THIRD DIVISION

April 10, 2019

G.R. No. 224638

ROLANDO D. CORTEZ, Petitioner
vs.
LUZ G. CORTEZ, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Petitioner Rolando D. Cortez assails in this petition for review on certiorari the

Decision1 dated November 5, 2015 and the Resolution2 dated May 13, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100062. The CA affirmed the
Decision3 dated July 9, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City,
which denied petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent
Luz G. Cortez on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner and respondent were married on March 5, 1990. On June 9, 2003,

petitioner filed an Amended Petition4 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on
the ground of his and respondent's psychological incapacity. He alleged that
respondent was introduced to him by the former's brother and the latter's friend. In
February 1990, he was invited to a birthday party of respondent's cousin at the
latter's house, and after consuming three bottles of beer, he became dizzy and
passed out. When he woke up, he was already in a room with respondent and was
clad only in his underwear and they were covered with a blanket. Respondent's
brother, a policeman, suddenly entered the room and said "May nangyari na pala sa
inyo, dapat panagutan mo iyan." He then went home to his mother's house in
disbelief.5

Petitioner claimed that at about the same time, he was already scheduled to work
abroad as a seaman. While at the airport, he was stopped by a hold-departure order
issued by the POEA because of respondent's complaint as she was then pregnant.
He was forced by respondent's brothers to marry respondent before a Municipal
Trial Court Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thereafter, he and respondent went to
his agency where he designated her as his allottee. They went to the POEA to
submit their marriage contract and the allotment paper, and he was able to leave for
his seaman duty. They never had a honeymoon nor sexual intercourse.6

Petitioner averred that while he was abroad, respondent gave birth to a son named
John Rol G. Cortez on September 14, 1990. When he came back to the Philippines
in March 1991, he was forced by respondent and her brothers to attend the child's
baptism on March 31, 1993 and paid for it. He never lived with respondent since his
return as he stayed in his sister's house in Valenzuela City until his departure for
abroad on October 16, 1991. While overseas, he was shocked to learn from
respondent that she had given birth to a baby girl on February 3, 1992 who was
named Rose Lyn G. Cortez. The baby was baptized upon his return to the
Philippines in October 1992, and he paid for the expenses. He tried to religiously
give support despite his doubts and reservations. However, in 1994, he came to
know that respondent had a husband and a child in Samar by the name of Nida
Guimbaolibot, thus, he suspended giving support to respondent and the two
children. However, respondent filed a case of abandonment against him but was
later dismissed, as they executed a compromise agreement for the support of the
children.7

Petitioner claimed that: upon his return to the Philippines in 1998 from his work
overseas, he subjected himself to a semenal examination which showed that he had
low sperm count and did not have the capacity to impregnate a woman; he
continued giving financial support to avoid being harassed, but stressed that he
never cohabited with respondent; and he claimed that they got married not out of
love but because of respondent's desire to ensure material support for herself and
the children.8

In her Answer,9 respondent alleged that she and petitioner were introduced by a

common friend in 1988; that they began to have a deep relationship sharing each
other's pains and secrets; that she intimated to petitioner that she had been sexually
abused before and bore a child; that they became sweethearts and he would sleep
over at her apartment. When she got pregnant, they decided to get married on
March 5, 1990 before a Municipal Trial Court Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan. When
petitioner left for overseas work, they stayed in touch; that he is a responsible
husband who saw to it that his wife be named as his allottee. On September 14,
1990, their son was born and petitioner came home for his baptism. She declared
that she was five months pregnant when petitioner left again for abroad on October
16 1991 and that the child was baptized upon petitioner's return in October 1992.
She claimed that their marital woes started in 1994 when petitioner told her that his
new year's wish was to be with another woman, Susan Barry; that they began to
have fights and petitioner left their apartment in 1995. She filed a complaint for
abandonment and demanded support for their children. She learned that petitioner
and Susan Barry are now living together.

Petitioner consulted Dr. Felicitas Artiaga-Soriano, a psychiatrist, whose psychiatric

evaluation report stated that petitioner is a person with dependency inclination and
has a passive aggressive personality disorder, and was emotionally scarred and
bitter for having been forced to marry respondent without love, hence, he had no
intention whatsoever to do the duties and obligations of a husband and a father. On
the other hand, she found respondent to be suffering from an anti-social personality
disorder and that her deceitfulness and persistence in getting money from petitioner
had traumatized the latter even more. She declared both parties psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.10

On July 9, 2012, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The marriage of Rolando D. Cortez

and Luz G. Cortez subsists and remains valid.
Let a copy of this [O]rder be furnished to the parties and their counsels, the Civil
Registrars of Valenzuela City and Meycauayan, Bulacan, the National Statistics
Office, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City.

SO ORDERED.11

The RTC made the following disquisition:

The court cannot close its eyes with the evidence on record. All the portrayal of
petitioner about himself and the respondent is the opposite of what he described.

