Socrates Pursuit of Definitions

Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions
Author(s): David Wolfsdorf

Source: Phronesis , 2003, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2003), pp. 271-312
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4182735
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Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions'
DAVID WOLFSDORF
ABSTRACT
"Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions" examines the manner in which Socrates

pursues definitions in Plato's early definitional dialogues and advances the fol-
lowing claims. Socrates evaluates definitions (proposed by his interlocutors or
himself) by considering their consistency with conditions of the identity of F (F-
conditions) to which he is committed. In evaluating proposed definitions, Socrates
seeks to determine their truth-value. Socrates evaluates the truth-value of a pro-
posed definition by considering the consistency of the proposed definition with
F-conditions that F he believes to be true. (For instance, a proposed definition's
inconsistency with one of these gives Socrates reason to believe that the definition
is false.) Socrates' belief in the truth of a given F-condition to which he is com-
mitted may be based on self-evidence, its endoxic status, experience, or deduc-
tion from premises to which he is committed on the basis of any of the previous
three. However, Socrates does not consider the epistemological grounds of his
commitments to his F-conditions. This is part of a general avoidance of meta-
ethical and ethical epistemological issues. Due to his avoidance of these,
Socrates' pursuit of true definitions is theoretically naYve. However, Socrates rec-
ognizes a certain limitation to his manner of pursuing definitions.
These results are applied to advancing the following further points. (1)
Although Socrates has a distinctive manner or style of pursuing definitions, it is
inappropriate to ascribe to him a method of doing so in the following sense. The
concept of method implies a certain theoretical conception of procedure that Socrates
lacks. Moreover, according to Socrates' own conceptual framework, only one
who possessed the relevant rcXVrI would have a method. (2) Furthermore,
Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions is not elenctic just insofar as the word
"elenchus" is interpreted to have adversarial connotations; that is inconsistent
with Socrates' motives and interests. (3) Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions
is consistent among the early definitional dialogues. More specifically, there is
no "demise of the elenchus" in a set of transitional dialogues, as Vlastos describes
it. First, Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions is not "elenctic" (in the sense
described). And, second, the fact that Socrates himself proposes definitions in
allegedly post-elenctic dialogues (that is, Lysis and Hippias Major) is consistent
with his manner of pursuing definitions. (4) In the early definitional dialogues,
Accepted June 2003

I Some scholars lament the enormity of secondary literature on Plato. But I have
always been grateful for it. This paper was written in a kind of isolation. The first
person to read or comment on it was an anonymous referee for Phronesis. Yet the
paper would have been nothing had I not had the opportunity to think its problems
over in light of previous contributions to the topic. My debts are plentiful and duly
acknowledged in the footnotes and bibliography.
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003 Phronesis XLVIII14

Also available online - www.brill.nl

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272 DAVID WOLFSDORF
Socrates does not have a theory of definition. In particular, he lacks a general

theoretical ontology. Moreover, while his comments and implicit commitments
entail beliefs about some conditions for a satisfactory definition (for example,
that the definiens must be a uniquely identifying true verbal description), such
conditions do not constitute a theory. (5) Although in other early dialogues and
in other parts of the definitional dialogues Socrates may express concern over the
psychological states and well-being of his interlocutors, in the process of pursu-
ing definitions, Socrates' principal concern is the evaluation of definitions, not
the psychologies or lives of his interlocutors. (6) Finally, Socrates is committed
to the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge for pertinent non-
definitional knowledge. This does present a methodological problem of the kind
to which Geach first drew attention. Specifically, according to the manner in
which Socrates pursues definitions, it is unclear how he can get from belief that
p to knowledge that p. Although this problem is genuine, Socrates himself is not
unaware of such limits of his approach.
In Cratylus Socrates suggests that a word is an instrument by which we divide up enti-

ties according to their natures (ouoiat).2 Reminiscent of the Latin derivation of the
English word, the Greek word for defining "opi'ea0" is derived from the practice
of marking the limits of a piece of owned land with boundary stones (Opot). The philo-
sophically fertile word "oUaiaa", having previously been used to denote a piece of
property, specifically a piece of owned land, was adapted with these others to meta-
physics and semantics. This linguistic history reminds us that the roots of Western phi-
losophy lie among a community offarmers. And so Plato's definitional dialogues mark
early steps in the journey from the practical knowledge of agriculture to the theoret-
ical knowledge of practical wisdom.
I. Introduction
Several of Plato's dialogues standardly conceived as belonging to the early

period share the following feature. The character Socrates and his inter-
locutors engage in a discussion focused on answering a question of the
form 'What is F? (hereafter referred to as the WF question), where the
symbol "F" stands for a word designating human excellence (&pvni]) or a
human excellence.3 The discussion mostly involves proposing answers
2 Crat. 388b13-cl.
3 Throughout the paper I use the symbol "F" as a notation for the variable whose
values are derived from the domain of words that designate the entities Socrates and
his interlocutors investigate in the early definitional dialogues, namely, "&v6pEi&",
"oxppoOi v", "6uCaioowUiv", "-o caXov" or "wcuiXX;", "..o iotov" or "0v1oTT5",
"apetj", and "(pkia". In Plato's Earlier Dialectic (1941) the first major book of the
twentieth century exclusively to focus on Plato's early writings, Richard Robinson used
the symbol "x" for the same purpose. More recently, Plato scholars have used the sym-

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SOCRATES' PURSUIT OF DEFINITIONS 273
to this question (that is, definitions of F) and evaluating these.4 Accord-

ingly, I refer to these texts as Plato's early definitional dialogues. They
include Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, Meno, and
Republic I.
This paper focuses on the manner in which Socrates pursues defini-
tions of F. This topic can be viewed as intersecting the familiar topic
of Socrates' method in the early dialogues. That subject ultimately owes
its current vitality to Gregory Vlastos' paper, "The Socratic Elenchus",
which has galvanized a number of searching treatments.5 I will begin the
discussion by reconsidering the basic data: the way Socrates evaluates
bols "F" and "F-ness". In these cases the symbols derive from quantificational logic.
The italicized capital letter is used to schematize a predicate. The excellence-terms
(also called virtue-terms) are not predicates, but adjectival or characterizing general
terms. However, since both predicates and adjectival or characterizing general terms
are thought to designate properties and the excellence-terms are assumed to do so, the
predicate symbol is used. "F-ness" or "the F" is preferred to "F" in order to make
clear the distinction between the noun and the corresponding adjective, viz. "51Oawocuv1"
and "iicoatov". But, simply for elegance, I prefer "F" for the noun and "f" for the
corresponding adjective.
4 Precisely, pursuit of definitions occupies approximately 57% of these texts, about
138 Stephanus pages out of a possible 243; about 26 of about 36.5 Stephanus pages
in Charmides (or about 72%); about 15.5 of about 34 Stephanus pages in Laches (or
about 45%); about 14 of about 26 Stephanus pages in Lysis (or about %53); about 17
of about 22.5 Stephanus pages in Euthyphro (or about 75%); about 27 of about 36.5
Stephanus pages in Hippias Major (or about 73%); about 12.5 of about 45 Stephanus
pages in Meno (or about 28%); about 26 of about 42.5 Stephanus pages in Republic
I (or about 61 %). These measurements are based on counting the number of pages
between the first time Socrates poses the WF question and the rejection of the final
definition. In Meno, the span covers the text until Meno poses his paradox. In Lysis,
Socrates never poses an initial WF question, although it is clear that the principal aim
of the inquiry is to determine what friendship is. The content of the entire dialogue
could arguably be said to contribute to this aim. But the direct and explicit argument
and inquiry pertaining to this question begins at 212b when Socrates asks Menexenus
who is (pwko to whom. Sedley (1989) argues that in fact the inquiry in Lysis is moti-
vated by the question "Who is (piko; to whom?" But, despite Sedley's philological
arguments, the dialogue is obviously concerned to examine the nature of (pqX'f and is
a definitional dialogue. In Republic I Socrates also does not initially pose a WF ques-
tion. Although it is obvious that the initial movement of the inquiry is motivated by
an attempt to answer this question. The pertinent span of text in the measurement runs
from Socrates' articulation of Cephalus' conception of 8lKatonvrJ at 331c until the
final refutation of Thrasymachus' definition, the good of the stronger, at 347e.
I Vlastos (1983) with postscript "Afterthoughts on the Socratic Elenchus" at 71-4.
The paper is reprinted in (1994) with appendix, "The Demise of the Elenchus in the
Euthydemus, Lysis, and Hippias Major". Cf. also Kraut (1983); Brickhouse and Smith

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274 DAVID WOLFSDORF
definitions. I will then turn to the central areas of controversy: why

Socrates evaluates definitions, the so-called "problem of the elenchus",
and the epistemic status of the premises Socrates uses in evaluating
definitions. Finally, I will briefly touch upon the ramifications of my
results for some related questions: whether Socrates has a method and, if
so, whether it is elenctic; whether Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions
is consistent among the early dialogues; whether Socrates has a theory of
definition; whether Socrates evaluates definitions or people; and whether
Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions is logical.
The theses I will be defending in the main body of the paper are these:
* Socrates evaluates definitions (proposed by his interlocutors or himself)

by considering their consistency with conditions for the identity of F
(hereafter F-conditions) to which he is committed.
* In evaluating proposed definitions, Socrates seeks to determine their
truth-value.
* Socrates evaluates the truth-value of a proposed definition by consid-
ering the consistency of the proposed definition with F-conditions he
believes to be true. (For instance, a proposed definition's inconsistency
with one of these gives Socrates reason to believe that the definition is
false.)
* Socrates' belief in the truth of a given F-condition to which he is com-
mitted may be based on self-evidence, its endoxic status, experience,
or deduction from premises to which he is committed on the basis of
any of the previous three. However, Socrates does not consider the
epistemological grounds of his commitments to his F-conditions. This
is part of a broad avoidance of meta-ethical and ethical epistemologi-
cal issues. Due to his avoidance of these, Socrates' pursuit of true
definitions is theoretically naive. However, Socrates recognizes a cer-
tain limitation to his manner of pursuing definitions.
II. Socrates' Responses to Definitions
Twenty-seven definitions of F are discussed in the early definitional dia-

logues.6 Four in Charmides: quietness; modesty; doing one's own thing
(1984); Polansky (1985); Benson (1987), (1990); Brickhouse and Smith (1991);
Gentzler (1994); Brickhouse and Smith (1994) 3-29; Benson (1995); Benson in Lehrer
(1996); Adams (1998); Scott (2002).
6 Of course, these are not the only definitions in the early dialogues or the early

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(which is reinterpreted as doing good things); and self-knowledge (which

is reinterpreted as knowledge of knowledge). Three in Laches: remain-
ing in rank, defending against the enemy, and not fleeing; toughness of
the soul; and knowledge of what is to be feared and dared. Two in Lysis:
the neither-good-nor-bad loves the good on account of the presence of the
bad; the neither-good-nor-bad loves the ultimate good on account of
desire. Four in Euthyphro: prosecuting one who commits sacrilege regard-
less of the prosecutor's relation to the offender; that which is god-beloved;
that which is loved by all the gods; attention to the gods (which is rein-
terpreted as service to the gods). Seven in Hippias Major: a beautiful woman;
gold; to be rich, healthy, honored by the Greeks, to live to old age, and
to bury one's parents; decorousness; utility; benefit; aesthetic pleasure
(reinterpreted as beneficial pleasure). Three in Meno: managing political
affairs (for a man) and managing domestic affairs (for a woman); being
able to govern people; desiring what is fine and being able to procure it.
Four in Republic I: telling the truth and returning what one takes; doing
what is fitting (reinterpreted as aiding friends and harming enemies); aid-
ing a friend who is good and harming an enemy who is bad; what is good
for the stronger.7
Of these, Socrates offers six; and these are confined to Lysis and the
last four definitions in Hippias Major.8 Otherwise, Socrates' responses
to definitions or the arguments Socrates develops in response to the
definitions may be distinguished as having two basic forms. In most cases
(twenty-six of twenty-seven) Socrates rejects the definition because it does
definitions dialogues. In Laches Socrates defines speed; in Republic I he defines func-

tion; in Gorgias he defines rhetoric; in Meno he defines shape and color.
7 There is certainly some room for debate about exactly how many definitions are
tested in the various dialogues. For instance, cf. Schmidt's appendix A (1998, 153-8)
where he discusses several possible interpretations of the number of definitions in
Charmides. One sticking point, as I have indicated above, is that Socrates sometimes
responds to definitions by reinterpreting them. In these cases, I have chosen to count
the original definition and its reinterpretation(s) as a single definition. Another ques-
tion is whether to count as definitions Laches', Euthyphro's, and Meno's first responses
to the WF question. For instance, Allen (1970) does not, whereas in the case of Laches
Saunders (1987) does. Cf. also Carpenter and Polansky's remarks: "In those dialogues
dominated by the search for a definition of some moral notion, the interlocutor often
begins with an attempted definition that seems to fail as a definition." (in Scott 2002,
93) I treat these responses as definitions for reasons that will become clear below. To
a large extent, though, my decisions correspond with those of other scholars.
8 Although, Socrates directly and indirectly assists in formulating Euthyphro's
fourth definition and Nicias' definition respectively.

