UNITED STATES

N UCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION

W
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA. PA 19406-1415

May 13, 20Ll

Mr. Thomas P. Joyce

President and Chief Nuclear Officer
PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09
P.O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING srATtoN, uNlr Nos. 1 AND 2 - NRc

TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 25151183 INSPECTION REPORT
050002721201 1008 and 0500031 1/201 1008

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On April 29,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, using Temporary lnstruction
25151183, "Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The
enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 29,
2011, with Mr. Eilola and other members of your staff.

The objective of this inspection was to promptly assess the capabilities of Salem Nuclear
Generating Station to respond to extraordinary consequences similar to those that have recenily
occurred at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. The results from this inspection,
along with the results from this inspection performed at other operating commercial nuclear
plants in the United States will be used to evaluate the United States nuclear industry's
readiness to safely respond to similar events. These results will also help the NRC to determine
if additional regulatory actions are warranted.

All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this
report, The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if
they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented
by the NRC in a separate report. You are not required to respond to this letter.
T. Joyce 2

ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC's Agencyuide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rmiadams.html (the Public Electronic Reading
Room).
Sincerely,

-l( i\ ln
A

\ Xal^ll^,- / .' Lu A!*,lV.g-,*-

Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief /
Engineering Branch 2 t

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-272;50-31 1

License Nos.: DPR-70; DPR-75

Enclosure: lnspection Report 0500027 21201 1 008 and 0500031 1 1201 1 008

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

 T. Joyce

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading
Room).
Sincerely,

/RN
Lawrence T, Doerflein, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-272: 50-31 1

License Nos.: DPR-70; DPR-75

Enclosure: lnspection Report 0500027 21201 1 008 and 0500031 I 1201 1 008

cc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ

ADAMS PACKAGE: ML1 1 1300168 ADAMS DOCUMENT ACCESSION: ML1 1 1300464

SUNSI Review Complete: LTD (Reviewer's Initials)

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRS\T|-183 Inspection Reports\SAL Tl-183 lR 2011008.docx
After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.
b receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = without attachmenVenclosure = CoDV with aftachmenve lclosure "N"=N P

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS

NAME PMcKenna CCahill/CGC ABurritUAR LDoerflein/LTD

Via emailon
DATE 5112111 5111111 5t11t11 5113111
T. Joyce 3

Distribution Mencl:
W. Dean, RA
D. Lew, DRA
D. Roberts, DRP
J. Clifford, DRP
C. Miller, DRS
P. Wilson, DRS
A. Burritt, DRP
L. Cline, DRP
A. Turilin, DRP
C. Douglas, DRP
D. Schroeder, DRP, SRI
P. McKenna, DRP, Rl
K. McKenzie, DRP, OA
S. Bush-Goddard, Rl OEDO
T. Kobetz, NRR, DIRS
D. Bearde, DRS
RidsNrrPMSalem Resource
RidsNrrDorlLpl 1 -2 Resource
ROPreports Resource
 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos: 50-272,50-311

License Nos: DPR-70, DPR-75

Report No: 050002721201 1 008 and 0500031 1 1201 1008

Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)

Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Location: P.O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

Dates: Aprif 5, 2011 through April 29,2011

lnspector: P. McKenna, Resident Inspector, Salem Units 1 and 2

Approved by: Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief

Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure
 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500027212011008 and 0500031112011008; 04/0512011 -0412912011;Salem Nuclear

Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 25151183 - Followup to the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event.

This report covers an announced Temporary Instruction (Tl) inspection. The inspection was
conducted by a resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process,"
Revision 4, dated December 2006.

INSPECTION SCOPE

The intent of the Tl is to provide a broad overview of the industry's preparedness for events that
may exceed the current design basis for a plant. The focus of the Tl was on (1) assessing the
licensee's capability to mitigate consequences from large fires or explosions on site,
(2) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions,
(3) assessing the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events
accounted for by the station's design, and (4) assessing the thoroughness of the licensee's
walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to
identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events possible
for the site. lf necessary, a more specific followup inspection will be performed at a later date.

