MCWP 5-10

MCWP 5-10
Marine Corps Planning Process
U.S. Marine Corps
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
PCN 143 000068 00

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
10 August 2020
FOREWORD
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process, was first
published in January 2000 as MCWP 5-1. Since that time, Marine Corps forces at all echelons of
command have used the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) to conduct the range of military
operations. The use of design over the last decade suggests that design is more than conceptual
planning which establishes aims, objectives, and intentions.
A more critical role of design is to promote understanding of the current situation as a basis for
broad solutions. While design establishes the nature of the problem, the inclusion of a design
methodology in this revision aids commanders, staffs, and planners in determining the problem set
and a framework for solving them. The publication’s design methodology reflects a belief that
sufficient complexity can exist at all levels of warfare and across the conflict continuum to include
tactical situations that will require an understanding of the set of problems that hinder movement
from the current state to the desired state of an operational environment.
Among all critical factors bearing on military operations, time is defining. The MCPP helps
Marines win the time fight through a promotion of intuitive understanding, commander’s intent,
and the use of task and purpose when operating inside an established paradigm. Another time aid
is the center of gravity techniques used to determine which of the actions that address a problem
set will be decisive. These visions of decisiveness inform the convergence of combat power
through main and supporting efforts and resource priorities.
The publication focuses primarily on commanders with staffs; however, any Marine required to
plan operations should know the planning process well enough to determine the problem, envision
a desired state, and develop options for achieving that state.
This publication supersedes MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process, dated 24 August 2010.
MCWP 5-10 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement
(STANAG) 2014, NATO Formats for Orders and Designation of Timing, Locations, and
Boundaries.
iv
Reviewed and approved this date.
CARLOS O. URBINA
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, Command Element – Information Warfare Division
Publication Control Number: 143 000068 00
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1. PLANNING OVERVIEW

Doctrinal Underpinnings .............................................................................................................. 2
Synopsis of the Marine Corps Planning Process ......................................................................... 4
Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process ............................................................................ 5
CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM FRAMING

Design ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Introduction to Marine Corps Design Methodology .................................................................... 11
Commander’s Operational Approach ........................................................................................ 16
Issue the Warning Order ........................................................................................................... 18
Staff Actions .............................................................................................................................. 20
Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER 3. COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Develop Courses of Action ........................................................................................................ 30
Course of Action Development Brief ......................................................................................... 34
Commander’s Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria .................................................... 34
Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 35
CHAPTER 4. COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

War Game Preparations ........................................................................................................... 37
War Game Techniques ............................................................................................................. 38
Conduct of the War Game ........................................................................................................ 39
Recording the War Game ......................................................................................................... 41
Refine Staff Estimates, Estimates of Supportability, and Supporting Concepts ......................... 42
Prepare Course of Action War Game Brief ................................................................................ 43
Commander’s Comparison and Decision Guidance .................................................................. 43
Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 43
CHAPTER 5. COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

Prepare Course of Action Comparison and Decision Products.................................................. 45
Course of Action Comparison and Decision Discussion ............................................................ 46
Commander’s Decision ............................................................................................................. 46
Update the Warning Order ........................................................................................................ 46
Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 46
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CHAPTER 6. ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

Refine the Concept of Operations ............................................................................................. 50
Prepare the Order or Plan ......................................................................................................... 50
Orders Reconciliation ................................................................................................................ 51
Orders Crosswalk ..................................................................................................................... 51
Approve the Order or Plan ........................................................................................................ 51
Considerations .......................................................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER 7. TRANSITION
Transition Preparation ............................................................................................................... 54
Transition Events ...................................................................................................................... 54
Transition Components ............................................................................................................. 55
Confirmation Briefs ................................................................................................................... 55
APPENDICES
A Marine Corps Planning in Joint Operations ......................................................................... 57
B Organization for Planning .................................................................................................... 59
C Marine Corps Planning Process Diagrams ......................................................................... 65
D Marine Corps Planning Process Tools ................................................................................ 69
E Design: An Example ............................................................................................................ 93
F Staff Estimates and Estimates of Supportability .................................................................. 95
G Red Team ........................................................................................................................... 99
H Rapid Response Planning Process ................................................................................... 105
I Interagency/Interorganizational Coordination .................................................................... 117
J Basic Operation Plan, Operation Order, and Attachments ................................................. 119
GLOSSARY
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 1
PLANNING OVERVIEW
Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective
ways of bringing it about.
—Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, Planning
MCDP 5, Planning, describes planning as an essential part of the broader field of command and
control. Command and control enhances the commander’s ability to make sound and timely
decisions. Effective decision-making requires both the situational understanding to recognize the
essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. Hence, an essential
function of planning is to promote understanding of the problem—the difference between existing
and desired conditions—and to devise ways to solve it. Planning involves elements of both art and
science, combining analysis and calculation with intuition, inspiration, and creativity. The Marine
Corps employs several planning processes:
 Troop Leading Steps. There are six steps that align with the acronym BAMCIS—begin
planning, arrange for reconnaissance, make reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order,
and supervise. While these steps have wide applicability, they are generally used by small unit
leaders who lack a staff.
 Marine Corps Planning Process. For Marine units with staffs, the Marine Corps Planning
Process (MCPP), as described in this publication, is a proven, intellectually rigorous approach
to planning. It is a six-step process comprised of problem framing, course of action (COA)
development, COA war game, COA comparison and decision, orders development, and
transition. See figure 1-1.
 Joint Planning Process. Marine Corps forces also operate in a joint environment. Joint force
commanders and their staffs use joint planning process, as described by Joint Publication (JP)
5-0, Joint Planning, for strategic plans and operational-level campaigns. Marine air-ground
task force (MAGTF) command elements, which may serve as or interact with a joint force
headquarters, must be capable of operating effectively within a joint planning process
framework.
 Rapid Response Planning Process. Used primarily by Marine expeditionary units (MEUs),
the rapid response planning process (R2P2) is a time-leveraged planning process that enables a
MEU to begin execution of an assigned task within 6 hours. To do so, MEUs conduct the
deliberate planning—within the context of the intended area of responsibility—as well as the
rehearsal of potential missions, such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief or noncombatant
evacuation operations, during pre-deployment training. Accordingly, the R2P2, when coupled
with the extensive use of standing operating procedures (SOPs), enables a MEU to focus its
execution planning on those aspects of a problem unique to the current situation.
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Figure 1-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.
DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS
Planning should never be viewed as an isolated activity or process. Not only is planning a critical
element of command and control, but planning along with execution and assessment comprise the
operation’s process. Planning is the basis for execution while assessment determines how and why
the environment has changed as a result of execution, which then informs subsequent planning and
assessment. While that description suggests a sequence to the relationship, these three essential
military activities are cyclical in nature. Individually and together, they interact and evolve over
time through countless, interrelated events.
Because situations change continuously, Marines make decisions in the face of relative uncertainty.
While it is natural to seek additional information to lessen that uncertainty, it usually comes at the
expense of time. Success in a fluid environment demands Marines to think critically, examine the
nature of the problem, as well as the purpose of the operation, and learn and adapt throughout the
entire operation’s process.
Many factors within the operational environment, some of which cannot be controlled, contribute
to making planning endeavors complex and nonlinear. These factors include: enemy actions; the
actions of other actors and stakeholders; other friendly, neutral, and threat networks; updated
intelligence; changing resources; revised guidance from higher headquarters (HHQ); input
provided as a result of operations; and concurrent planning by subordinate, adjacent, and
supporting units. Planners and commanders should expect problems to evolve even while they try
to solve them.
While this publication presents the six steps of the MCPP sequentially, planning seldom occurs in
a straightforward, linear manner. For example, understanding gained during COA development
and COA war game steps will often require planners to revisit the problem framing step of the
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planning process. To better appreciate the lack of a rigid, fixed planning sequence, planners need
to understand the planning hierarchy that is essential to the effective application of the MCPP.
As described in MCDP 5, conceptual planning is the highest level of planning. It establishes aims,
objectives, and intentions and involves the development of broad concepts for action. In general,
conceptual planning is a process of creative synthesis supported by analysis. It generally
corresponds to the art of war. Developing tactical, operational, or strategic concepts for the overall
conduct of military actions is conceptual planning.
At the lowest level of the hierarchy is detailed planning, which is concerned with translating the
broad concept into a complete and realistic plan. Detailed planning flows from conceptual planning
and generally corresponds to the science of war and encompasses the specifics of implementation.
Detailed planning generally is an analytical process of decomposing concepts into executable
tasks, although it likely involves some elements of synthesis as well. Detailed planning works out
the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering,
and directing military forces. Examples of detailed planning include load plans and air tasking
orders. Unlike conceptual planning, detailed planning does not involve the establishment of
objectives. Detailed planning works out actions to accomplish the objectives.
Between the highest and lowest levels of the hierarchy is functional planning, which involves
elements of both conceptual and detailed planning. Functional planning is concerned with
developing and integrating the supporting plans for discrete functional activities that include at a
minimum maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, information, and force protection.
Normally, due to the importance of conceptual planning, the commander directs the formulation
of plans at this level. While the commander is also engaged in both functional and detailed
planning, the specific aspects of these are usually developed by the planners and staff.
Conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning and should progress from the
general to the specific. For example, the commander’s operational approach leads to the unit’s
concept of operations (CONOPS) as well as to supporting functional concepts. These concepts then
lead to the specifics of execution.
The planning dynamic does not operate in only one direction. Conceptual planning must be
responsive to functional constraints. For example, the realities of deployment schedules (a
functional concern) can dictate employment schemes (a conceptual concern). Functional planning
in turn must be responsive to more detailed requirements of execution. In this way, the levels of
planning influence each other. Conceptual, functional, and detailed planning are seldom conducted
sequentially because the situation and available information are continually evolving. While
conceptual, functional, and detailed planning are described in sequence, in practice they are
conducted in a more interactive manner due to uncertainty and time.
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During the Korean War, General MacArthur succinctly restated his campaign concept in
his Far East Message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Operation planned mid-September is
amphibious landing of a two-division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of
enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from south by Eighth
Army.” Guided by this design, his staff planned multiple COAs. This planning revealed
that the most strategically advantageous COA - an amphibious assault at Inchon - also
involved the greatest operational risks. General MacArthur accepted the risks of landing at
Inchon and subsequent staff actions focused on the functional and detailed planning
necessary to both flesh out the COA and minimize attendant risks. The latter included using
a discarded COA, a landing at Kunsan, as the basis for a deception effort.
In 1864 and 1865, General Grant’s strategic concept called for coordinated military actions
in Virginia, Georgia, and Tennessee. These actions were complemented by a naval
blockade and put overwhelming pressure on all of the Confederate armies, thereby
removing their ability to shift resources to reinforce any one army.
SYNOPSIS OF THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

A commander may begin planning on his/her own initiative, based on indications and warnings,
or in response to specific guidance and direction from HHQ. The planning process is designed to
promote understanding among the commander, planners, staff, and subordinate commanders
regarding the nature of a given problem and the options for solving it. The plans that result may
be considered hypotheses that will be tested and refined as a result of execution and assessment.
The six steps of the MCPP are—
 Problem Framing. Problem framing uses a design methodology supported by staff actions to
enhance the understanding of the operational environment and the subsequent problem set.
Problem framing identifies what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be
done and, most importantly, why—the purpose of the operation. The mission statement
articulates the “in order to,” the ultimate purpose of the operation. The commander’s intent
restates and amplifies the purpose of the operation, which is enduring. No amount of subsequent
planning can solve a problem that is misidentified and/or insufficiently understood. It is
imperative that commanders identify and solve the correct problem. Therefore, problem
framing is the most important step in planning. The understanding that results from problem
framing allows the commander to visualize and describe how the operation may unfold, which
is articulated in the commander’s operational approach, a broad framework for solving the
problems identified. As planning continues, the commander’s guidance becomes more detailed,
providing additional clarity and operational context.
 COA Development. The COA development step produces options for accomplishing the
mission in accordance with commander’s operational approach. It provides options for the
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commander and promotes further understanding of the environment, problem set, and the
approach to solving the problem.
 COA War Game. This step seeks to improve the COA by testing and stressing it against an
enemy and/or adversary, or other forms of friction in operations such as humanitarian
assistance, in the operational environment. Planners identify and record flaws for correction in
the refined COA. Done well, COA wargaming improves COAs while enhancing a better
understanding of the environment, the problem set, and the forces (both friendly and
adversarial) involved. Planners evaluate refined COAs using the commander’s chosen criteria.
 COA Comparison and Decision. During COA comparison and decision, the commander
reviews the advantages and disadvantages of the options. The commander decides how to
accomplish the mission, either by approving a COA as formulated or by assimilating what has
been learned into a new COA that may need further refinement and wargaming.
 Orders Development. The orders development step translates the commander’s decision into
oral, written, and graphic direction sufficient to guide subordinate planning, execution, and
initiative.
 Transition. The transition step may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals
necessary to ensure a successful shift of situational awareness from planning to execution.
Transition addresses the human element. The written order is initially well-understood only
by the small group that wrote it. Transition enables the far larger group of executors (current
operations staff, subordinate unit commanders and staff, combat operations center members,
etc.) to comprehensively understand the plan. A number of factors can influence the transition
step, such as echelon of command, mission complexity, and most importantly, time available.
Throughout the planning process, commanders and planners must strive to increase their
understanding of the problem set, the plan, and developments in the operational environment.
Lead planners must seek a common understanding across the staff, to include those not assigned
to the core planning team. Providing focused, preparatory readings for upcoming briefs to
commanders and primary staff officers, with sufficient time for comprehension, will better prepare
leaders and planners to engage in substantive discussions. Warning orders (WARNORDs) and
other focused communications greatly facilitate concurrent and parallel planning, while driving a
higher level of integration. Videos, graphics, and other modern media, used in all facets of
planning, briefs, and orders, can greatly enhance knowledge and understanding.
TENETS OF THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS
The tenets of the MCPP—top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning—
derive from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. These tenets guide the commander’s use of the
staff to plan and execute military operations that include campaigns involving day-to-day
operations such as security cooperation activities and exercises.
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 Top-Down Planning. Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander

uses planning to increase his/her understanding of the environment, the problem set, and the
subsequent solution. The commander’s personal involvement is critical to successful,
centralized planning. The commander must not merely participate in planning, but must drive
the process to the degree that the published plan is a clear manifestation of the commander’s
decision regarding how to best accomplish the mission. In keeping with our institutional
warfighting philosophy, this commander-driven, centralized planning provides the necessary
foundation for decentralized execution, an important way Marine Corps forces leverage the
time-competitive nature of military operations to gain and maintain advantage relative to the
enemy/adversary.
 Single-Battle Concept. In planning, to maximize opportunities for success, commanders and
planners seek to purposely arrange forces in time, space, event, and purpose. Such
arrangements, to include phasing, main and supporting efforts, and the relationship among
decisive, shaping, and sustaining forces and activities, are well considered and never arbitrary.
During execution, events, activities, or operations in one part of the battlespace often have
profound and consequent effects in and on other areas and events. Commanders and planners
must, therefore, always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity—a single battle.
Commanders cultivate the single-battle mindset throughout planning, primarily through
articulated understanding of their higher commander’s purpose and their planning guidance and
intent. Global integration is now the norm for conducting operations, so commanders and staffs
must consider impacts beyond geographic boundaries that have traditionally bounded planning
considerations.
 Integrated Planning. Leveraging top-down planning and a keen appreciation for the MAGTF
single-battle concept, integrated planning seeks the coordination of actions by all elements of
the force toward a common purpose. There are both hierarchical and lateral perspectives to
planning integration. Hierarchically, the MAGTF command element integrates planning with
each of its subordinate elements, as well as its HHQ. Laterally, the MAGTF’s subordinate
elements integrate their planning with each other to generate synergy and to leverage the full
capacity and capability of the force. As Marine Corps forces fight as part of a larger force,
lateral integration with adjacent and supporting joint and combined forces is equally
important. Integrated planning results from the assignment of personnel to the operational
planning team (OPT), to include joint and combined force planners, who are armed with an
appropriate level of knowledge of their respective organization or functional activity. It will
also likely include the provision of Marine Corps planners to other joint and combined units.
The key to integrated planning is to involve the right personnel from the right organizations
as early as possible to consider a broader range of factors, reduce omissions, and share
information as widely as possible. See Appendix D for information on organizing for planning.
Overall, planning is a complex process of interacting activities with feedback loops. The six steps
of the MCPP aid in understanding and generally follow a sequence. However, planning is not a
simple sequence of steps. Any step in the process may inform previous steps. For example,
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conceptualizing a COA generally follows establishing goals and objectives, but it is difficult to
establish meaningful goals and objectives without some idea of how to accomplish them. Another
example, new information received during orders development may reveal a weakness in the
CONOPS that would require the development of new COAs or a branch plan.
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CHAPTER 2
PROBLEM FRAMING
To comprehend and cope with our environment we develop mental patterns or
concepts of meaning . . . we cannot avoid this kind of activity if we intend to survive on
our own terms.
—John R. Boyd, Destruction and Creation
First, we didn’t know ourselves. We thought we were going into another Korean War,
but this was a different country. Secondly, we didn’t understand our Vietnamese
allies. We never understood them, and that was another surprise. And we knew even
less about North Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody really knew. So, until we
know the enemy and know our allies and know ourselves, we’d better keep out of this
dirty kind of business. It is very dangerous.
—General Maxwell Taylor, Vietnam: A History
Figure 2-1. Problem Framing Process.
Problem framing is the first step in the MCPP and consists of a commander-driven design
methodology supported by staff actions. It may begin informally in response to indications and
warnings or more formally when the HHQ produces an order or directive—including the HHQ
mission and tasks to subordinate commands. The purpose of problem framing is to gain an
enhanced understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem set. In the
information age, with the global and instantaneous reach of information capabilities, resources,
and activities, the problem set will result from a consideration of all relevant actors, motives,
capabilities, and actions that could impact the ability to accomplish assigned tasks. This greater
understanding of the operational environment allows a commander to visualize the operation and
describe his/her broad operational approach, providing context for the examination of what the
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command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly, why—the
purpose of the operation. This higher level of understanding is especially useful in debunking
invalid assumptions, inaccurate stereotypes, and erroneous capability assessments. Particulary
important is to avoid mirror imaging, which is assuming other people or groups would react to a
given situation in the same way as you would. Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve
a problem insufficiently understood or misidentified, framing the problem is critical. To achieve
this understanding, problem framing requires both the judgment of synthesis and the systematic
study of analysis.
In problem framing, commanders and planners begin their appreciation of two enduring, critically
important factors—time and risk. This appreciation continues throughout all steps of planning and
every phase of execution.
Like people and equipment, time is a resource. Commanders and planners constantly deal with the
impact of time throughout planning and execution, and those who fail to appreciate it endanger the
integration and coordination within the force necessary for success. As its impact is pervasive, it
is not an exaggeration to say that of all the critical factors in military operations, the aspect of time
is defining. While clearly not a complete list, examples of the importance of time include—
• Allocating available time for planning, to include allocating time for subordinate units.
• Calculating the time required for the movement of forces to ensure forces are arrayed spatially
to achieve the desired outcomes.
• Determining how long it takes to do something, to include how weather and other
environmental conditions, day and night, impact that duration.
• How long staff review and approval processes take in advance of a commander’s decision that
directs tactical actions in a specific area.
While commanders and planners appreciate time, commanders own risk. As MCDP 1,
Warfighting, states, “Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission….Risk may be
related to gain; greater potential gain requires greater risk.” An appreciation for risk, therefore,
enables the commander to make more informed decisions regarding the employment of forces.
Where risk management programs in garrison rightfully focus on mitigation and preservation of
warfighting capabilities, risk in war and competitions short of armed conflict also include the need
to leverage—even embrace—risk in order to gain and maintain advantage relative to an enemy
and/or adversary.
DESIGN
A design methodology, as outlined in figure 2-1, is central to the problem framing effort. The goal
of design is to achieve understanding gained largely through critical thinking and dialogue—the
basic mechanisms of design. The ability to address complex problems lies in the power of
organizational learning through design. Group dialogue, when conducted within the proper
command climate, can foster a collective level of understanding not attainable by any individual
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within the group. While design occurs throughout problem framing, design is an enduring activity
not confined to the problem framing step.
INTRODUCTION TO MARINE CORPS DESIGN METHODOLOGY
The Marine Corps design methodology helps planners determine the correct set of problems, and
a framework for solving them. In this manner, design not only occurs throughout problem framing
but throughout all of planning and execution. The design methodology consists of four distinct
actions—
1. Describe the current and desired states of the operational environment.
2. Define the problem set.
3. Produce the operational approach.
4. Reframe throughout planning and execution.
Within the Marine Corps, design can play a meaningful role in virtually every planning evolution,
regardless of scope or complexity. Additionally, the Marine Corps views design beginning during
problem framing that further emphasizes the need for design in every instance where planning
occurs, even though the amount of design effort will be different for each situation.
The Marine Corps design methodology reflects a belief that sufficient complexity can exist at all
levels of warfare and across the conflict continuum to include tactical situations that will require
an understanding of the set of problems that hinder movement from the current state to the desired
state of an operational environment. These problems may be simpler to identify than a more
complex joint operation, but the requirement still exists. The Marine Corps design methodology is
flexible enough to add value in all of these instances. Figure 2-1 summarizes this methodology
and appendix E provides an example of design.
Commander’s Orientation
The commander’s orientation is the initial action by the commander in the design effort to begin to
frame the problem as a basis for developing possible solutions. It demonstrates the commander’s
personal involvement and leadership in the planning process, and allows the commander to set the
tone for subsequent planning. The commander’s orientation is the first of many venues where the
commander, planners, staff, and subordinate commanders collaborate through discourse, the
exchange of information, and the sharing of ideas and perspectives.
The commander’s orientation could be as simple as the commander’s initial thoughts or it may be
as complex as the commander’s experience and detailed analysis allow. For example, Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm did little to prepare I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for Joint
Task Force Los Angeles (Los Angeles Riots) and Joint Task Force Somalia (Operation Restore
Hope), which represented entirely different circumstances, actors, and operational environments.
In both cases, other than succinct planning directives to prepare for possible operations, there was
little initial information besides what could be gleaned from media outlets. In contrast, multiple
tours in Iraq and Afghanistan enabled commanders to provide a wealth of information to initiate
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their planning efforts. The commander will base the orientation on a study of the operational
environment that includes friendly and enemy forces, competitors, and other forms of friction
depending on the nature of the situation, such as terrain and weather impacts on operations. Another
critical factor is the information environment, that is defined as the aggregate of individuals,
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The
information environment includes space, cyberspace, as well as domestic and international
audiences.
In a mature situation with existing HHQ’s plans, the commander can provide higher’s intent and
may even suggest possible centers of gravity (COGs) and the commander’s intent for the
command’s subordinate forces. The degree to which the commander has, or can gain, an in-depth
understanding of the situation will go a long way toward helping the OPT determine both the
current and desired states of the operational environment.
Describe the Current and Desired States of the Operational Environment

Planners describe the current and desired states of the operational environment (see fig. 2-2). The
current state is the status of the operational environment as it presently exists. The desired state is
a hypothesis of more favorable conditions at a future time. Some desired states might be a simple
transition from one part of an operation to another, or a clear subset of the HHQ’s desired end
state. Other desired states at higher-level commands could include transition criteria that cease
hostilities altogether.
Figure 2-2. Current State to Desired State.
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Planners use graphics and a narrative to best describe the current and desired states. This technique
enhances the understanding of the operational environment for practitioners and provides a clear,
concise, and familiar way to portray information to a commander.
The type of graphics and narratives depend on the complexity of the operation and how each
commander best assimilates information. For instance, a MEF- or Marine expeditionary brigade
(MEB)-level operation may describe the current and desired states across the six common
operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure,
(PMESII). Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) is another
example that highlights civil variables that planners can use in conjunction with the operational
variables to gain a more holistic understanding of the operational environment.
Other options may be a systems diagram (see fig. 2-3) or a causal loop diagram (see fig. 2-4) to
describe relationships between and among a variety of factors and stakeholders.
Figure 2-3. System Diagram Example.
A causal loop diagram aids in visualizing how different variables in a system are interrelated (see
fig. 2-4). The diagram consists of a set of nodes that represent the variables and edges that represent
a connection or a relation between the two or more variables. A link marked positive (+) indicates
a positive relation and a link marked negative (–) indicates a negative relation. A positive causal
link means the two nodes change in the same direction. Meaning, if the node in which the link
starts decreases, the other node also decreases, or if the node in which the link starts increases, the
other node increases as well. A negative causal link means the two nodes change in opposite
directions. If the node in which the link starts increases, the other node decreases and vice versa.
In the causal loop diagram, closed cycles are very important features that are defined as either a
reinforcing loop or balancing feedback loop. A reinforcing loop is a cycle in which the effect of a
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variation in any variable propagates through the loop and returns to the variable reinforcing the
initial deviation. For example, if a variable increases in a reinforcing loop the effect through the
cycle will return an increase to the same variable. A balancing loop is the cycle in which the effect
of a variation in any variable propagates through the loop and returns to the variable a deviation
opposite to the initial one. For example, if a variable increases in a balancing loop the effect
through the cycle will return a decrease to the same variable.
Figure 2-4. Causal Loop Diagram Example.
Define the Problem Set

Informed by the work to determine the current and desired states, planners define the problem set.
The problem set is a list of reasons that can prevent the shift of the current state to the desired state
(see figs. 2-5 and 2-6). Joint and other Service doctrine refer to the development of a “problem
statement” within design. Problem statements are usually constrained to a single sentence and can
oversimplify the challenges within the operational environment. It is unlikely that the design
methodology will expose a single problem to solve. In reality, when engaging complex systems,
many problems will emerge. The key is to identify relevant problems, examine relationships
among them, and then package the understanding into a problem set that is representative of the
operational environment and informative to the planning process.
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Figure 2-5. Problem Set.
Figure 2-6. Problem Set Example.
Similar to the descriptions of the current and desired states in the previous step, Marines can
categorize and describe the problem set in a number of ways. The MAGTF command elements
may wish to use the operational variables PMESII and/or ASCOPE, for example, to categorize the
problem set. Another option is expressing the problem set by friendly, neutral, and threat networks.
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Other elements of the MAGTF may find a categorization of problems across warfighting functions
to be more useful. Staffs within regiments, groups, battalions, and squadrons may prefer a simple
brainstorming activity to itemize a list of problems that the staff determines are most relevant.
With a defined problem set, planners should brief the commander on the design results. This event
will help guide subsequent planning. It will also allow for an early opportunity to revisit design if
the commander does not agree with the problem set.
The problem set informs the mission statement developed later in problem framing. By that, the
mission statement must address the problem set. If the mission statement does not, planners should
revisit design and the task analysis that informed the mission statement. If the results remain the
same, the planners should consult HHQ for clarification of assigned tasks. The rigor that a staff
puts into the design effort will help to illuminate and provide evidence for why the assigned tasks
may not address the problem set.
The development of the problem set also influences COG analysis, described later in this chapter.
The relationships identified between various actors during the analysis of the current and desired
states can illuminate possible friendly, enemy, and adversary COGs. Moreover, while a problem
set rightfully identifies the need for simultaneity and concurrent operations using, for example,
multiple lines of effort and/or operations, COG analysis helps the commander and staff determine
what is most important among all the required actions. In this manner, COG analysis can help
planners envision decisive actions as a basis for main effort designations and the convergence of
combat power to seek a decision.
COMMANDER’S OPERATIONAL APPROACH
The commander’s operational approach concludes the initial iteration of problem framing. The
operational approach is broad, overarching guidance that the commander conveys through the
commander’s intent and COA development guidance. The operational approach requires the input
and synthesis of both design and the staff actions.
The operational approach is an expression of what the commander intends to accomplish and how
it will be done using available resources. This visualization reflects the commander’s
understanding of the situation and his/her hypothesis for achieving the overall purpose. Put another
way, the better the commander understands the situation and problem set, the more self-evident
the solution.
Commander’s Intent
Commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps
subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without
further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (DOD Dictionary) The desired
state or conditions may relate to terrain-based requirements as well as the disposition of friendly,
enemy, adversary, and/or civil elements. While end state conditions may change, the commander’s
16
intent endures to the point that the purpose is the most critical aspect of planning any and all
military operations.
Commander’s intent helps subordinates understand the larger context of their actions and guides
them in the absence of orders. It allows subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—when
the task assigned is no longer appropriate given the current situation—in a way that is consistent
with the higher commander’s aims. This freedom of action, within the framework of the
commander’s intent, creates tempo during planning and execution. Higher and subordinate
commanders’ intents must align. The purpose of the operation derives from the “in order to…”
portion of the mission statement or the execution paragraph of the higher commander’s operation
plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD).
The commander may develop his/her intent early in the planning process, but will review and
revise it as required. As the commander proceeds through the planning process, additional levels
of understanding about the environment and the problem are gained that allow the commander to
formulate and refine the intent as well as the vision of actions.
Course of Action Development Guidance

Based on a variety of considerations, such as available time or understanding of the problem and
its complexity, the COA development guidance may be narrow and directive or it may be broad
and inquisitive. The former may include development of a single COA, while the latter may direct
exploration of several COAs. Specific guidance can be in terms of warfighting functions, line of
or types of operations, or forms of maneuver. It may also include the commander’s vision of
decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions (which assist the staff in determining the main effort);
parts of the operation; location of critical events; and other aspects the commander deems pertinent
to COA development.
 Decisive Actions. Decisive actions are those the commander deems fundamental to achieving
mission success. Decisive actions can occur in multiple domains and throughout the
battlespace. They cause a favorable change in the situation or cause the enemy/adversary to
change or cease planned/current activities. For an action to be decisive, it must lead directly to
a larger success. Decisive actions create an environment in which the enemy/adversary has lost
either the means or the will to resist. The unit envisioned to be conducting the decisive action
is normally identified as the main effort.
 Shaping Actions. Shaping sets conditions for decisive actions. Shaping actions are
interactions with selected elements within the battlespace to influence an enemy’s capabilities,
force, or the enemy commander’s decision-making process. The commander may shape the
battlespace by protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities and attacking enemy critical
vulnerabilities. Shaping actions do not need to wait for physical forces to deploy from home
station; they could include an information campaign supported by the enterprise. Shaping can
incorporate a wide array of functions and capabilities and is more than fires and targeting. It
may also include engaging friendly, neutral, and threat networks through the use of operations
in the information environment (also referred to as OIE), security cooperation, engineer
17
MCWP 5-10
activities, civil affairs, civil-military operations, and counter threat finance. When faced with
an armed hostile threat, shaping actions can make the enemy vulnerable to attack, impede or
divert their attempts to maneuver, aid friendly maneuver, and influence the decision-making
of key actors to achieve information superiority. When not involved in armed conflict, shaping
can help enable the accomplishment of the mission. For example, if conducting a
counternarcotic mission in support of the US Drug Enforcement Agency, a key leader
engagement with US and other partners can help both sides understand the mission, limitations
(i.e., restraints and constraints), thus preventing or limiting friction and enabling the mission.
Shaping can dictate the time and place for decisive actions. It forces the enemy to adopt COAs
favorable to the friendly force commander’s plans. The commander attempts to shape events
in a way that allows for several options to achieving the decisive action.
 Sustaining Actions. Sustaining actions are shaping actions directed at friendly forces.
Planning is a sustaining action. It prepares friendly forces for military operations by improving
their understanding, which minimizes shock or surprise and promotes intuitive decision-
making to enhance tempo. Other examples of sustaining actions include information
preservation and resiliency actions, preventative medical services and logistic operations, such
as stockpiling critical ammunition, fuel, and supplies to facilitate future operations.
Additionally, COA development guidance may include—
 Minimum number of COAs to be developed.
 Enemy/adversary vulnerabilities.
 Types of operations.
 Forms of maneuver.
 Actions to influence the cognitive dimension.
 Selection and employment of the main effort.
 Reserve.
 Communication strategy and operations (COMMSTRAT).
 Command relationships.
 Task organization.
 Risk guidance.
 Further restraints and/or constraints.
 Arrangement of the operation (phasing).
 Timing of the operation.
ISSUE THE WARNING ORDER
Upon completion of problem framing, the commander directs the release of a WARNORD, which
allows subordinate commands to begin concurrent planning as the higher command begins COA
development. The WARNORD should emphasize critical information, but also contain all relevant
information to facilitate concurrent planning. Due dates for planning products and transition
events, as well as known or possible movement and execution dates, must be communicated early
18
in planning. Consistency with formats used for subsequent orders products will help speed the
information flow because subordinates will know where to look for critical information. When
operating with coalition and partner nation forces, WARNORDs should reflect language and
cultural considerations.
Reframe Throughout Planning and Execution

Reframing occurs when the commander, planners, and the staff revise their understanding of the
environment and problem set. If required, they develop a new approach to overcome the challenges
or to leverage opportunities that precipitated the need to reframe (see fig. 2-7). Reasons for
reframing can include—
 Changes in the original problem set.
 Significant changes in the enemy composition.
 Significant changes in the expected enemy approach.
 Significant changes in friendly capabilities.
 HHQ policy changes or directives that change the desired state.
 Lack of friendly progress toward objectives.
 Shifts in international support or domestic will.
 Key assumptions prove to be invalid.
Figure 2-7. Reframing.
Note that the actions associated with the design methodology first occur during problem framing.
However, this does not mean design is a singular effort that concludes after the first step of
planning. In reality, commanders and their staffs should routinely reexamine the results of their
design efforts during planning and throughout execution because significant changes to the
operational environment will occur. The problem set that derives from design will change as the
current and desired states evolve. Ultimately, the reframing challenge for commanders and
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MCWP 5-10
planners is to determine when a plan is no longer a basis for action. Through fragmentary orders
(FRAGOs), planners routinely maintain the viability of a plan. However, at some point with
enough change in the environment, the commander will need to reconvene the OPT for a complete
design reset.
STAFF ACTIONS
Design does not occur in isolation; much of the information available to the commander comes
from staff actions. Accordingly, staff actions are concurrent and complementary—vice
sequential—activities that underwrite the design effort. These complementary activities are of little
value unless they interact. The planning process provides venues for interactions between the
commander, OPT, staff, and subordinate units. When the staff or OPT briefs the commander, they
are providing, in part, the results of their actions. When the commander provides guidance, his/her
direction represents a synthesis of the staff’s input, along with other sources of information, which
manifest in the form of a decision about how to proceed. All of the following actions enhance
understanding and increase planning effectiveness largely through their contribution to the design
methodology.
Task Analysis
Task analysis may occur in two stages. Initially, any known tasks provided by HHQ will heavily
influence the environmental frame. As planning continues and understanding improves, planners
can use the problem set as a basis for determining among the specified and implied tasks which
are the more essential to mission success. Commands normally receive tasks that planners analyze
as a basis for determining the unit’s mission. The principal source for tasks is the HHQ plan or
order. There may be other sources, such as verbal guidance from the HHQ or unit commander,
from which to derive tasks. Additionally, as the problem and purpose are understood as a result of
the design effort, the command develops tasks from the problem set.
Design and Task Analysis