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276 DAVID WOLFSDORF
not satisfy some F-condition to which Socrates is committed. In the ex-

ceptional case, the definition is rejected because it does not satisfy some
F-condition to which the interlocutors are committed.9 Thus, definitions
are almost always rejected because they do not satisfy some F-condition
to which Socrates is committed.
These F-conditions are as follows. From the investigation in Char-
mides: temperance (co(ppocuvl) is in all instances fine (KX6Ov);1" tem

perance is in all instances good (iya0ov);" temperance entails knowledge
(for a temperate man knows what he is doing);'2 temperance exists; tem-
perance is beneficial.'3 From Laches: courage (av6prfta) is the same in all
cases and the common possession of courageous men; 4 courage is a
power (&vaqu);'5 courage is in all instances fine;'6 courage is a part of
excellence.'7 From Lysis: friendship (qXkia) must have an ultimate object;"
the presence of badness is not the cause of friendship.'9 From Euthyphro:
holiness (o OCatov) is a form (d-68o), is the same in all instances, and is
that because of which all holy entities are holy;2" holiness is not in any
way unholy (or, it is purely holy);2' the definiens must describe the
being (ol{ak) of holiness and not something that holiness undergoes (a
icOo).22 From Hippias Major: fineness (tb KaX6v) is not in any way not-
fine (or, it is purely fine);23 fineness makes entities fine;24 fineness is
9 This is Socrates' second definition of (pXix, which is rejected as inconsistent

with the view to which Lysis and Menexenus express commitment that {piXot are bopolot.
"' The first definition, quietness, is rejected because it does not satisfy this condi-
tion.
" The second definition, modesty, is rejected because it does not satisfy this con-
dition.
12 The third definition, reinterpreted as doing good, is rejected because it does not
satisfy this condition.
1' The fourth definition, reinterpreted as knowledge of knowledge and lack of
knowledge, is rejected because it does not satisfy these two conditions.
14 The first definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.
'5 The first definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.
16 The second definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.
17 The third definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.
2( The first definition is rejected because it does not satisfy these conditions.
21 The second definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.
23 The first, second, third, and fifth definitions are rejected because they do not sat-
isfy this condition.
24 The fourth definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.

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good.25 From Meno: excellence is the same in all instances and that
because of which instances of excellence are such instances;26 excellence
is a property most people do not possess.27 From Republic I: all instances
of justice must be just;28 it is not a function of justice to do harm;29 jus-
tice is beneficial to others.30
Of the twenty-six cases where a definition is rejected because it does
not satisfy one of these F-conditions, the form of the response to the definition
varies in the following ways. Most commonly (twenty-two of twenty-six
cases) Socrates elicits his interlocutor's assent to the F-condition to which
he, Socrates, is committed, and then his interlocutor's assent to the pro-
position that describes the definiens as not satisfying that condition. In
the remaining four cases, Socrates simply tells his interlocutor that the
definition is not satisfactory.3' In these latter cases, it has been argued that
the definition (or response to the WF question) is formally as opposed to
materially incorrect.32 The formal/material correctness distinction is rea-
sonable here. Nevertheless, Socrates rejects the responses as unsatisfac-
tory because they do not satisfy some condition regarding the identity of
F to which Socrates is committed - in these cases, formal as opposed to
material F-conditions.33
In fourteen of those twenty-two cases where Socrates elicits his inter-
locutor's assent to the set of propositions that entails the refutation of the
25 The sixth and seventh definitions are rejected because they do not satisfy this
condition.
26 The first, second, and third definitions are rejected because they do not satisfy
this condition.
28 The first and second definitions are rejected because they do not satisfy this con-
dition.
3n The fourth definition is rejected because it does not satisfy this condition.
'1 These are Socrates' responses to Laches' and Meno's first definitions, Socrates'
response to his first definition of Dtktia, and Socrates' response to Meno's second
definition.
32 For a full discussion of the distinction between formally and materially correct
answers to the WF question, cf. Benson (1990) reprinted in Benson (1992).
33 Benson would not agree with this characterization since he believes the formal
condition these responses fail to satisfy is that the WF question has only one answer.
I think Benson has mischaracterized the formal problem with the answers. But an ade-
quate explanation of Benson's error and my view on the matter is too involved for
the present context (cf. my "Understanding the 'What-is-F?' Question" [forthcoming,
Apeiron]).

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278 DAVID WOLFSDORF
definition, Socrates is unqualifiedly committed to all the propositions in

the argument (save the definition).34 In the remaining eight cases Socrates'
attitude toward the propositions ranges from tentative commitment (at
least of some propositions) to disbelief (at least of some propositions). To
the extent that this is so, these arguments are correspondingly ad homi-
nem.35 However, although they are ad hominem to this extent, the argu-
ments are not ad hominem insofar as the definition is suggested to fail to
satisfy an F-condition to which Socrates is committed.
In sum, the arguments Socrates develops in response to definitions have
the following forms:
In one case (Socrates' second definition of friendship):
Proposition Discussant's attitude toward proposition

Socrates Interlocutors
(I) p [definiens] Believes true Believes true
(2) q36 Believes false Believe true
(3) q entails not-p Believes true Believe true
(4) not-p Believes true Believes true
-4 These include the responses to the first three definitions

ond and third definition in Laches, the third definition in Euthy
the fifth definition in Hippias Major, the second definition in M
ond and fourth definitions in Republic L.
1s These include the response to the fourth definition in Charmides, the second and
fourth definition in Euthyphro, the fourth, sixth, and seventh definitions in Hippias
Major, the third definition in Meno, and the second definition in Republic 1. More pre-
cisely, in the response to the fourth definition in Charmides, Socrates concludes only
tentatively that the knowledge of knowledge does not exist, for he claims that he is
not competent to determine the issue. In response to the second definition in Euthyphro
Socrates accepts Euthyphro's claim that the gods quarrel although he obviously dis-
believes this. In response to the fourth definition in Euthyphro, he accepts the impli-
cations of Euthyphro's claim that o'atok; is the knowledge of praying and sacrificing
although it is not clear that he believes this. In response to the fourth definition in
Hippias Major, Socrates accepts Hippias' claim that the appropriate only makes things
appear Kcarov although it is unclear whether Socrates himself believes this. In
response to the sixth and seventh definitions Socrates fails to distinguish between that
which is ayxaOov and that which is x6o &yao6v. He clearly cannot believe that there is
no distinction between the two. In response to the third definition in Meno Socrates
accepts Meno's claim that wealth, etc. are goods although he does not think that these
are unqualifiedly goods. In response to the second definition in Republic 1, Socrates
develops two egregiously bad arguments to undermine the utility of 8tKatoalvil. He
surely cannot believe these arguments or their conclusions.
36 "q" stands for a premise set, which may include one or multiple premises.

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In three cases (Laches' and Meno's first definitions and Meno's second
definition):

Socrates Interlocutor
(1) p [definiens] Believes false Believes true
The articulation of p is followed by Socrates' explanation of why p does

not satisfactorily answer the WF question. The definition is not tested.
In one case (Socrates' first definition of friendship):

Socrates Interlocutors
(1) p [definiens] Believes true37 Believe true
The definition is immediately followed by Socrates' explanation of why

it isn't satisfactory.
In fourteen cases:

Socrates Interlocutor(s)
(1) p [definiens] 38 Believes true39
(2) q Believes true Believes true
(3) q entails not-p Believes true Believes true
(4) not-p Believes true Believes true
In eight cases:

Socrates Interlocutor(s)
(1) p [definiens] 40 Believes true
(2) q 941 Believes true
31 Socrates either believes the def

38 But immediately he realizes it
39 This is so in those cases where t
4 See n. 38.
41 Socrates at least believes that one of the premises is true, namely that which
expresses the F-condition with which the definiens is inconsistent. In some cases, he
disbelieves some of the other premises or only tentatively believes them.

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280 DAVID WOLFSDORF
(3) q entails not-p Believes true Believes true

(4) not-p Believes true42 43
III. Socrates' Pursuit of True Definitions
The signal feature of my interpretation of Socrates' manner of pursuing

satisfactory definitions in the early definitional dialogues, then, is the role
that Socrates' F-conditions play in the evaluation of proposed definitions.
I claim that Socrates tests proposed definitions against F-conditions to
which he is committed.
42 In one case, the refutation of the fourth definition in Charmides for not existing,
Socrates only tentatively accepts the conclusion.
43 My interpretations of the arguments in response definitions may be compared and
contrasted with those of Vlastos and Benson. Vlastos characterizes the standard form
of Socrates' responses as follows:
(I) p [definiens] Believes false Believes true
(2) q (& r) Believes true
(3) q (& r) entail not-p Believes true Believes true
(4) not-p Believes true
Vlastos does not state it, but according to his descr
q (& r) to be true. Otherwise, it would not make sense for him to conclude that not-
p is true (or p false). Also, since the interlocutor accepts the conclusion, the inter-
locutor must adjust his beliefs and believe not-p is true and p false. ("Socratic elenchus
is a search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a the-
sis is debated only if asserted as the answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted
only if its negation is deduced from his own beliefs. [The standard form of the
elenchus is this.] (1) The interlocutor asserts a thesis p [the so-called refutand3, which
Socrates considers false and targets for refutation. (2) Socrates secures agreement to
further premises, say q and r (each of which may stand for a conjunct of propositions).
[Vlastos notes that he uses two variables, q and r, "though one would suffice, with a
view to a special case... where the interlocutor has the option of welshing on just
one of the agreed upon premises" (1994) n. 33.] The agreement is ad hoc: Socrates
argues from Iq, rl, not to them. (3) Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees,
that q & r entail not-p. (4) Socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true,
p false." (Vlastos (1994) 4, 11; on the non-standard or indirect elenchus, cf. 12 and
nn. 34-5.))
Benson characterizes the form of Socrates' responses as follows:
(1) p [definiens] Believes true
(2) q (& r) Believes true
(3) q (& r) entail not-p Believes true Believes true
(4) not-p