INSPECTION RESULTS

All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this
report. The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if
they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented
by the NRC in a separate report.

Enclosure
03.01 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events, typically bounded by
security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section B.S.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident
management guidelines and as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh). Use Inspection
Procedure (lP) 71111.05T, "Fire Protection (Triennial)," Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guideline. lI lP 71111.05T was recently
performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of
inspection. Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel pool. The inspection should include, but not
be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:

Licensee Action Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment.

a. Verify through test or Licensee actions included the inventory of equipment (active and passive) utilized for
inspection that implementation of B.5.b actions and any additional equipment used in Severe Accident
equipment is available Management Guidelines (SAMG). Portable equipment such as pumps and generators were run to
and functional. Active verify readiness. The license identified surveillances/tests/preventive maintenance tasks and
equipment shall be performance frequencies for other identified B.5.b and SAMG equipment, and reviewed the results
tested and passive of recent tests.
equipment shall be
walked down and
inspected. lt is not Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness (e.9., observed a test, reviewed
expected that test results, discussed actions, reviewed records, etc.).
permanently installed
equipment that is tested
under an existing The inspector assessed the licensee's capabilities by conducting a review of the licensee's
regulatory testing walkdown activities. In addition, the inspector independently walked down and inspected all B.5.b
program be retested. contingency response equipment staged at the site. The type of equipment examined included:
interior fire water supply piping and hose stations; portable pump and associated suction and
This review should be discharge hoses, adapters, and tools; portable AC/DC power supplies; and equipment lockers and
done for a reasonable associated tools. The inspector evaluated the staging/storage location of B.5.b related equipment
sample of mitigating to ensure the survivability and availability of equipment. In addition, the inspector also reviewed
strategies/eq uipment. and discussed with responsible site personnel the results of any field testing of equipment
performed to validate its applications in postulated scenarios.

Enclosure
 Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

All active and passive 8.5.b and SAMG equipment was verified in place by the licensee. The
licensee documented minor issues and possible enhancements and entered them into their
Corrective Action Program (CAP). The inspector noted one minor issue with the recurring
preventive maintenance of B.5.b fire hoses and the licensee entered it into their CAP.

Based on the reviews conducted, the inspector concluded that the required mitigation equipment
is available and functional.

Describe the licensee's actions to verify that procedures are in place and can be executed (e.9.,
Licensee Action
walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.).

b. Verify through The licensee identified the procedures utilized to mitigate the consequences of a 8.5.b related
walkdowns or event and severe accidents. Licensee personnelwere then dispatched to walk down all
demonstration that applicable procedures to verify the ability of the procedure to be executed. The licensee walked
procedures to implement down a total of 41 procedures.
the strategies associated
with 8.5.b and 10 CFR
50.54(hh) are in place Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed. Assess whether procedures were
and are executable. in place and could be used as intended.

Enclosure
 Licensees may choose
not to connect or The inspector assessed the licensee's capabilities by conducting a review of the licensee's
operate permanently walkdown activities. In addition, the inspector selected a sample of procedures walked down by
installed equipment the licensee and walked those down with licensed and non-licensed operators to assess: the
during this verification. adequacy and completeness of the procedures/guidelines; familiarity of operators with the
procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and the
This review should be practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated
done for a reasonable scenarios. A few of the procedures selected by the inspector included procedures that had
sample of mitigating suggestions for improvement as of a result of the 2008 NRC Tl-171 8.5.b Phase 2 and 3
strategies/eq uipment. Mitigating Strategy inspection.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The licensee verified that all 8.5.b and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) procedures were in place and were
executable. The licensee documented a few minor issues and possible enhancements and
entered them into their CAP. The inspector did not identify any further issues and noted that
suggestions for procedural improvement from the 2008 Tl-171 inspection had been implemented.