Design establishes paradigms whereas task analysis is paradigm accepting. Within an accepted
or established paradigm, commanders armed with task and purpose can proceed to task
analysis as a basis for COA development.
With the need to reframe due to the constantly changing operational environment, the currently
understood paradigm—typically described in the “Situation” paragraph—will evolve to the
point that the existing plan—to include any FRAGOs—will no longer serve as a basis for
action. A subsequent design effort seeks to provide an updated framework within which tasks
(and purpose) to subordinate units can more directly lead to viable solutions.
20
 Specified tasks derive primarily from the execution paragraphs of the HHQ OPORD, but they
may be found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, annexes,
and FRAGOs. Specified tasks may also derive from verbal instructions from the commander
or the HHQ commander. Planners should identify and record any specified task that pertains
to any element of the unit. As a general rule, each specified task will quote the stated task and
cite the source (e.g., specific paragraph of the HHQ OPORD).
 Planners infer implied tasks which are necessary to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks
are those most challenging to identify. They entail those actions required within the context of
the mission but are neither stated nor part of a SOP or routine continuing action. Planners
discover them through an inductive process of rigorous analysis of all specified tasks,
commander’s guidance, assumptions, COG analysis, doctrine, case studies, intelligence
preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products, and the experience or expertise of subject matter
experts (SMEs), partners, allies, and other relevant human resources. A good example is global
integration that necessitates considering tasks that may not be accomplished with organic
forces with existing authorities. Similar to requesting joint sorties for additonal capacity,
unique capabilities, or shaping areas beyond the MAGTF area of operations, commanders will
need to coordinate for expanded information capabilities to the force or support from external
forces with necessary authorities and or capabilities.
 Essential tasks are the specified or implied tasks that a force must perform in order to
accomplish their mission. Typically the mission statement, developed later in problem framing,
includes all essential tasks. However, a commander may consider listing a single essential task
to promote a focused effort toward the most decisive action. Otherwise, a mission statement
that contains a sequenced list of essential tasks could start to look a lot like a CONOPS, thus
putting focus at risk.
Center of Gravity Analysis

However conducted, COG analysis is a means to focus the commander and staff on what is most
important—during a particular time or event—among all the variables and factors that can
influence the conduct of operations.
Relative Combat Power Assessment

Relative combat power assessment (RCPA), which includes emerging capabilities never
considered before—such as cyberspace units—provides planners with an understanding of
friendly and enemy forces’ strengths and weaknesses relative to each other. To assess relative
combat power, planners generally analyze force ratios two levels below the planning unit. For
example, division planners will compare numbers, readiness, etc. of friendly and enemy battalions
(infantry, artillery, etc.). The RCPA provides insight on the types of operations possible for
friendly and enemy forces, weaknesses, and additional resources that may be required.
While force ratios may be important, the numerical comparison of personnel and major end items
is one factor among many, such as leadership, morale, equipment maintenance, training levels,
21
MCWP 5-10
and the effects of weather. Planners present RCPA conclusions and key findings during the
problem framing brief.
Assumptions
Assumptions are suppositions about the current situation or about future events assumed to be true
in the absence of facts in order to continue planning and allow the commander to make a decision
concerning a COA. They apply to friendly, neutral, and enemy/adversary situations as well as the
environment. Assumptions must answer the following:
 Is it logical?
 Is it realistic?
 Is it essential for planning to continue?
 Does it assume away an enemy/adversary capability?
Subsequent planning will identify new assumptions while confirming or disproving prior
assumptions. Planners should keep a record of all assumptions and their resolution. Operation
plans can and will likely contain assumptions; but OPORDs should not. Unresolved assumptions
carried into execution become a risk to operations.
Where appropriate, planners forward assumptions to HHQ for validation. This ensures that the
HHQ commander understands the potential risks that a subordinate command is accepting. It may
prompt the HHQ to pursue facts that support the assumption or to request additional information.
Planning Limitations
Restraints (what cannot be done) and constraints (what must be done) that do not qualify as
specified tasks require identification. Planners often find restraints and constraints in the rules of
engagement, commander’s guidance, and instructions from higher headquarters. Planners then
must address these limitations during COA development and subsequent planning as they affect
the conduct of operations.
Develop the Mission Statement

The mission statement is a solution-based expression of the problem set. The purpose of the
operation and the essential tasks, as identified in task analysis, are the foundation for the mission.
A properly constructed mission statement answers the following questions:
 Who (forces that will conduct the operation)?
 What (essential task or tasks [e.g., destroy] and, as necessary, type of operation [e.g., “conducts
air assault and seizes …”]?
 When (time or event that determines when an operation will start and/or end)?
 Where (location)?
 Why (purpose of the operation)?
22
The commander approves the proposed mission statement, modifies it, or develops a new mission
statement as a prelude to COA development. The approved mission statement becomes the
foundation of an OPLAN or OPORD.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

The OPT develops and refines IPB products, to include enemy COAs. The IPB products must
mature and evolve as planning progresses. For example, as the OPT works through problem
framing, COA development, and COA war game, they may conduct pattern analysis of enemy
actions—as well as the activities of local inhabitants—to better understand the operational
environment. This pattern analysis feeds the development of various templates. These templates
will help populate the decision support template (DST), which will include named areas of interest
(NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), and decision points.
Green Cell Activities

At a minimum, the green cell provides for the independent wills and needs of the various groups
or neutral networks that may affect the MAGTF’s operations. The green cell may also provide
considerations for non-Department of Defense (DOD) entities, such as private sector or
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Green cell composition can range from an individual to
a task-organized group of SMEs that may include liaisons from the local populace and non-DOD
agencies. For more information related to green cell activities, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat
Networks, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-03, Stability Operations, and Marine
Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-02A MAGTF Network Engagement Activities.
Red Cell Activities

The red cell “employs” enemy/adversary forces to help the commander assess friendly COAs. A
red cell can range in size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of SMEs. While a
red cell’s principal duties center on COA development and the COA war game, it participates in
the analysis of COGs and also supports the commander’s understanding of the problem during the
initial stages of design. Determining which enemy/adversary forces and echelons on which to
focus is an important decision of the red cell. As planning continues, the red cell develops its own
enemy/adversary mission, intent, and COAs in accordance with the enemy’s doctrine, history,
goals, and IPB. The red cell is different than a red team.
Red Team
Red team, or in capability terms, red teaming is a broadly applicable resource that supports the
inclusion of independent, critical thought, and alternative perspectives to help facilitate problem-
solving and decision-making processes, to include planning. In addition to support to planning,
red teams can fully explore alternatives in operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities
within the context of the operational environment. See Appendix G, Red Team, for a detailed
discussion about how the red team supports each step of the planning process.
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MCWP 5-10
Red Team vs. Red Cell

What red teams and red cells share in common—through an adversarial, contrarian
approach—is the ability to expose plans to rigorous examination thereby
improving an organization’s adaptability to a constantly changing environment.
But they differ in a number of ways. Red cells are a key OPT element from problem
framing through COA war game. Red cell membership will vary by the nature of
the threat whether an established nation-state military force or a non-state
competitor. In contrast, red team members are school trained (0506 MOS) special
staff reporting to the chief of staff. Where the red cell is integral to the OPT, red
teams are an independent capability providing external support to planning efforts
in addition to other command concepts, ideas, and processes.
Staff Estimates
Staff estimates provide key information (e.g., facts, assumptions, asset locations and availability,
forecasted shortages) that will increase the commander’s understanding and aid decision-making.
Staff estimates depict how each staff section or warfighting function supports each COA. The staff
estimates also list, in prioritized order, the key concerns and issues (e.g., availability of a particular
port or airfield) of the associated staff officer. Staff estimates must clearly differentiate between
concerns and problems that can be resolved through subsequent staff coordination, and any that
require the commander’s personal intervention.
Estimates of Supportability
Estimates of supportability are similar to staff estimates. The subordinate units provide focused
accounts of unit readiness and associated dates, concurrent tasks and commitments, strengths,
locations, shortages, deployment status, and other key concerns. Estimates of supportability are
especially important for attached or supporting units, so commanders and planners can better
envision employment options. These estimates should provide a timely examination of factors that
support decision-making and identify significant aspects of the situation that can influence the
COA and affect mission accomplishment. A running estimate that favors content over format and
may be either a formal, detailed written document or an informal verbal briefing. For example, if
the staff or subordinate unit is aware of a COA will have a negative impact on mission
accomplishment, there is no need to complete a formal document or wait until the next planning
milestone meeting.
Operational Environment
The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that
affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. In the 2010
timeframe, JP 3-0 introduced the term operational environment to encourage a more thorough
examination of the battlespace. Understanding friendly and enemy forces is not enough; other
24
factors, such as culture, language, tribal affiliations, and the human and information environments,
can be equally important. Essentially, commanders analyze the operational environment in order
to determine the physical dimensions of their battlespace in the form of areas of interest, influence,
and operations.
Battlespace Refinement
Battlespace is environment, factors, and conditions that are studied and a resource Marines use to
accomplish the mission while protecting the force. Battlespace includes the area of interest, area
of influence, and operational areas. Operational areas for MAGTFs are usually an area of
operations. The size, shape, and duration of the battlespace can directly influence the staff’s
assessment of the current state during problem framing. As planning continues, the staff may
recommend battlespace refinements based on the analysis of the terrain and tasks as well as
friendly and enemy COGs, capabilities, and limitations.
Resource Shortfalls
Based on the tasks, possible solutions, and available resources, planners and staff identify critical
resource shortfalls which can include a need for SMEs, authorities (or agencies with those
authorities), and maneuver forces that can create effects within global areas of interest.
Operation Assessment
Assessment is an inherent staff action that each member of a command performs in their respective
functional area. If a command determines the need to further organize to the assessment
requirement via a cell and/or some other entity like an assessment working group, the commander
will either need external augmentation or source the personnel organically, since there are no
assessment cells in any standing MAGTFs.
Ideally, an assessment cell, if sourced, will form with the onset of planning. With the hierarchical
layering of tasks and intents, military planning provides a natural framework for assessment. While
the commander will eventually need to provide the assessment cell’s focus, the cell’s default role
at the beginning of planning typically is to shadow the planning effort looking for the more
subjective aspects of the plan that will require the cell’s attention.
The essential goal of an assessment cell is to explain the command’s progress toward a desired
state. In design terms, an assessment cell will update its environmental frame via measures of
performance and measures of effectiveness. The difference between the desired state and the ever-
changing current state is the basis for assessment reporting. To explain why the unit is progressing
or not, the assessment cell must interact with sufficient battle rhythm events and other sources of
information to obtain the feedback necessary to inform a rational narrative that may include
recommendations for change. See MCDP 6, Command and Control, discussion “What is the
Relationship Between ‘Command’ and ‘Control’?” concerning the role of feedback as the
mechanism that allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances.
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MCWP 5-10
This publication does not contain an assessment process, since commanders assimilate information
uniquely in their own way. Each mission is also unique to the command’s understanding. For
collection and reporting examples that can aid in developing a commander-friendly assessment
process, see Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-10.1, Multiservice Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment.
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) link to decisions. The staff may propose
and will continually review and update CCIRs, which fall into two categories—priority
intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). The PIRs
are key components of the IPB process and the collections plan.
Each CCIR asks a question that, when answered, assists the commander in making a key decision.
As planning continues, planners identify and list likely decisions associated with each CCIR.
Planners then create branch plans that facilitate the timely execution of the decisions tied to CCIRs.
Commander’s Significant Notification Events

Where CCIRs link to decisions, commander’s significant notification events (CSNEs) identify the
need for more information based on the presumption that CSNEs will incur a high demand for
information from the chain of command as well as the media. The CSNEs are serious incidents,
acts, or allegations that require the commander’s immediate notification.
Requests for Information

Planners identify requirements for information to remove assumptions, support future plans, or
conduct current operations. Based on the initial IPB and information requirements (including
CCIRs), the commander and OPT identify gaps in information and intelligence. Planners forward
requests for information (RFIs) to the appropriate staff section or to HHQ for answers. Policy
questions or other complex topics are better suited for other venues, such as commander-to-
commander discussions, for resolution. Over time, the number of RFIs can make the tracking effort
very difficult. Therefore, RFI management tools and a RFI manager are essential to track all RFI
submissions and responses.
Problem Framing Brief

The OPT presents a problem framing brief to the commander to review the completed products
and to ensure a shared understanding across the staff. When approved by the commander, these
products inform COA development. The brief may include the following:
 List of specific decisions, approvals, and guidance requested of the commander during the
brief (e.g., decision on whether to request an area of operations change from HHQ, approval
of proposed CCIRs).
 Situation update (status of friendly forces, stakeholders, and existing command relations;
significant events in the area of operations and area(s) of interest).
26
 Problem set review.

 IPB update.
 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collections (current and planned).
 HHQ missions (one and two levels up).
 HHQ commanders’ intents (one and two levels up).
 Task analysis (specified, implied, and essential tasks listed in prioritized or sequential order).
 COG analyses (friendly, enemy).
 Assumptions.
 Limitations (restraints and constraints).
 Red cell summary.
 Green cell summary.
 Staff estimates.
 Estimates of supportability.
 Recommended battlespace refinement.
 Resource shortfalls (prioritized).
 Lessons learned summary.
 Risk.
 Draft CCIRs.
 Draft CSNEs.
 RFIs (current RFIs and recently answered RFIs, prioritized).
 Draft liaison plan.
 Planning and execution timeline.
 Other updated products from ongoing activities.
 Proposed mission statement.
 Operational approach discussion.
o Commander’s intent.
o COA development guidance.
Both the brief and the work generating the products can influence the commander’s understanding
of the environment and the problem set. Accordingly, the commander may use this opportunity to
refine the commander’s intent and guidance or modify the mission statement.
The commander generally concludes the brief by approving the mission statement and releasing a
WARNORD. A critical output of problem framing is also a discussion of the broad operational
approach. With the commander’s intent, this broad operational approach forms a basis for the
commander’s COA development guidance and better postures planners for the detailed planning
that follows. The commander may also want to further consider the problem framing products, as
well as any additional information that emerged during the brief, before approving the products or
providing additional guidance.
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MCWP 5-10
CONSIDERATIONS
No amount of critical thinking will ensure complete understanding of a problem set. Accordingly,
design does not end with problem framing. The commander must continually return to his/her
understanding of the problem, refine the guidance, and provide an update or even a new vision and
description as the planners and staff work through the planning process.
The staff actions on the preceding pages provide a broad framework for an open-ended dialogue
with no predetermined conclusion during the command’s efforts to gain an understanding of the
operational environment and the problem set. The problem framing brief or any other planning-
related brief has an intrinsic value far beyond the information presented. Whenever the
commander, OPT, staff, and subordinate commanders and their staffs share a common venue
where dialogue takes place, learning and awareness improve. Group dialogue, when conducted
within the proper command climate, can foster a collective level of understanding not attainable
by any individual within the group regardless of experience or seniority. Group interactions
involving frank and candid input are the best way to replicate the nonlinear nature of conflicts and
the parties involved.
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CHAPTER 3
COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
Decision-making requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of
a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution.
—MCDP 1, Warfighting
. . . make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.
—General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It
Course of action development leads to one or more options for accomplishing the mission in
accordance with the commander’s operational approach that resulted from the design effort that
began during problem framing. For options to be distinguishable, each COA must employ different
means or methods that address the essential tasks and incorporate the commander’s operational
approach.
During COA development, planners use the products carried forward from problem framing to
generate options—COAs—that satisfy the mission in accordance with the commander’s
operational approach. Developed COAs should be—
 Suitable: Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the
commander’s guidance?
 Feasible: Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and
resources? Is the unit(s) capable of executing this COA?
 Acceptable: Is the COA worth the cost in personnel, casualties, equipment, materiel, time,
and/or position? Is it consistent with the law of war and is it militarily and politically
supportable?
 Distinguishable: Does the COA differ from other COAs?
 Complete: Does the COA address all of the tasks? Does it address the entire mission (main
and supporting efforts, reserve, associated risks, and all applicable warfighting functions)?
Does the COA contain sufficient detail for COA war game?
Planners develop COAs to give the commander options for how to be successful. The commander
may direct a single COA if his/her understanding of the situation and problem set makes a single
COA self-evident or if operating under severe time constraints.
When developing COAs, planners consider two fundamental questions:
 What needs to be accomplished?
 How should it be done?
Answering the second question is the essence of COA development. The following staff actions
assist COA development:
MCWP 5-10
 Update IPB Products. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace enables planners to view the
battlespace in terms of the enemy/adversary and the environment. It helps planners determine
how the enemy/adversary will react to proposed friendly COAs, the purpose of
enemy/adversary actions, the most likely and most dangerous enemy/adversary COAs, and the
type of friendly operations that the terrain, weather, and infrastructure will allow. It is critical
that planners continue to update and refine IPB to deepen their understanding of the situation
and to answer the two fundamental questions posed in COA development.
 Display Friendly Forces. The graphic display of friendly forces in relation to the terrain
allows planners to see the current and projected locations of friendly forces and can help reveal
possible options.
 Refine COG Analysis. The commander and planners refine COG analysis based on updated
intelligence and IPB products, initial staff estimates, and input from the red and green cells.
The refined COGs and critical vulnerabilities suggest ways to interact with selected elements
in the battlespace.
 Refine CCIRs. With the approved CCIRs, planners begin to link individual PIRs and FFIRs
to specific decisions. The refined CCIRs also include related branch plans and sequels for each
decision. As it is updated and refined throughout the MCPP, the CCIR list helps prepare the
commander for possible key decisions required in execution and also prepares the staff and
unit(s) for timely execution of or changes to the plan.
 Continue Red and Green Cell Planning. Red and green cells prepare to play the roles of key
enemy/adversary or civilian leaders during COA war game. During COA development, the red
cell builds and refines enemy/adversary COAs, using the enemy/adversary COAs in IPB as its
starting point. As planning continues, the red cell provides updates and findings for IPB
refinement. The red cell researches the tendencies, biographies, and/or histories of opposing
force commanders and units, and refines its plan accordingly. The red cell also articulates the
enemy/adversary commander’s anticipated knowledge of friendly intentions and plans. The
red cell must have enemy/adversary COAs completed in sufficient detail for wargaming by the
end of COA development. The green cell identifies and details the initiatives, events, and
important dates of populations or organizations that may affect friendly or enemy/adversary
operations. The green cell also develops the consequent reactions of civilian groups to friendly
and enemy/adversary actions.
 Update Staff Estimates. Staff estimates assist planners during COA development by
providing essential information on areas of concern, identifying requirements and capabilities,
determining shortfalls, and identifying potential solutions to those shortfalls.
 Continue Operation Assessment Planning. Planners, in conjunction with an assessment cell
if formed, will develop an overall operation assessment framework.
DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION
Guided primarily by the commander’s COA development guidance, along with the planning
products created in problem framing, planners begin developing possible ways, or options, to
30
accomplish the mission. This development requires critical thinking skills and unbiased, open-
minded participants. The number of COAs and level of detail depend on the commander’s
guidance and the time available for planning. Planners should not judge or eliminate initial or
“rough-cut” COAs; planners record all possibilities for consideration to provide the commander
with a variety of distinct options.
There are numerous techniques for developing COAs. Some commanders envision a sequence of
actions given goals and objectives in accordance with design; others consider key factors, such as
RCPA, a useful starting point; and others focus on ways to counter the enemy’s/adversary’s most
dangerous and most likely COAs. Regardless of the specific COA development technique used,
planners should consider the following factors:
 Battlespace Framework. The framework allows the commander to relate the forces to one
another in time, space, and purpose. Deep, close, and rear areas, as described in MCDP 1-0,
Marine Corps Operations, are a common framework for conventional operations.
 Array of Forces. Friendly, enemy/adversary, and, when relevant, populations should be
arrayed in the same venue while developing COAs.
 Purpose and Tasks. Identify the purpose for each subordinate element. Purposes are often
friendly-related, and generally either accomplish the mission or support the main effort. After
identifying the purpose of a subordinate element, identify the task that best accomplishes the
purpose. Begin with the main effort and follow with the supporting effort(s) and reserve, if
assigned.
 Task Organization. Task organization accounts for all units (e.g., organic, attached,
supporting, headquarters elements). The task organization should reflect each unit’s construct,
size, and resources such as main or supporting effort and priorities for lift, fires, and resupply.
Task organization identifies commanders, clarifies command relationships, and accounts for
span of control.
 Sequencing. Planners determine the best arrangement of actions to accomplish the mission.
This arrangement is often a combination of simultaneous and sequential actions. Although
simultaneous actions may be ideal, resource availability may require the commander to
prioritize and sequence actions.
 Phasing. If necessary, commanders may divide plans and operations into phases. Phases
represent distinct periods in the progress of the overall operation. Phasing may require
conditions to transition to the next phase. Planners identify the criteria, decisions, and
authorities associated with transitioning to each phase. Phases can be subdivided into two or
more stages, stages into two or more parts, and parts into two or more steps. To avoid confusion,
planners should nest their phasing plan within the HHQ plan.
 Integration. The OPT depicts the integration of actions across time and space in the COA
graphic and narrative as well as the synchronization matrix.
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MCWP 5-10
 Control Measures. Control measures (e.g., maneuver control measures, fire support
coordination measures, airspace coordination areas) should expedite actions and ensure forces
have sufficient battlespace and flexibility to accomplish their tasks while protecting their
forces.
 Focus on the Problem(s). Friendly COAs, in accordance with the mission statement and
commander’s intent, are designed to address the problem(s) identified during problem framing.
Initial Courses of Action Brief

The commander reviews the initial COAs to see if they meet his/her intent. Normally, an informal
review, referred to as a rough-cut COA brief, that the staff conducts as soon as possible once the
planners have drafted initial COAs. This brief saves time by avoiding refinements to COAs that
the commander will not approve or select. The review also helps the commander further refine
his/her understanding and begin to see tangible results of his/her intent. The commander may
eliminate COAs, direct modifications to the initial COAs, or may direct the development of
additional COAs.
Completed Course of Action Requirements

Using the commander’s guidance and a review of the initial COAs, the staff further develops,
expands, and refines the COAs to be taken forward into COA wargaming. A complete COA
normally consists of a COA graphic and narrative, task organization, synchronization matrix, and
supporting concepts. As applicable, COAs also include a draft assessment plan. Additionally, the
staff may recommend to the commander how a COA should be wargamed and evaluated. This
recommendation may include the war game method and which enemy/adversary COA to use.
Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The COA graphic and narrative portray how the organization will accomplish the mission.
Together, the graphic and narrative identify who (notional task organization), when, what (tasks),
where, how, and why (intent). The COA graphic and narrative are essential and inseparable.
Together, they help the commander, subordinate commanders, and the staffs understand the
method by which the organization intends to accomplish the mission. During conventional
operations, the graphic portrays the locations and activities of the main and supporting efforts,
reserve, command posts, critical maneuver control measures (e.g., objectives, boundaries, phase
lines), and fire support coordination measures (e.g., coordinated fire line, no-fire areas). The
narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the reserve, significant
operations that cannot be depicted on the graphic (e.g., certain aspects of operations in the
information environment), as well as the timing and sequencing of the operation. See Appendix D
for additional examples of COA graphics and narratives.
In other types of operations, such as those supporting competition below armed conflict, the
graphic may display civil-military activities, critical information nodes and infrastructure,
locations of relief organizations and dislocated civilians, demographic variations (tribal, ethnic,
32
religious patterns) of the population, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant
areas.The COA graphic and narrative, when approved by the commander, form the basis for the
CONOPS and operations overlay in the OPLAN or OPORD.
Task Organization
The task organization captures how the commander intends to structure the force to accomplish
the mission. It also establishes command and support relationships. Proper task organization
portrays each unit’s structure, size, and equipment to support the commander’s CONOPS. Planners
must depict all units (e.g., organic, attached, supporting), including headquarters elements, in the
task organization. Span of control considerations and command relationships are important aspects
of task organization.
Synchronization Matrix
The synchronization matrix is a working document showing the activities of the command and
subordinate elements over time. It displays how units, warfighting functions, and tasks interrelate
throughout all phases, providing additional details (e.g., displacement of the command post,
priorities and location of the reserve element, information integration specifics, sequencing of
tasks and movements) that complement and amplify the COA graphic and narrative. The purpose
of a synchronization matrix is to relate forces and their actions to one another in time, space, and
purpose, and converge combat power and military information power to achieve a decision or
advantage. A synchronization matrix should not overly script the actions of subordinate units as if
to create an expectation that planners can accurately predict precise unit dispositions days far in
advance. If a plan is too tightly coupled, it is easily damaged, difficult to repair, and lacks the
flexibility to address the inherent friction and uncertainty of war. During orders development, the
completed synchronization matrix enables planners to assign tasks to subordinates. See Appendix
D for additional examples of synchronization matrices.
Supporting Concepts
The staff prepares supporting, functional concepts for each COA to integrate and coordinate
actions into a single, cohesive plan. The staff estimates evolve into supporting concepts.
Supporting concepts may be organized by warfighting functions, as well as select activities
requiring separate supporting concepts (e.g., operations in the information environment). Once the
commander selects a COA, the supporting concepts inform the corresponding portions of the
OPORD. For example, within the OPORD logistics is outlined in paragraph 4, “Administration
and Logistics,” and discussed in detail in Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support); and
communications is oulined in paragraph 5, “Command and Signal,” and discussed in detail in
Annex K (Combat Information Systems).
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MCWP 5-10
COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT BRIEF
Planners brief each COA separately. Standardized formats help focus the brief and prevent the
omission of essential information. The COA development brief may include the following:
 List of specific decisions, approvals, and guidance requested of the commander during the brief
(e.g., approval of proposed CCIR changes, select COAs for wargaming, COA wargaming
method selected, COA evaluation criteria confirmed, etc.).
 Situation update (status of friendly forces, stakeholders, and existing command relations,
significant events in the area of operations and area(s) of interest, etc.).
 IPB update.
 ISR collections update.
 Red and green cell update.
 RFI update.
 CCIR recommended changes.
 Operation assessment plan update.
 For each COA:
o Task organization.
o COA graphic and narrative.
o Synchronization matrix (referenced, as necessary).
o Supporting concepts.
 Recommended COA wargaming guidance (see below).
 Recommended COA evaluation criteria (see below).
COMMANDER’S WARGAMING GUIDANCE AND EVALUATION CRITERIA
Following the COA development brief, the commander will select or modify the COAs for
wargaming and provide wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria.
The commander’s wargaming guidance may include a list of friendly COAs for wargaming against
specific enemy/adversary COAs. For example, COA 1 will be wargamed against the
enemy’s/adversary’s most likely COA, whereas COA 2 will be wargamed against both the
enemy’s/adversary’s most likely COA and most dangerous COA. Wargaming guidance may also
include priorities, wargaming method, refining the phasing or sequencing of an operation, and a
list of critical events requiring greater analysis, such as a river crossing.
Before the planners begin the COA war game, the commander must choose the evaluation criteria
that will be used to select the COA that will become the CONOPS. The commander establishes
evaluation criteria based on judgment, personal experience, and the overall understanding of the
situation and problem. The COA evaluation criteria focuses the wargaming effort and provides the
framework for data collection by the OPT and staff. The commander will use the data collected in
wargaming during the COA comparison and decision step. The COA evaluation criteria may
include—
 Warfighting functions.
34
 Principles of war.
 Limitation on casualties.
 Exploitation of enemy weaknesses/friendly strengths.
 Defeat of the enemy’s COG.
 Protection of the friendly COG.
 Degree of asymmetrical operations.
 Operations in the information environment
 Risk.
 Earliest date and time the operation can begin.
 Duration of the operation.
 Political considerations.
 Impact on local population and/or issues.
CONSIDERATIONS
A COA must contain sufficient detail to facilitate COA wargaming. The war game, if done
properly, will usually reveal flaws and omissions in each COA. Planners often must resume COA
development during wargaming, not because their COAs are infeasible, but because the COAs are
incomplete and require additional detail to continue the war game.
The COA development process continues to inform the commander and the staff and leads to
products that drive subsequent steps in the MCPP. The updated commander’s visualization
resulting from COA development, can include a possible reframing of the problem and purpose.
In this manner, the COA development brief provides another venue for further design discussion.
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36
CHAPTER 4
COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.
When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or
losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in
every battle to be in peril.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The purpose of COA wargaming is to improve the plan. War games enable commanders and
planners to: (1) validate the COAs, by testing each COA against an enemy/adversary with an
independent will or a competitor during operations below the threshold of armed conflict, under
realistic environmental conditions; (2) improve each COA and the overall plan, including
necessary branches or sequels; (3) evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each COA; and (4)
better understand the problem and environment. A COA war game prepares commanders,
planners, and staffs for the challenges, opportunities, and decisions inherent in execution.
Whether conducted formally as a disciplined, interactive process or informally through a “what if”
conversation between the commander and staff, wargaming relies heavily on the operational
judgment and experience of the participants. Computer-aided modeling and simulation
applications provide other methods for wargaming.
Planners war game friendly COAs against selected enemy/adversary COAs through an iterative
action-reaction-counteraction process. On larger staffs, a red cell creates and fights
enemy/adversary COAs, while a green cell develops probable responses and actions of the
population and other groups. This form of interaction coupled with feedback loops accounts for
the nonlinear nature of military operations.
War Game Preparations
War Game Billets

In addition to those personnel involved throughout the planning process, a facilitator, arbiter, and
recorder, who are intimately familiar with the plan, are assigned to war game the COA(s).
 Facilitator. Often the lead planner, the facilitator:
o Ensures that the war game effectively tests the COAs, in accordance with the
commander’s wargaming guidance.
o Prioritizes the wargaming focus, in accordance with the commander’s wargaming
guidance.
o Ensures the data and findings are properly recorded.
o Meets the planning and execution timeline requirements.
MCWP 5-10
 Arbiter. The arbiter determines the outcomes of turns (i.e., action, reaction, and counteraction),
assesses casualties (friendly, enemy, and adversary personnel, as well as civilians) and losses
(e.g., military materiel and facilities, civil facilities and infrastructure), and adjudicates
disagreements. Though an independent view is preferred, the facilitator could also serve as the
arbiter.
 Recorder. The recorder captures all relevant data and findings (e.g., updates to the
synchronization matrix, recommended modifications to a COA’s task organization, input to
the COA evaluation worksheet) as directed by the lead planner.
Documents and Tools

Requirements to conduct a COA war game include:
 Approved mission statement.
 Commander’s intent and guidance.
 Commander’s wargaming guidance.
 IPB documents.
 ISR plan.
 Friendly, complete COAs.
 Designated enemy/adversary COAs (including enemy/adversary ISR).
 Red cell supporting documents, when available, for each enemy/adversary COA.
 Green cell documents, when available.
 Operation assessment plan.
 RCPA (overall and at select locations identified for wargaming).
 Risk assessment.
 COG analysis (friendly, neutral, and enemy).
 CCIRs.
 COA war game rules.
 COA war game briefing sequence and requirements.
 Detailed timeline for the conduct of the COA war game.
 Map (paper or electronic) that includes the area of operations and area of influence with
control measures depicted.
 Military symbols for units and equipment (e.g., friendly, enemy, civilian).
 Casualty estimator tool.
 COA war game worksheet.
 COA evaluation worksheet.
War Game Techniques
Four standard wargaming techniques—key event or sequence of essential tasks, avenue in depth,
belt, and box—are available. Each technique is suited to a particular situation or type of command.
38
Commanders and planners may choose one, combine aspects of war game techniques, or create
new techniques to meet the commander’s overall wargaming requirements.
Key Event or Sequence of Essential Tasks