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Ample evidence supports the view that Socrates is committed to the F-

conditions I have attributed to him. During the investigation in Charmides
Socrates says, "I divine that temperance is something beneficial and
good"." And at the end of the investigation, he says, "I think temperance
is a great good."45 Outside the response in which he introduces the con-
dition that temperance entails knowledge, Socrates does not suggest that
this is so. However, Socrates' identification of excellence and some form
of knowledge is generally accepted on the basis of a wide variety of evid-
ence. Among the early definitional dialogues, for instance, in Laches
Nicias attributes to Socrates the view (and Socrates accepts the attribu-
tion) that a man is good insofar as he is knowledgeable (ao0p6)." Later
in the dialogue he suggests that a person who possessed the knowledge
of good and bad would lack nothing so far as excellence is concerned.47
Of course, Plato need not characterize Socrates as committed to the same
propositions in all of the early definitional dialogues. However, in this
case, there is no good reason to assume that he is not committed to these
views in Charmides." In Laches Socrates says that courage is the same
For Benson, Socrates' response to his interlocutor's definition is not an attempt to

disprove that p is true; p is not a refutand. Rather, Socrates' response is an attempt
to determine whether his interlocutor has knowledge. Socrates merely wants to deter-
mine whether the interlocutor has a consistent set of beliefs about F. Since he in-
evitably does not, this reveals that he does not have knowledge of F. The conclusion of
the argument does not, then, show that p is false, but merely that p, q (& r) are incon-
sistent and so that at least one of them is false. (The view I am attributing to Benson
is derived from (2000) 17-95, which is based on (1987) 67-85 and (1995) 45-112.
Benson nowhere expresses his conception of the elenchus in the schematic form I have out-
lined. But this schema, based on Vlastos', is consistent with Benson's claims.)
4 Charm. 169b4-5.
45 Charm. 175e6-7.
46 Lach. 194d 1-3.
4' Lach. 199d4-e 1.
4X Consider that early on in their discussion Socrates suggests to Charmides that
ao(ppoaUvri is a psychological entity, that is, an entity of the WvXi. He describes his
alleged Thracian charm with these words: "He said, my friend, that the VuXi' is treated
by means of certain charms, and that these charms are beautiful words. From such
words ao(ppoasyvrj is engendered; and when o(ppocT6vij is engendered and present,
then health comes more easily to both the head and the rest of the body." (Charm.
157a3-bl). Shortly after, he says: "Now it is clear that if aoxppoo{vrj is present in
you, you are able to form some opinion about it. For it is necessary, I suppose, that
if it is in you, it provides a sense of its presence, from which you would be able to
form an opinion both of what it is and of what sort of thing aw(ppoa1'vr1 is... So,
then, in order to guess whether or not it is in you tell me what in your opinion
aoppooYvT1 is." (Charm. 1 58e7- 159a3)

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282 DAVID WOLFSDORF
in all cases and the common possession of courageous men.49 In Laches

Socrates says that courage is a power.50 In Laches, outside of the argu-
ment where he introduces the condition, Socrates does not explicitly state
his belief that courage is fine. However, from a wide body of evidence
in and out of this dialogue, it seems beyond dispute that he does. For
instance, early in the discussion, he says that he and the others are "con-
sulting about making the souls of Lysimachus' and Melesias' sons as good
as possible (OTI &pitat)."5 Given his belief that courage is a part of
excellence, it is reasonable to infer that he believes courage is fine.52 In
Lysis Socrates suggests that friendship must have an ultimate object.53 In
this dialogue he also suggests that the presence of badness is not the cause
of friendship.54 In Euthyphro Socrates suggests that holiness is a form, the
same in all instances and that because of which all holy entities are holy.55
He also says that it is not in any way unholy;56 and that the definiens must
describe the being of holiness rather than that which holiness undergoes.57
In Hippias Major Socrates (or his alter ego) insists that fineness is not in
any way not-fine and that it makes entities fine.58 In Meno Socrates says
that excellence is the same in all instances and that because of which all
instances of excellence are such instances.59 In Meno Socrates says he does
not know what excellence is and that he has never met anyone who does.
Given this view, given his view, expressed in Laches, that a man is good
insofar as he is knowledgeable and that excellence is a kind of knowl-
edge, and given his view expressed in Charmides that if one possesses
49 Cf. Lach. 19lc7-e7.

50 Lach. 192a10-b3.
51 Cf. Lach. 186a3-6.
52 For evidence of Socrates' identification of what is KcxX6v with what is &yeyaO6v,
cf. his claim in Charmides: "Well, now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago
that co(ppoc'vWr1 is KxX6v? Certainly I did, he said. And c;iozppove men are also aya9oi."
(Charm. 160e6-10); and his claim in Protagoras: "Is going to war a KcaMv thing, I
asked, or an aicXpo6v thing? KaX6v, he replied. Then, if it is xccX6v, we have admitted,
by our former argument, that it is also a&yaxo0v; for we agreed that all MaM actions
are &ya0&a. True and I abide by that decision. You are right to do so, I said." (Prot.
359e4-8)
53 Lys. 218d6-220b5.
5 Lys. 220b6-22 1 b6.
s Euth. 6d9-el; cf. Euth. 5c8-d5.
56 Euth. 8a10-b6; cf. Euth. 5c8-d5.
57Euth. I Ila6-b 1.
58 E.g., Hip. Maj. 292c9-d6. On Socrates' view that To KCXOv is aiyaO6v, cf. n. 52.
59 Meno 72a6 ff.

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temperance one should be able to say what it is, Socrates' expressed fail-
ure to encounter anyone who knows what excellence is suggests that he
believes not many (if any) people possess excellence.60 Finally, I take it
that in Republic I the arguments Socrates develops for the views that it is
not the function of justice to do harm and that justice is beneficial obvi-
ously reflect his own views. However, if supporting evidence is desired,
one might consider his shock at Thrasymachus' suggestion that justice is
not an excellence and therefore not fine or good and his expressed intent
to try to persuade Thrasymachus otherwise.6'
It is clear, then, that the propositions expressing the F-conditions that
Socrates introduces in testing proposed definitions are propositions to
which he himself is committed. However, the claim that Socrates employs
these commitments in evaluating definitions in the way that I have de-
scribed is controversial and demands further justification.62 My claim is
that Socrates tests proposed definitions to determine their truth-value and
that he does so by considering their consistency with F-conditions he
introduces and to which he is committed. So, for instance, if a proposed
definition is inconsistent with an F-condition that he introduces, this gives
him reason to believe that the definition is false.
The following evidence supports the view that Socrates tests definitions
to determine whether they are true. In response to Euthyphro's second
definition, Socrates says: "Excellent, Euthyphro, you have now answered
as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure;
but, of course, you will show me that it is true."63 In Lysis Socrates re-
sponds in dismay to his first definition: "a most unaccountable suspicion
came over me that the conclusion to which we had agreed was not true."64
In Republic 1, Socrates tells Thrasymachus: "But it is clear that we must
investigate to see whether or not it [that is, Thrasymachus' definition] is
I Again, of course, these views from Laches and Charmides need not be applica-
ble to the Socrates of Meno. But I see no good reason why they should not be.
61 Rep. I 347e2 ff.
62 For example, Benson argues that in evaluating his interlocutors' definitions, Socrates
is testing to determine whether his interlocutor possesses a consistent set of beliefs
about F. This is because such consistency implies or at least suggests knowledge and
Socrates' immediate objective is to determine whether his interlocutor is knowledge-
able. Cf. Benson (2000) 32-95. Benson has re-articulated this view in Scott (2002).
Tarrant also defends the view that Socrates' method serves to test his interlocutor's
knowledge (in Scott [20021).
63 Euth. 7a3-4.
I Lys. 218c5-7.

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284 DAVID WOLFSDORF
true."65 In Charmides, Charmides introduces a definition that Socrates sus-

pects Charmides heard from Critias. Charmides asks whether it should
matter from whom he heard it; and Socrates replies, "It makes no differ-
ence at all ... One ought not to consider who said it, but whether or not
it is true."11 Later in the same dialogue when Critias accuses Socrates of
deliberately trying to refute him without paying attention to the content of
the investigation Socrates says:
If I am thoroughly refuting you, how can you think I am doing so for any other
reason than that on account of which I would scrutinize what I myself say - from
a fear of carelessly supposing at any moment that I knew something without
knowing it. And so I assert that here and now this is what I am doing; I am
examining the argument (Tov koyov) mostly for my own sake, but also perhaps
for that of my fellows. Or do you not think it is basically a common good for
all people that the nature of every entity be made clear?67
I take Socrates to be saying here that the fact that Critias is being refuted
is incidental; that Socrates is concentrating on the argument (TOv X6yov) -
rather than on refuting Critias - and that he is concerned to determine
what temperance is and whether temperance is what Critias says it is. His
attention is so focused just because it is beneficial to have a true belief
about this rather than a false one.68
65 Rep. I 339b2-3. Cf. also Socrates' explanation that his aim is not to refute
Thrasymachus (Rep. I 341a5-c2) Cf. also Socrates admission that he is not concerned
with whether the account under consideration is Thrasymachus', but merely with the
account itself (Rep. I 349a9-bl).
I Charm. 161c5-6.
67 Charm. 166c7-d4. Cp. Socrates' remarks in Gorgias: "I think we should be con-
tentiously eager to come to know what is true and what is false about the things we
discuss, for it is a common good for all that the truth should be made evident." (Gorg.
505e4-6)
I Cp. Socrates' remarks in Gorgias: "And why, when I have my suspicions, do I
ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It's not you I'm after, it's our dis-
cussion, to have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we're talking about
most clear to us." (Gorg. 453c1-4; cp. also Gorg. 454cl-5.) "What's my point in say-
ing this? It's that I think you're now saying things that aren't very consistent or com-
patible with what you were first saying about oratory. So I'm afraid to pursue my
examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness
to win against you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I'd be
pleased to continue questioning you if you're the kind of man I am; otherwise, I would
drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to refute
anyone who says anything untrue, and who, however, wouldn't be any less pleased to

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If still more evidence is needed, further support for the claim that, in
his discussions in the early definitional dialogues, Socrates seeks a true
definition of F can be gained from consideration of the explicit reasons
Socrates gives in each definitional dialogue for pursuing the definition of
F. Indeed, to cite all the available evidence would be tedious. So I will
offer a representative sample from Hippias Major and Meno.
In Hippias Major, Socrates recounts an experience he recently had lis-
tening to speeches. He thought parts of some of these base and parts fine.
But when he recognized that he was making these judgments he chastised
himself for assuming to know what was fine or base, without knowing
what beauty itself was. To avoid this in the future, he promised himself
that if he happened to meet one of the wise, he would learn from him
what fineness is. Believing that Hippias is such a person, Socrates wishes
to learn from him.69 So, clearly, in pursuing a definition of fineness with
Hippias Socrates wants to gain a true definition of fineness.
In Meno, Meno, assuming Socrates to be knowledgeable, asks him how
excellence can be acquired. Socrates professes not even to know what
excellence is and not to have ever met a person who does. Meno, who
had been a pupil of Gorgias and who is surprised by Socrates' claim, sug-
gests that Gorgias knows. Socrates, confirming that Meno shares Gorgias'
views, invites him, in Gorgias' absence, to tell him what excellence is and
so to prove him wrong in claiming never to have met anyone who knows
what excellence is. In short, then, Socrates' motivation in pursuing a sat-
isfactory definition of excellence is that he lacks knowledge of it, has
never been able to find someone who possesses that knowledge, and then
encounters someone who claims to have it. Clearly, then, Socrates wants
to know whether the definitions Meno proposes are true.
be refuted than to refute." (Gorg. 457el-458a5). Cp. Socrates' remarks in Protagoras:

"It makes no difference to me, provided you give the answers, whether it is your own
opinion or not. I am primarily interested in testing the argument, although it may hap-
pen both that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being tested." (Prot.
333c5-9) "I don't want you to think that my motive in talking with you is anything
else than to take a good hard look at things that continually perplex me. I think that
Homer said it all in the line, 'Going in tandem, one perceives before the other'." (Prot.
348c5-dI) Cf. also Socrates' and Protagoras' exchange: "I think that you just want to
win the argument, Socrates ... I have no other reason for asking these things than my
desire to answer these questions about virtue, especially what virtue itself is." (Prot.
360e3-8).
69 Hip. Maj. 286c3-e4.