The evidence showed that prior to their marriage on March 5, 1990, petitioner and
respondent already knew each other. He knew their ten-year age difference. In the
postcard dated August 28, 1988 he sent to respondent, petitioner showed that he
cared about respondent by writing the words: "Pls. take care of yourself and always
pray to GOD." Petitioner personally applied for a marriage license which he
subscribed on February 22, 1990. On March 5, 1990, he signed an allotment slip
making the respondent as the authorized person to receive the allotment. And in the
said allotment slip, the address of both the petitioner and respondent are the same,
that is 3rd Floor St. Cruz [A]partment, Doña Mercedes II Subd., Malhacan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. He likewise made respondent as his allottee when he left
abroad in 1992 and in 1994. He attended the baptism of his son John Rol, and
contrary to his assertion that his mother learned only later about his marriage with
respondent, the evidence showed that his mother was present during the baptismal
party of his son. Petitioner also attended to the baptismal of their second child.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that he did not love respondent, did not live with
her or have sex with her, the pictures depicting petitioner and respondent on the bed
together with respondent wearing skimpy clothes marked as Exhs. 12-13, clearly
showed that petitioner and respondent were intimate with each [other] and appeared
to be happy together. It was not denied that said pictures were taken sometime in
March 1991 to October 1991 while petitioner was in the Philippines using the
camera bought by petitioner from abroad. While petitioner was abroad, he showed
that he cared for his family by writing respondent a letter asking for her
understanding and asking her to take care of herself and their children and promised
to respondent that he will save money so that they could put up a business. In order
to secure the future of his children with respondent, petitioner invested on
educational plans. And even if already separated with respondent, petitioner did not
stop supporting his children.

xxxx

Petitioner's claim that respondent is also psychologically incapacitated to comply

with her marital obligations is unfounded. Record shows that respondent was
actually a caring wife and a loving mother to her children. Respondent had shown
that she is capable of fulfilling her martial obligations in the way she cared for the
[petitioner] and their children. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for
abandonment on January 24, 1995[,] which was amended on February 15, 1995 to
obligate petitioner to support his children which he actually abandoned. Respondent
should not be faulted for filing the case against petitioner to compel him to support
his children. All respondent wanted was for petitioner to support their children which
is his obligation as a father. As shown in petitioner's own evidence, he entered into a
compromise with respondent on July 17, 1995 resulting in the dismissal of his case.

xxxx
Petitioner's denial that he fathered the two children of respondent is unsubstantiated.
The doctor who allegedly examined his sperm count was not presented in court to
prove his allegation that he could not bear a child. As admitted by petitioner, at the
beginning he did not doubt the paternity of his children. He only started to doubt the
paternity of his children when he found out that respondent had a child before they
got married. In short, petitioner is not denying that he and respondent were actually
living together upon his return from assignment abroad, for which reason the
children were created. x x x.

xxxx

Besides in his authorization dated November 21, 2000 addressed to Scholarship

Plan Phils., Inc. given to respondent marked as Exh. 4, petitioner described John
Rol Cortez and Rose Lyn Cortez as "my children" and "our children."12

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an

Order13 dated October 4, 2012.

Petitioner appealed the Decision to the CA. After the submission of the parties'
respective Briefs, the case was submitted for decision.

On November 5, 2015, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 09 July 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 172, Valenzuela City) is SUSTAINED.

SO ORDERED.14

The CA gave credence to respondent's claim that he and respondent had an initially
loving and harmonious relationship that turned sour after petitioner decided to be
with another woman. It found that the totality of the established facts and
circumstances did not prove psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article
36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution

dated May 13, 2016.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner.

The issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that
the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that either or both
parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital
obligations which would result in the nullity of their marriage.

We find no merit in the petition.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

In Yambao v. Republic of the Phils.,15 We stated:

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness.16

and in Republic of the Philippines v. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico,17 We held:

The psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be

characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b)
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.

We find no error was committed by the CA when it concurred with the RTC's finding
that petitioner failed to show that he and respondent were both psychologically
incapable of knowing and performing their marital and parental obligations. A
perusal of the records would show that such finding is supported by the evidence.
We quote with approval the CA's findings, in this wise:

x x x While petitioner-appellant described their marriage as one attended by force

and reluctance, respondent-appellee painted a picture of an initially loving and
harmonious relationship that turned sour after petitioner-appellant decided to be with
another woman.

The pieces of evidence on record appear to be more in consonance with the version
of respondent-appellee who incidentally, appears determined to save the marriage.

For one thing, the postcard dated 28 August 1988 that was sent by petitioner-
appellant to respondent-appellee supports her claim that they already had a
relationship even before 1989. Moreover, the signature of petitioner-appellant on the
Application for Marriage License dated 22 February 1990 belie his claim that he was
forced to marry respondent-appellee on their wedding day, specifically, 05 March
1990. Additionally, the pictures of the couple and their children undeniably depict
filial cohabitation as a family and, including his letters and educational plans for the
children, show that petitioner-appellant genuinely cared for respondent-appellee and
their children. Furthermore, the claim of petitioner-appellant disputing his paternity of
the two (2) children, self-serving and uncorroborated by scientific evidence, is
undeserving of credence; even more so as We also note that petitioner-appellant
continued to support the children even after the parties have already separated in
fact, which conduct is inconsistent with the allegations now being advanced by
petitioner-appellant.

xxxx

In this case, both parties undoubtedly comprehend the nature and importance of
their spousal and parental duties. The letters of respondent-appellee to petitioner-
appellant attached to his Reply dated 9 October 2003 - demonstrate the former's
capacity and willingness to understand and forgive the latter even after he had
committed infidelity to their marital union. Petitioner-appellant described respondent-
appellee to be deceitful and manipulative; yet, in contrast, she asked for his
forgiveness for being a nagging wife and for being jealous. In Our view, these are
not the qualities of a person who is psychologically incapacitated to understand and
comply with the essential marital obligations espoused under the law.