Based on these reviews, the inspector concluded that procedures to implement the strategies
associated with 8.5.b and 10 CFR 50.54(hh) were in place and were executable.

Describe the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding training and qualifications of operators
Licensee Action
and support staff.

c. Verify the training and The licensee verified that the training and qualifications of operators and all emergency response
qualifications of organization positions were current for activities related to 8.5.b and SAMGS. This review
operators and the identified the number of personnel in each of the required positions and identified the associated
support staff needed to required qualifications. Both 8.5.b and SAMG training is conducted every two years for operators
implement the and every six years for emergency response personnel.
procedures and work
instructions are current

Enclosure
 for activities related to
Security Order Section Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess training and
8.5.b and severe qualifications of operators and support staff.
accident management
guidelines as required by
10 cFR 50.54 (hh). The inspectors examined the training material provided to the site personnel to be tasked with
implementing the B.5.b mitigation SAMG strategies. The inspectors assessed the licensee's
training and qualification activities by conducting a review of training and qualification materials
and records related to B.5.b and SAMG event response.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

No deficiencies were identified, with one exception. The licensee identified one issue regarding
the 6-year continuing training frequency requirement for non-operations personnel qualified as a
SAMG evaluator (similarly qualified licensed operators receive this training every two years). A
CAP notification was written to address this issue.

Based upon the inspector's review of formal training and interviews, the inspector concluded that
overall B.5.b and SAMG training was appropriate.

Describe the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding applicable agreements and contracts
Licensee Action
are in place.

d. Verify that any Licensee actions included the identification of all applicable contracts and agreements committed
applicable agreements to be in place for the mitigation of a 8.5.b related event. The licensee verified that the contracts
and contracts are in and agreements were current, and documented whether or not the contracts/agreements were
place and are capable of capable of meeting the mitigation strategy.
meeting the conditions
needed to mitioate the

Enclosure
consequences of these
events. For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with offsite entities,
describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and contracts are in place and current (e.9.,
confirm that offsite fire assistance agreement is in place and current).

This review should be

done for a reasonable The inspector verified that the licensee had in place current memoranda of understanding (MOU)
sample of mitigating or a formal agreement with off-site agencies to provide assistance in mitigation strategies. The
strategies/eq uipment. inspector selected a sample of MOUs for detailed review to verify consistency between the MOU
and the associated mitigation strategy. Additionally, the inspector interviewed licensee personnel
to discuss local and state emergency response.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

No deficiencies were identified. The inspector concluded that applicable agreements and
contracts are in place and are capable of meeting the conditions needed to mitigate the
consequences of these events.

Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems noted by the
Licensee Action
licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of any existing mitigating strategy.

Enclosure
e. Review any open | | Several CAP notifications and orders were reviewed during this inspection, and are listed in the
corrective action | | attachment to this report. The inspector concluded that there was not a significant adverse impact
documents to assess | | on the 8.5.b strategy mitigating capabilities.
problems with mitigating
strategy implementation
identified by the
licensee. Assess the
impact of the problem on
the mitigating capability
and the remaining
capability that is not
impacted.

03.02 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All
Alternating Current Power," and station design, is functional and valid. Refer to Tl 25151120, "lnspection of lmplementation of
Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action ltem A-22" as a guideline. lt is not intended that Tl 25151120 be completely reinspected.
The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:

Describe the licensee's actions to verify the adequacy of equipment needed to mitigate an SBO
Licensee Action
event.

a. Verify through The licensee reviewed procedures used for mitigating SBO events to identify the required
walkdowns and equipment for walkdowns. The licensee then conducted walkdowns of this equipment to ensure it
inspection that all was adequate and properly staged. Equipment included but was not limited to the SBO air
required materials are compressor, portable diesel generator battery chargers, and the Salem Unit 3 gas turbine
adequate and properly generator.
staged, tested, and
maintained.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.