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286 DAVID WOLFSDORF
In sum, in the investigations in the early definitional dialogues Socrates

pursues true definitions. Precisely, he evaluates proposed definitions to deter-
mine their truth-value. He does so by considering whether they are con-
sistent with F-conditions that he introduces and to which he is committed.
In short, Socrates evaluates the truth-value of definitions by considering
their consistency with F-conditions to which he is committed and which,
therefore, he believes are true.
IV. The Epistemic Status of Socrates' F-Conditions
As we will see, this account of Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions

to some extent - but only to some extent - resolves the problem of the
elenchus, as Vlastos first defined it.70 According to the problem of the
elenchus, the arguments Socrates develops in response to definitions can
demonstrate that a set of propositions Ip, q, r) constituting the argument
in response to a proposed definition (and including the definition p) is
inconsistent and therefore false, but not that any particular one of those
propositions is false and, in particular, not that the proposed definition is.
Therefore, it is questionable on what grounds Socrates can claim to refute
proposed definitions as a result of the arguments he develops.
In considering the problem, it should be clarified whether in fact
Socrates does claim to refute proposed definitions as a result of the argu-
ments he develops. For instance, in arguing for a "dissolution of the prob-
lem of the elenchus", Benson suggests that Socrates does not in fact claim
to refute proposed definitions. Rather, Socrates merely claims that the set
of propositions (including the definition) to which his interlocutor gives
his assent is inconsistent.7" In support of his view, Benson discusses Socrates'
arguments in response to the definitions in Charmides, Laches, and
Euthyphro.72 He suggests that Socrates' conclusions to his arguments in
these dialogues are qualified as conditionals. Rather than concluding that
not-p, Socrates concludes that not-p, if q (where p is the definition and q
is what I am calling the F-condition). For instance, in response to Charmides'
second definition Socrates concludes: "Then temperance would not be
modesty, if it happens to be something good and modesty is no more good
than bad."73
70 Vlastos (1994) 21 ff.

71 See n. 43.
72 Benson (2000) 57-80.
73 Charm. 161all-b2.

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Many of Socrates' conclusions in the definitional dialogues are qualified

in this way, or, more generally, they are qualified as relative to the par-
ticular argument developed. For instance, in concluding his response
to Euthyphro's second definition, Socrates says: "Then the same things
would be both holy and unholy according to this argument."74 Like the
previous kind of qualification, Benson interprets this form of qualification
as indicating that Socrates does not intend to conclude that the definition
is false, but merely that if one agrees to the premises of the argument
(excluding the definition), then the definition is false. Again, however,
it is undetermined whether these premises are true and so whether the
definition is in fact false.75 (I follow Adams who has recently described
the difference between conclusions qualified in these ways and unqualified
conclusions as hypothetical and categorical respectively.)76
In fact, Socrates does not always conclude his arguments with condi-
tional qualifications or by relativizing the conclusions to the particular
argument developed. Moreover, Benson's own conclusions from his in-
terpretation of the arguments in Charmides, Laches, and Euthyphro are
not entirely accurate. Among the early definitional dialogues, many of
Socrates' conclusions are expressed categorically rather than hypotheti-
cally. As mentioned earlier in the paper, in response to Laches' and
Meno's first definitions as well as Meno's second definition, Socrates more
or less simply tells his interlocutor that the response is inadequate because
it does not satisfy some F-condition.77 Moreover, Socrates' conclusions to
the arguments in response to the third definition in Laches, the first
7 Euth. 8a7-8.
75 In fact, according to Benson's interpretation of Socrates' immediate aims in con-
structing elenctic arguments, Socrates is not (immediately) concerned to determine
whether the proposed definition is true. Instead, Socrates uses the arguments to test
whether his interlocutor has knowledge. But this interpretation of Socrates' motives in
testing proposed definitions is unacceptable, in part for reasons that we have already
seen. Socrates clearly seeks true definitions, and he tests proposed definitions to deter-
mine whether they are true. Furthermore, not all of Socrates' interlocutors are alleged
or self-professed experts, as Benson suggests. Still further, Socrates proposes some
definitions himself. The key to Benson's argument, though, is what he calls the dox-
astic constraint, according to which it is a necessary and sufficient condition of a
premise in an elenctic argument that it be believed by the interlocutor. For a com-
pelling refutation of this notion, cf. Brickhouse and Smith (2002) 147-9. I elaborate
on some of these points below.
7 Adams (1998) 288-91.
7 Lach. 190e7-9; Euth. 6d6-1 1; Men. 72a6 ff., 74a7-10.

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288 DAVID WOLFSDORF
definition in Lysis, the first and third definitions in Euthyphro, the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and sixth definitions in Hippias Major, the third
definition in Meno, and the first, third, and fourth definitions in Republic
I are all unqualified.78 For instance, in concluding his response to the first
definition in Republic I Socrates says: "Then this is not the definition of
justice, telling the truth and returning what one takes." And in conclud-
ing his response to the third definition in Laches, he says: "So, what you
are now describing, Nicias, will not be a part, but the whole of excel-
lence... But, you know, we agreed that courage was a part of excel-
lence... Then, Nicias, we have failed to discover what courage is."
On the other hand, the conclusions to the second definition in Laches,
the first (and, as mentioned, second), and fourth definitions in Charmides,
the second definition in Lysis, the fourth (and, as mentioned, the second)
definition in Euthyphro, the second and seventh definitions in Hippias Major,
and the second definition in Republic I are also expressed hypothetically.79
An obvious explanation for this mix of hypothetical and categorical
conclusions is that Socrates has different attitudes toward the different
arguments. Some he finds more compelling and others less so. Reasonable
as this would seem, in fact, there isn't a compelling correlation between
the character of Socrates' conclusions and the character of his commit-
ments to the F-conditions he employs in the arguments. For instance, in
developing his arguments in response to Hippias' first and second defini-
tions in Hippias Major, Socrates uses the same F-condition. However, his
conclusion to the former is categorical, whereas his conclusion to the lat-
ter is hypothetical. Similarly, both the sixth and seventh definitions are
rejected on the same grounds, that fineness is good. But the conclusion to
the latter argument is expressed hypothetically, whereas that to the former
is expressed categorically. Still further, in Charmides the arguments using
the conditions that F is fine or good are concluded hypothetically, but
Socrates' commitment to these positions is as strong as that to any F-
condition.80
78 Lach. 199e3-1 1; Lys. 218c4-7; Euth. 6d9-e6, 10e9-1 la4; Hip. Maj. 289d2-5, 293b 10-
c7 (cf. also 293d6-8), 294e7-9, 296d2-3, 297d3-6; Men. 79d6-e2; Rep. I 331d2-3,
335el-5, 347d8-el (cf. also 342e6-11).
79 Lach. 193d4-10; Charm. 160dl-2, 174d3-7; Lys. 222dl-e3; Euth. 15c8-9; Hip.
Maj. 291c6-8; Rep. I 331el-2 and 334d5-8. Note that Critias himself concludes the
argument in response to the third definition in Charmides by retracting certain premises
to which he gave assent and by rejecting the definition (164c5-d3).
11 See nn. 44-5.

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Additionally, it is significant that, however hypothetically Socrates con-

cludes an argument, he never then proceeds to re-consider the definition
or to investigate the soundness of his commitment to the F-condition used
in the argument. Once a definition has been concluded to be unsatisfac-
tory - whether or not the conclusion is expressed hypothetically - Socrates
suggests that his interlocutor try again to answer the WF question by pos-
ing a new definition, or he himself offers a new definition. Furthermore,
the movement of the investigations is such that, once a definition has been
reached that satisfies an F-condition that has been introduced, a new F-
condition is introduced that the definition does not satisfy. That is to say,
the investigations advance in a linear fashion by satisfying a series of F-
conditions - although in some instances it takes more than one try (that
is, more than one definition) for the interlocutor to satisfy the F-condition
originally introduced. For example, Meno's first two definitions fail for
the same reason, and Hippias' first three definitions fail for the same rea-
son.8" As such, the investigations exhibit a consistent developmental form:
a set of properties that (Socrates believes) are constitutive of the identity
of F is incrementally clarified.82 In short, the investigations consistently
develop in this fashion, regardless of whether Socrates concludes his argu-
ments hypothetically or categorically.
In view of this, it is unreasonable to infer as a general principle that
the way Socrates concludes an argument in response to a proposed
definition - that is, either hypothetically or categorically - relates to the
degree of his conviction in the soundness of the argument, and specifically
to the strength of his commitment to the F-condition employed in the
argument. This is not to say that in some cases Socrates' tentativeness in
drawing a given conclusion does not correlate with the strength of his con-
viction in the soundness of the argument. For instance, in response to the
fourth definition in Charmides, although his argument concludes that the
knowledge of knowledge does not exist, he admits that he is not compe-
tent to judge the matter.83 However, generally speaking there is no evid-
ence to show that Socrates is not more or less equally committed to all
x1 Similarly, in Euthyphro the third and fourth definitions fail because they describe
a izi0o; of To 6atov, precisely, the same n6Oo;, being loved by the gods. And the
sixth and seventh definitions in Hippias fail because they do not satisfy the condition
that T6o ia6v is &yaOov.
82 No indication is given that by the end of the investigation all properties neces-
sary for a satisfactory definition have been determined.
83 Charm. 169a7-bl.

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290 DAVID WOLFSDORF
the F-conditions he introduces; which is to say, Socrates believes with

more or less the same degree of conviction that all of the F-conditions
that he introduces are true.
This fact to some degree resolves the problem of the elenchus, for it
shows that Socrates' manner of evaluating definitions does give him some
reason to believe the truth or falsity of a definition. Precisely, since
Socrates believes that the premise expressing the F-condition is true, its
inconsistency with the definition gives him reason to believe that the definition
is false. In other words, the definition p and the premise expressing the
F-condition q do not have the same doxastic status. Either q is more firmly
entrenched in Socrates' as well as his interlocutor's belief set, or the inter-
locutor follows Socrates in accepting that the definition must satisfy the
F-condition introduced, whether or not the interlocutor had previously
believed that. For instance, according to this view, in Charmides Char-
mides and Socrates more firmly believe that temperance is fine and good
than that it is quietness or modesty; and in Euthyphro, Euthyphro follows
Socrates in accepting that the definiens must be purely holy. Therefore,
while Socrates or his interlocutor logically could propose to reject the F-
condition rather than the definition, they never do, again, because their
attitudes toward the definition and the F-condition differ.84
The preceding account does not explain why Socrates occasionally
expresses the conclusions to his arguments in response to proposed definitions
hypothetically. It also leaves untouched a deeper and more complex issue
related to the so-called problem of the elenchus. Vlastos' conception of
the problem of the elenchus was in part motivated by the following epis-
temological question: What gives Socrates any more confidence in his
belief in one proposition than another? For our purposes, the question may
be put more precisely in this way. Consistency or inconsistency with one
I There are only two instances in the early definitional dialogues where, in the
process of testing a proposition, an interlocutor rejects an F-condition that Socrates
introduces. One occurs in Charmides, where Critias rejects Socrates' suggestion that,
qua Entariju, self-knowledge has a product and, given that it doesn't, that it has an
object distinct from itself. Socrates concedes that some u'rntarutco are not productive,
and he accepts Critias' suggestion that self-knowledge does not have a distinctive
object. Of course, in the ensuing conversation Critias is unable to defend the claim
that such an ?'nto pTI exists (Charm. 165c4-166c3, esp. 165e3-166a2 and 166b7-c3).
In Republic I - although not in the process of testing a definition of 8tKatoo'iv1 -
Thrasymachus claims that tcatoaloov is not an apc'r#l and therefore not 6akov or
ayao6v. Socrates is shocked, but develops an argument to justify this claim and per-
suade Thrasymachus to retract his position (Rep. I 347e2 ff.).

