thus, if two partners jointly own a property by virtue
of inheritance or sale, and one of them wished to sell the jointly owned
property, then the other may be forced to sell his portion as well. However,
if one of the partners has full ownership of his share of the property, then
he may not force the other to sell his separate share at the same time.
4. The joint property must not be used for leasing, and must not be purchased
with the intention of trading.
114.4 Methods of division

The H . anafı̄s described in detail the methods and procedures of division in the
manner described below.34 However, those listed methods and procedures seem
to be the best judgment (’ijtihād) of the jurists for their times, and thus such
rulings will change as times change:
1. Land must be surveyed so that charts may be given to the judge, and
buildings must be assessed so that each partner can know the value of his
share.
33 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.678 onwards) ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.285).
34 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.14 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
c
p.270), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.100 onwards), Al-Majalla (item #1151).
¯
Those procedures are also discussed by other schools of jurisprudence, c.f. ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-
Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.308 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.123), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B,
¯ ¯
2. The various shares should be separated and sorted together with its ease-
ment rights, etc. Thus, no partner’s share should continue to have common
rights with other partners.
3. The separated portions of the property should be given consecutive num-

bers or codes.
4. The names of the partners should be written on separate identical pieces

of paper, then ruling by juristic approbation, a lottery should be adminis-
tered by randomly pulling names from the urn and matching them to the
numbers assigned to the ratios. For instance, if the partner whose name
is drawn first is entitled to ten shares, he is given the first ten shares from
the numbered list, so that his total share is contiguous, and so on.
In this regard, using a lottery is only preferred by the H . anafı̄s to ensure
fairness. However, the divider may allocate the partners’ shares in another
manner, since his activity is akin to that of a judge, and thus each partner
would be required to accept his allocated share.
5. Al-Majallah (item #1147) stated that the means of measuring shares in

the property is determined by the genus of that property. Thus, parts may
be measured by volume, weight, size, or count, depending on the measure
used in sales of such properties. In this regard, item #1148 stated that
lands should be measured and distributed by size, while trees and buildings
on such land must be assessed by value.
Monetary adjustment
The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s allowed adjustments for inequality in division
¯
with financial side-payments, if it is not possible to make adjustment with shares
in non-fungible properties. For instance, if the divided property is land with
very heterogeneous parts, the partners’ shares may be adjusted for value using
financial side-payments.
In contrast, the H . anafı̄s did not allow the use of financial adjustments in
sorting division, except by the mutual consent of all partners. They based this
ruling on the view that the property is subject to division, and not money.
Thus, if a house is being divided and one of the two partners’ share is more
valuable, then if one partner wishes to adjust for value monetarily and the other
wishes to adjust using land, the wish of the latter is fulfilled. Thus, monetary
compensations may only be used if all partners consent, since division contains
an element of exchange, which requires mutual consent. However, if the judge
finds it necessary to use financial side payments, he may do so.35
In what follows, we shall review the jurists’ rulings for the most important
cases of dividing properties. Those include dividing homes, land with buildings,
35 ’Ibn
Al-Humām ((H. anafı̄), vol.8, p.15), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H anafı̄), vol.4, p.101), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
¯ . . anafı̄), vol.7, p.19), Al-
Majallah (item #1149).
a land and a home, a home and a shop, vertically neighboring properties, and
roads.
114.4.1 Dividing homes

The H . anafı̄s agreed that if the property includes homes in different towns, then
the homes in each town should be divided separately.36 ’Abū H . anı̄fa further
ruled that even if all the homes were in one town, each should still be divided
separately, since he deemed different homes to be of different genera based on
significant differences in location, etc. This is the most widely accepted H . anafı̄
opinion, according to which no adjustments in division is applied, each home is
divided separately, and shares may only be consolidated by mutual consent.
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that the judge should de-
termine whether to division by consolidation or division each home separately.
They based this ruling on their view that all homes are of the same genus at least
in form and fundamental usage for dwelling. Thus, they ruled that the judge
should determine the method of division that maximizes the partners’ benefits.
On the other hand, all three principals of the H . anafı̄ school agreed that small
homes are to be divided by consolidation, regardless of whether or not they are
adjacent, due to the great similarities of such small homes in usage.37 Finally,
the H. anafı̄s agreed that bathrooms, wells, and other indivisible properties may
not be divided without mutual consent, to avoid causing harm to any partner.
On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that a home with heterogeneous compo-
¯
nents must be divided with compensation for value, since different parts would
38
serve different functions. The Mālikı̄s also agreed that homes must be di-
vided either by mutual consent, or by lottery with readjustment for deviations
in value.39
114.4.2 Land with buildings

The principal H. anafı̄ jurists ruled in three different ways over the division of a
piece of land that contains buildings:40
1. ’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that the land should be divided by area, and the one
who receives a better piece of land, or gets the building within his share,
should compensate the others monetarily to equate the respective values.
In this case, monetary compensation is introduced only based on necessity,
since the H . anafı̄s otherwise do not allow such side-payments in exchange
. .
Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.22), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.98 onwards),
¯
’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.184).
37 Those opinions of the three principals of the Hanafı̄ schools were considered by late Hanafı̄s
. .
to be appropriate for their time, but argued that homes as well as rooms became much more
heterogeneous in later times, c.f. ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
c anı̄ Al-
¯
Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.99).
.
39 ’Ibn ¯Rushd Al-H ¯ ¯
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.262).
40 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H anafı̄), vol.8, p.15).
.
divisions. This exception based on necessity is analogous to the case of a

man appointed as guardian for his younger brother. Such a guardian does
not have financial guardianship rights, but is permitted to name the dowry
to satisfy the need for marriage. Thus, the ’Abū H . anı̄fa’s ruling in this
case agrees with the Shāfic ı̄ ruling for financially compensated division.
¯
2. ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the land and buildings should be divided based
on value assessments, since that is the only way to ensure fairness. This
agrees with the Shāfic ı̄ ruling for property-compensated division.
¯
3. Muh.ammad ruled that the partner who receives the building should first
attempt to compensate his partner with a larger share of empty land to
the extent possible. If fairness cannot be fully satisfied with such land-
compensation, then the difference may be assessed and compensated mon-
etarily. He ruled thus based on the view that necessity (which legitimizes
the financial compensation) must be limited to its extent, and thus does
not overrule the primary method of compensation with divided property.
114.4.3 Vacant land and and a home, or a home and a

shop
The H . anafı̄s ruled for partnerships over vacant land and homes, or homes and
shops, the judge should division each of the properties separately, without con-
solidation. They based this ruling on such properties being of different genera.
Thus, land would be divided based on area, and the home should be divided
based on value.41
114.4.4 Vertically neighboring properties

If the properties to be divided include a lower level to the exclusion of what’s
above it and an upper level to the exclusion of what’s below it, then each of the
two properties should be assessed separately, and the judge must division the
properties based on assessed value. Muh.ammad and the majority of H . anafı̄s
made this ruling based on the view that each of the two properties serves a
different purpose from the other, and hence they are considered to be of different
genera, requiring division by value to ensure equity.
In contrast, ’Abū H
. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that such properties should
be divided based on area. In this regard, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that each unit of
area on a lower floor is worth two units of a higher floor, while ’Abū Yūsuf
ruled that units of area should be traded on par. Later jurists interpreted this
difference in opinion as differences in the conventions of the two jurists’ times.42
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.184), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.99),
¯
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.22), Al-Majallah (item #1148).
. .
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.102), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.185).
¯ . .
43
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that if two partners share ownership of a two-level
home, and one of the partners requests that one of them take the upper level
and the other takes the lower, the other partner may not be forced to accept it.
Similarly, the second partner is not forced to accept the first partner’s request
of dividing one of the two levels alone. This ruling follows from the view that
the two levels are viewed as two separate homes, and one of the partners may
be harmed by such division.
If one of the partners in this case requests dividing each level separately, then
the H. anbalı̄s ruled again that the other partner is not forced to accept, since the
division may cause him harm. However, if one partner requests dividing both
levels simultaneously, and if that causes no harm and no property compensation
would be required, then the second partner must accept the division. In this
case, the H . anbalı̄s ruled in agreement with the H. anafı̄s that such division must
be determined based on value, to ensure equity. Simple area rules (e.g. one unit
of the lower level being equal to some number of units of the upper level area)
may not be used in this case unless both partners consent to such rules.
114.4.5 Road division

There are a number of problems that may arise when dividing a road. In what
follows, we shall consider some of those problems and the jurists’ rulings thereof:
1. Easement rights
If a jointly owned house is divided in such a way that one of them needs access
to drainage or a road through the property of another, but the division contract
44
did not specify that he has easement rights, the H. anafı̄ jurists ruled thus:
1. If the first partner has another means of drainage or gaining access to the
road, he must seek that alternative, and may not use the other’s property
for such purposes. This ruling follows since the division thus did not cause
harm to either partner.
2. If such alternatives were not available, the division must be voided. This
ruling follows since the easement rights amount to continued joint owner-
ship of some aspect of the second partner’s share, and thus the property
must be re-divided.
2. Disagreement over road closure

If the partners disagree over whether or not to close a connecting road between
their properties, the ruler must consider two cases:
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.271 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄),
vol.8, p.15 onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.102), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
¯
((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.185), Al-Majallah (items #1143-4, 1167).
1. If it is possible for each of the partners to have their own access through
roads exclusively within their properties, then the ruler may division the
property and close their connecting road to maximize their benefits and
fulfill maximal separation of their properties.
2. If it is difficult or impossible to have separate road access for the two

properties, the ruler may build a joint road to give them both full access
to the outside world.45
3. Disagreement over road size

If the partners disagree over the width of the road, then:
1. Roads within the house must be made of the same width and height as
the gate. Thus, balconies may only be built if they are higher than the
height of the door, to ensure ease of passage.
2. Roads to the outside must be made sufficiently wide for an animal to pass
through.46
4. Road ownership
Ownership shares in a joint road are proportional to their ownership shares
of the property prior to division. This ruling follows from the fact that the
property was divided but the common road was not, and thus ownership shares
in the road continue as they were prior to division.47
5. Unequal shares in the road

Jurists agree that ownership shares in the road may be unequal, even if their
original ownership shares in the land and home were equal. This follows from
the rule that unequal division of non-fungible properties is permissible subject
to mutual consent for properties not subject to ribā rulings.48
114.5 The divider

114.5.1 Appointing a divider
The partners may perform the division among themselves with mutual consent,
unless they include a young child, in which case they need a court-order since
they have no guardianship rights over the child partner. In this regard, part-
ners often appoint representatives for the division, or representatives may be
appointed by the judge. In this regard, it is preferable if the ruler or judge
45 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.16), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
46 ibid., ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.29).
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
114.5. THE DIVIDER 585
appoints a dedicated professional divider who is a paid public servant, so that

he may perform the division tasks without being compensated by the partners.
This makes matters easier for people, and avoids suspicion of unfairness. This
avoidance of suspicion is important since division is similar to court justice,
since it settles disputes, and produces a public good. Thus, the public servant
providing that public good should be paid from the state treasury.
If no dedicated divider was appointed, then the judge may appoint one for
each case, and he should be compensated by the partners for the market wages
of his labor. In this case, they alone benefit from this divider’s efforts, and thus
must pay him out of their wealth. Moreover, the judge should insist that the
divider be paid his market wages, and not restrict the profession to one person
to avoid monopoly behavior and demanding excessive compensation. Moreover,
the judge should not permit the dividers to collude and charge high wages, since
that would harm the public.49 However, it is permissible for such professionals
to form a modern syndicate under the ruler’s supervision, since such syndicates
often do not perform as cartels to keep wages high.
114.5.2 Divider characteristics

The H. anafı̄s listed based on juristic approbation a set of preferred characteristics
that the divider should possess:50
1. He must be just and competent, to avoid impermissible unjust division.
2. He must be appointed by the judge, since only the judge is allowed to di-
vision on behalf of children and absent individuals, and to ensure fairness.
3. He must try his utmost to seek the maximal level of justice in division.
He also should not leave any joint rights (e.g. of passage, drainage, or
access to drinking water) without dividing it if at all possible. Finally, the
divider should not combine the shares of any of the partners without their
consent, lest the division would have to be re-done.
4. He must use random assignment after division and sorting of the shares.
This rule removes suspicion of favoritism, thus satisfying the relevant par-
ties. It is also derived from the Sunnah.51
The Shāfic ı̄s stipulated seven conditions for the divider appointed by the
¯
judge:52 Islam, legal age, sanity, freedom, being male, being just, and knowledge
of mathematics and measurement to ensure competence in division. The Shāfic ı̄s
¯
49 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.5), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.179), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.91
¯
onwards).
50 ibid., Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.19,26).
.
51 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukhārı̄, and Muslim on the authority of c Ā’isha: “Whenever
. ¯ ¯
the Prophet (pbuh) traveled, he always ran a lottery between his wives to determine which
one would accompany him on the trip”, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.6, p.217).
52 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.338¯onwards), Hāshiyat Al-Bājūrı̄ (vol.2, p.351),
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.6, p.372), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.126).
added the further conditions of sight, hearing, speech, and accuracy, in order to
ensure his eligibility for guardianship over the partners. If any of the conditions
are violated, the division would only be binding by mutual consent, as if the
partners performed the division themselves. Moreover, if the partners were to
choose their own divider with mutual consent, then none of the above conditions
apply except for the ones needed to assign him as their agent.
114.5.3 Multiple dividers

Division is valid with one or more dividers. In this regard, the Mālikı̄s stated
that one divider is sufficient for divisions by lottery, since his task is merely to
report on the outcome of the lottery. Thus, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s
¯
ruled that one divider is sufficient if the division does not require assessment
of property values. However, if assessment is required, then they ruled that
at least two dividers would be required, since assessment is testimony that a
property has some value, and testimony requires two witnesses.53
114.5.4 Divider wages

All jurists agree that a court-appointed divider should be paid from the state
treasury if it suffices. They based this ruling on the previously mentioned ar-
guments that his duties are similar to those of a judge, and that he provides a
public service.
On the other hand, if a paid divider is selected by the partners, then they
should pay his wages. In this case, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Mālik ruled that the
partners should bear equal burden for the wages of the divider, since he is
paid for his work regardless of their property shares. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf,
Muh.ammad, the Shāfic ı̄s and the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that burdens for the divider’s
¯
wage should be made proportional to the partners’ property shares. They based
this ruling on the view that larger shares require more work from the divider.
They also reasoned that wages correspond to a cost associated with the property,
and thus the partner receiving more property should pay more than one who
receives less. They provided as proof for this reasoning the agreement that
the wages for one who measures property with volume or weight is paid in
proportion to the amount he measures, and all other tasks are thus rewarded
based on their sizes.54 This latter view seems to be more appropriate, since it
is more conducive to ease and justice.
53 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.500), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.665), Al-Khatı̄b Al-
¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.339), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.6, p.373 onwards).
¯ 54 ¯
Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.19), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.5), Al-Zayla ı̄
c
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.265), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H

c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.179 onwards), Abd
c
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.92), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.500), ’Ibn Juzayy
¯
((Mālikı̄), p.286), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.340), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯ ¯ ¯
(H. anbalı̄), vol.6, p.372), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.126).
114.6 Legal status

114.6.1 General rulings
1. Bindingness
Jurists agree that division is a binding contract, which may not be reversed or
voided under normal circumstances.55 In what follows, we shall list the views
of the various schools regarding its bindingness:
56
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that both voluntary and obligatory divisions are bind-
ing upon their completion, and thus they may not be reversed. Moreover,
they ruled that obligatory divisions are binding before their completion.
Thus, if a judge divided a joint property, they may not reverse the division
before or after the lottery outcome is determined.
In contrast, they ruled that partners may reverse the process of voluntary
division prior to its completion. This ruling follows from the fact that
voluntary division is only completed upon the determination of all partner
shares, and thus the process may be voided prior to completion, in analogy
to sales. In this regard, if all but one of the shares have been determined,
then the last share is automatically determined as the residual property,
and thus the contract would be deemed completed.
• The Mālikı̄s went further57 by ruling that all determined shares are binding
upon their recipients in voluntary or obligatory divisions, and thus the
recipient of a share in division is not allowed to void it.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled58 that obligatory divisions (which include sorting di-
¯
visions and compensated divisions) are binding. In voluntary divisions,
which they restrict to divisions with financial compensations only, the
majority ruled that consent after the lottery outcome is a requirement.
Thus, mutual consent is required in such divisions before and after the
lottery, and the divider’s assignments are not enforced without such mu-
tual consent.
59
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled in agreement with the Sh āfic ı̄s that obligatory di-
¯
visions are binding. However, the majority of H . anbalı̄s ruled in the case
of voluntary divisions that the division becomes binding upon the deter-
mination of lottery outcomes. They ruled thus based on the view that
a petitioner is similar to a ruler, who utilizes a lottery and does his ut-
most to ensure fairness, and thus the outcome of his lottery is binding in
analogy to the lottery of a ruler in obligatory divisions.
55 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.28), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.267), ’Abū-
. ¯ .
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.309), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.125), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B,
¯ ¯
vol.3, p.676), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
56 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Majallah (item #1158).
. .
57 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, ibid.).
58 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.344), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.).
. .
59 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, ibid.), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯
(3rd printing (H
¯ ¯
. anbalı̄), vol.6, p.373).
2. Options in divisions
60
• The H . anafı̄s considered three types of divisions: (i) ones dissenting part-
ners are not forced to accept (e.g. properties of different genera), (ii) ones
they are forced to accept due to fungibility of the joint property, and
(iii) ones they are forced to accept for other reasons (e.g. non-fungibles
of varying qualities, e.g. livestock). They also recognized three types of
options: (i) options stipulated as conditions, (ii) defect options, and (iii)
inspection options.
1. In dividing properties of different genera, all three types of options

are established and dissenting partners are not forced to accept the
division. This ruling follows from the fact that such division can only
be seen as an exchange, and thus inherits the rulings for sales.
2. In dividing fungible properties, dissenting partners are forced to ac-
cept the division, but the defect option is established to prevent harm
and injustice. In contrast, condition and inspection options are not
established in this case, since they serve no purpose and prevent no
harm.
3. In dividing non-fungibles of varying qualities, dissenting partners are
forced to accept the division of properties of the same genus, but
not forced to accept division of properties of different genera. In
this case, the H
. anafı̄s agree that the defect option is established to
prevent harm. Most H . anafı̄s further stipulated that condition and
inspection options are also established in this case.
• Most Mālikı̄s ruled61 that defect options are established in voluntary di-
visions, in analogy to sales.
• The H. anbalı̄s ruled that the defect option applies if a partner discovers a
previously unknown defect in his share. In this case, the adversely affected
partner has the option of voiding the division, or seeking compensation for
the defect. This ruling is based on the view that the defect thus caused a
diminution in his portion, which he owned by virtue of the division just
as a buyer owns what he bought.
• The Shāfic ı̄s merely mentioned that sorting divisions are voided if injustice
¯
or mistakes in division are discovered. On the other hand, they considered
divisions with property adjustments or financial compensations to be types
of sale, and thus establish the defect option for those two types.62
60 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.265), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.28), Al-
. .
Majallah (items#1153-1155).
61 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.662 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.267).
¯ .
¯ . ¯ ¯
3. Consequences of division
Divisions have the following consequences:63
1. Each partner’s share is identified independent of the others’ shares, and

he thus has full ownership of his share after division.
2. After division, each partner has full ownership of his share established,
and thus may deal in it as any full owner may, e.g. he may sell it, lease
it, pawn it, demolish or build it, etc.
3. No preemption rights are recognized in division. This follows from the

fact that preemption rights only apply to pure exchanges, while division
is only partially an exchange and thus does not qualify for preemption
rights.
It appears that all schools of jurisprudence agree on this legal status ruling.64
4. Voiding divisions
Divisions may be voided by revocation or mutual consent. In this regard, a di-
vision may only be voided after its completion. Since the H
. anafı̄s view divisions
after their completion to be binding, they enumerated cases where extraordinary
circumstances still dictate its voiding:
1. Discovery of a debt:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled If an inheritance is divided, and then it is discov-

ered that the deceased had a debt that would consume the divided
property, the division is thus voided if he had no other property.
However, if the heirs repay the debt out of their own properties, if
the creditors of the deceased absolve the heirs of their liability, or if
the remainder of the inheritance is sufficient to repay the debt, the
division would not be voided. In the latter three cases, the reason for
overruling the bindingness of the division would cease to exist, and
hence the division would remain binding.
As proof for the validity of voiding divisions in this case, jurists re-
ferred to the verse: “. . . after any will or debt” [4:11]. Moreover, if the
debt consumes the property, the heirs would have no ownership right
established therein. In this case, the owner of the property continues
to be the deceased, with an attached right therein established for the
creditors. In this regard, ownership rights of others in a property
prevent the validity of its division.
On the other hand, if debt was smaller than the value of the in-
heritance, the creditors would thus have an established right in the
inheritance equal to the value of the debt. This ownership right
64 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.306), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.121).
. ¯ ¯
would be distributed as a common share in the entire inheritance,

thus preventing execution of the division.65
This opinion seems to be the most appropriate, to protect the rights
of creditors.
66
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the division of an inheritance is not inval-
idated when a debt of the deceased is discovered. They based this
ruling on the view that the attachment of a debt to the inheritance
does not prevent dealing therein, since it would constitute the at-
tachment of a right to the inheritance without the heirs’ permission.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled67 that the effect of discovering a debt of the de-
¯
ceased on the division depends on the division’s classification. Thus,
if the division is a mere sorting of rights, it would not be voided by
the discovery of that debt. On the other hand, if the division is clas-
sified as a sale, then it would void the division due to the attachment
of the creditors’ right to the property. On the other hand, if the
debtor were to repay the debt, then that right would no longer exist,
and the division would not be voided.
2. If another heir or person named in the will is discovered after a voluntary
division is completed, the division would thus be voided. This ruling
follows from the fact that that heir or inheritor was in fact a partner of
the other heirs who completed the division. On the other hand, most
jurists agreed that obligatory divisions would not be voided in this case.
The latter ruling is based on the view that an obligatory division is based
on the best judgment of a judge in a sphere of ’ijtihād (juristic reasoning),
and thus it must be executed and may not be voided.68
3. If an obligatory or voluntary division is completed, and then found to
contain significant injustice (beyond reasonable variance in assessments),
the H. anafı̄ jurists agree that the division would thus be void. This ruling
is based on the principle that a judge’s dealing is meant to effect justice.
Thus, if significant injustice took place without the owner’s consent, the
judge’s dealing inherits the legal status of the sale of a child’s property by
his father or plenipotentiary, i.e. it is voided.
In this regard, the claim of significant injustice is only considered as long
as the claimant had not previously declared that he received his full right.
Otherwise, the declaration and the claim would contradict one another,
and the claim would be ignored. Moreover, claims of minor injustice
(within the normal range of assessment error) are not considered, and its
proofs are ignored.69
65 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.30), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.187), ’Ibn Al-Humām
. .
((H
67 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.310).
. ¯ ¯
68 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.30), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. . anafı̄), vol.5, p.187).
. .
Other jurists agreed with the ruling to void divisions that contain signif-
icant injustice.70 On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s considered many more
¯
cases, as we shall see under mistakes in division.
4. If one of the partners declares that he had received his full share, and then
claims that some of his share was given to another by mistake, his claim
is not accepted unless he provides a material proof, his opponent admits
it, or refuses to take an oath. This ruling follows from the fact that the
claimant thus claims that the division was voided after it was completed,
and thus a proof is required. In this regard, his declaration and his claim
are not viewed to contradict one another, since he may have relied on the
actions of a trustworthy person, and then discovered that the latter made
a mistake.
If no proof is provided, all claimant’s partners are asked to support their
claims by oath. Then, if any of them refuses to take an oath, his property
should be consolidated with the claimant’s, and the joint property must
be re-divided in proportion to their shares. In this case, refusal to take an
oath is taken as proof against the specific partner who refused to take it.
If the claimant had not previously declared receipt of his full share, all
partners would be asked to take an oath, and then the division would
be voided. In this case, the disagreement would pertain to the amount
received after the division, and thus would be judged in analogy to differ-
ences over the amount of an object of sale.
If the claimant had not previously declared receipt of his full share, and
he charged that part of his share was given to a particular partner who
denied it, then the two would take oaths, and the division would be voided.
In this case also, the disagreement is analogous to disagreements over the
amount of an object of sale.
On the other hand, if the claimant had declared receiving his share, and
then claimed that another received part of it, his opponent’s counter-claim
would be accepted if backed by his oath. This ruling follows from the fact
that the claimant is thus claiming that his partner usurped his property,
while the latter is denying it, and the denier’s counter-claim is always
accepted if backed by his oath.71
Jurists also agree that the division would be voided if one of the partners
claims that there was an error in distributing shares, and provides a ma-
terial proof.72 However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that obligatory and voluntary
¯
mere sorting divisions are voided if a mistake or injustice is established
with a valid proof (two respected male witnesses, one male and two female
70 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.677), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.355), ’Ibn
¯ . ¯ ¯
71 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.20 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.186), Al-
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4,
¯
p.103 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.26).
72 ibid.
witnesses, or one witness and the claimant’s oath). In contrast, they ruled
that adjusted or compensated divisions are not voided thus, since they
are types of sales. In all cases, if no proof is provided, the claimant may
demand that his opponent take an oath to support his counter-claim.
5. The H. anafı̄s considered three cases in which a judge establishes entitlement

to the divided property for another party:73
(a) If the entitled portion was an unidentified share in all of the divided
property, all H. anafı̄s agree that the division would be voided, since
the essence of sorting and demarcation would not have occurred.
(b) If the entitled portion was a specific part of the share of one of the
partners, all H. anafı̄s agree that the division would not be voided.
They based this ruling on the view that the entitled party’s owner-
ship of one specific part does not establish partnership in all of the
property, and thus the division is not invalidated. In this case, the
recipient of the share must return the entitled part to its claimant,
since his ownership of that part was thus negated, and demand com-
pensation from the other partners whose ownership of that part was
also negated.
(c) If the entitled portion was an unidentified portion spanning more
than one share, ’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that the recipient
of those shares are not forced to accept the voiding of their division.
Instead, they are given the option to void the division, or to demand
compensation for the entitled amount from their other partners. This
option is thus established since the division was only deemed invalid
for the entitled portion.
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the division would be voided in
this case. He based his ruling on the view that the entitled party was
in fact an additional partner who was absent at the time of division.
Thus, he ruled in analogy to the case where the entitlement pertained
to an unspecified but fixed percentage of all the shares.
74
In those cases the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the division is
¯
voided if entitlement is established in a specific portion of one part-
ner’s share (or if most of the entitlement was in one partner’s share).
They based this ruling on the fact that one of the partners would
thus be required to demand compensation from his other partners to
attain justice in the division.
On the other hand, if the entitled part was a specific portion equally
distributed over the divided shares, then the division is not voided.
73 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.23 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
. .
p.274), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.186 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄),
¯
vol.4, p.106), Al-Majallah (item #1145).
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
In this case, the ruling relies on the fact that the rights of the various
partners would have been correctly sorted.
In contrast, if the entitled part was distributed as an unspecified
portion in one or more of the divided shares, the division would be
voided for that part. However, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that
¯
the division would remain valid for the rest of the property, based
on the principle of partitioning of a contract. On the other hand,
the H. anbalı̄s ruled that the entire division (obligatory or voluntary)
would be voided in this case. They based their ruling on the view that
the entitled party was an absent partner at the time of division, and
without his permission. Moreover, they agreed with the reasoning of
’Abū Yūsuf that demarcation of the different rights of the partners
would thus not have taken place.
114.6.2 Rulings pertaining to proofs

For the remainder of this chapter, we shall consider specific legal status rulings
pertaining to resolving division disputes between partners, when their proofs
contradict one another. Those include disputes over boundaries of their prop-
erties, assessment of the degree of injustice, or one partner being in possession
of the other’s property.
1. Disputes over boundaries

If two parties to a division of land claims ownership of a house owned by the
other that falls in his allotted piece of land, and each presents proof for his claim,
each would be given ownership of the house he claimed. This ruling is based on
the grounds that each claimed house lies within the land of each claimant, and
outside the land of his opponent. Thus, this distribution of land containing the
homes would supersede the possession claims for the homes.
If one partner provided proof that the other is in possession of his home,
which possession resulted from the division of land, the proof is accepted, even
if the defendant denied the charge. If neither partner had proof for his claim,
then they would each take an oath to support his claim, and then they would
return each other’s properties (in analogy to sales),75 and the division is thus
voided.76
2. Assessing the extent of injustice

If two partners disagree over the amount of injustice in a division, we need to
consider the cases of minor injustice and excessive injustice:
75 Narrated by c Abdullāh ibn ’Ahmad in Ziyādāt Al-Musnad on the authority of Al-Qāsim
.
ibn c Abdulrahman on the authority of his grandfather the H . adı̄th : “If the buyer and seller
¯
disagree, the merchandise is still intact, and neither one can provide proof for his claim, they
must thus exchange oaths”, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.224).
¯
76 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.26),
. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.22 onwards), Al-
Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.274), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.186).
1. If the injustice is minor and within the bounds of normal assessment er-
rors, the claim is ignored both in obligatory and voluntary divisions, since
avoiding such minor injustice is very difficult.
2. If the injustice is excessive, exceeding the bounds of normal assessment

errors,77 then we must consider whether the division was obligatory or
voluntary. If the division was obligatory, the division would be voided,
sine the judge’s role of ensuring justice was not realized, and the partners
did not consent to the division. On the other hand, if the division was
voluntary, a few H . anafı̄ jurists ruled similarly that the claim is ignored,
arguing that such divisions are tantamount to sales, in which claims of
injustice do not void the contract.78 This ruling would not apply to sales
by a party other than the owner (e.g. father or plenipotentiary; or in
obligatory divisions by the judge), since such sales would be voided based
on significant injustice.79 On the other hand, we have already seen that
the majority of H. anafı̄s agree that the claimant’s claim would be accepted
in this case, and the division (obligatory or voluntary) would be voided
based on such significant injustice, since justice is a condition for the
permissibility of division.
3. Disputes over receipt of one’s share

We consider two cases in which partners disagree after division whether or not
one of them received his share:
1. If two or more dividers testify that the claimant did receive his share, ’Abū
H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that their testimony would be accepted.
They based this ruling on the view that they would thus be testifying to
the action of a third person, which is receipt, rather than their own action,
which is demarcation of the shares and that requires no testimony.
In contrast, Muh.ammad ruled that the testimony of the dividers is not
accepted in this case, since he deemed the object of the testimony to be
their act of demarcation of shares in the divided property.
2. If only one divider testifies that the claimant had in fact received his share,
it counts as a single testimony against another, and thus it is insufficient
to challenge the claim.80
77 Later Hanafı̄s determined that the demarcation for excessive injustice is 5% for movable
.
objects, 10% for animals, and 20% for immovable objects.
78 In this regard, significant injustice by itself is not deemed by most jurists to negate consent,
unless it is accompanied by deception (e.g. hiding defects in the merchandise). Proof for this
position is given in the H . adı̄th: “Let people benefit from one another”.
79 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), ¯
. vol.8, p.22), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.273
onwards).
80 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.185 onwards).
.
Chapter 115
Dividing Usufruct
The topic of this chapter will be covered in five sections:
1. Definition and legality of dividing usufruct.
2. The object of divided usufruct.
3. Characteristics of dividing usufruct.
4. Types of usufruct division.
5. Actions allowed for each partner after a division of usufruct.
115.1 Definition and legality

115.1.1 Definition of alternating use
The term (al-muhāya’ah) is used to indicate the division of usufruct (usually
temporally). The Arabic name suggests the nature of the contract: that each
partner uses the usufruct of the property in the same manner as the other
partner.1
In this regard, the Mālikı̄s defined usufruct division as separation of each
partner’s right from the rights of other partners in a single object (e.g. one
house), or multiple objects (e.g. multiple homes) by extracting usufruct of
the single object or multiple objects in specified time periods.2 Thus, they
stipulated specification of the time periods of usage as a condition of usufruct
division, otherwise the extent of usufruct extraction would be unknown, and the
contract would be deemed defective.
1 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.27), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.189), Al-Majallah
. .
(item #1174).
595
596 CHAPTER 115. DIVIDING USUFRUCT
115.1.2 Legality of usufruct division

The contract is deemed permissible based on juristic approbation, since this
procedure is needed in cases where simultaneous extraction of usufruct is im-
possible. The object of this contract is the usufruct of a jointly owned physical
property, the usufruct of which can be extracted without consuming the object
itself. The contract is not invalidated by the death of one or more of the part-
ners. If one of the partners requests physical division of the joint property, then
the alternating use contract becomes invalid.3
The latter ruling follows from the fact that physical division is stronger
than alternating use (or division of usufruct), since consolidation of all usufruct
perpetually is better than alternating their assignment over successive time pe-
riods.4 Thus, if one partner requests physical division and the other requests
dividing the usufruct, the judge should accept the request of the former and
division the property physically.
Jurists also found proof for the legality of usufruct division in the Qur’ān
and Sunnah:
• In the Qur’ān, they found proof in the alternating drinking rights for
the she-camel of S.āleh. (pbuh): “here is a she camel: she has a right of
watering, and you have a right of watering on the appointed day” [26:55],
which is an exact description of the alternating use division of usufruct.
• There are a number of occasions in the Sunnah supporting the practice.

For instance, it is narrated that the Prophet (pbuh) designated the riding
services of each of the army’s seventy camels to three people, who took
turns riding it.5
115.2 Object of usufruct division

We have seen that the object of the contract is usufruct, and not the physical
property itself. Thus, it is permissible for two partners to agree that one of
them reside in one part of a jointly owned house, and the other one reside in the
other. Similarly, it is allowed for one partner to reside upstairs and the other to
reside downstairs in a jointly owned property, even if one of the partners rents
his portion and collects the rent.
On the other hand, it is not permissible to division the usufruct of palm
trees or other types of trees between partners, such that each partner will invest
in some of the trees. Similarly, it is not permissible to division jointly owned
sheep so that each partner will benefit from the milk of a specific number of the
sheep. This follows from the fact that the fruits of trees and milk of sheep are
physical properties, and thus cannot be made object of usufruct division. All
3 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n((H. anafı̄), ibid.), Abd Al-Gh anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.106).
c
4 ’Ibn ¯
5 Sı̄rat ’ibn Hishām (vol.1, p.613).
¯
115.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF USUFRUCT DIVISION 597
jurists agree on this distinction between dividing usufruct and dividing physical
property.6
In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that fungible debts established as liabilities
¯
cannot be divided, even if by mutual consent. If debts are divided thus, the
partners would not own whatever they take. Al-Majallah (item #1175) stated
the same principle as follows: “divided usufruct only applies to non-fungible
properties, such that the property can survive the usage of the partners”.
115.3 Characteristics of usufruct division

The non-Mālikı̄s ruled that usufruct division is non-binding, and the Mālikı̄s
ruled that it is binding. In what follows, we list the rulings of each school:
7
• The H. anafı̄s ruled that temporal or special division of usufruct is a non-
binding contract. Thus, if one partner requests dividing the property, and
another requests dividing the usufruct, the first request is accepted. They
ruled thus based on the view that dividing the physical property is stronger
than dividing the usufruct, since it is more appropriate to consolidate all
the usufruct in one place perpetually than to alternate usage.8
Thus, they ruled that usufruct division is a permissible contract that can
be voided by any of its parties, without need for excuses. Moreover, the
contract is not invalidated by the death of one or more of the partners.
This is in contrast to the ruling for leases. The ruling for usufruct division
is based on the view that a judge may resume the contract at any time,
and its voiding is useless since any of its parties can void the contract
unilaterally.
On the other hand, ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n reported the H
. anafı̄ opinion that obliga-
tory usufruct division is a binding contract. Thus, voiding such a contract
requires mutual consent, and may not be done unilaterally without a valid
excuse.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled9 that usufruct division is a non-binding contract. Thus
¯
each of the partners may void it at any time. Moreover, they ruled that
usufruct division cannot be made obligatory by court order.
10
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled that usufruct division is a non-binding contract.
Thus, each of the partners may void the contract at any time. They
further agreed with the Shāfic ı̄ ruling that usufruct division cannot be
¯
6 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.32), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.277), ’Ibn
. .
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.285), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.498), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3,
p.660 onwards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.345), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.9, p.130),
c
¯ ¯ ¯
7 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.32), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.184,189), Al-Zaylac ı̄
. .
((H
8 See Al-Majallah (item #1182).
.
10 ’Ibn ¯Qudāmah ¯(, vol.9, p.130).
¯
made obligatory, in analogy to sales that require mutual consent. Finally,

they agreed with the H . anafı̄s that if any partner requests physical division
of the joint property, the usufruct division would thus be voided.
• In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled11 that usufruct division, like leases, are
binding contracts. Thus, they ruled that it can only be voided by mutual
consent, and no partner has the right to void it unilaterally.
115.4 Types of usufruct division

There are two major dimensions of differentiation between usufruct division
contracts. The first dimension pertains to whether the division is voluntary or
obligatory. The second pertains to whether its nature is temporal or spatial.
115.4.1 Voluntary vs. obligatory usufruct division

All jurists ruled that voluntary usufruct division is permitted, whereby partners
will agree to divide the usufruct of a jointly owned property either temporally
or spatially. The H . anafı̄s also ruled that obligatory usufruct division (temporal
or spatial) is permissible based on a request by one or more of the partners,
to ensure that all the partners’ benefits are considered.12 Thus, they reasoned
that people sometimes need to attain justice, and a court-ordered division of
usufruct can answer that need.
In this regard, Al-Majallah (item #1181) discussed at length the conditions
under which obligatory usufruct divisions are permitted:
If one partner in multiple properties requests usufruct division, and
his partner refuses to do so, then obligatory usufruct division is pos-
sible if the jointly owned properties had the same type of usufruct,
and impossible otherwise.
For instance if two partners share ownership of two homes, and one
of the partners requests that he be allowed to live in one, and allow
his partner to live in the other, obligatory usufruct division in that
manner is implemented if his partner refuses. Similarly, if the two
partners owned two animals, one can be forced to use one and allow
the other to use the other upon the request of his partner.
On the other hand, if a partner requests that he be allowed to live in
a house while the other collects rents of a bath, or that one resides
in a home and the other can utilize their farm, usufruct division is
only possible by mutual consent. Thus, if the other partner refuses
the request of the first, he may not be forced to act according to
that request.13
11 ’IbnRushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.266), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.285).
12 ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), ibid.), Al-Majallah (item #1176), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H. anafı̄
c
¯
13 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.276), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.30).
. .
115.4. TYPES OF USUFRUCT DIVISION 599
14
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that usufruct
¯
division is a form of exchange, and thus no partner should be forced to accept
it, in analogy to sales that require mutual consent. Moreover, they reasoned
that each of the partners has an immediate right to the usufruct, which may
only be postponed if he consents, in analogy to postponement of debts. Thus,
the non-H . anafı̄ jurists do not allow obligatory usufruct division.
Moreover, the Mālikı̄s ruled that usufruct division may not be implemented
by a lottery. On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the partners agreed
¯
to division the usufruct, and then disagreed over the order of usage, a lottery
may be used to determine the order.
115.4.2 Spatial vs. temporal division of usufruct

The Mālikı̄s only recognized two types of usufruct division:15 physical division,
and temporal division of usufruct. The latter refers to sequential usage of the
property for fixed time periods, e.g. each partner may use the house for a month,
and then await his turn after each of the other partners takes his, etc.
The former refers to dividing the jointly owned properties so that each may
use it for a fixed time period. For instance, one may live in one house for one
month, and the other may live in the other house for a month, etc.
1. Temporal division of usufruct

1-a. Definition
This form of usufruct division dictates that partners should take turns making
full use of the jointly own property, where the periods of usage are proportional
to their ownership shares.16 In this regard, Al-Majallah (item #1187) stated
that usufruct division cannot be applied by division of physical output (e.g.
each partner receiving fruits of some jointly owned trees, or milk from some of
the jointly owned sheep, etc.).
1-b. Legality
Temporal usufruct division is clearly legalized by the above referenced verse
[26:155] referring to the sequential drinking rights for camels, as well as verse
“and tell them that water is to be divided between them, each one having the
right to drink in his turn” [54:28]. It is also legal due to people’s need for such
a means of sharing joint property.
1-c. Juristic characterization

The H. anafı̄s ruled that temporal division of usufruct has elements of sorting,
and elements of exchange, in analogy to physical division. They ruled thus
14 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.285), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.345), ’Ibn
¯ . ¯ ¯
15 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.3, p.266), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.285).
¯ .
16 ’Ibn Rush d Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), ibid.), Al-Majallah (item #1176).
based on the view that the partner using the property at any point in time is
in fact borrowing his partners’ shares, establishing the exchange aspect.17 It is
because of this exchange aspect that specification of the time periods of usage
is required.
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that division of usufruct is a pure exchange contract.
Thus, they inferred that such contracts cannot be made obligatory, in analogy
to sales, which require mutual consent.18
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that any partner who extracts more than his share of
¯
the usufruct must compensate his partners for the market rent of the excess
usufruct he extracted.19 This ruling clearly implies that they considered division
of usufruct an exchange contract.
In this regard, Al-Majallah (item #1178) stated the following: “temporal
usufruct division is a type of exchange. Thus, the usage right of one partner is
exchanged for the usage right of another during his turn”.
1-d. Period specification

Temporal usufruct division requires specification of the time periods of usage
by each partner, while spatial usufruct division does not. This ruling follows
from the fact that specification of the time periods is required to determine the
amount of usufruct given to each partner. Without such determination, the
object of the contract would be unknown. In contrast, spatial usufruct division
determines usufruct spatially, and thus its object can be known without speci-
fying time periods for each partner.20 Thus, Al-Majallah (item #1178) stated
that since temporal usufruct division is a type of exchange, the specification of
time periods of usage for each partner is required.
The Mālikı̄s further stipulated restrictions on the allowed time periods for
each partner, beyond the fact that specification is required to avoid uncer-
tainty.21 Thus, they ruled that movable objects (e.g. animals, clothes, etc.)
require short usage periods for each partner. In contrast, usage periods may be
long for immovable objects (e.g. houses, owned land, etc.). On the other hand,
they ruled that land that is not owned by the partner (e.g. if it is borrowed)
cannot be an object of usufruct division, no matter how short the usage periods
are made. The latter ruling is based on the fact that the borrowed land may be
returned before a partner gets his turn to use it.
1-e. Termination
We have seen that usufruct division is not voided upon the death of one or
more of the contracting parties, since it may be resumed upon its voiding.
17 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.276).
¯ .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.32).
21 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.449), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.661), ’Ibn Rushd Al-
¯
H
115.4. TYPES OF USUFRUCT DIVISION 601
Thus, usufruct division is only terminated upon the mutual agreement of the
partners, e.g. by selling the joint property.
2. Spatial usufruct division
2-a. Definition
In spatial division of usufruct, each partner is given some of the joint property,
in proportion to his ownership share, and all the partners use the properties
allocated to them simultaneously.22 For instance, one partner may be given the
usufruct of one part of a house, while another partner may be given the usufruct
of another part.
2-b. Legality
Spatial usufruct division is legal, since it is a type of division similar to physical

division of joint properties.23 In this regard, both temporal and spatial division
of usufruct are made legal due to necessity if it is not possible for the partners
to utilize the entire property simultaneously.
2-c. Object of the contract
Spatial usufruct division may be applied to jointly owned properties that can
be divided spatially (e.g. a large house). In contrast, it cannot be applied to
indivisible properties such as a single car, a single animal, a book, or a small
house. Of course, temporal usufruct division would still be possible for such
physically indivisible properties.
Thus, we can see that homes can be objects of temporal or spatial usufruct
division, whether for personal use or to lease. This ruling follows since real
estate rarely changes. In this regard, spatial division of the usufruct involves
a full sorting of the partners’ shares, while temporal division is tantamount to
lending the property, whereby each partner is viewed as an agent for the others
during their turn to use the property.24
In the case of joint owned animals, ’Abū H. anı̄fa ruled that usufruct division
is not allowed for personal use or rental, since animals change over time, and
their usufruct depends on the user’s abilities. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and
Muh.ammad ruled that usufruct division is permissible for personal usage of one
or two jointly owned animals, while it is allowed for leasing only for two animals,
but not for one. They based the latter ruling on the view that equity can be
assured in the case of two animals, since they can be used simultaneously. In
22 Al-Majallah (item #1179).
23 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.276), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.31), ’Ibn
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.189), Al-Majallah (item #1176).
the case of one animal, however, they said that animals change over time, and
thus its usufruct in later time periods will be less than in earlier periods.25
Al-Majallah (item #1177) listed the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad
that one animal’s usufruct may be made the object of temporal division for
personal use. It also allowed spatial division of the usufruct of two animals, but
allowing each partner to use one. This ruling also agrees with the Mālikı̄ notion
of physical division of usufruct.
2-d. Characterization
Spatial division of usufruct is a mere sorting of shares, and thus does not contain
any element of exchange. Indeed, had it contained an element of exchange, it
would be deemed invalid based on exchanging properties of the same genus with
deferment. In this regard, recall that unity of genus is sufficient in the H . anafı̄
school to establish the occurrence of the forbidden deferment ribā.26
2-e. Period
The H . anafı̄s ruled that it is not necessary to specify the time period in spatial
division of usufruct, in contrast to the ruling for its temporal counterpart. In
the spatial division case, the usufruct is known spatially, and thus does not
require an additional temporal specification.27 In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled
that specification of the time period is required even in physical division of
usufruct.
2-f. Termination
The same rulings that apply to termination of temporal division of usufruct
apply to the spatial division. Thus, the contract is not terminated upon the
death of any partner, each partner has the right to void it whenever he wishes,
and the contract is terminated by mutual consent, e.g. if the joint property is
sold.28
115.5 Permitted actions after division

In both temporal and spatial division of usufruct, the partners are allowed to use
their allotted share as they wish, through personal usage, leasing, or lending.
In spatial division of usufruct, those rights are established for each partner,
whether or not they are stipulated as conditions in the contract, and whether or
not the joint property for which the usufruct was divided was a single home or
25 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.277), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.8, p.30
. .
onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.32), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.190).
26 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.276), Al-Majallah (item #1179).
.
27 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.32), Al-Majallah (item #1179).
.
28 Al-Majallah (item #1191) stated: “division of usufruct is not terminated upon the death
of one or all of partners”.