Enclosure
 The inspector assessed the licensee's capability to mitigate SBO conditions by conducting a
review of the licensee's walkdown activities. ln addition, the inspector selected a sample of
equipment utilized/required for mitigation of a SBO and conducted independent walkdowns of that
equipment to verify that the equipment was properly aligned and staged.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The licensee and inspector reviews verified that SBO equipment was ready to respond to a SBO
condition. Minor discrepancies were identified, and the licensee initiated the appropriate CAP
notifications. They are listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment of this report. The
inspector reviewed the associated CAP notifications, and determined the licensee's initial
response, including their assessment and prioritization were appropriate.

Licensee Action Describe the licensee's actions to verify the capability to mitigate an SBO event.

b. Demonstrate through The licensee performed a walkdown of the procedures used to combat an SBO condition to
walkdowns that demonstrate that the procedures were executable.
procedures for response
to an SBO are
executable. Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as
intended.

The inspector assessed the licensee's SBO capabilities by conducting a review of the licensee's
walkdown activities. In addition, the inspector selected several sections of the procedures walked
down by the licensee and conducted walkdowns to independently verify the licensee's
conclusions.

Enclosure
 Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The licensee documented minor issues and possible enhancements and entered them into their
CAP. No additional deficiencies were identifled by the inspector.

03.03 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Refer to lP
71111.01, "Adverse Weather Protection," Section 02.04, "Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding" as a guideline. The
inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through walkdowns and inspections
that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged. These walkdowns and inspections shall include
verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functional.

Describe the licensee's actions to verify the capability to mitigate existing design basis flooding
Licensee Action
events.

Verify through The licensee performed walkdowns and inspections of permanent plant equipment to ensure that
walkdowns and accessible doors, barriers, penetration seals, drains, and sumps were functional. The licensee
inspection that all verified by walkdown and inspection that all required material and portable equipment was
required materials are properly staged. Regarding the portable equipment, the licensee's walkdowns ensured it was
adequate and properly properly staged and would remain functionalfollowing a safe shutdown earthquake event. The
staged, tested, and rooms and structures that were considered in the review included those required by design basis
maintained. to mitigate the consequences of a flooding event, both internal and external.

Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether
procedures were in place and could be used as intended.

Enclosure
 The inspector assessed the licensee's capabilities to mitigate flooding by conducting a review of
the licensee's walkdown activities. In addition, the inspector conducted independent walkdowns of
selected flood mitigation equipment to assess the licensee's flood mitigating capabilities. The
inspector also conducted a walkdown of several flood penetration seals with licensee staff to verify
the licensee's procedure and inspection criteria. The licensee's flood mitigation procedures were
reviewed to verify usability. The inspector assessed these procedures to be usable as intended.

Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.

The inspector concluded that all required materials are adequate and properly staged, tested, and
maintained to respond to an internal or external flood within the plant's design basis. While no
operability or significant concerns were identified, the licensee and the inspector identified several
minor issues, which the licensee entered into their CAP. The associated CAP notifications are
listed in the Supplemental Information Attachment of this report. The inspector reviewed the
associated CAP notifications and determined that the licensee's initial responses, including their
assessment and prioritization, were appropriate.

03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and
flood events to identify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events possible for the site. Assess
the licensee's development of any new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.9., entered it in to the corrective action
program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns and inspections of
important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures, and fire and flood response
equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important function. Use lP 71111.21, "Component
Design Basis Inspection," Appendix 3, "Component Walkdown Considerations," as a guideline to assess the thoroughness of the
licensee's walkdowns and inspections.

Describe the licensee's actions to assess the potential impact of seismic events on the availability
Licensee Action
of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategies.

Enclosure
a. Verify through The licensee developed an attribute list for the inspection of important equipment needed to
walkdowns that all mitigate fire and flood events to indentify the potential that the equipment's function could be lost
required materials are during seismic events possible for the site. The licensee then performed walkdowns and
adequate and properly inspections of temporary and permanent plant equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events
staged, tested, and to ensure that the failure/rupture of these or surrounding structures, systems, or components
maintained. would not degrade the capability of the credited system to perform design basis functions.