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of his F-conditions gives Socrates reason to believe or disbelieve a given

proposition, but why should Socrates have any confidence that his F-con-
ditions are true? The answer to this question and to the question why
Socrates occasionally expresses the conclusions to his arguments hypo-
thetically are related.
If we inquire into the grounds of Socrates' commitments to his F-con-
ditions, we find that in most cases no argument is given. In Charmides,
that temperance is (necessarily or in all instances) fine is assumed. That
temperance is (necessarily or in all cases) good is based on the claims
that temperate men are good, that temperance makes them good, and that
that which makes men good must itself be good. But that temperate men
are good and that temperance makes men good is assumed. That temper-
ance entails knowledge because a temperate man knows what he is doing
is confirmed by appeal to intuition, but not argument. That temperance
exists is assumed. That temperance is beneficial is assumed.85 In Laches,
that courage is the same in all cases and the common possession of coura-
geous men is assumed. That courage is a power is assumed. That courage
is in all cases fine is assumed. That courage is a part of excellence is
assumed. In Euthyphro, that holiness is the same in all instances and that
because of which all holy entities are holy is assumed. That holiness is
purely holy is assumed. That the definiens of holiness must describe the
being of holiness and not something that holiness undergoes is assumed.
In Hippias Major, that fineness is not in any way not-fine is assumed.
That fineness makes entities fine is assumed. That fineness is good is
assumed. In Meno, that excellence is the same in all instances of excel-
lence and that because of which instances of excellence are such instances
is assumed. That excellence is a property most people do not possess
is assumed. In Republic 1, that all instances of justice must be just is
assumed.
Only in four cases does Socrates defend an F-condition with an argu-
ment. In Lysis, that the presence of badness is not the cause of friendship
is based on an imaginative inductive argument. That friendship must have
an ultimate object of love seems based on the suggestion that otherwise
85 Socrates expresses his commitment to this view in two places. On one occasion
he says, 'trilv owv 8l GoxppocuvsIv Ij ) W Xq6v Ti cai &yaoov gxvTFei6oR eivai." (Charm.
169b4-5) This may be compared with Socrates' "strange suspicion" that his first definition
of (pqXic is untrue ("iadiett' ozK o01' Ro0ev golt atoCrMOT&T TI; bnroOit EiiXOEV . . ."
(Lys. 218c5-6))

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292 DAVID WOLFSDORF
a vicious regress would ensue.86 In Republic 1, that it is not a function of

justice to do harm is based on a partly inductive analogical argument. That
justice is beneficial to others is based on a partly inductive analogical
argument.
But that most of Socrates' F-conditions are assumed to be true, but not
defended does not imply that Socrates does not have some resources to
defend them. Twice among the early definitional dialogues, Socrates'
interlocutor challenges an F-condition that Socrates introduces.87 In one
case, Socrates concedes his interlocutor's objection,88 but in the other he
defends his position. Given the way that Socrates develops arguments
throughout the early dialogues, it is reasonable to assume that were he
compelled to defend his F-conditions, the epistemological grounds of his
defense would be as varied as the explicit arguments he does develop.
That is to say, the premises of his arguments would rest variously on self-
evidence,89 common opinion,' experience, and deduction. Granting this, it
86 "Now are we not bound to weary ourselves with going on in this way, unless
we can arrive at some first principle which will not keep leading us on from one friend
to another, but will reach the one original friend for whose sake all the other things
can be said to be friends?" (Lys. 219c50d2).
87 See n. 84.
8h This need not be interpreted as indicating that Socrates admits he is wrong.
Rather, he admits the possibility that he may be wrong. He does seem to believe that
all the &pEtQi have Epya as well as content that is distinct from themselves. One
might compare his concession to Critias with his concession to Hippias that there is
no distinction between the questions, "What is KXX6v?" and "What is TO Krakv?"
(Hip. Maj. 287d3-e3). Although he believes that there is a distinction, he is willing to
concede that there may not be. Similarly, Socrates concedes to Euthyphro that the gods
quarrel, even though he believes they do not (Euth. 6a6-c7).
89 Others who have suggested that Socrates' premises are, at least in part, justified
by self-evidence include Gulley (1968) 43-4 and Polansky (1985).
1 Only one F-condition seems to be a candidate for this explanation, that dvApciW
is a part of ap?rri. Consider how Socrates introduces it. "Then which of the parts of
&p-nr shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of hoplomachy is supposed
to promote. And that, of course, is generally supposed (60KeI ?toi; no?Xoi) to be
&v6peia." (Lach. 190d4-5) Others who have suggested that Socrates' premises are, at
least in part, justified by common opinion include Bolton (1993) and Polansky (1985).
Cp. Xenophon's claim: "Whenever Socrates himself argued something out he pro-
ceeded from the most strongly held opinions, believing that security in argument lies
therein. Accordingly, whenever he argued he got much greater assent from his hear-
ers than anyone I have ever known" (Mem. 4.6.15, cited from Vlastos (1994, 14)).
Vlastos also claims that most of the premises Socrates uses in his arguments are rep-
utable opinions (1991, 112); but, of course, that he does not subscribe to these opin-
ions because they are endoxic.

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may reasonably be asked where else they could rest. In other words, we
must agree with Kraut and Vlastos that when he develops his arguments
Socrates "picks premises ... he considers ... eminently reasonable."9'
The problem that this conclusion does not address and which I regard
as the deeper problem motivating Vlastos' conception of the problem of
the elenchus is this. If Socrates develops arguments using premises he con-
siders eminently reasonable, then why then does he so frequently disavow
ethical knowledge? In other words, why is Socrates so infrequently willing
to claim that he knows a given ethical proposition? I suggest the follow-
ing answer. Nowhere in the early dialogues does Socrates broach episte-
mological questions about the grounds for believing or determining the
truth-value of ethical propositions. In this respect, his pursuit of true
definitions is theoretically and methodologically naYve. Yet Socrates is in
some sense aware of his epistemological and methodological limitations
of his investigations.92 It is this sensitivity to these limitations that com-
pels Socrates to disavow knowledge. It is precisely such an understand-
ing of ethical matters that he believes an expert (or the possessor of a
craft of excellence) would have and which he does not. Consequently,
although he sometimes categorically concludes that a given proposition is
the case, he never claims as a result of an argument or several arguments
to know a given conclusion.93 Furthermore, Socrates' occasional hypo-
thetical conclusions to arguments in response to proposed definitions are
9' Vlastos concedes this to Kraut in (1983) 73 with regard to Socrates' arguments
in pre-Gorgias dialogues.
92 In each of the definitional dialogues except Laches Socrates disavows knowledge
of the identity of F (Charm. 165b5-cl, 166c7-d3; Hip. Maj. 286dl-3, 304d5-8; Lys.
212a4-6; Meno 71 a5-7, 80d 1; Rep. ! 337e4-5; Euth. 5a7-cS, 15c 12, 15e5-16a4). Moreover,
nowhere in the early definitional dialogues does Socrates claim to know that F has a
given property. Still further, in Laches Socrates disavows ethical expertise at Lach.
186b8-c5 (on which cf. also Lach. 186d8-e3); and in Charmides (175e6) he claims
that he is a poor investigator.
13 One of the problems with Viastos' conception of the problem of the elenchus is
its commitment to the view that in developing arguments to evaluate definitions,
Socrates aims to demonstrate the truth-value of the definition. However, Socrates nowhere
expresses an intent to demonstrate or an expectation that he will demonstrate the truth-
value of any definition. In his paper on the elenchus, Vlastos claims that in one "cru-
cial" passage Socrates claims to have proven the truth of an atomic proposition. The
passage occurs in Gorgias, where Socrates elicits Polus' assent to the claim that it
has been shown to be true that suffering injustice is preferable to doing injustice
("?Q. Ooisov &1Lo56&uElc 'kq% a )PyeTo; HQA. C'icveTat." [Gorg. 479e7-81)
Vlastos draws special attention to the verb "&ro&56Eu'TOr", claiming that this means

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294 DAVID WOLFSDORF
reflections of this recognition of his deeper epistemological and method-

ological limitations. That is to say, although Socrates only occasionally
concludes his arguments hypothetically, these occasions reflect his deeper
epistemological commitments. His categorically expressed conclusions, then,
should only be interpreted as reflecting his strong belief in the conclusion,
not his belief that he knows the conclusion.94
Considerable debate persists over the interpretation of Socrates'
avowals and disavowals of ethical knowledge. Although Socrates often
disavows ethical knowledge, on a few occasions he claims to know an
atomic ethical proposition. For instance, in Apology Socrates claims to
know that it is wrong to do injustice by disobeying a superior, whether
god or mortal.95 It is unclear whether these can be explained as consistent
in view of the fact that the scope of their content does not overlap. That
is, Socrates knows some ethical propositions but not others.96 Or, whether
Socrates claims to know some ethical propositions, but disavows having
ethical expertise.97 Or, whether he uses the words for knowing in two dif-
ferent senses - meaning it in one sense when he claims to know, and in
another sense when he disavows knowledge.98 Or, whether his knowledge
claims are so infrequent as to be hermeneutically insignificant.99 Or,
whether he does not have a consistent view on the topic, but his ethical
epistemology to some extent shifts over the course of the early period.'0"0' ?
it has been proved, where "proved" implies demonstration by valid deduction (1994,
19 ff.). This is an egregiously anachronistic interpretation of the verb. Indeed, the argu-
ment upon which Socrates' conclusion is based could be deductive and the conclusion
could be validly inferred from the premises. But there are no grounds for believing
Socrates recognizes the logical distinction between inductive and deductive argumen-
tation or the epistemological ramifications of this distinction. Socrates is not using
'cano5EK1KTa" in a technical sense. Rather, the verb here means what it normally
means in conventional discourse, it has been shown; which is to say, both Socrates
and his interlocutor have perceived from the propositions they have introduced and to
which they have given assent that it is better to suffer than to do injustice.
4 Further explanation of why Plato makes Socrates express his conclusions hypo-
thetically in some instances and categorically in others would have to be gained from
a consideration of the immediate context of those passages in conjunction with con-
sideration of Plato's dramaturgical objectives in the passage.
95 Apol. 29b6-9 and 37b7-8.
96 E.g., Lesher (1987); Nozick (1994).
97 E.g., Brickhouse and Smith (1994) 30-72.
98 E.g., Vlastos (1994) 39-69, reprinted from (1985).
3 E.g., Benson (2000) 222-37.
E.g., Kraut (1984) 275.
10 One further possibility is that Socrates' frequent disavowals of knowledge are