115.5. PERMITTED ACTIONS AFTER DIVISION 603
multiple homes. This ruling is based on the fact that spatial division of usufruct
does not contain an element of borrowing from one’s partners, thus each partner
fully owns the usufruct of what he is given, and may use it as he sees fit.
In contrast, H
. anafı̄s are in agreement that temporal division of usufruct does
not give a partner the right to lease the property during his turn to use it, if
such a right is not stipulated as a condition in the contract. If the contract does
contain such a clause of rights to lease during one’s turn, then the H. anafı̄ jurists
differed in opinion:
1. The majority of H. anafı̄s accept the ruling of Al-Qadūrı̄ that partners would
still not have the right to lease the property during their turn, since the
contract contains an element of borrowing, and borrowed properties may
not be leased.
2. Muh.ammad ruled in Al-’As.l that the joint owners of a single home may
take turn living in it, or extracting its output. This was originally inferred
to legitimize leasing the home during one’s turn. However, later H . anafı̄s
reasoned that this text adopted from an earlier source was misinterpreted
in Al-’As.l, since “output” (al-ghallāh) is different from utilization by rent-
¯ they argued that the former term implies
ing (al-’istighlāl). In this regard,
¯
a physical output, while division of usufruct deals only with usufruct and
not with physical properties.29
Part XXI
Usurpation and Destruction

of Property
605
607
Preliminaries
Al-Kāsānı̄ said that there are two main types of felonies: those perpetrated
against animals and inanimate objects, and those perpetrated against human
beings. He further classified transgressions against animals and inanimate ob-
jects into: usurpation (ghas.b) and destruction (’itlāf).30 The latter two types of
transgression result in ¯guaranty of the usurped or destroyed property or legal
rights of others, and thus require financial compensation. Assaults on people’s
properties fall under that category of destruction and resultant guaranty.
In this part, we shall study the two forms of transgression in two separate
chapters:
1. Usurpation and its legal status rulings.
2. Property destruction and its legal status rulings.
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.233).
Chapter 116
Usurpation and Its Status

Rulings
The outline of this chapter is as follows:
• Section 1: definition of usurpation, its prohibition, and juristic rulings for

its demarcation.
• Section 2: worldly and religious status rulings for usurpation:
– Sinfulness and accountability.
– Returning usurped property if it exists.
– Guaranteeing usurped property if it perishes:
1. Methods of guaranty.
2. Time of establishing guaranty.
3. What relieves the usurper of guaranty.
(a) Changes in usurped property, or their mixture with other
property.
(b) Diminution in usurped property.
(c) Growth in usurped property, and the legal status of added
buildings, plants, or trees, in usurped land.
(d) Usufruct and output of usurped property.
(e) Disputes between usurper and owner of the usurped property.
(f) Usurpation of already usurped property.
609
610 CHAPTER 116. USURPATION AND ITS STATUS RULINGS
116.1 Prohibition, definition, and demarcation

116.1.1 Prohibition of usurpation
Proofs abound in the Qur’ān, Sunnah, and consensus of the scholars, that
usurpation is forbidden.1
• Proof in the Qur’ān is found in the verses: “O people of faith, do not
devour each other’s property unjustly, unless it is a trade with mutual
consent” [4:29], and “and do not devour each other’s property unjustly,
nor use it to bribe judges and devour limited properties of others sinfully,
and with full knowledge” [2:188].
• Proof from the Sunnah is derived from the H . adı̄th : “Your blood, and
¯
your property, are as sacred for you as the sacredness of this day, this
month, and this city”.2 Further proof is provided by the H . adı̄th s: “The
¯
property of a Muslims is forbidden for other Muslims, except with his
consent”,3 “Whoever takes a square foot of land unjustly will be raised
on the day of resurrection with that piece of land around his neck, seven
earth-depths away”,4 , “Every hand is indebted for whatever it took until
it is returned”,5 , and similar H
. adı̄th s.
¯
• Finally, Muslims have reached a consensus that usurpation is forbidden,
and that it is a great sin even if the usurped property is too small to
consider the violation a theft.
116.1.2 Definition of usurpation

Usurpation refers in language to taking a property by force unjustly. H . anafı̄
jurists gave it a very different juristic interpretation from the one given by the
non-H . anafı̄s:
6
• The H. anafı̄s defined usurpation as taking a valued property with a re-
spected property right, without the owner’s permission, in a manner that
negates the owner’s possession of the property.
– In this regard, the taking of property covers usurpation as well as
other activities.
2 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of ’Abū Bakrah (mAbpwh). Also
¯
narrated by Muslim on the authority of Jābir as part of the Prophet’s (pbuh) speech in Mina
on the day of sacrifice, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.73).
3 Narrated by ’Abū ’Ishāq Al-Jawzijānı̄, and also narrated by Al-Dāraqutnı̄ on the authority
. .
of c Amr ibn Yathribı̄, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.316), Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition,
c
¯ ¯
(H
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.169).
¯
4 Narrated by ’Ah.mad, Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of Sac ı̄d ibn Zayd, c.f.
¯
5¯Narrated by ’Ah.mad and the four authors of Sunan books, and deemed valid by Al-H . ākim
on the authority of Samurah ibn Jundub, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.67).
6 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.361 onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄),
. ¯ .
vol.2, p.188).
116.1. PROHIBITION, DEFINITION, AND DEMARCATION 611
– The H. anafı̄s explicitly specified that the property must be valued to

exclude un-valued properties such as pork and wine, and required the
property rights to be respected to exclude ownership by an enemy of
Islam.
– They explicitly specified that usurpation must be taking the property
without the owner’s consent to exclude properties taken as a gift, or
through a contract-based exchange.
– Finally, they specified that usurpation must involve negation of the
owner’s possession of the property, thus excluding growth of usurped
property (e.g. offspring, fruits, etc.) from the guaranty caused by
usurpation of the property.
Thus, the H. anafı̄s consider significant usage the property of another (e.g.
using the animal of another for transportation) as a form of usurpation,
since it constitutes dealing in the property. On the other hand, sitting
on the spread carpet of another does not constitute usurpation, since the
owner is assumed to have spread the carpet, and sitting on it does not
negate the owner’s possession.
It is important to add two more restrictions to the definition of usurpation.
The first is that usurpation must be made openly, to exclude clandestine
taking of property, which constitutes theft. Second, usurpation must be
made to include prevention of possession if the property was not in the
owner’s possession at the time of usurpation. The latter addition allows
the definition to extend to properties usurped while in the possession of
a lessee, a creditor as part of pawning, or a depositary. In all such cases,
the owner’s possession was not negated, but was prevented by limiting his
ability to deal in the property.
• The Mālikı̄s defined usurpation7 as taking property through forceful trans-

gression, outside the context of warfare or road-robbery (h.irābah).
– The taking of property includes usurpation as well as many legitimate

activities such as repayment of debts and withdrawals of deposits, etc.
– The use of the term “property” excludes mere transgression (al-
tac addı̄), in order to exclude from the definition of usurpation other
transgressions on usufruct, such as living in the house of another or
riding his animal without his consent.
– The requirement of taking by force excludes theft from the definition,
since theft includes forcefulness after the act of taking property, but
not at the time of taking such property. This restriction also excludes
properties taken by the owner’s consent, e.g. through a loan or gift.
– The requirement of injustice in usurpation excludes from the defini-
tion properties taken rightfully by force, e.g. to repay the debt of a
7 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.442,459).
delinquent debtor, return usurped objects to the rightful owner, or

taking the obligatory zakāh from one who refuses to pay it voluntarily.
– The final restriction excludes acts of h.irābah, since properties taken
by road-robbers or the like have a different status from usurped prop-
erties.
Thus, we see that the Mālikı̄s considered usurpation to be a special case of

transgression (tac addı̄), since the latter may impact not only properties,
but also honor, and lives, the latter requiring punishment by death rather
than fines. Moreover, they distinguished for properties usurpation, which
is taking the property itself unjustly by force, while taking its usufruct
falls within the larger context of transgression but outside the scope of
usurpation.8
In this regard, the Mālikı̄s listed four types of transgression against prop-
erty:9
1. Taking the physical object, i.e. usurpation.

2. Taking the usufruct but not the physical property, in which case the
transgressor is required to pay the market rent.
3. Consuming or destroying the property, e.g. killing an animal, cutting
trees, spoiling food, etc.
4. Causing loss for the owner, e.g. opening a man’s store and leaving it
open, resulting in theft, leaving a cage open resulting in a bird fleeing,
or lighting a fire that destroys property, etc. The transgressor in such
cases and similar ones is required to compensate the owner for what
he destroyed on purpose or accidentally.
10
. anbalı̄s defined usurpation as unjustly and forcefully
¯
taking the property or legal rights of another. This definition covers val-
ued properties, usufruct, legal rights such as the right to reclaim land by
marking its borders, non-valued properties such as wine, and non proper-
ties such as dogs. In contrast, taking the property of an enemy of Islam
is not usurpation since it is rightful.
8 There are other differences between the two concepts. For instance, minor harm caused
by the usurper gives the owner only the right to take the value of his usurped property if he
wishes. Thus, the usurper who causes minor harm is only responsible for punitive damages
(’arsh) equal to the loss his usurpation caused. Another difference between the two concepts is
¯
that a general transgressor does not necessarily guarantee the property against losses caused by
natural disaster, while a usurper guarantees usurped property against such losses. Moreover, a
general transgressor has to compensate the owner for all lost output (e.g. of a house he closed,
or a land he prevented from being cultivated). In contrast, a usurper is only responsible to
compensate the owner for the output of the part of the property he used in fact, c.f. Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.459 onwards).
9 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.331 onwards).
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
116.1.3 Consequences of juristic differences in demarca-

tion
There are two main views regarding the demarcation of usurpation:
11
1. ’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf defined usurpation as: forcefully and
openly preventing the owner of valued property from dealing in or us-
ing his property. Thus, two conditions are required for usurpation in their
opinion: removing the owner’s control over the property, and replacing it
with the transgressor’s control.12
13
2. Muh.ammad, Zufar, and the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that
¯
usurpation is established upon taking control of the property of another
without his consent. Thus, they did not require the owner’s control to
be removed for establishing usurpation. This definition covers not only
physically taking the property away, but also preventing the owner from
using or dealing in his property, even if it is not moved from its place.
The consequences of this difference in opinion is best illustrated by consid-

ering the cases of usurped immovable objects (e.g. real estate), as well as the
legal status of growth and usufruct of the usurped property. Moreover, the dif-
ference in opinion between the H. anafı̄s and other schools is best illustrated by
considering the case of non-valued property usurpation.
1. Usurpation of immovable property

’Abū H
. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf deem it impossible for immovable properties to be
usurped. This follows from the fact that they require removal of the owner’s
control by transporting the usurped property, and thus restrict usurpation to
movable properties.14 Thus, they ruled that if a person usurped real estate,
and it was later destroyed in his possession by natural causes (e.g. a flood),
the one in possession of the property is not required to compensate the owner,
since they do not consider him a usurper. They ruled thus in analogy to the
case where a transgressor merely prevents the owner of movable property from
using it, whereby if the property is destroyed by natural causes he would not
have to compensate the owner. On the other hand, if the one who took control
of an immovable property destroyed it by his own actions, then he would be
responsible for compensation, not by virtue of usurpation, but by virtue of
destruction of the property of another.
. .
((H
12 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), ibid.).
.
13 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol. 3, p.442), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.275), Al-
¯ . ¯ ¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.83). The opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad is
the accepted ruling among H . anafı̄s in properties not established as mortmains (waqf). As for
waqf, the H . anafı̄s apply the opinion of Muh.ammad and Zufar.
14 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.45 onwards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ .
p.189), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), ibid.).
In contrast, Muh.ammad, Zufar, Mālik, Al-Shāfic ı̄, and ’Ah.mad all ruled15
¯
that immovable properties, such as land and homes, can be usurped, and that
the usurper thus guarantees such properties. For the non-H . anafı̄s, this ruling
follows from the fact that the mere act of exercising control over the property of
another (e.g. by dwelling in his house, or putting his furniture therein) implies
removal of the owner’s full control over the property, since both parties cannot
have control simultaneously. Muh.ammad and Zufar also recognize that this
argument implies the essence of usurpation by removing the owner’s control
and replacing it with the usurper’s. Thus, they make no distinction between
movable and immovable properties with regards to the possibility of usurpation.
Those jurists also argued that all properties that are guaranteed against
destruction by transgressors must also be guaranteed by usurpers. Moreover,
whatever can be subject to guaranty in sales must also be subject to guaranty in
usurpation. Thus, since the essence of usurpation, which is using the property
of another through transgression, applies to movable and immovable proper-
ties alike, they must be treated alike. Moreover, the above-mentioned H . adı̄th :
¯
“whoever usurps a square-foot of land will have seven earths-wide collar around
his neck”16 implies that usurpation of land is possible. Thus, this ruling seems
to be the most appropriate.
2. Growth in usurped property

’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that increases in usurped property is not
guaranteed by the usurper against destruction by natural causes, without the
usurper’s transgression. Thus, they ruled that the usurper’s possession of such
growth is a possession of trust.17 They applied this rule regardless of whether
the growth is separate (e.g. offspring, milk, fruits, etc.), or contiguous (e.g.
fattening). They based this ruling on their demarcation of usurpation, which
requires removal of the owner’s control over the usurped property. In this case
of growth in the usurper’s possession, the owner would never have had control
over such growth, and hence the growth itself is not usurped. This is analogous
to their reasoning for the impossibility of usurpation of immovable property. On
the other hand, they ruled that if the usurper transgresses against the increase,
by destroying it, consuming it, selling it, or refusing to give it to the owner
upon his request, then he would thus become a usurper and his possession of
the growth becomes a possession of guaranty by virtue of that transgression and
prevention of the owner from exercising control over his property.
The majority of Mālikı̄s ruled18 that the usurper does not guarantee natu-
rally occurring contiguous growth (e.g. fattening or increase in size). On the
¯ .
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.275 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.223), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.83 onwards).
16 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukhārı̄, and Muslim on the authority of c Ā’isha (mAbpwh).
. ¯ ¯
17 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.143,160), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. . anafı̄), vol.5, p.143), ’Ibn Al-
Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.388), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.194).
18 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, ¯p.313), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.596), Al-
¯ .
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.448), Sharh. Al-Risālah by ’Abū Zayd Al-Qayruwānı̄ (vol.2, p.220).
¯
other hand, separate growth (e.g. milk, fruits, wool) are guaranteed by the
usurper against consumption and destruction, even if the growth did not result
from the usurper’s actions. Thus, the usurper is required to return all such
growth, together with the original usurped property, to the property’s owner.
19
Muh.ammad, the Shāfic ı̄s, and the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that all increases (con-
¯
tiguous and separate) that occur while the usurper is in possession of the usurped
property are thus guaranteed by the usurper against any destruction or diminu-
tion. They based their ruling on the view that the usurper’s forbidden trans-
gressing possession of the usurped property is the cause for his possession of its
growth, and thus the guaranty of the first possession extends to the second.
3. Usufruct and output of usurped property

20
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a usurper need not compensate the property’s owner
for that property’s usufruct that he extracted or prevented the owner from ex-
tracting. This ruling follows from their principle that usufruct does not qualify
as a property. Moreover, they reasoned, the usufruct that occurred while the
property was in the usurper’s possession was non-existent when the owner pos-
sessed the property, thus the usufruct is not considered usurped in their school,
since the owner’s possession of such usufruct was not negated by the usurper.
However, later H . anafı̄ jurists enumerated three exceptions to this rule, whereby
the usurper must compensate the owner for the market rent of his usurped prop-
erty: (i) if the usurped property was established as a mortmain, (ii) if the owner
was an orphan, or (iii) if the property was bought or built for the purpose of
leasing.
The H . anafı̄s also ruled, on the other hand, that if the physical property
itself is diminished by the usurper’s usage, then he must compensate the owner
for the diminution in value. As for the output of a usurped property, ’Abū
H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that the usurper is not entitled to that output,
since it constitutes benefiting from the property of another. In contrast, ’Abū
Yūsuf and Zufar ruled that it is legitimate for the usurper to take the usurped
property’s output.
The majority of Mālikı̄s ruled21 that a usurper must compensate the owner
for the output of usurped physical property if he used it, whether the property is
movable or immovable. On the other hand, they ruled that the usurper does not
need to compensate the owner for output that did not result from his own usage,
even if the usurpation prevented the owner from using the physical property.
In contrast, they ruled that if the usurper merely usurped usufruct of the
owner’s property (which they call transgression, more generally), he must pay
the market rent for usufruct that he used or prevented the owner from utilizing.
19 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.145), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.144-5), ’Ibn Al-
. .
Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.294), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.195), ’Abū-
¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.370), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.399 onwards).
c
¯
20 Al-Dardı̄r ¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol3, p.448), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.595 onwards), ’Ibn
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.315), Sharh. Al-Risālah (vol.2, p.240).
21¯Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.448), ¯Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.595 onwards), ’Ibn
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.315), Sh arh. Al-Risālah (vol.2, p.240).
¯ ¯
22
. anbalı̄s ruled that a usurper guarantees the usufruct of
¯
usurped property, and thus must compensate the owner for its market rent,
whether he extracted the usufruct or merely spoiled it for the owner, and
whether the property was movable or immovable. They based this ruling on
their classification of usufruct as valued property, which thus must be guaran-
teed in analogy to guaranty of the usurped physical property itself. This ruling
seems to be closest to justice, and most in agreement with today’s materialistic
leaning which enforces the assessment of values of all things, including intellec-
tual property rights.
4. Usurpation of non-valued properties

23
The H . anafı̄s ruled that a usurper does not compensate the owner for non-
valued property (e.g. wine or pork) that he had usurped if it perished in his
possession, or if he consumed it (including if he turned usurped wine into vine-
gar), regardless of whether the usurper is Muslim, Christian, or Jewish. This
ruling follows from the fact that wine or pork are not a valued property for a
Muslim, and thus should be thrown away. On the other hand, if the usurper
took wine from a Muslim, turned it into vinegar, and then consumed it, then
he should compensate the owner with vinegar (and not wine). In the latter
case, the usurpation of the wine itself does not require compensation, but when
the wine became vinegar, its owner was deemed to be the original owner of the
wine, and hence by consuming that owner’s vinegar, the usurper is required to
compensate him for it. The same complicated ruling applies to usurped skin of
a dead animal that is died by the usurper and then consumed thus, in which
case, he must compensate the owner for the value-added induced by dying it.
On the other hand, if the owner of usurped wine or pork was a Christian
or a Jew, then the usurper (Muslim, Christian, or Jewish) must compensate
the owner if he consumed his usurped property. This ruling follows from the
fact that such properties are permissible for the non-Muslims, and Muslims
were ordered to respect Christians and Jews and their religious practices, thus
allowing them to trade in such properties.24 However, if the usurper was a
Muslim, then he should compensate the owner with the value of usurped wine,
since he is forbidden from owning wine. If the usurper was a non-Muslim, then
he may compensate the owner with wine, since he may own it and deal in it.
In contrast, non-properties such as dead animals and blood are not guaran-
teed by usurpation, even if it belonged by a Christian of Jew, since no religion
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.367), Fath. Al-c Azı̄z (vol.11, p.262), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.270), ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition
(H. anbalı̄), p.213).
23 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.147 onwards, 162 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄),
. .
vol.5, pp.147-9), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, pp.396-405), Abd Al-Gh
¯
((H. anafı̄), vol.2, p.195), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
24 Narrated on the authority of c Alı̄ ibn ’Abı̄ Tālib (mAbpwh) that as long as Christians
.
and Jews pay the jizyah, their blood and their properties become protected the same as the
blood and property of a Muslim, and that Muslims were ordered to allow them to practice
their religion as they see fit, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.369), ’Ibn
¯
recognizes such objects as property. Similarly, if the owner of a property pur-

posefully makes it public, then its usurper does not guarantee it upon usurpa-
tion.
On the other hand, if a Muslim usurps a cross from its Christian owner, then
he must compensate the owner if the cross perished in his possession.
’Abū H
. anı̄fa further ruled that whoever destroys a Muslim’s musical instru-
ments must compensate him for them. He based this ruling on the view that
such properties have other legitimate uses, even if they are commonly used in
impermissible activities. In this case, the owner of musical instruments should
be compensated for the value of its raw materials. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf
and Muh.ammad ruled that musical instruments are not guaranteed thus, since
they considered them mere instruments of disobeying Allāh. Thus, they rea-
soned in analogy to wine that such properties are non-valued, and should be
destroyed. Thus, the destroyer of such instruments is deemed to simply perform
a legal duty, as if commissioned by the ruler, and thus should not compensate
the owner.
The Mālikı̄s ruled25 similarly that wine, pork, musical instruments, idols,
and other non-valued properties are not guaranteed if usurped from a Muslim.
They based this ruling on the H . adı̄th : “Allāh (swt) and his Messenger have
¯
forbidden the sale of wine, dead animals, pigs, and idols”.26 Moreover, they
reasoned, such properties require no compensation, they are non-valued.
On the other hand, they ruled that a usurper must compensate a Christian or
Jew for wine they owned, since such objects are considered properties for them.
Moreover, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if wine was usurped from a Muslim and then
became vinegar, then the owner is given the option of receiving compensation in
equal amounts of vinegar or juice. If the amount is not known, then he should
be compensated for its value. If the owner of the wine was not Muslim, then
the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that he is given the option of taking the vinegar,
or receiving the wine’s value on the day it was usurped.
Finally, they ruled that if the leather of a dead animal (dyed or otherwise),
or a dog that may be owned (e.g. for hunting or security) are usurped and
destroyed by the usurper, the usurper must thus compensate the owner for the
property’s value.
This ruling applies despite the prohibition on sales of such properties.
27
The Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s ruled ruled that owners of usurped wine or
¯
pork should not be compensated, regardless of the religion of the owner and
the usurper. They ruled thus based on the fact that such properties are per-
petually value-less, in analogy to dead animals and impure objects. Moreover,
they reasoned that objects such as those are forbidden to use, and thus their
25 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.204; vol.3, p.447), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.592
onwards).
26 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of Jābir, who said he heard it on
¯
the day of conquest of Makkah.
27 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.285-291), Fath Al-c Azı̄z Sharh Al-Wajı̄z (vol.11,
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ .
p.258), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.256,276), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.374),
¯c ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.84 onwards), Al-Sh a arānı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.90).
¯ ¯
owner should not be compensated for them. They thus based the ruling on the
Prophet’s (pbuh) prohibition of selling such properties and order to waste them.
In this regard, the general rule is that objects that are impermissible for sale or
ownership do not merit compensation.
They ruled similarly that no compensation is required for destroying usurped
idols or musical instruments. However, the Shāfic ı̄s agreed with the ruling of
¯
’Abū H . anı̄fa that the owners of such usurped objects may be compensated
for the raw materials if they can have a permissible usage. Otherwise, they
ruled that the property would be without value, and no compensation would be
required.
On the other hand, they ruled that if a usurper kept the wine of a Christian
or Jew, then he must return it to the owner, since the latter is allowed to drink
it. On the other hand, if the owner was Muslim, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the
usurper should spill the wine rather than return it to its owner. They based
this ruling on the fact that the Muslim usurper is forbidden from possessing the
wine, and forbidden from returning it to its Muslim owner (unless the latter
is a vinegar-maker) lest he would be assisting him in disobeying Allāh. In this
regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if wine was usurped from a Muslim, but the latter
¯
had not intended to make an intoxicant (e.g. was making vinegar), then it must
be returned to him. Otherwise, forbidden wine should be spilled.
Most of the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the usurped property was juice, which
¯
turned into wine and then into vinegar in the usurper’s possession, then the
owner is entitled to the vinegar and financial compensation of the difference
between the higher value of juice and the lower value of vinegar. They based
this ruling on the fact that the value of the usurped property diminished in the
usurper’s possession, and thus he was responsible for causing it. In contrast,
the H. anbalı̄s ruled that the usurper in this case should compensate the owner
with an equivalent amount and quality of the juice he had usurped.
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled similarly in the case of usurped skin of a dead
¯
animal that was dyed by the usurper. Thus, they ruled by analogy to wine that
turned into vinegar that if the property were later to perish in the usurper’s
possession, he would have to compensate the owner. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s
ruled that the skin of dead animals remains impure, even after dying, and thus
remains without value and ineligible for sale, and the usurper is not required to
return it to the owner.
116.2 Legal status rulings

There are three main legal status rulings pertaining to usurpation:28
1. The usurper who knows that what he usurped is owned by another is
sinful.
2. The usurped object must be returned to its owner if possible.
28 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.126), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.330), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
. ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.277), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.259 onwards).
¯
3. If the usurped object perished, then the usurper must compensate the
owner.
116.2.1 Sinfulness
If the usurper knows that a property belongs to another, and usurps it nonethe-
less, he would thus transgress religious law and earn a sin for which he is ac-
countable.29 Proof for this prohibition of usurpation is provided by the H . adı̄th :
¯
“Whoever usurps a square-foot of land will be raised on the day of judgment
with a collar seven-earths-wide”.
The H . anafı̄s, Mālikı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled30 that a discerning usurper should
¯
be disciplined with corporal punishment and incarceration, irrespective of age.
This punishment corresponds to the right of Allāh, and thus is required even
if the owner of the usurped property were to forgive the usurper. Thus, the
ruler should use his own judgment as to the best means of punishment needed
to reform the usurper and serve as a deterrent to future usurpers. On the other
hand, the H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that non-discerning children and insane
individuals are not to be disciplined physically for usurpation.
On the other hand, there is no sin or accountability for an individual who
usurped property by mistake, e.g. thinking that it was his. Proof for this prin-
ciple of unaccountability for errors is established by the verse: “Lord, condemn
us not if we forget or err” [2:286], and the H . adı̄th : “My nation has been forgiven
¯
mistakes, forgetfulness, and whatever they are coerced to do”.31 However, reli-
gious and legal unaccountability in this case does not overrule the requirements
of returning the property if it persists, and compensating the owner for it if it
perished.
116.2.2 Returning usurped properties

Jurists discussed a number of aspects of returning usurped properties. Those
include (i) the requirement of returning the property, (ii) the conditions for
returning it, where it should be returned, and who bears the cost of returning
it, and (iii) how to determine if the property has been returned to its owner.32
Jurists are in agreement that if a usurped property is intact, then the usurper
is required to return it to its owner. This ruling follows from the H
. adı̄th : “Every
¯
hand is responsible for what it took, until it returns it. Let not any of you take
29 There are ten forms of devouring property wrongfully, and they are all forbidden, but with
varying legal status rulings. Those ten forms are: (i) road-robbery (h.irābah), (ii) usurpation,
(iii) theft, (iv) embezzlement, (v) breach of trust, (vi) debasement, (vii) denying a valid claim
or making an invalid one, (viii) gambling, (ix) paying or receiving bribes, and (x) deception
in sales, c.f. ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.329). In this regard, forbidden property (h.arām) is
forbidden to accept, eat from, dwell in, or utilize otherwise. However, receiving compensation
from usurped property is a separate requirement, and thus applies even to forbidden properties.
30 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.442), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.330), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.277).
¯
31 Narrated by ’ibn Mājah and Al-Bayhaqı̄, as well as others, on the authority of ’ibn c Abbās.
. .
((H. anafı̄), vol.7, p.367), Al-Sh ac arānı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.88).
¯ ¯
the property of his brother seriously or jokingly. Even if one of you takes the
stick of his brother, he must return it”.33
In this regard, the usurped property should be returned to the location where
it was usurped, since a property’s value depends on the location. The usurper
should bear the cost of returning the property thus, since it is an integral part
of the required return, in analogy to the requirement in returning borrowed
property.
The property is considered returned to its owner as soon as the latter has
control and possession over it. Thus, removal of the usurper’s control and
possession, and restoring them to the owner, reverses the process of usurpation
and results in the property being returned (unless, of course, it is usurped once
again).
Once the property is returned, the usurper is absolved from his responsibility
to compensate the owner for any losses, whether or not the owner knows that the
property was returned to him. This ruling follows from the fact that returning
property is a physical act, the occurrence of which does not require knowledge
thereof.
116.2.3 Compensation for perished usurped properties

1. Methods of compensation
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the usurper must compensate the owner of a usurped
movable property if it perished in his possession, due to his own actions or
natural causes.34 The non-H . anafı̄s extended this requirement to compensate
the owner to usurped immovable properties.35 If the destruction of property
was caused by a third party, not by natural causes, then the usurper may in
turn seek compensation from the responsible party. This ruling follows from
the fact that prior to the property’s destruction, the usurper could have been
absolved of its guaranty by returning it to the owner. Thus, the jurists said: “A
usurper guarantees what he usurped, whether it is destroyed by natural causes,
or through the actions of a creature”.36
In this regard, jurists agree that compensation should be in kind for fungible
properties, and in value for non-fungibles. In cases of destroyed fungible prop-
erties the likes of which could not be found, necessity dictates that the usurper
should also compensate the owner for their value.
33 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Al-Sā’ib ibn
. ¯
Yazı̄d and his father, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.316).
34 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H ¯
¯ . anafı̄), vol.11, p.50), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, pp.150,168),
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.128), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.223-
4),’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.363), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.188
¯
onwards).
35 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.443), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.330 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd
¯
Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.312), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.281,284), Fath.
¯ . ¯ ¯
Al-c Azı̄z Sharh. Al-Wajı̄z (vol.11, p.242; in Al-’Imām Al-Nawawı̄/Al-Subkı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄))), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.221,254,258), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.116 onwards).
Compensation in kind is legalized by the verses: “Punish whoever trans-

gresses against you in the same manner of their transgression” [2:194], “If you
punish, then punish in the same manner that you were harmed” [16:126], “The
punishment for an injury caused is an equal injury” [42:40].
Moreover, compensation in kind is closer to returning the usurped property,
in the sense of compensation with the most similar property. Such compen-
sations are therefore most conducive to correcting the wrong that was done.
On the other hand, compensation for the value is legalized when compensa-
tion in kind is not possible. Thus, the value of property becomes the closest
approximation to its kind.
In this regard, we recall that fungible properties are those deemed homo-
geneous, readily available, and measured by weight, volume, count, or size. In
contrast, non-fungibles are those the likes of which are not readily available, and
each unit of which is unique in value.37
Thus, compensation for value is required in three cases:38
1. If the usurped property was non-fungible (e.g. a house or an animal).
2. If the property was a mixture of two genera (e.g. wheat mixed with
barley).
3. If the property was fungible, but could not be found in the market, if
it could only be found at a cost exceeding the market price of what was
usurped, or if the usurper was not allowed to possess the genus (e.g. wine).
2. Time of guaranty and compensation assessment

Jurists expressed somewhat similar opinions regarding the timing of establish-
ment of guaranty of usurped properties, and timing of the assessed compensa-
39
tion. In this regard, the Mālikı̄s and the majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that the
value of usurped property should be assessed for the day of its usurpation, irre-
spective of subsequent changes in price. This ruling follows from the view that
the instigating factor for guaranty and its object do not change from the usurpa-
tion time forward. However, the Mālikı̄s distinguished between guaranty of the
usurped physical property, and guaranty of its output. Thus, they ruled that
37 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.130; vol.4, p.173), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄),
. ¯c .
vol.2, p.188), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.363), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence),
vol.5, p.223), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.312), Sh arh. Al-Risālah (vol.2, p.217),
¯ ¯
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.330), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.281, 284), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.116 onwards), Al-Mudkh al by Professor Al-Zarqā’ (p.50).
38 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.129). ¯
.
. .
((H. anafı̄), vol.7, p.363), Al-Sarakh sı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.11, p.50), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄
¯
Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.223), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.188), Al-Dardı̄r
¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.443,448), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.312), ’Ibn Juzayy
¯
((Mālikı̄), p.330). This is the chosen opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf, which was codified in Al-Majalla
(item #921). In this regard, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that compensation is assessed for the disputa-
tion date, while Muh.ammad ruled that it should be assessed for the date the property’s equal
became unavailable in the market.
the property itself is guaranteed on the day of its usurpation, while the output
is guaranteed on the day it is used by the usurper. Moreover, they ruled that
transgressors who usurp usufruct must guarantee the usufruct at the time the
property’s owner could not extract it, whether or not the transgressor utilized
the physical property.
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled40 that guaranty should be assessed at the maximal level
¯
reached from the time of usurpation in its location until the time of the prop-
erty’s destruction or seeking its equal for compensation. They ruled thus,
whether changes in value arise from changes in prices, or changes in the prop-
erty itself. The same rule applies for non-fungibles, which are guaranteed for the
maximal value from the time of usurpation to the time of property destruction.
41
The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the compensation value for a usurped fungible
the equal of which could not be found must be assessed at its value on the
day its equal stopped being available. They based this ruling on the view that
compensation had to be in kind, until the time an equal could not be found,
thus value would be assessed at that time.
The H . anbalı̄s further ruled for non-fungible usurped properties that compen-
sation is assessed at the maximal property-value from the time of usurpation
to the time of compensation, provided that changes in value were caused by
changes in the property itself (e.g. growth) rather than price fluctuations. If
the value changed due to an increase in prices, the usurper is not responsible
for the increase. The latter ruling follows from the fact that if the property
was intact, it would have to be returned regardless of changes in market value
without adjustment for price fluctuations.
3. Absolution of usurper guaranty

The usurper can be absolved of guaranteeing the usurped property in one of
four ways:42
1. Returning the usurped property intact and unattached to any other.
2. Compensating the owner or his agent.
3. Explicit absolution (’ibrā’) by the owner of the usurped property, or spec-

ifying one of many usurpers as the guarantor thus implicitly absolving the
others.
4. Feeding the owner or his animals usurped food, knowing that it is his food
that he or his animal ate. Alternatively, if the owner gave the usurped
property to the usurper as a deposit, gift, loan, lease, or to work on it, with
40 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.283; vol.3, p.136), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.368), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.136), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
vol.4, pp.119-121).
41 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.257 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.4, p.117).
.
42 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.151), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.600 onwards), Al-Sirāj
.
Al-Wahhāj Sharh. Al-Minhāj (p.268), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.437), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯
(H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.103).
knowledge that this is the owner’s property, the usurper’s possession would
change and thus his own characterization would change from usurper to
depositary, recipient, borrower, lessee, etc.
Usurper entitlement after compensation?