Finally, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner-appellant's contentions
are true, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage would still fail because the
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the parties' alleged psychological
incapacity have not been proven. Here, the complained acts depicting the alleged
psychological disorder of the parties happened after the marriage. There was
likewise no showing of any underlying cause rooted in the parties' childhood or
adolescence that could have triggered a disorder. x x x Mere stubbornness or
refusal to cohabit with his or her spouse or the act of cohabiting with another woman
will not be automatically considered as a psychological disorder. Moreover,
demanding financial support for one's own children cannot even be considered
morally or fundamentally wrong, much less a disorder.18

Factual findings of the CA, especially if they coincide with those of the RTC, as in
the instant case, is generally binding on us.19 In a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, this
Court, may not review the findings of facts all over again. It must be stressed that
this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to re-examine and weigh
anew the respective evidence of the parties.20 The jurisprudential doctrine that
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court, must remain
undisturbed, unless the factual findings are not supported by the evidence on
record.21 We find no reason not to apply this doctrine in the instant case.

Petitioner reiterates that he married respondent not out of love but because he was
forced to marry her in order to lift the hold departure order made by the POEA and to
be able to work abroad as a seaman, hence, he is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. Such claim does not rise to
the level of psychologically incapacity that would nullify his marriage. In Republic of
the Phils. v. Spouses Romero,22 We held:

That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter's parents,
does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article
36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios, the Court held that:

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.23

Petitioner argues that he might have neglected or refused to act in accordance with
the norms imposed or expected by society or might have found difficulty in
performing such acts, but his neglect, refusal or difficulty was made or committed
without realizing that he has marital obligations to perform as husband to
respondent. Petitioner relies on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Soriano
which showed the antecedence, gravity and incurability of his psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The Report stated, among
others, that petitioner was the youngest of 8 children of a strict father and a mother
who was not into mothering; that he grew up with affectional deprivation; that feeling
confused, inadequate and inclined to be dependent, he needed support from people
around him, waver in his stance and adjustment when confronted by unfamiliar and
difficult situations. Thus, Dr. Soriano concluded that:

As for the petitioner, who has introversive learning, fraught with underlying anxiety
and fears because of his marital experience leaving him emotionally scarred and
bitter. Forced to marry the respondent without love and without the intention to do
the obligations of marriage aside from financial support as demanded by the
respondent, made him also psychologically incapacitated to do the duties and
obligations of marriage based on lack of intention, has no inclination whatsoever to
know the other no disposition to do service to others and is totally indifferent to the
presence of the other - as he did not love the respondent since.24

xxxx

Thus, the antecedence can be traced to his rearing and family environment making
him a person with dependency inclination and passive-aggressive in traits. As said,
his psychological incapacity stems from his traits and his not loving the respondent
from the very beginning. That is where gravity comes in as that is obviously, solid
evidence, that he, from the beginning had no intentions whatsoever to do the duties
and obligations of a husband and a father.25

We find that the report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits incapacitated
him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. On the contrary, the
report established that because petitioner was forced to marry respondent without
love, he had no intention to do his full obligations as a husband. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part
of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.26

Notably, petitioner admitted that it was only when he learned in 1994 that
respondent had a child prior to their marriage in 1990 that he stopped giving support
to respondent and their two children; that because of the abandonment case filed
against him and the threats coming from respondent's brothers if he would stop
supporting respondent and the children that he entered into a compromise
agreement with respondent regarding the financial support for their children; that
despite giving support, however, he refused to live with respondent. Petitioner's
showing of ill-will and refusal to perform marital obligations do not amount to
psychological incapacity on his part.

Petitioner's claim of lack of realization that he has marital obligation to perform as

husband to respondent is not a consideration under Article 36 of the Family Code as
what the law requires is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or
comprehend essential marital obligations.27

We, likewise, agree with the CA's and the RTC's findings that respondent was not
shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. As
the CA found, respondent was shown to be a caring wife and a loving mother to her
children. The findings and conclusions made by Dr. Soriano that respondent did not
have the mind, will and heart to perform the obligations of marriage as she did not
show concern for petitioner and was just contented to get money from the latter
cannot be given credence. There was no other basis for Dr. Soriano to arrive at such
finding other than the information supplied by petitioner. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side is not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.28 Moreover, such finding was
contradicted by respondent's letters29 to petitioner which were attached to petitioner's
Reply filed with the RTC where she wrote how much she wished for petitioner's
good health and safety; that the money she received from petitioner's allotment was
used to pay for the house rental, children's education and other incidental expenses;
that she would like to save money to buy a house for the future of their children; and
that she asked for forgiveness for nagging him because of jealousy and that she still
loves him. Respondent had shown that she is capable of fulfilling her marital
obligations and that she valued her marriage as she even opposed the petition for
annulment of her marriage and participated in the trial of the case.

We emphasized that the burden of proving psychological incapacity falls upon

petitioner. He must prove that he or respondent suffer from a psychological disorder
which renders them incapable of taking cognizance of the basic marital obligations,
which he failed to do.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated

November 5, 2015 and the Resolution dated May 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 100062 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Carandang,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated

*

November 28, 2018.

 Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, with Associate

1

Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.

concurring; rollo, pp. 44-53.
2
 Id. at 55-56.
3
 Per Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones of Branch 172; id. at 132-145.
4
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 115-V-D3; id. at 86-99.
5
 Rollo, p. 24.
6
 Id. at 24-25
7
 Id. at 26.
8
 Id. at 26-27
 9
 Id. at 100-103.
10
 Id. at 112-121.
11
 Id. at 145.
12
 Id. at 142-144. (Citations omitted)
13
 Id. at 146.
14
 Id. at 52-53.
15
 655 Phil. 346 (2011).
16
 Id. at 358-359.
17
 G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018.
18
 Rollo, pp. 50-52.
19
 Villanueva v. CA, 536 Phil. 404, 408 (2006).
20
 Valdez v. Reyes, 530 Phil. 605, 608 (2006).
21
 Id.
22
 781 Phil 737 (2016).
23
 Id. at 747-748.
24
 Rollo , p. 121.
25
 Id. at 123.
26
 Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil 826, 843 (2008).
27
 See Tani-Dela Fuente v. De la Fuente, 807 Phil. 32 (2017).

 Republic of the Philippines v. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico, supra note

28

17.
29
 Records, pp 72-75.

January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 218630

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27, 2015
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the
May 8, 2012 Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus
Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.

Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for

declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence)
on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual

friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got
pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict and
conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how
it would affect his image and how his parents would take the
situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.4

Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and
quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they
went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself
wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.5

Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the
birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30,
2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he
knew nothing about children and how to run a family.7 Lawrence spent almost
every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed
that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a
very high degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to
fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a
maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10

Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's

decisions-from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she
treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments,
often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her
youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation
center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if
she will not stop.11

In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his
parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact
since then.12

Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who
confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano,
based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-
importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.13

Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable,

and deeply integrated within his psyche;14 and that it was present but
repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in
early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his
capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to
his wife.15

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and
Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina

S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
the surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to
avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody
over the couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable
visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or
as the parties may agree among themselves.

Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National
Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn,
shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong
City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or cancellation of
the parties' marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the
parties and counsel.

SO ORDERED.16

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-
11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.17

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the
psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the
psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.

Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each
and every case for the nullity is different from the other and must be
appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological report
of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests18 to
come up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based not solely
on the expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have been
sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.

The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by

Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations,
meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.

Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative.

Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.19

The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out the
guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We
have decided:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
xxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. xxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. xxx
 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. xxx

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
xxx21

Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of
a husband.

Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other
cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly
wanting.

First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated

were based solely on Katrina's statements.  It bears to stress that Lawrence,
1âwphi1

despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he
interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.

The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B.

Matudan23is instructive on the matter:

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the
clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-
appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below.

The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition
was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the petitioner,
and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however,
that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the respondent
left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel
would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because
she could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening between her parents until
long after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas'
description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological
evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as
credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating
on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion

evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation
report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the
psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect
manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the
source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the
court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and
with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
above i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager

information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological
condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on
as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was

similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of
the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the
psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to
warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented
Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said
report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from. Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives
as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was
really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)

The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr.
Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of
Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of
Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that
Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions
and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind,
not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.24

Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly

depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent
fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said
to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.25 It
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that
must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about
to assume.26

Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to

affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to
support the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage
is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to
prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that apart
from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate
her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.28

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and
declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C.
Tionglico void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

Referred to as Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico in the RTC and CA

**

Decisions and other pleadings.

Designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 20,

*

2017 vice Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza.

 Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, and concurred in by

1

Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and Mario V.

Lopez.; Rollo, pp. 25-36.
2
 Penned by Presiding Judge Fernando L. Felicen; Id. at 31-34.
3
 Id. at 32 and 44.
4
 Id. at 26.
5
 Id. at 37.
6
 Id. at 42.
7
 Id. at 26.
8
 Id. at 37.
9
 Id. at 46.
10
 Id. at 47.
 11
 Id. at 38.
12
 Id. at 48.
13
 Id. at 52.
14
 Id.
15
 Id. at 53.
16
 Id. at 33-34.
17
 Id. at 29.

 Psychiatric and psychological interviews, Rhodes Sentence

18

Completion Test, Draw a Person Test, Zung Anxiety and Depression

Scale, Examination of Mental Status and Mental Processes, Hamilton
Anxiety Rating Scale, Social Case History. and Survey of Interpersonal
Values, see rollo, pp. 54-55.
19
 Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017.
20
 335 Phil. 664 (1997) and 268 SCRA 198.
21
 Id. at 676-679.
22
 Mendoza v. Rep. of the Phils., et. al., 698 Phil. 241, 0254 (2012).
23
 G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016.
24
 Castillo v. Republic, supra note 19.
25
 Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1083 (2009).
26
 Id at 1092.
27
 Castillo v. Republic, supra note 19.
28
 Id.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner)
asking the Court to reverse and set aside the April 25, 2017 Decision[1] and
January 11, 2018 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
105873, which affirmed the May 8, 2015 Decision[3] and September 16, 2015
Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34 (RTC)
declaring the marriage of Liberato P. Mola Cruz (respondent) and Liezl S. Conag
(Liezl) void ab initio.