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The topic is too complex to be entirely resolved here. But I do wish to

emphasize one fundamental point in support of the claims I have made.
In the early dialogues Socrates does not offer an explanation for why he
believes he lacks ethical knowledge. I suggest the reason for his silence
on this matter reflects the very reason why he so frequently disavows
ethical knowledge: he does not understand how ethical reasoning operates,
and, specifically, he does not understand what makes ethical propositions
true.
In the early dialogues Socrates does not disavow all knowledge.'02 At
the same time, ethical knowledge is not the only kind he does disavow.
Among other things, he also disavows certain eschatological knowledge.'03
He does not know what will happen when he dies. In this case, the rea-
son for his disavowals is also not made explicit. However, it is evidently
related to his commonsensical conception of the limitations of the human
condition and human experience. Precisely, most human beings have not
experienced death and then returned to life to report on it. I cite this in-
stance of Socrates disavowing knowledge because I believe his disavowal
of ethical knowledge is similar in its simplicity and non-theoreticality.
Consider Socrates' remarks in Euthyphro:
If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers
were greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and
make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to
arithmetic? ... Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative sizes of things,
we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?... And we
should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing?... But
about what would disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would
cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give
an answer offhand; but let me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong and
noble and disgraceful and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which
disingenuous. Hence, his notorious tipwviFta. But, although among previous genera-
tions of scholars this view was common, it is widely accepted today that Socrates'
disavowals are genuine. On this, cf. Vlastos (1985) 1-31, reprinted in (1994) 39-66.
102 Lesher (1987) instructively emphasizes this point. Brickhouse and Smith ([1994]
34-5) emphasize the fact that Socrates principally disavows ethical knowledge, not all
knowledge - although they do not make much of the fact that he disavows other kinds
of knowledge as well.
'03 Apol. 29a40b6, 37b5-7. In addition Socrates disavows knowledge of rhetoric, the
heavens, and Hades at Apol. 19c2-8 as well as of run-of-the-mill craft-knowledge at
Apol. 22d2-3. He also disavows knowledge about the activities of the gods at Euth.
6b 1 -2.

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296 DAVID WOLFSDORF
you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies,
because we differ about them and cannot reach any agreement?""4
Note that Socrates does not distinguish between rationally and empirically
derived evidence (that is, arithmetical and metrical evidence) per se.
Therefore, it seems unreasonable to assume that he regards the truth of
ethical propositions as difficult to determine because the method of deter-
mination is either deductive or inductive. When he examines ethical
propositions Socrates reasons both deductively and inductively,'t5 and he
makes no theoretical distinction between the two. Rather, in the Euthyphro
passage Socrates simply expresses a belief that people can resolve certain
kinds of questions satisfactorily or with ease and others not; and he
regards ethical or axiological questions as among the types of questions
that are difficult to resolve.
But, while Socrates believes that it is difficult to determine the truth-
value of ethical propositions, notably, neither here nor elsewhere in the
early dialogues does he indicate or consider why this is so. Socrates is
silent on this matter. Questions concerning the epistemological grounds of
ethical propositions do not preoccupy him. The process of reasoning in
which he engages is not meta-ethical or epistemological in a way that
could present such questions to him, much less facilitate answers to them.
Therefore, although he recognizes that disagreement in ethical debate is
common and perhaps also that ethical concepts appear shrouded in a par-
ticular obscurity, he gives no indication of understanding why it is difficult
to determine the truth-value of ethical propositions.
In considering these points, we might even grant that Socrates' ap-
proach to ethical reasoning tends to be foundationalist in style insofar
he tends to pursue definitional knowledge of F prior to pertinent non-
definitional knowledge and that he suggests the importance of pursuing
definitional knowledge prior to pertinent non-definitional knowledge."'
But Socrates does not approach his investigations by trying to determine
the truth-value of foundational ethical propositions that he can then use
to determine the truth-value of definitional propositions. So, even grant-
ing the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge for pertinent
non-definitional knowledge, the question remains how one can acquire
definitional knowledge.
'(4 Euth. 7b7-d5.

"'5 This point is also emphasized by Kraut (1983) 60 and Adams (1989).
'" On the question of whether Socrates is committed to the epistemological prior-

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In this regard, Socrates' pursuit of true definitions is limited. Yet, as

noted, in some sense he is not ignorant of his limitations. On the contrary,
at least pre-theoretically, he is keenly aware that his understanding of
ethics is limited. I suggest that ultimately it is for this reason that Socrates
so often disavows knowledge of ethical propositions, even on the basis of
his arguments for them.
In general, then, in some cases Socrates has reasons that persuade him
to believe certain ethical propositions, but he doesn't understand what
makes those reasons persuasive. And in other cases he merely believes
certain ethical propositions, but, again, without understanding reasons for
doing so. It is precisely such an understanding that Socrates believes an
expert in the field would possess. As he says elsewhere in Gorgias, a craft
(tF_Xvij) would encompass the nature ((p&t;) of entities within a specific
domain, the cause (axiia) of their operation, and it would enable its pos-
sessor to give an explanation (X6yo;) of these things.'07 Socrates always
denies being an expert in ethical matters or having a craft of excellence.'08
His pursuit of definitions is relatively unsystematic and ad hoc. Despite
his years of discussing ethical topics and pursuing definitions, he does not
have a theory of definition'" or even building blocks for a theory of prac-
tical reasoning.
ity of definitional knowledge for pertinent non-definitional knowledge, see subsection

V.v.
107 On these conditions as necessary for a r%Xv1, cf. Gorg. 500e4-501a7: "I was
saying, I think, that cooking does not seem to me to be a TEXv11; whereas medicine, I
said, has investigated the (vo;q of the object of its care as well as the aiTi'rt of the
things that it does. Moreover, medicine can give a X6yo; of these things. In contrast,
cooking, whose whole concern is with pleasure, pursues this in an altogether &eTxveX;
manner. It has not at all investigated the (plio0; of pleasure or the cixira, and in a com-
pletely 6koyco; manner, so to speak, has made no distinctions whatsoever . ." For a
fuller account of Socrates' conception of expertise and rEXvn as well as the contro-
versy over the extent to which Socrates thinks ethical expertise is analogous to carft-
expertise, cf. Irwin (1977) 71-101; Roochnik (1986), reprinted in Benson (1992); Woodruff
(in Everson 1990), reprinted in Benson (1992); Brickhouse and Smith (1994) 5-7;
Roochnik (1996); Smith (1998). I agree with Smith when she says that "[flor
Socrates ... [a] definition is . .. a particularly clear manifestation of the kind of knowl-
edge possessed by an expert." (148) But I strongly disagree with her claim that a
definition "does not even constitute the content of that knowledge." (ibid.)
108 Apol. 20c1-3 (cf. Apol. 21d2-6); Lach. 186b8-c5 (cf. also Lach. 186d8-e3).
'0 For more on this claim, cf. subsection V.iv.

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298 DAVID WOLFSDORF
V. Problems and Consequences
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, the topic of how Socrates

pursues definitions in Plato's early definitional dialogues intersects the
broader topic of Socrates' method of philosophizing in the early dialogues.
Since one of main preoccupations in the early dialogues is pursuing
definitions, my views on Socrates' pursuit of definitions bear directly on
the interpretation of Socrates' manner of philosophizing more broadly. In
the following subsections I address some of these consequences as well
as touch upon some problems more narrowly related to Socrates' pursuit
of definitions. These include whether Socrates has a method of pursuing
definitions and whether Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions is "elenc-
tic"; whether Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions changes over the
course of the early period; whether Socrates has a theory of definition;
whether Socrates evaluates definitions or people; and whether Socrates is
committed to the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge. In brief,
I advance the following claims:
* Although Socrates has a distinctive manner or style of pursuing definitions,

it is inappropriate to ascribe to him a method of doing so in just the
following sense. The concept of method implies a certain theoretical
conception of procedure that Socrates lacks. Moreover, according to
Socrates' own conceptual framework, only one who possessed the rel-
evant craft would have a method. Furthermore, Socrates' manner of
pursuing definitions is not elenctic, just insofar as the word "elenchus"
is interpreted to have adversarial connotations that are inconsistent with
the motives and interests we have ascribed to Socrates.
* Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions does not change among the
early definitional dialogues. More specifically, there is no "demise of
the elenchus," as Vlastos describes it. First, Socrates' manner of pur-
suing definitions is not "elenctic" (in the sense described). And, second,
the fact that he himself proposes definitions in allegedly post-elenctic
dialogues (that is, Lysis and Hippias Major) is consistent with the man-
ner of pursuing definitions I ascribe to him.
* In the early definitional dialogues, Socrates does not have a theory of
definition. In particular, he lacks a general theoretical ontology. Moreover,
while his comments and implicit commitments entail beliefs about
some conditions for a satisfactory definition (for example, that the
definiens must be a uniquely identifying true verbal description), such
conditions are too rudimentary to count as constitutive of a theory.

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* Although in other early dialogues and in other parts of the definitional

dialogues Socrates may express concern over the psychological states
and well-being of his interlocutors, in the process of pursuing defini-
tions, Socrates' principal concern is the evaluation of definitions, not
the psychologies or lives of his interlocutors.
* Socrates is committed to the epistemological priority of definitional
knowledge over pertinent non-definitional knowledge. This does pre-
sent a methodological problem of the kind to which Geach first drew
attention. Specifically, according to the manner in which Socrates pur-
sues definitions, it is unclear how he can get from belief that p to
knowledge that p. Although this problem is genuine, Socrates himself
is not unaware of such limits of his approach.
V.i On Whether Socrates Pursues Definitions by an Elenctic Method
Following Vlastos, the current, standard characterization of Socrates' man-

ner of investigating definitions in the early dialogues is elenctic."O But
throughout the paper I have hesitated to describe as elenctic the manner
in which I view Socrates as pursuing definitions. The word "?yx?0oq" often
has adversarial connotations and typically means cross-examination, test-
ing to disprove, or refutation."' But in investigating the WF question Socrates
does not conceive of himself as antagonistically or adversarially engaged
with his interlocutor. We have seen some evidence for this in the course
of the discussion. But it is worthwhile to cite further support here.
It is precisely Socrates' sensitivity to his epistemic and methodological
limitations that to a large extent explains why he engages in genuinely
dialogic exchanges, why he wants his interlocutor to say what he
believes,"2 and, more specifically, why in pursuing true definitions he usu-
ally asks for his interlocutors' assent to the premises he introduces that
"1 Vlastos (1994, 2, n. 8) writes that George Grote first used the word "elenchos"
to describe Socrates' method (1865). Robinson (1941) revived it. Although, to quote
Scott, it seems that the meaning of "elenchus" has broadened so much that it often
includes almost any question-and-answer style of conversation ([20021 2-3). Ob-
viously, Socrates' method is elenctic according to this broad conception of elenchus.
But I here retain a narrow conception of elenchus so that the question of whether
Socrates' method is elenctic retains its substance.
"I At least, in conventional discourse (cf. Ausland in Scott (2002) 37 ff.). On pre-
Socratic philosophical usage of the term, cf. Lesher in Scott (2002).
112 This view was originally emphasized by Vlastos (1994) 7-9. It is the cornerstone
of Benson's view, which he calls the doxastic constraint; cf. his (2000) 37 ff. Benson