In this regard, one might wonder if the usurper owns the usurped property after
compensating the original owner. We now review the jurists’ views on this issue:
43
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that upon compensating the original owner, the usurper
is considered to be the property’s owner retroactively from the time of
usurpation. They ruled thus to avoid assigning ownership of the property
and its compensation simultaneously to the original owner. Thus, if the
usurper had sold, or given the usurped property away as a gift or charity
prior to compensating the owner, his actions would be executed based
on this retroactive assignment of ownership. This ruling is analogous to
the dealings of a buyer in a defective sale. Thus, if the usurper takes a
property away from its owner, and the owner seeks compensation for the
property’s value, the usurper would thus automatically become the prop-
erty’s owner, to avoid making a single person owner of the property and
its compensation.
• ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Muh.ammad rueld in this regard that the usurper is not
allowed to use the usurped property (e.g. by eating it or feeding it to
another) prior to paying compensation. Moreover, they ruled by juristic
approbation that any increase or growth in the property, or output thereof,
is deemed unlawful for him should be given away in charity.44 They based
their ruling on the fact that the Prophet (pbuh) did not allow usage of
usurped property before making the original owner whole. This H . adı̄th
c ¯
was narrated by ’Abū H . anı̄fa on the authority of ’Abū Mūsā Al-’Ash arı̄
¯
(mAbpwh) that the Prophet (pbuh) was hosted by some of the ’Ans.ār,
when they offered him a roasted sheep. He (pbuh) took a bite, and did not
like it. Then he (pbuh) said: “This sheep tells me that it was slaughtered
unlawfully”. They said: “It belongs to our neighbor, and we thought we’d
slaughter it now and pay him its price later”. Thus, the Prophet (pbuh)
said: “Then, feed it to the war prisoners”.45 Thus, he (pbuh) forbade
them from eating or giving it to him despite their need. Were it lawful for
them to use the sheep as they saw fit, he (pbuh) would not have restricted
them thus.
43 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.16, p.15), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.152 on-
¯ . .
wards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.193).
44 ’Abū Yūsuf and ¯
Zufar ruled that the usurper is allowed to benefit from the property, and
is not required to give increases in charity. They based this ruling on the view that usurper-
ownership of the property is established retroactively from the time of usurpation. Thus all
growth and output of the usurped property would become lawfully owned by the usurper.
45 Narrated by Muhammad ibn Al-Hasan in Kitāb Al-’Āthār, and also narrated by ’Abū
. . ¯
Dāwūd, ’Ah.mad, and Al-Dāraqut.nı̄, o the authority of c Ās.im ibn Kulayb, on the authority
of his father, on the authority of a man of the ’Ans.ār, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition,
c
(H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.168).

¯
• The Mālikı̄s ruled46 that a usurper is not allowed to pawn usurped prop-
erty or use it in a guaranty contract, to avoid wasting the owner’s right.
Similarly, if anyone receives usurped property as a gift, cannot accept it
and use it (e.g. eat it or live in it), in analogy to all h.arām properties.
However, if the usurped property was adversely effected in the usurper’s
possession, then most Mālikı̄s ruled that he may thus utilize it, since it
would thus be established that he has to compensate the owner for its
value. Thus, some jurists have ruled that it is permissible to buy the meat
of usurped sheep after it was sold to butchers and slaughtered. This rul-
ing follows from the view that the act of slaughtering made the usurpers
responsible for compensation in value, and makes him retroactively the
property’s owner from the time of usurpation. However, those same ju-
rists stated that it is better from the view of religion and honor to avoid
such meat.
47
. anbalı̄s ruled that a usurper does not own the usurped
¯
property by virtue of paying its value to the owner. They based this ruling
on the view that he could not buy it after it became defective, since it
cannot be delivered whole, and hence cannot own it by paying its value
either. Thus, they ruled in analogy to the ruling of impossibility of owning
a defective item by virtue of causing its defect.
Consequently, they forbade and invalidated all dealings of the usurper in
the usurped property, with or without a contract.48 They based this ruling
on the H. adı̄th : “Whoever acts in a way that we (Muslims) do not act has
¯
this action rejected”.49 Thus, sales and leases of usurped property are not
permitted, and usage or consumption of such properties are not permitted
either, based on the H . adı̄th : “Your properties and your blood are sacred
¯
among you”.
4. Changes in usurped property

The H. anafı̄s distinguished between four cases, depending on whether changes
in a usurped property that continues to exist were caused by the usurper or
independently, and whether the change pertains to characteristics or the name
and identity of the property:50
46 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.445 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.586).
47 ’Abū-’IshāqAl-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.368), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
pp.277,279), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, pp.120, 123 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah
(, vol.5, pp.251-3).
48 The Hanbalı̄s further ruled in disagreement with other jurists that performing pilgrimage
.
or other acts of worship using usurped property is invalid and forbidden, while other property-
utilizing acts of worship (e.g. prayer with usurped clothes, paying zakāh from usurped prop-
erty, etc.) that do not utilize the usurped property (e.g. fasting) are not invalidated, c.f.
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.123 onwards), ’Us.ūl Al-Fiqh by Dr. Al-Zuh.aylı̄
(vol.1, p.82).
49 Narrated by Muslim on the authority of c Ā’isha (mAbpwh).
50 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.375,384), ¯ c
. Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄),
¯
vol.2, pp.191,193), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.226,229), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n
1. Independent changes in the usurped property (e.g. drying of grapes or

dates) establishes an option to the owner either to be compensated with
the usurped property itself, or compensated for its value by the usurper.
2. If the usurper caused a change in the usurped property (e.g. dying a

dress) or if the usurped property was mixed with the usurper’s property
in a manner that does not allow separation, then the owner is also given an
option. In this case, the owner is allowed either to demand compensation
from the usurper for the value of his usurped property prior to usurpation,
or to take the changed or mixed property and compensate the usurper for
the value of increase, to ensure equity on both sides.
51
The Mālikı̄s agree with the H . anafı̄ ruling in this case.
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled52 in this case that if the increase can be
¯
separated from the usurped property (including removal of dye from a
dress), the usurper is required to separate it. If separation is not possible,
then the ruling depends on changes in the value of the usurped property.
Thus, if the property’s value did not increase, the usurper is not enti-
tled to any portion or compensation thereof. If the property’s value was
diminished, the usurper is thus responsible to compensate the owner for
that diminution. Finally, if the property’s value increased, that increase
is distributed: two-thirds to the owner, and one-third to the usurper. In
all of the above, market prices are used to determine changes in value.
The H . anbalı̄ rulings in this case generally agree with their Sh āfic ı̄ coun-
53 ¯
terparts. However, they ruled in the case of a usurped dress that was
dyed by the usurper that the usurper should not be forced to remove the
dye, since the latter was his property, and he would thus have to destroy
it. They also ruled that the usurper should compensate the owner for any
diminution in value caused by his action. Finally, they ruled in the case
of increase in value due to mixture with the usurper’s property that the
owner and usurper are deemed partners in proportion to their properties.
Thus, the property should be sold, and its price should be distributed
according to that ratio.
3. The H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that if the property itself and its nature
are changed by the usurpers actions, thus changing its intended usufruct
(e.g. usurped sheep slaughtered and cooked by the usurper, etc.), then
ownership is transferred to the usurper, who thus must compensate the
owner (in-kind for fungibles, and by value for non-fungibles). In this case,
they ruled by juristic approbation that the usurper should only utilize the
usurped property after compensating its owner or getting his absolution
of guaranty, to avoid creating disputes and animosity.
((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.134-8), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.160 onwards).
¯ .
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, pp.86,103), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.266
onwards).
In this case, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled54 that the original owner’s right is not
¯
terminated in this case. Thus, they allowed the owner to take his altered
property, together with compensation for any diminution in value. The
majority of H. anbalı̄s further ruled that if the property’s value increased in
this case, he would not be entitled for any compensation from the owner.
55
’Abū H. anı̄fa’s ruling for usurped gold and silver used in minting coins
or making pots agreed with the Shāfic ı̄ and H
. anbalı̄ rulings just reviewed.
¯
Thus, the owner would still be entitled to take back his property, and
the usurper is not entitled to compensation for increases in value. He
based this ruling on the view that the usurped physical property in fact
continues to exist in essence and name, thus retaining the four legal status
rulings pertaining to gold and silver (serving as monetary numeraires,
measurement by weight, susceptibility for ribā, and requirement of paying
zakāh). Thus, the owner’s right remains attached to the usurped and
altered gold or silver.
In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled for gold and silver in the
same manner they ruled for other usurped and substantially altered prop-
erties.56 Thus, they ruled that ownership would be transferred to the
usurper, who is consequently required to compensate the owner in-kind.
They based this ruling on the view that the alterations described in the
example (minting coins of making pots) are recognizable manufacturing
alternations of the property. Thus, the legal status should be determined
by analogy to the case of perished usurped property. They also disagreed
with ’Abū H. anı̄fa’s claim that the property remains the same in essence
and name, since the prior name of “gold” is different from the subsequent
name of “Dinār” (gold-coin) or “pot”.
5. Diminution in usurped property

A usurped property may be diminished in the usurper’s possession either mate-
rially, or in value. In this regard, the H
. anafı̄s considered four types of diminution
in usurped property:57
1. Diminution in value may be caused by a fall in the property’s market

price. The owner is clearly not compensated for this type of diminution
in value if the physical property is returned to him. This ruling follows
form the fact that diminution in this case was not caused by a physical
diminution in the property, but merely by a reduction in market demand,
54 ’Abū-’IshāqAl-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.369), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.243).
. ¯ ¯
55 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.379), Abd Al-Gh anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.2,
c
¯
p.192).
56 In this regard, Al-Majallah (item #899) applies this ruling to all properties, hence agreeing
with the opinion of ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad.

. .
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.288 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.2,
¯
p.190), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.132).
the causer of which is Allāh (swt), and which cannot be controlled by any
one individual.
2. Diminution in value may result from a change in the property’s charac-

teristics (e.g. if a usurped animal becomes weaker, loses sight, etc.). In
this case, the owner should take back the property that continues to exist,
and the usurper must compensate the owner for diminution in value if the
usurped property was not susceptible for ribā.
However, if the usurped property was eligible to ribā (e.g. wheat that
rotted, or a silver pot that was broken), then the owner is only entitled to
taking back the usurped property without any compensation for diminu-
tion. This ruling follows from the fact that returning the physical property
with an increase to compensate for diminution in value would be a form
of forbidden ribā.
3. Diminution may be caused by loss of desirable characteristics (e.g. youth

giving way to old age, escape of a usurped animal, or loss of a skill). In
all such cases, the usurper is required to compensate the owner for the
diminution in value.
4. Diminution may be a physical loss of part of the property, in which case the
usurper must compensate the owner for the loss if the property continues
to exist.
However, if the physical loss in the property is major (e.g. a dress that
has a major cut), rendering the property useless, then the buyer is given
an option of taking it back and seeking compensation for the defect, or
leaving it and demanding compensation for its value. The latter option
is given since the property may be deemed destroyed. In this regard, the
demarcation between minor and major losses is determined thus:
• Minor losses do not negate any uses of the property, but merely
reduce the amount of usufruct.
• Major losses pertain to part of the physical property and some of its
usufruct, whereby what remains is the other part of the property and
corresponding part of the usufruct.
In this regard, Al-Majallah (item #900) stated that any losses of one-
quarter of a usurped property or more are considered major, and anything
less is considered minor.
If compensation for diminution in value is required, it is assessed by com-
paring the value of the undiminished property on the day of its usurpation,
and its value after diminution.
In the case of usurped immovable properties, we have seen that the H
. anafı̄s
do not require the usurper to compensate the owner for diminution or
destruction due to natural causes. On the other hand, we have also seen
that the usurper must compensate the owner for diminution caused by the
usurper’s actions or utilization of the usurped property, since diminution

in this case is caused by his transgression.
58
The majority of non-H . anafı̄s ruled in agreement with the H . anafı̄s that
the usurper is not responsible for changes in the property’s value due to price
fluctuations. They based this ruling on the view that the physical property and
its characteristics would not have changed in this case, but merely its desirability
in the market place, for which there is no compensation.59 In contrast, the
Shāfic ı̄s and ’Abū Thawr ruled that a usurper must compensate the owner for
¯ ¯
changes in value caused by price changes.
The majority of non-H . anafı̄s also ruled that the usurper must compensate
the owner for any diminution in the physical property or its characteristics,
whether the diminution was caused by the usurper’s actions or natural causes.
In contrast, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that the owner is entitled to an option
of taking back his diminished property if the diminution resulted from natu-
ral causes, or compensation for the property’s value on the day of usurpation.
However, they did not allow the owner to take back the diminished property
together with a separate compensation for the diminution in value. However,
if the property was diminished by the usurper’s transgression, then the owner
is given the option of taking compensation for the property’s value on the day
of usurpation, or taking the diminished property together with a compensation
for its diminution. The later change in value is assessed by ’Ibn Al-Qāsim on
the day of transgression, and by Sah.nūn on the day of usurpation. On the other
hand, ’Ashhab did not distinguish in his rulings between diminution caused by
¯
natural causes and that caused by usurper transgression.
6. Increase in usurped property

We have already reported the ruling of ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf that a
usurper need not give the owner any compensation for contiguous or separate
growth in the usurped property. They based this ruling on the view that the
property’s owner never had control over that growth, and hence the instigating
factor for compensation (removal of his control) does not apply. In contrast, we
have seen that Muh.ammad, the Shāfic ı̄s and the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that all increases
¯
in usurped property are guaranteed for the owner by the usurper, and that the
Mālikı̄s ruled that the usurper is only required to compensate the owner for
separate growth. In what follows, we shall list some of the examples of growth
in usurped property studied in some detail.
58 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.312 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.452),
¯ .
’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.331), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.286,288), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.369), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
c
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.99 onwards),
¯ ¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.228,232,241).
59 Price changes are not considered in usurpation of physical properties. In contrast, the
Mālikı̄s ruled that the owner is entitled to demand compensation for the property’s value on
the day of usurpation in transgression through usurpation of usufruct. On the other hand,
they also allow the owner in this case to take his property back, with no compensation for
price changes required from the transgressor.
Building, planting trees, or farming usurped land
The jurists of all four schools agreed in principle that the usurper must return
usurped land to its owner. They also ruled that he must remove any additions
(buildings, plants, or trees) added to the property. This ruling is based on the
H. adı̄th : “The labor of a transgressor earns him no rights”.60 In what follows,
¯
we review the specific rulings in each school:
61
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that if a person usurped a large wooden beam and
built around it a building of higher value than the original beam, he would
thus own the beam and be required to compensate its previous owner for
its value. They based this ruling on the view that the beam’s nature
changed by virtue of the building, and its removal would cause obvious
harm to the builder without benefiting the previous owner of the beam.
Moreover, the harm done to the original owner can be rectified by com-
pensating him for the value of his property, thus no harm will be caused
to either party, as prescribed by Islam. On the other hand, they ruled
that if the value of the beam exceeds the value of the entire building, then
ownership remains with the previous owner, since that results in the lesser
of two evils.
However, Al-Qād.ı̄ Zādah commented on this ruling in the continuation
of Al-Fath. by stating that there should be no differentiation between the
case where the beam is worth more than the building and the case where
it is worth less. He reasoned that any harm caused to the original owner
can be rectified through compensation for the value, while removal of the
building would be a sheer harm to the usurper in either case. Thus, he
argued, since the harm that was rectified is less important than the sheer
harm, the rule of “choosing the lesser of two evils” should be applied in
both cases.62
For usurped land, the H. anafı̄s ruled that if the usurper planted a crop or
erected a building, then if the land is worth more than the addition, the
60 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd and Al-Dāraqutnı̄ on the authority of c Urwah ibn Al-Zubayr as
.
follows: “Whoever reclaims a land owns it, but the labor of a transgressor earns no rights”,
61 ’Ibn¯Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.379,383), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.135-7), Al-
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.228 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
¯
vol.2, p.192).
62 This rule was also applied to many other cases, including a chicken swallowing a pearl,
a cow that traps its head in a pot, a camel that gets too big inside a building and cannot
leave without demolishing a wall, a gold coin that falls in an inkpot and cannot be taken out
without breaking it, etc. In all such cases, they ruled that the one who would sustain the
larger loss should compensate the one with the lesser potential loss. Similarly, the H . anafı̄s
and H . anbalı̄s ruled that if a person swallowed a pearl and then died, his belly should not
be cut to extract the pearl since the sacredness of a human body exceeds the sacredness of
property. Thus, the value of the pearl should be paid to its owner out of the estate of the
deceased. In contrast, Al-Shāfic ı̄ ruled that it is permissible to cut the person’s belly in this
¯
case, in analogy to the case of cutting the belly of a pregnant mother to extract an infant, c.f.
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.135).
usurper is required to remove his additions and returning the cleared land
to its owner in its original condition. This ruling is based on their general
principle that land cannot be usurped, and thus ownership remains with
the original owner. In this regard, the usurper is ruled to have occupied
the owner’s land with his property, and must hence remove it, since he
is a transgressor and his labor earns him no rights. On the other hand,
they ruled that if the value of an erected building exceeded the value of
the land, then the usurper should be given the right to pay the landlord
the value of his land and take it thus.
Moreover, they ruled that if the land would diminish in value by removing
the added crop or demolishing the added building, then the owner may
compensate the usurper for the value of the removed crop or the building’s
rubble. This ruling was intended to maximize the benefit, and reduce the
harm, for all parties. Thus, the land’s value should be assessed with and
without the addition that would otherwise be removed, and the owner
may pay the difference to the usurper.
Finally, they ruled that if a landlord had prepared his land for planting a
crop, and the usurper subsequently planted a crop therein, an automatic
muzārac a contract is established between the owner and the usurper. The
crop shares for the two parties in this case are to be determined by con-
vention. In contrast, if the owner had intended to lease the land, then
the usurping farmer should keep the entire crop, and pay the landlord
the market rent for his land. If the land was not prepared for planting a
crop or for rental, then the usurper must pay the landlord a compensation
of any diminution in the value of his land caused by the crop. For land
established as a mortmain (waqf), or for land owned by an orphan, either
convention is followed, or market rent is paid, whichever gives the mort-
main or the orphan the most benefit. The last ruling follows from their
general principle to maximize the benefits of mortmains and the like.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled as follows:63
– If someone usurped land and built on it, the owner is given an option
of demolishing the building at the usurper’s expense, or keep it and
pay the usurper the value of its rubble after deducting the cost of
demolishing it. On the other hand, the owner should not compen-
sate the usurper for any embellishments he may have added to the
building, since such additions have no physical value, and the owner’s
benefits should take precedence since he has the primary right.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the owner of
¯
a wooden beam that was usurped and used in a building is entitled
to take it back, even if that requires demolishing the building.
63 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.331), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.448), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d
¯ .
((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.319).
– The usurper of a land who plants trees therein should not be ordered
to remove those trees. In this case, the landlord should compensate
the usurper for the value of his trees after deducting the cost of
removing them, in analogy to the ruling for buildings on usurped
land. In contrast, if a person usurped trees and planted them in his
own land, then he must uproot the trees from his land.
– If a usurper plants a crop in the land he usurped, then if the landlord
takes it back before harvest time, he has the option of removing the
crop or leaving it to the usurper and taking the market rent for his
land. If the land is taken back after harvest, some jurists said that
the owner is entitled to the same option, and some said that the crop
would thus belong to the usurper and the owner is only entitled to
the market rent of his land.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled64 ruled that the usurper must remove any building he
¯
erected or crop he planted in usurped land. Moreover, they ruled that
he must pay financial compensation (’arsh) for any diminution in land
¯
value caused by his additions, as well as market rent for the period of
usurpation. They based those rulings on the H . adı̄th specifying that the
¯
labor of a transgressor earns him no rights.
On the other hand, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the owner is not
¯
allowed to force the transgressor to give him the additions and be com-
pensated for their value, or keep them and demand market rent from the
usurper, since it is possible for the usurper to remove the addition and
pay compensation for any resulting diminution in land value.
If the usurper sowed seeds in usurped land, the landlord may force him to
remove the seeds, and pay financial compensation for any diminution in
land value caused by his action. However, if the landlord decides to keep
the seeds in the land, the usurper is not allowed to remove it. Similarly,
if the landlord decides to keep a building on his land that the usurper
erected, the usurper is not allowed to remove any embellishments he had
put therein.
In summary, the Shāfic ı̄s give the landlord of usurped land the right to
¯
remove all additions caused by the usurper without enduring any loss
because of their removal.
65
• The H . anbalı̄s agreed precisely with the Sh āfic ı̄ rulings listed above for
¯
buildings erected on and trees planted in usurped land, based on the
H. adı̄th establishing that the labor of a transgressor give him no rights.
¯
However, they ruled in the case of planting a crop in usurped land that
the landlord has the option of keeping the crop until harvest time and
64 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.289,291), Al-Shac arānı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.89
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.371).
65 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, ¯ ¯
pp.223-5, 234,245), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H anbalı̄), vol.4, pp.87-
.
94).
taking rent for his land and compensation for any diminution in its value,
or taking the crop and paying the usurper compensation for his expenses.
The latter option follows form the H . adı̄th : “Whoever plants a crop in the
¯
land of another without his permission has no right to the crop, and bears
all his expenses”.66 Another H. adı̄th also states: “Take your crop, and pay
¯
him back for his expenses”,67 meaning the usurper. This ruling seems to
be closest to justice and most practical in application.
7. Usurped property usufruct and output

We have seen that ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Muh.ammad deemed the output or rent of
a usurped property unlawful for the usurper. They based this ruling since any
profits thus made would be the outcome of an illegal usurpation of the property
of another. Thus, such output should be given away in charity.
We have also seen that ’Abū Yūsuf and Zufar ruled that the usurper may
keep the output or rent, provided that he compensates the owner. They ruled
thus based on the H . anafı̄ juristic rule that once compensation is paid to the
owner, the ownership of the usurped property is retroactively established at the
time of usurpation.
The H . anafı̄s also ruled that the usurper does not compensate the owner for
the usufruct of usurped property, except in three cases: (i) if the property is
established as a mortmain (waqf), if it belonged to an orphan, or (iii) if it was
prepared for rent. They based this ruling on their rule that usufruct is not
valued property, which can only acquire value through the establishment of a
lease contract. Moreover, they reasoned that if the usurped property were to
perish, the usurper must thus compensate the owner, in accordance with the
H. adı̄th : “The guarantor is entitled to the output.68 Thus, the judge is only
¯
limited to forcing the return of the property to its owner if it remains intact, or
compensation for its value if it perished.
We have also reported that the H . anafı̄s ruled that compensation is required
for the usufruct of usurped property. They based this rule on their classification
of usufruct as valued property. Moreover, Al-c Izz ibn c Abdulsalam reasoned that
the apparent purpose for holding any property is to extract its usufruct.69
However, the Mālikı̄s ruled that compensation is required for usurped land
or homes only upon their usage. In contrast, they ruled, no compensation is
required merely based on disallowing the owner from using his usurped physical
66 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the authors of Sunan with the exception of Al-Nasā’ı̄ on the
.
authority of Rāfic ibn Khudayj. It was deemed a H . adı̄th Hasan by Al-Bukhārı̄, c.f. Al-
¯ ¯ . ¯
Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.319 onwards).
¯ 67
Narrated by ’Ah.mad, ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Tabarānı̄, and others that the Prophet (pbuh) saw
a crop in the land of Z.ahı̄r, and liked it. When he (pbuh) commented that he liked the crop
of Z.ahı̄r, he was told that the crop belonged to another person. Then he (pbuh) said: “Take
your crop, and pay him compensation for his expenses”, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.320).
68 Narrated by Al-Shāfic ı̄, ’Ahmad, and the authors of Sunan. Deemed¯
. valid by Al-Tirmidhı̄,
¯ ¯
ibn Khuzaymah, ibn Al-Jārūd, ibn H . ibbān, Al-H
. ākim, and ibn Al-Qat.t.ān, but deemed weak
¯
by Al-Bukhārı̄, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.30).
¯
69c Izzuldı̄n ibn c Abdul-Salām’s Qawāc id Al-’Ah.kām (vol.1, p.152 onwards).
property. On the other hand, if the transgressor merely usurped the usufruct
(e.g. by closing a person’s house), then he must compensate the owner for
having obstructed his use of the property, even if he himself did not use it.
. anbalı̄s ruled that the usurper is required to compensate
¯
the owner for usufruct of usurped property, as well as usurped usufruct. They
ruled thus, regardless of whether or not the transgressor himself extracted that
usufruct, or merely prevented the owner from doing so.70
8. Disputes between usurper and owner

There are many cases where the usurper and the owner of usurped property
make opposing claims, whereby the usurper would be required to compensate
the owner if we believe the latter, and would be absolved thus if we believe the
former. In what follows, we shall report a summary of the lengthy treatment
jurists of different schools gave to this topic:
71
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that if the usurper claimed without proof that the
usurped property was destroyed in his possession by natural causes, and
the owner denied his claim, the judge may incarcerate the usurper for a
sufficient period to find the property if it was not destroyed. If the period
of incarceration passes without finding the property, then the usurper
is required to pay compensation to the owner. This ruling follows from
the view that returning usurped property is the primary remedy, and
compensation for its value is only an alternative that applies if it is shown
that the property cannot be returned.
On the other hand, the usurper’s claim is accepted if supported by his oath
in all disputes regarding the usurped property, its genus, type, amount,
characteristics, or value at usurpation time. This ruling follows form the
fact that the owner thus claims that the usurper owes him a certain com-
pensation, and the latter is denying that claim. Hence the denier’s claim
is accepted if supported by his oath.
In contrast, the usurper must provide proof for any claim that he makes
that he had already returned the property to the owner, or that the owner
himself had caused a defect in the property. In this case, the usurper is
the claimant, and thus he must provide a proof.
If both parties make conflicting claims and provide proofs thereof, the
owner’s proven claim is given priority, and the usurper is required to com-
pensate him for the property’s value. For instance, the owner may claim
that his car was made defective by the usurper’s excessive usage, while the
usurper may claim that he had returned the property to the owner, and
each may provide a valid proof for his claim. The usurper’s proof in this
case may be ignored, since it is possible to return the usurped property,
70 Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . ¯ ¯
71 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.163 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.387), Abd
c
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.2, p.194).

¯
and then to usurp it again and ride it in a manner that causes the defect
claimed by the owner.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled72 in agreement with the H . anafı̄s that if neither party
provides a proof for his claim regarding the defectiveness of usurped prop-
erty, its genus, characteristics, or amount, the usurper’s claim is accepted
if supported by his oath.
73
. anbalı̄s ruled similarly that the usurper’s claim is ac-
¯
cepted if backed by his oath in disputes over the value of usurped property.
Thus, they reasoned that the default is absolution of responsibility for the
claimed excess, and the owner needs to provide a proof for his claim.
Similarly, they ruled that if the usurper claimed that the property per-
ished while the owner claimed that it remained intact, the usurper’s claim
is accepted if backed by his oath. They based this ruling on the extreme
difficulty of proving that a property had perished. Moreover, if they dis-
agreed about the amount or characteristics of the property, with neither
party providing a proof, the usurper’s claim is accepted if backed by his
oath. The latter ruling follows from the familiar rule that the denier’s
claim is accepted over the claimant’s if backed by his oath.
In contrast, they ruled in agreement with the H . anafı̄s that the owner’s
claim is accepted if the usurper claimed that he had returned the property,
and the owner denied that claim. In this case, the default is considered to
be that the property was not returned, and thus the owner is the denier
of the usurper’s claim. Similarly, they ruled that if the owner denied
the usurper’s claim that the property was defective, the owner’s claim is
accepted if backed by his oath. In the latter case, the default is deemed
to be that the property was free from defects.
9. Usurpation from the usurper

Jurists of the four schools agree74 that the owner has an option if his usurped
property is later usurped from the usurper, and perishes in the possession of
the second usurper. If he wishes, he may demand compensation from the first
usurper due to his transgression by taking the property out of his control. Alter-
natively, he may seek compensation from the second usurper in whose possession
the property perished, whether or not the second usurper knew that the prop-
erty was already usurped. The liability of the second usurper follows from his
own removal of the property from the control of the first usurper who was capa-
ble of returning the property to its owner. Moreover, the second usurper took
73 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.287), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ . ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
74 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.144,146), ’Ibn Nujaym (1290H (Hanafı), vol.2, p.96 on-
. .
wards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, pp.126 onwards, 139), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3,
p.457), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.279), Fath. Al-c Azı̄z Sharh. Al-Wajı̄z (vol.11,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.252), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.252), Al-Majallah (item #910).
control of a property that was not his, and ignorance of the ultimate owner is
not an excuse that negates his responsibility for compensation. Finally, the sec-
ond usurper caused the property to perish, and thus is liable for compensation.
This reasoning was legally formalized as the attachment of the owner’s right to
a property regardless of who has possession and control at any point in time.
Thus, if the owner seeks compensation from the first usurper, and the prop-
erty had perished in the possession of the second usurper, the first usurper is
entitled to demand compensation from the second usurper. The H . anafı̄s based
this ruling on their principle that the first usurper by paying compensation
owns the property retroactively from the time of usurpation. Thus, they rea-
soned that the second usurper merely becomes a usurper of the first usurper’s
property. The non-H . anafı̄s based the same ruling on the fact that the first
usurper would have borne the cost of compensation without causing the prop-
erty to perish, and thus equity demands seeking compensation from the one who
caused it to.
If the owner chooses to seek compensation from the second usurper who
caused the property to perish, the latter has no recourse to demanding compen-
sation from anyone else. Thus, the second usurper would have compensated the
owner for his own actions of usurping the property and causing its destruction.
The jurists further ruled that the owner’s option allows him to take some of
the compensation from one usurper, and some from the other.
The H. anafı̄s reported an exception to this rule of giving the owner an option
of usurper to compensate him. Thus, they ruled that if property designated as
a waqf is usurped and then usurped again, and if the second usurper was richer
than the first, the guardian of the waqf must seek compensation from the second
usurper alone.
Moreover, the majority of H . anafı̄s ruled that once the owner chooses one
usurper from whom to seek compensation, the other usurper is absolved of
responsibility for compensation by the very choice made by the owner. Thus,
the owner may not later change his mind and decide to seek compensation from
the other usurper.
They also ruled that if the second usurper returned the property to the
first usurper, he would thus be absolved of his guaranty. Moreover, if either
usurper returns the property to the owner, both usurpers would be absolved of
guaranty.75
Dealings of the usurper

76
The H. anafı̄s ruled that if the usurper leased the property, sold it, pawned it,
deposited it, or lent it to another, and then the property perished in the latter’s
possession, then the owner has the option of seeking compensation from the
usurper or the one with whom he dealt. Thus, if the owner takes compensation
from the usurper, the latter has no recourse to seeking compensation from any-
one else. In contrast, if the owner seeks compensation from the lessee, buyer,
75 Al-Majallah (item #911), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.138).
depositary, or recipient of the property in pawning, the latter can in turn seek
compensation from the usurper. The latter ruling is made on the basis of such
parties receiving the property as part of dealing with the usurper, in analogy to
a buyer, who is entitled to repayment of his price upon compensating the seller
for the value of his merchandise. In this context, payment of the property’s
value is equivalent to returning the property itself.
In contrast, they ruled that a person who borrowed the usurped property,
or received it as a gift or charity, is ultimately responsible for compensating the
owner, whether or not he knew that the property was usurped. They based this
ruling on the premise that receipt in such cases is made for the recipient’s sake
alone.
On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled77 that all possessions subsequent to
¯
the possession of the usurper are deemed possessions of guaranty, whether or
not the possessors of the property are aware of the prior usurpation. They
based this ruling on the premise that the possessor in all such cases would thus
be in possession of the property of another without his permission. In this
regard, ignorance of the previous usurpation does not remove the guaranty, but
merely removes sinfulness of the possession. Thus, the owner has the option of
demanding compensation from the usurper or the subsequent possessor of his
property.
However, they ruled in this case that ultimate liability for compensating the
owner only falls with the second possessor of the property if he knew of its
usurpation, which makes him a usurper as well. If the second possessor did not
know of the usurpation, but held the property in a possession of guaranty (e.g.
as a borrower, a buyer, or one in the process of negotiating the price), he would
still be the ultimate guarantor, since the usurper thus did not deceive him.
In contrast, if the second possessor did not know of the usurpation, and held
the property in a possession of trust (e.g. as a depositary or entrepreneur in
a silent partnership), then ultimate liability for compensating the owner would
fall on the usurper. This ruling follows from the fact that he dealt with the
usurper on condition that his possession is merely as an agent of the usurper’s.
On the other hand, most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the recipient of usurped property
¯
as a gift has ultimate responsibility for compensating the owner. In the latter
case, even though the recipient’s possession was not a possession of guaranty,
he received the property to own it.
In summary: if the possessor of the property did not know of its previous
usurpation, the H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s make him ultimately responsible for com-
¯
pensating the owner only if he received it in a simple loan, a gift, or charity. If
the property was received in a deposit or silent partnership, in which cases it
was held in a possession of trust, the usurper would be ultimately responsible
for compensation. Moreover, the H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s agree that the owner al-
¯
ways has the option of demanding compensation from the usurper or whoever
received the property from him.

¯ . ¯ ¯
Usurped property expenses

The usurper is responsible for all the expenses of a usurped property during
usurpation, by virtue of his transgression. On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s
ruled78 that the usurper is only responsible for all necessary expenses (e.g. feed-
ing the usurped animal, watering the land and treating it, tending to trees, etc.),
in exchange for any output that the usurper derives from the usurped property.
Thus, they reasoned, the transgressor should not be transgressed upon, and
must receive a compensation for his expenses. However, if the usurper spent
more on the usurped property than the output he derived from it, or if the
property produced no output, the usurper is not entitled to any compensation
for his expenses. In contrast, if the property’s output exceeded the expenses
borne by the usurper, the owner may seek compensation for the excess.
79
We have seen that the H . anbalı̄s ruled in disagreement with other schools
that if a usurper takes agricultural land and farms it, the landlord may take
the crop and compensate the farmer/usurper for his expenses. They based this
ruling on the H. adı̄th : “Whoever plants a crop in the land of others without
¯
their permission has no right to the crop, but has a right to be compensated for
his expenses”.80 Alternatively, they ruled, the landlord may keep the crop in
his land to harvest time, and take from the usurper the market rent for his land
plus compensation for any diminution in its value due to planting that crop.
78 Al-Dardı̄r((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.598).

80 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd and Al-Tirmidhı̄, who deemed it a Hadı̄th hasan.
¯ . ¯ .
Part XXII
Fighting an Assailant
647
Chapter 117
Destruction of Property
(Al-’Itlāf)
Destruction of property is often associated with usurpation, since it derives its

legal status rulings from the establishment of guaranty. We shall cover this topic
in three sections:
1. Definition and establishment of guaranty.
2. Conditions for establishing guaranty.
3. The nature of guaranty and means of compensation.
117.1 Definition, and establishment of guaranty

Destruction of property1 is defined as causing any change in the property that
makes it impossible to use in the usual manner.2 It is a cause for establishing
guaranty, since it constitutes a transgression that causes harm to the owner.
Proof for this is derived from the verse: “Whoever transgresses against you,
punish him in the same manner that he harmed you” [2:194], and the H . adı̄th :
¯
“No causing of harm is allowed in Islam”. In this regard, if guaranty and the
requirement for compensation is establishment by virtue of usurpation, it is
more appropriate to establish guaranty in the case of destruction of property,
which constitutes a sheer harm and transgression.
In this regard, jurists do not distinguish between immediate destruction of
property and destruction that is caused by indirect actions. Moreover, they
do not distinguish between guaranties caused by intentional or unintentional
1 Various notions of destruction, causing defect, or consumption of property are deemed
to be similar in juristic writings. All of those concepts fall under the more general notion of
causing harm to others through diminishing their property.
.
639
640 CHAPTER 117. DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY (AL-’ITLĀF)
destruction of property, and between cases of transgressors’ sanity, discernment,

and being of legal age, or lack thereof.
However, the Mālikı̄s distinguished between the case of a discerning and
a non-discerning child. Thus, they ruled that a discerning child should pay
compensation out of his own property if he has any, or otherwise be liable for
such compensation. On the other hand, some Mālikı̄s ruled that non-discerning
children and insane individuals are not liable for compensating any properties
that they destroy.3 However, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that the discerning
and the non-discerning are equally liable for compensation, to make the harmed
party whole.
Despite this general agreement on principle among the four schools, jurists
differed in opinion regarding the establishment of guaranty in specific cases. In
what follows, we shall review their respective rulings on some of those special
cases.
117.1.1 Leaving a store open

This special case refers to an individual who left a store open, or otherwise
allowed a thief to steal a property or allowed the property (birds or animals) to
escape. In this case:
4
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the perpetrator does not guar-
antee the property in this case. They based their ruling on the fact that
leaving the store open or releasing animals or birds by themselves are not
direct causes of destruction or loss of property, and other forces (a thief,
the animal’s actions, a flood, etc.) were required.
5
• The Mālikı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, and Muh.ammad ibn Al-H . asan ruled ruled that
the perpetrator of such acts is responsible for compensation, since the
subsequent harm was predictable under normal circumstances. This seems
to be the most logical and equitable opinion, and indeed Al-Majallah (item
#922) had already listed that opinion as the accepted one.
• The Shāfic ı̄s differentiated between different subcategories of this case.6

¯
Thus they ruled that if a person opened a birdcage and excited it to fly
away, then he would be liable for compensation if the bird fled promptly
with the assistance he provided. Moreover, if he had only opened the
3 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.139), ’Ibn Nujaym (1290H (Hanafı), vol.1,
. .
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.378,415), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H
. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.404
¯
onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), pp.332-3), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.277),
c
¯ ¯ ¯
4 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.166), Jāmic Al-Fusūlayn (vol.2, p.115 onwards), Majmac
. .
5 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.451), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.332), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.128 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.280,282), ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition
(H
. anbalı̄), p.285).
6 Fath Al-c Azı̄z Sharh Al-Wajı̄z (vol.11, p.245 onwards), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
. ¯ . ¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.278), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.374 onwards).
¯ ¯
117.1. DEFINITION, AND ESTABLISHMENT OF GUARANTY 641
birdcage, most Shāfic ı̄s still ruled that he is liable if the bird fled right
¯
away. On the other hand, if the bird stayed for a while before flying,
they ruled that it fled of its own will without the transgressor’s direct
assistance.
The same analysis to the three cases was also applied to untying animals
or opening a stable door. Moreover, they ruled that the transgressor is
liable for compensation if he gave an animal access to food that it ate
promptly.
In contrast, they ruled that if a transgressor merely opened the door of
a store which was thus robbed, or if he pointed a thief to the store, the
transgressor is not deemed liable for compensation. They ruled thus by
arguing that those actions by themselves are not sufficient to establish
guaranty.
They further considered the case of releasing a ship, which promptly sank,
in which case the perpetrator is liable for compensation, since his action
thus caused the sinking directly. On the other hand, if the ship floated for
a while, and later sank due to another cause, e.g. in a storm, his action
would not have directly caused its sinking, and he would not be liable. If
the ship merely floated for a while and then sank with no clear other cause,
some jurists ruled that he would thus be liable since water is a source of
destruction, and others ruled that he would not be liable in analogy to
the case described below.
117.1.2 Opening a fat container

Jurists issued a number of rulings regarding the liability of an individual who
opens a container filled with oil, ghee, or other fats:
7
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that if the jug contained liquid oil
which was thus spilled, the transgressor must thus compensate the owner.
On the other hand, if the jug contained solid ghee, which later melted and
spilled, he would not be liable for compensation. They based the ruling
in the first case on the fact that liquids naturally spill when allowed to do
so, and thus the perpetrator caused it directly to spill. In contrast, solid
ghee does not naturally spill, and it is only heat that turns it to liquid
and spills it. Thus, the perpetrator in the second case is not considered a
direct cause of property destruction.
8
• The Mālikı̄s, the H
. anbalı̄s, and Muh.ammad ibn Al-H. asan ruled that
the perpetrator is liable for compensation if the jug was lying on the
ground, whether its contents spilled immediately upon opening, or later
after melting or by any other cause. In all such cases, they ruled that
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.166), Majma Al-D . amānāt (pp.148,153).
c
8 ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.332), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.129), Al-Kāsānı̄
((H
. anafı̄), vol.7, p.166).
the perpetrator is a transgressor regardless of the timing of property loss.