Wargaming a key event or essential tasks in sequence (if there is a sequence) allows the planners
to determine timing, support requirements, and how the accomplishment of a key event or essential
tasks predisposes success or accomplishment of subsequent tasks.
Avenue in Depth
Avenue in depth focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This
technique is good for offensive COAs or for defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits
mutual support.
Belt
Belts divide the terrain into segments that span the width of the sector (defense), zone (offense),
or area of operation. This technique is most effective in cross-compartment terrain, phased
operations, or when the enemy deploys in clearly defined echelons. A belt will normally include
more than one event. When time is short, the commander may use a modified belt technique, such
as noncontiguous belts selected on the basis of anticipated critical events, which may or may not
occur at the same time. At a minimum, belts should include the area of—
 Initial contact along the forward line of own troops, the line of departure/line of contact, or in
the security area.
 Initial penetration or initial contact along the forward edge of the battle area.
 Passage of the reserve or commitment of a counterattack.
 The objective (offense) or defeat of the enemy (defense), such as the limit of advance for the
counterattack.
Box
The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, such as a colored landing beach, an
infiltration route, a river crossing operation, or a raid objective. It is most useful when time is
limited. This technique applies to all types of units. The OPT isolates the area and focuses on the
critical events within that area.
Conduct of the War Game
Prior to the execution of the war game, the facilitator leads a discussion that includes the following:
 War game purpose.
 Wargaming guidance.
 Review of friendly COAs.
 Review of enemy/competitor mission, intent, and COAs.
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MCWP 5-10
 Order of events (e.g., COA 1 vs. most likely COA, then COA 2 vs. most dangerous COA).
 Detailed timeline for the conduct of the war game.
 Rules, including adjudication.
 Briefing sequence (initial and per turn) and requirements.
 Conduct of the war game details.
 Starting locations (friendly and enemy units and ISR assets, populations, etc.).
 Facilitator’s master scenario event list (MSEL).
 Recording methods.
 MCPP products requiring updates.
 Details regarding the future COA wargaming brief to the commander.
The COA war game itself consists of one or more turns. In most instances, a turn includes the
discussion of three steps, as described below: friendly action, anticipated reaction of
enemy/adversaries and the local population, and friendly counteraction. If the enemy/adversary is
on the offense or has the initiative during a turn, the turn may be modified to include four steps:
enemy/adversary action, friendly and civilian reaction, enemy/adversary counteraction, friendly
counteraction.
 Action. Friendly force commanders or their representatives during the COA war game describe
the operations of all forces involved during this event. They describe the force, mission, tasks,
and desired outcome. They annotate the force list to account for all forces employed in the
event, while moving icons on a map or electronic overlay if physical positioning is applicable.
If using a map or overlay, unit representatives need to provide markers for the relevant global
considerations that can impact a unit’s ability to achieve its desired state.
 Reaction. The red cell will react to friendly actions by briefing the enemy’s/adversary’s (or the
element that represents a threat to friendly success) actions according to its plan, and similarly
moving icons. The red cell commander describes the operations enemy/adversary forces are
currently executing as well as the employment of relevant forces outside the immediate area of
operations but within the area of interest during this event. Friendly wargamers can then
validate the portion of their plan or higher and adjacent plans that address these additional
enemy/adversary forces. The red cell and friendly commanders determine where they will have
contact. The red cell commander describes the locations and activities of the assets identified
as high-value targets (HVTs) and highlights points during the operation where these assets are
important to the enemy’s/adversary’s COA. If these points affect the friendly COA, friendly
wargamers identify the HVTs as high-payoff targets (HPTs), making their engagement an
integral part of the friendly COA. With this information, planners update the situation and event
templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that support the engagement of those HPTs.
 Civilian Reaction. The green cell will provide likely civilian responses to friendly and
enemy/adversary actions, as well as any relevant civilian initiatives. The OPT discusses the
impact of the contact on friendly and enemy/adversary forces and the population. Recording
tools capture the discussion. If the OPT members agree on the outcome, the game turn proceeds.
If they do not agree, the arbiter determines the outcome and the war game proceeds.
40
 Counteraction. The counteraction will require some degree of synthesis in order to respond to
the enemy/adversary’s actions. The war game facilitator determines the outcome, whether
failure, success, losses, or casualties, as a basis for the next turn. The war game continues until
the entire avenue of approach, belt(s), box, key event or sequence of essential tasks have been
thoroughly wargamed.
To examine and test the details of timelines, support requirements, combat power, etc., war games
generally depict and exercise units two levels down. For instance, MEF wargamers will represent
the wing and division commanders and include all aircraft groups and infantry regiments on their
force list as well as all separate battalions, such as the light armored reconnaissance battalion and
tank battalion. Because commanders frequently task-organize forces, wargamers should also list
the number of subordinate units in each element; for example, one regiment is currently operating
with two battalions, another with three. Similarly, the wargamer employing the aviation combat
element (ACE) would be expected to know the number of squadrons in each group (by type) and
the number of aircraft in each squadron.
A casualty estimator (software, paper, etc.) is useful for quickly assigning casualties and assisting
the arbiter in adjudicating battle outcomes.
Facilitators create beforehand and use a MSEL consisting of plausible war- and mission-related
events, acts, crises, etc. that could occur during the operation and can be used to test the overall
plan. During wargaming turns, the facilitator injects items from the MSEL to further test and
examine aspects of the overall plan and each of the COAs. Examples of MSEL items include a
friendly aircraft collision during an air assault to examine the tactical recovery of aircraft and
personnel (TRAP) and other related responses in detail; a mass casualty event to examine the
casualty evacuation capabilities and response times to Role I, II, and III facilities; and an enemy
unit surrender to examine the comprehensive enemy prisoner of war (EPW) plan and associated
support requirements.
During each COA’s war game, planners develop the DST and decision support matrix (DSM). The
DST and DSM depict decision points, refined NAIs, TAIs, time phase lines, and other key
information gleaned or validated during COA wargaming and are included in theOPORD. See
Appendix D for DST and DSM examples and details.
The focus of COA wargaming is on improving the plan, vice the completion of the game. The
facilitator is therefore responsible for determining when each turn has met the objectives of the
war game, in accordance with wargaming guidance, the established timeline, and the facilitator
and lead planner’s judgment.
RECORDING THE WAR GAME
As lessons and findings are discovered during the COA war game, the recorder or applicable
planning team member will note recommended additions, changes, and updates for the
corresponding documents listed below—
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MCWP 5-10
 IPB documents.
 ISR plan.
 Red and green cell documents, if applicable.
 CCIRs.
 Branches and sequels.
 COA graphic and narrative.
 Synchronization matrix (additional tasks, sequencing modifications, change the location of a
headquarters or combat service support area, modify the phases and stages, etc.).
 Supporting concepts.
 DST and DSM.
 TAIs.
 Resource shortfalls.
 RFIs.
 COG analysis (friendly and enemy).
 HVTs.
 HPTs.
REFINE STAFF ESTIMATES,

ESTIMATES OF SUPPORTABILITY, AND SUPPORTING CONCEPTS
The staff and subordinate commands continue to develop their estimates and supporting concepts.
These estimates and supporting concepts are critical to the COA comparison and decision step and
eventually become a part of the OPLAN or OPORD. Criteria used in the development of estimates
and supporting concepts includes the above-mentioned COA war game recorded information, as
well as—
 Personnel replacement requirements.
 EPW requirements.
 Unit, asset, and resource requirements and shortfalls.
 Projected allocation of mobility assets, lift, and sorties versus availability.
 Requirement for pre-positioning equipment and supplies.
 Projected location of units and supplies for future operations.
 Projected location of the combat operations center and command post echelons.
 Command and control system requirements.
 Necessary authorities to act.
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PREPARE COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME BRIEF
The COA war game brief may include—

 List of specific decisions, approvals, and guidance requested of the commander
during the brief (e.g., approval of proposed CCIR changes, COA comparison and
decision guidance, etc.).
 Updated IPB.
 Updated information environment running estimate
 Review of COA wargaming guidance.
 Review of original task organizations and friendly COAs.
 Review of enemy/adversary COAs.
 Summary of the COA war game execution (by turn, or overall).
 Key findings and recommended changes discovered during the COA war game.
 Assumptions (validated and new).
 DST and DSM.
 Updated friendly COAs (incorporating recommended changes).
 Advantages and disadvantages of each COA.
 Branches and sequels identified for development.
 Resource shortfalls.
 Recommended changes to CCIRs.
 RFIs.
 Updates to other planning documents (e.g., operation assessment plan).
COMMANDER’S COMPARISON AND DECISION GUIDANCE
The COA war game brief concludes with the commander’s approval of the updated COAs, or any
recommended changes to the original COAs, before they are compared. The commander also can
take this time to provide guidance for the comparison of the COAs, such as the type of COA
comparison input expected from staff officers.
CONSIDERATIONS
Initial, informal war games will likely take place during problem framing when the commander,
planners, and staff consider possible solutions as a basis for understanding as well as the
subsequent generation of a commander’s concept that informs the COA development guidance.
When formally conducted, a well-run COA war game can often be a time-consuming and onerous
process, but it is worth every minute of the effort. The iterative nature of the action-reaction-
counteraction process leads to the emergence or discovery of critical aspects of the operation. The
intuitive level of understanding gained reduces decision-making time in execution.
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MCWP 5-10
A successful war game fosters a better understanding of the situation, which will lead to modified
COAs that better reflect the problem that planners are attempting to resolve.
The more turns examined in a war game, the further forward in time the staff must project events.
This projection will result in less detail and a greater number of assumptions—factors that
commanders and staffs must recognize when considering their results.
The rationale for wargaming two levels down makes sense for all the reasons discussed earlier in
this chapter. However, special recognititon must be given to the potential strategic impact of
tactical actions in the information age.
There are two main reasons planners may have to stop the war game and return to COA
development:
 A COA is beyond repair.
 A COA lacks sufficient information upon which to base the COA war game.
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CHAPTER 5
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION
The first principle of a [commander] is to calculate what he must do, to see if he has
all the means to surmount the obstacles with which the enemy can oppose him and,
when he has made his decision, to do everything to overcome them.
—Napoleon Bonaparte, Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book
When all is said and done the greatest quality required in commanders is ‘decision’. . .
—Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs
During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates each friendly COA against the
established criteria, compares the COAs, and selects the COA believed to best accomplish the
mission. Inputs useful in COA comparison and decision may include—
 Updated IPB products.
 Updated, complete COAs.
 Synchronization matrix.
 Initial task organization.
 Resource and any shortfalls.
 Updated CCIRs.
 List of critical events and decision points.
 Staff estimates and estimates of supportability.
 DST and DSM.
 Branches and sequels identified for further planning.
PREPARE COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION PRODUCTS
The planners refine the COA evaluation worksheet in preparation for the commander’s COA
comparison and decision. Planners use the commander’s evaluation criteria as well as their own
judgment to analyze each COA separately and capture the analysis on the COA evaluation
worksheet. Once complete, the planners create a draft COA comparison and decision worksheet
on which planners compare COAs against each other. Planners then provide these documents to
the commander, staff, and subordinate leadership as early as possible for an informed COA
comparison and decision discussion.
MCWP 5-10
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION DISCUSSION
The commander leads a discussion with the staff and subordinates about the relative merits of each
COA. The COA evaluation worksheet provides the commander with an understanding of the
relative merits of each COA and aids in decision-making. The commander then compares the
COAs against one another, using the COA comparison and decision worksheet. The commander
may solicit COA recommendations from the staff and subordinates, with their input recorded on
the COA comparison and decision worksheet. Since military operations are nonlinear by nature
and the smallest input can have a disproportional effect, the numerical weighting of factors offers
limited insights into the merits of one COA over another.
COMMANDER’S DECISION
In making a decision, the commander may—

 Select a COA.
 Modify a COA.
 Direct the development of a new COA, perhaps by combining favorable elements of
multiple COAs.
 Discard all COAs and resume problem framing or COA development, as required.
Once a decision is made, the commander may take advantage of the setting and review the
approved COA with the staff and subordinate commanders. The commander’s points of emphasis
guide further refinement of the COA and overall plan. The commander may also provide additional
guidance for branches and sequels (priorities, degree of completion required, etc.). With a decision,
detailed planning can accelerate now that the entire command’s focus is on a single, tested, and
validated COA.
UPDATE THE WARNING ORDER
The WARNORD informs subordinate units (e.g., organic, attached, supporting) to begin
concurrent planning that facilitates a more rapid and informed transition to execution.
CONSIDERATIONS
COA comparison and decision requires the commander’s involvement along with subordinate
commanders and their staffs for an informed, detailed discussion of the COAs. Ideally, all
participants can attend one meeting. The dialogue during this step represents a continuation of the
design effort because it offers multiple perspectives that deepen the group’s understanding of the
environment and the problem set.
During this discussion, participants should be able to view each COA through electronic
presentations, printouts, maps with icons, or a terrain board. Each COA should contain, at a
46
minimum, the supporting concepts of fires, maneuver, logistics, intelligence, information,

command and control, and force protection. Within the context of military operations, concepts
are visions of action.
In the event of a single COA, planners could allocate any time saved to additional wargaming or
developing branches and sequels.
If the commander selects a modified COA, planners fully develop the COA and then war game it
against selected enemy/adversary COAs, if time allows.
47
MCWP 5-10
48
CHAPTER 6
ORDERS DEVELOPMENT
As a rule, plans should contain only as much detail as required to provide
subordinates the necessary guidance while allowing as much freedom of action as
possible.
—MCDP 5, Planning
The purpose of orders development is to translate the commander’s decision into oral, written,
and/or graphic communication sufficient to guide execution and promote initiative by
subordinates. A form of detailed planning, the OPLAN or OPORD, once completed, becomes the
principal means by which the commander expresses his/her decision, intent, and guidance.
The orders development step in the MCPP should communicate the commander’s decision in a
clear, useful form that those executing the order can easily understand. An order is a written or
oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinate’s tasks and activities toward
accomplishing the mission. Planners prepare various portions of the order, such as the mission
statement, during previous steps of the MCPP. The development of the order begins during
problem framing and continues throughout the planning process, since so many of the planning
products either inform or become a part of the directive.
The order contains the critical information and necessary details required for successful execution
and assessment. Orders writers must focus on the audience (organic units, attachments, augments,
other Service supporting elements, allied elements, etc.). Many of these external elements will not
be familiar with the publishing command’s SOP, so the planning directive may contain selected
portions of the SOP or doctrinal references.
The updated, approved COA (task organization, graphic and narrative, synchronization matrix,
and supporting concepts) is a required input to orders development. Other inputs include—
 Mission statement.
 Commander’s intent and guidance.
 HHQ:
o Mission.
o Commander’s intent.
o OPORD.
o FRAGO.
o WARNORD.
 Updated IPB products.
 Updated CCIRs.
 Staff estimates.
 Branches and sequels.
MCWP 5-10

 WARNORD/planning orders.
 Existing plans and orders.
The chief of staff or the executive officer, as appropriate, directs orders development by dictating
the format for the order, setting and enforcing the time limits and development sequence, and
assigning annexes to specific staff sections. Effective information management throughout the
MCPP (version control of products, naming conventions, shared drive locations and access, etc.)
enables efficient orders production. On large staffs, the orders development division of labor has
the OPT developing the base order or plan to include command- and functional-level concepts.
The appropriate special staff member(s) and general staff section(s) (i.e., G-sections/S-sections)
develop respective annexes.
REFINE THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
Planners extract the CONOPS from the details of the approved COA. In turn, the CONOPS is the
basis for supporting concepts, such as the concepts of fires, logistics, and force protection. Within
the context of military operations, concepts are a vision of actions. Accordingly, a CONOPS is a
general description of actions to be taken in pursuit of mission accomplishment. Armed with the
CONOPS and supporting concepts, planners, and their supporting staff sections, proceed with the
functional and detailed planning essential for the development of the plan or order and
implementation of the plan during execution.
PREPARE THE ORDER OR PLAN
Orders appear in a variety of forms, ranging from detailed, written documents with numerous
annexes to simple verbal commands. Their form depends on the time available, complexity of the
operation, and level of command involved. Staff estimates, estimates of supportability, and other
planning documents inform a plan or order’s annexes and appendices. See Appendix J for
order/plan formats.
The order in narrative form with graphics and a range of supporting documents serves to focus the
command during transition. The order is the vehicle by which the commander expresses intent and
assigns tasks to subordinates. The order ensures a common understanding and direction for every
staff section and subordinate unit toward the same objective.
With a basic order, commanders can issue FRAGOs to subordinate commanders to address
changes in the situation. Whatever the format, orders and plans must be clear, concise, timely, and
useful. Orders development also includes two essential quality control techniques—orders
reconciliation and orders crosswalk.
50
ORDERS RECONCILIATION
Orders reconciliation is a process internal to the command during which the planners review in
detail the entire order. The purpose of reconciliation is to ensure the basic order and all the annexes,
appendices, and other attachments are complete and in agreement. It identifies discrepancies or
gaps in the planning that will require corrective action. Specifically, the planning team compares
the commander’s intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the CONOPS and the supporting
concepts, such as maneuver, fires, and logistics. Planners also ensure details throughout the
OPORD, such as dates, unit locations, and tasks, are accurate and in agreement. Orders
reconciliation may involve all planning team members in a single location, comparing a displayed
basic OPORD against their own annexes and appendices. Another option is for the lead planner to
distribute documents and collect individual feedback.
ORDERS CROSSWALK
Orders crosswalk is an external process in which the planners compare the completed, draft
OPORD with the orders of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to achieve unity of effort
and ensure the CONOPS aligns, or nests, with the superior commander’s intent. Similarly,
transition events, such as confirmation briefs (discussed in chap. 7), can help a commander ensure
the subordinate units nest within the plan or order.
APPROVE THE ORDER OR PLAN
The final action in orders development is the approval of the order or plan by the commander.
While the commander does not have to sign every annex or appendix, it is important that he/she
reviews and signs the basic order or plan.
CONSIDERATIONS
For those who will receive and execute the order, they will devote most of their attention to the
base (five paragraph) order or plan. Therefore, the order must provide the reader with a sufficient
understanding of the overall plan to facilitate integration of functional capabilities and the nesting
of tasks and intents among commands to enhance the single-battle effort. Incorporating readable,
updated graphics or videos into the order are useful tools that aid the visualization of the order and
single-battle concept. For example, a basic OPORD Paragraph 4 that includes a summary of the
concept of logistics support and combat service support (CSS) (further articulated in Annex D,
Paragraph 3.a.), along with a graphic, would enable the general audience to understand how
logistics integrates into the overall plan.
All subordinate tasks are, if possible, included in the basic OPORD. If this is not practicable, higher
priority tasks are listed in the basic OPORD and additional tasks should appear no lower than the
appendix level.
51
MCWP 5-10
When writing plans or orders, words matter. Writers must remain consistent in their use of
approved terminology, particularly tactical tasks. For example, there is a significant difference
between “seize” and “secure.” Inappropriate or inconsistent terminology can lead to unintended
consequences, including mission creep, gaps, or redundancies. For more information on tactical
tasks, see MCDP 1-0 (with changes 1–3).
Updated SOPs are critical to producing a concise plan or order. For example, Annex U
(Information Management) of the order should only address information management topics
specific or unique to an operation or location. Meanwhile, the command can train to baseline
information management procedures contained in the SOPs to promote tactics, techniques, and
procedures excellence so critical to tempo. The SOPs need to be current, widely disseminated, and
used if the plan or order references them.
While meeting orders development timelines and requirements, planners continue to develop,
refine, and archive branches and sequels.
First and foremost, a plan or order must be a basis for action. Plans and orders, in conjunction with
SOPs, must provide the information infrastructure for the conduct of operations. For example, the
small unit leader who wishes to exploit a local advantage, still needs a detailed communication
plan to request and employ the necessary fire support. In turn, the pilot providing the fire support
needs detailed return-the-force procedures lest the pilot survive the engagement but not the return
flight to the airfield. In areas of responsibility with long-standing contingencies, OPLANs
combined with combatant command regulations and unit SOPs can provide the needed
information. For example, 7th MEB used a letter of instruction to deploy its forces to Saudi Arabia
in August 1990 for the first-ever, combat offload of a maritime prepositioning squadron. For other
operations, particularly natural disasters, planners will likely need to apportion a significant
amount of time to the production of orders to address the emergent combatant command
requirements, as well as host nation(s)’ considerations.
52
CHAPTER 7
TRANSITION
. . . plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those
who write them.
—MCDP 5, Planning
The written order is initially well-understood only by the small group that wrote it. Transition
enables the far larger group of executors (current operations staff, subordinate unit commanders
and staff, combat operations center members, etc.) to comprehensively understand the plan.
Transition enables the commander to personally brief, discuss, and rehearse the completed plan
with the staff and subordinate commanders prior to execution. Successful transition enhances the
situational understanding of those who will execute the order, reinforces the intent of the
commander, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo. Transition may involve a wide range
of briefs, drills, and rehearsals necessary for a successful shift from planning to execution.
Transition accounts for the human element—how people learn and understand. Simply sending a
signed order to the staff and subordinates, and expecting successful comprehension and
implementation, is unwise. Seeing, hearing, discussing, questioning are important elements of
understanding the overall plan. At a minimum, this step includes a CONOPS brief along with a
discussion of key portions of the OPORD. Whenever possible, the transition step includes
rehearsals as well as confirmation briefs by subordinate commanders.
Transition is a continuous process that requires a free flow of information between commanders
and staffs by all available means. A designated planner coordinates details for the commander’s
transition events as well as required staff transition requirements (e.g., orders brief to the combat
operations center watch floor personnel). The planners ask and answer questions, highlight key
aspects of the order, and otherwise facilitate understanding of the plan for those who did not take
part in the planning process.
Transition occurs at all levels of command. On staffs with distinct planning and execution
capabilities (e.g., plans, future operations, and current operations), responsibility of the OPLAN
or OPORD must formally transfer during the transition step. If the unit SOP does not prescribe
when this transfer occurs, the transfer will generally occur after the commander’s final transition
event and resolution of any questions or issues raised during that event. Clear staff responsibility
and ownership of the plan is essential, so that one identified group (e.g., current operations) is
prepared to issue FRAGOs, refine and implement branches and sequels, etc., based on the evolving
situation. This formal staff transition also frees the OPT planners to focus on other plans and
problems or return to their parent units and sections.
MCWP 5-10
For transition to occur, an approved OPLAN or OPORD must exist. The approved order or plan
and the products of continuing staff actions form the input for transition. Other transition inputs
may include—
 HHQ updates and FRAGOs.
 Refined IPB products.
 Planning support tools.
 Draft FRAGOs for branches and sequels.
 Any outstanding issues.
TRANSITION PREPARATION
The planning and execution timeline, as well as the WARNORD issued after the COA comparison
and decision, prescribe many of the components of the transition events. As necessary, the
command issues a message to the staff and subordinates (including attachments, supporting units,
etc.) with amplifying details and requirements to ensure proper attendance and preparation.
Details common to nearly all transition events include:
 Date and time.
 Type of transition event.
 Location.
 Venue.
 Focus.
 Required briefers (e.g., specifying subordinate commanders or their operations officers).
 Sequence of events and briefs.
 Required attendees.
 Operations security requirements.
 Transition event rehearsal details.
 Recorder.
 Seating.
 Audio/visual/lighting arrangements.
 Display or terrain model preparations and responsibilities.
 Confirmation brief format, date, time, and location.
TRANSITION EVENTS
Ongoing missions, time, resources, operational security concerns, and other factors influence the
type of transition events. A common purpose these various events share is the need, in the interest
of tempo, to convey an intuitive level of understanding the planners gained to those that will
execute the plan. Options include:
 Full dress rehearsal.
54
 Reduced force rehearsal.

 Key leader rehearsal.
 Combined arms rehearsal.
 Rehearsal of concept drill.
 Communications exercise.
 Terrain model brief.
 Map brief.
 Transition brief.
TRANSITION COMPONENTS
Briefs within transition events include—

 HHQ mission (tasks and intent).
 Situation (friendly, enemy/adversary, and civilian population).
 Updated IPB.
 Mission.
 Commander’s intent.
 CCIRs.
 CONOPS (overall, or by phase).
 Supporting concepts.
 Operation assessment overview.
 Assumptions (for plans).
 Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
 Planning support tools.
CONFIRMATION BRIEFS
Subordinate commanders provide a confirmation brief to their higher commander to—

 Confirm the subordinate commander’s understanding of the HHQ commander’s intent.
 Confirm the subordinate commander’s specific task and purpose.
 Discuss the relationship between the subordinate unit’s mission and that of the other units in
the operation.
 Discuss the subordinate unit’s draft COA or completed CONOPS.
The confirmation brief allows the HHQ commander to identify gaps in the plan, discrepancies
between his/her and the subordinate commanders’ plans, and learn how subordinate commanders
intend to accomplish their missions.
55
MCWP 5-10
56
APPENDIX A
MARINE CORPS PLANNING IN JOINT OPERATIONS
The MCPP is the vehicle through which commanders and their staffs in the Fleet Marine Forces
provide input to the joint planning process. See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Planning.
JOINT PLANNING
The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the foundation for joint planning
and is the principal system for translating policy decisions into operation plans, concept plans, and
operation orders. Joint planning integrates military actions of the Services with those of
multinational partners and other instruments of national power to achieve a specified end state.
The military contribution to national strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning and its
three subsets—security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Joint
operation planning consists of contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP). See figure
A-1.
Contingency planning and CAP share common planning activities and interrelate. Contingency
planning occurs in non-crisis situations. The process is highly structured to support iterative,
concurrent, and parallel planning to produce comprehensive, detailed plans. In-progress reviews
provide commanders opportunities to interact with their staffs, giving them further guidance to
ensure the planning effort meets their vision. Contingency planning facilitates the transition to
CAP. A combatant commander can use CAP to adjust existing contingency plans for rapid
execution. Crisis action planning shortens the process in light of the dynamic requirements of
changing events (see fig. A-2 on page A-2).
Figure A-1. Joint Strategic Planning.

MCWP 5-10
THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS AND JOINT PLANNING
The MCPP aligns with and complements JOPES, especially during the plan development phase.
Supporting plans are developed once the combatant commander’s concept has been approved;
Marine Corps supporting plans address the tasks identified for Fleet Marine Forces and outline the
actions of assigned and augmenting forces. The MCPP provides an approach for commanders and
staffs to prepare supporting plans. Marine Corps Order P3000.18, Marine Corps Planner’s
Manual, establishes Marine Corps policies, procedures, and standards for developing and
executing plans for the deployment and redeployment of Marine Corps forces. The Marine Corps
deployment planning and execution process describes Marine Corps Service responsibilities
within JOPES. It provides specific procedures for Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
planners and for the commanders and staffs in the Fleet Marine Forces for contingency planning
and CAP.
This order addresses the combatant commander’s requirements for standing plans, which include
sourcing the types and numbers of units, sustainment for units, and replacement manpower.
The MCPP aligns with CAP beginning with situation development and continuing throughout the
process as Marine Corps planners develop new plans or expand or modify existing plans.
Figure A-2. Contingency and Crisis Action

Planning Activities, Functions, and Products.
58
APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING
The commander organizes the staff to gather, manage, and process information essential to
decision-making. Organization for planning not only involves personnel, structure, and a plan to
plan, but planning modes will affect the organization for planning, as well.
PLANNING MODES AND LEVELS
The MCPP facilitates planning at all levels and satisfies three modes of planning—orientation,
contingency, and commitment—as described in MCDP 5. Orientation planning is used when the
degree of uncertainty is so high that it is not worthwhile to commit to a specific plan. Planners
focus on assessing the situation and designing flexible preliminary plans that can adapt to a broad
variety of situations. Contingency planning applies to situations when there is less uncertainty, but
not enough is known to allow for the adoption of a specific plan. Normally, planners prepare for
several contingencies, allowing the commander to respond quickly when the situation requires
action. During commitment planning, the commander selects a plan and commits resources to
executing the plan. Commanders and planners consider these modes when organizing their
planning efforts to ensure they use a mode and planning sequence appropriate to the situation. See
MCDP 5 for further discussion on planning modes.
These modes span the planning horizon based on degrees of uncertainty. Additionally, planning
may also be viewed as a hierarchical continuum with conceptual, functional, and detailed levels of
planning. As discussed in chapter 1, conceptual planning is the highest level, establishing aims,
objectives, and broad concepts for action. Detailed planning is the lowest level of planning,
translating the broad concept into a complete and practicable plan. In between these two levels is
functional planning, which involves elements of both conceptual and detailed planning and is
concerned with designing supporting concepts for warfighting functions, such as maneuver or
force protection. Planning modes and levels are interrelated. For instance, commitment planning
normally includes considerable detailed planning that facilitates execution, while orientation
planning most often remains at the conceptual planning level.
To gain and maintain tempo, commanders and their staffs must be involved in all modes and levels
of planning by ensuring a constant flow of information vertically within the chain of command
and laterally among staff sections. At the small-unit level, this information exchange can be simple
and direct—commander to commander or operations officer to operations officer. In larger-sized
units, such as the component or MEF, a more formal arrangement that uses liaison officers and
distinct planning organizations is necessary due to the scope and detail involved as well as the
requirement to align with HHQ planning organizations and to properly address the entire planning
continuum.
MCWP 5-10
Planning is an event-dominated process; therefore, commanders should organize planning

organizations to enhance planning for significant events, such as changes in mission. Conversely,
time-driven processes are a necessary, yet subordinate, aspect of planning. Planners must address
both time- and event-driven processes, while maintaining the proper perspective between the two.
For example, the air tasking order is critical to the planning and execution of operations and it is
produced in a cycle that requires timely input from subordinates. Nevertheless, the air tasking order
is produced in support of the plan—it is not the plan.
PLANNING ORGANIZATIONS
The MCPP is scalable from the component level to the battalion and squadron level. Lower
command levels, such as battalions and squadrons, adapt and consolidate certain planning
responsibilities and functions within their limited structures. Normally at these command levels,
most MCPP procedures are performed by the commander, primary staff officers, and select special
staff officers. Figure B-1 shows the planning organization and relationships found at lower levels
of command, such as a battalion.
Higher levels of command (MEF, MEB, division, wing, or logistics group) form specialized
planning staff elements and organizations. Figure B-2 illustrates planning organizations at the
Marine Corps component and MEF and their link to HHQ.
Planning Organizations
Three planning organizations—future plans, future operations, and current operations—at the
component and MEF levels are primarily responsible for the conduct of the planning process. They
must coordinate their efforts to ensure a smooth transition from long-term planning to execution.
Future Plans Division

The future plans division is normally under the staff cognizance of the G-5. Among its many
responsibilities, the G-5 normally forms a liaison element to the HHQ staff; integrates the HHQ
plan into the MEF’s planning process; plans the next mission, phase, or operation; and oversees
the force deployment planning and execution process for the command. Upon receipt of tasks from
HHQ, this division initiates the MEF’s planning process by assisting the commander with the
initial design and developing an outline plan. Depending on the situation, it may focus on a phase
of a campaign, develop reconstitution requirements, or plan deployment. This division’s
responsibility is to conduct the initial design effort as a basis for subsequent planning.
The future plans division may also develop sequels, support relationships for the next phase, and
develop plans to ensure the force does not reach a culminating point. Future plans will transition
an outline plan to the future operations center. The outline plan provides the salient features of a
mission and precedes detailed planning.
60
Figure B-1. Notional Lower Level Organizations and Planning Relationships.
Future Operations Center

The future operations section is under the staff cognizance of the G-3 and is the focal point of the
planning process. It usually forms the nucleus of an OPT and coordinates with both the future
plans and current operations centers to integrate planning. The future operations center will either
inherit outline plans from the future plans division or receive planning requirements from the
current operations center that exceed its planning horizon. The future operations center fully
integrates the other staff centers’ plans officers, warfighting function representatives, and
subordinate unit representatives into the planning process. It takes the outline plan from the future
plans division and uses it as the basis for further planning. The future operations center focuses on
changes to subordinate missions and develops branch plans and sequels. This center interacts with
intelligence collection and the targeting process to shape the next battle. The current operations
center may provide a representative to the future operations center to facilitate an efficient
transition process. This representative returns to the current operations center during transition.
The future operations center’s efforts generate tempo internal to the force.
Current Operations Center

The current operations center is under the staff cognizance of the G-3. During operations, it
receives the OPORD from the OPT prior to the transition brief. The current operations center—
 Coordinates and executes the OPORD.
 Prepares and transmits FRAGOs.
 Monitors operations of the force.
 Tracks CCIRs and reports relevant information to the commander.
 Analyzes and synthesizes battlespace information.
61
MCWP 5-10
Figure B-2. Notional Component and Marine

Expeditionary Force Organizations and Planning Relationships.
When unforeseen events develop, the current operations center refines or develops branch plans.
To support the commander, the current operations center may develop new COAs, allocate
resources, and prepare FRAGOs to modify the current OPORD. This center assesses change in the
battlespace and progress toward the mission and purpose; monitors the status of forces and
materiel; monitors rear area operations; coordinates terrain management; maintains a common
operational picture and information; and provides the future operations center with situational
awareness.
TEAMS
Operational Planning Team

The OPT is an organization formed by either the future plans division or future operations center
to conduct integrated planning. The OPT helps frame problems, develops and wargames COAs,
and leads or assists the staff in the preparation and transition of the order. Normally, the OPT is
built around a core group of planners from either the future plans division or the future operations
center and may include the future plans or future operations officer, assistant plans or assistant
future operations officer, future plans or future operations chief, and a clerk/plotter. It integrates
additional staff representatives from the G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, staff judge advocate,
provost marshal, health services, or COMMSTRAT sections, as appropriate to the mission. The
OPT may also include the warfighting function or lines of operations (LOOs) representatives,
liaison officers, and SMEs needed to support planning. While all staff sections conduct planning
in their respective areas of expertise and mini-OPTs can be formed to address specific problems,
the commander’s integrated, single-battle effort resides in the OPT, whether formed by future
plans or future operations. Commanders of smaller organizations that lack separate staff sections
may also form OPTs because the term often applies to working groups and integrated planning
teams formed to address any issue of importance to the commander.
62
Crisis Action Team