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300 DAVID WOLFSDORF
express the F-conditions to which he is committed."3 When his inter-

locutor proposes a definition and Socrates perceives that the definition is
inconsistent with an F-condition to which he is committed, this suggests
to him that the definition is unsatisfactory. But, because he does not
believe he knows that his F-condition is true, he elicits his interlocutor's
assent to the F-condition in order to confirm his view. Moreover, while
the interlocutor's assent to the F-condition does not persuade Socrates to
believe that he knows the F-condition is true, it satisfies him that the argu-
ment may at least reasonably develop upon this assumption.
Socrates' conception of himself as engaged in a joint investigation is
well brought out by the way in several texts he concludes the investiga-
tion. Rather than claim that his interlocutor has failed to offer a satisfac-
tory definition of F, he says his interlocutor(s) and he have failed to
discover one. "[W]e have not yet been able to discover what a friend is";"4
"we have failed to discover what courage is";"5 and "we are unable to
discover to which entity the lawgiver gave the name 'temperance'."'6

Similarly, in the course of the discussions, Socrates tends to describe
himself and his interlocutor as engaged in a joint investigation. For
instance, in Meno he says: "Now, with regard to excellence, I myself do
not know what it is, and whereas you perhaps thought you knew before
you came into contact with me, now you are in a similar state to me. But,
I am willing to investigate with you (jit&' aoi5 CEOkxarOax) and engage in
a joint investigation (aurxicTiat) of what it is.""7 And in Charmides he
says: "But, Critias ... you treat me as though I were speaking as one who
knew about the things into which I am inquiring... But the situation is
not so. I am always inquiring with you (4iny gsra' a6o) into the proposi-
tion proposed because I do not know.""8
Perhaps the most revealing passage in this regard occurs in Republic 1.
Just as he turns from consideration of what justice is to examine Thrasy-
machus' claim that the life of the unjust man is superior to that of the just
has tried to answer criticisms of his view in Scott (2002), but I think Brickhouse and
Smith's points in Scott (2002), esp. 147-9, settle the issue.
"I I say usually because Socrates sometimes does not request his interlocutor's
assent to the F-conditions that he introduces. As we have seen, in some cases, he sim-
ply explains that the proposed definition is inadequate.
"4 Lys. 223b7-8.
" Lach. 199e11.
116 Charm. 175b3-4.
17 Meno 80dl-4.
1 Charm. 165b5-cl.

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man, Socrates asks Polemarchus if they should try t

that what he says is not true (BouAr olv cvi5otv nirri
X7Yet;).1'9 When Polemarchus assents, Socrates explains:
If then we oppose him setting out a lengthy speech against his speech
(iVrtKrwriv~vreVaVT?; X ? ... X6yov pa X6,yov), in which we each enu-
merate all the goods of being just or, in his case, unjust, it will then be neces-
sary to add up and compare the number of goods, and so we will need judges
to decide the case between us. But if, as we did before, we investigate and try
to come to a mutual understanding with one another (&vogoXoyoig,Evot ip6o
XkijXoI)g aKoltogFV), we will be both the pleaders and the judges... Which
way do you prefer?'20
The evidence indicates that in the course of investigating the WF ques-

tion Socrates' disposition toward his interlocutors is neither antagonistic
nor adversarial, but cooperative and supportive.'2' Furthermore, as we
have also seen, Socrates is primarily focused on the definitions and argu-
ments that his interlocutors and he develop. That is to say, he primarily
examines definitions, not people.'22 Given this, it hardly even makes sense
to conceive of Socrates as having an adversarial relationship to a defini-
tion or as cross-examining definitions. Of course, he can test to disprove
or refute definitions. But, for the most part, his attitude toward definitions
is not negative in this way. Socrates does not in principle approach definitions
with the assumption that they are false and must therefore be shown to
be false. Rather, given his sensitivity to his own epistemic limitations, he
typically approaches definitions with an open-mind, and he tests them to
determine whether it is reasonable to believe them.
While I have hesitated to characterize Socrates' manner of pursuing
definitions as elenctic insofar as elenchus is understood as adversarial, I
have also hesitated to characterize Socrates' manner of pursuing defini-
tions as methodical. Socrates does not conceive of himself as having a
method of investigating definitions, insofar as the concept of method
implies a relatively systematic and theoretically based procedure.'23 The
' Rep. I 348a4-5.

120 Rep. I 348a7-b6
121 The only occasion where Socrates uses a deliberately fallacious argument against
his interlocutor in the course of pursuing a definition of F is in Republic I in consid-
ering Polemarchus' definition.
122 Cf. subsection V.iv.
23 Cp. Brickhouse and Smith's comments at (1994) 3 f. and more recently in Scott
(2002).

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302 DAVID WOLFSDORF
possessor of a craft would have a method, but Socrates denies such exper-
tise. On the other hand, in view of the role that Socrates' F-conditions
play in the evaluation of the truth-value of proposed definitions, Socrates'
investigations do have a distinctive character. As such, I suggest that,
while he lacks a method, Socrates does have a manner of pursuing definitions
in the early definitional dialogues.
V.ii On the Demise of the Elenchus
In the appendix to his paper, "The Socratic Elenchus", entitled, "The

Demise of the Elenchus in the Euthydemus, Lysis, and Hippias Major",
Vlastos briefly touches upon what he regards as a new feature of these
supposedly transitional dialogues: "abandonment of adversary argument
as Socrates' method of investigation". That is to say, "[t]he theses that are
seriously debated in these dialogues are uncontested by the interlocutor,
Socrates himself is both their author and their critic."'24 In other words,
Vlastos suggests that, for among other reasons, Lysis and Hippias Major
were composed after the other early definitional dialogues because Socrates'
method in these two texts is not elenctic.
In the postscript to his paper,'25 Vlastos explains Socrates' abandon-
ment of the elenctic method as due to Plato's growing preoccupation with
specific epistemological questions, evidence of which is first apparent in
Gorgias. Accordingly, Lysis and Hippias Major were composed after
Gorgias. Moreover, since Meno is generally viewed (with Vlastos among
those in agreement) as a transitional dialogue, Meno too must be included
among post-Gorgias definitional dialogues.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of Vlastos' conception of
Socrates' manner of pursuing satisfactory definitions and my own, then,
is that Vlastos regards Socrates' manner as changing among the early
definitional dialogues. And the central reason for Vlastos' claim is the fact
that Socrates, as opposed to his interlocutors, offers definitions in Lysis
and Hippias Major. This is decisive, precisely because Vlastos views Soc-
rates' manner as adversarial, specifically as geared to refuting his inter-
locutors' definitions.
Vlastos claims that "these three dialogues [Euthydemus, Lysis, and Hippias
Major] ... [have] been frequently thought (on the strength of miscella-
124 (1994) 30.

125 "Postscript to 'The Socratic Elenchus"' (1994) 33-7.

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neous criteria) to fall late within the early dialogues".'26 In this case, I will
only be concerned with Lysis and Hippias Major. In particular, I want to
suggest that Lysis is not generally thought to be a transitional dialogue.
The one secondary source Vlastos cites in favor of this view is a mono-
graph published by V. Schoplick in 1969 that has exerted little influence
on scholarship on Lysis. Beyond this, he offers no specific reason why
Lysis should be regarded as transitional.
Vlastos' position is also internally inconsistent because he regards
Meno as transitional, yet Socrates' treatment of Meno's three definitions
is, by Vlastos' criteria, "elenctic" - as is the treatment of the first three
definitions in Hippias Major. Vlastos writes of the first three definitions
in Hippias Major that they are not meant to be taken seriously.'27 It is true
that Socrates' alter ego thinks that Hippias' definitions are simple-minded
and easy to refute. But Hippias Major is the most adversarial of the early
definitional dialogues; and if the adversarial style had been abandoned
by its date of composition, it is odd that Plato would have composed
the search for a satisfactory definition of fineness in such a way at all.
Moreover, what is one to do with the treatment of Meno's first three
definitions? Meno certainly has difficulties grasping what is common to
all instances of excellence, but his third definition hardly seems ridiculous
relative to some of those proposed by Socrates' other interlocutors in
Charmides, Laches, Euthyphro, or Republic I"128
I suggest that, although the investigations in Lysis and Hippias Major
are distinct insofar as Socrates offers definitions, Socrates' method of pur-
suing definitions does not change in these texts. As I have suggested,
elenchus (understood as an adversarial style) is not fundamental to Soc-
rates' manner. Socrates' introduction of definitions in Lysis and Hippias
Major can be explained on other grounds.
In Lysis the definition is rather complex and the boys, being the
youngest and most naive of Socrates' interlocutors, couldn't be expected
to develop the sort of view that Socrates ends up developing and which,
in virtue of that, it is clear Plato intended to advance for consideration.
In Hippias Major, Socrates' introduction of definitions conforms to the
especially sardonic and comic style of the text. The necessity of Socrates
introducing definitions just so that the investigation can progress beyond
126 (1994) 29-30.
127 "Definitions meant to be taken seriously ... are all put forward by Socrates" (31)
12I For a similar criticism, see Benson (1990) 25 ff.

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304 DAVID WOLFSDORF
a certain rudimentary point is supposed to highlight Hippias' incompe-

tence - as is Socrates' alter ego's comment that Hippias' definitions are
too simple-minded and easy to refute.
Moreover, the fact, according to my position, that Socrates' F-condi-
tions influence the course of the investigation and make a substantial con-
structive contribution to the progress of the investigation diminishes the
distinctiveness between the fact that Socrates introduces definitions him-
self in Lysis and Hippias Major and the fact that he doesn't in the other
definitional dialogues. To this may be added the fact that in Euthyphro
Socrates is also compelled to help Euthyphro advance the investigation,
when Euthyphro becomes stuck. He does so with the suggestion that holi-
ness be conceived as a part of justice.'29 And in Laches, Nicias' definition
of courage as a kind of epistemic state is based on a view that he attrib-
utes to Socrates: a person is good only insofar as he is knowledgeable.
In sum, among the definitional dialogues there is no demise of the elenchus
because Socrates' manner of pursuing definitions in these texts is not
"elenctic". Moreover, Socrates' examination of his own definitions in
Lysis and Hippias Major is consistent with the non-elenctic manner of
pursuing definitions that I attribute to Socrates throughout the early
definitional dialogues.
V.iii On Whether Socrates Has a Theory of Definition
It is often stated, and, I take it, uncontroversial that Socrates seeks real
as opposed to nominal definitions.'30 Socrates does not just want to know
what the popular conception of F is; he wants to know what F really is.
But real definition broaches the most fundamental problems in philoso-
phy, problems such as whether and how language can (accurately) repre-
sent the world. A theory of real definition in natural language must engage
this question and in doing so engage problems of semantics and with these
epistemology and metaphysics. Plato's early writings touch upon these
philosophical matters to a very limited extent.
129 Cp. Brickhouse and Smith's comment: "Euthyphro has been fully reduced to
aporia by Euthyphro llb6, yet Socrates continues his search for the definition of [TO
oatovl by contributing one of what ... appears to be his own views. He proposes that
[o 6ootov] is part of [to 8iQtaov]." (1994) 22.
'30 For instance, Ross (1951) 16; Bluck in Allen (1965) 34 ff.; Allen (1970) 79-105;
Penner (1973); Irwin (1977) chapter 3; Fine (1995) 46-9, n. 10. Dissenters include
Cross in Allen (1965) 27-9; Vlastos (1972), (1981) 410-7.