This seems to be the most appropriate ruling in this case.
• The Shāfic ı̄s ruled9 in agreement with the Mālikı̄s that the transgressor
¯
must compensate the owner if the container was lying on the floor, and
its contents spilled and were ruined immediately upon opening, or after a
while due to heat or other factors, and regardless of whether or not the
owner was present and could prevent the spillage. On the other hand, if
the container was upright on some object, he would only guarantee it if
it fell and spillage occurred as a cause of his act of opening it, otherwise
he would not be liable if the container fell later due to other reasons. In
the final case, the perpetrator is not deemed to be the cause of actual
destruction of property.
117.1.3 Terrorization
Jurists disagreed over the case where a ruler sent for a woman to be brought to
court, and she was frightened to the point of losing a fetus she was carrying, or
losing her mind:
10
• ’Abū H . azm rueld that no party is responsible for com-
. anı̄fa and ’ibn H
pensation in this case, since the outcome is in no way connected to the
action.
• The majority of jurists ruled11 that the ruler must thus pay financial
compensation for the loss of life (diyah), in analogy to the case when
c
Umar called for a woman and she lost her fetus.
117.1.4 Detention and incarceration

If someone prevents an owner from tending to his property until it is ruined, the
majority of H. anafı̄s ruled that he must thus compensate him if the property was
movable, but not if it was immovable.12 ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf supported
this ruling on their principle that usurpation is not possible for immovable prop-
erties. In contrast, Muh.ammad argued that both types of property are subject
to usurpation.
13
The Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled in this case that the perpetrator caused
the property loss, and thus must compensate the owner.
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.375), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.111 onwards).
¯
10 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.397), Majmac Al-Damānāt (p.172), Al-La’āli’ Al-Durriyah
. .
fı̄ Al-Fawā’id Al-Khayriyyah (vol.2, p.112), ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.11, p.29 onwards).
¯
11 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.244), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.192), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.7, p.832 onwards).
12 Jāmic Al-Fusūlayn (vol.2, p.117), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.189).
. ¯ .
13 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.242), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.223; vol.7, p.834).
117.2. CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING GUARANTY 643
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled14 that the perpetrator is liable for compensation if it was
¯
his intention to prevent the owner from tending to his property. Otherwise, if
that was not his intention, then he should not be liable since his action was
against the owner and not against his property.
117.2 Conditions for establishing guaranty

Jurists listed the following conditions that must be satisfied for destruction of
property to result in a requirement of compensating the owner:
1. The destroyed object must be property. Thus destruction of objects that
customarily and legally do not qualify as property (e.g. dead animals and
their skin, blood, dogs, etc.) does not result in guaranty.
2. The property must be valued from the vantage point of the owner. Thus,
no guaranty is established for destruction of wine or pork that belonged
to a Muslim, regardless of the perpetrator’s religion. In contrast, the
destroyer of wine or pork that belonged to a non-Muslim must compensate
him. If the perpetrator is Muslim, he must compensate him for the value,
and the H. anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled that non-Muslims should compensate
such properties in-kind. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that
¯
such objects that are not deemed properties for Muslims should not be
compensated, in analogy to the ruling for destruction of non-properties.
The majority of jurists, including ’Abū Yūsuf and Muh.ammad ruled that
the destruction of idols and musical instruments does not result in guar-
anty, since they deemed such properties non-valued based on the prohi-
bition of their use. In contrast, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Al-Sh āfic ı̄ ruled that
¯
the value of raw materials of such properties should be guaranteed, and
thus the wood of such objects is considered valued property for which
compensation is required.
No guaranty is established for the destruction of ownerless properties,
since they are non-valued. In this regard, we recall that such properties
only become valued upon being taken into the possession of an individual.
Moreover, jurists argued that there is no guaranty for burning books of
idolatry that teach lies and disbelief. They reasoned that such subversive
books are more worthy of destruction than musical instruments and con-
tainers of wine, and the Prophet (pbuh) ordered the destruction of such
containers.15 Further proof for this view is provided by the fact that the
Prophet’s (pbuh) companions burned all mus.h.afs written in a different
hand or different dialect from the one unified under c Uthmān, for fear of
¯
having excessive differences in recitation result in divisions among Mus-
lims.16
14 Fath Al-c Azı̄z Sharh Al-Wajı̄z (vol.11, p.247), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.112), Al-
. ¯ . ¯
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.283).
¯15 ¯ ¯
Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.329 onwards).
16 ’Ibn¯Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah ((Hanbalı̄)b, p.271 onwards, 275).
.
3. The damage caused to the property must be permanent. Thus, if the prop-
erty is restored to its original condition, no compensation will be required.
In this case, all harm caused by the original diminution is deemed to be
removed, and any compensation that may have been received for that
diminution must be returned to the transgressor. Thus, ’Abū H . anı̄fa and
others ruled that the condition for establishing guaranty is the perpetual
impossibility of utilizing the destroyed property, and returning the prop-
erty to its original state negates this condition. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf
and Muh.ammad ruled that the transgressor should pay full compensation,
by virtue of his transgression, considering recovery of the property to be
a new gift from Allāh.17
4. The majority of the jurists ruled that the destroyer of property must meet
eligibility conditions to be liable for compensation. Thus, the owner of an
animal would not be liable for properties that it destroys. In contrast, we
have seen that some Mālikı̄s ruled that compensation is required even if
the destroyer is not discerning.18
5. The establishment of guaranty must be beneficial to the owner. Thus, if

the guaranty and the resulting liability for and payment of compensation
cannot be enforced, there is no point in establishing guaranty.
Consequently, jurists ruled that no liability for compensation is established
for a Muslim who destroyed the property of an enemy of Islam, or for the
destruction of an enemy of a Muslim’s property in the Land of War. In the
first case, the enemy’s property rights are not recognized by the Muslim,
and in the second, no Muslim ruler has jurisdiction to enforce a guaranty.
Due to the first example, jurists stipulated a condition in guaranty that
the destroyed property rights must be recognized in Islam.19
Similarly, the H
. anafı̄s ruled that no guaranty is established for righteous
people destroying the property of religious transgressors (e.g. Al-Khawārij
¯
and others who declared civil wars against their fellow Muslims), or vice
versa. The non-H . anafı̄s restricted this ruling to the case of military conflict
between the two groups, to give other transgressors who did not declare a
war on Muslims an excuse for possible differences in interpreting religious
commands.20
The Shāfic ı̄s stipulated one further condition21 that the owner’s possession
¯
of the property must be established. Thus, they ruled that if the owner
had a bird in an open cage, and a passerby scared him unintentionally into
flying, he would not be required to compensate the owner. They also ruled
17 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H. anafı̄), vol.7, pp.155,157), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.137),
c
¯ .
18 Indeed, this latter opinion is the one adopted in Al-Majallah (item #916).
¯
20 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.442; vol.4, p.300), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.277 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.128).
¯
117.2. CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING GUARANTY 645
based on this condition that a buyer is not responsible for any defects that
occur in the merchandise prior to receiving it.
The H. anafı̄s listed three conditions for establishing a liability for compensa-
tion on a person who caused a loss in property:22
1. The one who caused destruction of property must be a transgressor, i.e.

must have acted outside the domain of permissible actions. Transgressions
include digging a well in the public road without official permission, in
the property of another without his permission, or digging a well with
permission, but without taking proper precautions, and thus causing an
animal or human being to fall therein. Other examples include lighting
a fire on a windy day, causing others’ properties to be burned, causing
spillage of liquid in a container, destroying important legal documents,
etc.
2. The act must be intentional, e.g. by taking the watering rights of another
to benefit oneself, or blocking a ditch that watered a neighbor’s land, etc.
However, the true meaning of intention in this case is subsumed under the
notion of transgression, whether or not the transgressor intended to cause
harm. Thus, even an insane person’s actions may make him liable for
compensation if he shouts at a person’s riding animal and causes him to
fall. Indeed, the juristic rule in this context is: “The one who caused harm
is responsible for compensation only if he transgressed”, and “Whoever
caused a loss immediately is liable for compensation, even if he was not a
transgressor”.
3. The cause must indisputably lead to the harmful effect, i.e. no other
conventional reason for the loss was present. Thus, if a more immediate
cause of the loss can be found, it should be attributed to that cause.
In this regard, if the suspected act normally does not cause loss of property
(e.g. digging a well without permission), and then another person threw
an animal into that well to kill him, the latter would be responsible for
compensation and not the former. On the other hand, if an animal merely
fell into the well by itself, then the one who dug the well must pay its
compensation.
On the other hand, if the suspected act commonly causes the loss, but a
second direct cause was also present, then the two parties share liability
for compensation.
In this regard, we reiterate that jurists did not require the guarantor of
property that he destroyed to be discerning or of legal age. Moreover,
necessity does not absolve the liable party of his guaranty. Thus, if a
starving person has to eat the property of another to survive, he is still
22 Jāmic Al-Fusūlayn (vol.2, pp.116,112,124), Majmac Al-Damānāt (p.323) Sh. Khālid Al-
. . ¯
’Atāsı̄’s Sharh. Al-Majallah, ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition (H . anbalı̄), p.190 onwards), Al-Qarāfı̄
¯
((Mālikı̄), vol.4, p.27; vol.2, p.208), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.278).
¯ ¯ ¯
required to compensate the owner. This ruling follows from the juristic
rule: “Necessity does not void the rights of others”.
Moreover, ignorance that a property belongs to another does not void
the transgressor’s guaranty of destroyed property. Thus, even if a person
destroyed property that he thought was his own, he would be liable for
paying compensation to the true owner. In this regard, destroying the
property of another knowingly earns the transgressor both: religious sin-
fulness, as well as liability for compensation. In contrast, destroying the
property of another unknowingly only establishes liability without sinful-
ness. This latter ruling follows from the H . adı̄th : “Allāh has disregarded
¯
for my nation their mistakes, forgetfulness, and coerced acts”.23
117.3 Means of compensation

Rulings for the method of compensation in property destruction are the same as
their counterparts for usurped properties. Thus, if the destroyed property was
fungible, it should be compensated in kind, if at all possible. This ruling follows
from the fact that guaranty in this case is established by virtue of transgression,
which requires in-kind compensation. If compensation in-kind is not possible
for any reason, then compensation in value is required, in analogy to the rulings
for usurped property.24
23 Hadı̄th Hasan narrated by ’ibn Mājah, Al-Bayhaqı̄, and others on the authority of ’ibn
. ¯ .
c Abbās (mAbpwt).
24 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.168), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.332), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
. ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.284), Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H
. anbalı̄), vol.2, p.246). In this regard,
¯
the H. anbalı̄s ruled that if the destroyed property was fungible but its equal could not be
found, then its value is established as a liability on the day its equal ceased to exist, and thus
should be assessed on that day, c.f. ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.258).
Chapter 118
Legality, stages and legal

status
If a transgressor attacks a person’s self, property or honor, the assaulted party

and others are authorized to exercise the amount of force they deem necessary
to prevent the assault. In this regard, one must begin with the most amount
of restraint in using force, and gradually increase the level of force to stop the
assault with minimal counter-assault. In this context, verbal means are deemed
the mildest, followed by using one’s hand, followed by using a whip, followed
by using a stick, followed by severing a limb, and at the very end resorting to
killing the assailant. Thus, if the assailant credibly threatens the use of deadly
force (e.g. by raising his sword), necessity might dictate killing him to protect
oneself or others.
Thus, the use of force in this case was stipulated as an exception to the
general juristic rule that “harm cannot be removed with harm”. However, the
use of minimal force to avoid assault is still required in this case. Thus, the
Shāfic ı̄s, the Mālikı̄s, and some of the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that if it is possible to
¯
escape the assailant and seek refuge and safety with others, then fighting the
assailant would be deemed forbidden.1 Moreover, Al-c Izz ’ibn c Abdulsalām
ruled that if the assailants were to stop their assault, then fighting them and
killing them becomes forbidden.2 .
There are numerous proofs of the legality of forceful prevention of assault.
For instance, proof in the Qur’ān is provided by the verse: “Punish those who
attack you in the same manner that they harm you, but be wary of Allāh, and
know that Allāh is with those who are God-wary” [2:194]. This order to be God-
wary is proof that the use of force should be proportional, and that minimal
effective force should be used in preventing assault.
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.93), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.197), Al-Dardı̄r
. .
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.357), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.319), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, pp.196-7), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, pp.329-331).
¯2
Qawāc id Al-’Ah.kām (vol.1, p.195)
649
650 CHAPTER 118. LEGALITY, STAGES AND LEGAL STATUS
There are a number of H . adı̄th s that support the right to use force in this
¯
context. One such H . adı̄th states: “Whoever dies defending his religion, his
¯
life, his property, or his family, is a martyr”.3 This H . adı̄th , and its mention of
¯
martyrdom, provides proof of the permissibility of using force to defend religion,
self, property, and honor.
Moreover, defending others with force is legalized on the basis of the general
principle of protecting the sanctity of life and property. Indeed, were it not for
cooperation in protecting one another, many a person and his property would
be easy prey for criminals. In this regard, the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Support
your brother, oppressor or oppressed. They asked: How do we support him as
an oppressor? He (pbuh) said: by preventing him from oppression, that is a
form of support”.4 He (pbuh) also said: “Whoever witnesses a believer being
oppressed and does not help him despite his ability, Allāh will humiliate him on
the day of judgment in front of all witnesses”.5 In another H . adı̄th , he (pbuh)
¯
said: “True believers assist each other in fighting devils”.6
Therefore, all jurists ruled that the legal status of legitimate defense of re-
ligion, self, property, or honor, is permissibility.7 Thus, the defender is only
liable financially and legally if he exceeds the limits of permissible activity. In
this regard, the defender is only permitted to kill the assailant if he has proof
that this was required to stop him (e.g. if witnesses saw the assailant carrying
a lethal weapon and seemed ready to use it). Thus, the defendant would not
be acquitted if he merely claims that the assailant attacked his home, and that
he could not stop him without killing him. Similarly, it is not sufficient for ac-
quittal that witnesses saw the assailant enter the house, if they do not mention
his readiness to use a lethal weapon. On the other hand, if no witnesses were
available to testify in this case, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the defender’s claim is
accepted if backed by his testimony.8
3 Narrated by the four authors of Sunan, and deemed valid by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority
¯
of Sac ı̄d ibn Zayd, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.4, p.40).
4 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukhārı̄, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of ’Anas ibn Mālik.
. ¯ ¯
5 Narrated by ’Ahmad on the authority of Sahl ibn H
. . andı̄f, c.f. Al-Sh
¯
awkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.327).
6 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd.
7 ibid., Nazariyyat Al-Darūrah Al-Sharc iyyah by Dr. Al-Zuhaylı̄ (pp.140-2).
. . ¯ .
8 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.357), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.333).
Chapter 119
Conditions for Fighting an

Assailant
There are four conditions for the permissibility of fighting an assailant:1
1. The majority of jurists ruled that an actual assault is required for fighting
the assailant. On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s stipulated that the assault
must also itself be a punishable crime. In this regard, legitimate corpo-
ral punishment at home, in school, or in court, is not considered by the
H. anafı̄s to be an assault. Moreover, the actions of children, the insane,
and animals, cannot be described as criminal, and hence do not qualify as
assaults in the H . anafı̄ school.
The H. anafı̄s ruled that if a man kills an animal that attacked him, he must
instantly guarantee its value, in accordance with their rule that properties
must be guaranteed at the time of their destruction. This ruling follows
from their juristic principle that “necessity does not negate the rights of
others”, as well as their decision not to classify any animal’s action as an
assault.
In contrast, the non-H . anafı̄s ruled in this case that the man is not respon-
sible for any compensation if the only way to protect himself was to kill
the animal. They ruled thus based on necessity, and in analogy to killing
a human assailant, where the sanctity of human life clearly exceeds that
of property. This ruling is also analogous to the permissibility of killing
animals that are forbidden to hunt (based on the pilgrimage season or
location) if they attack. In this regard, the jurists distinguished between
the necessity of killing the assailing animal and the necessity of eating the
food of others. The difference in the latter case (where the owner of the
food is still entitled to compensation) is that the food did not force the
person to destroy it, and thus its sanctity (as the property of another) was
1 Al-Tashrı̄c Al-Jinā’ı̄ Al-’Islāmı̄ by the late c Abdulqāder c Ūdah (vol.1, p.278 onwards).
¯
651
652 CHAPTER 119. CONDITIONS FOR FIGHTING AN ASSAILANT
never negated.2 The non-H . anafı̄ opinions regarding assaults by animals,

children, and the insane, seem to be the most appropriate.
2. There must be an actual ongoing assault, not merely the threat of future
assault.
3. There must be no other way to prevent the assault without using force.
Thus, if it was possible to seek help from others or the police, but the
assaulted party decided instead to use force, he would thus be deemed a
transgressor.
4. Only the appropriate measure of force should be used, as best assessed

by the assailed party. Thus, minimal force should be considered and tried
before more forceful techniques are applied.
2 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.273), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.319), ’Ibn
. ¯ .
Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.328 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.225), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.143), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.357).
Chapter 120
Is Fighting the Assailant

Required?
To study the rulings in this chapter, we need to consider each type of legitimate
defense separately.
120.1 Self defense

’Abū H. anı̄fa, the Mālikı̄s, and the Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that an individual is required
¯
to defend himself if attacked by another human being or by an animal that
attempts to kill him or sever his limb.1
However, the Shāfic ı̄s restricted the requirement of fighting the assailant
¯
to non-Muslim and animal assailants, reasoning that surrendering to a non-
Muslim humiliates Islam, and animal life is less important than human life. On
the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that it is permissible to surrender to a Muslim
¯
assailant. Indeed, they ruled that it is better to do so, based on the narration of
’Abū Dāwūd: “Be the better of Adam’s two sons”, which the Prophet’s (pbuh)
companions repeated and practiced without any blame. The Shāfic ı̄s further
¯
ruled that the demarcation between permissibility and requirement of fighting
an assailant of oneself are the same for fighting the assailant of others.
The Mālikı̄s restricted the requirement of fighting the assailant by ruling that
it is better to warn the assailant first if possible. They ruled thus in analogy
to the case of declaration of war. Thus, the assaulted party should first ask the
assailant to desist, but if he does not, then he may fight him, even kill him if
necessary.
1 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.110), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.93), ’Ibn
. .
Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.269), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.197; vol.5, p.387), Indian
Authors ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, pp.7, 51), Al-H. at.t.āb (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.6, p.323), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.357), Al-Bājı̄ Al-’Andalusı̄ (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.6, p.61), Al-Suyūt.ı̄
(b, vol.2, p.220), Al-Qarāfı̄ ((Mālikı̄), vol.4, p.185), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4,
¯ ¯ ¯
pp.21,195), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.225).
¯ ¯
653
654 CHAPTER 120. IS FIGHTING THE ASSAILANT REQUIRED?
The jurists who ruled that self defense is a requirement relied for proof on the
verses: “Make not your hands throw you into destruction” [2:195], “Then fight
against the transgressing party until it complies with the command of Allāh”
[49:9], “Whoever transgresses against you, punish him in the same manner that
he hurt you” [2:194], “The reward of a mistreatment is equal mistreatment”
[42:40]. They further reasoned that just as man is required to sustain himself
by eating whatever he finds if he is starving, he is required to defend himself
against an assailant.
2
The H . anbalı̄s ruled in harmony with the Prophetic tradition that fighting
the assailant is permissible, but not required, whether the assailant is a child, a
grown-up, or insane. They based this ruling on the Prophet’s (pbuh) order in
the case of great trials for Muslims: “Stay at home, and if you fear that sunlight
will blind your eye, then cover your face”. In another narration, the Prophet
(pbuh) is narrated to have said: “There will come a time of great trial, so be the
slain slave of Allāh, and be not the killer”.3 Moreover, there is a valid narration
that c Uthmān forbade his four hundred slaves from defending him, and further
¯
told them that whoever dropped his weapon among them earned his freedom
thus.
In this regard, the H . anbalı̄s differentiated between the case of defending
oneself and eating to avoid starvation. They thus reasoned that in death at
the hands of an assailant, one attains martyrdom and saves the life of another,
while eating only sustains one’s own life.
2 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.329 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H

. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.143).
3 Narrated by ’Ibn ’Abı̄ Khaythama and Al-Dāraqut.nı̄ on the authority of c Abdullāh ibn
¯ ¯
Khabbāb ibn Al-’Art. Also narrated in similar fashion by ’Ah.mad on the authority of Khālid
¯ ¯
ibn c Arfat.ah.
Chapter 121
Compensation for Fighting

an Assailant
Jurists are in agreement1 that an assaulted individual who kills his assailant
bears no civil or criminal liability. This ruling follows from the H.adı̄th: “Who-
¯
ever raises his sword and attacks with it has thus made his blood permissible”.2
Moreover, the assailant is deemed to be the transgressor, and the assaulted was
merely defending himself.3
However, the H . anafı̄s stipulated exceptions for this rule if the assailant was
a child, an insane person, or an animal. In those cases, they ruled that if the
assaulted party killed the assailant, he would bear no criminal liability, but
will bear civil liability for paying financial compensation (diyyah) for a child or
insane person, or the value of the animal. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that
civil liability only applies in the case of an assaulting animal, but no diyyah is
required for killing a child or insane assailant.
The H . anafı̄s based their ruling for the case of an animal assailant on the
H. adı̄th : “An animal that injures a human being thus makes its blood permissi-
¯
ble”.4 In contrast, the actions of a child or an insane person cannot be labeled as
a crime or transgression, and thus sanctity of the assailant’s life is not dropped
in this case. Thus, we have seen that the H . anafı̄ condition of transgression of a
punishable crime to permit self-defense fails to hold in such cases.
On the other hand, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the actions of a child or insane
person may be considered criminal, since they are required to compensate own-
ers of properties that they destroy. However, he reasoned, punishment for such
1 ibid.
2 Narrated by Al-Nasā’ı̄, ’Ish.āq ibn Rāhawı̄h, and Al-T . abarānı̄ on the authority of
c Abdullāhibn Al-Zubayr, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.347).
c
3 Thus, the Hanafı̄s ruled that if an assailant threatens another with ¯
. a deadly weapon at
day or night, or threatens with a stick at night in a town or in the morning outside, then the
assaulted party has no liability if he kills the assailant on purpose, c.f. Majmac Al-D . amānāt
(p.166).
4 Narrated by all the major narrators on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah (mAbpwh), c.f.

¯
655
656 CHAPTER 121. COMPENSATION FOR FIGHTING AN ASSAILANT
transgressors is suspended due to their non-discernment. In contrast, he argued,

the actions of animals can never be classified as crimes, and no compensation is
required for properties that they destroy.
In summary, ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that there is no case for self-defense if as-
saulted by a child, insane person, or animal. He thus ruled that defense in this
case is allowed only on the basis of necessity, and thus compensation is required
of the defender. On the other hand, ’Abū Yūsuf and the non-H . anafı̄s ruled that
there is a case for self-defense against a child or insane assailant. However, he
ruled that self-defense against an animal assailant is based on necessity, and
thus compensation is due to its owner for destroying it.
The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that all of the above-mentioned cases fall under the
category of self-defense. In this regard, they ruled that man is required to
defend himself and his property against all attacks. Moreover, they ruled that
the attack by itself does not legalize killing the assailant, but merely permits
prevention of the attack or makes it a requirement. Thus, it is the act of self-
defense that permits killing the assailant, and not the assault itself. Hence, they
concluded that the assault itself need not be classified as a punishable crime.
5
In this regard, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that if a person killed an assailant on
his life or his life and his family is not liable for compensation. However, they
ruled, if the killed assailant had attacked anything else (e.g. property), then the
killer is liable for compensation.
The non-Mālikı̄s ruled that if an assailant bit a person’s hand, and his teeth
fell when the assaulted person pulled his hand away, the latter is not liable
for any compensation. They based this ruling on the H . adı̄th narrated on the
¯
authority of c Umrān ibn H . us.ayn that “A man bit the hand of another. When
the latter pulled his hand away, the assailant’s front teeth fell-off. They took
their dispute to the Prophet (bpuh), who said: How could any of you bite
his brother’s hand the way animals bite each other? You do not deserve any
financial compensation”.6 The same H . adı̄th was narrated on the authority of
¯
Yac lā ibn ’Umayyah.7
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the bitten person is liable for compensa-
tion in this case, based on the H . adı̄th : “The compensation for each tooth is five
¯
camels”.8 On the other hand, Yah.yā ibn Yac mur said that if Mālik had known
c
of the above mentioned H . adı̄th of ’ibn H . us.ayn and Ya lā, he would not have
¯
ruled against it.9
5 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.143).

6 Narrated by ’Ah.mad and the six major narrators with the exception of ’Abū Dāwūd.
7 Narrated by ’Ahmad and the six major narrators with the exception of Al-Tirmidhı̄.
. ¯
8 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd in Al-Marāsı̄l, and also by Al-Nasā’ı̄, ibn Khuzaymah, ’ibn
¯
Al-Jārūd, ibn H . ibbān, and ’Ah
. mad.
9 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.333 onwards), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.197),
¯ . ¯ ¯
Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.7, p.25), Al-Shac arānı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.173), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
¯ c ¯ ¯ c ¯
((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.225). In this regard, the Shāfi ı̄s ruled that it is permissible to hit one
¯ ¯
who stares into homes, without compensation, unless that person is married and there was
nothing forbidden for him to see in the house.
657
Defending honor
Jurists agree that a woman is required to defend herself against a rapist’s assault,
since allowing him to have his way is forbidden.10 They also ruled that she has
the right to kill the rapist if she cannot defend her honor otherwise, in which
case she is not liable for any compensation.
Similarly, any man who witnesses a rape attempt is required to prevent the
rapist, even if by killing him, provided that he can fight him without endangering
his own life. This ruling follows from the fact that honor is made sacred by Allāh,
and thus all men have to protect the honor of their family and others alike.
The defender in such cases bears no civil or criminal liability, and thus
cannot be required to pay any compensation. This ruling follows from the
apparent meaning of the H . adı̄th : “Whoever dies defending his family dies as
¯
a martyr”.11 Further proof is provided by the narration of ’Imām ’Ah.mad on
the authority of Al-Zuhriy on the authority of c Ubayd ibn c Umayr that a man
tried to rape a woman, and she hit him with a stone thus killing him. c Umar
then swore that there shall never be any diyah (blood money) for this man.
Moreover, jurists argued that fighting an assailant to protect property that is
permissible to give away is permissible, and clearly honor that cannot be given
is more worthy of protection.
Similarly, the scholars of all four schools ruled12 that if a man finds another
committing adultery with his wife, he is not liable for any compensation if he kills
the adulterer. They based this ruling on the narration that c Umar (mAbpwh)
was once eating when a man came running towards him carrying an unsheathed
sword covered with blood. The man sat with c Umar and started eating with
him. Then, a group of people came and said: “O ruler of the faithful, this man
killed our kinsman with his wife”. c Umar asked the man, and all present agreed
that he found the man committing adultery with his wife, and killed him. Thus,
c
Umar said, “If you are ever in the same situation again, do the same thing”.13
If the woman was also committing adultery willingly, then she may be killed
with no compensation required. However, if a coerced (raped) woman is killed
in this context, her killer must be killed in retribution for murder (qis.ās.).
In such cases, a proof is required as we have seen previously. In this regard,
the H . anbalı̄s have two reported opinions regarding the required proof: one is
the requirement of having four witnesses, and the other is two witnesses. The
first opinion is based on the narration that c Alı̄ (mAbpwh) was asked regarding
a man who found his wife with another and killed them both, in which case c Alı̄
ruled that the killer should provide four witnesses for his claim, otherwise pay
10 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.197; vol.5, p.397), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.93),
. .
’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.319), Majma Al-D
c
. amānāt (p.203), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.194 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.225), ’Ibn
c c
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.331 onwards), Kashf Al-’Asrār (vol.4, p.1520), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A,
¯
vol.4, p.357).
11 Narrations reported previously.
12 ibid., ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.332).
13 Narrated by Hashı̄m on the authority of Mughı̄rah on the authority of ’Ibrāhı̄m, also
¯ ¯
narrated by Sac ı̄d ibn Mans.ūr.
the man’s family his diyah. This ruling was also supported by the narration on
the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah that Sac d ibn c Ubādah asked the Messenger of
Allāh (pbuh) if he found a man with his wife whether he should try to get four
witnesses before killing him, and the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Yes”.14
The opinion that two witnesses are sufficient in this context is based on the
view that only the crime of adultery requires four witnesses. However, to prove
the mere fact that the man was with his wife only requires two witnesses.
If the husband cannot provide a proof, and claims that the woman’s guardian
knew that she committed adultery, then the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the guardian’s
counter-claim (denial) is accepted if supported by his oath.
Peeking into a house

If a man peeks into a house without permission, the Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled
¯
that the homeowner is not responsible for any criminal or civil compensation
if he throws him with a stone or hits him with a stick, thus destroying his
eye. In other words, the homeowner in this case pays neither a diyah nor is he
liable for physical punishment (qis.ās.).15 They based this ruling on a H . adı̄th
¯
that explicitly states that there is no punishment for a man who found another
peeking into his house without his permission, and threw him with a stone
destroying his eye.16 The Prophet (pbuh) is also narrated to have said that
“If a man peeks into the house of a people without their permission, they are
thus permitted to take-out his eye”.17 Another H . adı̄th to the same effect states
¯
explicitly that the owners of the home in this case are not liable for diyah or
qis.ās..18
On the other hand, if the homeowner throws the peeking transgressor with a
very heavy or sharp object and kills him, he would be liable for qis.ās., diyah, or if
the man’s family absolves him. On the other hand, if the peeking transgressor
does not leave after being stoned with proportional objects, he may thus be
subjected to more forceful treatments, ultimately to the point of killing him,
whether he was staring at what he should not see in the road, or in a home.
In this regard, the Prophet (pbuh) clarified the wisdom in the prohibition of
peeking into homes by saying: “Seeking permission was precisely recommended
to protect what can be seen unlawfully”.19
20
In this regard the H. anafı̄s and the Mālikı̄s ruled that the homeowner is
14 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ on the authority of c Ubādah ibn Al-Sāmit, c.f. Fath Al-Bārı̄
. . .
(vol.12, p.154).
¯ . ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.225), ’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah ((H . anbalı̄)a, vol.2, p.336), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.335).
16 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄, Muslim, and ’Ahmad on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah.
¯ .
17 Narrated by ’Ahmad.
.
18 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukhārı̄, Muslim, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Sahl ibn
. ¯ ¯
Sac d.
19 Narrated by ’Ahmad, Al-Bukhārı̄, Muslim, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Sahl ibn
. ¯ ¯
Sac d.
20 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.6, p.110), Indian Authors ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.7),
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.390), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.8, p.269), Majma Al-
c
D. amānāt (p.169), Al-Kh ¯

at.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), p.351), Al-Shac arānı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
659
criminally liable in this case, based on the H . adı̄th : “The punishment for a
¯
destroyed eye is half the diyah”.21 Thus, they ruled that the mere act of looking
does not justify physically transgressing against the perpetrator. In this regard,
they argued that even being with a man’s wife without fully committing the act
of adultery would not justify taking out a man’s eye, and clearly looking is less
harmful than such a scenario.
The difference between the two opinions pertains to one who peeked into a
house from outside. However, he argued, all jurists agree that if the man put
his head inside the house, and the homeowner through him with a stone and
took out his eye, then he is not liable for any compensation.
Defending property
The majority of jurists ruled that defending property (small or large) against
unlawful usurpation is permissible, but not required. In this context, if the
defender of his property tries to use the least force possible, and only uses more
force if necessary, then he should not be liable for any compensation. This ruling
is based on the narration on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah that a man came to
the Messenger of Allāh, and asked him: “What shall I do if a man comes, with
the intention of taking my property?”. He (pbuh) said: “Do not give him your
property”, or in another narration, “Fight him to defend your property”. The
man asked: “What if he fights me?”. He (pbuh) said: “Then fight him”. The
man asked: “What if he kills me?”. He (pbuh) said: “Then, you’ll be a martyr”.
The man asked: “And what if I killed him?”. He (pbuh) said: “Then, he will
be in hell-fire”.22 Thus, the jurists argued that if the defender eventually has to
kill the usurper to prevent him, he would not be liable for any compensation.
They also noted that the H . adı̄th was not specific to any specific value of the
¯
property, large or small.
In this regard, defense of property (permissible but not required) is distin-
guished from defense of self and honor (required) by the fact that property may
be given away with its owner’s consent. In contrast, life cannot be given away
with consent.
Some Mālikı̄s went further to argue that it is not permissible to defend
property of small value. However, we have seen that the above mentioned
H. adı̄th s apply to all cases of property, irrespective of amount or value. At the
¯
other extreme, some jurists ruled that defending property is required. Indeed,
we have shown that the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that it was required after first
warning the transgressor.23
p.159).
21 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd in Al-Marāsı̄l, and also by Al-Nasā’ı̄, ibn Khuzaymah, ibn
¯
Al-Jārūd, ibn H. ibbān and ’Ah.mad, c.f. Al-S.an ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.244).
c
22 Narrated by Muslim and ’Ahmad, c.f. Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4,
. . . . ¯
p.348 onwards). ’Ibn Taymiyya concluded from this H . adı̄th that the defender should sequen-
¯
tially try to use the least force, and then use more only as necessary, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5,
¯
p.326).
23 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.388), Al-Hattāb (1st edition (Mālikı̄), vol.6, p.323), Al-
. . ..
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.357), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.4, p.326), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.329
¯
In this context, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled differently for different types of property.24
¯
Thus, they ruled that defense of inanimate properties is not required, since it
is permissible to allow others to take such properties. On the other hand, the
majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the transgressor intended to kill the animate
¯
property, the owner is thus required to defend its life in the same manner he
defends his own life and honor. They also ruled that he is required to defend
properties to which the rights of others were attached, e.g. through a pawning
or a lease.
On the other hand, if the assault was caused by an inanimate object (e.g. a
pot that was falling on his head, and he could only protect himself by breaking
it), then he should pay a compensation. This ruling followed from the fact that
the pot cannot be deemed an assailant, since it has no will of its own. Thus,
the ruling must be made in analogy to a man who eats food owned by another
out of necessity, in which case he must pay the owner proper compensation.
onwards).
24 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.224 onwards), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
. ¯ ¯ ¯ . ¯ ¯
Part XXIII
Lost and Found (Al-Luqat.ah

& Al-Laqı̄t.)
661
663
Preliminaries
The Arabic term Al-Luqat.ah refers to anything that is found and taken,
human, animal, or inanimate. The term is used in verse [28:8] to refer to the
family of Pharaoh finding and taking-in Moses (pbuh).
The H . anafı̄ and other jurists used different terms for what is found and
taken: luqat.ah, laqı̄t., and d.āllāh, depending on its nature. The first term usually
refers to human infants that are found and taken, the second applies mostly to
inanimate properties, and the third applies to animals, and is often subsumed
under the more general term Al-Luqat.ah. In what follows, we shall the legal
status ruling for each of those.
Chapter 122
Nature and Rulings for

Al-Laqı̄t.
The Arabic term laqı̄t. literally refers to anything being lifted off the ground. The
term conventionally refers to picking up an infant that was left on the ground
by its mother, for fear of the child’s illegitimate origins being known, for fear of
not being able to provide for it, etc.
The H . anafı̄s ruled that picking up such infants and raising them is one of the
most commendable actions, since it preserves life. They further ruled that it is
a social religious obligation (fard. kifāyah), i.e. that if nobody else is expected to
pick up the infant, it becomes a religious obligation to do so if the infant’s life
is endangered. Scholars of the other schools also ruled similarly, adding that it
becomes a personal religious obligation (fard. c ayn) if the infant’s life is believed
to be in danger.
In what follows, we consider some of the specific legal status rulings pertain-
ing to picked-up infants.1
122.1 Foster parenting

Whoever picks up a deserted infant is most appropriate to raise him. Thus,
the finder of such an infant may either volunteer to raise him and bear his
expenses, or raise the matter to the ruler to assign a foster family that raises
him at the expense of the state treasury designated to serve the public needs of
Muslims. On the other hand, if the found infant had some property left with
it, then his expenses should be taken out of his property, rather than the public
treasury. Thus, the jurists ruled that expenses should only be taken from the
1 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.10, p.e09 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.197
¯ . .
onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.417), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.3, p.343 onwards), Al-T . ah.āwı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), p.141), Majma
c
. amānāt (p.211 onwards).

Al-D
665
666 CHAPTER 122. NATURE AND RULINGS FOR AL-LAQĪT
.
state treasury if the infant has no property, thus establishing his right in public
money.2
In this regard, if the foster parent spends out of his own property to raise the
infant, he may seek compensation for his expenses when he reaches adulthood,
if he was commissioned by the judge to raise the child. Otherwise, the foster
parent is deemed to have volunteered to raise the child, and hence is not entitled
to any compensation from him upon reaching adulthood.
Jurists also ruled that adopted deserted infants, as well as found properties,
are considered to be in a possession of trust by the finder.
122.2 Guardianship
Guardianship over adopted children and their property is established for the
judge, i.e. as pertaining to his education, upbringing, marriage, and finan-
cial dealings. This ruling follows from the H . adı̄th : “The ruler is the default
¯
guardian for anyone without a guardian”.3 Thus, the foster parent does not
have guardianship rights for marrying the foster child or dealing in his property.
If the ruler marries a picked-up infant after he grows up, his dowry should be
paid out of his property if he had any. Otherwise he should pay it out of the state
treasury. Similarly, al the expenses of the infant should be borne by the state if
he had no property, as c Umar and c Alı̄ ruled. This ruling follows from the fact
that the treasury is responsible for all such expenses of needy individuals. On
the other hand, by taking responsibility for such expenses, the state treasury is
also entitled to benefits such as the inheritance of such individuals, and financial
compensations for any injuries caused to them (diyah).
122.3 Presumed religion

Every infant picked-up in the Land of Islam is deemed to be a free Muslim, and a
citizen of the Land of Islam, since that is the default status of all human beings.
On the other hand, if the infant was found by a Muslim or a non-Muslim in a
church or synagogue, or in a village with no Muslim residents, then the child
will be considered a non-Muslim. In contrast, if a non-Muslim finds an infant
in an Islamic land, he would be deemed Muslim. In other words, the location
where the infant is found determines his presumed religion.
2 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.683), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.305), Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . ¯ .
3¯ ¯
Narrated by five companions of the Prophet (pbuh): Ā’isha, ibn Abbās, Alı̄, Abdullāh
c c c c
¯
ibn c Amr, and Jābir. The H . adı̄th of c Ā’isha was narrated by all major six narrators, Al-Shāfic ı̄,
¯ ¯ ¯
and ’Ah.mad: “There is no marriage without a guardian. The marriage of a woman without
her guardian’s permission is invalid, invalid, invalid. If a woman has no guardian, then the
ruler is the default guardian of anyone without a guardian”. ’ibn Mājah narrated the H . adı̄th
¯
on the authority of ibn c Abbās as a shortened version, c.f. the authentication of the H . adı̄th s of
¯ c
Tuh.fat Al-Fuqahā’ by Dr. Al-Zuh.aylı̄ and Prof. Al-Kittānı̄ (vol.3, p.510), Al-H āfiz
. . Al-Zayla ı̄
¯
122.4. LINEAGE CONSIDERATIONS 667
In one opinion reported by ’ibn Samāc ah in Riwāyat Al-Nawādir, it was

stipulated that the religion of the finder determines the religion of the infant,
rather than the location in which he was found. This ruling is based on the
juristic rule that possession is a stronger proof than location, e.g. one follows
the religion of one’s parents and not one’s land.
However, Al-Kāsānı̄ ruled that the correct opinion relies on a combination
of the religions of the land and the finder. Thus, he ruled that if a Muslim
or a non-Muslim finds an infant in the Land of Islam, he would be deemed a
Muslim. Finally, if a Muslim, a Christian, or a Jew finds the infant in a non-
Muslim house of worship, he would be deemed a Christian or a Jew.4 Thus, the
H. anafı̄s did not consider the place alone, or the finder alone to determine the
infant’s religion, and considered each case separately.
. anbalı̄s ruled that every infant found in the Land of Islam
¯
is considered a Muslim, and every infant found in a non-Muslim land with no
resident Muslims is considered a non-Muslim. However, the majority ruled that
if an infant is found in a non-Muslim land with some Muslim residents, then he
is deemed a Muslim, giving priority to the default birth state of Islam.5 They
based that ruling on the H . adı̄th narrated by ’Ah.mad and Al-Dāraqut.nı̄: “Islam
¯
should always be held supreme”.
122.4 Lineage considerations

A picked-up infant is deemed to be of unknown lineage. Thus, if a person claims
that the infant is his descendant, his claim is accepted and thus establishes a
family line. Thus, if the foster parent or another person claims the foster child to
be his own, his claim is accepted without requiring material proof, even though
the ruling by analogy requires a proof for his claim.
The ruling by analogy is based on the obvious possibility that the claim may
be false, thus requiring a proof to establish its validity. However, the ruling in
this case is made on the basis of juristic approbation, since the foster parent’s
claim benefits the picked-up infant in many material and social ways. On the
other hand, the establishment of family-lines by such a claim does not negate
the infant’s presumed state of Islam, since the claim is only accepted in matters
that benefit the infant. Thus, if the foster father who claims fatherhood of the
infant is a non-Muslim, the child need not be considered a non-Muslim. In this
case his religion will be derived from that of the Muslim parent, in analogy to
the case where the mother had become a Muslim. Similarly, if two adults claim
an infant as their own without proof, then the infant should be given to the
Muslim among them to maximize the infant’s benefit.
If two adults claim the infant as their own, and they are both free Muslims,
then the H . anafı̄s ruled that whichever one of them can describe a birthmark
on the infant should be given the infant. They ruled thus by reasoning that
knowledge of such a birthmark implies possession, which makes the presumption
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.198).
¯ . ¯ ¯
668 CHAPTER 122. NATURE AND RULINGS FOR AL-LAQĪT
.
of his parenthood more credible. On the other hand, a material proof by one
claimed parent is given more weight than the mere knowledge of a birth mark.
If neither one can describe a birthmark or provide any other proof, then
both are considered to have an equal claim to his parenthood. In this regard, it
is narrated that c Umar ruled in a similar situation that the infant is deemed a
son to both claiming parents, thus they would inherit him, and he would inherit
them.
In this case, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if two adults claim one infant, a lineage
¯
tracker is called to assign the infant to one of them, based on physical features.
They based this ruling on the fact that assigning the infant to a parent affects
all family-lines, and thus the best available methods of investigation should be
applied to ensure maximal accuracy.6
On the other hand, if an unmarried woman claims the infant as her own, her
claim is rejected since that does not give the infant a paternal lineage. On the
other hand, a married woman’s claim of parenthood is accepted if the husband
supports her claim, an expert supports her claim, or two witnesses testify to the
same effect.
If two women claim parenthood of a found infant, the one who provides
a proof is given priority. If both provide proof, then ’Abū H . anı̄fa ruled that
they would both be considered his mothers. In contrast, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that
only one should be the recognized mother, and Muh.ammad has two reported
opinions, one making both of them his mothers, and one making neither one his
parent.