The crisis action team (CAT) falls under the staff cognizance of the G-3. The CAT is usually
formed in the initial stages of a crisis and has the requirement to rapidly collect and manage
information. It can be task-organized to reflect the unique nature of a crisis. Often, at the initial
stage of a crisis, the commander’s primary concern is force readiness status and deployment
planning. The CAT may initiate the planning process, develop situational awareness, and access
previously prepared and emerging planning products. To facilitate a common situational
awareness, potential members of the CAT are identified in advance and recalled for initial crisis
action planning. For extended operations, the CAT’s planning and execution functions transition
to the normal planning organizations, whether current operations, future operations, or future
plans, and their staffing and functions are redefined.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTION REPRESENTATIVES
The MEF or a major subordinate command is not restricted in their planning or conduct of
operations. For example, the ground combat element does not only consider maneuver and the
ACE does not only consider fires. Planners at all echelons of command must consider and integrate
activities within and among all the warfighting functions.
Warfighting function or LOO representatives should be selected because of their experience and
training. They should also be trained and experienced in the MCPP and consideration is needed
regarding the rank of the representative, which may be necessary at higher command levels. A
warfighting function or LOO representative may be on the commander’s staff, a member of a
subordinate unit staff, a commander of a supporting unit or organization from another Service or
nation, or any Marine qualified to address the issues of a particular functional area or LOO.
Designation as a representative may be an additional responsibility; for example, a Marine could
serve simultaneously as a warfighting function/LOO representative, a staff member, and a staff
representative to the OPT.
USE OF LIAISONS
Liaisons are the point of contact through which intercommunication is maintained between
elements of military forces to ensure shared understanding and unity of purpose and action.
Through direct communications, a liaison ensures senior commanders remain aware of the tactical
situation by providing them with exceptional, critical, or routine information; verification of
information; and clarification of operational questions. Overall, the liaisons are another tool to help
commanders reduce the fog of war, overcome friction, and accomplish the mission.
Command Liaison
Commanders of all organizations routinely initiate contact with commanders of other units in their
locale even though there may be no official command or support relationship between them. This
contact opens the channels of communications to facilitate mutual security and support.
63
MCWP 5-10
Staff Liaison
Staff officers of all organizations routinely initiate contact with their counterparts at higher, lower,
adjacent, supporting, and supported commands. This contact opens channels of communication
that are essential for the proper planning and execution of military operations. Staff liaisons may
also include the temporary assignment of liaisons to other commands.
Liaison Officers
The most commonly used way to maintain close, continuous contact with another command is
through the liaison officer. He/She is the commander’s personal representative and has the special
trust and confidence of the commander to make appropriate recommendations and estimates in the
absence of communications. As necessary, the commander uses a liaison officer to transmit or
receive critical information directly with key persons in the receiving headquarters. The liaison
officer must possess the requisite rank and experience to properly represent the command. The
ability to communicate effectively is essential, as is the liaison officer’s sound judgment and
immediate access to the commander.
Liaison Team
A liaison team, usually headed by the liaison officer, is assigned when the workload or need for
better communications is greater than the capabilities of a single liaison officer. The liaison team
will normally consist of the liaison officer, a liaison chief, clerical personnel, drivers, and
communications personnel with equipment. Members of the liaison team may function as couriers
when necessary. The grade of the senior member of the liaison team depends on the unit’s size and
personnel available. Liaison teams are generally required for continuous operations.
Couriers
Although infrequently used because of the capabilities of electronic communications, the courier
remains a valuable liaison element. The courier is more than a messenger and is expected to
provide more information than is contained in the message being delivered. For this reason, the
courier should possess sufficient experience and maturity to respond to questions and provide more
than superficial insight into the situation or issues of concern. Individuals selected as couriers are
often junior officers or staff noncommissioned officers. If such personnel are available, dedicated
couriers may be used to augment the liaison officer or liaison team.
Operational Planning Team Representatives

The subordinate command’s OPT representatives are key contributors to the planning process and
the future operations plan. These individuals provide timely and accurate movement of information
between the OPT and their commands. Normally, these individuals’ primary responsibility is to
the planning effort. They may only be able to provide part-time support to other activities, such as
logistics coordination or targeting.
64
APPENDIX C
MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS DIAGRAMS
Figures C-1 through C-6 are graphic depictions of the injects, activities, and results for each step
of the planning process. The results of each step provide the injects for the following step, keeping
in mind the process as a whole is as much iterative as it is sequential. The diagrams are not intended
to be used as a checklist, but as a ready reference to help promote clarity of understanding for the
entire process. The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of
the commander for each step.
Figure C-1. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Problem Framing.
Figure C-2. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action Development.
MCWP 5-10
Figure C-3. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Course of Action War Game.
Figure C-4. Injects, Activities, and Results

Diagram for Course of Action Comparison and Decision.
66
Figure C-5. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Orders Development.
Figure C-6. Injects, Activities, and Results Diagram for Transition.
67
MCWP 5-10
68
APPENDIX D
MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS TOOLS
The commander and staff use the MCPP tools to record, track, display, and analyze critical
planning information. These tools help the commander, planners, and staff better understand the
environment, facilitate the commander’s decision-making, assist in the preparation of plans and
orders, and increase tempo. The MCPP tools must serve the needs of the commander and the
requirements of the situation. Commanders and staffs can tailor these tools to meet their needs and
use other available tools that are appropriate for their particular problem. Many of these tools are
either directly or indirectly included in the OPORD.
Table D-1 identifies commonly used templates, worksheets, and matrices and notes how each tool
supports the MCPP. The examples in this appendix are at the MEF level, but these tools may be
employed at any level of command. The formats and uses of these tools may be modified as
required.
Table D-1. Marine Corps Planning Process Tools.
Overlays, Templates,
Matrices, Work- COA
sheets, and Graphics Problem COA COA War Comparison Orders
and Narratives Framing Development Game and Decision Development Transition
IPB Integration X X X X X X
(see table D-2)
Modified combined X X X X X
obstacle overlay
(see fig. D-1)
Adversary template X X X
(see fig. D-2)
Situation template X X X X X
(see fig. D-3)
Event template X X X
(see fig. D-4)
Event matrix X X X
(see table D-3)
Decision support template X X X X

(see fig. D-5)
Decision support matrix X X X X

(see table D-4)
COA graphic and narrative X X X X

(see figs. D-6a and D-6b)
Synchronization matrix X X X X X
(see table D-5)
MCWP 5-10
COA war game work- X X X

sheet (see table D-6)
Comparison and X
decision matrix with
comments
(see table D-7)
OPORD assignment X X X X X
matrix (see table D-8)
Liaison plan X X
(see table D-9)
Planning and execution X X X X X X

timeline
(see table D-10)
ASCOPE matrix X X X
(see fig. D-7)
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE PRODUCTS
Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the
threat and environment in a specific geographic area. The four steps of IPB are: (1) define the
operational environment, (2) describe the effects on operations, (3) evaluate the enemy/adversary,
and (4) determine enemy/adversary courses of action. Led by the intelligence section, IPB is a
whole-of-staff activity and is conducted and updated continually.
The OPT develops and refines IPB products, to include enemy COAs. The IPB products must
mature and update as planning progresses. For example, as the OPT works through problem
framing, COA development, and COA war game, it may conduct pattern analysis of enemy
actions—as well as the activities of local inhabitants—to better understand the operational
environment. This pattern analysis feeds the development of various templates. These contribute
to a DST created later in the MCPP, complete with NAIs, TAIs, and decision points.
Below are summaries and examples of IPB products. For additional information, consult MCRP
2-10B.1, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace.
Table D-2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Integration Throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process.
Problem COA COA Comparison Orders

Framing Development War Game and Decision Development Transition
Modified G-2/S-2
combined
obstacle overlay
Adversary G-2/S-2 Continuous1
template
Situation G-2/S-2 Continuous1
template
70
Pertinent enemy / G-2/S-2 Continuous1

adversary COAs
Refined and Continuous1
prioritized adver- G-2/S-2
sary COAs and
event templates
and matrices
Initial decision G-3/S-3/OPT Continuous1
support template
Decision support G-3/S-3/OPT Continuous1
template and
matrix
Note: 1Templates are updated throughout the operation.
Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay

The modified combined obstacle overlay (also referred to as MCOO) (fig. D-1) is a graphic of the
battlespace’s effects on military operations. It is normally based on a product depicting all
obstacles to mobility and it is modified as necessary. Modifications can include crosscountry
mobility classifications, objectives, avenues of approach and mobility corridors, likely obstacles,
defensible battlespace, likely engagement areas, key terrain, cultural factors, built-up areas, and
civil infrastructure.
Figure D-1. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay.
71
MCWP 5-10
Adversary Template
Adversary templates (see fig. D-2) are models based on enemy doctrine. They illustrate the
disposition and activity of enemy forces conducting a particular operation arrayed on ideal (often
flat, open) terrain. Adversary templates depict the enemy’s nominal organization, frontages,
depths, boundaries, and control measures for combat. They are usually scaled for use with a map
background and they are one part of an adversary model. In irregular warfare, adversary templating
will focus on pattern analysis, which involves tracking, analyzing, and identifying specific trends,
such as the use of improvised explosive devices or population support, over time. Commanders
should also consider adversary actions external to the area of operations that may have immediate
impacts within the battlespace.
Figure D-2. Adversary Template.
72
Situation Template
A situation template (fig. D-3) is an adversary template that has been modified to depict
enemy/adversary dispositions based on the effects of the battlespace and the pursuit of a particular
COA. This template accounts for the enemy’s/adversary’s current situation with respect to the
terrain, training and experience levels, logistic status, losses, and dispositions. Normally, the
situation template depicts enemy/adversary units’ two levels down and critical points in the COA.
Situation templates are one part of an enemy/adversary COA model. Models may contain more
than one situation template to depict locations and formations at various times.
Figure D-3. Situation Template.
73
MCWP 5-10
Event Template and Matrix

The event template is derived from the situation template and depicts the NAIs, areas where
activity—or lack of activity—will indicate which COA the enemy/adversary has adopted. Event
templates contain time phase lines that depict movement of forces and the expected flow of the
operation. Movement rates depend on the terrain (modified combined obstacle overlay) and the
enemy/adversary COA (DRAW-D [defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, and delay]). The event
template is the IPB starting point for COA wargaming. The event matrix depicts types of activity
expected in each NAI, when the NAI is expected to be active, and any additional information to
aid in collection planning. See figure D-4 and table D-3.
Figure D-4. Event Template.
Table D-3. Event Matrix.
Named Area No No
of Interest Earlier Than Later Than Event/Indicator
1 H+6 H+12 Brigade-sized forces moving north.
2 H+6 H+12 Brigade-sized forces moving north.
Orangeland forces enter Blueland. Northern operational

3 H+12 H+24
group driving on Jesara oil fields.
74
Orangeland forces seize junction of highways 7 and 8.

4 H+14 H+24 Northern operational group turns northwest toward
Jesara.
Orangeland forces enter Tealton. Northern operational

5 H+18 H+24
group driving on Jesara.
Decision Support Template and Matrix

The DST is normally developed during COA wargaming. It is derived from enemy/adversary,
situational, and event templates. The DST depicts decision points, time phase lines associated with
movement of enemy/adversary and friendly forces, the flow of the operation, and other information
required to execute a specific friendly COA. The DST is a key planning tool for use during
transition and execution. The DSM provides an outline of expected events, decision points, and
planned friendly actions in a narrative form. It shows where and when a decision must be made if
a specific action is to take place. It ties decisions and decision points to CCIRs, ISR, NAIs, TAIs,
and potential friendly response options. The DST and DSM may be refined as planning progresses
after the COA war game, and is published in the final OPORD. See figure D-5 and table D-4.
Figure D-5. Decision Support Template.
75
MCWP 5-10
Table D-4. Decision Support Matrix.
Event No Earlier Than/ Named Area Target Area

Number Event No Later Than of Interest of Interest Friendly Action
1 Orangeland forces enter H+14/H+24 1, 2 A, B Covering force withdraws; Marine
Blueland. Northern operational aircraft wing conducts interdiction
group division driving on west of phase line TEAL.
Tealton.
2 Orangeland forces seize junction H+18/H+24 3, 4 C 1st and 3d Marine Divisions

of Highways 7 and 8. Northern execute branch plan HAWK.
operational group turns
northwest on Jesara.
PLANNING SUPPORT TOOLS
Planning support tools support the commander’s and staff’s planning effort by recording and
displaying critical planning information on the COAs and the commander’s decisions and
guidance. They aid the commander in decision-making by displaying critical information in a
useful format. Planning support tools include the COA graphic and narrative, synchronization
matrix, COA war game worksheets, and the comparison and decision matrix.
Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The COA graphic and narrative clearly portray how the organization will accomplish the mission,
identifying: who (task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (intent). See figures
D-6a and D-6b. Planners must determine how best to depict the key elements of the COA without
cluttering the graphic. The COA graphic and narrative, when approved by the commander, forms
the basis for the CONOPS and operations overlay in the OPLAN or OPORD.
Depending on the unit, problem, environment, and type of operation, COA graphic and narrative
elements may include:
 Form of maneuver.
 Main effort tasks and purpose.
 Supporting efforts (task and purpose of each).
 Reserve (location, priorities).
 Control measures (e.g., fire support coordination measures, maneuver control measures,
airspace coordinating measures).
 Boundaries.
 Objectives.
 Command posts.
 Rear area boundaries and associated unit (e.g., rear area commander).
 NAIs.
 TAIs.
 Combat service support areas.
76
 Airfields.
 Forward arming and refueling points.
 ISR locations.
 Enemy/adversary forces.
 Adjacent forces.
 Civilian groups.
 Routes and axes.
 Barriers and obstacles.
 Essential fire support tasks.
 Operations in the information environment support tasks.
Figure D-6a. Course of Action Graphic.
77
MCWP 5-10
Phase III, Stage A

At D+6, III MEF defeats Dakotian forces south of International
Boundary IOT restore Northland sovereignty.
3d MARDIV (ME):
T1: Destroy the 2nd Infantry Div.
P1: IOT restore Northland sovereignty.
T2: Screen east of Valleyville.
P2: IOT deny ENY reinforcing forces IVO Valleyville.
T3: Provide one RLT as the MEF Reserve.
P3: Provide the MEF CG with flexibility to react to ENY actions.
1st MAW (SE1):

T1: Interdict ENY forces IVO Highlandville.
P1: IOT prevent ENY reinforcing forces IVO Valleyville.
T2: Provide air assault support to TF Hawk.
P2: IOT support TF Hawk seizure of Summerville oil fields and key infrastructure.
TF Hawk (SE2):
T1: Conduct air assault IVO Summerville oil fields and destroy ENY forces.
P1: IOT reclaim Summerville oil fields and key infrastructure.
3d MLG (SE3):
T1: Provide DS to ME attack.
P1: IOT facilitate the ME attack against the 2nd Infantry Div.
T2: Establish CSSA IVO Springville.
P2: IOT sustain MEF operations during Phase III, Stage B.
TF Guardian (SE4):
T1: As RACOM, conduct 8 functions rear area operations.
P1: IOT allow MEF to conduct decisive operations against Dakotian forces.
Reserve (SE5):
T1: Locate east of CSSA Springville
Priorities: BPT
EF ST1:
T1: Disrupt 50th Fires Regt.
P1: IOT facilitate ME attack.
OIE ST1:
T1: Deny information on ME direction and timing.
P1: IOT create an advantage for the MEF.
Legend
BCL battlefield coordination line IVO in the vicinity of OIE operations in the information
BPT beach party team JTF joint task force environment
CG commanding general MARDIV Marine division P purpose
CSSA combat service support area MAW Marine aircraft wing RACOM rear area commander
Div division ME main effort Regt regiment
DS direct support MLG Marine logistics group RLT regimental landing team
EFST essential fire support task MSR main supply route SE supporting effort
ENY enemy NAI named area of interest ST supporting task
FSCL fire support coordination line NFA no-fire area T task
IOT in order to TF task force
Figure D-6b. Course of Action Narrative.
78
Synchronization Matrix
The synchronization matrix (see table D-5) is a working document showing the activities of the
command and subordinate elements over time. It displays how units, warfighting functions, and
tasks interrelate throughout all phases, providing additional details that complement and amplify
the COA graphic and narrative. Additional details to this matrix may include displacement of the
command post, priorities and location of the reserve element, information integration specifics,
and sequencing of tasks and movements. A synchronization matrix should not be used to overly
script the actions of subordinate units. If a plan is too tightly coupled, it is easily damaged, difficult
to repair, and lacks the flexibility to address the inherent friction and uncertainty of war. The
detailed, completed synchronization matrix is a key component of a productive COA war game.
During orders development, the completed synchronization matrix enables planners to efficiently
assign tasks to subordinates and aids in developing Annex X (Execution Checklist) of the OPLAN
or OPORD.
Table D-5. Synchronization Matrix.
Phase II Stage C Phase III Stage A Phase III Stage B Phase III Stage C
Shaping, Force Re-Set, Clear / Defeat Bypassed Forces/
Major Events Fix, Penetrate, Exploit Withdrawal
MILDEC, Counterreconnaissance Secure Valleyville
2 x CAG Bns IVO 1st Motor Div are

combat ineffective.
1st MID & 2nd Mech DAGs are
combat ineffective. GCE IVO Springville.
5th Corps fixed.
Right flank protected. Bypassed ENY is cleared / defeated.
Desired State Air threat reduced to manpad. NORTHLAND border
Logistically postured for Phase III, Valleyville secured.
Logistically postured for Phase III. restored.
Stage B.
Armor formations are attrited to
XX%.
GCE readiness rate is above XX%.
T - FIX 1st Motor Div IVO Valleyville

(regain / maintain contact).
P - ALLOW penetrations of
defensive belts.
T - PENETRATE 1st Motor/2nd
T - CLEAR bypassed ENY in zone in T - WITHDRAW south of
Mech Div defensive belts on E-5.
NORTHLAND. NORTHLAND-DAKOTA
Maneuver
T - DEFEAT ENY reconnaissance P - ALLOW exploitation into ENY

T - DEFEAT bypassed ENY in zone in international border.
south of XXX. rear area.
GCE
DAKOTA. T - OCCUPY defensive

P – Ensure tactical surprise in T - DISRUPT ENY CSS and C2 sectors along the border.
T - SECURE Valleyville.
Phase III Stage A. nodes IVO MEF OBJ A
(Springville). P - ENABLE NORTHLAND-DAKOTA T - BPT transition security to
international border restoration. host nation.
T - INTERDICT GLOCs IVO MEF
OBJ A (Springville).
P - PREVENT commitment of ENY
strategic reserve (5th Corps).
T - BPT block 101 AD.
79
MCWP 5-10
T - GUARD GCE’s right

T - SHAPE IVO XXXXX. (east/southeast) flank.
P – XXXXX. P - ALLOW exploitation to MEF T - WITHDRAW south of
ACE OBJ A (Springville). T - INTERDICT reinforcements IVO
T - Provide sorties to CFACC ISO NORTHLAND-DAKOTA
XXXXX.
shaping. T - BPT block 101 AD. international border.
T - Aerial reconnaissance. T - BPT establish FARP at XXX.
T - BPT displace EW/C.
Countermobility
T - Breach obstacle belts IVO

Mobility /
XXXXX. T - ASSIST in clearing

obstacles and improving
T - Ensure mobility through wet/dry mobility.
gap crossing.
TF West and 1st NORTHLAND -

Adjacent
RIP/TOA with host-nation

FIX (invert Stage A & B tasks). TF West and 1st NORTHLAND - FIX
security forces in liberated
(invert Stage A & B tasks).
CFMCC amphibious demonstration. areas of NORTHLAND.
Mech infantry heavy Bn TF located

Reserve
IVO XXXX.
Priorities: 1.XXXXX, 2. XXXXXX.
NAIs
1, 2 3, 4 5
UAS. Identify any emplaced

Recon. Route reconnaissance of obstacles or destroyed routes
MSR RED. Shaping. Recon. Provide I&W of 1st Corps units in MEF’s rear area.
SIGINT Support Team. Identifying moving south. HUMINT. Identify remaining
Organic Collections
SIGINT Support Team. I&W of 1st

C2/AD nodes. UAS. Identify ENY positions south of DAKOTIAN SOF within
Corps brigades movement.
CI support to FP. Valleyville. Provide recce for supply NORTHLAND. Identify
UAS. Identify ENY recon elements convoys. population sentiment of CF
Locate HPTs. withdrawal. Identify
in passes and obstacle belts. IVO
UAS. Identify ENY recon elements NAI XXXX, YYYY, ZZZZ. HUMINT. XXXXX. intentions of 1st and 5th
in passes and obstacle belts. SIGINT. Identify movement of Corps.
HUMINT. Identify HPTs in 25th/2nd defensive positions. SIGINT. Identify remaining
Intelligence
Valleyville. DAKOTIAN forces within

NORTHLAND.
UAS and IMINT identify obstacle
belts along MSR RED. IMINT. Identify change of
battle positions of 1st or 5th
UAS/SIGINT identify I&W of 2nd
Higher's Collections
UAS/SIGINT identify I&W of 2nd UAS/SIGINT Identify movement of 1st Corps units.
MID/101st AD movement.
MID/ 101st AD movement. Corps units south to reinforce. UAS/SIGINT. Identify I&W of
IMINT identify battle positions of
UAS/SIGINT identify I&W of 5th UAS/SIGINT identify I&W of 5th Corps movement of 1st or 5th Corps
20th/25th/101st.
Corps movement or mobilization / movement or mobilization / WMD units.
UAS/SIGINT identify I&W of 5th WMD employment. employment. Assess DAKOTAIN and
Corps movement or mobilization /
Locate HPTs. Locate HPTs. NORTHLAND ability to
WMD employment.
provide internal security
Locate HPTs/ ENY collection within their borders.
assets.
SA-15, SA-17, Skyguard, Crotale,
ADA radar.
HPTs may change.
HPTs
C2 nodes (Div and above) / Priorities may change. HPTs may change.
commanders. SOF.
CAG / DAG (Btry / Bn).
80
LIMIT ability of ENY armor formations

(101 BDE, Div Tank BDEs) to CATK
NEUTRALIZE HPTs (mobile AD, LIMIT ability of ENY armor GCE maneuver.
Lethal
T - SUPPORT GCE
Div/Corps artillery, Div and above formations (101 BDE, Div Tank
INTERDICT reinforcements. operations.
C2 nodes). BDEs) to CATK vs GCE maneuver.
SUPPORT GCE operations against
bypassed forces.
Fires
Leave FSCM as is, if CFACC can

strike targets we nominate.
FSCMs
Request battlespace and establish BCL shift. ESTABLISH FSCMs to support GCE. SHIFT FSCMs to rear.
FSCMs after AD assets are Sync w/ adjacent units.
neutralized if CFACC cannot/will not
strike our targets.
T-1 – Determine any ENY attempts
T-1 – Determine any ENY attempts to degrade, disrupt, neutralize, or T-1 – Determine any ENY attempts to
to degrade, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy friendly force C2. degrade, disrupt, neutralize, or destroy
destroy friendly force C2. P-2 – Determine ENY C2 targets friendly force C2.
P-1 – Determine ENY C2 targets and protect against electronic P-2 – Determine ENY C2 targets and T-1 – Employ signature
and protect against electronic attack. protect against electronic attack. management plan for steady
attack. T-2 -- Disrupt ENY AD capabilities. T-2 -- Disrupt ENY AD capabilities. state operations.
EMSO
T-2 – Establish signature P-2 – Support friendly force ACE P-2 – Support friendly force ACE P-1 – Establish normal
management plan in conjunction operations. operations. reporting networks for post
with deception effort at decoy rally T-3 – Disrupt ENY battalion and T-3 – Disrupt ENYbattalion and operation requirements.
point to the West IVO Freeway 101. division C2 signals IVO Springville. division C2 signals IVO Springville.
P-2 – Protect friendly force C2 P-3 – Limit ENY force coordination P-3 – Limit ENY force coordination and
practices ISO Phase III operations. and response to friendly force response to friendly force actions.
actions.
T-1 -- DCO: Defend local network
against cyberattack/cyberdenial. T-1 -- DCO: Defend local network
P-1 – Ensure tactical friendly force against cyberattack/cyberdenial.
T-1 – DCO: Defend local network
C2. P-1 – Ensure tactical friendly force C2.
against cyberattack/cyberdenial.
T-2 – Defend HHQ servers against T-2 – Defend HHQ servers against
P-1 – Ensure tactical friendly force T-1 -- DCO: Defend local
cyberattack. cyberattack.
C2. network against
CYBER
Information
P-2 – Ensure reach back support P-2 – Ensure reach back support from cyberattack/cyberdenial.
T-2 – Defend HHQ servers against
from HHQ ISO of friendly force HHQ ISO of friendly force operations.
cyberattack. P-1 – Ensure tactical friendly
operations. T-3 – OCO: Target DAKOTIAN
P-2 – Ensure reach back support force C2.
T-3 – OCO: Target DAKOTIAN propaganda networks.
from HHQ ISO of friendly force
propaganda networks. P-3 – Deny DAKOTIAN ability to
operations.
P-3 – Deny DAKOTIAN ability to upload/share misinformation /
upload/share misinformation / disinformation via social media.
disinformation via social media.
T-1 – Disrupt ENY use of GPS.

T-1 – Disrupt ENY use of GPS.
SPACE
P-1 -- Limit ENY force coordination

P-1 -- Limit ENY force coordination
and response to friendly force
and response to friendly force actions.
actions.
T-1 – Deploy CA contact team to

Valleyville to engage with local T-1 – Create billboard IVO Freeway
political leaders. 101 en route to decoy rally point. T-1 – CA contact team begins
T-1 – Broadcast radio and TV
P-1 – Influence civilian population to P-1 – Influence DAKOTIAN forces support to rebuild civilian
messages about friendly force support
support friendly force efforts IVO to no longer support infrastructure IVO Valleyville.
INFLUENCE
to NORTHLAND defense and

Valleyville. mission/leadership. P-1 – Reinforce narrative that
rebuilding civilian infrastructure.
T-2 – Broadcast radio messages T-2 – Broadcast radio messages friendly forces are
P-1 – Influence civilian population to
about friendly forces conducting about NORTHLAND civilian support NORTHLAND allies and are
support friendly force efforts IVO
joint training with NORTHLAND for friendly force. enabling NORTHLAND self-
Valleyville.
defense forces. P-2 – Influence DAKOTIAN forces governance.
P-2 – Influence DAKOTIAN forces to depart Valleyville.
to depart Valleyville.
81
MCWP 5-10
T-1 – Establish decoy rally point to

T-1 – Conduct a feint attack to the
the West IVO Freeway 101.
West IVO Freeway 101.
T-1 – Terminate decoy rally point and
DECEPTION
T-2 – Establish pattern-of-life with
T-2 – Limit C2 transmissions from feint force return to base.
personnel and equipment at decoy
feinting force.
rally point. P-1 – Reconstitute ground forces IVO
P-1 – Influence 1st Corps CDR to assembly area.
P-1 – Deceive ENY by presenting a
commit forces to the West IVO
credible threat to ENY forces from
Freeway 101.
the decoy rally point.
T-1 – Coordinate NORTHLAND
media outlets’ reporting on CA T-1 – Coordinate
engagement with local politicians. NORTHLAND media outlets’
reporting on CA engagement
P-1 – Inform foreign and domestic
with local politicians.
audiences of friendly force efforts to
support NORTHLAND infrastructure P-1 – Inform foreign and
development projects. domestic audiences of
friendly force efforts to
T-2 – Release images or social
support NORTHLAND
media posts at least every six hours T-1 -- Release images or social T-1 -- Release images or social media
infrastructure development
showing friendly force training with media posts at least every six hours posts at least every six hours showing
projects.
NORHTLAND forces. showing friendly force support to friendly force support to local
local population. population. T-2 -- Release images or
P-2 – Inform NORTHLAND
social media posts at least
audiences that friendly forces are P-1 – Reinforce narrative that P-1 – Reinforce narrative that friendly
every six hours showing
supporting NORTHLAND forces friendly forces are enabling forces are enabling NORTHLAND self-
friendly force support to local
against DAKOTIAN aggression. NORTHLAND self-governance. governance.
population.
INFORM
T-3 – Release images or social T-2 – Release images or social T-2 – Release images or social media
P-2 – Reinforce narrative that
media posts at least every six hours media posts at least every six hours posts at least every six hours showing
friendly forces are enabling
showing friendly force support to showing friendly force training with friendly force training with
NORTHLAND self-
local population. NORHTLAND forces. NORHTLAND forces.
governance.
P-3 – Reinforce narrative that P-2 – Counter DAKOTIAN P-2 – Counter DAKOTIAN
T-3 – Release news story and
friendly forces are enabling misinformation / disinformation misinformation / disinformation efforts
photos to domestic
NORTHLAND self-governance. efforts and inform NORTHLAND and inform NORTHLAND audiences
NORTHLANDIAN
T-4 – Release news story and audiences that friendly forces are that friendly forces are supporting
communities in the US
photos to domestic supporting NORTHLAND forces NORTHLAND forces against
showing friendly force
NORTHLANDIAN communities in against DAKOTIAN aggression. DAKOTIAN aggression.
conducting partnered training
the US showing friendly force operations with NORTHLAND
conducting partnered training defense forces.
operations with NORTHLAND
P-3 – Inform domestic
defense forces.
audiences with ties to
P-4 – Inform domestic audiences NORTHLAND about
with ties to NORTHLAND about narratives for friendly force
narratives for friendly force support support to NORTHLAND.
to NORTHLAND.
BPT support Regt-sized movement

Adequate transportation assets are from XXX to YYY.
Trans
Move EPWs as directed. Move EPWs as directed.

available for resupply.
Move EPWs as directed.
Supply
Ensure adequate stockages

Establish RRP under I, III, V. Establish RRP under I, III, V. Establish RRP under I, III, V.
available for resupply.
Logistics
Gen Engr
BPT support construction of EPW BPT support construction of EPW BPT support construction of
facilities. facilities. EPW facilities.
Ensure required readiness levels

Maint
Priority to GCE. "Maintenance Standdown"

are established.
82
Establish forward Role II sites as Establish forward Role II sites

Ensure Role I and II facilites are Establish forward Role II sites as
HSS
required. as required.
established. required.
Services BPT treat civilian casualties. BPT treat civilian casualties.
Coordinate port handling with US Provide combat replacement Arrange for MPF
Coordinate with JFC withhold shipping
Army logistics companies as required reconstitution
Maintain MEF(FWD)
communications established
Establish C2 node north of Clayton
Forward
Establish C2 node north of Clayton in either Stage A or B.

pass along MSR RED IVO
pass along MSR RED IVO Valleyville. Provide retransmission sites
Valleyville.
to MARDIV(FWD) as
Command and Control
required.
Establish retransmission sites
Establish retransmission sites (as Establish retransmission sites (as
(as needed) to maintain
needed) to maintain connectivity needed) to maintain connectivity with
connectivity with
Main
COC established at XXX. with MARDIV(FWD). Maintain rear MARDIV(FWD). Maintain rear area
MARDIV(FWD). Maintain
area communications with 3d MAW communications with 3d MAW and 1st
rear area communications
and 1st MLG. MLG.
with 3d MAW and 1st MLG.
Rear
BPT establish C2 node. BPT establish C2 node. BPT establish C2 node. BPT establish C2 node.
BPT displace as required to

BPT establish IVO MARDIV MAIN BPT displace as required to maintain
Retrans
maintain terrestrial data

to maintain MEF connectivity with terrestrial data communications with
communications with
FWD. MARDIV(FWD).
MARDIV(FWD).
T- Assume RACOM at D-6. T - SECURE critical sites and

T - SECURE critical sites and
T - SECURE critical sites and GLOCs
GLOCs in MEF rear area.
TF Guardian
T - SECURE critical sites and GLOCs in MEF rear area. in MEF rear area.
(RACOM)
GLOCs in MEF rear area. P - PROTECT critical

P - PROTECT critical requirements P - PROTECT critical requirements to
P - PROTECT critical requirements to include personnel, supplies, requirements to include
include personnel, supplies,
to include personnel, supplies, personnel, supplies,
equipment, and facilities. equipment, and facilities.
equipment, and facilities. equipment, and facilities.
Identify location of temporary

Identify location of temporary Identify location of temporary
Force Protection
Identify location of temporary collection collection facility IOT facilitate

collection facility IOT facilitate the collection facility IOT facilitate the
facility IOT facilitate the processing of the processing of EPWs. As
processing of EPWs. As GCE processing of EPWs. As GCE
EPWs. As GCE identifies forward EPW GCE identifies forward EPW
identifies forward EPW collection identifies forward EPW collection
collection points coordinate EPW collection points coordinate
EPWs
points coordinate EPW exchange. points coordinate EPW exchange.

exchange. Move EPWs to a temporary EPW exchange. Move EPWs
Move EPWs to a temporary holding Move EPWs to a temporary holding
holding facility in rear area. Coordinate to a temporary holding facility
facility in rear area. Coordinate the facility in rear area. Coordinate the
the movement of EPWs to a in rear area. Coordinate the
movement of EPWs to permanent movement of EPWs to a permanent
permanent detention facility. movement of EPWs to a
detention facility. detention facility.
permanent detention facility.
SUPPORT the
reestablishment of the rule of
LE Bn route control WRT IDPs. LE Bn route control WRT IDPs. law.
MIG
Set up temporary EPW facilities. Set up temporary EPW facilities. BPT partner with
NORTHLAND law
enforcement agencies.
Legend
AD airborne division EW/C early warning/control MEF Marine expeditionary force
ADA air defense artillery FARP forward arming and refueling point MID mechanized infantry division
BCL battlefield coordination line FP force protection MIG Marine expeditionary force information group
BDE brigade FSCM fire support coordination measure MILDEC military deception
Bn battalion FWD forward MISO military information support operations
BPT beach party team GCE ground combat element MLG Marine logistics group
83
MCWP 5-10
Btry battery GEN ENG general engineering MSR main supply route
C2 command and control GLOC ground line of communications NAI named area of interest
CA civil affairs Gov’t government OBJ objective
CAG civil affairs group GPS Global Positioning System OCO offensive cyberspace operations
CATK counterattack HHQ higher headquarters OPSEC operations security
CDR commander HPT high-payoff target P purpose
CF conventional forces HSS health service support RACOM rear area commander
CFACC combined force air component commander HUMINT human intelligence Recon reconnaissance
CFMCC combined force maritime component I&W indications and warnings Regt regiment
commander IDP internally displaced person RIP relief in place
CI counterintelligence IMINT imagery intelligence RRP repair and replenishment point
COC combat operations center Intel intelligence SIGINT signals intelligence
COMMSTRAT communication strategy and operations IOT in order to SOF special operations forces
CSS combat service support ISO in support of sync synchronize
DAG division artillery group IVO in the vicinity of T task
DAK Dakotian LE law enforcement TF task force
DCO defensive cyberspace operations Maint maintenance TOA transfer of authority
Div division MARDIV Marine division Trans transportation
ENY enemy MAW Marine aircraft wing UAS unmanned aircraft system
EPW enemy prisioner of war Mech mechanized WMD weapons of mass destruction
EW electronic warfare
Course of Action War Game Worksheet

The COA war game worksheet (see table D-6) is used during the war game to record friendly
action, enemy/adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction involved in each COA. It is also used
to capture critical information that may be identified during the war game, such as potential CCIRs,
decision points, and NAIs.
Table D-6. Course of Action War Game Worksheet.