The Antecedents

Respondent and Liezl were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Their
dating relationship began when Liezl's sister gave Liezl's mobile phone number
to respondent so they could become textmates. In the course of their
relationship, Liezl left for Japan to work as an entertainer for six (6) months. The
couple got married after Liezl returned home. They lived for some time in Manila
where respondent worked, but later moved to Japan where Liezl again secured a
contract as an entertainer and respondent found work as a construction worker. It
was while living in Japan when respondent noticed changes in Liezl. She began
going out of the house without respondent's permission and started giving
respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at respondent for
no reason. The couple later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was released
from detention due to overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to
respondent her romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the confession,
Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused respondent such stress that
he was hospitalized. Respondent expressed her willingness to forgive Liezl but
she chose to walk away from their marriage.

The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back. One day,
however, respondent found Liezl's Japanese lover in their house. To
respondent's surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her elder brother.
Respondent went along with the charade, and allowed Liezl to share her bed with
her lover as she threatened to leave their home. Liezl went on with her partying
ways, and continued working in a Manila nightclub despite respondent's offer for
her to start a business.

Despite the concessions given her, Liezl left respondent a second time.
Respondent tried to move on and left for Singapore to work in 2008. Though
abroad, he continued to woo his wife back, but found out that Liezl already
cohabited with her lover.

Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under

Article 36 of the Family Code. The public prosecutor assigned to the case
reported, submitted a written report to the RTC, stating, among others, that the
filing of the petition was not a result of collusion between the spouses.
[5]
 Thereafter, pre-trial was held and trial on the merits ensured.

The RTC's Decision

The RTC granted respondent's petition, and declared respondent and Liezl's
marriage void ab initio and their property regime dissolved.

The RTC relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr.
Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Based on the evaluation and
assessment procedure she followed, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was afflicted by
histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive pattern of behavior characterized by
excessive emotionality and attention seeking. A histrionic so afflicted tends to be
perceived by others as selfish, egotistical and unreliable; seeking immediate
gratification; over-reactive to even minor provocations; suggestible; and lacking
in analytical ability.

Dr. Tudla presented the following indicators of Liezl's disorder: going out without
her husband's knowledge or permission; coldly treating her husband, verbally
and sexually; quick anger at the slightest provocation or for no reason; arrest in
Japan due to overstaying; admission to an affair; insensitivity towards her
husband's feelings, as shown by introducing her husband as her brother to her
Japanese lover; threats of leaving if her ideas are not agreed to; unabashed
declaration of having no feelings for her husband; maintaining a night life with
friends; and choosing to work in a nightclub instead of engaging in a decent job.

Dr. Tudla found that Liezl's psychological incapacity existed prior to the marriage
because she grew up irritable, hard-headed and more fond of friends than family.
She despised advice or suggestion from her elders, and would rebel when her
demands were not met. This personality aberration was determined by Dr. Tudla
as rooted on Liezl's poor upbringing - Liezl's father resorted to corporal
punishment to instill discipline, while her mother tolerated her whims. Liezl also
tended to skip house and spend nights with her friends to avoid her father's
spanking. According to Dr. Tudla, the irregular treatment she received from her
parents led to Liezl acquiring unsuitable behavioral patterns.

Aside from the existence of Liezl's psychological incapacity prior to the marriage,
Dr. Tudla found her incapacity too grave that it seriously impaired her relationship
with her husband, and caused her failure to discharge the basic obligations of
marriage which resulted in its breakdown. Her incapacity was also found
incurable because it was deeply ingrained in her personality. Further, Dr. Tudla
found Liezl unconscious of her personality disorder and, when confronted, would
deny it to avoid criticism. The disorder was also permanent as it started during
her adolescence and continued until adulthood. Treatment was also deemed
ineffective as lack of any indication that behavioural or medical therapy would
play a significant role, considering Liezl's unawareness of her disorder. Only the
people around her noticed her maladaptive behavior.

The RTC found that Liezl was largely responsible for the failure of her marriage.
Her moral bankruptcy, coupled with respondent's weakness in character
inconsistent with what is expected of the head of a family, left the marital union
bereft of any mutual respect. According to the RTC, the marriage was wrong
from the very beginning.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and argued that Dr. Tudla's findings were
based on hearsay because she lacked personal knowledge of the facts on which
her evaluation was anchored; and that the hopelessness of the parties'
reconciliation should not mean that their marriage should be declared void ab
initio.

In its Order,[6] the RTC denied the motion for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals' Decision

On appeal, petitioner raised the sole issue of whether respondent was able to
prove Liezl's psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations. It
claimed that respondent failed to do so, and that witness Dr. Tudla only made a
sweeping statement that Liezl's condition was grave and permanent. Petitioner
questioned Dr. Tudla's report as it lacked details regarding Liezl's condition and
how Liezl was unable to comply with her marital obligations. Petitioner contended
that the change in Liezl's behavior was only caused by her illicit relationship and
not because of psychological incapacity. Petitioner asserted that sexual infidelity,
indulgence and abandonment can only be grounds for legal separation as they
do not constitute psychological incapacity.

In its decision, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the
RTC's decision. It reasoned that:
What matters in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity. In the task of ascertaining the presence of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which
are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must rely
on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus
enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the
in-depth diagnosis of experts.