¯ . ¯ ¯
Chapter 123
Found Property (Luqat.ah)
123.1 Definition and legal status

123.1.1 Definition
The most common term used for found property is luqat.ah. ’ibn Mālik said that
it has four pronounciations: luqāt.ah, luqt.ah, luqat.ah, and laqat.. Al-Khalı̄l ibn
¯
’Ah.mad derived the morphological implications of its various pronounciations.
In this regard, the name is derived from the verb laqat.a (to pick up or take),
since human nature dictates taking properties that one finds.
The H . anbalı̄ jurist ibn Qudāmah defined luqat.ah as property lost for its
owner, found and taken by another. In H . anafı̄ sources, luqat.ah is defined as
property with an unknown owner that is found, but is not deemed ownerless.
Thus, they ruled that such property will have a similar status to the property
of an enemy of Islam.
123.1.2 Legal status rulings

1. Preferability
Jurists differed over the preferability of taking lost properties. Thus, the H . anafı̄s
and Shāfic ı̄s ruled that it is preferable to pick-up such lost properties, since a
¯
Muslim is required to safeguard the properties of other Muslims. They based this
ruling on the verse: “Assist one another in doing good and God-consciousness”
[5:2], and the H . adı̄th : “Allāh assists his slave, as long as the slave assists his
¯
brother”.1 Thus, picking-up such property can preserve it and make it possible
to return it to its owner. Otherwise, if the property were found by a dishonest
person, he may take it for himself. On the other hand, jurists ruled that if the
finder of lost property fears that he may not return it to its owner, then it is
better not to pick-it-up. If the finder knows that he would never return the
property, then it is forbidden for him to pick-it-up. The final ruling is based on
1 Narrated by Muslim on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Sharh. Muslim (vol.17, p.21).
¯
669
670 CHAPTER 123. FOUND PROPERTY (LUQAT
. AH)
the H. adı̄th narrated by ’Ah.mad on the authority of Jarı̄r ibn c Abdillāh: “Only a
¯
misguided person would take-in a lost animal, unless he announces his finding”.
The Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that picking-up lost properties is reprehen-
sible. They based this ruling on those of ibn c Umar and ibn c Abbās. They
further reasoned that by picking-up such properties, a man exposes himself to
the risk of devouring forbidden property. Moreover, one should be afraid of not
exerting enough effort in trying to find the rightful owner and returning the
property to him, as well as resisting the temptation to use it unlawfully.2
Those are the general rulings of the different schools. Then each school
developed its own set of specific rulings. For instance, the H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s
¯
ruled that picking-up lost property is highly recommended for those who are
confident of their honesty and fearful of the possibility that a dishonest person
may pick-it-up if he leaves it. On the other hand, if there is no fear that the
property may be taken thus, then it is permissible to leave it. At the other
extreme, we have seen that it is forbidden to pick-up the property if one is not
confident of one’s own honesty, based on the H . adı̄th : “Only a misguided person
¯
takes-in lost animals”.3
2. Guaranty
The H . anafı̄s ruled that one who picks-up lost property only guarantees it against
his own transgression or refusal to deliver it to its owner if he demands it. This
ruling is established if the finder of the property states in front of witnesses that
he picked-it up to safeguard it and return it to its owner. Taking a property
thus is lawful, based on the H . adı̄th : “Whoever finds lost property, let him ask
¯
two men of good character to bear witnesses”.4 The order in this H . adı̄th makes
¯
the two witnesses a requirement. Moreover, if he did not make this declaration
before witnesses, he would apparently be taking the property for himself. In this
regard, it is sufficient in order to meet this requirement to tell the two witnesses:
“If you hear of anyone looking for his lost property, tell him to contact me”.
The possession of the property finder is also a possession of trust if the owner
agrees to let him safeguard it for him. On the other hand, if the taker of lost
property had no witnesses, and was not authorized by the owner to safeguard
it, ’Abū H
. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that his possession would be a possession
of guaranty if the owner does not believe that he picked-it up to give it to him.
This ruling was based on the appearance that he took the property for himself.
. .
((H
. anafı̄), vol.3, p.406), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.299 onwards), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.406), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.630).
c
¯ 3 ¯
Narrated by Muslim and ’Ah.mad on the authority of Zayd ibn Khālid with the addition
¯
“unless he cannot determine its owner”, and also narrated by ’Ah.mad, ’Abū Dāwūd and ’ibn
Mājah, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.338,344), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.94).
4 Narrated by¯’Ahmad and ’ibn Mājah on the authority of c iyād ibn Himār. Also narrated by
. . .
’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Nasā’ı̄, Al-Bayhaqı̄, and Al-T . abarānı̄, and deemed valid by ibn Kh uzaymah,
¯
ibn Al-Jārūd and ibn H . ibbān, c.f. Al-Sh awkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.338), Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st
c
¯
edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.3, p.466), Al-S. an c ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.96), ’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (,
¯
p.370).
123.1. DEFINITION AND LEGAL STATUS 671
In this regard, ’Abū Yūsuf, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H . anbalı̄s ruled that
¯
found and picked-up properties are thus held in a possession of trust. Thus, they
ruled that seeking witnesses is recommended, but not required. They based this
ruling on the view that picked-up property is tantamount to a deposit, and thus
its possession of trust cannot become a possession of guaranty merely because
of lack of witnesses. They based this classification on the H . adı̄th of Sulaymān
¯
ibn Bilāl and others: “Give it to its owner if he comes, otherwise, hold it as a
deposit”.5
They based their ruling that witnesses were not necessary on the narration
that the Prophet (pbuh) ordered Zayd ibn Khalid and ’Ubay ibn Kac b to try
¯
to find the owner, but did not order them to have witnesses.6 In this regard, if
witnesses were required, the Prophet (pbuh) would have told his companions.
Therefore, the mention of witnesses in the H . adı̄th of c Iyād., used by the H . anafı̄s
¯
as described above, is inferred to make it preferable to have witnesses, but not
a requirement.7
This difference in opinion results in the following differences in rulings:
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that there is no guaranty if a person

took a lost property, and then returned it to where he found it. They
based this ruling on the view that he merely took it to safeguard it for
its owner, and thus when he returned it, he voided his volunteering that
service, as though he had never taken it. In this case, they ruled that if
the property was later lost, the volunteer is not liable for compensation
if the owner believed that he had originally taken it for safekeeping, or
if he had declared that that was his intention before witnesses. On the
other hand, if he returned the property to where he found it and it was
subsequently lost, and he had no witnesses, then they ruled that he must
compensate the owner.
• ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that the volunteer is not responsible for compensation,
whether or not he had witnesses. Thus, he ruled that the volunteer’s claim,
that he picked-up the property to safeguard it for its owner is, accepted if
supported by his oath.
• Mālik ruled that if the volunteer returned the property to where he found
it, he would not be liable for compensation. He based this ruling on the
narration that c Umar told a man who found a donkey to take it back to
where he found it. In contrast, the majority of Mālikı̄s ruled that once a
5 Narrated by Muslim, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, ibid., p.341), ’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (, [.371), Sharh
¯ ¯ .
Muslim (vol.12, p.25).
6 The Hadı̄th of Zayd was narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄, Muslim, and ’Ahmad. The other Hadı̄th
. ¯ ¯ . . ¯
was narrated by Muslim, ’Ah.mad, and Al-Tirmidhı̄, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, ibid., p.338).
7 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.11, p.12), ¯ ¯
. ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), ibid.), Al-
¯
Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.201), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.2, p.301), Majma
c
Al-D. amānāt (p.209 onwards), ’Ibn Rush ¯

d Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.303 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.121), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.342), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.407), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.744,647), ’Ibn Rajab (1st edition (H . anbalı̄), p.53).
. AH)
volunteer picks-up a property for safeguarding, he would guarantee it if

he puts it back where he found it, or anywhere else.

. anbalı̄s ruled in this case that once a volunteer picks-
¯
up a property for safeguarding, as a trust, he is required to protect it.
Thus, if he puts it back where he found it, and it is subsequently lost, he
must compensate the owner, in analogy to a depositary who does not take
precautions to protect a deposit.
• Similarly, the majority of jurists ruled that if a person picks-up lost prop-
erty and gives it to another for safekeeping without the judge’s permission,
since picking-it-up obliges him to safeguard it himself.
• If the lost property perished in the possession of the one who picked it up,
then he is not liable for compensation if he had announced that he found
lost property. If he had not made the announcement in front of witnesses,
then we have seen that ’Abū H . anı̄fa and Muh.ammad ruled that he is liable
for compensation. In contrast, we have seen that ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that
that his claim of taking the property for safeguarding is accepted subject
to his oath, and thus he would not be liable for compensation.
• If the taker of a lost property admits that he took it for himself, then
he can only be absolved of his guaranty by returning the property to
its owner. This ruling follows from the fact that he thus usurped the
property, and thus must return it to its owner.8 This ruling is based on
the H. adı̄th : “Every hand is responsible for what it took, until it returns
¯
it to its owner”.9
123.2 Types of luqat.ah, and modes of behavior

123.2.1 Types of luqat.ah
There are two main types of luqat.ah, depending on whether the found property
is an animal, or an inanimate object.
The H. anafı̄s and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that picking-up lost animals is
¯
permissible for safeguarding. In contrast, Mālik and ’Ah.mad ruled that picking-
up lost animals or inanimate property is reprehensible.10 They based that latter
ruling on the H . adı̄th narrated by the six major compilers on the authority of
¯
8 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.201), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.11, pp.11,13),
. ¯ .
’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.304), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.694), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-
¯ ¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.411).
c
¯ 9 ¯
Narrated by ’Ah.mad and the four authors of Sunan on the authority of Al-H . asan ibn
Samurah, and deemed valid by Al-H . ākim, c.f. Al-Sh awkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.298), Al-H . āfiz. Al-
¯
Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (H . adı̄th ), vol.4, p.167).
10 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition¯(Hanafı̄), vol.11, p.11), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.200), ’Ibn Al-
¯ . .
Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.428), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.3, p.305), ’Ibn Rush d
¯
Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.299 onwards), Al-Kh at.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.409), ’Ibn
¯ ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.630 onwards).
123.2. TYPES OF LUQAT
. AH, AND MODES OF BEHAVIOR 673
Zayd ibn Khālid Al-Juhanı̄ that the Prophet (pbuh) was asked about picking-up
¯
lost gold and silver. He (pbuh) said: “Identify it and keep it separate from other
properties (lit. know its sack and rope holding the sack closed), and announce
for one year that you have found it. If nobody claims it, and you cannot find
its owner, then you may either spend it and guarantee its value for the owner,
or keep it as a deposit. If the owner ever comes to claim it, you must give it to
him”. In another H . adı̄th , a man asked him (pbuh) about lost camels, and he
¯
(pbuh) said: “Leave it alone, for it has its own shoes (its hoofs), and its own
water in its belly. It can drink and eat whatever it finds, so leave it free until
its owner finds it”. On the other hand, when he (pbuh) was asked about a lost
sheep, he (pbuh) said: “Take it, for either you take it, your brother takes it, or
the wolf will take it”.11 Thus, we conclude that picking up lost camels is not
permitted, while picking up other properties is permissible.
’Abū Dāwūd, ’Ah.mad, and ’ibn Mājah narrated on the authority of Jarı̄r
ibn c Abdillāh that he heard the Prophet (pbuh) say: “Only a misguided person
would take-in a stray or lost animal”.12 It was also narrated that the Prophet
(pbuh) said: “Taking-in a lost animal can lead a Muslim to the hell-fire”, mean-
ing if he takes it for himself.13 Finally, it was narrated by Muslim, ’Ah.mad, and
Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of ’Ubay ibn Kac b that the Prophet (pbuh) said:
¯
“Announce finding the lost property. If someone comes who correctly identifies
its sack and rope, then give it to him. Otherwise, use it”.14
Those who ruled for taking lost property for safeguarding argued against
that opposing H . adı̄th s by saying that they applied to a time in the past, when
¯
most people were honest. However, they argued, it is better in current times
to legalize taking property for safekeeping, given the large number of dishonest
people who can take it.
For the one category of lost properties of pilgrims, all jurists are in agreement
that it is not permissible to pick-up such properties, based on the Prophet’s
(pbuh) explicit prohibition of doing so.15 The jurists are also in agreement
that lost properties dropped in Makkah should not be picked up, based on the
statement the Prophet (pbuh) made on the day of its conquest: “Any dropped
or lost property in this city may only be picked up by one who aims to find its
owner”.16
11 Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4, p.468), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.338),
. . . ¯ ¯
Sharh. Muslim (vol.12, p.20).
¯ 12
Narrated by ’Ah.mad, ’Abū Dāwūd and ’ibn Mājah, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, ibid., p.344),
¯
Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.94).
13 Narrated by Al-Tabarānı̄ in his Kabı̄r on the authority of c Ismah, with a weak chain
. .
of narration including ’Ah.mad ibn Rāshid. It was also narrated by ’Ah.mad, ’ibn Mājah,
¯
Al-T. ah.āwı̄, ibn H
. ibbān, and others on the authority of Abdullāh ibn Al-Sh
c ikhkhı̄r, c.f. Al-
¯ ¯ ¯
Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.167), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.94).
¯
14 Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.3, p.467), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.339).
. . . ¯ ¯
15 Narrated by ’Ahmad and Muslim on the authority of c Abdulrah.man ibn c Uthmān, c.f.
. ¯
sharh. Muslim (vol.12, p.28), Al-S.an ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.96).
c
¯ 16
Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of ’ibn c Abbās and ’Abū Hurayrah,
¯
with slight variation in the wording, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.3,
¯
¯
. AH)
123.2.2 What to do with luqat.ah

Anyone who picks-up a dropped or lost property must announce that he found
it, and thus seek its owner. This ruling follows from the narration of Al-Bukhārı̄
¯
and Muslim on the authority of Zayd ibn Khālid Al-Juhanı̄, and other H . adı̄th s
¯ ¯
wherein the Prophet (pbuh) said that one who picks-up a property should an-
nounce it for a year.17
In this regard, jurists discussed at length the nature of announcement of
the found property and seeking its owner, the period for such activities, the
place announcement should be made, responsibility for expenses of the search,
expenses of a lost and found animal, the condition of returning lost and found
property to is owner, and the legal status ruling for owning the found property.
1. Methods of announcement
The taker of lost property should openly announce having found it in public
places, mentioning its genus or some of its characteristics. However, he should
not give a full description, so that the detailed descriptions can be provided as
proof of a true owner.
The non-Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the taker of a lost property must announce hav-
¯
ing found it. They based this ruling on the above mentioned H . adı̄th of Zayd
¯
ibn Khālid, where the order to announce having found it for a year, renders it
¯
a requirement. In this regard, scholars of Islamic legal theory agree that the
apparent implication of any order in a H . adı̄th is that the ordered action is a
¯
requirement.
In contrast, most Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the taker of lost property is not required
¯
to announce having found it, as long as he takes it to safeguard it for its owner.
They ruled thus by reasoning that the Law made announcement a requirement if
the taker of the property intended to own it if its owner was not found. However,
the official Shāfic ı̄ opinion is in agreement with the other three schools: that
¯
announcement is a requirement.
In this regard, the taker of lost property may announce having found it
himself, or he may have another person make the announcement in his place.18
2. Period of announcement
Jurists are in agreement that if a person finds a stray sheep in a desolate place,
he may eat it. This ruling follows directly from the above mentioned H . adı̄th :
¯
“It is yours, your brother’s, or the wolf’s”. However, they differed over whether
or not he is liable to compensate the owner for its value. The majority of
17 Narrated by Al-Bazzār in his Musnad, and Al-Dāraqutnı̄ in his Sunan on the authority
.
of ’Abū Hurayrah, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition, (H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.3, p.466), Al-Shawkānı̄
¯ ¯
(, vol.5, p.338), Al-S.an ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.94), Sharh. Muslim (vol.12, p.26).
c
18 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.3, p.350), ’Ibn Al-Humām ¯
. ((H
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.426), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.120), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.411,413), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-
¯ ¯ ¯
Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.429), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.631,633 onwards), Al-Shawkānı̄ (,
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.5, p.340), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.362).
¯
jurists ruled in this case that he must compensate the owner, since a Muslim’s
property cannot be taken without his consent.19 In contrast, the more accepted
opinion of Mālik in this case is that the H . adı̄th does not explicitly suggest that
¯
compensation is required.
For properties other than lost sheep, jurists agreed that announcement for
one year is required for significant properties, as per the H . adı̄th reported above.
¯
In this regard, the H . adı̄th of ’Ubayy narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim that
¯ ¯
lists an announcement period of three years, four years, or ten years, is rejected
based on errors of some of the compilers, according to the research of ’ibn Al-
Jawziyy. Another interpretation is that the extra period may be appropriate
for individuals who wish to err on the side of caution before dealing in lost and
found property.20
The Shāfic ı̄s and most of the Mālikı̄s ruled that insignificant property should
¯
be advertised for any period sufficiently long to assume that the one who lost
it would have given up looking for it, even if that is less than one year. In this
regard, insignificant property wad defined by c Ā’isha (mAbpwh) to be anything
¯
less than a Dirham, the majority of jurists defined it to be anything less than
one-quarter of a Dinār, and the H . anafı̄s defined it to be anything less than ten
Dirhams.
In contrast, Al-T.ah.āwı̄ reported that the accepted opinion among the H . anafı̄s
is that announcement for a year is required regardless of the property’s value.
21
The H . anbalı̄s also adopted the same opinion as the H . anafı̄s in this regard.
On the other hand, all jurists agree that trivial properties (e.g. a single
date) may be taken and used, since the Prophet (pbuh) did not deny for one
who found a date to eat it, and he (pbuh) once saw a date and said: “If it were
not for fear that it was part of a charitable payment, I would have eaten it”.22
Moreover, we note that the full period of announcement is only stipulated for
non-perishable properties. However, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that perishable properties
¯
should be spent, consumed, or given to charity. In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled
¯
that the finder of such property should sell it and own the price only after the
announcement period elapses. Alternatively, they ruled, he may eat the found
property immediately, and be liable for its value.
19 Hadı̄ths to this effect were narrated by Al-Hākim, ibn Hibbān, ’Ahmad, and Al-Bazzāar
. ¯ . . .
on the authority of ’Abū H . umayd Al-Sā idı̄. It was also narrated by ’Ah.mad on the authority
c
of Amr ibn Yathriby, c.f. Al-S.an ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.3, p.60 onwards), Al-Haythamı̄ (,
c c
¯ ¯
vol.4, p.171).
20 Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.3, p.467), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.340
. . . ¯ ¯
onwards).
21 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, pp.301,303), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.120),
¯ .
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.632,634), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.430), Al-Khat.ı̄b
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.415), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄
¯ ¯
Jurisprudence), vol.3, p.302 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.434 onwards), Al-
T. ah.āwı̄ ((H. anafı̄), p.139).
22 Those two Hadı̄ths were reported in ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.634). The second one was
. ¯
narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of Anas, c.f. Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing,
¯
vol.3, p.93), ’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (, p.373).
. AH)
3. Location of announcement
Announcement of finding a lost property should be made in all public places
of congregation, to seek maximal dissemination of information, and maximal
exposure. However, the owner of a lost property should not go looking for it
in the Masjid, since the Prophet (pbuh) said: “If you hear a man looking for
his lost animal in the Masjid; say: May Allāh never bring it back to him. For
Masjids were not built for that purpose”.23 However, announcement at the
doors of Masjids is allowed, as c Umar ordered the finder of lost property to do
so. Moreover, the Shāfic ı̄s made an exception for the Masjid Al-H
. arām, wherein
¯
they allowed the announcement of lost and found, since anyone who picks up
lost properties there clearly has no intention of owning it.
In this regard, there is no harm in using the loudspeakers of Masjids to
announce lost and found in times other than prayer times, due to the vast
areas of modern cities. He also reasoned that advertisement in newspapers and
posting signs, and other modern methods of information dissemination should
be used.
The Shāfic ı̄s explained how advertisement should be done during the speci-
¯
fied one year. Thus, they ruled that the finder of lost property should announce
it twice a day (beginning and end) in the beginning, then once a day, then once
a week, and then once a month as the year draws to an end.24
4. Announcement and property expenses

The H . anafı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that all costs of announcement (e.g. newspaper
advertisement, or the wages of an announcer) are to be borne by the finder of
lost property. They based this ruling on the fact that the finder is responsible to
make the announcement, and thus must bear its expenses just as he bears the
expenses of his own time, whether or not he aims to own the found property.
The Mālikı̄s ruled that if the finder of lost property spent out of his own
property to announce the found property, the owner will be given the option of
compensating him for such expenses, or leaving the property with the finder in
exchange for the expenses he spent.25
In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that if the finder took the property with the
¯
intention of safeguarding it for the owner, he should not bear the expenses of
announcement, and should either take the expenses from the state treasury by
court order, or borrow the expenses to be repaid by the owner.26 On the other
hand, they ruled that if the finder took the property with the intent of ultimately
owning it, then he must bear responsibility for the costs of announcement,
23 Narrated by Muslim and ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority of ’Abū Hurayrah. Also narrated
by Al-Bazzār on the authorities of Sac d ibn ’Abı̄ Waqqās., ’Anas ibn Mālik, and ibn Masc ūd,
c.f. Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.4, p.170), Al-Tāj (vol.1, p.214).
¯
24 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.6, p.202), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.3, p.350), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-
¯ .
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.413), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.633), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4,
¯ ¯
¯
¯ . ¯ ¯
whether or not he actually owns it in the end. This seems to be the most
reasonable opinion.
With regards to costs of sustaining found animals, the Mālikı̄s ruled that the
finder may seek compensation for such expenses from the owner. In contrast,
the Shāfic ı̄s and H. anbalı̄s ruled that the finder of a property is thus volunteering
¯
to safeguard it, and hence may not seek compensation from the owner. However,
the Shāfic ı̄s allowed the finder to seek a ruler’s permission, or find witnesses, if
¯
he wishes to be compensated for such expenses.
The H . anafı̄s also ruled thus that if the finder spends out of his own property
to sustain the found property without taking the ruler’s permission, then he is
considered a volunteer, and is not entitled to any compensation from the owner.
They based this ruling on the view that the finder has no guardianship over
the property’s owner which entitles him to establishing a debt on him. On the
other hand, if he seeks and receives the ruler’s permission, then whatever he
spends can be established as a debt on the owner. In this regard, the judge
should consider if the found animal has usufruct that can be leased. Then, if it
is possible, he should lease the animal, and use its rent to cover its expenses. In
this case, the lease is allowed since it benefits the owner [by keeping his animal
alive]. On the other hand, if the animal has no lease value, and if the judge
fears that its expenses may exceed its market value, he may order the finder to
sell the animal and safeguard its price.
Finally, if the judge finds that the most advantageous arrangement is to
cover the animal’s expense and not sell it, then he may permit the finder to
spend on the animal’s sustenance and maintenance, and establish the expenses
as a debt on the owner. Then when the owner comes to claim the animal, the
finder may keep the animal until the owner reimburses him for his expenses. If
the latter refuses to pay, the judge may then sell the animal to reimburse the
finder for his expenses out of its price.27
5. Returning the property to its owner
Jurists of all schools are in agreement that the owner of a property must be able
to name some features that distinguish it, have material proof of ownership, or
provide two witnesses to testify that it belongs to him. If the owner provides
such a proof or testimony, then the finder may give him the property, and if he
wishes, he may take a reward for having found it. Thus, the finder is allowed to
return the property if the claimed owner merely mentions a distinguishing sign,
since this has been explicitly legalized by the H. adı̄th .
¯
On the other hand, jurists differed over whether or not the finder is obliged
to return the property if the owner merely mentions a distinguishing sign or
characteristic of the property, without presenting a material proof of owner-
27 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.304), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ . ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.410), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.203), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.4, p.428 onwards),
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.3, p.305), ’Abū-’Ish
. āq Al-Sh ı̄rāzı̄ ((Sh āfic ı̄), vol.1,
¯ ¯
p.432), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.11, p.9), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.633 onwards).
¯
. AH)
ship:28
• The H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that the finder is not obliged to give the
¯
property to its claimed owner, unless the latter can provide a material
proof. This ruling follows from the fact that the latter is a claimer, and
thus his claim requires a proof just like any other claim. Proof for this prin-
ciple is provided by the H . adı̄th : “If all claims were accepted, some people
¯
would falsely claim the property and blood of others. Thus, a claimant
needs to provide a material proof, otherwise the denier’s counterclaim is
accepted if supported by his oath”.29
Moreover, since found property belongs to another, its delivery is only
required if the claimant can present more proof than a mere description
of the property, in analogy to the rule for deposits.
However, the H . anafı̄s ruled that the finder is allowed to give the property
to a claimant who can provide a detailed description. The Shāfic ı̄s ruled
¯
similarly if the finder has sufficient reason to believe the claimant. Both of
those rulings are based on the H . adı̄th , wherein the Prophet (pbuh) said:
¯
“Then if the owner of the property comes, and accurately describes the
sack, its rope, and its content, then give it to him. Otherwise, it becomes
yours”.
• The Mālikı̄s and H. anbalı̄s ruled that the finder is required to give the
property to the claimed owner if he gave the above mentioned detailed
description, whether or not the finder believes him. Thus, they reasoned
that the apparent meaning of above mentioned H . adı̄th obliges the finder
¯
to give the property based on description, regardless of the availability of
material proof, or his own suspicions.
In this regard, we recall that the above mentioned H . adı̄th of Zayd: “Know
¯
its sack and rope, then announce having found it for one year. If it is
not identified within that time, you may spend it. And, if someone ever
comes demanding it, then give it to him”, meaning demanding it with
its specific description. Note that the H. adı̄th does not mention material
¯
proofs anywhere. Were such proofs required, it would not be permissible
to violate that requirement, and the order would not have been issued
to give the property back without its satisfaction. Moreover, providing
material proof for ownership of a lost property can be quite difficult, since
properties are often lost due to forgetfulness. In this regard, the H . adı̄th
¯
28 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.4, p.431), Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.11, p.8), Al-
. ¯ .
Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.6, p.202), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
c
((H. anafı̄), vol.3, p.353), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.302), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.416), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.431), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5,
¯ ¯ ¯
p.644 onwards).
29 This is a Hadı̄th Hasan, narrated by Al-Bayhaqı̄ and ’Ahmad in this form, and narrated
. ¯ . .
with slightly different language in Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of ibn c Abbās,
¯
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.95), Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.305),
¯ ¯
Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.4, p.132), ’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (, p.521), Sharh. Muslim (vol.12,
¯
p.2).
stating: “The claimant must provide proof” applies only if there is a denier
of that claim. However, there is no denier in the context of returning lost
property. This seems to be the most appropriate ruling in this case.
6. Owning the found property

Jurists differed in opinion regarding whether or not all finders of lost property
would own it after one year of announcements, or whether only the poor finders
would own it thus:
30
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that a rich finder of property is not permitted to
benefit from it, but must give it in charity to poor family members (in-
cluding parents, a wife, or offspring) or others. They based this ruling
on the view that the property belongs to another, and thus may not be
used without its owner’s consent. For proof, they cited the verses: “And
do not devour your wealth among yourself unlawfully” [2:188], and “And
do not transgress, for Allāh loves not the transgressors” [2:190], as well
as the H . adı̄th : “The property of a Muslim is not permissible for another
¯
without his consent”.
Moreover, they cited an explicit H . adı̄th on the authority of ’Abū Hu-
¯
rayrah: “Found property is not permissible. Thus, whoever finds lost
property should announce it for a year. Then, if its owner comes, he
should give it to him. If the owner does not come, then the property
should be given away in charity”.31 Finally, they relied on the H . adı̄th
¯
of c iyād. ibn H
. imār Al-Mujāsh i c
iy: “Whoever finds lost property should
¯
ask one or two individuals of good characters to bear witness, and he
should not hide it. Then, if he finds its owner, he should return it to him,
otherwise, it is a property of Allāh to be given to whomsoever he wishes”.
On the other hand, they ruled that if the finder is poor, then he may use
the found property. They made this ruling on the view that being poor, he
is himself eligible to receive the property in charity, and thus the H
. adı̄th :
¯
“Let him give it away in charity” is not violated.
In either case, if the owner is found after the property was used or given
away in charity, he has an option of (i) letting the charity stand, getting
full religious credit for it, (ii) seeking compensation from the finder, or (iii)
taking the property back from the poor who received it in charity. In this
regard, whomever the owner takes compensation from has no recourse to
seek compensation from the other.
• The non-H. anafı̄ jurists ruled that the finder of a lost property may own it
whether he is poor or rich, and thus it becomes part of his property. They
30 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.11, p.4 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.4,
¯ . .
p.432 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.3, p.307), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.6,
p.202), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.3, p.351).
31 Narrated by Al-Bazzār and Al-Dāraqutnı̄, c.f. Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th),
. . . . ¯
vol.3, p.466). Also narrated by Al-T . abarānı̄ on the authority of Ya lā ibn Murrah, with a
c
weak chain of narrators and a slightly different wording, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, p.337).
¯
. AH)
based this ruling on the narration that a number of companions of the

Prophet (pbuh), including c Umar, ibn Masc ūd, c Ā’isha, and ibn c Umar
¯
approves such ownership. Moreover, they relied on the H . adı̄th of Zayd ibn
¯
Khālid: “Then, if the property is not claimed, you may spend it”, or “you
¯
may do with it as you please”. This is a valid H . adı̄th , and its narrations
¯
on the authority of ’Ubay ibn Kac b include the wording “you may spend
it” and “you may use or benefit from it”.
They deemed the H . adı̄th on the authority of ’Abū Hurayra, on which the
¯
H. anafı̄s relied, not to be authentic. Moreover, they countered the H . anafı̄
c
understanding of the H . adı̄th of Iyād
. , that whatever is characterized as
¯
the property of Allāh may only be spent in charity, by saying that all
property belongs to Allāh, since He (swt) said: “And give them some of
the property of Allāh which He has given you” [24:33].
In this regard, the non-H
. anafı̄s differed regarding the nature of ownership,
thus:
– The H . anbalı̄s ruled that found property becomes part of the finder’s
property at the end of the announcement period, and has the same
legal status as inheritance. They based this ruling on the H . adı̄th :
¯
“Otherwise, it is part of your property”, and he (pbuh) said: “then
spend it”. Thus, the finder is granted full ownership of the property
after the announcement period, otherwise the Prophet (pbuh) would
have specified the limits of his ownership.
– The Mālikı̄s ruled that the finder must renew his intent to own the
property, otherwise the transfer of ownership would be incomplete
since no offer was made by another person.
– The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the finder of lost property must make a verbal
¯
declaration of owning the property he found. They based this ruling
on the view that this is entitlement to own in an exchange, and thus
requires a declaration of the will to become an owner, in analogy to
the exercise of preemption rights.
All jurists, with the exception of the Z.āhirı̄s ruled that if the finder of lost
property ate it, he is liable for compensating its owner.32
Lost and found in the H

. aram
The majority of jurists ruled that the above mentioned rulings apply to lost
property found in Makkah or elsewhere. They based this ruling on the view
that lost properties are taken into a possession of trust, and thus its legal status
is not affected by the sacredness of the time or the place, in analogy to deposits.
Moreover, they argued the H . adı̄th s related to lost and found property did not
¯
distinguish between times and places.
¯ .
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.636 onwards).
In this regard, the H . adı̄th that explicitly mentions properties lost and found
¯
in Makkah aimed to dispel any misconceptions that lost and found properties
in Makkah need not be announced, thinking wrongly that there is no benefit in
making such announcements since most of the dwellers there are travelers who
are likely to have left.33
On the other hand, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled that lost and found prop-
¯
erties in the Masjid Al-H . arām in Makkah must be announced forever, since
nobody is entitled to claim ownership of such properties other than their origi-
nal owners. They based this ruling on the H . adı̄th narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and
¯ ¯
Muslim: “This city was made sacred by Allāh. Thus, the only one allowed to
pick-up property in it is one who seeks to find its owner”. Another narration
in Al-Bukhārı̄ stated the H . adı̄th as: “Picking up lost property in the H . aram is
¯ ¯
only allowed for those seeking to find its owner”. Thus, the Prophet (pbuh) did
distinguish between properties lost and found there and those lost and found
elsewhere. Moreover, since the announcement and attempt to find the owner is
not timed in this H . adı̄th , it is clear that the requirement in this case is to make
¯
the announcement perpetual, otherwise there would be no reason for making a
special statement regarding lost and found in the H . aram. In this regard, people
may leave the H . aram, but they tend to visit repeatedly, and they would thus
find their property safeguarded for them when they come back.
This is not a unique distinction for the H . aram. For instance, it is well known
that compensation for causing bodily harm in it (diyyah) is multiplied manifold.
. .
. anafı̄), vol.6, p.202), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.4, p.121), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5,
p.642).
Part XXIV
Missing Persons
683
Chapter 124
Missing Persons
This short part discusses the meaning of missing persons, how to classify a lost
person, and how the judge should treat his property and family, or declare him
dead, etc.1
124.1 Definition
A missing person is one who has been away from his home for a long time,
without his whereabouts being known. A person is only announced legally
missing if he has been gone sufficiently long that it is not known to be dead or
alive.
124.2 Declaration of life or death

A missing person is legally considered alive as far as he is concerned, but dead as
far as others are concerned. Thus, the H . anafı̄s establish for him all the negative
rights, and none of the positive. Hence, as far as he is concerned, his property
cannot be inherited, and his wife cannot remarry, as if he is alive. On the other
hand, as far as others are concerned, he cannot inherit any of his relatives or
anyone who named him in his will, as if he is dead. In such cases, his share of
the inheritance is suspended pending knowledge of whether he is alive or dead.
The H. anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s also ruled that the wife of a missing person is not
¯
allowed to void the marriage. Thus, they ruled that she must wait, and only be
allowed to remarry if she knows that her husband has died.
In contrast, ’Imām Mālik and ’Imām ’Ah.mad ruled that after four years
of absence, a judge may separate a woman from her absent husband. In this
case, she must wait the months of c iddah required for a widow, and then she is
. .
((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.3, p.360), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)B, fol.2, p.694 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.146), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.5, p.487 onwards).
685
686 CHAPTER 124. MISSING PERSONS
allowed to marry whomsoever she wishes. They based this ruling on a report
that c Umar (mAbpwh) ruled thus for missing husbands.
124.3 Guardianship rights for the judge

The H. anafı̄s listed the following rights over the property and family of a missing
person:
1. The judge must appoint a trustworthy person to safeguard the absent
person’s property, tend to it, invest it, and collect its revenues and legal
entitlements. Thus, this trustee is appointed in analogy to the trustee
over the property of a young boy or an insane person.
2. The judge should sell all the perishable properties of the absent person,
and safeguard the price collected thereof, since selling such properties is
a mean of safeguarding them. The deposits of the missing person should
be kept with the depositary for safeguarding, since the despositary acts
as the missing person’s agent in safeguarding his property.
3. If it is known that the missing person’s marriage was not dissolved, then
some of his property should be spent on his wife. Similarly, some of his
property should be spent on his small children, or older poor offspring.
The judge may only spend monetary property and food and clothes on the
missing person’s family. However, the judge may not spend his tradable
goods and real estate on the family, since spending out of such properties
is only possible if they are sold. In this regard, the judge is not allowed to
sell real estate and tradable goods on behalf the missing person. However,
the missing person’s father may sell his tradable properties on his behalf,
since a father has full guardianship over his son’s financial dealings, while
the judge does not. As for the real estate holdings of a missing person,
the father may only sell such properties with the judge’s permission.
124.4 Declaration of death

If the absent person is gone sufficiently long that it is very unlikely to be alive at
his age, he may be declared dead. Thus, his wives will be separated from him,
and his living heirs inherit his property. Moreover, he would thus not inherit
from anyone.
In this regard, there is no specific age that can be used universally as a
demarcation for declaring a missing person dead. Rather, life expectancy of
the missing person should be estimated based on the life expectancy of those of
his generation. In jurisprudence books, Al-H . asan ibn Ziyād reported that ’Abū
H. anı̄fa considered maximum life expectancy to be 120 years, but 90 years seems
more reasonable and less stringent.
Part XXV
Racing and Athletic

Competition
687
Chapter 125
Racing & Competition

(Al-Sabq)