COA 1, STAGE A; BOX: MOST LIKELY
Approximate
Action Reaction Counteraction Assets Time DP CCIR Remarks
MARDIV envel- 102d and 103d MAW interdicts moving Surge MAW attack D+3 DP 3 Will 102d and 103d MARDIV has
ops Orangeland Armored enemy forces. assets to interdict Armored Brigades priority of close
forces north of Brigades enemy armor. move west to air support.
Gray City. counterattack. MARDIV engages and counterattack.
destroys enemy armor at
long range.
Legend
DP decision point MARDIV Marine division MAW Marine aircraft wing
84
Course of Action Comparison and Decision Matrix

The COA comparison and decision matrix is a planning support tool designed to assist the
commander and staff in recording the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as it is compared
against the commander’s evaluation criteria. It also provides a venue for further discussion. It may
reflect various techniques for weighing the COA against the commander’s evaluation criteria, as
shown in table D-7. The commander may use the COA comparison and decision matrix to aid the
decision-making process during the selection of a COA for execution. Commanders and staffs
should guard against relying on numerical “rankings” or other simplistic methods that can fail to
underscore the complexity involved in the decision-making process.
Table D-7. Comparison and Decision Matrix with Comments.
Commander’s
Evaluation Criteria COA 1 COA 2 COA 3
Force protection Moderate casualties. High casualties. Light casualties.
Increased chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threat.
Tempo, surprise Achieving surprise unlikely High chance of achieving surprise.
Shapes the battlespace ACE interdiction of enemy lines of Deception likely to be effective.
communications limits enemy’s
ability to reinforce.
Asymmetrical operations ACE operates against second MEF mechanized forces against
echelon armor forces. enemy mechanized forces.
GCE mechanized forces attack
enemy dismounted infantry.
Maneuver Frontal attack followed by Limited to frontal attack. Turning movement.

penetration.
Decisive actions ACE disrupts deployment of second Isolate first echelon forces.
echelon forces through interdiction. Disrupt lines of communications,
logistic facilities, and assembly areas.
Simplicity Simplest Demanding command and

coordination requirements.
Legend
GCE ground combat element
85
MCWP 5-10
Table D-8. OPORD Assignment Matrix.

Document Title Responsible POC Billet Action Officer Billet
BASIC ORDER
Annex A. Task Organization
Appendix A-1 Time-Phased Force Deployment List
Appendix A-2 Shortfall Identification
Appendix A-3 Flexible Response and Flexible Deterrent Options
Annex B. Intelligence
Appendix B-1 Priority Intelligence Requirements
Appendix B-2 Signals Intelligence
Tab B-2-A Communications Intelligence Collection Requirements
Tab B-2-B Operational Electronic Intelligence Collection Requirements
Appendix B-3 Counterintelligence
Tab B-3-A Counterintelligence Target List
Tab B-3-B Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report
Tab B-3-C Designation of Theater Counterintelligence Executive Agency
Appendix B-4 Targeting Intelligence
Tab B-4-A Target List (Conventional)
Network Targeting (nonlethal actions against friendly and neutral
Tab B-4-B
networks and nodes)
Appendix B-5 Human Resource Intelligence
Tab B-5-A HUMINT Operations Cell Operations
Tab B-5-B EPW/Civilian Detainees
Intelligence Support to Operations in the Information
Appendix B-6
Environment
Appendix B-7 Imagery Intelligence
Appendix B-8 Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Appendix B-9 Captured Enemy Equipment
Tab B-9-A Specific Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirements
Tab B-9-B Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes
Tab B-9-C Network Analysis
Appendix B-10 National Intelligence Support Team
Appendix B-11 Intelligence Estimate
Appendix B-12 Intelligence Products
Appendix B-13 Intelligence Collection Plan
Tab B-13-A Signals Intelligence Employment Plan
Counterintelligence/ Human Source Intelligence Employment
Tab B-13-B
Plan
Appendix B-14 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
Tab B-14-A Ground Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
Tab B-14-B Sensor Surveillance Plan
Exhibit B-14-B-1 Sensor Implant Plan
Exhibit B-14-B-2 Sensor Employment Plan
Exhibit B-14-B-3 Sensor Monitoring and Dissemination Plan
86
Table D-8. OPORD Assignment Matrix.

Document Title Responsible POC Billet Action Officer Billet
Exhibit B-14-B-4 Sensor Resources
Appendix B-15 Geographic Intelligence
Appendix B-16 Intelligence Operations
Appendix B-17 Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
Annex C. Operations
Appendix C-1 Nuclear Operations
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense
Appendix C-2
Operations
Appendix C-3 Special Operations
Legend
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear Det detachment LtCol lieutenant colonel
Col colonel HUMINT human intelligence Maj major
CWO 4 chief warrant officer 4 LDR leader Ops operations
Table D-9. Liaison Plan.
MEF LNO Plan

LNO TO MEF LNO FROM MEF
UNIT FROM BILLET RANK NAME UNIT TO BILLET RANK NAME
DIV DIV LNO LTCOL SMITH JTF HQ MEF LNO LTCOL HARDY
Doctors w/o
ACE ACE LNO MAJ BROWN MEF LNO CAPT BLACK
Borders
MLG DIV LNO LTCOL ELROD Centralian Gov’t MEF LNO COL JONES
TF WEST TF WEST LNO LTC MOORE TF WEST MEF LNO MAJ PAIN
TF EAST TF EAST LNO LCDR ROW TF EAST MEF LNO MAJ MAY
Legend
Capt captain JTF joint task force Maj major
Col colonel LCDR lieutenant commander (Navy) MLG Marine logistics group
Div division LNO liaison officer TF task force
Gov’t government LTC lieutenant colonel (Army) w/o without
HQ headquarters LtCol lieutenant colonel
87
MCWP 5-10
Table D-10. Planning and Execution Timeline.
Planning and Execution Timeline

CG
Day Time Event Location Attends? Notes
D Day Execution Y
D-1 Unit Movement to AA Y
D-3 Unit Rehearsals Y

D-4 Transition Brief Y MSC COs required to brief
D-5 Transition Event Rehearsal MSC OpsOs required
Transition Event Preparation Lead: G-3 Ops chief
MSC Confirmation Brief Y OPT lead will send template
to MSC OpsOs; MSC COs
brief
D-7 OPORD Published
D-8 CG Signature on OPORD Y
Staff Review & Feedback of OPORD
OPORD Draft Complete
OPORD Crosswalk
OPORD Reconciliation
D-10 Complete OPORD
COA Comparison and Decision Brief Y
COA Comparison and Decision Brief
Preparation
COA Comparison and Decision Brief
OPT Work
D-12 COA Wargaming Brief Y
COA Wargaming Brief Prep
COA Wargaming Brief OPT Work
D-13 COA War Game
COA War Game Preparation Order 10 ft x 20 ft map
POC: Capt X for set-up
COA War Game OPT Work
D-16 COA Development Brief Y
COA Development Brief Preparation
COA Development Brief OPT Work
Operational Approach Discussion Y
88
Table D-10. Planning and Execution Timeline (Continued).
D-19 Problem Framing Brief Y

Problem Framing Brief Preparation
D-20 Problem Framing OPT Work
WARNORD Issued SIPRNET; must identify way
to send to coalition TACON
units
Design Discussion Y
D-22 Commander's Orientation Y AC/S G-3: BPT lead
discussion
Form OPT
Identify OPT Membership and
Requirements
D-23 Identify OPT Leader
Legend
AA avenue of approach CG commanding general Ops operations
AC/S assistant chief of staff CO commanding officer OpsO operations officer
BPT beach party team ft feet SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
Capt captain MSC major subordinate command TACON tactical control
PLANNING SUPPORT TOOLS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS
The following planning support tools have emerged and evolved as a result of Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom lessons learned. For detailed information on stability
operations, see MCWP 3-03, Stability Operations.
Civil Considerations
Civil considerations are a factor in all types of military operations, but they are of particular
significance in stability operations and security cooperation. If the mission is to support civil
authorities, civil considerations define the mission.
Civil considerations generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on operations in
progress; however, they also include larger, long-term diplomatic, informational, and economic
issues at higher levels. Given the global and accelerated nature of information flows, civil
considerations must also take into account international audiences as well as American domestic
audiences. At the tactical level, they directly relate to key civil considerations within the area of
operations. The world’s increasing urbanization means that the attitudes and activities of the
civilian population in the area of operations often influence the outcome of military operations.
Civil considerations can either help or hinder friendly or enemy/adversary forces and will influence
the selection of a COA.
An appreciation of civil considerations—the ability to analyze their impact on operations—
enhances several aspects of operations, such as the selection of objectives; location, movement,
89
MCWP 5-10
and control of forces; use of weapons; and protection measures. Civil considerations comprise six
characteristics of ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. See
figure D-7.
Figure D-7. Sample Civil Considerations (ASCOPE).
Areas
Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander’s operational environment
that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civil areas,
however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission.
Civil affairs Marines and civil-military operations planners analyze key civil areas from two
perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact
civilian activities in these areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically
influence major portions of the COAs under consideration.
Structures
Structures are architectural objects, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and
dams, and are often identified as traditional HPTs. Other structures, such as churches, mosques,
national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites subject to protection by international law or other
agreements. Still other structures are facilities with practical applications, such as jails,
warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and printing plants, which may be useful
for military purposes.
Structures analysis involves determining their location, functions, capabilities, capacity, and
application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the military, political,
economic, religious, social, and informational consequences of removing them from civilian use;
the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs.
90
Capabilities
Civil capabilities can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to—
 Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain themselves, such as through public
administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.
 Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities,
public health, public transportation, sanitation, economics, and commerce.
 Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as
interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the host
nation, or other nations may provide these resources and services. Under a hostile threat
condition, civil capabilities include resources that may be taken and used by military forces
consistent with international law.
Analysis of the existing capabilities of the area of operations is normally conducted by personnel
with functional expertise in civil affairs or civil engineering. The analysis also identifies the
capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, civil-
military operations planners consider how to address shortfalls as well as how to capitalize on
capability strengths.
Organizations
Civil organizations are groups that may or may not affiliate with government agencies. They can
be religious groups, companies, patriotic or service organizations, community watch groups,
international organizations, or NGOs. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the
populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an area of operations and influencing the
actions of the populace. Some of these organizations may also form the nucleus of humanitarian
assistance programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other population-centric
activities.
People
People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, negative, or no impact on military
operations. The people element of ASCOPE includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel
encountered in an area of operations. The term may also extend to those outside the area of
operations whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all
military operations, US forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of
all types. When analyzing people, Marines should consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political,
economic, and humanitarian factors. Working with the people assists Marines in identifying the
key communicators as well as the formal and informal processes used to influence people.
Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter civilians living
and operating in and around the unit’s area of operations. Major categories of civilians likely to be
encountered include—
 Local nationals, such as town and city residents, farmers, other rural residents, and nomads.
91
MCWP 5-10
 Local civil authorities, such as elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government.
 Expatriates.
 Foreign government employees.
 Employees of international organizations and NGOs.
 US Government and third-nation government agency representatives.
 Contractors, who may be US citizens, local nationals, or third-nation citizens providing
contract services.
 DOD civilian employees.
 The media, including journalists from print, radio, and visual media.
Events
As there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian events
that may affect the military mission. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections,
riots, holidays, and voluntary and involuntary evacuations. Likewise, there are military events that
impact the lives of civilians in an area of operations. Some examples are combat operations,
including indirect fires, deployments, and redeployments. Civil-military operations planners
determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic,
psychological, environmental, and legal implications.
92
APPENDIX E
DESIGN: AN EXAMPLE
ITERATIVE DESIGN DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM II
During Operation Iraqi Freedom II, 1st Marine Division employed design (see fig. E-1). The
Commanding General, Major General James N. Mattis, began with an assessment of the people
that the Marines, Soldiers, and Sailors would encounter within the division’s area of operations,
western Iraq’s Al Anbar province. Al Anbar possessed a considerably different demographic than
the imam-led Shia areas that dominated Operation Iraqi Freedom I operations.
Major General Mattis grouped Anbar provincial constituents into three basic groups: the tribes,
the former regime elements, and the foreign fighters. The tribes constituted the primary identity
group in Al Anbar. They had various internal tribal affiliations and looked to a diverse array of
sheiks and elders for leadership. The former regime elements were a minority that included
individuals with personal, political, business, and professional ties to the Ba’ath Party. These
included the civil servants and career military personnel with the skills to run government
institutions. Initially, they saw little gain from a democratic Iraq. The foreign fighters were a small
but dangerous minority of transnational Islamic jihadists. To be successful, US forces had to apply
a different approach to each of these groups within the framework of an overarching plan. As in
any society, some portion of each of these groups was composed of a criminal element, further
complicating planning and interaction. Major General Mattis’s “vision of resolution,” was
composed of two major elements encompassed in an overarching “bodyguard” of information
operations.
The first element, and the main effort, was reducing support for insurgency. Guided by the maxims
of “first do no harm” and “no better friend, no worse enemy,” the objective was to establish a
secure local environment for the indigenous population so people could pursue their economic,
social, cultural, and political well-being and achieve some degree of local normalcy. Establishing
a secure environment involved both offensive and defensive operations, with a heavy emphasis on
training and advising the security forces of the fledgling Iraqi government. It also included putting
the population to work. Simply put, an Iraqi with a job was less likely to succumb to ideological
or economic pressure to support the insurgency. Other tasks included the delivery of essential
services, economic development, and the promotion of governance, all geared toward increasing
employment opportunities and furthering the establishment of local normalcy. Essentially,
diminishing support for insurgency was about gaining and maintaining the support of the tribes,
as well as converting as many of the former regime members as possible. “Fence-sitters” were
considered a winnable constituency and addressed as such.
The second element involved neutralizing the enemy and/or adversary, a combination of
irreconcilable former regime elements and foreign fighters. Offensive combat operations were
MCWP 5-10
conducted to defeat disobedient former regime members. The task was to make those who were
not neutralized see the futility of resistance and give up the fight. With respect to the hard-core
extremists, who would never give up, the task was more straightforward: their complete and utter
destruction. Neutralizing the enemy supported the main effort by improving the local security
environment. Neutralization had to be accomplished discriminately, however, to avoid
unintentionally increasing support for insurgency.
Both elements described above were wrapped in an overarching “bodyguard” of information
operations. Information operations, both proactive and responsive, were aggressively employed to
favorably influence the populace’s perception of all coalition actions while discrediting the
insurgents. These tasks were difficult, as corruption was historically prevalent among Iraqi
officials, generating cynicism toward government. Decades of Arab media mischaracterization of
US actions created mistrust of US motives. The magnitude of that cynicism and doubt highlighted
the critical importance of using information operations to influence every situation.
In pursuing this “vision of resolution,” 1st Marine Division faced an adaptive enemy/adversary.
Persistent US presence and interaction with the populace threatened the insurgents and caused the
enemy/adversary to employ more open violence in selected areas of Al Anbar. This response
resulted in learning and adaptation within 1st Marine Division. Design enabled 1st Marine
Division to adjust the blend of “diminishing support for insurgents” and “neutralizing bad actors”
to meet local challenges. Throughout the operation, 1st Marine Division continued learning and
adapting with the espoused vision providing a constant guide to direct and unify the effort.
Note: The term “information operations” is a legacy term in this context

and was replaced by “operations in the information environment” in the Marine Corps.
Figure E-1. 1st Marine Division Design for Operation Iraqi Freedom II.
94
APPENDIX F
STAFF ESTIMATES AND
ESTIMATES OF SUPPORTABILITY
Keeping commanders informed to facilitate their decision-making is a critical requirement of
planning. During planning, estimates are a primary means of informing the commander. The two
basic types of estimates are the staff estimate and the estimates of supportability.
Staff estimates are generally functional in nature, such as fires, logistics, or intelligence, and often
require subordinate unit information, such as the ACE’s sortie calculations. Staff estimates evolve
into supporting concepts as COAs are developed. Once the commander approves a COA, the staff
estimate and supporting concept become the first draft of their respective portion of the order or
plan. Estimates of supportability, especially estimates provided by attached, supporting, etc. units,
enable the commander and planners to better understand the capabilities, requirements, limitations,
and shortfalls of the particular unit.
Estimates may be text documents, slides, graphic representations, or an oral presentation of the
analysis and recommendations. These estimates enable commanders, staff, and planners to develop
a plan and develop complete COAs. Done properly, estimates contribute information to the
annexes and appendices to OPORDs and OPLANs.
Commanders and staffs use estimates as they collect, process, and evaluate information. A
subordinate unit or a staff section, upon discovering a fatal flaw, should not wait to complete a
document to raise concerns about a particular COA. The sooner the commander and planners know
of a problem, the sooner they can either discard or modify the COA. The key issue is time. Format
or formality should never delay the timely delivery of important information to the commander.
At a minimum, commanders and their staffs should update their estimates when their
understanding of the environment or problem changes, assumptions become invalid, new tasks are
received, and/or requirements or capabilities change.
STAFF ESTIMATES
The staff and warfighting function representatives develop staff estimates (see figs. F-1a through
F-1e). The staff summarizes significant aspects of the situation that influence the COA, analyzes
the impact of the factors on the COA, and evaluates and determines how the means available can
best support the COA. Staff sections may also require their functional representatives to develop
functional estimates within their areas of expertise. A staff estimate is not a replacement for an
order or for supporting concepts; however, a thorough staff estimate will shorten the time it takes
to fully develop a COA and write the order or plan.
MCWP 5-10
Figures F-1a through F-1e provide examples of staff estimates. The G-2, with input assistance
from all staff members, will also prepare and disseminate the IPB as a separate and continuously
updated product.
Figure F-1a. Notional G-2 Staff Estimate. Figure F-1b. Notional G-3 Staff Estimate.
Figure F-1c. Notional Figure F-1d. Notional G-6 Staff Estimate.

Information Environment Staff Estimate.
Figure F-1e. Notional G-4 Staff Estimate.
96
ESTIMATES OF SUPPORTABILITY
Estimates of supportability are produced by subordinate commanders or their planners to assist the
higher commander with planning. Estimates of supportability are especially important for attached,
supporting units. Figure F-2 provides an example of an estimates of supportability.
Figure F-2. Notional Estimate of Supportability.
97
MCWP 5-10
98
APPENDIX G
RED TEAM
This appendix describes red team principles and provides perspectives for the employment of red
teams and red-teaming techniques in the MCPP. See MCBUL [Marine Corps Bulletin] 3510/C461,
Marine Corps Red Team Policy.
Red teams, like red cells, have direct application to planning and provide commanders with an
independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans, operations, concepts, organizations,
and capabilities in the context of the operational environment. Red teams also provide the
perspectives of partners, enemy/adversaries, and others, vice that of the planning organization and
of Western military thought in general. People and organizations court failure in predictable ways,
by degrees, almost imperceptibly, and according to their own culture and context. As a
countermeasure, Marines can fully explore alternatives in that context and from differing
perspectives.
Red teams can apply at all levels of warfare, across the range of military operations, and during all
phases of operations. Red teams challenge the OPT’s understanding of the problems and the
environment, as well as assumptions. Red teams also seek to qualify the assumptions, develop
targeted cultural questions, propose alternative perspectives, and identify any cognitive biases or
instances of groupthink.
Red teams succeed when they help commanders and staffs avoid complacency and consider a
wider range of perspectives and COAs. All planners and analysts endeavor to think critically,
consider alternatives, and avoid bias and error. However, red teams are distinguished by their—
 Independence that helps them view problems and processes from detached perspectives.
 Specialized training that helps them identify and counter biases and stimulate critical and
creative thought.
 Purposeful out-of-the-box approach to problems that helps them consider issues with fewer
concessions to convention, policy, established community positions, and functional
specialization.
Red teams participate in each phase of the planning process, often without overt intervention and
while remaining largely in the background. Commanders may direct alternate approaches. Red
teams identify unseen opportunities, alternatives, gaps, vulnerabilities, and threats to the friendly
COAs that may generate development of additional branches and sequels not previously
considered. Separate, discrete red team briefs and discussions may better serve the commander.
The red team’s communication skills and finesse will determine its effectiveness during planning.
Red teams can be a useful tool, but their existence does not relieve planning teams of their
responsibility to think critically about their plan from multiple perspectives.
MCWP 5-10
Figure G-1: Three Red Team Focus Areas.
Red Team Tools Within the Marine Corps Planning Process

Red teams help establish an initial hypothesis about the character of the friendly, adversarial, and
wider environmental factors which define the situation. Red teams also explore cultural narratives,
institutional histories, propensities, and strategic trends to postulate a general structure of the
factors and their relationships to the problem. Red team contributions to the planning process as
well as details for the development of the red team tools and products are discussed below. See
figure G-2.
Figure G-2: Red Team Tools Within the Marine Corps Planning Process.
100
Problem Framing
The purpose of problem framing is to achieve a greater understanding of the environment and the
nature of the problem set to identify an appropriate conceptual solution. The red team, or red team
techniques, contributes to the design methodology by reinforcing the effort to frame the correct
problem. While not prescriptive or a checklist, design is based on—
 Critical thinking.
 Conceptual planning.
 Visualization.
 Emergence of a hypothesis.
 Continuous activity.
For the red team, critical thinking is purposeful and reflective judgment on what to do in response
to observations, experience, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. Critical thinking involves
the high-order cognitive skills of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Critical thinkers are often
open-minded yet skeptical individuals who: gather, assess, and interpret relevant information;
question their own assumptions; and, consider the quality of information and the associated
implications and consequences.
Red teams gain perspective by using multiple tools. Commanders and planners can leverage many
of these tools, some of which include:—
 Four Ways of Seeing. Using multiple lenses, commanders and planners can reveal challenges
to mission accomplishment and heighten understanding. These lenses include: how friendly
forces view themselves; how the enemy/adversary views themselves; how the
enemy/adversary views friendly forces; and, how friendly forces view the enemy/adversary.
 Key Assumption Check. The red team can play a key role in validating assumptions and may,
therefore, undertake a systematic effort to question the assumptions that guide an analyst’s
interpretation of evidence and the reasoning underlying any particular judgment or conclusion.
 Frame Audit. A tool to help identify more useful frames and reframe an issue in more useful
ways.
Red teams may present their products as part of the problem framing brief or at a separate time.
Course of Action Development

Red teams provide options for commanders by an approach to solve the problem from an alternate
perspective. Red teams make independent assessments of possible COAs, while identifying and
addressing catastrophic points of failure and utilizing available internal and external resources.
Red teams provide independent validation of the suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and
completeness of the COAs. Red team tools for COA development include—
 Team A / Team B. A competitive analysis that pits Team A against Team B.
 Premortem analysis. A red team strategy in which the red team imagines that a project or
organization has failed and then works backward to determine what potentially could lead to
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the failure of the project or organization. The technique breaks possible groupthinking by
facilitating a positive discussion on threats, increasing the likelihood of identifying the main
threats. The red team can then analyze the magnitude and likelihood of each threat to
recommend preventive actions to protect the project or organization from suffering an untimely
failure.
 Devil’s advocate. Advocating an opposing or unpopular cause for the sake of argument or to
expose it to a thorough examination.
 Stakeholder mapping. Identifying and understanding key stakeholders, where they come from,
and what they are looking for in relationship to your operation.
Red team products may be briefed with the OPT’s COA development products or separately.
Course of Action War Game

The red teams assist with the examination and refinement of options in light of enemy/adversary
capabilities and potential actions and reactions. They also examines other factors specific to the
operational environment, such as the local population and how it may respond to friendly and
enemy/adversary interactions. While planners are wargaming friendly COAs against selected
enemy/adversary COAs through an iterative action-reaction-counteraction process, red teams
focus their efforts on the examination of the risk inherent to each COA to find alternative ways to
minimize risk. Red teams work independently from the OPT and their tools include—
 Devil’s advocate.
 Functional systems approach. Conceptualizing everyday concepts as an interconnected
dynamic system rather than as separate processes.
 Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats analysis. This analysis is a framework that adds
value by essentially forcing the red team to think through the various perspectives of a given
situation using different situations and actors. Doing so helps the red team attain alternative
perspectives and a more holistic view of the environment.
Red teams may brief their products and assessment as part of the COA war game brief or in a
separate discussion with the commander.
Course of Action Comparison and Decision

Red teams examine the synchronization matrix and identify possible catastrophic points of failure.
In addition, red teams conduct independent assessments for the commander as required or
instructed utilizing the following tools:
 Devil’s advocate.
 Key assumptions check.
 Analysis of competing hypotheses. A methodology for evaluating multiple competing
hypotheses (suppositions or proposed explanations made on the basis of limited evidence as a
starting point for further investigation) for observed data.
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The dialogue during the COA comparison and decision step represents a continuation of the design
effort. Red teams offer differing perspectives to deepen the group’s understanding of the
environment and the problem.
Orders Development
Red teams assist commanders by ensuring the OPORD is useful, realistic, and can be understood
by all audiences.
Red teams utilize the following tools to assist during this step of the process:
 Analysis of competing hypotheses.
 Cultural perception framework. A conceptual framework of the different mechanisms by which
culture conditions perception and cognition.
 Divergent/convergent analysis. The use of divergent and convergent modes of thought—
generating and taking seriously alternative possibilities, even comparing and contrasting
alternative models and types of analysis, and yet in the end offering a reasonable (and
reasonably definitive) conclusion.
Transition
Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with
separate planning and execution teams. For transition to occur, an approved order or plan must
exist. The approved order or plan and the products of continuing staff actions form the input for
transition. Red teams conduct an independent assessment of overall mission requirements and
commander’s intent.
Red teams utilize the following tools to assist during this step:
 Four ways of seeing.
 Outside-in thinking. Harnesses insight about the external environment to make the most
intelligent choices about where to compete and how to win the competition. The primary role
of this tool is to create an intense focus on the few things that matter most for the achievement
of competitive advantage.
 5 Whys. An iterative interrogative technique used to explore the cause-and-effect relationships
underlying a particular problem.
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APPENDIX H
RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS
The goal of the R2P2 is to spend less time planning in order to provide the executing forces with
the maximum time allowable to prepare for the mission. When circumstances impose severe time
constraints on the executing command, the commander and the staff must allocate enough time to
develop a feasible COA, time to coordinate critical details, and time to prepare for execution. The
commander and the staff must be thoroughly familiar with potential contingencies or missions and
the individuals involved with planning must know their roles in the planning process. Successful
rapid planning is predicated on—
 Significant MCPP knowledge and experience.
 Detailed preparation, training, and organization of the force and equipment.
 Intelligence and mission planning products developed previously.
 Current intelligence information.
 Refined, well-rehearsed SOPs.
If rapid planning is to be successful, both mission planning and preparation requirements are
conducted concurrently. The speed with which a unit can plan an operation varies with the
complexity of the mission, the experience of the commander and the staff, and METT-T factors.
The R2P2 was developed to enable the MEU to plan and commence execution of certain tasks
within 6 hours. The rapid planning techniques discussed in this appendix focus on the MEU and
its 6-hour timeline, but these techniques may be tailored and employed to meet other unit’s needs.
Rapid planning by non-MEU units is usually more effective when conducting routine missions or
tasks for which the unit has been well trained and has established SOPs.
ACTIONS PRIOR TO RAPID PLANNING
To best employ the R2P2, a unit must develop capabilities in four areas—integrated planning cells,
planning and operations SOPs, intelligence, and information management. If one of these areas is
lacking, effective rapid planning may not be achieved.
Integrated Planning Cells

The amount of staff turnover in the planning cells, to include the commander, directly impacts the
staff ’s ability to plan rapidly; therefore, the composition and membership of the various planning
cells used in rapid planning should remain constant, especially during the predeployment training
program and deployment of the MEU and amphibious ready group (ARG). The planning cells
employed by the MEU and ARG usually include the CAT, the battlestaff, and the mission planning
cells. These cells must participate in frequent planning exercises that involve scenarios similar to
those the unit might encounter. These exercises ensure the CAT, battlestaff, and mission planning
cells are thoroughly trained in rapid planning; their members know their commanders and each
MCWP 5-10
other; and the planners possess situational awareness of likely contingency missions and areas of
operation. Planning cells should understand where they are to meet, what they are to accomplish,
and how much time they have to complete their planning efforts. The planning cells also must be
capable of conducting concurrent (simultaneous at different echelons of the same command) and
parallel (between equivalent echelons of different commands) planning.
Planning and Operations

Standing Operating Procedures
The SOPs are the cornerstone of rapid planning. The planning SOP should be second nature to all
concerned. Operations SOPs are equally important because they allow planners to select proven
and practiced tasks that provide solutions to tactical problems. The SOPs allow major subordinate
elements (MSEs) to carry out familiar tasks effectively and efficiently with minimal or no higher-
level guidance or communications. The SOP for each type of mission should include a
predesignated task organization, equipment and ordnance lists, elements of a landing plan, mission
execution procedures, and an execution checklist with code words.
The SOPs must be current, studied, rehearsed, executable on a moment’s notice, and supported by
timesaving factors. For example, standard ordnance packages for likely missions, such as TRAP
or a platoon-sized reinforcement, are prestaged in readily accessable locations in their magazines
to reduce the time needed to break out and issue ammunition. In addition, mission smart packs are
created for each mission profile. Smart packs contain specific planning information and SOPs
based on the mission profile, such as for a light, medium, or heavy helicopter raid. Smart pack
planning and coordination of information are also used as references during mission execution.
Intelligence
The commander and the staff must anticipate possible contingencies based on continual analyses
of open-source news and classified intelligence reports. For each situation, the staff should be
equipped with the latest intelligence (a MEU usually prepares mission folders), possible targets,
area studies, and other relevant information. Periodic reviews of potential contingencies permits
situational awareness to be maintained and provides current information. When appropriate, a
commander conducts contingency planning and refocuses unit training based on likely scenarios.
The intelligence staff must also be familiar with the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook
(GIRH), which is produced by Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. This handbook contains
essential elements of information for various mission types.
Information Management
Due to the time constraints inherent in rapid planning, there is less opportunity for the commander
and the staff to analyze information requirements. Also, the growth of technology greatly increased
the speed and volume of information flow, so an overabundance of information may obscure vital
facts. It is critical that each participant in the planning process realizes the importance of his/her
mission area and takes positive steps to appropriately share knowledge. Commanders and staff
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officers must possess the ability to present clear and concise information. Simple, concise
presentations best support rapid planning.
COMPOSITION OF MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT PLANNING CELLS
Crisis Action Team

The central planning cell in the MEU and ARG is the CAT. Although the CAT’s final composition
depends on the commander and METT-T, the basic composition is established in the command
SOP. Three factors to consider in determining membership in the CAT are the physical space
available to accommodate the group, the benefits of additional input from a wider array of
functional areas, and the drawbacks of too many participants. The CAT members may include the
MEU and ARG commanders and their primary staffs, MSE commanders and their operations
officers, and SMEs. Some MEUs interchangeably refer to the CAT or the landing force operations
center watch team as the battlestaff.
Battlestaff
Some MEU and ARG commanders employ a battlestaff. The battlestaff may consist of staff
officers at the MEU, ARG, and MSE levels, plus representatives from attachments and functional
areas not included in the CAT. Ideally, any potential member of a mission planning cell not part
of the CAT should be on the battlestaff. The battlestaff convenes whenever the CAT is established,
which provides leaders and planners an opportunity to gain identical situational awareness with
the CAT and to prepare for participation in any mission planning cell. Because there are
insufficient personnel in some functional areas to staff all mission planning cells simultaneously,
the battlestaff may have members that support more than one mission planning cell.
Mission Planning Cell

Early in the planning process, the MEU and ARG commanders designate a mission commander,
usually one of the MSE commanders. The mission commander then establishes the mission
planning cell to plan the details of the operation. Consideration must be given to the feasibility of
separate planning cells due to limited staff members; therefore, the mission commander may
designate more than one planning cell in order to plan concurrent, contingency, or follow-on
missions. Additionally, a separate reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) mission planning cell
may plan R&S operations.
Each mission planning cell should include appropriate representation from relevant experts. For
example, a battalion landing team planning cell might include air and logistic SMEs and Navy
representatives. Maintaining the same personnel in the planning cells throughout the work-up and
deployment speeds and improves the planning process. For example, if the ACE is the primary
mission commander for a TRAP, then the ground combat element should send the same
representative to all TRAP planning meetings.
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The planning cell’s working spaces must be pre-designated so all cell members know where to
report and to ensure no two cells are competing for the same space. Lower echelon units, such as
companies and platoons, must be prepared to plan concurrently with the mission planning cells
and have a designated planning space.
MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS
The R2P2 is a time-constrained, six-step process that mirrors the MCPP. The six steps of R2P2
are—
 Problem framing
 COA development
 COA war game
 COA comparison and decision
 Orders development
 Transition
Problem Framing
Effective problem framing is achieved through prior familiarization with both the situation and the
type of mission and reliance on intuitive decision-making, which emphasizes rapid recognition of
patterns based on experience, training, and education. Planning times can be shortened if the MEU
and ARG perform anticipatory planning for various contingencies.
Upon receipt and acknowlegement of a WARNORD or an OPORD, the commander or a
designated individual establishes the CAT. The MEU and ARG commanders may retain or
delegate the authority to establish a CAT to their operations officers or the MEU executive officer
and the ARG chief of staff. The decision to establish the CAT is passed immediately to the other
ships. If it is a standard mission covered by an SOP, the initiation of SOP-based cross-decking
may occur.
Designated personnel in the landing force operations center watch section produce copies of the
order for the CAT and battlestaff/mission planning cells and ensure planning spaces are prepared
for use. The CAT and battlestaff/mission planning cells assemble in their respective spaces. These
spaces should be selected or identified in the SOP to prevent conflicts; for example, the battlestaff
is to assemble in the wardroom during meal hours. The CAT and battlestaff/mission planning cells
should be in their spaces and have copies of the WARNORD as soon as possible.
Designated staff personnel begin obtaining updated personnel and equipment status reports.
Ideally, these reports are collected in a manner that avoids distracting planners from the planning
process, such as outside the planning cells or on status boards in the planning spaces.
The MEU operations officer serves as the facilitator of the CAT and calls the group to order. A
designated recorder takes roll or members check-in with the recorder upon their arrival. The CAT
determines if there is a need for clarification during problem framing. If so, a designated staff
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member, who is not involved in the CAT, requests clarification from HHQ. The CAT confirms
cross-deck requirements and considers the need for SMEs based on the nature of the mission. For
example, if the mission involves a raid on a chemical weapons site, the CAT may include a
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense officer. If expertise in a critical area is
lacking, the CAT may initiate the process of obtaining reachback expertise. The meteorology
officer provides the latest weather information. The MEU S-2 and the ARG N-2 provide an
intelligence update. The division of labor between these two officers should be clearly stated in
the SOP to avoid overlap. The entire CAT then conducts problem framing in the same manner as
the MCPP. Specifically—
 MEU and ARG commanders gain an understanding of the environment and the problem
identified during problem framing. This understanding is essential to the development of a
commander’s concept.
 Time-constrained units should have their IPB products ready prior to starting the planning
process. During problem framing, these products are updated if time permits. If IPB products
are not available, the staff generates them.
 Rapid planning requires that SOPs are already understood. Units lacking well-rehearsed SOPs
require additional time in all of the planning steps, leading to a more deliberate, slower
planning process.
 The lack of “orientation” time associated with rapid planning may require an initial staff
orientation. A staff orientation informs the planners of previously unknown mission-related
facts.
The beginning of this phase depends, however, on whether and how the MEU and ARG
commanders use the battlestaff. The workings of the CAT may be viewed directly by the battlestaff
or the mission planning cells through video teleconferencing or a channel on the ship’s secure,
closed-circuit television, affording them the same situational awareness as the CAT. If the
battlestaff or mission planning cells do not have connectivity with the CAT, they can conduct their
own version of problem framing simultaneously with the CAT; however, the results of the CAT’s
problem framing must be provided to the battlestaff or the mission planning cells to ensure all
planners have the same situational awareness. Orientation of the staff occurs shortly after
completion of problem framing to allow the battlestaff or the appropriate mission planning cells
(identified during problem framing) to convene in their designated spaces.
The MEU and ARG commanders, beginning with the supporting commander, provide their
planning guidance to the CAT and the battlestaff/mission planning cells at the conclusion of
problem framing or any required staff orientation. A mission commander may be assigned at this
point. The supported commander follows with his/her intent; an assessment of COGs and critical
vulnerabilities; ongoing, standby, and follow-on mission priorities; COA considerations and/or
restrictions; timing; phasing; warfighting function considerations; and other significant
information that addresses planning for R&S as well as the main mission(s).
The commander’s guidance reflects the experience and proficiency of the staff. The supporting
commander provides any additional guidance. The MEU S-3 provides the planning timeline and
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assigns definite times for completing each step. The locations for planning and any required
augmentation for their planning cells are determined. Augmentees acknowledge their requirements
and identify themselves to the mission commander. Participants adjourn to their respective mission
planning cells once problem framing is complete and the mission is determined.
Based on the type of mission assigned, the mission commander may also direct commencement of
specific preparations by the forces. For example, if the ACE has been assigned to conduct TRAP,
the ACE can simultaneously prepare the standard package of aircraft while the predesignated
ground force draws the standard list of ordnance and prepares mission-associated equipment.
Course of Action Development