In the present case, the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by petitioner's

witness Pacita P. Tudla. Ph.D concluded [that] respondent is suffering from
histrionic personality disorder. From interviews of said psychologist with
petitioner, respondent and her sister, it was revealed how her psychological
disorder resulted in the failure of their marriage. At the time the parties were
living in Japan, respondent had an affair with a Japanese national which she
admitted to petitioner. Furthermore, her attitude towards her husband had
changed ever since she met her Japanese lover, giving him the cold treatment
and getting angry at him at the slightest provocation. She likewise refused to
have sexual intercourse with petitioner. Respondent preferred to work at a
nightclub over a decent business offered to her by petitioner. Worst, she let her
Japanese boyfriend visit the conjugal home she shared with petitioner and
introduced the latter as her older brother to her lover. Petitioner was forced to
keep silent because she threatened to leave him. And ultimately, Liezl left
Liberato and cohabited with her Japanese boyfriend.

According to Ms. Tudla, respondent's psychological incapacity has antecedence

since it already existed long before she married petitioner. Growing up, Liezl was
irritable, hard-headed and was fond of her group of friends. She did not know
how to accept advice and suggestion from elders.

Respondent's psychological incapacity is considered by the expert witness to be

grave, permanent and incurable. Liezl's histrionic personality disorder seriously
impaired the quality of her relationship with her husband and caused her failure
to discharge the basic obligations of marriage - love, respect, concern, support
and fidelity to her husband. Further, she is unconscious of her personality
disorder and if confronted about it, she would deny it in her attempt to protect
herself from criticisms.

Ms. Tudla said in her report that Liezl's psychological incapacity is permanent
because it started in the adolescent stage of her life and continued to manifest as
she grew up into adulthood. Thus, it is already ingrained in her personality make-
up and no treatment will be effective.[7]
The CA described Liezl's acts of allowing her lover to stay in the conjugal home
and introducing her husband as her brother as extreme perversion and depravity.
It then concluded that, in dissolving marital bonds on account of psychological
incapacity, the court is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The Present Appeal

Petitioner now questions whether the totality of the evidence adduced by

respondent proves Liezl's psychological incapacity, thus warranting the
declaration of their marriage as null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.

Using the guidelines set forth in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina (Molina),[8] petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's
findings because there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Liezl is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. Dr. Tudla's
assessment, based only on the information given by respondent, Liezl and her
sister, must be weighed strictly and with due care. Petitioner avers that there
must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the couple to obtain a conclusive
diagnosis of psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
Information retrieved from Liezl's interview does not necessarily enhance Dr.
Tudla's conclusion because the details Liezl conveyed were wanting. There is
also no independent collateral informants, which made Dr. Tudla's evaluation
fallible. Therefore, Dr. Tudla's findings should not be accepted without question.

For petitioner, Liezl's purported actuations were not proven to have existed prior
to the marriage; nor was it alleged in respondent's petition that she showed
abnormal and peculiar character and behavior prior to the celebration of the
marriage that would support a conclusion that she is suffering from any
psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that the CA observed nothing peculiar
about the spouses that would insinuate that they are suffering from psychological
incapacity, and that the finding that Liezl was suffering from a psychological
disorder was merely based on incidents that occurred after the celebration of the
marriage. Petitioner, thus, avers that Liezl's incapacity is merely conjectural since
there was no mention or proof that her incapacity manifested, or at least was
hinted at, before the celebration of the marriage.

Petitioner also claims that the CA failed to detail how Liezl's disorder could be
characterized as grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable. There
should be a causal connection between the failure of the marriage and the
psychological disorder. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty", a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Petitioner maintains that sexual infidelity and abandonment are only
grounds for legal separation and not for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The
change in the spouses' feelings toward each other could hardly be described as
a psychological illness.

Issue
Whether Liezl's psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations
was sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented by respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[9] the Court explained psychological incapacity as

follows:
"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x.[10]
Further, "x x x psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them x x
x."[11]

Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating

psychological incapacity cases set in Molina. We quote the fairly recent iteration
of the guidelines in Republic v. Pangasinan[12] for reference:
x x x [P]sychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thereafter, in Molina, the Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by expe1ts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital  obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up