The term al-sabq refers to racing in which the winner wins some prize. The
derivative term al-sibāq refers to horse or camel racing between men. Such racing
is permissible based on Sunnah and consensus. In this regard, it is narrated that
the Prophet (pbuh) raced two groups of horses.1 Moreover, Muslims have been
in consensus that such racing is allowed.
In this regard, racing for a prize is exempted from three prohibitions: gam-
bling, causing harm to animals without eating them, and a compensator being
himself the compensated, if each of the racing parties puts-up part of the prize
to be one.2
In this regard, racing without a prize are universally permitted with no
restrictions, just as other athletic competitions without prizes are allowed. Proof
for the legality of uncompensated racing is provided by the proof of c Ā’isha
¯
(mAbpwh) that she raced the Messenger (pbuh) and beat him, but he kept
racing her until she got tired and he beat her and said: “Now we’re even”.3
It is also narrated that Salamah ibn Al-’Akwac raced a man from the ’Ans.¯ar
and beat him in front of the Prophet (pbuh).4 It is also narrated that the
Prophet (pbuh) wrestled with Rukānah and beat him.5 Finally, it is narrated
that the Prophet (pbuh) passed by people who were lifting rocks in a strength
1 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ and Muslim on the authority of ibn c Umar, c.f. Al-Sanc ānı̄ (2nd
¯ .
printing, vol.4, p.70), ’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd (, p.358).
3 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Shāfic ı̄, Al-Nasā’ı̄, ’ibn Mājah, ibn Hibbān and
. ¯ .
Al-Bayhaqı̄ on the authority of c Urwah on the authority of his father on the authority of
c Ā’isha, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.91).
¯
4 Narrated ¯
by Muslim and ’Ah.mad, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, ibid.).
5 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd on the authority ¯
of Muh.ammad ibn c Aliy ibn Rukānah, c.f.
Al-Shawkānı̄ (, ibid.).
¯
689
690 CHAPTER 125. RACING & COMPETITION (AL-SABQ)
competition, and he (pbuh) did not admonish them. Thus racing and other
types of competition are legalized by analogy to those examples.
On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s ruled that racing or competing for a prize is
only allowed in four forms: racing with (i) arrows or spears, (ii) horses, donkeys,
and mules, (iii) camels, cows, etc., and (iv) on foot. They ruled thus based on
the view that the first three are tools of war that Muslims were ordered to learn
in the verse “Prepare for them what you can of force” [8:60], and the Prophet
(pbuh) explained force as power in throwing.6 Moreover, the Prophet (pbuh)
said: “Only three types of idle activity are allowed: training horses, playing
with one’s family, and archery; for they are good ways of spending time”.7
The above mentioned H . adı̄th s also legalize racing on foot and wrestling,
¯
and since they develop skills useful in war. In this regard, the Shāfic ı̄s said
¯
that physical and athletic competitions for a prize are permitted, since they
encourage people to prepare for war.
The non-H . anafı̄ jurists ruled that racing or competing for a reward is only
allowed for the use of swords and arrows, and horse or animal-back riding. They
based this ruling on the H . adı̄th : “No competition is allowed except in racing
¯
with animals, or competing with weapons”.8
In contrast, they ruled that foot-racing and wrestling for a reward are not
allowed, since such skills are not of much use in war. In this regard, ’Abū Dāwūd
narrated in his Marāsı̄l that the Prophet (pbuh) only wrestled with Rukānah
to illustrate his strength and convince him to accept Islam, which he did.9 .
However, as we have seen, all types of physical competition are allowed without
compensation.
125.2 Permissibility conditions

The jurists stipulated a number of conditions for the permissibility of competing
for a reward, including:
1. The competition must involve a skill that is useful in war. The H . anafı̄s
listed four eligible competitions: the use of weapons, horses and the like,
camels and the like, and racing on foot. The non-H . anafı̄s only accepted
competition for a prize in the first three categories.
6 Narrated by Muslim and ’Ahmad on the authority of c Uqbah ibn c Āmir, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄
. ¯
(, ibid.), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.4, p.71).
7 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd and Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of c Uqbah ibn c Āmir, c.f. the
¯
research of the hadiths of Tuh.fat Al-Fuqahā’ by Dr. Al-Zuh.aylı̄ and Prof. Al-Kittānı̄ (vol.3,
p.500).
8 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd and Al-Tirmidhı̄ who deemed it Hasan. Also narrated by Al-
¯ .
Nasā’ı̄, Al-Shāfic ı̄, Al-H
. ākim, ’ibn Mājah, ’Ah.mad, and ibn H. ibbān who deemed it valid along
¯
with ibn Al-Qat.t.ān. Also narrated by ibn Daqı̄q, on the authority of ’Abū ’Abū Hurayra,
ibid, Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.77), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.4, p.71), Al-Haythamı̄ (, vol.5,
¯ ¯
p.263).
9 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.6, p.206), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.412 on-
. . ¯ ¯
wards), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.311 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.651
¯ ¯ ¯
onwards; vol.9, p.172), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, p.209), Sharh. Al-Risālah (vol.2, p.417).
¯
125.2. PERMISSIBILITY CONDITIONS 691
2. The reward must be offered from one of the two competitors, or from a
third person, to avoid forbidden gambling. Thus, the prize is paid as a
reward to encourage people to learn the skills of war.
On the other hand, if the prize is paid from both sides (rihān; a type of
gambling) then a third person with equal skill or an equal horse (muh.allil)
is required to legalize the otherwise forbidden transaction. Thus, they
each pay a certain amount of money, and if the third person wins the race
or competition, he wins the full prize, and if either one of the original two
wins, he pays nothing and receives nothing. This ruling is based on the
H. adı̄th : “If a third horse is added to the two racing horses, and there is
¯
a chance of the third horse winning, then that is not gambling. However,
if the third horse is very unlikely to win, that is indeed gambling”.10 On
the other hand, if two raced so that the winner will get some money from
the other, that will be clearly a form of forbidden gambling.
3. It must be probable for each of the competitors to win, otherwise the

competition for a prize will not be allowed. In this case, the encouragement
to learn certain skills would not be realized, and the procedure would
merely amount to giving an amount of money to one party on a condition
that has no benefit.
4. The Shāfic ı̄s ruled that the reward must be known, and the beginning and
¯
end point of a race must be known.11
10 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd, and ’ibn Mājah on the authority of ’Abū Hurayra.
.
Some of the narrators deemed its chain of narrators to be weak, and other leading narrators
found major faults with the validity of making ’Abū Hurayra a narrator of this H . adı̄th . It
¯
was also narrated by Al-H . ākim and ibn H . azm, each of whom deemed it valid, and also by
Al-Bayhaqı̄, c.f. Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.8, p.80), Al-S.anc ānı̄ (2nd printing, vol.4, p.71), ’Ibn Daqı̄q
¯
Al-c Īd (, p.360).
11 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.313 onwards), ’Abū-
. ¯ . ¯ ¯
’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.415 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.8, p.654 onwards), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.157 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.2, pp.208-211).
Chapter 126
Al-munād.ala
This is a specific type of competition first considered by Al-Shāfic ı̄, according

¯
to Al-Muznı̄. We shall study its definition, types, legal status, and conditions.1

The term munād.ala means trying to beat another in competition, especially us-
ing a weapon. Together with other forms of athletic competitions, we have listed
in the previous chapter the verses and H . adı̄th s establishing its permissibility for
¯
male Muslims from the Qur’ān and Sunnah.
There are particular additional H . adı̄th s that urge Muslims to learn archery.
¯
Thus, ’Ah.mad and Al-Bukhārı̄ narrated on the authority of Salamah ibn Al-
¯
’Akwac that the Prophet (pbuh) passed by a group competing in archery near
the market. He (pbuh) said to them to learn this skill well, calling them “sons
of Ismac ı̄l” who was a good marksman, and said that he will compete with one
of the teams. When the other team decided to stop in order not to compete
against the Prophet (pbuh), he said that he will be on both teams.
’Ah.mad and the four compilers of Sunan also narrated on the authority of
c
Uqbah ibn c Āmir that the Prophet (pbuh) said: “Allāh admits three people
into paradise for each single arrow: the one who made it hoping it will be used
well, the one who prepares it for fighting in the way of Allāh, and the one who
actually throws it”. Then, he (pbuh) was narrated to have said: “Learn archery
and learn to ride horses, and learning archery is better”. We have reported
other H. adı̄th s in this regard in the previous chapter.
¯
In this regard, competition in throwing is allowed for arrows and spears, as
well as marksmanship with any instrument of war, as well as the use of swords.
On the other hand, competition for a prize using balls of various types, or nuts
thrown in a hole,2 or swimming, or chess, or balance games, or guessing games,
1 Al-Khatı̄bAl-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, pp.311-319).
¯ . ¯ ¯
2 Although Al-Māwirdı̄ stated in the H . āwı̄ that it was permissible, contrary to Al-Nawawı̄’s
opinion in Al-Rawd.ah.
693
694 CHAPTER 126. AL-MUNĀD
. ALA
or foot-racing, or any other activity that is not useful in war.

On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that all such competition is permissible
¯
if the winner does not win a prize.
Moreover, Al-Qurt.ubı̄ said that there is no disagreement about permissibility
of racing on any animals, or on foot, or on using all types of weapons, etc. His
proof was based on the H . adı̄th narrated by ’Ah.mad and ’Abū Dāwūd that the
¯
Prophet (pbuh) raced c Ā’isha on foot, and the narration of ’Ah.mad, Al-Bukhārı̄,
¯ ¯
and Muslim that Abyssinians played with spears in front of the Prophet (pbuh)
in his Masjid.
126.2 musābaqa and munād.ala bindingness

The accepted opinion among the Shāfic ı̄s is that both contracts are binding if
¯
a prize is stipulated. Thus, if two racing competitors agree with a third that
he would win some money from each of them if he wins, neither one is allowed
to void the contract. Moreover, neither party would be allowed to desist from
following through with the promised action. The only exception allowed is if
the two racers promising the reward agree with the third racer to void the first
contract and replace it with another.
126.3 Legal status

The Shāfic ı̄ notion of munād.ala is identical to the general concept of musābaqa.
¯
Thus, it has three permissible forms, and one forbidden as gambling. Thus, if
the compensation is (i) from the state treasury or a wealthy person, (ii) from
one of the competitors, or (iii) from two competitors to a worthy third, the
contract is valid. However, if the compensation is from the loser to the winner,
then that constitutes forbidden gambling.
126.4 Conditions of validity

There are five conditions for the validity of munād.ala:
1. The parameters of competition must be stated clearly (e.g. the archers,

the target and its size, the distance, the goal in terms of number and
accuracy of hits, etc.). Such parameters must be specified to make the
task similar to the parallel task in a war field.
2. All competitors must be using the same type of weapon. Thus, competi-
tion is not allowed with different weapons, even if the competitors agree
to that.
3. The nature of scoring must be specified, e.g. does the weapon have simply
to touch the target, at least scrape it, penetrate it, etc. If scoring is not
specified, simply touching the target should be counted as a score.
126.4. CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY 695
4. The prize must be specified in type and amount. In the cases where a
third party is required to avoid gambling, that is obviously stipulated as
a condition.
5. The order of competition must be specified, otherwise the contract is

deemed defective, since it may not be possible to tell who scored if they
shoot at the same time.
Part XXVI
Preemption (Al-Shufca)
¯
697
699
Preliminaries
In this part, we shall study preemption (al-shufc a) in eight chapters:

¯
1. Definition, proof, wisdom, cornerstone, components, instigating factor,
legal status, and characteristics.
2. Object of al-shufc a.
¯
3. Entitlement to al-shufc a, prioritization of competing preemption rights,
¯
absence of some preemptors, preemptors forfeiting their preemption right.
4. Legal status rulings for al-shufc a.

¯
5. Conditions of al-shufc a.
¯
6. Procedures for exercising preemption rights.
7. Growth, diminution, or dealings in objects of preemption.
8. Dropping preemption rights.

Chapter 127
Basics of Preemption
(al-shufca)
¯
127.1 Definition
The Arabic term for preemption is derived from the verb shafac a, meaning
¯
to combine, increase, or fortify. This term is used for preemption since the
preemptor combines what he owns by virtue of this right to his own property,
thus increasing and fortifying it. The term also alludes to the property becoming
part of a shafc (even), rather than witr (odd, or single), since one single property
¯
was owned prior to exercising the right, and it was combined with another after
its exercise.
The H . anafı̄s defined the term legally as the right to claim ownership of a sold
immovable object, thus taking it from the buyer (with or without his consent)
in exchange for its price and any expenses that he paid. It is legalized to avoid
the harm caused by introducing new unwanted partners or neighbors.1 Thus,
the H . anafı̄s establish preemption rights for partners and neighbors of the owner
of a property offered for sale.
The non-H . anafı̄ jurists defined preemption as a contract-language based en-
titlement of one partner to take the portion of joint immovable property ex-
changed by his partner, and pay its price or value in exchange. In other words,
it is a right established for an old partner over a new partner, to take ownership
of his share with or without his consent, with fair compensation.2 Thus, they
established preemption rights only for partners, and not for neighbors.
It is worthy of note that the four major Sunni schools restricted preemption
rights to immovable properties. In contrast, the Z.āhirı̄s allowed it also for
. .
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.239), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.2, p.106).
2 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.630), Al-Dardı̄r ¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.473), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.296), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.196), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
701
702 CHAPTER 127. BASICS OF PREEMPTION (AL-SHUFC A)
¯
movable objects, such as animals.3
127.2 Proof and reason for its legality

Proofs of the legality of preemption (al-shufc a) is taken from the Sunnah, and
¯
consensus:
• Proof from the Sunnah is established by numerous H
. adı̄ths:
¯
– It was narrated on the authority of Jābir (mAbpwh) that the Prophet
(pbuh) ruled that preemption rights are established for undivided
properties. If boundaries are delineated, and roads are paved and
delineated, then there is no preemption any more”.4 In another nar-
ration, this ruling was applied to land, homes, and orchards.
– In another H . adı̄th narrated by Jābir: “A neighbor is more worthy of
¯
buying his neighbor’s property. Thus, his decision must be awaited,
even if he is absent. This is legalized since they share a road.5
– Samurah narrated the H . adı̄th : “The neighbor of a house is more
¯
worthy of buying it than a third party”.6
– There is also a H . adı̄th by ’Abū Rāfic that states: “A neighbor has a
¯
first right to buying adjacent property”.7
• Moreover, proof is provided by consensus. In this regard, ’ibn Al-Mundhir
¯
said that all scholars are in agreement regarding preemption rights for
a partner who has not engaged in delineation of the boundaries of his
property, be it land, a real estate, or an orchard. In fact, there is only
one person (Al-’As.amm) who is known to have disagreed with this ruling.
The latter ruled that al-shufc a is not established legally, arguing that it
¯
causes harm to property owners. He based his dissenting ruling on the
view that buyers will be discouraged from trying to buy any property for
which preemption rights are established, which limits his ability to deal
in what he may buy, thus harming the owner. On the other hand, his
opinion was rejected, since it contradicts the well-established H . adı̄th s in
¯
this regard, as well as the consensus that was reached prior to his dissent.8
127.3 Wisdom in legalizing preemption

The reason preemption rights are established is to prevent the harm caused
to a property owner by introducing a permanent relationship of partnership or
3 ’Ibn H. azm (, vol.9, p.101 #1594).
4A valid H. adı̄th narrated by ’Ah.mad, Al-Bukh ¯
ārı̄, ’Abū Dāwūd, and ’ibn Mājah.
5 Narrated by ¯ ’Ah.mad and the four authors of Sunan.
6 Narrated by ’Ahmad, ’Abū Dāwūd, and Al-Tirmidhı̄ (who deemed it valid). Also narrated
. ¯
by Al-Bayhaqı̄, Al-T . abarānı̄ and Al-D
. iyā’. However, its chain of narration is questionable.
7 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄, c.f. Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st edition, (Hadı̄th), vol.4, pp.172-5),
¯ . . . ¯
Al-Shawkānı̄ (, vol.5, pp.331-6).
8¯’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.284).
127.4. CORNERSTONE, AND INSTIGATING FACTOR 703
neighborhood. This harm can be substantial if the new partner or neighbor is

feared to act poorly in using joint property (e.g. raising a high wall, lighting
a fire, blocking sunlight, stirring dust, etc.), especially if the new partner or
neighbor is an old adversary.
. anbalı̄s also found benefit in establishing pre-
¯
emption rights to avoid the transaction costs and harm caused by dividing
property between the selling partner and the potential preemptor. This type of
harm, as well as the previously mentioned types, are forbidden on the basis of
the H. adı̄th: “No harm is allowed in Islam”.
¯
Moreover, part of being a good partner or good neighbor is to protect the
benefits of one’s partner or neighbor, as the law dictates.9 Thus, the H . anafı̄s
ruled that such care to benefit others and not cause them any harm extends be-
yond partners, and includes neighbors (for whom they thus establish preemption
rights).
127.4 Cornerstone, and instigating factor

10
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the cornerstone of preemption is the preemptor’s tak-
ing a property from one of the contracting parties, when the instigating factor
and conditions of preemption apply. In this regard, the instigating factor for
preemption is partnership or neighborhood, and its condition is that the object
of sale and preemption is an immovable property (which may be only the upper
or lower portion of a building).
The Mālikı̄s stipulated four cornerstones for preemption:11 (i) a preemptor,
(ii) a buyer from whom the property is taken, (iii) an object of preemption, and
(iv) language implying verbally or otherwise that the preemptor has exercised
his right and taken the property.
12
. anbalı̄s enumerated three cornerstones for preemption:
¯
(i) a preemptor, (ii) one from whom the property is taken, and (iii) object of
preemption. Moreover, they ruled that valid language is required to establish
ownership for the preemptor (e.g. “I have taken ownership of this property”, or
“I have taken this property by exercising my preemption right”).
127.5 Legal status and characterization

13
The H. anafı̄s ruled that if the instigating factor for preemption is established,
the preemptor may request to exercise his right even years after the first sale,
9 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.239), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
. ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.296), ’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah ((H . anbalı̄)a, vol.2, p.120), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.284),
10 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.152 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), ibid.).
. .
11 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.630 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.253).
.
12 Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.296,300), ¯’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.297), Al-
¯ . ¯ ¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.158).
13 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.153 onwards), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), ibid.).
. .
704 CHAPTER 127. BASICS OF PREEMPTION (AL-SHUFC A)
¯
if he did not know of the sale until then. Moreover, taking a property based
on preemption rights is tantamount to a new purchase, thus establishing all the
rights for the preemptor that are established for a buyer, e.g. the inspection
and defect options to return the property to the seller.
Chapter 128
Object of Preemption
Muslims are in agreement that preemption rights are established in immovable

objects such as homes, land, orchards, wells, buildings, trees, etc. However,
there are differences over preemption rights for other properties.
The four major Sunni schools agreed that no preemption rights are estab-
lished for movable properties, such as animals, clothes, etc. They based this
ruling on the above mentioned H . adı̄th narrated by Muslim, Al-Nasā’ı̄, and ’Abū
¯
Dāwūd, which explicitly listed the establishment of preemption in land, homes,
and orchards. Moreover, jurists argued that al-shufc a was legalized to prevent
¯
permanent harm to partners (or, H . anafı̄s also argued, to neighbors). In this re-
gard, since movable properties are significantly more transient than immovable
ones, the harm of partnership in movable properties cannot be viewed as perma-
nent. The insistence on permanent harm is required for legalizing preemption,
since it allows taking a property against its buyer’s will, thus limiting the rights
of the seller and the buyer. Such severe limitation can only be justified if the
harm resulting from its removal is substantial and permanent.1
128.1 Vertical neighborhood

The H . anafı̄s ruled that immovable properties that are eligible for preemption
include the upstairs portion or the downstairs portion of a building.2 This
opinion seems to be the most reasonable.
Moreover, the H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption applies to divisible as well as
indivisible properties (e.g. a very small home, a mill, or a well). They based
this ruling on the instigating factor for preemption being the prevention of
. .
((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.239), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.12), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄ Al-
¯
Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.109), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.254), Al-Dardı̄r
¯
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.482), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.634), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.296), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.376), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, bol.5, p.287),
¯ ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, pp.153-5).
2 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.435).
. .
705
706 CHAPTER 128. OBJECT OF PREEMPTION
harm caused by partnership or neighborhood, whether the relevant property is

divisible or indivisible.
In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s ruled that preemption
¯
rights are not established for the upstairs portion of a properties. They based
this ruling on the view that the upstairs portion uses the roof of the lower floor
as a foundation. Then, they reasoned that since that roof is not permanently
fixed, the upper floor of a building must have the legal status rulings of movable
properties.3
Most non-H . anafı̄ jurists of the Mālikı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄, and H . anbalı̄ schools also
¯
disagreed with the H . anafı̄ ruling regarding divisibility of the property. Thus,
they ruled that preemption is only established for divisible properties, relying
on the above mentioned H . adı̄th of Jābir, which explicitly limited preemption for
¯
properties that were not in fact divided. While jurists disagreed over the legiti-
macy of using this H . adı̄th as proof that the property must be divisible, they in
¯
fact accepted the restriction of preemption to divisible properties. They ruled
this ruling on their view that the instigating factor for preemption is avoid-
ance of harm caused by dividing the property, thus applying only to divisible
properties.4
128.2 Easement rights

The H . anafı̄s ruled that the presence of easement rights (e.g. private watering
rights for animals and plants, c.f. Al-Majallah (item #1262), or passage right on
a private road) establishes preemption rights.5 On the other hand, they ruled
that watering rights from public water sources, or passage rights through public
roads, do not establish preemption rights. In this context, private roads are
defined as those that do not give access to the public roads.
Thus, for instance, they ruled that if a group of people shared ownership
of a river and watering rights thereof, then if a part of that land is sold, all
others with watering rights from the private river have preemption rights. On
the other hand, they ruled that if watering rights were designated from a public
river, then only the immediate neighbors have preemption rights. They ruled
similarly for public roads, whereby all who have passage rights have preemption
rights, otherwise only neighbors do.
The Mālikı̄s ruled in this regard6 that no preemption rights are established
for a shared private road if the house is divided among the partners. They based
this ruling on the fact that the road would in this case be attached to a divided
¯ . ¯ ¯ .
p.155).
4 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.255), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.476), Al-
¯ .
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.634), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.297), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.377), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.289).
c
5¯ ¯
Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.239 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5,
c
p.154), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.106).

¯
6 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.482), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.640), ’Ibn Rushd Al-
¯
H
128.3. PREEMPTION RIGHTS IN SHIPS 707
home, for which no preemption rights are established. Hence, the derivative
rights of the road cannot include preemption rights when the principal property
is not eligible for preemption. They ruled similarly for the common yard of a
divided house, for which no preemption rights are thus established.
The Shāfic ı̄s ruled7 that no preemption rights are established for passage
¯
ways from a sold home to the public road. On the other hand, they ruled
that preemption rights are established for internal passageways, in exchange for
their share of the price, provided that the homeowners have no other way of
accessing their property. However, if it is easy to create a direct access to the
public road for each partner, no preemption rights would be established. Those
rulings follow from the fact that preemption causes harm to the buyer, and
preemption was legalized to avoid a different harm of partnership. However,
one harm cannot be removed by introducing another harm, if there is another
way of removing it.
The H . anbalı̄s agreed with the Sh āfic ı̄ rulings8 that no preemption is estab-
¯
lished for a house or its private road if the house has direct access to a public
road. They based this ruling on the view that no partnership really exists in such
properties once the house has direct outside access. In addition, the H . anbalı̄s
ruled that no preemption rights are established, even if the road in question did
not have access to a public road, and the house had no other roads. They based
the latter ruling on the view that such preemption rights would harm the buyer,
since the house would continue to have no access to public roads.
On the other hand, if the house can have an easy access to the public road
built, they consider the characteristics of the passageway sold with the property:
• If the passageway was indivisible, then no preemption rights are estab-

lished.
• If it was divisible, then preemption rights must be established. This ruling

is based on the classification of the passageway as divisible jointly owned
land, which thus must have preemption rights established, to abide by the
above mentioned H . adı̄th .
¯
128.3 Preemption rights in ships

Jurists of all school are in agreement9 that ships are movable properties, and
thus are not eligible for preemption rights. As a possible exception, Al-Kāsānı̄
reported10 that ’Imām Mālik ruled that ships are used for residence, and thus
7 Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.145), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.298).
8 Al-Buhūtı̄ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.154), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.290).
9c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.190), ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . . ¯ ¯
vol.1, p.376), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.296), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯ ¯ ¯
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.155).
10 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.12). However, the author (Dr. Al-Zuhaylı̄) said that he could
. .
not find in any Mālikı̄ reference an opinion supporting preemption rights in ships. Indeed, the
Mālikı̄ jurist ’Ibn c Abdulsalām said that what some H . anafı̄s reported regarding the opinion
of ’Imām Mālik in this regard is false, c.f. Sharh. Al-Tannūkhı̄ lirisālat Al-Qayruwānı̄ (vol.2,
¯ ¯
708 CHAPTER 128. OBJECT OF PREEMPTION
are eligible for preemption in analogy to other immovable residences. However,

research by ’Ibn c Abdulsalām has shown that this claim is false. Thus, we can
claim that all four Sunni schools agree that preemption is not established for
ships.
128.4 Preemption in crops, fruits, and trees

The non-Mālikı̄ jurists ruled11 that preemption is not established for immov-
able properties (e.g. buildings or trees) that are sold separately from the land.
However, they ruled that if such properties are sold as attachments to the land,
then preemption must be established thus.12
In this regard, most Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that un-picked fruits may be attached
¯
in sales to the land, in analogy to buildings and trees. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s
ruled that only trees and buildings may be attached to the land, and have
preemption established accordingly. Thus, they excluded crops and fruits from
attachment to the land, since they do not pass the permanence criterion for
establishing preemption.
The Mālikı̄s allowed13 preemption in buildings and trees, even if sold sep-
arately from the land. They ruled thus on the basis of classifying buildings
and trees as immovable properties, since they are attached to the land. On the
other hand, they ruled that no preemption is established for animals or tradable
movables, unless they are sold in conjunction with the land.
For instance, they ruled that if trees or buildings were planted or built on
a waqf land while it was leased to multiple parties, on condition that those
additions belong to the lessees, then if one of them sells his share, each other
lessee has a preemption right.
Moreover, the Mālikı̄s allowed preemption in fruits, vegetables, and similar
plants that stay in the land for some time.14 Thus, if one partner in such
fruits or vegetables sells his share separately from the land, the other partner
is entitled to take it through preemption. In this regard, the Mālikı̄s ruled that
for fruits to be taken separately through preemption, they must exist separately
from the tree at the time of purchase.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s did not permit preemption in crops, or
plants that are pulled with their roots from the ground (e.g. carrots, onions,
etc.). Thus, if such plants are sold together with the land, preemption will only
p.193).
11 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.435), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.296
. ¯ . ¯ ¯
onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.155).
12 Al-Majallah (item #1019) stated that preemption is not allowed for trees and buildings
on land established as a waqf.

13 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.479 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.634,638-9),
’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.254 onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.286), Sharh.
¯ ¯
Al-Risālah (vol.2, p.192).
14 Mālik said regarding preemption in fruits that he knew of no precedent of allowing it, but
that he allowed it based on juristic approbation, Sharh. Al-Tannūkhı̄ lirisālat Al-Qayruwānı̄

¯ ¯
(vol.2, p.192).
128.4. PREEMPTION IN CROPS, FRUITS, AND TREES 709
be established for the land, in exchange for its share of the price, and not for
the plants.
In contrast, the Z.āhirı̄s expanded the range of preemption rights significantly
beyond all other schools. Thus, they allowed it for all objects of sale, movable
or immovable, and attached or unattached to an immovable property. They
also did not differentiate in their permission between divisible and indivisible
properties.15
15 ’Ibn H
. azm (, vol.9, p.101 #1594).
Chapter 129
The Preemptor
129.1 Definition
We have seen that the H . anafı̄s ruled that a preemptor may be a partner or a
neighbor, while the non-H . anafı̄s ruled that only a partner may be a preemptor.
In what follows, we shall discuss this distinction in some detail.
1
The H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption rights are established for a partner in
the object of sale itself, or in the easement rights associated with it (e.g. wa-
tering rights from a private river and right of passage through a private road).
Moreover, they ruled that the immediate neighbor has a preemption right to the
object of sale, even if his house-door opened to a different road. In this regard,
an adjacent neighbor is considered an immediate neighbor whether he has only
a one-foot common wall, or three sides of adjacency. In this regard, they ruled
that one who co-owns a beam in the wall of a building is deemed a neighbor and
not partnership in the building. This follows from the fact that preemption is
established for immovable properties, and wood is movable. Finally, they ruled
that preemption rights are established for Muslims as well as respected religious
minorities (i.e. Jews and Christians), since the proofs legalizing preemption are
general, and since all such individuals are subject to the same instigating factors
and reasons for establishing preemption.
Thus, they refer to the above mentioned general H . adı̄th s legalizing preemp-
¯
tion for neighbors, including: “The neighbor of a house is more worthy of buy-
ing the neighboring property”,2 “The neighbor of a house is more worthy of the
house and land of his neighbor”,3 and “A neighbor is more entitled to preemp-
1 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.4), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.406,414,436), Al-
. .
Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.239-241), Abd Al-Gh
¯
vol.2, p.106), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.155).
2 Narrated by Al-Bukhārı̄ on the authority of ’Abū Rāfic , c.f. Al-Hāfiz Al-Zaylac ı̄ (1st
¯ . .
edition, (H . adı̄th), vol.4, p.174).
3 Narrated ¯ by ’Abū Dāwūd, Al-Tirmidhı̄, Al-Nasā’ı̄, ’Ah.mad, Al-T
¯ . abarānı̄, ibn ’Abı̄
Shaybah, and ibn H . ibbān. It was deemed by Al-Tirmidh ı̄ to be a H . adı̄th Hasan S . ah.ı̄h. on
¯ ¯ ¯ .c
the authority of Al-H . asan on the authority of Samurah, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition,
(H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.172).
¯
711
712 CHAPTER 129. THE PREEMPTOR
tion”.4 Moreover, they inferred from those H . adı̄th s that the instigating factor
¯
for establishing preemption is the prevention of permanent harm caused by hav-
ing bad neighbors, as well as bad partners, thus establishing preemption in both
cases to prevent harm.
5
The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption is only established for a partner,
and only in undivided property offered for sale. Thus, they ruled that a partner
who received his share has no preemption rights, a partner has no preemption
rights for the easement rights of sold property, and neighbors have no preemption
rights.
The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and Z.āhirı̄s ruled in agreement with the H . anafı̄s that
¯
a non-Muslim has preemption rights over his Muslim partner. In contrast, the
H. anbalı̄s ruled that non-Muslims do not have preemption rights over Muslim
sales of immovable property, based on the H . adı̄th : “No preemption rights are
¯
established for Christians”.6 They used the specific instance mentioned in this
H. adı̄th to infer their more general ruling. Moreover, they reasoned that pre-
¯
emption rights for a property are established in analogy to adding more floors
over a building, which a non-Muslim is not allowed to do to a Muslim, since
the partnership would harm the latter. In this regard, the non-H . anbalı̄ ruling
seems to be more appropriate, since the H . adı̄th used as proof by the H . anbalı̄s
¯
is weak.
The non-H . anbalı̄ jurists also agreed that preemption rights are established
for one non-Muslim over another, again relying on the generality of the above
listed H . adı̄ths, as well as the fact that non-Muslims are equal to Muslims in debts
¯
and sanctity of their property. Moreover, preemption rights are established for
heretics that were legally deemed to still be Muslims. On the other, hand the
H. anbalı̄s ruled that heretics who were legally deemed non-Muslims have no
preemption rights over Muslims, while the non-H . anbalı̄s maintained that they
do.7
The non-H . anafı̄s argued against establishing preemption rights for neighbors,
based on the above mentioned H . adı̄th of Jābir: “The Prophet (pbuh) ruled that
¯
preemption is established for all undivided properties. Thus, if boundaries are
delineated, and roads are paved, no preemption is allowed”, and the H . adı̄th of
¯
Sac ı̄d ibn Al-Musayyab: “If land is divided and delineated, then there is no
preemption thereof”.8 Thus, they reasoned that if preemption is not allowed for
a partner who took his share and thus became a neighbor, it certainly should not
4 Narrated by Al-Tirmidhı̄ on the authority of Jābir.
5 ’Ibn ¯
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.253), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.473), Al-
¯
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.631), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.297), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.377 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.285 onwards,357), Al-
¯ ¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, pp.149,182), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.286), ’Ibn H. azm
(, vol.9, p.115 #1598).
6 Narrated by Al-Dāraqutnı̄ in Kitāb Al-c Ilal on the authority of ’Anas and ’Abū Bakr
.
(mAbpwt). However, he and ibn c Udayy deemed its chain of narration to be weak, due to
including Bābil ibn Najı̄h..
7 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.358 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.4, p.183).
.
8 Narrated by ’Abū Dāwūd, and Mālik, as a Hadı̄th mursal on the authority of ’Abū Salamah
. ¯
ibn c Abdulrah.mān.
129.2. PRIORITIZING PREEMPTION RIGHTS 713
apply to one who has merely been a neighbor and never a partner. Moreover,
they reasoned, since the default ruling is impermissibility of putting restrictions
on trading, preemption rights are established as an exception, which is thus
limited to the cases mentioned in the H . adı̄th.
c ¯
As for the H . adı̄th of ’Abū Rāfi that “a neighbor is more worthy of the
¯
neighboring property”, the non-H . anafı̄s argued that this H. adı̄th is not explicitly
¯
regarding preemption rights. Indeed, it is conceivable that what is meant by the
H. adı̄th is to encourage neighbors to visit their neighbors and be good to them.
¯
Moreover, the H . adı̄th of Jābir is much more specific and explicit, and thus
¯
should be given priority over the one of ’Abū Rāfic . All the other H . adı̄th s that
¯
the H . anafı̄s relied on to establish preemption for neighbors have weak links in
their chains of narration. For instance, the H . adı̄th of Samurah is narrated by Al-
¯
H. asan, who was only known to have narrated one other H . adı̄th regarding c aqı̄qah
¯
(feeding people to celebrate a newborn baby). Thus, the non-H . anafı̄s ruled
that the term for neighbor in the H . adı̄th s of preemption should be understood
¯
to mean partner. This opinion seems to be the most appropriate, since the
default legal ruling is freedom in transactions, and preemption causes many
complications, and thus must only be established for partners.
’Ibn Al-Qayyim chose a compromise between the H . anafı̄ and non-H . anafı̄
positions. Thus, he ruled that preemption is established for a neighbor only if
he shares any easement rights with his neighbor, which is a type of partnership.9
Al-Shawkānı̄ and some Shāfic ı̄ jurists also found this compromise appealing,
¯ ¯
relying on the wording in the H . adı̄th of Jābir: “If they share a common road”.10
¯
129.2 Prioritizing preemption rights

11
The H
. anafı̄s ruled that the priority order of preemption rights is as follows:
1. A partner in the object of sale.
2. A partner in easement rights, i.e. an ex-partner who took his share of the
property and continues to be a partner in easement rights (e.g. private
watering or passage).
3. An immediate (adjacent) neighbor.
For the second category:
• They did not distinguish between preemption rights established to part-

ners in easement rights on the basis of distance.
9 ’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah ((H . anbalı̄)a, vol.2, pp.123-132).
10 Al-Shawkānı̄
(, vol.5, p.333).
11 ’Ibn¯Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7,pp.406,412 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.154
. .
onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.8-9), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
p.239), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.106 onwards), Al-Majallah (item
¯
#1008).
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa and Muh.ammad defined a private source of water as a small

river too small for ships.12 Moreover, all H. anafı̄ scholars agreed that a
river is deemed small if the number of partners in watering rights is small,
where some defined a small number to be less than forty, others defined
it as less than five-hundred, and later jurists ruled that this has to be
decided separately for each time and place.
• A private road is defined to be one that is restricted to a specific group,

in which case all who have passage rights thereof have preemption rights.
The H . anafı̄s based the above listed prioritization of preemption rights on

the H. adı̄th : “A full partner has priority over one with common ownership,
¯
and the latter has priority over a preemptor”.13 They also reasoned that the
order is chosen based on the strength of the underlying reason, in terms of the
strength of the potential preemptor’s connection to the property (in terms of
co-ownership, easement rights, or neighborhood). The H . anafı̄s ruled that if
multiple preemptors exist and have the same priority, then the property must
be divided among them, as we shall see briefly.
129.2.1 Allocation among multiple preemptors

1. Different priority-ranks
If the multiple preemptors had different priority ranks, then the one with the
highest priority rank is given the option of preempting the sale, c.f. Al-Majallah
(item#1009). Thus, if one of the preemptors is a partner, he would be given the
priority, followed by a partner in easement rights, followed by a neighbor. In
this regard, a partner in a wall is deemed equivalent to a partner in the entire
house, whereas a partner in wood beams on his neighbor’s house is considered
an adjacent or immediate neighbor, and not a partner, c.f. Al-Majallah (item
#1012). Moreover, upstairs neighbors and downstairs neighbors are considered
immediate neighbors, c.f. Al-Majallah (item #1011).
With regards to easement rights, watering rights are given priority over
passage rights, c.f. Al-Majallah (item #1016). Moreover, if someone entitled
to a watering or passage right sells his land alone and not the easement right,
partners in easement rights are not given preemption rights, c.f. Al-Majallah
(item #1015). Finally, if two partners share the same general category, more
specific easement rights (e.g. drinking rights from a stream) are given priority
over more general ones (e.g. general watering rights), c.f. Al-Majallah (item
#1014).
12 ’Abū Yūsuf defined a private source of water as a river barely large enough to water two
or three farms, c.f. c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.107).
¯
13 Al-Zaylac ı̄ found this Hadı̄th
. to be strange, and ’ibn Al-Jawziyy said that it had no basis.
¯
Shurayh. said: “A partner has priority over a neighbor, and a neighbor has priority over
¯
others”. ’Ibrāhı̄m Al-Nakhc ı̄ said: “A partner has fist priority in preemption. If there is
¯
no partner, then preemption is established for the neighbor. A partner has priority over a
preemptor, and a preemptor has priority over all others”, c.f. Al-H . āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄ (1st edition,
c
(H. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.176).