For simplicity purposes, this step of the R2P2 assumes that the mission commander is developing
COAs. The mission commander begins COA development by convening the mission planning cell
and conducting roll call. A review significant material from the first step of the process may be
conducted if some cell members were not present for problem framing. This review may include
an intelligence brief by the S-2 and a presentation by the S-3 on the mission and the CAT’s problem
framing.
The mission commander summarizes the MEU and ARG commanders’ guidance and then presents
his/her own. If information is required to support COA development, the commander directs
specific members of the mission planning cell to gather the required information. The mission
planning cell then begins to develop COAs.
Depending on the guidance received, the mission planning cell may initially concentrate on a
specific COA. Effective COA development relies on intuitive decision-making and operational
SOPs to meet the reduced timeline of the R2P2. The planning cell develops each COA considering
such factors as—
 R&S linkup procedures, if applicable.
 Movement from the ship to the objective.
 Movement from objective back to the ship.
 Fire support.
 Command and control.
 Operations in the Information Environment.
 Special equipment.
 General timeline.
The mission planning cell prepares graphics and narratives for each COA. The COAs are typically
broken into phases and evaluated to ensure they are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable,
and complete. If surface reconnaissance is required, then the R&S mission commander convenes
a planning cell and simultaneously conducts R&S COA development.
To ensure the parallel planning efforts of the primary and R&S mission planning cells are
coordinated, liaisons from each cell remain in constant contact. For example, an R&S coordinator
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moves from planning cell to planning cell while keeping in close contact with the MEU S-3. Since
R&S elements are normally inserted prior to other forces, the R&S cell must develop their COAs
in a shorter period of time, but the R&S effort must support the information needs of the primary
mission commander.
The COA development brief can be presented to the CAT, the entire battlestaff, or only to the
MEU and ARG commanders, the MSE commanders, the primary mission commander, and a few
key staff officers. The R&S planning cell normally briefs first, while the primary mission planning
cell is still developing COAs. At the conclusion of the R&S COA brief, the R&S portion of the
operation can immediately move on to COA wargaming.
At this point, the primary mission commander has completed COA development and the planning
cell is preparing their own brief. The MEU and ARG commanders may approve the R&S COA
before receiving the COA brief for the primary mission. Alternatively, the MEU and ARG
commanders could delay COA wargaming and COA comparison and decision for the R&S
mission until deciding on a COA for the primary mission, but this delay would drastically reduce
time needed to prepare and launch R&S forces.
The COA development brief for the primary mission is given to the CAT and the battlestaff. If the
battlestaff concept is not employed, standby and follow-on mission planning cells and designated
additional staff officers and attachment leaders may also attend the COA brief. The brief follows
the unit planning SOP, but typically opens with the MEU S-3’s review of any ongoing/projected
missions and provision of updates/clarifications obtained from HHQ. The MEU S-2 and the ARG
N-2 provide an updated intelligence picture, focusing on changes since their last brief and
including any answers received to PIRs, FFIRs, or RFIs.
The mission commander summarizes the MEU and ARG mission, the envisioned end state,
measures of effectiveness, and the COAs. The mission commander presents the sketch; describes
expected events by phase; and provides the task organization, timeline, concept of fire support,
other significant details, and a list of key advantages/disadvantages for each COA.
Course of Action War Game

Once all the COAs have been briefed, staff officers, including appropriate attachment leaders and
SMEs, develop their staff estimates according to unit SOPs. To assist in reaching quick
conclusions and to avoid any oversights, each staff officer uses a prepared matrix that lists each
consideration relevant to their area of concern. For example, the S-4 could address supply
quantities and transportation means. Each staff member prepares an independent estimate that is
based solely on his/her area of expertise and includes each friendly COA’s strengths and
weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls as they apply to a warfighting function, staff
section, or attachment. These estimates assist commanders in reaching their decisions. The order
of briefing the estimates is established in the SOP. This brief should—
 Identify which COAs are unsupportable, if all are equally supportable, or if one is superior to
the others.
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 Identify any salient facts requiring the attention of the MEU and ARG commanders.
 Address impact of a COA on SOPs.
 Address impact of COAs on future operations.
For example, if “x” amount of helicopter and flight deck time is used today, then “y” amount will
be available tomorrow.
An intelligence officer is also usually tasked to produce an estimate from the enemy commander’s
perspective. The enemy commander’s viewpoint, as expressed by the S-2/N-2, and staff discussion
of hypothetical situations serve as additional wargaming within the time constraints of the planning
process. At a minimum, this estimate identifies the most dangerous and most likely COAs. The
recorder enters the information on a clearly visible staff estimate worksheet. The MSE
commanders who are not assigned as the mission commander also prepare and provide concise
estimates of supportability. An execution matrix or synchronization matrix is started or refined at
this point in the planning process. The mission commander makes the final input to avoid
influencing staff estimates. Rapid planning wargaming differs from the MCPP in that it may be
conducted internally within each staff section rather than being conducted as one large war game
where all MSEs and staff sections are represented. If time permits, the latter method is preferred.
Course of Action Comparison and Decision

Based on personal experiences and information acquired from COA wargaming, the MEU and
ARG commanders compare the COAs and rapidly reach a decision. Although the supported
commander is the lead decision maker, typically concurrence is sought from the supporting
commander, particularly when relying on assets from the supporting command. The commanders
may accept a single COA, modify a COA, or decide to execute something entirely different. Unless
the situation is changing rapidly, both time constraints and continuous involvement of the MEU
and ARG staff should preclude significant COA alterations. In announcing their decision, the
commanders provide their refined commander’s intent and any additional guidance needed to
finalize the plan.
Orders Development
During orders development, all echelons involved in the operation complete required detailed
planning for the approved COA, which is converted into the CONOPS. This vertical and horizontal
flow of information among the chain of command and all elements of the MEU and ARG is vital
to concurrent planning and preparation. If the mission forces or supporting echelons encounter any
difficulties or if the situation changes, the mission planning cell is alerted immediately and the
MEU and ARG commanders are notified if any significant alterations to the COA arise. If changes
in the situation threaten the suitability of the COA and if time permits, the commanders may direct
the staff and the mission planning cell to return to an earlier step in the planning process.
The mission commander immediately passes the results of COA comparison and decision to the
forces to assist their planning and preparations. The mission commander and the mission planning
cell continue to update and forward planning details as changes occur. Plans for supporting or
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contingency missions may also be developed. Such missions may be mass casualty, medical
evacuation, platoon-size reinforcement, initial terminal guidance, linkup, evasion, or recovery.
Supporting echelons, such as ships or other MSEs, receive updated information from their liaison
officers inside the mission planning cell. The mission planning cell produces a confirmation brief,
which serves as the draft OPORD.
The MEU S-3 creates and delivers the graphic and written CONOPS in addition to other
documents required by HHQ. To save time and ensure coordinated execution, the commander may
not approve the completed final order until after the confirmation brief.
Transition
The commander approves the mission for execution immediately following the confirmation brief;
therefore, the confirmation brief is the primary tool used to transition from planning to execution.
It is also the optimum means of final coordination within the time available and it can serve as a
form of rehearsal. The brief’s purpose is to ensure those involved in executing the plan completely
understand it and achieve situational awareness.
The brief also ensures agreement among force elements, since all critical participants are present.
Because the confirmation brief is primarily for those who have a role in executing the mission, all
available members of the mission planning cell and the mission force should attend. Supporting
elements, such as ship personnel, not represented in the mission planning cell should also attend.
All standby and follow-on mission planning cells that might be affected by the primary mission
should also observe the brief. The CAT and battlestaff members should attend to provide expertise
and answer questions.
Using the format in the unit planning SOP, the confirmation brief is conducted by the mission
commander. Each participant uses the SOP’s format and media in the brief to avoid overlaps or
omissions. The presentation media are collected by the scribe and assembled into a smart pack that
may serve as the written order. An initial version of the smart pack may be assembled during orders
development, but it should not be issued until sanctioned by the commander at the confirmation
brief. The original confirmation brief’s contents, together with any resulting changes or decisions,
must be provided to the R&S force, particularly if no representative attended, to ensure that the
final, approved mission is understood.
The brief’s major focus is on actions occurring in the objective area. The commander of the
element executing these actions, such as the raid force commander, provides a detailed explanation
of the intended actions and the specific tasks assigned to subordinate elements. During the brief,
the commanders and their staffs identify any potential problems. Conflicts that arise from the brief
are resolved or planned for prior to the completion of the brief. Additional planning must occur if
anything is briefed that is not yet planned for or coordinated.
The primary mission confirmation brief is usually limited to an hour. The MEU and ARG
commanders may schedule confirmation briefs for standby or follow-on missions following
completion of the primary mission brief. Upon completion of the primary mission brief, various
elements of the force may conduct supporting briefs to the same audience. The commander then
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designates time for subordinate element leaders to accomplish any remaining preparations and
rehearsals and a final inspection of troops and equipment is conducted to ensure mission readiness.
During the period before the launch of forces, the MEU and ARG command echelons supervise
the final preparations and coordination of subordinate elements and prepare for their own role in
the command and control of the operation. The SOPs establish command and control procedures
for various types of operations except that preparation time is limited. Assumptions and
preconditions are validated and branch and sequel planning should occur.
Sample Planning Matrix

Table H-1 is a sample planning matrix. Units normally develop their own timelines and SOPs.
Table H-1. Sample Planning Matrix.
Command and Concurrent and

Timelines Who Staff Actions Products Parallel Actions
Problem Framing
0:00-0:30 CAT Receipt of mission Mission statement Battlestaff forms
Commander’s orientation Commander’s intent Cross-deck requirements
Break out IPB and intelligence folders Commander’s planning guidance Command and staff
Conduct problem framing Updated IPB products supervision
Specified tasks
Implied tasks
Essential tasks
Limitations (constraints [must do]
and restraints [cannot do])
Assumptions
Resource/SME shortfalls
COG analysis
Approved CCIRs
0:30-0:50 Battlestaff Initial staff orientation WARNORDs Acknowledge receipt

Determine information Planning schedule Issue planning schedule
requirements RFIs R&S planning
Commander’s planning guidance Initial staff estimates Command and staff
supervision
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Table H-1. Sample Planning Matrix (Continued).

COA Development
0:50-1:10 Battlestaff Convene planning cells COAs written and graphics R&S planning/brief
(if not already done) developed Command and staff
Update IPB/intelligence (time and distance identified) supervision
Develop COA(s) Each potential response force
commander prepares actions in
objective area plan
Air support requirement to carrier
battle group
Staff/subordinate command
estimates
Commander’s wargaming
guidance and evaluation criteria
COA War Game/COA Comparison and Decision

1:10-1:30 Battlestaff Conduct COA war game War game results Response force/support
Refine COAs/IPB WARNORDs element planning
COAs briefed CONOPS Command and staff
supervision
Compare/evaluate COAs Execution matrix
Commander makes decision Refined staff estimates
Identify branches/sequels
Updated CCIRs
Orders Development
1:30-3:00 Battlestaff Refine IPB Timeline Develop timeline/plan
Prepare OPORD Graphic and overlay R&S launch
Order reconciliation Fire support plan Command and staff
Order crosswalk Landing plan supervision
OPORD approval Communications plan Cross-decker return
Execution checklist Final planning conference
WARNORDs
Concept of operations message
to HHQ
Charts/maps
Confirmation briefing slides
Transition
3:00-4:00 Battlestaff Confirmation brief/issue the order Total understanding by all hands Response from force
of the plan commander
Briefs/response from
force/support elements
4:00-6:00 Amphibious Drills All hands ready to execute Alternate/sequel plan(s)

Task Force mission developed
115
MCWP 5-10
116
APPENDIX I
INTERAGENCY/INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION
Joint and multinational operations are integrated at the strategic level and coordinated at the
operational and tactical level with the activities of participating US Government departments and
agencies, relevant international organizations, NGOs, host nation agencies, and elements of the
private sector to achieve common objectives. Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation,
for additional information.
Annex V (Interagency/Interorganizational Coordination) of the OPORD or OPLAN reflects the
commander’s priorities and approach to interorganizational cooperation. Information in the annex
provides a basis for staff and liaison interaction with these numerous organizations and agencies.
Continued coordination strengthens the whole of government efforts and improves the probability
of mission success. In developing Annex V, consideration should be given to—
 Key Interagency Strategies. Marine Corps planners must become familiar with interagency
strategies, assessments, and plans at all levels (see table I-1). Requests for relevant interagency
strategies, such as counternarcotics or counterterrorism, must be made through the appropriate
interagency coordination center within each geographic combatant command or Marine Corps
component command. A basic understanding of these strategies, assessments, or plans is
critical to enable interagency activities.
 Assessment and Planning Frameworks. Interagency partners in many cases have developed
assessment tools and have conducted or are conducting assessments in the area of operations.
These assessments, coupled with their authorities, make interagency coordination a valuable
process. This is especially true for operations in the information environment, where the
application of military information power complements diplomatic efforts, federal law
enforcement agencies as well as cyberspace and space operations. All security cooperation
events will require assessment, monitoring, and evaluation to determine the outcomes of
partner capability development. (For more information, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.)
Assessment tools, such as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, should be the
starting point for an interagency team to assess conflict systematically and collaboratively
prepare for interagency planning. Planners may employ other tools, such as Measuring Peace
in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework and the Interagency Management
System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to facilitate interagency activities. The United
States Institute of Peace publication Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction
is an example of a reference that would augment the applicable joint doctrine, such as JP 3-07,
Stability. A liaison or staff officer assigned to interorganizational cooperation needs to study
the relevant joint and agency publications. Interagency planning structures will not supersede
Marine Corps planning structures.
MCWP 5-10
Table I-1. Interagency Documents.

Document Primary Office or Responsibility Summary of Document
Guidance for Employment of the Force Department of Defense Annual classified document that
prioritizes theater strategic end
states that include interagency
cooperation and integration.
Country Development Cooperation United States Agency for 5-year look at the needs of a
Strategy International Development country.
(USAID)
Bureau Strategic Plan Department of State bureaus, Annual interagency objectives
both regional and functional and performance result indicators.
Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) Chief of mission; to include all Annual interagency objectives by
other US Government agencies priority.
that reside on the country team
Operational Plan USAID mission in country Annual plan that feeds into
mission support plan.
118
APPENDIX J
BASIC OPERATION PLAN,
OPERATION ORDER, AND ATTACHMENTS
This appendix provides instructions and formats that govern the development of a basic operation
plan and order, referred to as OPLAN and OPORD, respectively. The formats are based on the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03A, Planning and Execution
Formats and Guidance, and should be used by all staffs, subordinate commands, and support
agencies.
This appendix applies to commanders of Marine Corps forces at all levels. It contains two sections.
Section I provides general administrative guidance for writing a basic operation plan or order. An
operation plan/order foldout is included at the end of this publication for quick reference. Section
II includes sample formats of a plan summary, operation plan or order, and other attachments.
Sample formats are descriptive in nature and identify the information that needs to be placed in
the appropriate paragraph. The formats provided in section II are followed except when, in the
judgment of the commander, modifications are required. Only those annexes, appendices, and tabs
applicable to the level of command are required within the operation order.
SECTION I. GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE

The arrangement of information in a basic operation plan or order will conform to the formats
shown in this appendix. Paragraph and subparagraph headings indicated in the format will always
appear in each plan. In OPORDs, if information or instructions are not required in a particular
paragraph, then that paragraph is noted as “not applicable” to show that consideration has been
given to that part of the order. Further subdivisions, if required, should conform to the basic system
of paragraph titles and numbering discussed below. The sequencing for naming supplemental
documents to the basic plan/order is as follows: annex, appendix, tab, exhibit.
The last page of the basic operation plan or order and each attachment will contain a list of any
included documents. The basic operation order or plan should refer to each annex. Information
provided in the basic operation order or plan is not normally repeated in the attachments.
Paragraphing, Titling, and Numbering

Paragraph titles are a combination of upper and lower case letters that are underlined, as in
Situation. All subparagraphs and subtitles are upper and lower case and underlined, as in Concept
of Operations, except forces, commands, or agencies. Forces, commands, and agencies are
capitalized and underlined only in titles, as in SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF.
When a paragraph is subdivided, it must have at least two subdivisions. When paragraphs are
subdivided, they will be numbered and lettered as follows:
MCWP 5-10
1.
a.
(1)
(a)
1
a
(1)
(a)
Subsequent lines of text for each paragraph may be align flush with the left margin or equally
indented (as in the following examples) as long as consistency is maintained.
Example 1: Flush with left margin
a. (U) Situation. Follow-on text. Text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text,
text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text.
Example 2: Equally Indented.
a. (U) Situation. Follow-on text. Text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text,
text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text, text.
Classification Markings
Mark front and back covers with the overall classification of the operation plan/order. Mark the
first page of plan elements—plan summary, basic plan, and each annex, appendix, tab, and
exhibit—with the overall classification of the element. Unclassified plan elements are marked as
such. Mark each interior page of the classified plan element with the highest classification and
sensitive classified information code word of the material contained on the page. If the page does
not contain classified material, mark it as unclassified. Center classification markings between the
left and right margins at both the top and bottom of the page. The classification marking is written
in uppercase letters, as in UNCLASSIFIED.
All paragraphs will have a security classification level. Use parenthetical symbols (TS), (S), (C),
and (U) to indicate the security classification level of titles, paragraphs, and subparagraphs. For
additional guidance related to classification marking for documents, see Department of Defense
Manual 5200.01 Volume 1, DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and
Declassification.
Page Numbering
Page numbers are located at the bottom of the page and centered. Page C-1-A-3, for example,
denotes page 3 of Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex C. There is a single space between the page
number and the classification marking.
120
Formatting Instructions
The following list provides a line-by-line format for the OPLAN and OPORD:
Line 1—Classification.
Line 2—Changes from Oral Orders. These changes are used when oral orders regarding this
operation were previously issued and are enclosed in parentheses. Example: “(No change from
oral orders except paragraphs 3b and 3f.).” This phrase is omitted in plans and in orders when no
oral orders were issued.
Lines 3–7—Heading Data. The heading data is formatted as follows:
Copy no. ___ of ____ copies
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
Message reference number
 The first line of the heading is the copy number assigned by the issuing headquarters. A copy
number is given to each copy. It is not shown on attached annexes. A log will be maintained
of specific copies issued to addressees.
 The second line is the official designation of the command. It is always capitalized. Use a code
name if required for security.
 The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designator, or geographic
location (including coordinates). The place of issue is always capitalized.
 The fourth line is the date or date-time group the plan or order is signed, issued, and becomes
effective unless specified otherwise in coordinating instructions.
 The fifth line is the message reference number. It is assigned by the originator and contains
letters, numbers, or a combination of the two. The message reference number has no
connection with the message center numbering system. Annexes issued separately are assigned
different message reference numbers. It allows their acknowledgement in the clear.
Line 8—Title. Orders are numbered consecutively for a calendar year. Two or more orders issued
on the same day are given consecutive numbers. A joint operation plan or order is so designated.
The code name, if any, is shown.
Line 9—Type of Document.
Lines 10–13—References. Documents, such as maps, charts, photo maps, or standing operating
procedures, necessary for understanding must be available to recipients. This entry is always
included. Use “References: None” when applicable. Map entries include series number, country,
sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.
Line 14—Time Zone. If the time zone is the same for the place of issue and execution and will
be the same throughout execution, then this entry may be omitted. If the time zone is different in
121
MCWP 5-10
the area of execution, as frequently occurs in amphibious or airborne operations, then state when
the indicated time zone becomes effective.
Line 15—Task Organization. Task organization may be shown in the following ways:
 As an unnumbered entry before paragraph 1 (Situation). Used when entire command of issuing
headquarters is organized into task organizations for a particular operation and task
organizations are too complicated to be shown using other methods.
 If there is no change to previous task organization, show as “No change.”
 Under the proper subparagraph of paragraph 3. This method is the simplest and preferred in a
continuing ground combat situation. Show as “No change except paragraph 3b . . .”
 As an annex when lengthy, such as for a division or higher. It is used in amphibious operations,
because it permits early dissemination and assists concurrent planning, and where planning
precedes operation by a considerable period of time.
The organization of the issuing headquarters, including Service and administrative groupings that
will perform normal functions, is the first entry. Following that, each task grouping to receive a
tactical mission is shown in the sequence in which the missions are assigned in paragraph 3.
See fig. J-1 for an example of the aforementioned lines 1–15.
1 CLASSIFICATION
2 (No change from oral orders)
3 Copy no.__ of__ copies
4 I MEF
5 GREENTOWN, BLUELAND
6 DD Mmm YYYY
7 ABD-1
8 OPERATION ORDER 0002-10 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)
9 BASIC ORDER (U)
10 (U) REFERENCES:
11 (a) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheet G-2 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND),edition 12,
12 1:1,000,000
13 (b) USINDOPACOM Planning Directive, DD Mmm YYYY
14 (U) TIME ZONE: Zulu
15 (U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A
Figure J-1. Sample Operation Plan or Operation Order Format, Lines 1–15.
122
Lines 17–18—General. For plans, describe the general politico-military environment that would
establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. For orders, this can be the
commander’s estimate of the situation. In both cases, the lines include information obtained during
the ongoing design effort.
Line 19—Battlespace. Battlespace includes the higher commander’s area of operation and the
command’s areas of interest, influence, and operations described by physical area and forces of
concern.
Line 20—Enemy Forces. The enemy forces section includes information vital to the entire
command or information likely to affect mission accomplishment. It may refer to such attachments
as the intelligence annex, operation overlay (if enemy information is shown), or intelligence
summaries. It contains disposition, intent, objectives, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and
courses of action.
Line 21—Friendly Forces. Friendly forces include information on own forces having a bearing
on the operation (higher, adjacent, and supporting). Artillery is listed as the first supporting unit
and then others are listed alphabetically. It may reference an annex or the operation overlay.
Line 22—Attachments and Detachments. Nonorganic units attached and/or organic units
detached from the unit temporarily.
Lines 23–25—Paragraph 2. Paragraph 2 is the mission statement. There are no subparagraphs.
The mission is always stated here even if shown on an operation overlay or map.
Line 26—Paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 addresses execution.
Line 27—Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal expression of
the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It must be clearly and concisely written. The
purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—to depart
from the plan when the task assigned is no longer appropriate to the situation—in a way that is
consistent with the higher commander’s aims.
Line 28—Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is a summary statement of how the
operation will be accomplished. It amplifies paragraph 2 by providing the method, end state, and
other considerations. It may be shown graphically or published as an appendix to annex C. Specific
unit designations are not used.
Lines 29–35—Tasks. This subparagraph identifies tasks to subordinate elements. The highest
priority task or tasks to subordinates will include the purpose, as in “in order to …” Additional
tasks may simply be listed, if the purpose is understood. Each unit (organic, attached, supporting,
etc.) or tactical grouping that is executing a tactical task is assigned a separate, numbered
subparagraph. All tactical tasks must be listed in the body of the basic order. List tasks for major
subordinate elements as follows:
 Offensive order—Ground combat units (infantry first followed by artillery and combat support
units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat units or elements (aircraft units, combat
support, combat service support), and combat service support units or logistic elements.
 Defensive order—Units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first. Ground and aviation
combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order followed by other
units alphabetically.
123
MCWP 5-10
Each tactical task assignment may show the assets (attached or in support) available to the unit or
element for the operation first, then tasks are enumerated. For each subordinate element, tasks are
listed in priority of importance or in sequential order.
Line 36—Reserve. The reserve is tasked separately from the remainder of the units. It is usually
designated the main effort when committed. If there is no reserve designated, then so state.
Line 37—Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. Commander’s critical
information requirements identify information the commander has deemed critical to maintaining
situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decision-
making. The commander’s critical information requirements consist of priority intelligence
requirements and friendly force information requirements that will be numbered (e.g., PIR #1: Is
the 2d Centralian Armored Brigade crossing the Green River?). Each numbered priority
intelligence requirement and friendly force information requirement will include anticipated
decisions and associated branches and sequels, as developed during the Marine Corps Planning
Process. Operations divided into multiple phases may have separate commander’s critical
information requirements lists for each phase.
Line 38—Coordinating Instructions. This paragraph is the final subparagraph in paragraph 3. It
contains instructions common to two or more units, coordinating details and control measures
applicable to the command as a whole, and time or conditions when the plan is to be executed. It
refers to annexes or references for coordinating details when appropriate. Communications
instructions are shown in paragraph 5 only.
Line 39—Paragraph 4. Paragraph 4 contains logistic and personnel information and instructions
for the operation. At a minimum, this paragraph provides a summary of the concept of logistics,
then directs readers to the appropriate annexes and appendices.
Line 40—Page number.
See fig. J-2 for an example of the aforementioned lines 16–41.
124
16
16 1. (U) Situation
17 a. (U) General. With the failure of deterrence, Blueland forces crossed the Orangeland border and
18 have been successful in their initial battles.
19 b. (U) Battlespace. See appendix 18 to annex C.
20 c. (U) Enemy Forces. See annex B and current INTSUMs [intelligence summaries].
21 d. (U) Friendly Forces
22 e. (U) Attachments and Detachments
23 2. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations to defeat adversary
24 forces in zone in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to continue offensive operation into
25 Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.
26 3. (U) Execution
27 a. (U) Commander’s Intent
28 b. (U) Concept of Operations. This operation will be conducted in three phases.
29 c. (U) Tasks
30 (1) (U) 1st MARINE DIVISION (Rein)
31 (2) (U) 3d MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
32 (3) (U) 1st MARINE LOGISTICS GROUP (-) (Rein)
33 (4) (U) SPECIAL PURPOSE MAGTF-B
34 (5) (U) REAR AREA COMMANDER
35 (6) (U) MIG
36 d. (U) MEF Reserve
37 e. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
38 f. (U) Coordinating Instructions
39 4. (U) Administration and Logistics
40 Page number
41 CLASSIFICATION
Figure J-2. Sample Operation Plan or Operation Order Format, Lines 16–41.
Page two of the OPLAN or OPORD provides the following information and is exemplified in
fig. J-3:
Lines 2–6—Paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 contains instructions that establish and maintain command
and signal procedures.
125
MCWP 5-10
 Command Relationships. Used in a large operation or when relationships are unusual,

otherwise omitted. If command relationships are clarified in the task organization, there is no
requirement to restate them in this paragraph.
 Command Posts and Headquarters. May reference operations overlay for locations.
 Succession to Command. Designates the succession to command for the operation.
 Signal. Usually references annex K and other communication publications, such as standing
operating procedures or communications-electronics operating instructions. Includes
instructions or restrictions about communications-electronics, such as radio restrictions or
pyrotechnic signals.
Use additional subparagraphs to show location and time of opening communications centers,
recognition and identification instructions, code words and names, and liaisons.
Line 7—Acknowledgement Instructions. Acknowledgement instructions are included in every
order and in separately issued portions. It ensures that recipients receive and understand the order.
Lines 8–10—Signature and Authentication. The basic operation plan or order and each annex
within are signed or authenticated by the commander. Full signature blocks are used. Appropriate
officers may be given authority to sign portions of the order. The commander is the only person
authorized to sign or approve any portion of the order unless by direction authority has been
granted to another individual.
 Appendices, tabs, exhibits, and maps do not require signature or authentication except when
distributed separately from the basic operation order or plan.
 Original is signed by commander, with name, rank and service, and title:
Name,
Rank and Service
Title
Lines 11–34—Annexes. Annexes form a portion of the completed plan or order. They pertain to
a particular concept, subject, or coordination aspect that is too voluminous, of insufficient general
interest, or in an irregular form (e.g., overlays, graphs, or tables) for the body of the plan or order.
Annexes amplify and clarify information and details within the basic operation plan or order.
Sequence and lettering must not be changed, but annexes may be omitted when not required.
Annexes are amplified where necessary by appendices to annexes, tabs to appendices, and exhibits
to tabs.
Annex formats and designations shown in this appendix are mandatory unless otherwise indicated.
The annex title is upper and lower case. Within the body of the basic operation plan or order, the
annex title is also enclosed in parentheses. When any of these annexes are not required, the annex
is noted as “not used” or “not applicable” in the table of contents. Elements that will be developed
later may be noted as “to be issued.”
Annex format is preferred for other attachments, such as appendices or tabs, but it may be altered
when information or instructions must be included for which no provision is made in the standard
format.
Additional annexes may be added when necessary to permit distribution separate from the basic
operation order or plan or when information must be included where no provision is made in
standard annexes.
126
Usually annexes A, B, C, D, J, and K will be provided as part of the basic operation order or plan.
Develop additional annexes and their associated appendices in an abbreviated format for those
areas significantly affecting mission accomplishment.
Lines 35–39—Authentication. Authenticated by deputy, executive officer, chief of staff, or G-
3/S-3 when the commander’s or executive officer’s signature is on the original only. This
authentication appears on all other copies. The original is signed by chief of staff/executive officer:
OFFICIAL:
Name
Rank and Service
Title
Line 40—Page number.
127
MCWP 5-10
1 CLASSIFICATION
2 5. (U) Command and Signal
3 a. (U) Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
4 b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters.
5 c. (U) Succession to Command.
6 d. (U) Signal. See Annex K (Combat Information Systems)
7 ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
8 GERALD C. THOMAS
9 Lieutenant General, USMC
10 Commanding
11 ANNEXES:
12 A—Task Organization
13 B—Intelligence
14 C—Operations
15 D—Logistics/Combat Service Support
16 E—Personnel
17 G—Civil-Military Operations
18 H—Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
19 I—Information
20 J—Command Relationships
21 K—Combat Information Systems
22 L—Environmental Considerations
23 M—Geospatial Information and Services
24 N—Space Operations
25 P—Host-Nation Support
26 Q—Medical Services
27 R—Reports
28 S—Special Technical Operations
29 T—Network Engagement
30 U—Information Management
31 V—Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination
32 W—Aviation Operations
33 X—Execution Checklist
34 Z—Distribution
35 OFFICIAL
36 s/
37 M.B. TWINING
38 Colonel, USMC
39 AC/S G-3
40 Page number
41 CLASSIFICATION
Figure J-3. Sample Operation Plan or Operation Order Format, Page 2.
128
SECTION II. SAMPLE FORMATS

Section II provides examples of a plan summary, basic operation plan or order, and select annexes,
appendices, and tabs. Sample formats are descriptive in nature and identify the information
necessary for the appropriate paragraph. For annexes and appendices, commanders may modify
the format, to include using graphs and slides, to meet the needs of the unit and their operation.
The following table of contents lists standing formats. Bold text indicates the format is provided
in this section. Examples for many of the annexes and appendices may be found in CJSCM
3130.03A, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.
Page
Plan Summary 134
Basic Order or Plan 137
Annex A. Task Organization 143
Appendix 1. Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
Appendix 2. Shortfall Identification
Appendix 3. Flexible Response and Flexible Deterrent Options
Annex B. Intelligence 146

Appendix 1. Priority Intelligence Requirements
Appendix 2. Signals Intelligence
Tab A. Communications Intelligence Collection Requirements
Tab B. Operational Electronic Intelligence Collection Requirements
Appendix 3. Counterintelligence
Tab A. Counterintelligence Target List
Tab B. Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Report
Tab C. Designation of Theater Counterintelligence Executive Agency
Appendix 4. Targeting Intelligence
Tab A. Target List (Conventional)
Appendix 5. Human Resource Intelligence
Tab A. HUMINT Operations Cell Operations
Tab B. EPW/Civilian Detainees
Appendix 6. Intelligence Support to Operations in the Information Environment
Appendix 7. Imagery Intelligence
Appendix 8. Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Appendix 9. Captured Adversary Equipment
Tab A. Specific Prioritized Intelligence Collection Requirements
Tab B. Equipment Releasable for Operational Purposes
Appendix 10. National Intelligence Support Team
Appendix 11. Intelligence Estimate
Appendix 12. Intelligence Products
Appendix 13. Intelligence Collection Plan
Appendix 14. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
Appendix 15. Geographic Intelligence
Appendix 16. Intelligence Operations
Appendix 17. Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
Annex C. Operations 151