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A real definition of x is a description of some entity x. This descrip-

tion should be true and should uniquely identify x (that is, distinguish x
from all other entities). Since this may be done in a number of ways, it
is a question how one identifying description is to be preferred to another;
for instance, in terms of simplicity, richness, clarity, accessibility, funda-
mentality, intrinsic versus extrinsic properties. Fundamentality, in partic-
ular, has a special significance in its relation to essentialism within the
tradition of real definition. But it, like all the other concepts enumerated,
is theory-relative.
So the question of preference of identifying descriptions raises the
more basic question: What form must a real definition have? The early
definitional dialogues do not offer a great deal with which to answer this
question. Socrates specifies F-conditions that the definiens must satisfy,
but these conditions pertain to the specific excellences under investiga-
tion. They are not general conditions for defining entities. What Socrates
lacks is a theoretical ontology to provide a general framework for real
definitions.
In this respect, the early definitional dialogues are remarkable works.
Historically, the WF question arises prior to the conceptualization of meta-
physics. But methodologically the pursuit of the WF question requires
such conceptualization. So, in the absence of a general theoretical ontol-
ogy, a theory of definition must be basically limited to the principle men-
tioned: a real definition uniquely identifies, by means of a linguistic
description, some entity x. But this principle alone does not constitute a
theory of real definition. Moreover, while this principle is certainly extri-
cable from the content of the early definitional dialogues, nowhere in these
texts does Socrates make any explicit general statements about the con-
dition of definitions. Rather, Socrates' engagement with the WF question,
the first such engagement of which we have record, puts Plato in a posi-
tion to develop a theory of (real) definition - indeed, to create philosophy
as we know it.
V.iv On Whether Socrates Tests Definitions or Lives
My emphasis on Socrates' concern with the truth-value of definitions as

opposed to the psychological states of his interlocutors will seem at least
lopsided to those who emphasize that Socrates examines "lives and not
merely propositions."'31 In particular, Brickhouse and Smith draw atten-
13' Brickhouse and Smith (1994) 12-14; cp. Vlastos (1994) 9: "But those who know

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306 DAVID WOLFSDORF
tion to Socrates' claims in Apology that a significant aspect of his divine

mission involves liberating his compatriots from the false conceit of
knowledge and encouraging them to attend to their souls.'32 I find the use
of Apology as a hermeneutic guide for interpreting the early definitional
dialogues questionable since Plato's motivations in composing Apology
might have been quite different from those in composing the definitional
dialogues. Although, of course, the contents of Apology could be illumi-
nating in this regard, insofar as one is concerned to determine Socrates'
motives for engaging his interlocutors in the search for satisfactory defini-
tions, evidence must primarily be gleaned from the definitional dialogues
themselves. 133
him best understand that the elenchus does have this existential dimension - that what
it examines is not just propositions but lives."
132 "Socrates even claims that he has a 'mission' undertaken on behalf of the god
of Delphi to show people who think they are wise that they are not" (4).
133 My position here may be broadened to a general hermeneutic rule of thumb.
Most scholarship on Plato's early dialogues focuses on the philosophical beliefs of the
main and favorite character in these texts, Socrates - a tendency I have followed here.
The procedure of determining Socrates' philosophical beliefs tends to operate by glean-
ing all relevant utterances pertaining to a particular topic and then attempting to
construct from these a coherent conception to be presented as Socrates' view on that
topic. This approach is susceptible to neglecting a possibility that, if actual, could
significantly affect the interpretation of Socrates' utterances. The possibility is that
Plato composes or uses the character Socrates in different ways for different ends in
different dialogues. As such, whatever Socrates believes, does, or says in a given dia-
logue or at a given stage of a given dialogue would be influenced by Plato's aims in
composing these. One difficulty with this is that it involves us in a hermeneutical cir-
cle. But this is by no means a vicious circle. It merely requires of the interpreter an
oscillation of focus from the particular facts of the content to the author's intentions
in composing those facts and the reinterpretation of each according to the other, ide-
ally, gradually and asymptotically leading to the truth. The other difficulty - with
which I am more concerned - is that, regardless of his own intellectual develop-
ment - if any - Plato need not have felt bound to compose Socrates in the various dia-
logues with consistent acts, beliefs, or utterances. Although in all the early dialogues
the character Socrates is obviously derivative of the historical Socrates or Plato, this
derivation need not be one of the strictest correspondence; and Plato could have felt
free to shade or color his main character slightly differently in different texts, again,
to suit particular ends. This possibility suggests caution when drawing inferences
among Socrateses in the dialogues. For example, why should we assume that Socrates'
description of his philosophical activity in Apology should be reflected in other dia-
logues? It could be the case that, say, memorializing motives compelled Plato to cast
Socrates in Apology in one way that makes him slightly different from the way that,
on account of other kinds of motives, he is cast in another text. As a matter of fact,

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SOCRATES' PURSUIT OF DEF[NITIONS 307
Accordingly, in these texts we do not "always discover that, in fact,

Socrates is seeking somehow or other to refute the one he is question-
ing."'134 As we have seen, he is typically cooperative and supportive. For
instance, he most explicitly explains to Critias that he is not trying to
refute him. Rather, he stubbornly seeks the truth (about F). Consequently,
he is unwilling to concede opinions just because it would be polite or
socially graceful to do so."' That his interlocutors' positions are always
revealed as inadequate is not, even partially, to be explained on the
grounds of Socrates' intent to refute them. Rather, this is simply because
the interlocutors have not adequately reflected on the questions as he has.
Furthermore, since the topics in which Socrates is interested are of fun-
damental importance for the conduct of human life, the discussions natu-
rally can have significant ramifications for the conduct of the discussants'
lives. This may explain Nicias' statement in Laches that ".. . whoever is
closest to Socrates and draws near into a discussion with him, if he would
begin a discussion about something else, will necessarily not stop being
led around by him in the discussion until he falls into giving an account
of himself - of the way he is living now and of the way he has lived in
the past."'36 However, in fact, in the early definitional dialogues no one is
made to give an account of the way he is living or of the way he has
lived in the past.
In sum, in tiying to define basic ethical virtues, the interlocutors inevitably
expose some of their basic values. The refutation of these can lead them
to believe they do not know what they thought they did and can make
them feel that they need to attend to their beliefs and the conduct of their
lives more closely. But Socrates' explicit intentions in pursuing definitions
in these dialogues are not to refute his interlocutors or to compel them to
question the conduct of their lives.'37 As he says to Protagoras: "I am
Socrates may be cast in precisely the same way in all the texts. But I caution that we
should not assume this. It should be something we discover. And, in particular, what-
ever we discover should result from examining Socrates' acts, utterances, and beliefs
one by one within the context of individual dialogues and, to the extent that it is pos-
sible, with a sensitivity to the compositional aims of individual dialogues and the pos-
sibility that these may not be identical in all texts.
"4 Brickhouse and Smith (1994) 4.
'3 Cf. Charm. 165b5-c2. Although, on at least one occasion, out of politeness, Socrates
does hesitate from compelling his interlocutor to admit that his definition has failed
(cf. Charm. 169c3-d8).
136 Lach. 187e6-188a2.
I" It is, of course, the case that, as Socrates himself says, knowledge of things

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308 DAVID WOLFSDORF
primarily interested in testing the

that the questioner, myself, and m
V.v On the Epistemological Priority of Definitional Knowledge
Elsewhere I have argued that Socrates is committed to the epistemological

priority of definitional knowledge for pertinent non-definitional knowledge
(PD).'39 Precisely, (PD) is a conjunction of the following two propositions:
(P) If one does not know what F is, then one cannot know, for any x, whether
x is an instance of F;"'0 and
(D) If one does not know what F is, then one cannot know, for any property P,
whether F has P.
Here I merely wish to note the significance of my position in light of the

preceding discussion. Geach first raised the question whether Socrates's
commitment to a proposition resembling (PD) was methodologically ac-
ceptable. Specifically, he suggests that Socrates is committed to (P) and
yet, illogically, employs examples of F in pursuing definitions of F.'4' This
problem, subsumed under the more general problem of how Socrates can
reasonably pursue definitional knowledge of F, if he is committed to (P)
or (D) or (PD), has since been called "the Socratic fallacy". In response
(especially aperx) will be of great value for human life. Socrates strongly believes
that F is beneficial. Moreover, although Socrates never says it in the definitional dia-
logues, it is hardly controversial that he believes his pursuit of definitions of F is con-
sonant with his pursuit of riu&xtgtovicx. (It is generally accepted that Socrates believes
that definitional knowledge is necessary for expertise. Cf., for example, Woodruff
(1990); although, recently Smith (1998) has - unsuccessfully, I believe - argued for
a contradictory position. However, Socrates' exact view of the relation between ethi-
cal expertise and ebaxtRovia is more controversial. Cf., for instance, Zeyl (1980),
(1982); Vlastos (1984), reprinted in (1985), reprinted with revisions in (1991); Bnckhouse
and Smith (1994) 103-36; Irwin (1995) 65-77; Rudebusch (1999). Accordingly, inso-
far as he can engage in the same pursuit with others, who, like himself, do not know
what F is, he makes a constructive contribution to their pursuit of FrI'xtigovia. Still,
in the definitional dialogues, Socrates' motives for pursuing definitions are as I have
described them - not merely to test his interlocutor's claims for consistency, but to
determine true definitions.
38 Prot. 333c7-9.
39 "The Epistemological Priority of Definitional Knowledge" (under review).
'40 Note that instances of F are not restricted to particulars, they include kinds.
14' Geach (1966).

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to Geach, a number of scholars have defended Socrates against the charge

of committing the Socratic fallacy.'42 Their responses are of three kinds:
(1) In some early dialogues Socrates is committed to (PD); however, these are
transitional dialogues. In the transitional dialogues Socrates does not employ
the elenctic method of pursuing definitions. Consequently, in these dialogues
Socrates' commitment to (PD) is consistent with his method of pursuing
definitions. 143
(2) Socrates is not committed to (P)'" or (D)'4s or (PD).'46
(3) Although Socrates employs propositions about F's putative properties and
putative examples of F in pursuit of definitional knowledge of F, he does not,
in the process, assume he knows F's properties or that any given entity x is
an example of F.'47
I reject (1) and (2) and defend a version of (3). At least two other schol-
ars have defended versions of (3), Irwin and Burnyeat, both in 1977. In
the past quarter century, defenses of (1) or (2) have prevailed - although,
in 1990 (subsequently reaffirmed in 2000),148 Benson presented a power-
ful argument for accepting Socrates' commitment to (PD), and I follow
Benson to this extent. However, Benson maintains that Socrates does not
pursue definitional knowledge of F so much as test his interlocutors'
alleged expertise by considering whether their beliefs about F are consis-
tent. In section IV, we have seen that this is mistaken.'49 Therefore,
Benson's conclusion is only partially satisfactory - and, as such, the
question whether Socrates commits the Socratic fallacy remains alive. I
maintain that although in the early definitional dialogues Socrates is com-
mitted to (PD) and pursues definitional knowledge of F, he does not com-
mit the Socratic fallacy in the egregious sense supposed. This is because
he employs putatively true beliefs (not knowledge) about examples and
properties of F to achieve definitional knowledge of F. In fact, there is
42 Santas (1972); Burnyeat (1977); Irwin (1977) 40-1; Woodruff (1982) 138-49;
Vlastos (1985); Nehamas (1985), (1986); Beversluis (1987); Lesher (1987); Benson
(1990); Vlastos (1994); Brickhouse and Smith (1994) 45-60.
'4 Vlastos (1985), (1994); Beversluis (1987).
4" Woodruff (1982); Santas (1979) suggests that this is possible, though the evid-
ence is inconclusive.
14' Lesher (1987).
146 Brickhouse and Smith (1994); Nehamas (1985), (1986); Kraut (1984).
47 Irwin (1977); Bumyeat (1977).
14' Benson (2000) 112-63.
141 Wolfsdorf (2003).

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310 DAVID WOLFSDORF
no passage in the early definitional dialogues where Socrates claims to

know any of the definiendum's properties or that any x is an instance of
the definiendum.
Boston University
Department of Philosophy
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