¯
129.2. PRIORITIZING PREEMPTION RIGHTS 715
2. Equal priority-ranks
If all preemptors had the same priority-ranking, e.g. if they were all partners
in the sold property, the property should be divided among all preemptors who
14 15
wish to exercise their rights. In this case, the H . anafı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s ruled that
all willing partners should be given equal shares, irrespective to their ownership
shares. This ruling is based on the view that the partners are thus equal in
the instigating factor for preemption rights, since they are equal in the type of
ownership rights.
16
The other jurists (excluding H . anafı̄s and Z.āhirı̄s) ruled that the property
should be divided among the willing preemptors in proportion to their ownership
shares. They based this ruling on the view that preemption is a right based
on ownership, and thus must be exercised in proportion to ownership shares.
This ruling is analogous to entitlements to fruits, output, or rents resulting
from ownership, and profits in corporations, which are determined in proportion
to ownership. Moreover, the jurists argued that preemption was legalized to
prevent harm to the owners, and each owner’s potential harm is proportional to
his ownership share.
The Mālikı̄s ruled further17 that more specific partnerships (which are asso-
ciated to specific shares in the property) should be given priority over others.
Thus, if a property owner dies, and is inherited by two grandmothers, two
wives, and two sisters, and one of them sold her share, only the heir sharing
in that share (i.e. of equal entitlement) is given a preemption right. More
specifically, if the two partners in a share were a paternal aunt and a full-sister,
or a paternal niece with a daughter, then if the sister or daughter sold her
share, the aunt or niece may exercise her preemption right with priority over
male heirs.
Moreover, they ruled that the closer association to the share of the seller gets
priority over the more general (e.g. residual inheritors who are not partners in
specific inheritance shares). For instance, if a man dies and leaves behind one
or more daughters, and two brothers or two paternal uncles, then if one of the
brothers sells his share, preemption rights are established for the daughters, and
the other brother or uncle have no exclusive right for preemption.
In another example, if a man left behind three daughters, and one of them
died and left behind two daughters, then if one of the sisters of the deceased
daughter dies and her other sister sold her share, the daughters of the deceases
daughter have preemption rights. This ruling is based on the view that descen-
dants have closer and stronger ties than other relationships.
. .
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.116), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.154), ’Ibn Al-
¯
Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.414), Al-Majallah (item #1013).
15 ’Ibn Hazm (, vol.9, p.120 #1609).
.
16 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.646), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.486 onwards), ’Ibn
Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.257), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.287), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.305), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.381; vol.5, p.335), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ ¯ ¯
17 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.492), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.650 onwards).
Similarly, male heirs have preemption rights over individuals named in a will
and given a share in immovable property inheritance, to the exclusion of others
named in the will. Moreover, heirs are always given priority over non-relatives,
unless the heirs willingly drop their preemption right.
129.3 Absent preemptors

18
The H . anafı̄s ruled that if some of the preemptors were present, and others
were absent, at the time of sale, then if the present preemptors demand to
exercise their right, they should be allowed to do so. They based this ruling on
the view that the present preemptor is thus known to wish to exercise his right,
while the absent preemptor’s wishes can only be guessed. Thus, exercise of the
present preemptor’s right should not be deferred, since certain rights should not
be postponed to accommodate probable ones.
If the absent preemptor later arrives and demands exercising his right, then:
• If he has the same priority rank as the present preemptor, the first division
is voided, and the property is re-divided to allow the two preemptors to
share it.
• If the absent preemptor had a different rank-ordering from the present

one (this scenario is only possible within the H
. anafı̄ framework), then the
preemptor with the higher ranking is given the property and the other one
is excluded.
The Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, H

. anbalı̄s, and Z.āhirı̄s agreed with the H
. anafı̄ that
¯
absent preemptors are still granted preemption rights.19 They based this ruling
on the generality of the Prophet’s (pbuh) that “preemption is established in
undivided properties”. Moreover, they reasoned, preemption rights are financial
rights which are established for absent parties, in analogy to inheritance. In this
regard, the absent partner’s preemption right is established at the time he finds
out about the sale, in analogy to present preemptors whose rights are established
instantly. In this regard, any harm caused to the buyer who loses the property
is remedied by the value that the preemptor pays him.
129.4 Voluntary dropping of preemption rights

20
The H
. anafı̄s ruled that if some preemptors voluntarily drop their rights:
18 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.6), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.156), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄
. . .
¯ . ¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.305 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.164), ’Ibn H. azm
(, vol.9, p.115 #1598), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.644).
. .
129.4. VOLUNTARY DROPPING OF PREEMPTION RIGHTS 717
1. If the right is dropped prior of legal determination of their right to pre-

emption, they thus exclude themselves from preemption considerations,
and the remaining preemptors are allowed to take the entire object of
preemption.
2. If a preemptor dropped his right after he was assigned a portion of the

property, remaining preemptors are not allowed to take his share. This
ruling is based on the view that assignment of property shares separates
the ownership of partners, and thus the remaining preemptors have no
partnerships in the dropped share.
The Mālikı̄s, H
. anbalı̄s, and most of the Sh āfic ı̄s ruled21 that the preemption
¯
right of any preemptor who drops it is dropped like all other financial rights.
Thus, other preemptors have the option of taking the entire object of preemp-
tion, or leaving it all; but they are not allowed to take only their share or only
his share. This ruling follows form the view that the dropper of his preemption
right thus dropped it all (in analogy to dropping the right to exacting physical
punishment – qiyās), to avoid partitioning the deal for the buyer. ’Ibn Al-
Mundhir reported that all scholarly opinions he knew agreed with this ruling,
¯
since dividing the deal for the buyer is harmful for him, and harm cannot be
removed by introducing another harm.
21 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.490), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.306), Al-
¯ . ¯ ¯
Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.164), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.338).
Chapter 130
Legal Status Rulings
130.1 Establishment of ownership

1
The H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption rights are established after any sale, in-
cluding defective sales that were not voided for some reason, or sales including
a buyer-option. On the other hand, they ruled that no preemption right is es-
tablished by the mere inception of a defective sale, since a defective sale must
be legally voided. In this regard, establishing a preemption right after such
a defective sale would be accepting of its defectiveness, which is not allowed.
However, if the voiding is dropped, e.g. through dealing in the purchased prop-
erty or building on it, then the impediment to establishing preemption rights
would thus vanish. Moreover, they ruled that no preemption is established in
sales with seller-options, since such options preserve the seller’s ownership. In
contrast, buyer-options do not preserve seller-ownership, and thus may serve as
grounds for establishing preemption rights.
Moreover, they ruled that a preemptor must indicate his wish to exercise
his preemption right promptly. The preemption is then established upon sec-
ond statement in front of witnesses. Finally, preemption results in transfer of
ownership to the preemptor either by mutual consent, or by court order.
In other words, the preemptor can own the property in one of two ways:
(i) the buyer may give it to him voluntarily, or (ii) through a court order,
even before taking possession of the property. This ruling is based on the fact
that the property belongs to the buyer upon conclusion of the sale, and thus
ownership cannot be transferred to the preemptor without mutual consent or a
court order, in analogy to the ruling for returned gifts. The court order clause
is permitted since the ruler has general guardianship which allows him to rule
for such transfers of property rights.
Consequently, the preemptor is not granted any ownership rights except
. .
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.242,254), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
Zaylac ı̄ ((H c
. anafı̄), vol.4, p.154),
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, pp.107,114), Al-Majallah (items #1036,1038).
¯ .
719
720 CHAPTER 130. LEGAL STATUS RULINGS
through one of the above mentioned venues. Thus, the H . anafı̄s ruled that
properties pending preemption are not inherited if the preemptor died prior to
establishing ownership. Moreover, they ruled that if an owner sold his house
while using it for a claim to preempt the sale of the neighboring house, his
preemption is voided.
All schools agree about ownership being established through the above men-
tioned two venues.2 On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s ruled that ownership
through preemption may be established in three ways: (i) through a court
order, (ii) payment of the price to the buyer, (iii) declaring before witnesses
that he took the property through preemption, even in the buyer’s absence.
The non-H . anafı̄s do not recognize preemption rights in any defective sales,
since they equate defectiveness and invalidity in that case. However, the Mālikı̄s
made an exception for the case where the buyer in a defective sale re-sold the
object in a valid sale, in which case the preemptor is allowed to take it from the
second buyer in exchange for the price he paid. Moreover, they ruled that if the
property was substantially changed in the possession of a buyer in a defective
sale, the preemptor may take the property in exchange for its value if there is
agreement about the defectiveness, and the price if there is disagreement thereof.
Note that owning an immovable property through preemption is tantamount
to a new purchase. Thus, the preemptor has the right of returning the property
based on defect and inspection options, as in other sales contracts.3 In this
regard, the preemptor gains ownership of whatever the buyer in the preempted
sale had owned accordingly, either independently or as part of owning another
property (e.g. buildings, crops, trees, and fruits). The H . anafı̄ based the latter
ruling on juristic approbation, since ownership rights to an immovable property
automatically apply to all attached movable properties, by matching the legal
status of the branch to that of the root.4
130.2 Compensation
130.2.1 The Price to be paid
Jurists are in agreement that a preemptor takes the property in exchange for
the price or compensation paid by the buyer. Thus, the preemptor must make
a payment of the genus and amount of the price, and not the property itself,5 ,
based on the H . adı̄th of Jābir’s statement: “Then he is more worthy of paying
¯
2 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.640,647), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.300),
¯ . ¯ ¯
Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.177), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.346 onwards),
3 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.24), Al-Majallah (item #1037), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurispru-
. .
dence), vol.5, p.246 onwards).
4 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.27 onwards).
.
. .
vol.5, p.249), Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.2, pp.114-5), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B,
¯
vol.3, pp.635,637), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.301), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄
c
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.378 onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.322), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯
(H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.177), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H
¯
130.2. COMPENSATION 721
its price”.6 The preemptor must also compensate the buyer for any other costs
borne, e.g. brokerage and documentation fees.
If the price of the property was non-fungible, then the preemptor should
take the property in exchange for its value (since it is the compensation in loans
and destruction of property) assessed at the time the contract becomes binding
and preemption is established.
If two houses were traded for one another, and there was only one preemptor
for both properties, he may thus take each of them in exchange for the value
of the other used as its compensation. If there are two different preemptors for
the two exchanged properties, each of them may take the property for which he
had preemption rights in exchange for the value of the other property.
If a non-Muslim bought a house in exchange for wine or a pig, and the
preemptor was also non-Muslim, he may take the house for the equivalent of
the wine (fungible), or the value of the pig (non-fungible). In contrast, the non-
H. anbalı̄s ruled that a Muslim preemptor in this case would take the property
in exchange for the value of the wine or the pig.
In those cases, jurists are in agreement that the value of the price is deter-
mined on the day of sale, not the day of taking the property by preemption.
This ruling is based on the view that the day of the sale is the day of establishing
preemption rights and liability for the price.
In contrast, the H. anbalı̄s ruled that no preemption is possible for properties
purchased by a non-Muslim and paid for in wine or pigs, since those are non-
properties.7
130.2.2 Reduction or increase in the price

8
The H . anafı̄s ruled that if the seller reduces the price of the property before
or after it is taken by preemption, the preemptor is entitled to the same dis-
count. This ruling follows from appending the discount to the original sales
contract, and thus affects the preemptor’s right since he is thus entitled to take
the property in exchange for its discounted price.
On the other hand, if the seller drops the entire price liability on the buyer,
the preemptor would still be responsible for the full price. This follows from
the fact that dropping liability for the entire price cannot be appended to the
sales contract, which thus becomes a gift. Non-H . anafı̄ jurists agreed with the
H. anafı̄s on this ruling.
If the buyer increases the price, or renews the sales contract with a higher
price, the preemptor is not required to pay the higher price. This follows from
the fact that the higher price would be harmful to him, after having been entitled
to take the property at the original lower price. In contrast, the discount was
allowed to affect the preemptor liability since it benefited him.
6 Narrated by ’Abū ’Ish.āq Al-Jūzjānı̄ in Al-Mutarjam.
7 Al-Buhūtı̄(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.152).
8 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.14, p.107), Abd Al-Gh anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H. anafı̄),
c
¯ ¯
vol.2, p.115 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.427), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurispru-
dence), vol.5, p.248 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.27).
9
. anbalı̄s ruled in this case that the preemptor is bound
¯
by any increase or discount in the price during the option period (i.e. before the
contract becomes binding). This follows from the fact that the preemptor’s right
is only established after the contract is concluded, and all options are dropped.
Thus, said changes would be appended to the contract, and affect the price that
the preemptor would have to pay. On the other hand, changes in price after
the contract is binding cannot be appended to the contract, and do not affect
the preemptor’s right. In this regard, increases in price after the option period
elapses are deemed to be gifts, and subject to gift conditions.
130.2.3 Price deferment

All H. anafı̄s other than Zufar, and most Sh āfic ı̄s according to the new Shāfic ı̄
10 ¯ ¯
opinions ruled that if the price, or part thereof, is deferred, the preemptor
does not get to benefit from this deferment offered to the buyer. In this case,
the preemptor is given the option of taking the property and paying the price
immediately, or waiting until the term of deferment expires to take the property
and pay the price, without dropping his preemption right. In this case, however,
the preemptor must indicate his intention to exercise the preemption right at
the time of sale, otherwise he would lose it. The latter ruling follows from the
fact that the preemption right is established immediately upon conclusion of
the sales contract. However, the preemptor is allowed to establish that right,
and then wait to exercise it at the end of the price deferment period.
On the other hand, the preemptor is not allowed to take the property and
pay its deferred price, since the purpose of preemption is not to change the
contract as it is from the buyer to the preemptor. Instead, preemption is a
voiding of the contract of sale to the buyer, and replacing it with a sale to the
preemptor.
In contrast, Zufar ruled that the preemptor in this case has the right to
benefit from the term of deferment. He reasoned that deferment in this case is
a characteristic of the price paid by the buyer, and preemption dictates taking
the property in exchange for the price with all its characteristics.
11
The Mālikı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that the preemptor is allowed to benefit
from the stipulated price deferment given to the buyer, provided that he is rich
and trustworthy, or guaranteed by one who is. Otherwise, they ruled that the
preemptor must pay the price immediately to protect the buyer’s interests. This
opinion seems to be the most appropriate one, since it protects the interest of
the buyer who lost the contract due to preemption.
¯ . ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4,p.177).
10 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.103), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.24,27),
¯ . .
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.428), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,p.249), Al-
Ramlı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.150), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.2, p.301), ’Ibn Hubayrah
c c
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
((H. anbalı̄), p.277).
11 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.637), ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.256), ’Ibn
¯ .
130.2. COMPENSATION 723
130.2.4 Predication on price payment

12
Most H . anafı̄s, the Sh āfic ı̄s, the Mālikı̄s, and the H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the pre-
¯
emption is established without a court order, price payment, or presence of the
buyer. They ruled thus since the preemption right is established immediately
upon the property was sold to another, to protect the preemptor. Thus, it is
as though the seller actually sold the property to the preemptor, and owning a
property by virtue of such a sale is not predicated upon price payment.
However, the Mālikı̄s ruled that if the preemptor indicated his intention
to take the property in preemption, he is given three days to bring the price,
otherwise his preemption is voided.
Moreover, Muh.ammad ibn Al-H . asan ruled that a judge may only rule that
the property is taken through preemption when the preemptor brings the price,
to protect the buyer. Indeed, the preemptor may be bankrupt, and thus the
judge should give him two or three days to produce the price. This ruling is
based on the view that prevention of harm to the preemptor cannot be removed
by harming the buyer. However, this scenario that Muh.ammad feared can be
avoided, as ’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf argued, by allowing the buyer to keep
the property in his possession until the preemptor pays the price.
Al-Kāsānı̄ chose a compromise between the two positions, arguing that the
difference in opinion is only semantic. Indeed, he reasoned, all jurists agreed
that the judge may establish preemption prior to price payment, since he found
Muh.ammad’s language to indicate that the judge should take care in this case,
but may certainly declare preemption without price payment.
130.2.5 Entitlement of the preempted property

13
The H. anafı̄s ruled that if the preemptor took the property from the buyer and
paid him the price, and then the property was found to belong to another, the
buyer would be responsible to compensate the preemptor for the price. This
ruling is based on the view that the buyer thus received that price when the
property was transferred to the preemptor. This seems to be the most reasonable
opinion.
On the other hand, the seller may be made responsible for compensating the
preemptor, since the seller received the price from the buyer before preemption
and further transfer of property.
14
. anbalı̄s ruled that if the preemptor took the
¯
property and found a defect therein, he is thus entitled to take back the price or
12 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.119), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence),
¯ . .
vol.5, p.245), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.422), Abd Al-Gh
¯
vol.2, p.112), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.24 onwards), Al-Kh atı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄),
¯ . ¯ ¯
vol.2, p.300), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.647-9), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4,
p.177).
13 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.433), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.160), c Abd Al-
. .
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.119), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.30).
¯14
Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.493), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.383), ’Ibn
¯ ¯
Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.344 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.182).
a compensation from the buyer, and the buyer may in turn seek compensation
from the seller. This ruling follows from the view that the preemptor takes
the property from the buyer based on his ownership of it, and thus must seek
compensation from him for defects as if he was the seller.
130.2.6 Disagreements over price

The majority of jurists of all schools ruled15 that if the buyer and the preemptor
disagree over the price for which the property was purchased, the buyer’s claim
is accepted if supported by his oath. This ruling follows from the view that the
buyer is more informed regarding the price he paid. Moreover, the preemptor
is claiming a lower price, and the buyer is denying that claim, and thus his
counterclaim is accepted if supported by his oath.
However, the Mālikı̄s restricted this acceptability of the buyer’s claimed
price to the case where this price is within the reasonable range of assessments.
Otherwise, they ruled that the preemptor’s claimed price will be accepted if it
is closer to the range of professional assessments.
If neither claimed price is within the reasonable range, then they should both
be asked to take an oath supporting his own claim and denying the other’s. If
they both take the oath, or both refuse to do so, the price should be assessed
at the mid-point of the reasonable range of assessments.
16
The H . anafı̄s also ruled that if the buyer and preemptor disagree over
the genus or characteristics of the price, the buyer’s claim is accepted, since
he should have better information in this regard. Moreover, the preemptor is
deemed to be claiming that the buyer owned the property by paying in a certain
genus, and the buyer is denying that claim. Hence, the buyer’s counterclaim
should be accepted if backed by his oath.
One of the characteristics of the price affected by this ruling is deferment.
Thus, if the preemptor claims that the buyer bought the property for a deferred
price, and the buyer claimed that he had in fact paid the price immediately, the
buyer’s claim is accepted. In this case, the default is immediate payment of the
price, the preemptor is claiming deferment, and the buyer is denying it. Thus,
the buyer’s claim is accepted.
15 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.30-2), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.424), c Abd Al-
. .
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.115), ’Ibn Rush d Al-H. afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.261), Al-
¯ ¯
Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.656), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.304), ’Ibn Qudāmah
¯ ¯ ¯
(, vol.5, pp.328,333).
16 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, pp.30-2).
.
Chapter 131
Preemption Conditions
Jurists had some differences over the following five major conditions of preemp-
tion:
1. Negation of all seller ownership rights in the preempted, with no options
established.
2. The contract must be a commutative financial contract, such as a sale or
equivalent.
3. The contract must be valid.
4. The preemptor must have ownership from the sale time to the time of
ruling that he has the right of preemption.
5. The preemptor must be objecting to the sale.
In addition, the following conditions were stipulated by some jurists:
• The non-H . anafı̄s stipulated further that the preemptor must be a partner
in the sold property, thus excluding preemption by neighbors, as we have
seen. They also required the object of sale to be an unidentified share in
a divisible property.
• All jurists agreed that the preemptor must take the entire sold part of the
property, to avoid harming the buyer by partitioning his contract. This
follows from the principle that one harm cannot be removed by imposing
another.
• We have already discussed at length that the object of preemption must
be an immovable property for some jurists.
• While some jurists stipulated a condition that the object of preemption
cannot be owned by the preemptor prior to sale, there is no need to discuss
this condition, since it is impossible for him to acquire ownership of what
he already owned.
725
726 CHAPTER 131. PREEMPTION CONDITIONS
• Finally, we shall discuss the order of seeking preemption with mutual

consent first, or seeking a court order first. We shall study this issue in
the chapter on preemption procedures.
131.1 Negation of seller ownership

The sellers ownership in the sold immovable property must be totally negated
through a final and binding sale devoid of any option. Thus, preemption is
not established if the sale had a stipulated seller option, until the sale becomes
binding. All jurists are in agreement regarding this condition.
On the other hand, jurists differed over buyer-options in the sale. Thus, the
H. anafı̄s and the majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled1 that preemption is established if the
¯
buyer had an option condition. The H . anafı̄s based this ruling on their view that
buyer-options do not prevent negation of seller ownership. The Shāfic ı̄s based
¯
this rule on their view that ownership of the property is established for the
buyer during his option period. Moreover, defect and inspection options do not
prevent negation of seller ownership, and hence do not prevent the establishment
of preemption rights.
2
The Mālikı̄s and H. anbalı̄s ruled preemption is not established if there are
any options for the seller or the buyer, until the option expires. They based this
ruling on the view that establishing preemption is binding upon the buyer, with
or without his consent, and establishes a liability on him for possible defects in
the property,3 while negating his right to demand compensation for the price
form the seller.
131.2 Contract must be commutative

Preemption rights are only established if the immovable property is given by
the owner in a commutative contract equivalent to sales (including a gift with
compensation, or exchange for a debt), whether or not the sold property was
established as a waqf.
The ruling for preemption in sales follows immediately from the above men-
tioned H. adı̄th of Jābir: “If he sells it without his permission, the preemptor has a
¯
stronger claim to buy it”. The H . anafı̄s further ruled for properties given in gifts
with compensation that preemption is established upon mutual receipt, since
that is the essence of commutative contracts. Thus, ’Abū H . anı̄fa, Muh.ammad,
and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that preemption rights are not established in mutual gifts
if only one of the recipients received the other’s gift. They based this ruling
. .
((H. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.253 onwards), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.160,167),
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.114), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ . ¯ . ¯ ¯
p.299).
2 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.256), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.633), ’Ibn
¯ .
3 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.4, p.182).
.
131.2. CONTRACT MUST BE COMMUTATIVE 727
on their classification of mutual gifts as a contribution at its inception, and an

exchange in the end. This logic also restricts the ruling to the case of a gift and
a compensation neither of which is an unspecified share in a property, to qualify
as a pure contribution. In contrast, Zufar ruled that preemption is established
by virtue of the contract itself. He based this ruling on his classification of
compensated gifts as exchange contracts from inception to end.
The non-H . anafı̄s did not stipulate the condition that mutual receipt is re-
quired for establishing preemption in compensated gift contracts. They based
this ruling on their classification of gifts as binding contracts. Since the recip-
ient of the gift thus owns it for a compensation, the essence of exchange, and
preemption rights, are thus established even prior to receipt.
If a house is given as a compensation for absolution from a debt, the H . anafı̄s
ruled that preemption rights are established, whether the creditor accepts, re-
jects, or reserves judgment regarding use of the house to repay the debt.
The majority of Mālikı̄s also accept the condition of commutativity of the
contract.4 Thus, they ruled that no preemption is established if the property
is given with no compensation (e.g. a pure gift, establishment as a waqf, and
bequests). This ruling follows from the fact that preemption results on oblig-
atory transfer of ownership from the buyer to the preemptor in exchange for
the price and expenses he paid. In contrast, if the property was given without
compensation, and preemption was established, the preemptor would thus get
the property for free, and against the will of its original preemption.
On the other hand, jurists differed in opinion regarding properties exchanged
with non-properties, e.g. dowry, financial compensation to the husband for
divorce, physician or lawyer fees, rent for a house, or financial compensation
accepted in settling liability for physical punishment in murder. The jurists
opinions in this case were as follows:
5
• The H . anbalı̄s ruled that the contract must be an exchange
. anafı̄s and H
of properties. Thus, they ruled in the above mentioned examples that
preemption is not established. They based this ruling on the view that
non-property compensations for property are similar to gifts and inheri-
tance, and there is no equal for such compensations that the preemptor
can pay it in a valid preemption.
. anbalı̄s ruled that preemption is not established by
any compensated exchange that constitutes a voiding of the contract, e.g.
return based on defect, or a revocation of sale.
The H
. anafı̄s also ruled that if partners divide a joint immovable property
among them, their neighbor has no preemption right established by virtue
4 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.11), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.239,252),
. .
’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, pp.436-8), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.157,165), Abd
c
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.110), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.255
¯ ¯
onwards), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.287), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.633 onwards), Al-
Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.298), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.376
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
onwards), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.291), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.152).
5 Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, pp.229,252-3), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.292).
.
of the division. This ruling follows from the fact that division is not a
pure exchange (recall: it also involves a sorting aspect), and partners have
priority over neighbors.
Moreover, they ruled that if the preemptor declined to exercise his pre-
emption right, and then the buyer returned the property based on any
option (e.g. inspection, condition, or defect option exercised by court or-
der), then the preemptor has no rights. This ruling follows from such
return of property constituting a complete voiding of the contract, and
preemption applies to new contracts. On the other hand, if the property
was returned without a court order, or based on a revocation of the sale,
the preemptors right is still established. The latter ruling follows from the
view that voiding the sale in this case constitutes voiding for the original
seller and buyer, in addition to a new sale for the preemptor, who was
also party to an exchange of properties with mutual consent, i.e. another
sale.6
• The Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s ruled7 that the requirement is only that the
¯
contract in which preemption is established is a commutative contract,
whether or not both compensations were properties. They based this rul-
ing on the view that the objective of preemption is to prevent harm to the
partner from introducing a new partner, which applies in all commutative
contracts. Moreover, they reasoned, the contract is always tantamount
to a sale, since it constitutes ownership of an immovable property in a
commutative contract. In the case of non-property compensation, the
preemptor has to pay the value of the compensation received by the seller,
in analogy to tradable commodities used as a price in sales. Thus, they
ruled that the compensation that is not a physical property still consti-
tutes a valued property, and may thus be substituted by their value if
the equivalent is not available. For instance, if the property was taken
in a marriage or compensated divorce, the preemptor can pay the market
equivalent of the dowry or compensation in divorce.
131.3 Validity of the contract

Jurists agreed on the condition that the contract resulting in preemption is
valid.8 They based this ruling on the view that negation of the sellers owner-
ship is required for preemption. Hence preemption is not established in prop-
erties made object of a defective sale, since religious law dictates voiding such
a contract and returning the property to the seller. Hence, such sales are not
6c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.2, p.120), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄),
¯ . .
7 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.255), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.287), Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . ¯ .
8¯ ¯
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.13), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.254), Abd
c c
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.114), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.640), Al-Kh atı̄b
¯ ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.298), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.291).
¯ ¯
131.4. PREEMPTOR OWNERSHIP AT SALE TIME 729
binding, and may be voided by the buyer or seller, and thus cannot establish
preemption. Moreover, preemption in a defective sale would be tantamount to
approving of its defectiveness, which is inappropriate.
On the other hand, the Shāfic ı̄s and Mālikı̄s ruled9 that the preemption is
¯
established if defectiveness of a sale is voided due to increase in the sold property,
re-sale by the buyer, etc. In such cases, they ruled that the possibility of voiding
the sale was an impediment to establishing preemption, and that impediment is
removed once the contract cannot be voided. Thus, the ruling is analogous to
the case where the sale included a conditional option, which was later dropped,
at which point preemption is established.
The H . anafı̄s ruled in the case of a defective sale, followed by the buyer re-
selling the property, that the preemptor has an option of taking the property by
virtue of the first or the second sale. In this case, they reasoned, the preemptors
right is established in both sales. However, they argued, if he decides to exercise
his right by virtue of the second sale, he must pay the price of that sale. In
contrast, if he takes by virtue of the first sale, he must pay the value of the
property on the day it was received by the first buyer, since defective sales
result in ownership in exchange for the propertys value and not the named
price. Moreover, they argued that the propertys value is assessed at the time
of receipt since guaranty of the property is established at the time of receipt, in
analogy to usurped properties. We have seen in the previous chapter that the
Mālikı̄ rulings in this case are similar to their H. anafı̄ counterparts.
131.4 Preemptor ownership at sale time

Jurists agreed that the preemptor must own the property that entitles him to
preemption prior to the sale in which he exercises his preemption right. However,
they differed over whether or not ownership must be established until the time
a court order establishes the preemption right:
10
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemptors ownership must be in effect until
the time a court-order establishes his preemption right. Thus, his right to
preemption is voided if he sold his property before his request of enforcing
his preemption right is honored legally. They based this ruling on the view
that preemption was legalized to prevent harm to the preemptor, and no
such harm from the buyer can be perceived if he sold his neighboring or
joint property. Similarly, they ruled that the preemptors right is voided
before his claim of preemption is honored legally, whether or not he knew
that the joint or neighboring property was sold.
11
• The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that preemptor ownership needs to be established
only at the time of sale, and need not continue until preemption is recog-
9 Al-Kāsānı̄((H. anafı̄), ibid.), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, ibid.).
10 Al-Kāsānı̄
((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.14), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.446), Abd Al-Gh anı̄
c
¯
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.157,170).
11 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.260), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.287), Al-Khatı̄b
¯ . ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, pp.298,303,308 onwards), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.308),
¯ ¯ ¯
nized legally. Thus, the Shāfic ı̄s ruled that even if the preemptor sold his
¯
share or gave it at as a gift, then his preemption right is dropped if he did
not have partnership at the time of sale.
All jurists agree that this condition implies that a lessee or borrower residing
in leased or borrowed property has no preemption right. Similarly, no preemp-
tion rights are established for owners who sold their property, made it a Masjid,
or established it as a waqf, prior to the sale. In the latter case, the supervisor of
a waqf is not deemed an owner, and thus no preemption right is established for
waqf. On the other hand, the H . anafı̄s permitted exchanging waqf properties in
cases of necessity. Thus, if the waqf is sold, and thus ceases to be a waqf, they
establish a preemption right for its neighbor.
The H . anafı̄s also established preemption rights in the case of sale of property
designated by the owner as waqf, but without official recognition thereof.12
Similarly, they established preemption for land subject to the agricultural taxes
(c ushr, or kharāj), since they are deemed owned. In contrast, feudal lands owned
¯ ¯
by the state have no preemption rights.
The Mālikı̄s ruled13 that the state is allowed to take property for the state
treasury through preemption. For instance, if one of two partners dies without
having any heirs, and the state thus inherited his share of the property, then
the state may exercise preemption rights on behalf of its treasury if the other
partner sells his share. Similarly, if a man dies leaving behind only a daughter,
who thus inherits half his property, then the state may exercise its preemption
right if she sells her share.
The differences in opinion among H . anafı̄s and non-H
. anafı̄s yield different
rulings for the inheritability of preemption rights:
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption rights are not inherited if the pre-
emptor died before his right was recognized legally. Thus, an heir has no
preemption right by virtue of any property that his benefactor sold during
his life.
• The non-H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption rights can be inherited, provided
that the first preemptor claimed his right to preempt a sale prior to his
death. They based this ruling on the view that an heir is a vicegerent of
his benefactor, and thus inherits all his rights, including preemption, to
avoid harm caused by new partners in his inheritance.
This difference in opinion is analogous to the difference regarding inheritance

of conditional options. The basic question in both cases is whether or not legal
rights can be inherited the way properties are inherited. We have seen in this
’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.383), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.317,346), Marc ı̄
¯ ¯
ibn Yūsuf (1st printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.2, p.263), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.4,
pp.153,158,176), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.645), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, pp.474,487).
12 ’Abū Hanı̄fa ruled that establishing property as a waqf becomes binding, and ownership
.
is negated for its owner, only upon a court order, or death of the owner, c.f. ’Ibn Al-Humām
((H. anafı̄), vol.3, p.10).
13 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.632), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.474).
131.5. PREEMPTOR OBJECTS TO THE SALE 731
regard that the H . anafı̄s ruled that legal rights are not inherited, while the non-
14
H. anafı̄s ruled that they are.
131.5 Preemptor objects to the sale

Jurists agreed that if the potential preemptor verbally indicated his approval,
or failed to indicate his objection for a long time without excuse, his preemption
right is dropped. This ruling is based on the fact that the preemptor has an
option of taking the sold property to prevent harmful partnership, or letting the
sale stand.
In this regard, the Mālikı̄s estimated a period of silence long enough to
indicate letting the sale stand to be one year, provided that the preemptor is
present and knows of the sale. On the other hand, it is important for preemption
right to be dropped that no deception in terms of the buyer, the price, or the
object of sale is utilized to trick the preemptor into dropping his right.15 If any
such deception or misinformation regarding the buyer, the price, or the object
of sale was used, the preemptors right would thus be maintained.
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s and most of the Shāfic ı̄s and H. anafı̄s ruled
¯
that if the misinformation was such that it would encourage the preemptor
to exercise the right (e.g. if the price was in fact higher than what he was
told, or was in fact deferred), then his preemption right is thus dropped. This
ruling follows, since unwillingness to take the property at a lower price implies
unwillingness to take it at a higher price, and unwillingness to pay a deferred
price implies unwillingness to pay immediately.
Similarly, they ruled that if the partner in fact sold only half of his share,
but told the preemptor that he sold all of it, the preemptors right is dropped if
he declined to exercise it for the whole. However, in this last case, ’Abū Yūsuf
and the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the preemptors right is not dropped. They reasoned
that the preemptor may be unable to pay the price of the entire share, but may
be able to pay for half. Alternatively, they argued, the half may be sufficient for
the preemptors purposes, and he may not need the entire share of his partner.
In summary, despite disagreements over minor points, the majority of jurists
are in agreement that a preemptors right is dropped if he declines to accept what
is better for him than the actual sale.
Legal tricks to drop preemption

The H . anafı̄s are in agreement that legal tricks to drop a preemption that is es-
tablished after a sale are reprehensible to the point of prohibition. On the other
hand, ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that tricks to prevent the establishment of preemption
14 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (H
¯ . anafı̄), vol.14, p.116).
15 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.15,19-20), Al-Sarakh ¯
sı̄ (1st edition (H . anafı̄), vol.14,
pp.105,111), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.173), Abd Al-Gh
¯
vol.2, p.118), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.643 onwards), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.4, p.159),
c
¯
’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.379), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.308),
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.302), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.286).
prior to the sale are not reprehensible if the neighbor does not need the object of
preemption. He based this ruling on the view that a prevention of establishing a
right does not amount to causing harm to the potential preemptor. In contrast,
Muh.ammad deemed such legal tricks reprehensible as well. He based his ruling
on the view that preemption is legalized to prevent harm, and thus allowing a
trick that drops that right makes the harm unpreventable.16
However, the majority of H . anafı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s accepted the opinion that
¯
tricks to drop preemption rights prior to the sale are permissible. For instance,
a seller may give the buyer part of the property as a gift, and then sell him the
rest to preempt the potential preemptor. In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s and Mālikı̄s
explicitly forbade all tricks to drop preemption rights. They based their ruling
on the view that preemption was legalized to prevent harm, and such tricks
make the harm unpreventable, which is tantamount to causing the harm.17
16 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.450), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.173), c Abd Al-
. .
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.118).
¯17
’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.326 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.149
onwards), ’Ibn Hubayrah ((H . anbalı̄), p.276).
Chapter 132
Preemption procedures
The jurists classified preemption as a “weak right. Thus, they ruled that it
can only result in ownership if the preemptor abides by its specific procedures,
including requesting to exercise his right immediately upon knowing of the sale.
In this regard, the H. anafı̄s ruled that three requests are required in pre-
emption: (i) immediate request to exercise the preemptors right, (ii) request of
witnessing that he wishes to exercise his right, and that the seller and buyer
recognize that right, and (iii) request of taking ownership of the sold property.1
Before proceeding to a discussion of those procedures, we should review the
opinions of various jurists regarding the timing of exercising preemption rights.
132.1 Time of exercising preemption rights

The H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemptor must make a request to exercise his
right immediately upon knowledge of the sale. They based this ruling on their
classification of preemption rights as weak rights, and such weak rights require
strengthening by immediate requests of exercise.
In contrast, Imām Mālik ruled that the request to exercise of the preemption
right may come anytime within a year after the contract, according to his better
accepted opinion.2
The majority of Shāfic ı̄s ruled3 that the preemptor must request exercising
¯
his right immediately upon knowing of the sale. They based this ruling on the
view that preemption is legalized to avoid harm, and thus must be exercised
immediately in analogy to returning defective merchandise. In this regard, they
1 Al-Majallah (item #1028), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.17), Al-Tahāwı̄ ((Hanafı̄), p.120
. . . .
onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, pp.416,418 onwards), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Ju-
risprudence), vol.5, p.242), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.157 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
c anı̄
¯
Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, pp.107,112).
2 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.487 onwards), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.639,645),
’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.259).

¯
3 ’Abū-’Ish
. āq Al-Sh ¯
ı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.380), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.307), H
. āsh iyat Al-Bājūrı̄ (vol.2, p.19), Al-Qalyūbı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.3, p.50).
¯ ¯
733
734 CHAPTER 132. PREEMPTION PROCEDURES
considered the demarcation for delay of exercising the right to be determined by

convention, for instance he must be allowed enough time to finish his prayers,
or whatever he was doing.
Moreover, they ruled that if the preemptor was sick, afraid to travel, or away
from the buyer’s land, then he should appoint an agent if he can. If he cannot
appoint an agent, then he should have two men of good character, or one man
and two women, testify that he indicated his wish to exercise his preemption
right. On the other hand, they ruled that if the preemptor does not attempt to
appoint an agent or find agents, he would thus forfeit his preemption right.
The H . anbalı̄s agreed with the Sh āfic ı̄s4 that the preemptor should request
¯
exercising his right, in front of witnesses, immediately upon knowing of the
sale, unless he had a valid excuse. Then, once his right is established by such an
immediate request, he may demand taking the property from the buyer anytime
later, even years after the sale.
Thus, we can see that the majority of jurists require the preemptor to request
the exercise of his preemption right immediately, in-part based on the H . adı̄th :
¯
“Preemption is like unwrapping a head-dress”.5 They also based this ruling on
their view that the buyer may be harmed if the preemptor is allowed to take a
long time to demand exercising his right, since his ownership of what he bought
will remain uncertain for that long period.
In contrast, the Mālikı̄s granted a preemptor a whole year to request ex-
ercising his right. They based their ruling on the view that silence does not
invalidate a legal right for a Muslim, unless other factors require such a drop-
ping. On the other hand, they allowed the buyer to make a request that the
ruler ask the preemptor whether or not he intends to exercise the right. In the
latter case, the preemptor may choose to exercise his right or to drop it. If the
preemptor fails in this case to answer one way or the other, his right is thus
forfeited.
132.2 Stages of requesting preemption

In this section, we shall review the sequence of requests of preemption as stip-
ulated by the H . anafı̄s.
132.2.1 Immediate request to exercise preemption right

The preemptor must immediately indicate verbally that he intends to exercise
his preemption right, and thus demand taking the sold object.6 This ruling
was based on the H. adı̄th : “Preemption is established for one who is quick to
¯
4 Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (Hanbalı̄), vol.4, p.156), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.299,306
.
onwards).
5 This is a weak Hadı̄th narrated by ’ibn Mājah, Al-Bazzār, and ’ibn c Udayy, on the au-
. ¯
thority of ’ibn c Umar, c.f. Al-H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.176 onwards).
6 Al-Majallah (item #1029). ¯
132.2. STAGES OF REQUESTING PREEMPTION 735
demand it.7 Having witnesses for this request is not required, but preferable
to avoid the possibility of later denial by the buyer. This is analogous to the
case of guaranty of a destroyed wall, where witnesses are not required for the
guaranty, but may be needed to prove its instigating factor.
In this regard, the majority of H. anafı̄s established the preemptor right to
make this first request for the entire period of the session of knowledge of the
sale, however long. In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the
¯
first request must be made immediately upon knowing of the sale. Finally, we
have seen that most Mālikı̄s allow a grace period of one full year for the first
request to exercise preemption to be made.
132.2.2 Second confirmation request

The preemptor must then make a second request of preemption, to confirm his
first one. This ruling is based on the view that the first request may be made
hastily, and the preemptor may later discover that his condition and financial
resources do not allow him to preempt the sale. Thus, a second confirmation
request is required.8
This second request must follow shortly after the first one, and requires as
witnesses two men, or one man and two women. The grace period allowed
before this second request is made must be determined by the time required to
get such witnesses.
The witnessing may be directed towards the seller if he still held the property,
the buyer (the new owner), even if he did not receive it, or the property made
object of preemption. Thus, the preemptor should say in front of the witnesses
something to the effect: “so-and-so bought this house, and I am a preemptor.
I have made a first request of preemption, and I now made a formal request, so
be my witnesses”.
In this regard, having witnesses for this second request is not a condition of
its validity, or the validity of the first request. Rather, witnessing in this case is
stipulated for documentation purposes, in case the buyer denies that the request
was made. If the preemptor was in a distant place, he may appoint an agent,
or send a letter with his second request.
Moreover, if the first request to exercise his preemption right was made
in front of witnesses, the seller who still held the property, the buyer, or the
property, then no second request is necessary. In any such cases, the preemptor
would have already established his seriousness and determination to exercise his
preemption right.
7 Narrated by jurists in their books. Al-Zaylac ı̄ said that it was strange and of unknown
origin (gharı̄b). It was narrated by c Abdulrazzāq as a statement of Shurayh., i.e. an ’athar

¯ ¯
and not¯a Prophetic H . adı̄th , c.f. Al-H
c
. adı̄th ), vol.4, p.176).
¯
8 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, ¯
. pp.18-19), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.419 onwards),
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.158), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.243 on-
wards), c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, pp.108-9), Al-Majallah (item #1020).
¯
Legal status of the request

’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf (according to one report) ruled that once the pre-
emptor makes his confirmation request, his preemption right is established and
cannot be dropped by the mere passage of time. The majority of H . anafı̄s ac-
cepted this ruling, based on the view that once a legal right is firmly established,
it can only be dropped if its owner drops it.
In contrast, Muh.ammad ruled that if the preemptor waits another month
after the confirmation request is made, without any excuse, his preemption is
voided to protect the buyer’s interest. Some H . anafı̄s found this opinion to be
more appropriate for their time when people were deemed likely to intentionally
cause harm to others. Indeed, Al-Majallah (item #1034) codified this opinion
as law.
In this regard, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that if a request is made in front of wit-
nesses, the preemptor has the right to demand taking the property from the
buyer, even years later. Finally, the Mālikı̄s gave the preemptor a grace period
of one full year. Thus, if he had no excuse, and still did not demand to take
the property for a whole year after the contract, or kept his silence despite his
knowledge that construction or demolition was taking place, his silence will be
understood as unwillingness to take the property, and his preemption right will
thus be dropped.
132.2.3 Demanding to take the property

Finally, the preemptor must present a formal legal request to take the property
by preemption.9 For instance, the preemptor may say to the judge: “So-and-so
bought this property, for which I have preemption rights by virtue of owning
this other property (or being a partner), and I now demand that the buyer gives
it to me”.
Delay penalties
The preemptor’s right is dropped if he fails, without excuse, to make his first
request during the session in which he first knows of the sale, i.e. if he turns
to another matter or leaves the session without requesting preemption. On
the other hand, if he had a valid excuse, his preemption right is not dropped
until the circumstances preventing him from making the request (e.g. natural
disasters) is removed.10
Moreover, the preemption right is dropped if the preemptor delays the second
confirmation request for a period during which it could have been made, if only
by letter, c.f. Al-Majallah (item #1034). Finally, if the preemptor delays the
final request to take the property for a whole month, without a valid excuse
such as being away, his preemption right is thus dropped, c.f. Al-Majallah (item
#1034).
132.2. STAGES OF REQUESTING PREEMPTION 737
Preemption requests for an interdicted person
Most jurists allow children to take a property through interdiction. Thus, jurists
of the four schools allow the child’s guardian to exercise his preemption right if
he finds it beneficial, and if the child has enough wealth to buy the property.
In this case, the child is not allowed to void the preemption after reaching legal
age.
’Abū H . anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that if the child’s guardian does not
request the exercise of his preemption right, the child does not retain that right
until he reaches legal age. They based this ruling on the view that the guardian
who is allowed to exercise the preemption right, is also allowed to drop it, in
analogy to the owner himself.
The Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s also ruled that the child does not have the right
¯
to exercise preemption if his guardian dropped that right according to what he
found most beneficial for the child. Similarly, if the child did not have enough
wealth to buy the property by preemption, his preemption right is automatically
dropped. In such cases, the guardian is deemed to be acting within his authority,
and thus the child is not allowed to void his actions, in analogy to returning
purchased property. Moreover, the guardian in such cases is assumed to be
acting in the best interests of the child. On the other hand, they ruled that
if the guardian dropped the preemption right without considering its costs and
benefits for the child, the right is not dropped, and the child may exercise it
upon reaching legal age.
The H . anbalı̄s, and the H . anafı̄ Zufar and Muh.ammad ruled that a child
may exercise his preemption right upon reaching legal age, whether or not his
guardian dropped that right, and whether or not it was beneficial. They based
this ruling on the view that the possessor of a preemption right may exercise it
whether or not it is beneficial for him. Moreover, they reasoned, preemption is
a right established for the child, and thus the guardian is not authorized to drop
it. The final ruling is made in analogy to the case of an absent person whose
agent fails to exercise his right.11
The judge’s role
If a preemptor requests buying a house based on preemption, the judge must

first ask him regarding the location and boundaries of the house, to ascertain
the legitimacy of his claim.12 Then, the judge must ascertain that the buyer
had indeed received the house, otherwise the claim will not be honored if the
seller is not present.
11 ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, pp.436,451), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5,
. .
p.263), Al-Majallah (item #1035), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.645), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A,
vol.3, p.486), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, pp.313-4)], Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4,
p.161 onwards).
12 ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.159), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((Hanafı̄), vol.7, p.421), c Abd Al-
. .
Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.111), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.244
¯
onwards).
Then, the judge must ascertain that he preemptor owns a property that gives
him a preemption right, and ask the preemptor to define its borders to make
sure that the preemption right is valid. Finally, the judge must ask when and
where the confirmation request was made, and who were the witnesses. After
making sure that the preemptor’s claim is justified, and that he followed proper
procedure, the claim becomes legally valid.
Then, the judge must ask the buyer regarding the preemptor’s ownership
of the property that entitles him to preemption. If the buyer denies that the
preemptor owns that property, then the judge must require the preemptor to
provide proof of ownership. This ruling follows from the fact that mere posses-
sion is insufficient to prove entitlement. Then, if the preemptor cannot provide
proof of ownership, he may ask the buyer to take an oath that he does not
know of the preemptor’s ownership of said property. If the buyer refuses to
take the oath, or if the preemptor can provide a proof of ownership, the right
of preemption is thus established legally.
Moreover, the judge must ask the buyer if he had purchased the object of
preemption. If he denies having bought it, the preemptor is asked to provide
proof of the sale, since preemption is only established by virtue of that sale. If
the preemptor cannot provide such a proof, he may ask the buyer to take an
oath that he did not buy the property, or that his adversary has not established
preemption right. If the buyer admits having bought the property or refuses
to take an oath to the contrary, or if the preemptor can provide proof of the
sale, he is thus granted the legal right of preemption, provided that the buyer
does not deny his request to exercise his preemption right. On the other hand,
if the adversary (buyer) takes an oath denying having bought the property, or
having received a request of preemption at the appropriate time, his claim is
accepted based on his oath.13 In this regard, if the buyer denied the first request
of preemption, his oath should be that he did not know about it. On the other
hand, if he denied the confirmation request, he should take an oath that that
request never took place.
In all of the above, note that the preemptor’s adversary can always be the
buyer, since he is an owner of the property after the sale, whether or not he
had received the property. On the other hand, the preemptor may identify the
seller as his adversary if the property was still in his possession. However, proofs
against the seller are not considered until the buyer (and owner) arrives, and
thus the sale cannot be voided in his absence. In contrast, the seller need not
be present if the property was in the buyer’s possession, since the seller in this
case has neither ownership nor possession of the property in question.14

. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.158-160).
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.160).
Chapter 133
Changes in the Object of

Preemption
The object of preemption may change in status while in the buyer’s possession,
before the preemptor’s right is legally established. Thus, it may have been re-
sold, given as a gift, leased, or loaned. Alternatively, additions to it may have
been made, e.g. buildings or trees, or it may have suffered diminution. In what
follows, we shall study the effect of all such changes on preemption.
133.1 Contracts and dealings

We consider dealings that transfer ownership, e.g. sale, gift with receipt, desig-
nation of property as dowry, or establishing as a waqf. We also consider dealings
that transfer usufruct, e.g. leasing, simple loans, and pawning.
All four schools of jurisprudence agreed1 that the preemptor is allowed to
void re-sales of the property once the judge ruled that the preemptor is entitled
to the property. This ruling results from the fact that such a ruling estab-
lishes that another had a right attached to the object of sale. They are also in
agreement that pawning, leases, and simple loans of sold properties in which no
preemption was present at inception are thus voided.
In the case of re-sale, they ruled that the preemptor is given the option
of taking the property in exchange for its first price or its second price. Al-
Sarakhsı̄ ruled thus based on the view that each of those two sales establishes
¯
a preemption right, and the preemptor’s right in the first sale is not voided by
the second sale.
Moreover, the H . anafı̄s, Sh āfic ı̄s, and Mālikı̄s agreed that preemption can
¯
void contracts in which no preemption could be established at the inception
1 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.108 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((Hanafı̄),
¯ . .
vol.5, p.164), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.652), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.287), Al-Dardı̄r
((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.493), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.303 onwards), ’Abū-’Ish.āq
¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.382), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.169 onwards).
¯ ¯
739
740 CHAPTER 133. CHANGES IN THE OBJECT OF PREEMPTION
(e.g. established as waqf, Masjid, a cemetery, or given as a gift or in bequest).