to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition.
In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential
obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or
clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at
the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be evident
after marriage. x x x.[13]
In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no longer be
viewed as a stringent code which all nullity cases on the ground of psychological
incapacity should meet with exactitude, in consonance with the Family Code's
ideal to appreciate allegations of psychological incapacity on a case-to-case
basis and "to allow some resiliency in its application" as legally designed.[14] Ngo
Te v. Yu-Te[15] predicated, thus:
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in
this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga
in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.[16]
In the case at hand, petitioner is again assailing the CA's affirmance of the RTC's
conclusion that Liezl is psychologically incapacitated to carry out her marital
obligations to respondent (1) by attacking the reliability of expert witness Dr.
Tudla's medical conclusions on the ground that they were based only on
interviews of Liezl and her sister; (2) by claiming that Liezl's actions manifesting
her disorder occurred after the celebration of the marriage; and (3) because the
CA failed to detail why it found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her
childhood and incurable. These issues were resolved by the CA by affirming the
factual findings earlier made by the RTC as regards the histrionic personality
disorder suffered by Liezl, all of which were deemed binding to the Court. The
Court is so bound "x x x owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the
veracity of these facts."[17] A sharper pronouncement on the respect accorded to
the trial court's factual findings in the realm of psychological incapacity was made
in Kalaw v. Fernandez (Kalaw):[18]
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence
of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as
such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence
are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where
the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting
its own judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by
the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the
Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social
institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a
valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.[19]
The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's
psychological report confirms, contrary to petitioner's allegation, that Dr. Tudla
personally interviewed both spouses regarding their personal and familial
circumstances before and after the celebration of their marriage. Information
gathered from the spouses was then verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag,
Liez's youngest sister,[20] a close relation privy to Liezl's personal history before
and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based her psychological evaluation and
conclusions on all the information she gathered. Her findings were, thus, properly
anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the parties as individuals and
as a married couple under a factual milieu verified with an independent
informant. The courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and utilized
it as an aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed psychologically incapacitated
to meet essential marital functions. Clearly, petitioner has no basis to assail Dr.
Tudla's psychological findings as wanting evidentiary support.

Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the couple will
not perforce result to the expert's opinion becoming unreliable, as petitioner
advances. In Kalaw, a case also involving a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage wherein the expert witnesses declared the respondent spouse therein
as suffering from narcissistic personality disorder without personally examining
the latter albeit with the support of the medical findings of the respondent
spouse's own clinical psychologist. In said case, the Court had the occasion to
re-emphasize that such lack of personal examination does not per se invalidate
the experts' findings of psychological incapacity. Citing Marcos v. Marcos,[21] the
Court emphasized the importance of the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party's psychological incapacity and the inessentiality of a
physician's personal examination to have a party declared psychologically
incapacitated. Kalaw expounded on the point, as follows:
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from
an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be
admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert's
findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify
their exclusion as evidence. This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the
scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been
based on the parties' upbringing and psychodynamics.[22]
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the CA
and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established the link between
Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to understand and perform
her marital obligations and her histrionic personality disorder. The Court respects
the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial on what transpired
before and during the marriage, considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of
one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other."[23] In addition, Dr. Tudla was able to collect and
verify largely the same facts in the course of her psychological evaluation of both
spouses and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description
of histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the characteristics of this
disorder with Liezl's behavior from her formative years through he course of her
marriage to petitioner. Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such
probative force emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the courts to
show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was based.[24]

The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after
the marriage was celebrated does not mean, as ,petitioner argues, that there is
no psychological incapacity to speak of. As held in Republic v. Pangasinan,
[25]
 psychological incapacity may manifest itself after the celebration of the
marriage even if it already exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly,
Art. 36 of the Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated party is also treated as void even if the incapacity becomes
manifest only after the marriage was celebrated.[26]

Also, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the CA did expound on the reasons why it
found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her childhood and incurable.

To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage,

the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse's
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the
marriage.[27] The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.[28] "There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to the marriage  which must be linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity."[29]

The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her
inability to discharge her marital obligations to love, respect and give concern,
support and fidelity to her husband. The CA also narrated how the disorder was
evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated, starting from
when she and petitioner lived together in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is
shown by appreciating the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl was
unable to accommodate the fact that she was already married into the way she
wanted to live her life, and essentially treated petitioner as a manipulable
inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede to her desires. It is
clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital responsibilities.

The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent
and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's psychological
evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder. Together with its
rootedness in Liezl's personality since her teens, the CA came to agree with the
expert findings that any medical or behavioral treatment of her disorder would
prove ineffective.
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and
abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and cannot be used as basis
to hold a marriage void ab initio. According to petitioner, Liezl cheated on and
abandoned her husband because of her illicit affair and not because she is
psychologically incapacitated.

It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation.
It may be noted, however, that the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant
acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality disorder. A
person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and
demands immediate gratification.[30] These traits were especially reflected in
Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the
marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and
introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of
desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the
marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who
reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.

The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as void ab initio,
even as it is clear from the records how much petitioner must love his wife to
endure the pain and humiliation she callously caused him in the hope that their
relationship could still work out. Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the marital
responsibilities that came when she married petitioner. The severance of their
marital vinculum will better protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of
marriage and family, the importance of which seems utterly lost on respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 25, 2017 Decision and January
11, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105873
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Martires, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 56-66; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with
Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla,
concurring.
[2]
 Id. at 68-69.
[3]
 Id. at 92-101; penned by Judge Celso O. Baguio.
[4]
 Id. at 116-118.
[5]
 Id. at 92-93.
[6]
 Id. at 116-118.
[7]
 Id. at 64-65. Citations omitted.
[8]
 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[9]
 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[10]
 Id. at 40.
[11]
 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 351 (2006).
[12]
 792 Phil. 808 (2016).
[13]
 Id. at 819-820. Citations omitted.
[14]
 Supra note 8 at 36.
[15]
 598 Phil. 666 (2009).
[16]
 Id. at 699. Citation omitted.
[17]
 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 10 at 358.
[18]
 750 Phil. 482 (2015).
[19]
 Id. at 500-501. Citations omitted.
[20]
 Rollo, p. 86.
[21]
 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
[22]
 Supra note 17 at 503. Citations omitted.
[23]
 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017.
[24]
 See Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017.
[25]
 Supra note 12 at 825-826.
[26]
 Art. 36 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization. (As amended by E.O. 227)
[27]
 Mendoza v. Republic, et al., 698 Phil. 241, 243 (2012).
[28]
 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 39.
[29]
 Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017.
[30]
 Rollo, p. 89.

CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:

I concur. The marriage between Liberato P. Mola Cruz (Liberato) and Liezl (Liezl)
Conag is void due to psychological incapacity.

To recall, this Court first interpreted Article 36 of the Family Code in the 1995
case of Santos v. Court of Appeals.[1] In Santos, this Court outlined the history of
Article 36, noting that the term "psychological incapacity" was not defined in the
law "to allow some resiliency in its application."[2] The Family Code Revision
Committee gave no examples of psychological incapacity to prevent "[limiting]
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis."[3]

Still, standards were set in Santos. At the very least, the psychological incapacity
should be a "mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[4] In addition, psychological
incapacity must refer to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage"[5] and should be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability.[6]

This Court went on to lay down more specific guidelines for resolving Article 36
petitions in the 1997 case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
[7]
 The Molina guidelines, as they have been called since, are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence -
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.[8] (Citations omitted)
With the Molina guidelines, psychological incapacity petitions were rarely granted
by this Court. From 1997 to 2008,[9] only the parties in Antonio v. Reyes[10] were
found to have complied with all the requirements of Molina.

This led the Court to state in Ngo Te v. Yu Te,[11] decided in 2009, that

"jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed."[12] As accurately noted by the Court,
this view was "totally inconsistent with the way the concept [of psychological
incapacity] was formulated."[13] The Molina guidelines were then compared to a
"strait-jacket" to which all Article 36 petitions are "forced to fit," thus:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor
General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world". The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit
into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage.[14] (Citation omitted)
The same observation of the "rigidity" of the Molina guidelines was made
in Kalaw v. Fernandez,[15] resolved on reconsideration in 2015, thus:
The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to
every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the
fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly
and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to
adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency
in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
"all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."[16] (Citations omitted)
Since Ngo Te's promulgation in 2009, Kalaw would only be the fifth[17] case
voiding the parties' marriage due to psychological incapacity, at least through a
signed decision or resolution. The present case would only be the sixth. The
State's interpretation of its constitutional mandate to protect marriages as the
foundation of the family remains the same: all Article 36 petitions are to be
challenged until they reach this Court.

Protecting marriages, however, is not the same as forcing partners to stay

together when they clearly no longer wish to do so. While the law characterizes
marriage as an "inviolable social institution"[18] and a "permanent union,"[19] its
inviolability and permanence should be consistent with its purpose of establishing
conjugal and family life.[20] This is obviously not the case here, with Liezl having
left Liberato to cohabit with another man. Forcing Liberato to stay married to a
woman who has no intention of sharing her life with him would have been cruel
and inhuman.
Furthermore, the notion of "psychological incapacity" should not only be based
on a medical or psychological disorder; it should consist of the inability to comply
with the essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.
Marriage should be protected only insofar as it affects the stability of society;
otherwise, the State has no business interfering with intimate arrangements.

I maintain that divorce is more consistent with our fundamental rights to liberty
and autonomy. We had absolute divorce laws in the past,[21] but as the law stands
now, former partners have to pathologize each other in order to separate. This is
inconsistent with the reality that we are humans and that we make mistakes.
There is no need to punish those who simply made the wrong choice of people to
love.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the

Court of Appeals[22] voiding the marriage between Liberato P. Mola Cruz and
Liezl Conag.

[1]
 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
[2]
 Id at 36.
[3]
 Id. citing Salita v. Magtolis, 303 Phil. 106 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First
Division]. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 677
(1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[4]
 Id. at 40.
[5]
 Id.
[6]
 Id. at 39.

Important Note for Court Staff: This is part of the internal deliberations of the
Court. Unauthorized disclosure, sharing, publication, or use of this document or
any of its contents is classified as a grave offense and is punishable by
suspension or dismissal from service.
[7]
 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
[8]
 Id. at 676-679. The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor
General briefly stating his or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has
been dispensed with under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages).
[9]
 Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third
Division]; Bier v. Bier, 570 Phil. 442 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First
Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilia-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725
(2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337
(2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Villalon v. Villalon, 512 Phil. 219 (2005) [Per
J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807
(2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004)
[Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 266
(2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175
(2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001)
[Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919
(1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[10]
 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
[11]
 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
[12]
 Id. at 669.
[13]
 Id.
[14]
 Id. at 695-696.
[15]
 G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/january2015/166357.pdf> [Per J. Bersamin, Special
First Division].
[16]
 Id. at 6-7.
[17]
 The other four cases are Azcueta v. Republic, 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Halili v. Santos-Halili, 607 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per
J. Corona, Special First Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602
(2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; and Aurelio v. Aurelio, 665 Phil. 693
(2011) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
[18]
 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State.
[19]
 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
[20]
 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
[21]
 Act No. 2710 (1917) allowed the filing of a petition for divorce on the ground of
adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband.
(Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc]) Executive
Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, effective during the Japanese
occupation, provided for eleven grounds for divorce, including "intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of [a
petition for divorce]" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable."
(Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 (1946) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc]).
[22]
 CA-G.R. CV No. 105873.