For portable equipment, the licensee's assessment included reviewing potential vulnerabilities
related to associated procedures for equipment usage and equipment storage (to protect it from a
seismic event). Regarding permanently installed fire protection equipment, the licensee's review
evaluated its seismic classification and associated procedures used to operate the system for
fighting fires.

Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable. Assess whether
procedures were in place and could be used as intended.

The inspector conducted multiple walkdowns, both independently and in conjunction with licensee
personnel, of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential
that the equipment's function could be lost during a seismic event. This equipment included, but
was not limited to:
. all major 8.5.b contingency response equipment staged throughout the site;
o portions of the installed fire protection and suppression equipment in various plant areas;
. the installed fire pumps and their controls; and
o watertight doors, roof hatches and floor plugs at the plant's intake structure and other
exterior/building areas.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's flood and fire mitigation procedures to assess usability. The
results of the inspector's reviews aligned with the licensee's conclusions that there were a number
of seismic vulnerabilities, as described below. The inspector determined that the licensee meets
the current licensing and design basis for 8.5.b, fire protection, and flooding.

Enclosure
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Briefly summarize any new
mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of their reviews.

The licensee's reviews for this issue determined that non safety-related structures, systems, and
components, in general, were not considered to be seismically qualified. This included the
majority of the fire protection system, including the installed fire pumps and the fresh water
storage tanks. The licensee also determined that firefighting equipment staged to respond to
B.S.b events was stored in buildings that were not seismically qualified, as a seismic event and
B.5.b event have not previously been assumed to occur coincidentally. The licensee also
determined that the portable fire protection equipment storage areas in the Nuclear Operations
Support Facility and the Turbine Building were also not seismically qualified.

The inspector confirmed that the vulnerabilities were properly entered and characterized in the
CAP. Potential corrective actions and/or any associated mitigating strategies were under review
at the close of this inspection.

Enclosure
Meetinos

4OAO Exit Meetinq

The lnspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Eilola and other members of
licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 29,2011. Proprietary
information reviewed by the inspector during the inspection was returned to the licensee.
The Inspector verified the inspection report does not contain proprietary information.

12 Enclosure
 A-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

H. Berrick, Regulatory Assurance

E. Eilola, Plant Manager
C. Fricker, Site Vice President
J. Garecht, Operations Director
A. Johnson, Manager Design Engineering
J. Kandasamy, Manager Salem Regulatory Assurance
J. Konovalchick, Operations Shift Manager
E. Powell, Shift Operations Manager
L. Rajkowski, Engineering Director
B. Thomas, Senior Compliance Engineer
E. Villar, Regulatory Assurance

Other

E. Rosenfeld, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. lnclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report'

CAP Notifications with an asterisk (*) indicate the document was written as a result of the
inspection effort.

03.01 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond
design basis events

Procedures:

FP-AA-0003, Safe Set-up and Operation of the Emergency Skid Pump, Rev. 3
FP-AA-0020, Emergency Resource lnformation, Rev. 0
SC.MD-AB.ZZ-0001, Installation of Temporary 4kY Power Cables to CCWRHR Motors, Rev. 6
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Manually Depressurizing Steam Generators Utilizing MS10s, Rev.1
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0002, Alternate Primary Cooling to ECCS, Rev. 3
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0004, Temporary Cooling Water to Salem Diesel Generators, Rev. 2
Attachment
 A-2

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0005, Manual Operation of the Turbine Driven AFW Pump, Rev. 1