In contrast, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that the preemption right is dropped if the
buyer dealt in the property prior to the first request of preemption through a
gift or charity, waqf, or other contracts with non-property compensations. They
based this ruling on the view that preemption would harm the beneficiaries
of the waqf, the recipient of a gift or charity, etc. without compensation in
preemption, since no price was paid. Thus, preemption is voided in this case
based on the principle that a harm cannot be removed by introducing another
harm.
On the other hand, the H . anbalı̄s ruled that dealings of the buyer after the
first request of preemption are not valid. They based this ruling on the ma-
jority view in their school that ownership of the property is transferred to the
preemptor upon his request. Moreover, they ruled that if the buyer designated
the purchased share in property in his will, the will is deemed invalid if the pre-
emptor took the property prior to the buyer’s death. This ruling was based on
giving the preemptor’s right priority over the beneficiary’s right, since following
a will after death is not binding.
133.2 Growth in the object of preemption

133.2.1 Natural growth
If the property grows naturally while in the buyer’s possession, e.g. if trees bear
fruit after he takes possession of what he purchased:
2
• The H . anafı̄s stated that ruling by analogy would give the growth to
the buyer and not to the preemptor, since the growth took place in the
buyer’s property, and with his knowledge. However, the ruling by juristic
approbation, they said, would give all such growth to the preemptor, since
fruits are derivative of the sold trees, and thus the preemptor’s right to
the trees extends to the fruits. This ruling agrees with the ruling for a
sold animal that gives birth prior to receipt, where the buyer is entitled
to the offspring.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled3 that output prior to preemption belongs to the buyer,
since he bears the responsibility for guaranteeing the property.
4
. anbalı̄s distinguished between two types of growth:
¯
1. The preemptor is entitled to contiguous growth, such as very small
fruits. They ruled that such additions are not distinguished in own-
ership from their origins, and thus ruled in analogy to returning such
increases in sales if an option is exercised or the sale is revoked.
2 Al-Zaylac ı̄((H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.251), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.434),
c Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.119), ’Ibn Ābidı̄n ((H
. anafı̄), vol.5, pp.164-5).
c
¯
4 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.382), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.319 onwards),
. ¯ ¯
133.2. GROWTH IN THE OBJECT OF PREEMPTION 741
2. The buyer is entitled to any separate growth, such as separate fruits,

output, and rent. Such growth is deemed to have occurred in the
buyer’s property, and thus are not considered derivative of the object
of sale. Thus, the preemptor would only be entitled to buying what
was part of the original contract, and may only take the growth by
mutual consent with the buyer.
In summary, we see that the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s agreed with the
¯
ruling based on analogy, as described by the H . anafı̄s.
133.2.2 Caused increase

If the buyer added to the purchased property, e.g. by building on it, or planting
trees or crops therein:
• If the increase was a crop with a known duration, all jurists agreed that
the preemptor may take the land, the crop is kept till harvest time, and the
buyer is entitled to the crop. In this case, the H
. anafı̄s ruled that the buyer
must thus pay the preemptor rent for the period between preemption and
harvest.5 In contrast, the Shāfic ı̄s and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the crop was
¯
thus planted in the buyer’s property, and he may keep it till harvest time
without paying rent to the preemptor.6
• In the case of buildings and trees, the jurists ruled that the preemptor may
take the land, but differed over compensation for the value of buildings or
trees:
7
– The H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemptor is given the option of order-
ing the buyer to remove all additions at his own expense. In this
case, the buyer is entitled to the rubble, since it belongs to him once
separated from the preemptor’s land. This option is allowed since
the buyer thus put the trees or buildings in the property of others.
Alternatively, they ruled, the preemptor may take the land for the
price paid by the buyer, and pay the latter a compensation for the
value of the building or trees if removed from the property (i.e. as
rubble).
8
– ’Abū Yūsuf, the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s, and H
. anbalı̄s ruled that the buyer
¯
has the option of removing the additions, provided that this does
5 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.115), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.27 on-
¯ . .
wards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.164), Al-Zayla ı̄ ((H
c
p.250).
6 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.319), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.154), Al-Khatı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄
¯ ¯ . ¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.304), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.174).
¯7
Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H. anafı̄), vol.5, p.29), Al-Zayla c ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.250), Al-
.
c
. anafı̄), vol.5, p.164), Abd
c
¯
Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.118 onwards).
8¯’Ibn Rushd Al-H
¯ . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.260), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Sh ¯
āfic ı̄), ibid.), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-
¯
Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.317 onwards), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
¯ ¯
(H. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.175).
not harm the land. They based this ruling on the view that those
additions are his property, and thus he may remove them and take
them, and is not required to flatten the land before leaving it, since he
was not a transgressor. On the other hand, the buyer is also allowed
in this case to leave the addition, in which case the preemptor has
the option of dropping his preemption, or paying the buyer the value
of the buildings and trees as they exist. This seems to be the more
equitable solution.
’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄)) stated that the difference in opinions in
¯
this case depends on whether the buyer’s action is seen as a transgressor’s
act by adding to the property of the preemptor, or permissible actions
that justify entitlement to the addition. Thus, the H . anafı̄s found the
transgression aspect to be dominant, and ruled that the preemptor should
pay the buyer the value of his buildings’ rubble. In contrast, the non-
H. anafı̄s found the buyer’s entitlement to his additions to be dominant,
and hence required the preemptor to compensate him for the full value of
that added property.
133.3 Diminution in the object of preemption

The H . anafı̄s and Mālikı̄s had similar opinions in this regard, while the Sh āfic ı̄s
¯
and H. anbalı̄s ruled differently. Thus, the H
. anafı̄s considered whether the diminu-
tion pertained to the land itself, or some of its associated properties:9
1. If the diminution was derivative of the land, e.g. a removal of fruits,

or destruction of farming equipment, and then the preemption right was
legally established, the preemptor may deduct the value of the diminished
property from the price he pays. They ruled thus, regardless of whether
the diminution was caused by the buyer’s actions (by taking some of what
he had bought), or by natural causes. This ruling follows from the fact
that such items were part of the sale, and thus must have an associated
portion of the price deducted if they are not included.
2. If the diminution pertained to a property attached to the land (e.g. drying

of trees, destruction of a building, etc.), and then the preemption right
was legally established, the preemptor can deduct the diminished value
from the price if the diminution was caused by the actions of the buyer or
another person. Thus, the land value should be assessed with and without
the lost properties, and the difference must be deducted from the price to
be paid by the preemptor. This ruling follows from the fact that loss in
this case was caused by transgression, and thus must correspond to part of
9 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.115), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((Hanafı̄ Jurisprudence),
¯ . .
vol.5, p.251 onwards), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.164 onwards), ’Ibn Al-Humām
((H
c anı̄ Al-Maydānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.2, p.119), Al-’Amwāl wa
¯
Naz.ariyyat Al-c Aqd by Dr. Muh.ammad Yūsuf Mūsā (p.236 onwards).
133.3. DIMINUTION IN THE OBJECT OF PREEMPTION 743
the price. In this case, the buyer is entitled to the rubble of the destroyed
property.
Alternatively, if the destruction was due to natural causes, the preemptor
must pay the full price. In this case, the diminution in value was not a
transgression, and the affected properties are derivative of the land and
included implicitly in the sale. Thus, no portion of the price corresponds
to those properties deemed to be among the description details of the land.
In this case, if rubble remained, and the buyer took it by virtue of being
separate from the land, the price should be reduced by the value of such
rubble assessed on the day the buyer took it. If the destroyed property
was a house, its value should be assessed on the day of sale, and the price
should be reduced by the difference between the value of the house and
the value of its rubble, as described above.
On the other hand, if the buyer did not take the rubble, it is considered
derivative of the property, and no portion of the price is deducted thereof.
Thus, once the property was taken by preemption, the sale was transferred
from the buyer to the preemptor, and the loss of property by natural causes
is borne by the latter.
3. If the diminished property was part of the land itself, the preemptor is
given the option of dropping the preemption, or taking the remaining
land in exchange for its portion of the price. This ruling follows from the
establishment of the preemptor’s right to take all of the land, and thus if
only part thereof remained, he must pay only the corresponding part of
the price.
The Mālikı̄ rulings in this case are very similar to the H

. anafı̄ rulings. Thus,
they ruled10 that the buyer does not guarantee the property share made object
of preemption against destruction by natural causes. Moreover, they ruled that
the buyer does not guarantee the property against destruction that he caused for
a beneficial reason (e.g. demolition of a building to widen a road). On the other
hand, they ruled that if the buyer caused an unbeneficial diminution, he must
guarantee the property against loss of value. Finally, if the buyer demolished
a building and rebuilt it, the buyer is entitled to compensation for the value of
the property on the day it was finished, since he was not transgressing. Thus,
the preemptor should pay the price of the land, less the value of the rubble on
the day of purchase, plus the value of the existing building.
11
. anbalı̄s ruled that the buyer guarantees any diminution
¯
in the purchased property, since it is deemed to be a diminution in his property
while in his possession. Then, they ruled, if the preemptor wishes to take the
remaining part of the object of preemption, he must thus take it for its share of
the price, whether the diminution was caused intentionally, unintentionally, or
by natural causes. Finally, they ruled that if rubble exists, then the preemptor
10 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.654), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.494).
must take it along with the land, in exchange for its share of the price. If no
rubble exists, then he merely takes the land and whatever remains on it.
Chapter 134
Dropping Preemption
Rights
The reasons for dropping preemption rights can be inferred from the previous
discussion of conditions for taking a property through preemption. Thus, we
shall discuss the various means of dropping preemption rights briefly here, noting
that some are agreed upon and some raise juristic differences.
134.1 Preemptor sale of his property

All jurists with the exception of the Z.āhirı̄ ibn h.azm ruled that if the poten-
tial preemptor sold the property granting him preemption rights either before
knowing of the sale, or afterwards but before having a legal establishment of
preemption right, his preemption is voided. This ruling is based on the fact that
the instigating factor for establishing preemption would thus be absent, since
no harm can be prevented by its establishment for an ex-partner (or, for the
1
H. anafı̄s for an ex-neighbor).
134.2 Voluntary dropping of the right

Preemption rights are dropped if the potential preemptor dropped his right
verbally or implied his unwillingness to exercise it at sale time, whether or not
he knew of the sale. Jurists of the four schools allowed preemption to be dropped
thus, since preemption is a weak right that can be dropped quite easily.2
. .
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.170), Abd Al-Gh
. anafı̄), vol.2, p.113),
¯
’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfi ı̄), vol.1, p.381), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H
c
. anbalı̄), vol.4,
¯ ¯
p.169), ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.9, p.116 #1601), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.642).
2 Al-Sarakhsı̄ (1st edition (Hanafı̄), vol.14, p.154 onwards), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5,
¯ . .
pp.19-20), Al-Zaylac ı̄ ((H . anafı̄ Jurisprudence), vol.5, p.275), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄),
vol.7, pp.442-5), ’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.168 onwards), Abd Al-Gh
¯
745
746 CHAPTER 134. DROPPING PREEMPTION RIGHTS
Thus, the preemptor may drop his preemption right by explicitly saying so
after the sale is concluded, and before it is legally established in court. This
ruling follows from the fact that prior to the sale, the preemptor has no sale to
drop, and after the court-order he can only transfer ownership of the property
by another contract such as sale, gift, etc.
Moreover, any implicit sign that indicates the preemptor’s acceptance of the
sale, and transfer of ownership to the buyer, is deemed sufficient. For instance,
if the potential preemptor fails to make the first or confirmatory requests of
exercising his right, despite his ability to do so, his silence is considered a drop-
ping of his right. Similarly, leaving the session in which he knew of the sale, or
getting occupied by another matter, is taken to imply his consent to the sale,
and its resulting establishment of buyer ownership.
Moreover, if the preemptor negotiates a price or rent to buy or lease the
property from the buyer, that is taken as proof that he had decided not to
exercise his preemption right. Also, if the preemptor served as the seller’s selling
agent, he would thus implicitly drop his preemption right, since he cannot void
a contract he just helped conclude. On the other hand, the preemptor may act
as the buyer’s buying agent, and then take the property by preemption, since
the purchase is not negated by the similar act of taking the property for himself.
This is how the H . anafı̄s, and some H. anbalı̄s and Sh āfic ı̄s ruled.
¯
However, the majority of Shāfic ı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled3 that preemption is
¯
not dropped by preemptor agency for the buyer or the seller. In this regard,
they argued that suspicion of malicious intent does not matter, since the seller
appointed the preemptor as his selling agent knowing that he may exercise his
preemption right.
Two issues pertaining to taking dropped preemption rights were discussed
by jurists in some detail. Some of those points were reported above, and thus
we cover them here briefly:
4
• ’Abū H. anı̄fa and ’Abū Yūsuf ruled that it is permissible for a father or
guardian of a child to drop his preemption right. They based this ruling on
the fact that taking a property through preemption is a form of commerce
and financial dealing, and thus performing such actions or choosing not to
perform them falls within the scope of a guardian’s authority, in analogy
to engaging or not engaging in any sale. Moreover, they reasoned that
taking a property by preemption may be beneficial or harmful, and thus
the guardian’s judgment with regards to the child’s benefit should be
observed.
• The Mālikı̄s ruled in this case5 that the guardian’s or father’s dropping
of a child’s preemption right is only valid if the dropping is in the child’s
((H
. anafı̄), vol.2, pp.112-3), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, pp.642,645), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Sh ı̄rāzı̄
¯
((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.380), Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.306), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5,
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p.349 onwards), ’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol.2, p.259), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.286).
3 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, ¯
p.351).
. .
5 Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)A, vol.3, p.486), Al-Dardı̄r ((Mālikı̄)B, vol.3, p.645).
134.3. GUARANTY OF THE PRICE 747
best interest. Otherwise, it is invalid, and the child may demand exercise
of his preemption right upon reaching legal age.
6
• Zufar, Muh.ammad, and the H . anbalı̄s ruled that a guardian does not
have the authority to drop a child’s preemption right, whether or not it
is for his benefit. Thus, the child’s right remains intact, and the child
may exercise it upon reaching legal age. They ruled thus by analogy to
other legal rights that a guardian cannot drop for the child, e.g. the
right to financial or physical compensation (diyyah or qis.ās.) for physical
transgression. Moreover, since preemption was legalized to prevent harm
for the child, dropping it is deemed a purely harmful action.
This same difference in opinion among the H . anafı̄s applies to the case of
an agent who drops his principal’s preemption right. In this case, ’Abū
H. anı̄fa ruled that the agent’s dropping of his principal’s right in court
is valid, based on the view that he takes the place of his principal in a
court of law. ’Abū Yūsuf went further, ruling that an agent may drop
his principal’s preemption right in court as well as elsewhere, by virtue of
unlimited agency rights. In contrast, Muh.ammad and Zufar ruled that an
agent is not permitted to drop his principal’s preemption right.
7
• The H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemption right may be dropped by the
preemptor by taking a compensation for it in settlement. Thus, the act
of settlement and taking of compensation is taken to imply unwillingness
to exercise the right. However, they ruled, the preemptor in this case
must return whatever compensation he took, since settlements and sales
with mere legal rights are not allowed in the H. anafı̄ school. In this re-
gard, preemption is a mere right to own the property, legalized to prevent
harm, and thus cannot be exchanged for any compensation, rendering the
compensation an illegal bribe.
134.3 Guaranty of the price

8
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemptor drops his preemption right if he guaran-
tees the buyer’s liability for the price towards the seller. They ruled thus based
on the acceptance of the sale implicit in such guaranty. Similarly, they ruled
that if the seller stipulated a condition in the sales contract that the preemptor
has the option of allowing the sale to be concluded or voiding it, and the pre-
emptor allowed it to be concluded, his preemption right is thus dropped. This
seems to be the most appropriate ruling to follow.
9
. anbalı̄s ruled that the preemption right is not
¯
6 ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.313), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.161 onwards).
7 Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.20), ’Ibn Al-Humām ((H . anafı̄), vol.7, p.443), Al-Zayla ı̄
c

¯
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.169).
. .
¯ .
dropped if the preemptor guaranteed the buyer’s liability for the price to the
seller, or if the seller gave him the option to void the contract and he allowed
it to be concluded. They based this ruling on the view that a preemption right
may only be dropped after the sale is binding, which is not the case in either
example. Thus, such actions preceding the establishment of preemption rights
cannot drop them, in analogy to giving a prior permission to sell, or dropping
the right prior to completion of the sale, which do not drop the subsequent right.
134.4 Division of the object of preemption

Jurists are in agreement10 that preemption rights cannot be divided. Thus, if the
preemptor drops his right for any part of the object of preemption, his entire
preemption right is thus dropped. This ruling is based on the principle that
partitioning the purchase harms the buyer, and the principle that a potential
harm (to the preemptor) cannot be remedied by introducing another harm (to
the buyer). However, ’Abū Yūsuf and most H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemption
right is not dropped if the preemptor asks to take only half of the object of
preemption; and he retains the right to either take all of it or leave it all.
If there are multiple preemptors, neither of them is allowed to give his share
to another preemptor. If any preemptor attempts to give his share to another,
he would thus drop his preemption right, c.f. Al-Majallah (item #1042).11 If one
of two preemptors drops his right prior to the court order, the other preemptor
is thus allowed to take the entire object of preemption. On the other hand, if
one preemptor dropped his right after the court order, then the other preemptor
does not have the right to take his share, c.f. Al-Majallah (item #1043).
134.5 Death of a preemptor

12
The H . anafı̄s ruled that the preemption right is dropped upon death of the
preemptor if he died prior to receiving the property or a court order, regardless
of whether he died before or after the first or confirmatory requests of exercising
his right. They based this ruling on their view that preemption rights cannot be
inherited, in analogy to other legal rights such as conditional options. Moreover,
they ruled that when the preemptor died, ownership was thus transferred to his
heir, and the preemption condition of ownership was voided. On the other
hand, they ruled that preemption is not voided upon the buyer’s death, since
the object of preemption and its justification remains in this case.
. ¯ . ¯ .
Al-Shirbı̄nı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.2, p.306), ’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.381), Al-Buhūtı̄
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(3rd printing (H . anbalı̄), vol.4, p.164), ’Ibn H . azm (, vol.9, p.118 #1604).
11 ’Abū-’Ishāq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), ibid.), Al-Kāsānı̄ ((Hanafı̄), vol.5, p.5 onwards), ’Ibn
. ¯ ¯ .
.
. .
¯
Al-Kāsānı̄ ((H . anafı̄), vol.5, p.22), Al-Majallah (item #1038).
134.5. DEATH OF A PREEMPTOR 749
13
The Z.āhirı̄s and H . anbalı̄s ruled that death of the preemptor prior to re-
questing exercise of his right drops that right.14 Moreover, they ruled that heirs
have no right to exercise such preemption rights, since this right was assigned
to the preemptor alone, and options cannot be bequeathed. On the other hand,
they ruled that if the preemptor had issued the confirmatory request to exercise
his right, in front of witnesses, then his heirs may demand exercising preemp-
tion. In this case, the preemptor is unable to exercise the right himself, but
having witnesses for the confirmatory request takes the place of exercising the
right himself, and thus the heirs may exercise it on behalf of his estate.
Thus, we see that the Z.āhirı̄s and H . anbalı̄s agreed with the H . anafı̄s that
preemption rights are not inherited if the preemptor died prior to requesting
their exercise.
In this regard, the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s ruled15 that preemption rights are
¯
inherited if the preemptor requested their exercise prior to dying. Thus, they
classified preemption rights at this stage as established legal options to avoid
financial harm, and thus it may be inherited in analogy to defect options.
Moreover, references of other schools suggest that the Mālikı̄s and Shāfic ı̄s
¯
also allowed preemption rights to be bequeathed, even if the preemptor died
c
prior to requesting their exercise. However, at least for the Shāfi ı̄s, it is well
¯
known that the preemptor request is required, otherwise they agree with the
16
H. anbalı̄s and deem the preemption right dropped.
In summary, the H . anafı̄s ruled that preemption rights are not inherited,
even if the preemptor died after making the request, while the Mālikı̄s, Shāfic ı̄s,
¯
H. anbalı̄s, and Z.āhirı̄s ruled that they are inherited in that case. This difference
in opinion only applies in the case where the preemptor died prior to a court
order establishing his preemption. On the other hand, all jurists agree that if
he died after a court order gives him the right, but prior to paying the price
and receiving the object of preemption, the sale is still binding for his heirs.
We conclude the following three points from our discussion of dropping pre-
emption rights:17
1. Preemption is a weak right, fortified and confirmed by requesting its ex-

ercise.
2. Preemption was legalized to protect the preemptor’s interests. All ju-

rists agree that a partner in the property is a preemptor, but the H
. anafı̄s
included neighbors as well.
13 ’Ibn Hazm (, vol.9, p.117 #1603), ’Ibn Qudāmah (, vol.5, p.346), Al-Buhūtı̄ (3rd printing
.
(H
. anbalı̄), vol.4, p.176).
14 Thus, ’Imām ’Ahmad said that death voids three things: preemption rights, physical
.
punishment if the victim of libel died, and options if the one who stipulated them died.
15 ’Ibn Rushd Al-Hafı̄d ((Mālikı̄), vol2, p.260), ’Ibn Juzayy ((Mālikı̄), p.287), ’Abū-’Ishāq
¯ . .
Al-Shı̄rāzı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.1, p.383), Al-Ramlı̄ ((Shāfic ı̄), vol.4, p.158).
16¯ ¯ ¯
On the other hand, the Mālikı̄s allowed the preemptor a grace period of one year to make
his request. Thus, if he died prior to making the request, the right is inherited by his heirs,
unless the judge had dropped that right if the buyer requested that he must reveal his intention
to the judge.
17 Al-’Amwāl wa Nazariyyat Al-c Aqd by the late Dr. Mūsā (p.238).
.
3. Preemption cannot result in a harm to the buyer by partitioning the sale,

e.g. if the preemptor requests to take only part of the object of sale and
preemption.
Bibliography
c
’Abu Al-Barakāt. (H. anbalı̄). Al-Muh.arrar fı̄ Al-Fiqh alā Madhhab Al- Imām
c ¯
Ah.mad ibn H . anbal. Mat . ba at Al-Sunnah Al-Muh. ammadiyyah.
’Abū-’Ish.āq Al-Shı̄rāzı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Al-Muhadhdhab. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Al-H . alabı̄.
’Abū Yac lā. (H c
. anbalı̄). Al- Ah.kam Al-Sult.āniyyah. Cairo: Mat.ba at Al-Bābı̄
Al-H
. alabı̄.
Al-Bājı̄ Al-’Andalusı̄. 1st edition (Mālikı̄). Al-Muntaqā Sharh. Al-Muwat.t.a .
¯
Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Sac ādah.
Al-Bājūrı̄. 5th printing (Shāfic ı̄). H . āsh iyat al-Bājūrı̄ c alā Sharh. ibn Qāsim al-
¯ ¯ ¯
Ghozay c alā matn Abı̄ Shujāc . Būlāq: Al-Mat.bac ah Al-’Amı̄riyyah.
¯ ¯
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄ni. (Shāfic ı̄). H. āsh iyat Al-Bijirmı̄ c alā Sharh. al- Iqnāc fı̄ H
. all
¯ ¯ c ¯ ¯ c ¯
Alfāz. Abı̄ Shujā . Egypt: Mat.ba at Al-Bābı̄ Al-H . alabı̄.
¯
Al-Khat.ı̄b Al-Shirbı̄nı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Mughnı̄ Al-Muh.tāj. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Al-H . alabı̄.
Al-Kharshı̄. 1317H, 1st and 2nd editions (Mālikı̄). Fath. Al-Jalı̄l c alā Mukhtas.ar
¯ c¯ ¯
Al- Allāmah Khalı̄l. Būlāq.
¯
Al-Shac arānı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Al-Mı̄zān Al-Kubrā. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄ Al-
¯ ¯
H. alabı̄.
Al-Shāfic ı̄. Al- Umm. Beirut: Dār Al-Mac rifah lilt.ibāc ah wa Al-Nashr.
¯ ¯
Al-Sharqāwı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Tuh.fat al-T
. ullāb. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄ Al-H
. alabı̄.
¯ ¯
c c
Al-Shawkānı̄. Nayl al- Awt.ār. Egypt: Al-Mat.ba ah Al- Uthmāniyyah Al-
¯ ¯
Mis.riyyah.
Al-Shaykh c Elı̄sh. (Mālikı̄). Fath. Al-c Aliyy Al-Mālik fı̄ Al-Fatwā c alā Madhhab
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Al- Imām Mālik. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Taqaddom.
Al-Buhūtı̄. 3rd printing (H
. anbalı̄). Kashshāf Al-Qināc c an Matn Al- Iqnāc .
¯ ¯
Makkah: Mat.ba at Al-Sunnah Al-Muh.ammadiyyah, wa Mat.bac at Al-
c
H
. ukūmah.
751
752 Bibliography
Al-Dardı̄r. (Mālikı̄)A. Al-Sharh. Al-Kabı̄r. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄ Al-H

. alabı̄.
¯
Al-Dardı̄r. (Mālikı̄)B. Al-Sharh. Al-S.aghı̄r. Egypt: Dār Al-Mac ārif.
¯ ¯
Al-H at
. .. t āb. 1st edition (Mālikı̄). Mawāhib Al-Jalı̄l.
c
Al-H
. āfiz. Al-Zayla ı̄. 1st edition, (H
. adı̄th ). Nas.b Al-Rāyah fı̄ Takhrı̄j ah.ādı̄th
¯ ¯ ¯
al-hidāyah.
Al-H
. illı̄. (Sh ı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah). Al-Mukhtas.ar Al-Nāfic fı̄ Fiqh Al- Imāmiyyah.
¯ ¯
Egypt: Dār Al-Kitāb Al-c Arabı̄.
c
Al-H
. usaynı̄ Al- Āmilı̄. (Sh ı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah). Muftāh. Al-Karāmah. Mat.bac at
¯
Al-Shūrā.
¯
Al-H
. ūt Al-Bayrūtı̄. Asnā Al-Mat.ālib.
Al-S.anc ānı̄. 2nd printing. Subul Al-Salām.
Al-T.ah.āwı̄. (H
. anafı̄). Mukhtasar. Egypt: Mat.bac at Dār Al-Kitāb Al-c Arabı̄.
¯ .
Al-Haythamı̄. Majmac Al-Zawā id. Egypt: Maktabat Al-Qudsı̄.
¯
Al-’Imām Al-Nawawı̄/Al-Subkı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Al-Majmūc . Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-
¯
’Imām.
c c
Al-Kāsānı̄. (H
. anafı̄). Badā i Al-S.anā i . 1st printing.
Al-Kulı̄niy. (Shı̄c ah ’Imāmiyyah). Al-Kāfı̄.
¯
Al-Māwardı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Al- Ah.kām Al-Sult.āniyyah. Egypt: Al-Mat.bac ah Al-
¯
Mah.mūdiyyah Al-Tojāriyyah.
Al-Qalyūbı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Sharh. Al-Jalāl Al-Muh.allā Lelmenhāj. Egypt: Mat.bac at

¯ ¯
S.ubı̄h..
Al-Qarāfı̄. (Mālikı̄). Al-Furūq. Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄ Al-H

. alabı̄.
Al-Ramlı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Nihāyat Al-Muh.tāj. Egypt: Al-Mat.bac at Al-Bhiyyah.
¯
Al-Sakhāwı̄. Al-Maqās.id Al-H . asanah. Egypt: Maktabat Al-Kh ānjı̄.
¯ ¯
Al-Samarqandı̄. (H . anafı̄). Tuh.fat Al-Fuqahā . Damascus: Dār Al-Fikr.
c c
Al-Sarakhsı̄. 1st edition (H . anafı̄). Al-Mabsūt.. Mat.ba at Al-Sa ādah.
¯
Al-Suyūt.ı̄. Al-Jāmic Al-S.aghı̄r, wa Al-Fath. Al-Kabı̄r. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Bābı̄
Al-H ¯
. alabı̄.
Al-Suyūt.ı̄. Tanwı̄r Al-H
. awālik, Sh arh Muwat.t.a Mālik. Cairo: Mat.bac at Al-
¯ .
H. alabı̄.
Al-Suyūt.ı̄. (Shāfic ı̄). Al- Ashbāh wa Al-Naz.ā ir.
¯ ¯
Bibliography 753
Al-Zaylac ı̄. (H
. anafı̄ Jurisprudence). Tabyı̄n Al-H
. aqā iq. Al-Mat.bac ah Al-
’Amı̄riyyah.
Khusrū. 1304H (H
. anafı̄). Durar Al-H
. ukkām fı̄ Sharh Gharar Al- Ah.kām. Al-
¯ ¯ . ¯
Mat.bac ah Al-Sharafiyyah.
¯
c
Abd Al-Ghanı̄ Al-Maydānı̄. (H
. anafı̄). Al-Lubāb Sharh. Al-Kitāb. Cairo:
¯ ¯
Mat.bac at S.ubı̄h..
’Ibn Al-’Athı̄r Al-Jazarı̄. Jāmic Al- Us.ūl. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-Sunnah Al-
¯
Muh.ammadiyyah.
’Ibn Al-Humām. (H . anafı̄). Fath. Al-Qadı̄r, Sharh Al-Hidāyah. Cairo: Mat.bac at

¯ .
Mus.t.afā Muh.ammad.
’Ibn Al-Murtad.ā. 1st edition (Shı̄c ah Zaydiyyah). Al-Bah.r Al-Zakhkhār.

¯ ¯ ¯
’Ibn c Ābidı̄n. (H . anafı̄). Hāsh
. ¯ iyat Radd Al-Muh
. tār. Egypt: Mat
. bac
at Al-Bābı̄
Al-H . alabı̄.
’Ibn Daqı̄q Al-c Īd. Al- Ilmām fı̄ Ah.ādı̄th Al- Ah.kām. Damascus: Dār Al-Fikr.
¯
’Ibn H
. ajar. Al-Talkh ı̄s Al-H
. abı̄r. Egypt.
¯ .
’Ibn H
. azm. Al-Muh.allā bi-l āth ār. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-’Imām.
¯
c c
’Ibn Hubayrah. (H . anbalı̄). Al- Ifs.āh. an Ma ānı̄ Al-S.ih.āh.. Al-Maktabah Al-
H
. alabiyyah.
’Ibn Juzayy. (Mālikı̄). Al-Qawānı̄n Al-Fiqhiyyah. Fās: Mat.bac at Al-Nahd.ah.
’Ibn Nujaym. 1290H (H . anafı). Al- Ash bāh wa Al-Naz.ā ir. Egypt: Dār Al-
¯
T.ibāc ah Al-’Amiraiyyah.
c
’Ibn Nujaym. 1334H H
. anafı̄. Al-Bah.r Al-Rā iq. Egypt: Mat.ba at Al-Bābı̄ Al-
H
. alabı̄.
c c c
’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah. (H
. anbalı̄)a. A lām Al-Muwaqqi ı̄n an Rabb Al-
c
Ālamı̄n. Cairo.
’Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah. (H . anbalı̄)b. Al-T. uruq al-H

. ukmiyyah fı̄ Al-Siyāsah
Al-Sharc iyyah. Egypt: Mat.bac at Al-’Ādāb.
¯
’Ibn Qudāmah. Al-Mughnı̄. Beirut: Dār Al-Kutub Al-c Ilmiyyah.
¯
c
’Ibn Rajab. 1st edition (H
. anbalı̄). Al-Qawā id.
c
’Ibn Rushd Al-H . afı̄d. (Mālikı̄). Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid. Egypt: Mat.ba at Al-
¯
’Istiqāmah.
Indian Authors. (H. anafı̄). Al-Fatāwā Al-Hindiyyah. Al-Mat.bac ah Al-

’Amı̄riyyah.
754 Bibliography
lbn-Rushd Al-Qurt.ubı̄. (Mālikı̄). Al-Muqaddimāt Al-Mumahhidāt. Mat.bac at

¯
Al-Sac ādah.
Marc ı̄ ibn Yūsuf. 1st printing (H

. anbalı̄). Ghāyat Al-Muntahā. Damascus: Al-
¯
Maktab Al-’Islāmı̄.
Muh.ammad c Elı̄sh. 1294H (Mālikı̄). Sharh. Manh. Al-Jalı̄l c alā Mukhtas.ar Khalı̄l.
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Al-Mat.bac ah Al-Kubrā.

Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence Volume 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence Volume 2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence Volume 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dr. Wahbah Al-Zuh.

Translated by: Dr. Mahmoud A. El-Gamal

In The Name of Allāh, The Most Gracious, The Merciful

Typeset in LATEX 2ε TM with ArabTEXTM macros by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal

All rights reserved

VIII Guaranty Al-Kafālah 1

60.2 Guaranteed persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

61 Seeking compensation from the principal 33

62 Contemporary Guaranty for a Fee 39

63 Applications to Modern Guaranties 41

IX Transfer of debt (Al-H

64 Definition, legality, and cornerstone 51

65 Transfer of debt Conditions 55

68 Compensation of the Transferee 71

70.4.5 Being owned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

71 Legal Status and Consequences 141

71.2 The right to hold the pawned object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

72 Growth of pawned property 183

73 Pawning Contract Termination 187

74 Debtor-Creditor Disputes 191

XI Settlement (Al-S.ulh.) 195

76 Settlement Conditions 207

77 Legal Status 225

78 Invalid Settlements 229

XII Absolution (Al-’Ibrā’) 233

79.2 Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

80 Absolution Cornerstones 239

81 Absolution Conditions 243

82 Objects of Absolution 253

83 Absolution Types 257

84 Legal Status 259

XIII Entitlement (Al-’Istih.qāq) 263

86 Rulings for Specific Contracts 271

86.1.3 Shāfic ı̄ rulings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

87 Entitlement to Sacrificial Animals 289

XIV Debt-Clearance (Al-Muqās..sah) 291

89 The Object of Debt-Clearance 297

90 Types of Debt-Clearance 299

91 Consequences of Debt-Clearance 307

XV Coercion (Al-’Ikrāh) 311

93 Coercion Conditions 317

94 Coerced Physical Actions 321

94.2.1 Permissibility due to coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

95 Legal Actions 333

XVI Interdiction 341

97 Reasons for Interdiction 351

97.8 The terminally ill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

98 Ending Interdiction 405

99 Indebted Estates 409

XVII Ownership and its characteristics 413

101 Eligibility for Ownership 419

102 Types of Ownership 421

103 Partial Ownership 423

Expiration of the usufruct extraction period . . . . . . 426

104 Establishment of Total Ownership 433

105 Is Private Ownership Absolute? 441

XVIII Ownership-Related Topics 453

106.2.2 Owned wasteland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465

107 Land Reclamation 471

108 Inaccessible Land & Land Distribution 487