SC.OP-AM.TSC-0007, Emergency Fillto RWST/AFWST, Rev. 4
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008, Emergency Fillto Spent Fuel Pool, Rev. 5
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0009, Flooding Containment Utilizing Portable Diesel Driven Pump, Rev. 1
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0010, Use of Portable Spray to Reduce Fission Product Releases, Rev. 1
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0012, Feeding Steam Generators Utilizing Portable Diesel Pump, Rev. 1
SC.OP-AM.TSC-0013, Service Water System Cross-Connect Alignment, Rev. 0
SC.OP-AM.TSC-1000, Salem EDMG Initial Plant Response, Rev. 0
SC.OP-AM.TSC-1001, Salem EDMG Initial Damage Assessment, Rev. 0
SC.OP-PT.SF-0002, Portable Spent Fuel Pit Pump Full Flow Test, Rev. 5
SH.OP-AM.TSC-0001, Supplemental Severe Accident Management Guideline, Rev. 8

Completed Tests:

30201658, 1-Year Spent Fuel Pit Portable Pump Full Flow Test,3l22l11
30190337, Annual Godwin Pump PM,3119111
30198502, 8.5.b Equipment Inventory, 3119111
30204142,3-Month SFP Portable Pump Functional Check, 3122111

Calculations/Evaluations:

80096177, B.5.b Scenario Calculation, Rev. 2

Notifications:

2050081 6, FP-AA-201 0 Emergency Resource lnformation Procedure, 31 191 1 1

20501367, Use of Vents in Procedure SC.OP-AM.TSC-0013 Requires Scaffolding,3121l1l

20501445, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0002 Alternate Primary Cooing to ECCS Enhancement,3121111
20501458, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0013 SW Cross-Connect Alignment Procedure Change, 3121111
20501464, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008 Emergency Fillto Spent Fuel Pool Enhancement, 3121111
20501465, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0008 Emergency Fillto Spent Fuel Pool Enhancement, 3121111
20501467, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0004 Temporary Cooling Water to Salem EDGs Change, 3121111
20501478, Forklift Qualifications Needed for 8.5.b Mitigating Strategies, 3121111
20501526, 8.5.b Godwin Pump is Shared between Salem and Hope Creek, 3121111
20501536, Hose Length for Flooding Containment - Procedure SC.OP-AM.TSC-0009, 3122111
20501655, SC.EP-AM.ZZ-0001Severe Accident Guidelines Procedure Enhancement,3l22l11
20501826, Emergency Fill to Spent Fuel Pool Validation Papenrvork,3l23l11
20500815, FP-AA-0003 Safe Setup and Operation of Emergency Skid Pump Change, 3119111
20501444,8.5.b Hose Ratings for Feeding Steam Generators ,3121111
20501034,IER 11-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3117111
20500886, 8.5.b Pump out of Service Due to Degraded Fuel,3l18l11
20500977, 8.5. b Eq uipment Transportation, 31 1 81 1 I
20501223, 8.5.b Equipment Labeling, 311 9/1 1
20501267, 8.5.b Storage Area Cleanliness, 3121 111
20501463, B.S.b Hose Ratings, 3121111
20501 470, 8.5.b Equipment Storage Location, 3121 111
20501476, 8.5.b Inventory List Enhancement, 3121111
20501477, 8.5.b Generators Batteries Recurring Tasks, 3121111
Attachment
 A-3

20501502, Satellite Phone Testing, 3122111

20501632, SupplementalSAMG Inventory ltems Not in Stock, 3122111
*20507832, 8.5.b Fire Hose Hydrostatic Test Procedures, 4126111

Other:

70085974, FASA Self-Assessment Report of Site Specific lmplementation of 8.5,b Phase 2&3
Mitigating Strategies, 8l24lOB
70120777, IER 1 1-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3124111
MOU Between PSEG Nuclear, LLC and the Kent County Department of Emergency Services
for Radiological Emergency Preparedness, 121 15110
MOU Between PSEG Nuclear, LLC and the Salem County Department of Emergency Services
for Radiological Emergency Preparedness, 3l30l1O
MOU Between PSEG Nuclear, LLC, New Castle County, Delaware and the Delaware
Emergency Management Agency, 4123110
MOU Between PSEG, Nuclear, LLC and the Cumberland County Office of Emergency
Management, 9/10/10
MOU Between Salem - Hope Creek Generating Stations and the State of Delaware Department
of Safety and Homeland Security Delaware Emergency Management Agency,4l23l1A
MOU Between Wilmington Fire Department and PSEG, Nuclear, LLC for Radiological
Emergency Preparedne ss, 1 I 41 1 1
SC.EP-AM.ZZ-0001, Severe Accident Guidelines, Rev. 0

03.02 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions

Procedures:

ER-AA-2O1, Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability Program, Rev. 0

ES-45.0003, Station Blackout Endurance Calculation, Rev. 1
S2.OP-AB.LOOP-0001, Loss of OftSite Power, Rev. 23
S2.OP-SO.500-0125, SBO Diesel - Vital Battery Chargers, Rev. 0
S3.OP-PT.JET-0001, Dead Bus Bootstrap Start Test, Rev. 14
S3.OP-SO.JET-0001, Gas Turbine Operation, Rev. 32
SC.DE-PS.ZZ-0040, Salem Station Blackout Program, Rev. 3
SC.OP-AB .ZZ-0001, Adverse Environmental Conditions, Rev. 13
SC.OP-SO.500-0125, SBO Diesel- Miscellaneous Switchyard, Rev. 1

Completed Tests:

30204889, Switchyard Generator 3 Month PM, Q3122111

30203189, B.5.b Equipment Inventory, 03119111

Calculations/Evaluations:

314204, Station Blackout Analysis for Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Rev. 5

Attachment
 A-4

Notifications:

20501034, IER 1 1-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3117 111

20501314, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0003 Alt Power Supply to Battery Chargers Enhancement,3l22l1l
20501477, SBO Vital Battery Charger Generators Batteries Recurring Tasks, 3121111
20501525, SC.OP-AM.TSC-0003 Alt Power Supply to Battery Chargers Enhancement,3l2ll11
20501625, SBO Vital Battery Charger DG Battery has Corroded Terminals,3l22l11
20501630, SBO Vital Battery Charger Diesel Generators Fluid Checks,3l22l11
20501760, SC.OP-SO.500-0125 SBO Diesel- Miscellaneous Switchyard Revision, 3123111
20501944, 51(2).OP-AB.LOOP-0001 LOOP Power Procedure Revision Request, 3124111
20502267, SC.OP-SO.SA-0002 Temporary Station Air Compressor Operation Revision,3l24l11
20502855, SC.OP-SO.MET-0001 MET Shelter EDG Operation Procedure Revision, 3129111

Other:

70120777, IER 1 1-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3124111

03.03 Assess the licensee's capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events
required by station design

Procedures:

NC.OP-DG.ZZ-0002, Severe Weather Guide, Rev. 7

SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, Rev. 4
SC.MD-PM.Z2-0036, Watertight Door Inspection and Repair, Rev. 5
SC.OP-AB .ZZ-0001, Adverse Environmental Conditions, Rev. 1 3

Drawinqs:

602105, Unit 1 and 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room Numbering Floor Plan, Rev. 1
602797, Unit 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room 25445 #23 AFW Pump, Rev. 2
602798, Unit 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room 25438-SW Piping Room No. 1, Rev. 1
602799, Unit 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room 25438-SW Piping Room No. 2, Rev. 1
604709, Unit 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room 25438-SW Piping Room No. 1, Rev. 0
604710, Unit 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room 25439-SW Piping Room No. 2, Rev. 0
604726, Unit 2 Penetration Seal Locations Room 25440-SW Piping Room No. 3, Rev. 0

Notifications:

20503202, SWIS Door, SISWl-1DOOR-SW-8 has Non-watertight Lock Set,4l1l11

20503545, Access Plate lnstallation Nonconforming with Drawing and Standards,414111
20501034, IER 1 1-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3117111
2050301 1, Minor Watertight Door Defects, 411111
20503012, Watertight Door Gasket Painted, 411111
20503203, Watertight Door Gasket Loose, 411111
20503266, Watertight Door Gasket Painted, 411111
2050331 1, Watertight Door Gasket Loose, 414111
20503547, Service Water Bay Roof Hatch Minor Leak, 414111
Attachment
 A-5

20503549, Service Water Bay Roof Hatch Minor Leak, 414111

20505293, OP-AA-1 08-1 1 1-1001 Procedure Revision, 4115111
*20507835, Label Request Penseal N-25439-011, 4126111
.20507836, Label Request Penseal N-25439-012, 4126111
.20507838, Label Request Penseal W-25445-004, 4126111
.20507839, Label Request Penseal 5-25445-003, 4126111
Other:

70120777,IER 11-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3124111

03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensee's walkdowns and inspections of

important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the
potential that the equipment's function could be lost during seismic events

Procedures:

NC.FP-PM.ZZ-0007, Firefighting and Rescue Equipment Inventory, Rev. 5

51.FP-SV.FS-0022, Class 1 Fire Hose Station Visual Inspection, Rev. 5
51.FP-SV.FS-0066, Relay Room Halon Cylinders Volume and Pressure Check, Rev. 8
S2.FP-SV.FS-0022, Class 1 Fire Hose Station Visual lnspection, Rev. 4
52.FP-SV.FS-0066, Relay Room Halon Cylinders Volume and Pressure Check, Rev. 7

Completed Tests:

30202903, 92-Day Preventative Maintenance on Fire Protection Equipment,4l13l11

Drawinqs:

205222, Salem Nos. 1 and 2 Fire Protection - No. 2 Unit TGA, Service Building, Administration
Building, Switch Yard, Foam Tank House, Sh. 4, Rev. 59
205222, Salem Nos. 1 and 2 Fire Protection - No. 1 Unit Aux Building, Drumming Area,
Containment, Yard and Intake Structure, Sh. 1, Rev.61
205222, Salem Nos. 1 and 2 Fire Protection - No. 1 Unit TGA, Service Building, Administration
Building, Switch Yard, Foam Tank House, Sh. 3, Rev. 59
205222, Salem Nos. 1 and 2 Fire Protection - No. 2 Unit Aux Building, Drumming Area,
Containment, Yard and Intake Structure, Sh. 2, Rev. 60
205242, Unit 1 Service Water - Nuclear Area, Rev. 93
205249, Salem Units 1 and2 Fuel Oil, Sh. 1, Rev.42
205249, Salem Units 1 and2 Fuel Oil, Sh.2, Rev.34
205249, Salem Units 1 and2 Fuel Oil, Sh.3, Rev.29
205342, Unit 1 Service Water - Nuclear Area, Rev. 76
218263, Salem Nos. 1 and2 Aux Building Fire Protection Piping, Sh. 1, Rev.31
218263, Salem Nos. 1 and 2 Aux Building Fire Protection Piping, Sh. 2, Rev. 1
218263, Salem Nos. 1 and 2 Aux Building Fire Protection Piping, Sh. 3, Rev. 0

Attachment
 A-6

Notifications:

20501034, IER 11-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3117111

20504382, B.5.b Equipment Storage Area Seismic lmprovements, 411Ol11
20505293, Revise SC.OP-AB .ZZ-0001, 411511 1
"20508146, IER 11-1 Section 4 Tracking Requirement, 4128111

Other:

600256, Unit 2 Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System, Rev. 18

600257 , Unit 1 Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System, Rev. 19
70120777,IER 11-1 Fukushima Daiichi Earthquake Actions, 3124111
Individual Plant Examination Report Salem Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2,7130193
Salem Generating Station Individual Pant Examination for External Events, 1/96

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agencyuide Documents Access and Management System

CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidelines
SBO Station Blackout
TI Temporary Instruction

Attachment