Appendix 1. Nuclear Operations
Appendix 2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Operations
129
MCWP 5-10
Page
Appendix 3. Special Operations
Appendix 4. Evasion and Recovery Operations
Appendix 5. Risk
Appendix 6. Rules of Engagement
Appendix 7. Reconnaissance
Appendix 8. Air Base Operability
Appendix 9. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Appendix 10. Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Appendix 11. Amphibious Operations
Tab A. Amphibious Advance Force Operations
Tab B. Embarkation Plan
Tab C. Landing Plan
Tab D. Rehearsal Plan
Tab E. CSS Control Agencies Plan
Tab F. Assault Follow-On Echelon Plan
Tab G. Maritime Prepositioing Force Plan
Appendix 12. Force Protection
Tab A. Combating Terrorism
Tab B. Physical Security
Tab C. Base Defense
Tab D. Counter-Improvised Device Plan
Appendix 13. Rear Area Operations
Appendix 14. Cyberspace Operations
Appendix 15. Liaison Plan
Appendix 16. Operations Overlay 154
Appendix 17. Fire Support
Tab A. Aviation Support
Tab B. Artillery Support Plan
Tab C. Naval Surface Fire Support
Tab D. Current Fire Support Operations
Tab E. Targeting
Tab F. Fire Support Coordination Plan
Tab G. Fire Support System Plan
Tab H. Reports
Tab I. Coalition Fire Support Plan
Tab J. Counterfire Plan
Tab K. Liaison Plan
Appendix 18. Countermechanized Plan
Appendix 19. Obstacle and Barrier Plan
Appendix 20. Breaching Plan
Appendix 21. Decision Support Matrix and Template
Appendix 22. Operation Assessment Plan
Appendix 23. Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees Plan
Appendix 24. Authorities Matrix
Annex D. Logistics/Combat Service Support 156

Appendix 1. Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply
Appendix 2. Mortuary Affairs
Appendix 3. Sustainability Analysis
Appendix 4. Mobility and Transportation
Tab A. En Route Support Requirements
130
Page
Tab B. Reception and Onward Movement
Appendix 5. Civil Engineering Support Plan
Appendix 6. Nonnuclear Ammunition
Tab A. Munitions Matrix
Appendix 7. Supply
Appendix 8. Services
Appendix 9. Health Services
Appendix 10. Aviation Logistic Support (normally in the aviation combat element plan or order)
Appendix 11. External Support
Appendix 12. Maintenance
Appendix 13. General Engineering
Annex E. Personnel
Appendix 1. Personnel Replacement Plan
Appendix 2. Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel
Appendix 3. Finance and Disbursing
Appendix 4. Legal
Appendix 5. Military Postal Service
Tab A. Aerial Mail Terminals
Tab B. Military Post Offices
Appendix 6. Chaplain Activities
Tab A. Inter-Service Chaplain Support
Tab B. Host-Nation Religious Support
Tab C. Commander-Staff Chaplain Relationships
Annex G. Civil-Military Operations

Appendix 1. Population and Resource Control (Dislocated Civilians Operations)
Appendix 2. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
Appendix 3. Nations Assistance Operations
Annex H. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
Annex I. Information 163

Appendix 1. Assure Enterprise Command and Control and Critical Systems
Appendix 2. Provide Information Environment Battlespace Awareness
Appendix 3. Attack and Exploit Networks, Systems, and Information
Appendix 4. Inform Domestic and International Audiences
Tab A. Communication Strategy and Operations
Exhibit 1. Personnel, Equipment, and Support Requirements for Joint Information Bureaus and Sub-
Joint Information Bureaus
Exhibit 2. General Ground Rules for the Media
Exhibit 3. Department of Defense National Media Pool
Appendix 5. Influence Foreign Target Audiences
Tab A. Military Information Support Operations
Appendix 6. Deceive Foreign Target Audiences
Tab A. Military Deception 168
Exhibit 2. MILDEC Intelligence 173
Attachment A. MILDEC Priority Intelligence Requirements 176
Appendix 7. Control Operations in the Information Environment Capabilities, Resources, and Activities
Appendix 8. Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
Tab A. Electronic Warfare
Tab B. Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
131
MCWP 5-10
Page
Appendix 9. Cyberspace Operations
Tab A. Defensive Cyberspace Operations
Tab B. Offensive Cyberspace Operations
Tab C. Department of Defense Information Network Operations
Appendix 10. Civil-Military Operations
Appendix 11. Operations Security
Tab A. Signature Management
Annex J. Command Relationships 177

Appendix 1. Command Relationships Diagram 180
Annex K. Combat Information Systems
Appendix 1. Information Systems Security
Appendix 2. Defensive Actions in the Information Environment
Appendix 3. Communications Planning
Appendix 4. Satellite Communications Planning
Tab A. UHF SATCOM Network List
Tab B. SHF SATCOM Network List
Tab C. EHF SATCOM Network List
Appendix 5. Department of Defense Information Network Operations
Appendix 6. Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
Annex L. Environmental Considerations
Annex M. Geospatial Information and Services

Appendix 1. Geospatial Information and Services List
Annex N. Space Operations
Annex P. Host-Nation Support

Appendix 1. List of Host-Nation Support Agreements
Annex Q. Medical Services

Appendix 1. Joint Medical Regulating System
Appendix 2. Joint Blood Program
Appendix 3. Hospitalization
Appendix 4. Patient Evacuation
Appendix 4. Returns to Duty
Appendix 5. Medical Logistics (Class 8A) System
Appendix 6. Preventive Medicine
Appendix 7. Host Nation Medical Support
Appendix 9. Patient Evacuation
Appendix 8. Medical Communications and Information Systems
Appendix 10. Medical Sustainability Assessment
Appendix 11. Medical Intelligence Support to Military Operations
Appendix 12. Veterinary Medicine
Appendix 13. Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identifications
Appendix 14. Detainee Care
Annex R: Reports
Annex S. Special Technical Operations
132
Page
Annex T. Network Engagement 181
Annex U. Information Management
Annex V. Interagency/Interorganizational Coordination 184
Annex W. Aviation Operations

Appendix 1. Air Defense/Antiair Warfare
Appendix 2. Offensive Air Support
Appendix 3. Assault Support
Appendix 4. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
Appendix 5. Supplementary Air Operations
Appendix 6. Aircraft Armament
Appendix 7. Air Control
Appendix 8. Air Communications
Appendix 9. Air Movement Plan/Flight Ferry
Appendix 10. Aircraft Schedules
Appendix 11. Air Tasking
Annex X. Execution Checklist 187
Annex Z. Distribution
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF A PLAN SUMMARY

A plan summary allows commanders, staffs, and other individuals and agencies to quickly review
the envisioned activities of a command. They are particularly useful in creating situational
awareness in newly assigned personnel and in higher, supporting, and adjacent commands. A plan
summary is normally only prepared at higher levels of command, such as the Marine Corps
component commands and Marine expeditionary force, in support of a unified command plan.
CLASSIFICATION
Copy no. ___of ___ copies
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
OPLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)
PLAN SUMMARY (U)
1. (U) Purpose
a.(U) Describe the purpose to be achieved by executing the plan and the desired state. If this
is a supporting plan, indicate what plan it supports.
b.(U) Include a statement similar to the following: “This summary provides military decision
makers with the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates
available at the time of preparation and is subject to modification in the context of a specific
contingency. The information contained herein must be updated before use in adopting courses
of action in a particular situation.”
2. (U) Conditions for Implementation/Execution
a.(U) Politico-Military Situation. Summarize the politico-military situation in which
execution of the plan should be considered.
b.(U) Legal Considerations. Summarize any legal considerations that may affect plan
implementation (status of forces, rules of engagement, international agreements, law of
armed conflict).
3. (U) Operations to be Conducted
a. (U) Forces Assigned. Summarize the major forces (assigned, attached, or supporting) and
augmentation required from other sources.
b. (U) Deployment. Summarize the movements of forces necessary to place combat forces in
the operational area. When applicable, include operational security measures to be carried out
before full execution of the plan.
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c. (U) Employment. State the general nature of combat operations to be conducted, including
amphibious operations, operations in the information environment, or electronic warfare, when
applicable. These operations may be discussed in the phases of the operations. A mission
statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations may be written for each phase. This
discussion may contain a concise statement of the operation’s end state and end state for each
phase. It may include how unit dispositions at the end of each phase facilitate transition to the
next phase. A discussion of the commander’s estimate of the enemy’s intent may also be
included.
d. (U) Supporting Plans. List any requirements for supporting plans to be prepared by
subordinate and supporting commands or agencies.
e. (U) Collateral Plans. List operation plans that could be implemented before, during, or after
the subject plan.
4. (U) Key Assumptions. List assumptions deemed essential to the success of the plan, including
the degree of mobilization and mobility (sealift and airlift) assumed.
5. (U) Operational Constraints. List major factors that may impede accomplishment of the
mission.
6. (U) Time to Commence Effective Operations. If appropriate, include a table showing the
required time-phased buildup of combat forces in the objective area. Indicate which forces must
be available in the operational area before effective operations can begin. Show the elapsed time,
following an order to implement the plan, when each significant level of combat force required by
the plan could begin effective operations in the objective area. Note that the lowest level of force
reported will be the smallest force increment that could initiate effective operations. List
successively higher force levels up to the maximum level called for in the basic plan. List any
assumptions applied in preparing the table that are not specified in the plan. In determining the
time to commence effective operations, consider forces to be deployed or employed to be at normal
conditions of readiness; that is, no preparations except those required for force protection. Also
consider the following additional factors, as appropriate.
a. (U) Time required to carry out information operations as specified in the relevant plans.
b. (U) Time for preparation and transmission of necessary orders.
c. (U) Reaction time, including all necessary preparations for movement and, if necessary,
staging.
d. (U) Availability and capability of strategic transportation resources and facilities.
e. (U) Time en route to the operational area, using available lift and considering possible
restrictions on the use of deployment routes.
f. (U) Possible enemy action against forces in transit.
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g. (U) Reception and throughput capabilities of overseas terminals, where appropriate.
h. (U) Time to marry up forces and equipment deployed by separate movement modes,
including marry up with prepositioned equipment, when appropriate.
i. (U) Availability and capability of transport systems within the area of operations, where
required.
j. (U) Time required in the operational area for final preparation of forces, including
movement to the objective area before employment.
7. (U) Command Relationships. Summarize the command arrangements to be employed on
execution.
8. (U) Logistic Appraisal. Provide an estimate of logistic feasibility for the plan.
9. (U) Personnel Appraisal. Provide an estimate of personnel feasibility for this plan.
10. (U) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Provide
a consolidated listing and impact assessment of force, movement, and support shortfalls and
limiting factors that impact significantly on the conduct of operations. Identify shortfalls in joint
and Service doctrine, interoperability, and training. Specify the tasks that cannot be accomplished
in view of the shortfalls. Include specific documentation of each significant shortfall and limiting
factor and the efforts to resolve it in the appropriate annex to the plan. Address additional forces,
including combat support and combat service support, recommended by the supported commander
to reduce risk but not allocated in the plan summary. Do not include such forces in Appendix 2 to
Annex A (Task Organization) of the plan.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF A BASIC ORDER OR PLAN

CLASSIFICATION
Copy no. of copies

PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

TITLE (U)
REFERENCES: List any maps, charts, standing operating procedures, or other documents
essential to understanding the order or plan.
(U) TIME ZONE: Enter if area of operations is different than place of issue.
(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.
1. (U) Situation
a.(U) General. (May be omitted.) Describe the general politico-military environment that
would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the plan. If applicable, state US
policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties and outline political decisions needed
from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations
to accomplish US military missions. Similarly, this paragraph can also contain the results of
the commander’s design, providing the larger context for the plan or order by explaining his/her
understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem that the mission
statement and concept of operations are meant to solve.
b. (U) Battlespace
(1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander’s Area of Operations. Describe the
higher commander’s area of operations. A map may also be included.
(2) (U) Area of Interest. Describe the commander’s area of interest covered by the basic
operation order or plan. This description should address all air, ground, and maritime areas
that directly affect the operation. A map may also be included.
(3) (U) Area of Operations. Describe the specific area covered by the operation. A map may
also be included.
c. (U) Enemy Forces. Identify the opposing forces expected on execution (location,
disposition) and appraise their general capabilities and possible actions (defend, reinforce,
attack, withdraw, and delay). Address enemy information that is vital for the entire command
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or is likely to affect mission accomplishment. See Annex B (Intelligence) for details. Address
known or potential unconventional, terrorist, separatist, criminal, etc. threats, as appropriate.
When applicable, identify the enemy’s operational and tactical center(s) of gravity.
d. (U) Friendly Forces
(1) (U) This paragraph provides information on nonorganic forces having a bearing on the
operation. The information is presented in the following order:
(a) (U) Higher. State the mission statement and commander’s intent of the higher
commander.
(b) (U) Adjacent. State the mission statement or relevant tasks of adjacent commanders.
(c) (U) Supporting. State the command relationship with the supporting commanders
(operational control, tactical control, general support, direct support) or relevant tasks
of supporting commanders.
(2) (U) Identify applicable friendly centers of gravity that require support and protection
for successful mission accomplishment.
(3) (U) If applicable, list the tasks of government, international, nongovernment, host
nation, and private sector departments, agencies, and organizations associated with the
operation, such as Department of State, Doctors Without Borders, or Red Cross.
e. (U) Civilian Populace. List circumstances or factors regarding tribes, clans, religious, or
ethnic groups that can impact operations.
f. (U) Attachments and Detachments. List nonorganic units attached to or units detached from
the issuing headquarters. As appropriate, state “See Task Organization.” If no units are
attached or detached, state “None.”
g. (U) Assumptions. (Omitted in operation orders.) List all assumptions on which the plan is
based.
h. (U) Legal Considerations. List those significant legal considerations on which the plan is
based, such as status of forces agreements or law of land warfare.
2. (U) Mission. A concise statement of the tasks and purpose of the operation. State the who,
what, when, where, why, and as much of the how as necessary to ensure command, control, and
coordination. The who, what, when, and where are derived from the essential tasks. The why is
derived from the purpose of the operation.
3. (U) Execution
a. (U) Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal expression of
the purpose of the operation. This paragraph contains the purpose from the mission statement
as well as any additional information related to purpose that allows subordinate commanders
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to exercise proper initiative if the task they are assigned is no longer appropriate to the situation.
It may include the desired end state.
b. (U) Concept of Operations. A written statement and graphic that clearly and concisely
express what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available
resources. The concept of operations provides a basis for supporting concepts, such as—
(1) (U) Concept of Maneuver. See Annex C (Operations) and Annex W (Aviation
Operations) for detailed description.
(2) (U) Concept of Fires. See Annex C (Operations) and Annex W (Aviation Operations)
(if applicable) for detailed description.
(3) (U) Concept of Support. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) for detailed
description.
(4) (U) Other Concepts as Required. See appropriate annex for detailed description.
c. (U) Tasks
(1) (U) List the tasks assigned to each subordinate commander in separate, numbered
subparagraphs. Tasks are listed in order of priority or accomplishment. Tasks may be listed
by phase. Designation of main effort or supporting effort is noted in tasking.
(2) (U) All tactical tasks must be listed in the body of the basic order. The highest priority
task(s) to subordinates must include the task and purpose (in order to …) Additional tasks
may simply be listed, if the purpose is understood. The commander assigns subordinate
commanders tasks deemed necessary to fulfill the concept of operations. The
synchronization matrix is the chief resource for assigning tasks to subordinates.
(3) (U) Unit or element task assignments are listed in the following order:
(a) (U) Offensive Operations. Ground combat units or elements (infantry first followed
by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat
units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), combat
service support units or logistic elements.
(b) (U) Defensive Operations. Units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first.
Ground and aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in
numerical order. Other units are listed alphabetically after that.
(4) (U) Each task assignment may begin with the assets (attached or in support) available
to the unit or element.
d. (U) Reserve. List the tasks assigned to the reserve force. To ensure responsiveness and
success, list planning priorities for the reserve unit (e.g., Planning Priority #1: Be prepared to
conduct exploitation operations in vicinity of MEF Objective 3). If the unit or element will be
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the reserve in the future, their current assigned tasks will be listed in paragraph 3c. If a unit or
element in reserve is given a future task or ordered to prepare plans for possible reserve
missions, it is included in this subparagraph.
e. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. Commander’s critical information

requirements identify information the commander has deemed critical to maintaining his/her
situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed
decision-making. They help the commander tailor the command and control organization and
are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow, and use
of information throughout the force. Commander’s critical information requirements consist
of priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements.
Commander’s critical information requirements will be numbered (e.g., PIR #1: Is the 2d
Centralian Armored Brigade crossing the Green River?). Each numbered priority intelligence
requirement and friendly force information requirement will include anticipated decisions and
associated branches and sequels, as developed during the Marine Corps Planning Process.
Operations divided into multiple phases may have separate commander’s critical information
requirements lists for each phase.
f. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions applicable to the entire command or two
or more elements of the command that are necessary for proper coordination of the operation
but are not appropriate for inclusion in a particular annex. They should establish the conditions
for execution and provide information about the timing of execution and deployments.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Personnel. In preparing this paragraph, refer to Annex E (Personnel). Identify detailed
planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating
personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength
reporting, and making provisions for staffing. Discuss the administrative management of
participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation
policies, and required individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational
requirements.
b. (U) Logistics. In preparing a basic operation order or plan, refer to Annex D
(Logistics/Combat Service Support). Logistic phases are normally concurrent with operational
phases. This subparagraph should address sustainment priorities and resources, base
development and other civil engineering requirements, host-nation support, and inter-Service
responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and
phase of the concept. Identify strategic and theater ports for resupply. Outline transportation
policies, guidance, and procedures for all options. Identify logistic and transportation
assumptions and include them with other plan assumptions in subparagraph 1g (Assumptions).
Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings.
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c. (U) Communication Strategy and Operations. Include appropriate information in this

subparagraph or refer to Appendix 4 of Annex I (Information).
d. (U) Civil-Military Operations. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer
to Annex G (Civil-Military Operations).
e. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Include appropriate information in this
subparagraph or refer to Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
f. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. Include appropriate information in this
subparagraph or refer to Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
g. (U) Medical Services. In preparing the basic operation order or plan, refer to Annex Q
(Medical Services). Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for hospitalization
and evacuation. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Refer to wartime host-nation
support agreements or provisions to support in Annex P (Host-Nation Support).
5. (U) Command and Signal
a. (U) Command Relationships. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer

to Annex J (Command Relationships). Indicate any changes to major commands and the time
of the expected shift. Identify all existing memoranda of understanding and those that require
development.
b. (U) Command Posts and Headquarters. The command post is the headquarters echelon
(forward, main, rear) where the commander is located. List the designations and locations of
the issuing commander’s headquarters echelons and appropriate senior, adjacent, and
subordinate commanders’ headquarters echelons. When headquarters are to be displaced,
indicate the known or estimated location and time of opening of the new headquarters and
closing or displacing of the old headquarters.
c. (U) Succession to Command. Designate the succession of command for the operation.
d. (U) Signal. Include appropriate information in this subparagraph or refer to Annex K (Combat
Information Systems). Provide instructions or restrictions about communications-electronics,
such as radio restrictions, pyrotechnic signals, or lasers. Include a general statement concerning
the scope of communications system and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight
any communications system or procedures requiring special emphasis.
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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
ANNEXES:
A–Task Organization
B–Intelligence
C–Operations
D–Logistics/Combat Service Support
E–Personnel
G–Civil-Military Operations
H–Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
I–Information
J–Command Relationships
K–Combat Information Systems
L–Environmental Considerations
M–Geospatial Information and Services
N–Space Operations
P–Host-Nation Support
Q–Medical Services
R–Reports
S–Special Technical Operations
T–Network Engagement
U–Information Management
V–Interagency/Interorganizational Coordination
W–Aviation Operations
X–Execution Checklist
Z–Distribution
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION)
Organization for combat is a commander’s plan for grouping organic and attached combat, combat
support, and combat service support units to effectively employ the forces to support the scheme
of maneuver. These groupings may be shown, if simple, in paragraph 3 of the basic OPORD or
OPLAN. If these groupings are complex, the task organization will be shown in a separate appendix
or just before paragraph 1 of the basic OPORD or OPLAN.
At a minimum, the task organization lists all major commands or task groupings directly
subordinate to the commander issuing the basic OPORD or OPLAN. In addition, all organizations
that directly support the operation are listed and designated as “support,” although they are not
under the command of the supported commander. Organizations to be established specifically to
implement the basic OPORD or OPLAN should appear in the task organization. The level of detail
in the task organization should only be that necessary to convey a clear understanding of the
significant forces committed to the operation. Commands may use either a graphic (e.g., wire
diagram) or a written format to display the task organization.
For written task organizations, underlining indicates that the unit or task grouping has an
assignedtask. Successive subordinate echelons of units or task groupings are shown by indentations
beneath the underlined unit or task grouping. Units or task groupings with no assigned task and not
included in another unit or task grouping are indented and listed immediately after the issuing
headquarters.
Subordinate units or task groupings that are assigned tasks are underlined and listed in appropriate
sequence. This sequence depends on two factors—the type of units or task groupings being
assigned missions and the type of mission (offensive or defensive). This sequence should parallel
the sequence of task assignments in paragraph 3 of the basic OPORD or OPLAN. The sequence
of listing major subordinate units or task groupings is—
 Offensive Operations: Ground combat units or elements (infantry units are listed first,
followed by artillery and combat support units numerically or alphabetically), aviation combat
units or elements (aircraft units, combat support, combat service support), and combat service
support units or logistic elements.
 Defensive Operations: Units or elements closest to the enemy are listed first. Ground and
aviation combat units in the forward defense area are then listed in numerical order followed
by other units alphabetically.
When the Marine Corps component commander prepares a supporting plan, Appendix 1 (Time-
Phased Force and Deployment List) must be included.
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Copy no. of copies

PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
ANNEX A TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)
TASK ORGANIZATION (U)
(U) REFERENCES: List maps, charts, standing operating procedures, or other documents essential
to understanding the order or plan.
ORGANIZATION COMMANDER
Issuing Headquarters Indicate names of
The first entry is the organization of the issuing headquarters. commanders of the
parent organization
Subordinate Unit or Task Grouping
Units or task groupings with no assigned tasks, and which are not and principal units
assigned to any other grouping, are indented under issuing
headquarters.
Subordinate units or task groupings with assigned tasks, and which are not assigned to any
other grouping, are indented under issuing headquarters.
Organic and attached units or task groupings are indented under the subordinate unit or task
grouping.
Units or task groupings that are not attached but will provide support are listed under the
supported unit or task grouping. The type of support, whether general support or direct
support, is shown in parentheses.
Reserve Unit or Task Grouping
Units or task groupings in reserve are listed last. If a unit or task grouping will be in reserve
in the future it is listed under reserve, as well as in its normal sequence.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
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Appendices:
1–Time-Phased Force and Deployment List
2–Shortfall Identification
3–Flexible Response and Flexible Deterrent Options
OFFICIAL:
s/
Name
Rank and Service
Title
Task Organization Graphic Example
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)

The purpose of Annex B (Intelligence) is to provide detailed information/intelligence on the
enemy/adversary and the battlespace and to provide guidance on intelligence and
counterintelligence functions.
The G-2/S-2 prepares the intelligence annex, based on the previously completed intelligence
estimate. This annex provides both encyclopedic data and current information on the
enemy/adversary, including order of battle, location and biographical information on
enemy/adversary commanders, capabilities, and intentions. One of the most important aspects
covered in the enemy/adversary’s intentions is the identification and discussion of the most likely
and most dangerous COAs.
The battlespace also includes informat ion regarding climate, topography, geography, terrain
analysis, physical infrastructure (roads, power grids, information grids), cultural considerations
that affect the operation, political structure, and leadership. Much of this information may have
been previously provided in intelligence estimates and in intelligence reports and summaries
provided by national sources or HHQ. This information may be referenced in the intelligence
annex to reduce the size of the basic OPORD or OPLAN.
The intelligence annex normally provides intelligence preparation of the battlespace products to
help further planning and execution. They include such products as the situation template and
modified combined obstacle overlay. These products are normally found in Appendix 11
(Intelligence Estimate) or in Appendix 12 (Intelligence Products).
CLASSIFICATION
Copy no.___of___copies
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
ANNEX B TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

INTELLIGENCE (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
(a) Maps and charts required for an understanding of this annex. Reference Annex M
(Geospatial Information and Services).
(b) Documents providing intelligence required for planning. Including related annexes, such
as Annex H (Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
(c) Appropriate publications on Marine Corps and joint intelligence doctrine.
(d) Appropriate standing operating procedures and other documents providing guidance on
intelligence operations.
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(e) The originator of the annex should ensure that the units receiving or executing the plan or
order have the cited references.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Summarize the conditions of the battlespace as they may
influence the operation. Describe, as appropriate, the physical, economic, political, medical,
social, religious, and psychological aspects and conditions of the people and infrastructure in
the battlespace. Do not repeat information included in the general situation paragraph of the
basic operation order or plan or detailed information contained in the appendices. Include
sufficient analysis of the battlespace to permit development of appropriate supporting plans.
Include complete information or reference documents and reports containing required
intelligence.
b. (U) Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and Weather
(1) (U) Summarize the hydrographic data and amphibious considerations needed to support
amphibious and logistic over-the-shore operations. Refer to Annex H (Meteorological and
Oceanographic Operations) and Annex M (Geospatial Information and Services).
(2) (U) Address topographic aspects, including trafficability, key terrain, obstacles, cover,
concealment, and avenues of approach. Reference Annex M (Geospatial Information and
Services).
(3) (U) Include, as appropriate, climate and weather aspects of the battlespace. Coordinate
with the staff weather officer or oceanographer and refer to reference Annex H
(Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations).
c. ( U ) Estimate of Enemy/Adversary Capabilities. Summarize the enemy’s/adversary’s
situation, capabilities, and possible courses of action. Provide the enemy’s/adversary’s order
of battle, estimates of the enemy’s/adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, and, at a minimum,
the enemy’s/adversary’s most likely and most dangerous courses of action. When summarizing
the enemy/adversary situation, refer to the general situation paragraph of the basic operation
order or plan or refer to documents containing the required intelligence. Outline the
enemy’s/adversary’s capability to collect, communicate to intelligence centers, process, and
disseminate intelligence. Include specific intelligence cutoff dates and, when possible, identify
finished intelligence products supporting these findings.
2. (U) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations

a. (U) Mission. State the command’s mission in the basic operation order or plan.
b. (U) Concept of Intelligence Operations. Outline the purpose of intelligence operations and
summarize the means and agencies used in planning, directing, collecting, processing,
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exploiting, producing, disseminating, and evaluating the necessary intelligence. When
available and appropriate, integrate the resources of other Services and allied nations.
3. (U) Intelligence Activities. Identify intelligence resources and the intelligence planning,
direction, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and evaluating efforts required to
support the basic operation order or plan. Identify the required intelligence by proceeding from the
priority intelligence requirements, through intelligence operations and capabilities or resources
planning, to tasking of intelligence elements, including the following specific areas:
a. (U) Planning and Direction. Provide guidance for determining intelligence requirements
(including those of subordinate commanders), preparing a collection plan, issuing orders and
requests to information collection agencies, and monitoring the performance of collection
agencies. Specify all exceptions to standard procedures.
(1) (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. List priority intelligence requirements. If
Annex B (Intelligence) is not published, list the priority intelligence requirements and
other requirements for intelligence in the coordinating instructions of the basic operation
order or plan. When the priority intelligence requirements and other requirements for
intelligence are lengthy and detailed, place them in Appendix 1 (Priority Intelligence
Requirements) of this annex.
(2) (U) New Requirements. Provide specific guidance for new intelligence requirements
during peace, crisis, and war, both before and during execution.
b. (U) Processing and Exploitation. Provide appropriate guidance for converting information
into usable form, including required provisions for document translation; imagery, signals,
and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other pertinent processing activity.
c. (U) Production. Provide guidance on analyzing and reporting collected intelligence

information by all collection sources used in support of the plan. Include guidance on
multidiscipline reports that fuse information from multiple sources. Reference appropriate
regulations, directives, and standing operating procedures specifying US-only and
multinational reporting procedures. Identify the production effort, including any intelligence
and counterintelligence products, required to support the plan.
d. (U) Dissemination. Provide necessary guidance for conveying intelligence to appropriate

units. Establish procedures and criteria to satisfy expanded requirements for vertical and
lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and spot reports. Establish alternate means to
ensure that the required intelligence will be provided to combat units as well as headquarters
during crises and combat operations. Cover any of the following in this subparagraph:
(1) (U) Intelligence reports required from units (periods covered, distribution, and time
of distribution).
(2) (U) Formats for intelligence reports (appendices, if required).
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(3) (U) Distribution of intelligence studies.
(4) (U) Requirements for releasability to allied nations.
(5) (U) Requirements for secondary imagery dissemination.
4. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks
a. (U) Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Use separate, numbered subparagraphs to
list detailed instructions for each unit performing intelligence functions, including the
originating headquarters, separate intelligence support units, and allied or coalition forces.
b. (U) Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Provide separate, numbered
subparagraphs applicable to each unit not organic or attached and from which intelligence
support is requested, including allied or coalition forces.
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Provide any instructions necessary for coordinating
collection and processing and exploitation, producing, and disseminating activities. Include—
(1) (U) Periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers.
(2) (U) Intelligence liaison, when indicated, with adjacent commanders, foreign
government agencies or military forces, and host countries.
5. (U) Communications System. Summarize the US and non-US communications system and
procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate
paragraphs of Annex K (Combat Information Systems). Include comments on interoperability of
these communications system.
6. (U) Miscellaneous Instructions. List under separate subparagraphs required items or

information not covered above or in standing operating procedures, or items that require action
different from that provided in standing operating procedures. As appropriate, include items, such
as operations security, deception, disclosure of intelligence, releasability to coalition forces and
communication strategy and operations, use of specialized intelligence personnel and personnel
augmentation requirements, and exploitation of captured foreign materiel and documents.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
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Appendices:
1–Priority Intelligence Requirements
2–Signals Intelligence
3–Counterintelligence
4–Targeting Intelligence
5–Human Resource Intelligence
6–Intelligence Support to Operations in the Information Environment
7–Imagery Intelligence
8–Measurement and Signature Intelligence
9–Captured Enemy Equipment
10–National Intelligence Support Team
11–Intelligence Estimate
12–Intelligence Products
13–Intelligence Collection Plan
14–Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan
15–Geographic Intelligence
16–Intelligence Operations
17–Support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

Annex C (Operations) provides substantive guidance for planning the conduct of operations.
Annex C should amplify information and concepts from the basic OPORD. Simply repeating
paragraphs and diagrams from the basic OPORD is counterproductive. Plans for the employment
of non-US forces should include proposed command arrangements and, as necessary,
consideration of requirements for furnishing essential combat and logistic support.
CLASSIFICATION
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

OPERATIONS (U)
(U) REFERENCES: List other plans, standing operating procedures, and doctrinal guidance to be
followed in the conduct of operations.
1. (U) General
a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides amplifying guidance for the conduct of operations.
b. (U) Mission. State the mission as described in the basic operation order or plan.
c. (U) Area of Operations. Define the area of operations encompassed by the basic order or
plan to include land, sea, and air space. The annex should also define any areas where
reconnaissance and surveillance operations are authorized.
d. (U) Situation. Refer to the basic operation order or plan.
2. (U) Concept of Operations. Normally, the concept of operations is included in the basic
operation order or plan; however, when lengthy and detailed, place it here. The format and content
are similar to the concept of operations in the basic operation order or plan. Refer to Appendix 16
(Operations Overlay).
3. (U) Conduct of Operations. Provide any guidance required for the conduct of specific operations
that is not already included in the basic OPORD. Provide an overview of any of the included
Annex C appendices and tabs, as appropriate.
4. (U) Operational Constraints. List any constraints to the conduct of combat operations not
enumerated elsewhere, such as the impact of deployment or employment of forces and materiel
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on airfield ramp space including possible host-nation support. Estimate the impact of these
operational constraints and indicate how the concept of operations and tasks to subordinate
commanders would be modified if these constraints were removed. State the effect of incremental
removal of constraints.

a. (U) Command. Refer to the basic operation order or plan.
b. (U) Signal. Refer to the basic operation order or plan or to Annex K (Combat Information
Systems).
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
APPENDICES:
1–Nuclear Operations
2–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Operations
3–Special Operations
4–Evasion and Recovery Operations
5–Risk
6–Rules of Engagement
7–Reconnaissance
8–Air Base Operability
9–Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
10–Explosive Ordnance Disposal
11–Amphibious Operations
12–Force Protection
13–Rear Area Operations
14–Cyberspace Operations
15-Liaison Plan
16–Operations Overlay
17–Fire Support
18–Countermechanized Plan
19–Obstacle and Barrier Plan
20–Breaching Plan
21-Decision Support Matrix and Template
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22-Operation Assessment Plan

23-Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees Plan
24-Authorities Matrix
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF APPENDIX 16 (OPERATIONS OVERLAY) TO ANNEX C
CLASSIFICATION
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation

CODE WORD) (U)
OPERATIONS OVERLAY (U)
Use appropriate marks and graphics from MIL-STD-2525D, Department of Defense Interface
Standard: Joint Military Symbology, to visually depict desired aspects of the operation. If the
operation is divided into phases, stages, etc., this appendix may require multiple overlays. The
basis of the operations overlay is the approved course of action graphic. The overlay must provide
a clear depiction of the CONOPS. The overlay strikes a correct balance between necessary detail
and simplicity. Creating an overly dense and cluttered operations overlay is counterproductive.
The overlay may depict—
 Form of maneuver
 Main effort purpose and tasks
 Supporting effort purposes and tasks
 Reserve (location, priorities)
 Control measures (FSCMs, maneuver control measures, ACMs, etc.)
 Boundaries
 Objectives
 Command posts
 Rear area boundaries and associated unit (e.g., RACOM)
 Named areas of interest
 Target areas of interest
 Combat service support areas
 Airfields
 Beaches
 Ports
 Forward arming and refueling point
 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance locations
 Enemy/adversary forces
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 Adjacent forces
 Civilian groups
 Routes and axes
 Obstacles
 Essential fire support tasks
 Operations in the information environment support tasks
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX D (LOGISTICS/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT)
Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It
includes the provision of combat service support to forces at the tactical level of war as well as the
movement and sustainment of Marine forces at the operational level of war. Logistics provides the
commander with the means to conduct and win battles, campaigns, and, ultimately, the war. Annex
D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) provides direction and guidance to the subordinate
commanders and staffs on the provision of logistics and combat service support in support of
operations described in the OPORD or OPLAN. The theory and philosophy of logistics as
practiced by the Marine Corps is provided in MCDP 4, Logistics. MCTP 3-40.B, Tactical-Level
Logistics, provides detailed information on combat service support as well as amplifying
instructions on the preparation of logistic planning documents.
The command and control of logistic and combat service support organizations, to include
command relationships and command and control support requirements, should be addressed in
annex D. It provides a general discussion of how the operation will be supported and is fully
integrated with other critical concepts, such as maneuver, fires, and force protection. It requires
only as much depth as is necessary to ensure understanding of envisioned logistic combat service
support operations by subordinate commanders and staffs. The G-4/S-4 is normally responsible
for the preparation of annex D; however, the logistic combat element should be involved in the
planning process. Phasing and significant anticipated changes in mission or tasks should be
reflected in the concept of support. Detailed or specialized information should be provided in other
subparagraphs or in appendices of annex D. Discuss or refer to aviation-specific logistic functions,
such as supply and maintenance, in Appendix 1 (Supply) or in the aviation combat element
OPORD or OPLAN.
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ANNEX D TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)
LOGISTICS/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (U)
(U) REFERENCES: Cite references necessary for a complete understanding of this annex.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) Enemy. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Provide available information on enemy
actions or intent to conduct actions to disrupt or degrade envisioned friendly logistic and combat
service support operations. Include information on enemy capabilities or assets that can
augment friendly logistic and combat service support operations.
b. (U) Friendly. List supporting logistic or combat service support organizations not
subordinate to the force and the specific missions and tasks assigned to each.
c. (U) Infrastructure. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). Provide information on existing
infrastructure, such as ports, factories, fuel and water sources, and lines of communications
that can be used to support friendly logistic and combat service support operations.
d. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization). List logistic
and combat service support units from other Services/nations attached to the force. List all
Marine Corps logistic and combat service support units detached to support other friendly
forces.
e. (U) Assumptions. State realistic assumptions and consider the effect of current operations
on logistic capabilities. Omitted in orders.
f. (U) Resource Availability. Identify significant competing demands for logistic resources
where expected requirements may exceed resources. Include recommended solutions within
resource levels available for planning, if any, and reasonably assured host-nation support.
g. (U) Planning Factors. Refer to and use approved planning factors and formulas, except
when experience or local conditions dictate otherwise. When deviating from planning factors,
identify the factors and the reason.
2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the base order.
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3. (U) Execution
a. (U) Concept of Logistics and Combat Service Support. State the concept for logistics and
combat service support operations necessary to implement the order or plan. Describe how the
logistic and combat service support assets will be organized and positioned to execute the
mission. The concept may include planned employment of other Service and nation logistic
and combat service support forces, host-nation support logistic capabilities, or operation of the
lines of communications.
b. (U) Tasks
(1) (U) Assign logistic and combat service support responsibilities to subordinate logistic
organizations.
(2) (U) Identify and assign responsibility for logistics and combat service support required
from other commands, Services, or nations.
for forces assigned or attached from other commands, Services, or nations.
for Marine Corps forces assigned or attached to other commands, Services, or nations.
(5) (U) Assign responsibilities to support joint boards and committees, such as
transportation and procurement, and other Services or nations providing services.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics
a. (U) Logistics and Combat Service Support
(1) (U) Supply. Refer to Appendix 7 (Supply). Summarize the following, in coordination
with supporting commanders and Service component commanders, if different from
standard planning factors. Place detailed discussions in the appendices and listings of
supply depots, terminals, and lines of communications in tabs or the appropriate
appendices.
(a) (U) Distribution and Allocation
1 (U) Purpose, location, and projected displacement of main and alternate supply
depots or points and supporting terminals and ports to be used or considered.
2 (U) Prepositioned logistic resource allocation.
3 (U) Existing terminals and lines of communications and the known or estimated
throughput capability. Indicate the time-phased expansion necessary to support the
plan.
(b) (U) Level of Supply
1 (U) Indicate the time-phased operating and safety levels required to support
the plan.
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2 (U) Indicate the prepositioned war reserve materiel requirements to support the
time-phased deployments pending resupply.
3 (U) Specify significant special arrangements required for materiel support
beyond normal supply procedures.
4 (U) Indicate anticipated shortfalls.
5 (U) Indicate common user logistic supply support responsibilities and
arrangements.
(c) (U) Salvage. Provide instructions for and identify the logistic impact of the
collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.
(d) (U) Captured Enemy/Adversary Materiel. Provide instructions for the collection,
classification, and disposition of enemy/adversary materiel. See Annex B (Intelligence)
for further guidance. See Appendix 10 to Annex B (Intelligence) for specific
instructions for the disposition of captured enemy/adversary cryptographic equipment.
(e) (U) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. See Joint Publication 4-01, The
Defense Transportation System, and the current version of Department of Defense
Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.
1 (U) Identify acquisition of goods and services in the following categories:
a (U) The general categories of materiel and services that are available and
contemplated as a supplement to regular sources.
b (U) Those that may be used as emergency acquisition sources.
2 (U) Make a statement concerning the dependability of the local acquisition or
labor source in each of the aforementioned categories and the joint or Service
element that will obtain or manage these resources.
3 (U) State that all essential contractor services, to include new and existing
contracts, have been reviewed to determine which services will be essential to
OPLAN execution. Make a statement concerning the existence of contingency
plans to ensure the continuation of these essential services.
(f) (U) Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants. Refer to Appendix 1 (Petroleum, Oils, and
Lubricants Supply).
(2) (U) External Support. Refer to Appendix 11 (External Support). Provide the required
planning information including type and quantity of support and instructions where inter-
Service and cross-Service arrangements for common supply and service support are
appropriate.
(a) (U) Summarize major support arrangements that are presently in effect or that will
be executed in support of the plan.
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(b) (U) Include significant inter-Service and cross-Service support arrangements.
Refer to appropriate annexes or appendices.
(c) (U) Include foreign and host-nation support.
(3) (U) Maintenance
(a) (U) General. Refer to Appendix 12 (Maintenance).
(b) (U) Specific Guidance
1 (U) Include sufficient detail to determine the requirements for maintenance
facilities needed to support the plan.
2 (U) Indicate the level of maintenance to be performed and where it is to occur,
including host nation or contractor facilities, if applicable.
(4) (U) Transportation
(a) (U) General. Refer to Appendix 4 (Mobility and Transportation). Provide general
planning or execution guidance to subordinate and supporting organizations to
facilitate transportation of the force and its sustainment. This can include movement
and use priorities.
(b) (U) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis. Provide an
estimate of the mobility support and movement feasibility of the plan. Include in the
analysis any appropriate remarks affecting mobility and transportation tasks. Consider
the availability of adequate lift resources for movements of personnel and equipment,
airfield reception capabilities, seaport and aerial port terminal capabilities, and port
throughput capabilities. Also, consider any features that will adversely affect
movement operations, such as the effect of deployment or employment of forces and
materiel on airfield ramp space (to include possible host-nation support).
(5) (U) General Engineering Support Plan. Refer to Appendix 13 (General Engineering).
State the rationale if Appendix 5 (Civil Engineering Support Plan) is not prepared. Indicate
the general engineering support activities applicable to the basic operation order or plan
and the policies for providing these services.
(6) (U) Health Services. Refer to Appendix 9 (Health Services).
(7) (U) Services. Refer to Appendix 8 (Services).
(8) (U) Mortuary Affairs. Refer to Appendix 2 (Mortuary Affairs) or, if not used, indicate
the mortuary affairs activities applicable to the operation order or plan and policy for
providing these affairs.
(9) (U) Ammunition. Refer to Appendix 6 (Nonnuclear Ammunition) or if not used, discuss
any critical ammunition issues that may affect the ability of the force to accomplish the
mission.
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(10) (U) Aviation Logistic Support. Refer to Appendix 10 (Aviation Logistic Support) or
Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support) of the aviation combat element operation
order or plan. Critical aviation logistic and combat service support issues may be discussed
if they affect the ability of the force to accomplish the mission.
(11) (U) Operational Security Planning Guidance for Logistics. Refer to Appendix 11
(Operations Security) to Annex I (Information). Provide comprehensive operations
security planning guidance for planning, preparing, and executing logistic and combat
service support activities. At a minimum, address base, facility, installation, logistic
stocks, physical, and line of communications security. Provide guidance to ensure that
logistic and combat service support activities promote essential secrecy for operational
intentions, capabilities that will be committed to specific missions, and current preparatory
operational activities.
b. (U) Administration. Include general administrative guidance to support logistic and combat
service support operations for the basic operation order or plan. If reports are required, specify
formats for preparation, time, methods, and classification of sub- mission.
a. (U) Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J (Command Relationships) for command
relationships external to logistic units. Provide support relationships.
b. (U) Communications System. Refer to Annex K (Combat Information Systems) for detailed
communications and information systems requirements. Provide a general statement of the
scope and type of communications required.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
Appendices:
1–Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply
2–Mortuary Affairs
3–Sustainability Analysis
4–Mobility and Transportation
5–Civil Engineering Support Plan
6–Nonnuclear Ammunition
7–Supply
8–Services
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9–Health Services
10–Aviation Logistic Support (Normally provided in the aviation combat element plan or order.)
11–External Support
12–Maintenance
13–General Engineering
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX I (INFORMATION)
Operations in the information environment are actions taken to generate, preserve, or apply military
information power in order to increase and protect competitive advantage or combat power
potential within all domains of the operational environment. Military information power is broadly
applicable in competition and war, and is a necessary mutually supporting element to combat
power. The Marine Corps defines military information power as “the total means of force or
information capability applied against a relevant actor to enhance lethality, survivability, mobility,
or influence.” The essence of military information power is the ability to exert one’s will or
influence over an opponent through the generation, preservation, denial, or projection of
information.
Annex I (Information) provides an integration framework for the information warfighting function
by ensuring Marine Corps operations in the information environment are planned in concert with
MAGTF operations in all domains to create and exploit military information power. Marine Corps
operations in the information environment are persistently conducted in global campaigns
throughout the competition continuum and during armed conflict to support naval, Service,
combatant command, and joint force objectives in the information environment and across all
domains. In all cases, operations in the information environment are planned and executed in
accordance with the following seven functions/tasks:
(1) Assure enterprise C2 and critical systems

(2) Provide information environment battlespace awareness
(3) Attack and exploit networks, systems, and information
(4) Inform domestic and international audiences
(5) Influence foreign target audiences
(6) Deceive foreign target audiences
(7) Control operations in the information environment capabilities, resources, and activities
Marine Corps operations in the information environment are planned and executed using the means
provided by the following six capability areas:
(1) Electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO)

(2) Cyberspace operations
(3) Space operations
(4) Influence operations
(5) Deception operations
(6) Inform operations
Operations in the information environment take place across the full range of military
operations. MAGTF information plans must be nested within the joint force commander’s plan.
Information planning requires a whole-of-staff or whole-of-operational planning team approach
and extensive coordination among commands to avoid conflicts and to ensure nested and reinforcing
efforts. As in other areas, intelligence support to operations in the information environment is
critical.
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The information annex should clearly state the primary tasks of each of the applicable seven
functions/tasks of operations in the information environment. Tasks should identify how a
specific capability within a capability area will be used to accomplish the task. Tasks may also
include how a specific capability associated other warfighting functions (e.g., fires and maneuver)
may be used to accomplish or support the accomplishment of the information tasks. For example,
the primary information function/task “Assure Command and Control” may require the physical
attack (e.g., air delivered fires) of enemy long range precision fires targeting friendly C2 nodes.
This same task may also require the use of defensive cyberspace operations, electronic attack, and
electronic warfare support. The information annex should provide enough guidance to ensure
that these elements are all working toward the accomplishment of operations in the information
environment as well as detailed execution instructions for each of the capabilities required in the
subsequent tabs.
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ANNEX I TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

INFORMATION (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
(a) Any relevant plans or orders.
(b) Required maps and charts.
(c) Other relevant documents.
1. (U) Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to operations in the
information environment.
a.(U) E n e m y / Adversary. Summarize the enemy/adversary situation, force disposition,
intelligence capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable, reference intelligence
estimates or summaries. Address any specific information that bears directly on the planned
operations in the information environment.
b.(U) Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that may directly affect
attainment of information objectives. Address any critical limitations and any other planned
operations in the information environment.
c.(U) Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, enemy, adversary, or third party
capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. Describe the conditions that the commander
believes will exist at the time the plan becomes an order. Omit in orders.
2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the basic OPORD.
3. (U) Execution
a. (U) Concept of Support. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of
operations in the information environment from its beginning to its termination. Describe how
information will support the command’s mission. Describe the integration of the applicable
information tasks within the CONOPS and overall plan. Summarize the concepts for
supervision and termination of operations in the information environment.
(1) (U) The concept of support may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more
paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.
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(2) (U) When an operation involves various phases, such as peace or pre-hostilities, crisis,
war, or post-hostilities, the concept of support should include subparagraphs describing the
role of information tasks in each phase.
b. (U) Operations in the Information Environment Tasks. Identify the major tasks for each of
the applicable seven functions/tasks of operations in the information environment. As
operations in the information environment tasks and capability areas cross various units and
warfighting functions, specific tasks related to achieving information objectives may be found
elsewhere in the order (e.g., physical attack in unit tasks (Basic OPORD paragraph 3.c. (Tasks)
and Annex C, Appendix 17 (Fires Support); Communication Strategy and Operations tasks in
Annex I, Appendix 4, Tab A (Communication Strategy and Operations); etc.). This paragraph
lists information tasks not captured elsewhere in the OPORD.
(1) (U) Assure enterprise command and control and critical systems
(2) (U) Provide information environment battlespace awareness
(3) (U) Attack and exploit networks, systems, and information
(4) (U) Inform domestic and international audiences
(5) (U) Influence foreign target audiences
(6) (U) Deceive foreign target audiences
(7) (U) Control operations in the information environment capabilities, resources, and
activities
(9) (U) Electromagnetic spectrum operations
(10) (U) Cyberspace operations
(11) (U) Civil-military operations
(12) (U) Operations security
(13) (U) Signature Management
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues relating to the elements
of operations in the information environment.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Address any operations in the information environment
administrative or logistic requirements.
5. (U) Command and Control. List any operations in the information environment command and
control instructions. State the command structure for operations in the information environment.
Identify any special operations in the information environment communications and reporting
requirements.
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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
APPENDICES:
1–Assure Enterprise Command and Control and Critical Systems
2–Provide Information Environment Battlespace Awareness
3–Attack and Exploit Networks, Systems, and Information
4–Inform Domestic and International Audiences
5–Influence Foreign Target Audiences
6–Deceive Foreign Target Audiences
7–Control Operations in the Information Environment Capabilities, Resources, and Activities
8–Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
9–Cyberspace Operations
10–Civil Military Operations
11–Operations Security
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
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Sample Format for Tab A

(Military Deception) to Appendix 6 to Annex I
Tab A (Military Deception) provides background and guidance for the preparation of the military
deception tab of joint plans and orders. The process for military deception planning conducted in
support of joint operations is established in JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. As a general policy, any
material related to planned, ongoing, or completed military deception is accorded controlled
access. Production guidelines are—
 “Need-to-know,” for the purposes of military deception, t h i s means limiting access
to those individuals who are involved in planning, approving, or executing deceptions and
who must have knowledge of the deception to perform their duties.
 The deception tab will normally be developed, published, distributed, and maintained
separately from the rest of the OPLAN.
 Standard administrative procedures are not used to distribute or staff the deception tab. Only
positive control means, such as hand-to-hand delivery or secure electronic communications
will be used to distribute deception-related material.
 Specific deception events, such as unit movements, may be included in the basic OPLAN
and its annexes if not identified as being deception related.
 Deception-related documents will have cover sheets with the appropriate classification
markings. They will be annotated in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3211.01, Joint Policy for Military Deception.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3211.01 establishes the review criteria for
deception concepts and plans. Deception planners must follow the specific administrative and
security procedures established by that document to ensure that their plans are approved by the
appropriate authority.
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX I TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)

(Operation CODE WORD) (U)
MILITARY DECEPTION (U)
(U) REFERENCES: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are essential to the effective
execution of military deception.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) General. See basic operation order or plan.
b. (U) E n e m y
(1) (U) General Capabilities. Identify enemy military capabilities directly relating to the
planned deception.
(2) (U) Deception Targets. Describe the political, military, or economic decision makers (or
organizations) targeted by the deception plan. Include personalities, strengths, weaknesses,
vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions.
(3) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions. Provide information on known biases and
predispositions of political, military, or economic decision makers (or organizations).
(4) (U) Probable Enemy Course of Action. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
c. (U) Friendly. Summarize the friendly situation, critical limitation, and concept of
operations.
d. (U) Assumptions. List all assumptions on which the deception is based.
2. (U) Mission
a. (U) Operational Mission. Extract from paragraph 2 of the basic operation order or plan.
b. (U) Deception Mission
(1) (U) Deception Goal. Describe the desired effect or the end state a commander wishes
to achieve (commander’s concept for the deception operation). For example, “To cause the
enemy to weight their defense in the eastern corridor, to mislead the enemy as to the time
and place of forcible entry operations, to cause dissension within the enemy coalition such
that…”
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(2) (U) Deception Objective(s). List the desired action or inaction by the enemy at the
critical time and location.
(3) (U) Desired Enemy Perceptions. Describe what the deception target must believe for it
to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.
(4) (U) Deception Story. Outline a scenario of friendly actions or capabilities that will be
portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception. This could be an
alternate course of action to the one chosen for the basic operation order or plan itself.
3. (U) Execution
a. (U) Concept of the Operation

(1) (U) General. Describe the framework for the operation. Include a brief description of the
phases of the deception operation.
(2) (U) Other Operations in the Information Environment Elements. Discuss the use of other
operations in the information environment elements in support of the deception operation.
Discuss all other operations in the information environment element plans and activities
pertinent to the deception. Include coordination required to deconflict if necessary.
(3) (U) Feedback and Monitoring. Provide a general statement of the type of feedback
expected, if any, and how it will be collected (monitored). Include a brief statement on the
impact of the absence of feedback on the plan.
(4) (U) Means. Describe available deception assets.
(5) (U) Tasks. Specify execution and feedback taskings to organizations participating in the
execution and monitoring of the deception operation.
(6) (U) Risks. Give a brief risk analysis in the categories given below. Rate risk as low,
moderate, or high in each category. Refer to Exhibit 3 (Operations) to this tab for detailed
risk analyses.
(a) (U) Deception is successful. Include likely enemy/adversary response. Describe
impact on friendly forces from enemy/adversary intelligence sharing.
(b) (U) Deception fails. Describe the impact if the target ignores the deception or fails
in some way to take the actions intended.
(c) (U) Deception is compromised to allies or enemy/adversaries.
b. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Identify any tasks or instructions pertaining to two or more
of the units listed in the preceding subparagraphs. List the tentative D-day and H-hour, if
applicable, and any other information required to ensure coordinated action between two or
more elements of the command.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics. State instructions regarding administrative and logistic
support procedures to be used in developing, coordinating, and implementing the deception plan.
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Do not include those administrative, logistic, and medical actions or ploys that are an actual part
of the deception operation. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 (Administration and Logistics).
a. (U) Administration
(1) (U) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination,
and implementation of deception activities.
(2) (U) Specific. Detail any special administrative measures needed to execute the
deception operation.
b. (U) Logistics. Detail logistic requirements for the execution of the deception operation,
such as the transportation of special material, or provision of printing equipment and materials.
Do not include executions conducted by logistic elements as part of the portrayal of
observables. Place detailed instructions in Exhibit 4 (Administration and Logistics).
c. (U) Costs. As applicable.
5. (U) Communications System
a. (U) Command Relationships. Use Exhibit 5 (Command Relationships) to illustrate

command relationships by phase, if required.
(1) (U) Approval. State approval authority for execution and termination.
(2) (U) Authority. Designate supported and supporting commanders, supporting agencies
as applicable, and any caveats to Exhibit 1 (Task Organization) or Exhibit 5 (Command
Relationships).
(3) (U) Oversight. Detail oversight responsibilities particularly for executions by
nonorganic units or organizations outside the chain of command.
(4) (U) Coordination. Identify coordination responsibilities and requirements related to
deception executions and execution feedback. Address in-theater and out-of- theater
requirements.
b. (U) Communications. Detail communications means and procedures to be used by control
personnel and participants in the deception operation. Include all reporting requirements.
6. (U) Security
a. (U) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and
implementation of deception activities.
b. (U) Specific. State access restrictions, handling instructions, and who has authority to grant
access to the deception appendix or plan. Describe the use of cover stories if applicable, code
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words, nicknames, and procedures for planning and execution documents. If required, place
access rosters and other detailed security considerations in a separate document.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
EXHIBITS:
1–Task Organization
2–Intelligence
3–Operations
4–Administration and Logistics
5–Command Relationships
6–Execution Schedule
7–Distribution
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
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172
Sample Format of Exhibit 2

(Intelligence) to Tab A to Appendix 6 to Annex I
Information and intelligence provided here must be focused and specific to the deception. Do
not repeat information found in Annex B (Intelligence).
CLASSIFICATION
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX I TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN

(Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)
INTELLIGENCE (U)
(U) REFERENCES: Identify plans, documents, maps, and charts that are essential to the execution
of the deception.
1. (U) Deception CONOPS. Provide a concise statement of the deception operation. Identify the
command executing the deception, the deception target, the deception objective(s), and the
duration of the operation.
2. (U) Situation
a. (U) Enemy/Adversary
(1) (U) Target Description. Describe the political, military, or economic decision makers
(or organizations) targeted by the deception plan. Include personalities, strengths,
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions.
(2) (U) Target Biases and Predispositions
(3) (U) Enemy/Adversary Intelligence Organizations. Identify the targeted country’s
intelligence organizations, their missions, and their methods and capabilities for covert and
clandestine operations. Include collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination.
Specifically note those organizations most likely to provide intelligence to the targeted
decisionmaker and those tasked with exposing deception.
(4) (U) Enemy/Adversary Counterintelligence Organizations. Describe missions,
capabilities, and operations.
(5) (U) Enemy/Adversary Intelligence-Sharing with Other Countries. Identify other
intelligence organizations available to the targeted country, the nature of intelligence
exchange, and the potential for using that relationship for the deception.
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(6) (U) Other Sources and Related Matters. Identify scientific, technical, diplomatic, or
academic contacts that might act as information conduits.
(7) (U) Deception and Denial Activities. Provide an analysis of the targeted country’s use
of deception and denial in support of its political and military goals. Identify the target’s
deception and denial methods and current deception and denial activities.
(8) (U) Target Reaction. Provide an estimate of the target’s reaction if the deception is
successful. Also provide likely target reactions if the deception is not successful. Identify
whether the enemy/adversary would use deception in response. This subparagraph
provides in-depth information to document the risk assessments presented in Tab I-6-A
(Military Deception) and Exhibit I-6-A-3 (Information).
(9) (U) Third-Party Reaction. Provide an analysis of the impact of the deception on allies,
neutrals, and potential enemy/adversaries and their responses. This subparagraph provides
in depth information to document the risk assessments presented in Tab I-6-A (Military
Deception) and Exhibit I-6-A-3 (Information).
b.(U) Friendly. Provide information on activities by unknowing US forces having an impact
on the deception. Compare the time necessary to collect, process, report, and analyze
intelligence (in support of deception) with the plan’s operational timeline. Assess the impact
here.
3. (U) Intelligence Requirements
a. (U) Priority Intelligence Requirements. Priority information requirements associated

with deception are listed in Attachment A (Priority Intelligence Requirements).
b. (U) Feedback. Assess the intelligence community’s ability to identify and collect plan-
specific feedback information.
c. (U) Assignment of Intelligence Tasks. Identify organizations to produce plan-specific
collection requirements.
(1) (U) Service intelligence agencies and organizations.
(2) (U) Commander’s intelligence organizations and assets.
(3) (U) Others.
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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
ATTACHMENTS:
A–Priority Intelligence Requirements
B–Others as needed
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
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Sample Format of Attachment A (Priority Intelligence

Requirements) to Exhibit 2 to Tab A to Appendix 6 to Annex I
CLASSIFICATION
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PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
ATTACHMENT A TO EXHIBIT 2 TO TAB A TO APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX I TO

OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (U)
1. (U) General. Identify requirements, including those of subordinate commanders, for priority
intelligence requirements for pre-execution and execution phases of the planned deception
operation.
2. (U) Before Implementation of the Order or Plan. List questions for which answers are needed
for further planning and as a basis for decision on plan implementation.
3. (U) Upon Implementation of the Order or Plan. List the additional priority intelligence
requirements and other intelligence requirements that become relevant upon decision to implement
the operation plan. (Use additional paragraphs if necessary to reflect differing requirements during
planned phases of the operation.)
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
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176
Sample Format of Annex J (Command Relationships)
Command relationships are the interrelated responsibilities between commanders and the authority
of commanders in the chain of command. Unity of effort is, in large part, achieved through the
application of a flexible range of command relationships. The joint force commander exercises
command during joint operations according to the provisions of JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States; JP 3-0, Joint Operations; MCDP 1-0; and MCWP 7-10, Marine Corps
Componency. These publications describe possible command relationships between the joint force
commander, the Marine Corps component commander, the MAGTF commander, and subordinate
commanders of assigned or attached Marine forces. This annex discusses—
 Requirements to coordinate support between forces in the same or adjacent areas according
to JP 1 and the common HHQ OPORD or OPLAN.
 Planning for succession of command and change of command location (alternate command
and control procedures). Refer to Paragraph 5 (Command and Signal) of the OPORD or
OPLAN or Annex K (Combat Information Systems).
 Department of Defense Directive 3025.14, Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated
Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad, delineates the responsibilities for protection of US
citizens abroad. In support of this directive, give special attention to cooperation and
coordination between US diplomatic and military activities during periods of tension and
hostilities.
 Relationships between the US Information Agency and the US Armed Forces in the conduct
of military information support operations.
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ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)
(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance on the command
relationships of forces concerned.
1. (U) General
a. (U) Purpose. To establish the relationships between—

(1) (U) Combatant commands
(2) (U) International commands and organizations.
(3) (U) Commander, US forces country
(4) (U) Service and functional component commanders
(5) (U) Major subordinate commanders
(6) (U) Coordinating authorities
(7) (U) Other subordinate military activities
(8) (U) US diplomatic missions
(9) (U) Government departments or agencies that support the operations
(10) (U) Forces and agencies of other nations
b. (U) Scope. Specify the scope and applicability of the command relationships established in
this annex for specific military operations or functions within an assigned geographic area; or
for specific military operations or functions not limited to a geographic area and the times or
circumstances when the relationships become effective.
2. (U) Command Lines

a. (U) Service and Functional Components. Indicate the command lines to Service and
functional components of the force and to subordinate elements, as appropriate.
b. (U) Other Subordinate Commands. Indicate the established command lines to subordinate
commanders for conducting this operation and the conditions under which forces will be
transferred to their operational control.
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c. (U) Augmentation Forces. Indicate the purpose, time, and approximate duration of the
attachment and the degree of authority over and responsibility for the augmentation forces.
d. (U) Alternate Procedures. Discuss procedures for succession of command and change of
command location (alternate command and control procedures).
3. (U) Support and Coordination Relationships

a. (U) Supporting Military Forces. Indicate established relationships with military
organizations operating in support of the originating command.
b. (U) Coordinating Authorities. As necessary, assign a commander or another person the
responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities.
c. (U) Supporting Agencies. Indicate the relationships between the elements of the force and
any supporting agencies, such as United States Information Agency. Refer to other annexes or
appendices, as appropriate.
d. (U) Inter-Service Support Arrangements. Refer to Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service
Support), subparagraph 2b(7), Inter-Service Logistic Support.
e. (U) Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. Indicate any requirement for coordination
with chiefs of US diplomatic missions that is not included elsewhere in the plan and note who
is responsible for such coordination.
4. (U) Relationships with International and Foreign Commands and Organizations. Indicate
established command arrangements or relations with international commands and organizations,
foreign military commands, or guerrilla organizations. Also indicate the conditions under which
such relations would become effective.
5. (U) Planning Relationships. Specify established relationships between military commands for
developing supporting plans. Include any requirements for coordination with other-nation
commands and nonmilitary agencies.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
APPENDIX:
1–Command Relationships Diagram
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
CLASSIFICATION
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SAMPLE FORMAT OF APPENDIX 1

(COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM) TO ANNEX J
CLASSIFICATION
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Date-time group
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX J TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation

CODE WORD) (U)
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DIAGRAM (U)
This appendix graphically portrays the command relationships. Show all specific relationships,
such as operational control, tactical control, or administrative control.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
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180
SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX T (NETWORK ENGAGEMENT)
The purpose of Annex T (Network Engagement) is to provide detailed information on the

interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks that will facilitate guidance to help achieve
the commander’s objectives within an operational area. These networks consist of people, places,
and things. There can be multiple friendly, neutral, and threat networks in the battlespace. Annex
T assist the commander and staff with gaining an understanding of the operational environment.
Intelligence is a critical component to build the necessary products that will facilitate
understanding. The products of network engagement support targeting and engagement. The
network engagement annex provides information that facilitates generating lethal and nonlethal
effects against threat networks. It also organizes information to facilitate generating nonlethal
effects exclusively with friendly and neutral networks, through partnership, cooperation, and
engagement.
CLASSIFICATION
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
ANNEX T TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

NETWORK ENGAGEMENT (U)
(U) REFERENCES:
(a)Diagrams, matrices and charts required for an understanding of this annex.
(b)Documents providing intelligence required for planning. Including related annexes, such as
Annex B (Intelligence).
(c) Appropriate publications on Marine Corps and joint network engagement doctrine.
(d)Appropriate standing operating procedures and other documents providing guidance on
network engagement.
(e)The originator of the annex should ensure that the units receiving or executing the plan or
order have the cited references.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) Friendly. Summarize and categorize the friendly networks in the battlespace (i.e., allied
military forces, host nation government, international organizations, etc).
b.(U) Neutral. Summarize and categorize the neutral networks in the battlespace. (i.e., Local
tribes, labor unions, international organizations, etc).
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c.( U ) Threat. Summarize and categorize the threat networks in the battlespace. (i.e., Nation
state military force, non-state actors, criminal, terrorist, etc).
2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the basic OPORD.
3. (U) Execution
a. (U) Concept of Support. Summarize how the commander visualizes the integration of
network engagement into the operation.
b. (U) Network Engagement Products. Provide appropriate guidance for network engagement
products across the multiple friendly, neutral, and threat networks.
(1) (U) Critical variables. Identify the key resources or conditions within the operational
environment that must be shaped or maintained to attain the commander’s desired end
state.
(2) (U) Relevant Networks. Identify the relevant networks within the operational
environment that must be considered for planning, targeting and engagement to support the
attainment of the commander’s desired end state. These networks should associate in some
manner to the critical variables identified to meet the commander’s intent.
(3) (U) Association matrix. Identify the existence of relationships between nodes in each
friendly, neutral, and threat network, as determined by direct contact, that are relevant to
the operation. The nodes for each relevant network identified should be included in this
product to capture key information.
(4) (U) Activities matrix. Determine the connections between a key actor and
organizations, events, locations, or activities for each friendly, neutral, and threat network
that are relevant to the operation. The nodes for each relevant network identified should
be included in this product to capture key information.
(5) (U) Network diagram. Graphically display the connections between individuals,
organizations, and activities for each friendly, neutral, and threat network that are relevant
to the operation.
(6) (U) Social network analysis. Provide quantitative data regarding the degree of links
between nodes using mathematical computations to determine the relevancy of nodes
within a network that are relevant to the operation.
(7) (U) Network function templates. Organize known information about the relevant
networks to graphically depict the association of the network’s structure to its
functions.Templates assist in visualizing how networks function and may be used to
facilitate critical factors analysis.
(8) (U) Critical factors analysis. Apply critical factors analysis to each relevant network to
identify the critical factors needed for planning and targeting. The critical factors to be
identified are the network’s critical variables, conditions in the operational environment
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that may affect the formation and sustainment of friendly, neutral, or threat networks that
are relevant to the operation, critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical
vulnerabilities.
c. (U) Targeting and Engagement. Summarize network engagement support to targeting and
engagement. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex C (Operations).
d. (U) Operation Assessment. Summarize network engagement support to the operation

assessment plan. Refer to Appendix 22 (Operation Assessment Plan) to Annex C (Operations).
4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Address any network engagement administrative or logistic
requirements.
5. (U) Command and Signal. List any network engagement command and control instructions. State
the command structure to support network engagement. Identify any special network engagement
communications, software, or reporting requirements.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
Appendices:
1–Critical Variables
2–Relevant Networks
3–Association Matrices
4–Activities Matrices
5–Network Diagrams
6–Social Network Analysis
7–Network Function Templates
8–Critical Factors Analysis
OFFICIAL:
s/
Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
CLASSIFICATION
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MCWP 5-10
SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX V

(INTERAGENCY/INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION)
CLASSIFICATION
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PLACE OF ISSUE
Date-time group
ANNEX V TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)

INTERAGENCY-INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION (U)
(U) REFERENCES: List documents that provide necessary guidance to this annex.
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) General
(1) (U) Statement. This annex provides military and interagency planners with a brief
synopsis of the major elements of this plan and the necessary coordination and interaction
between the command and the interagency while preparing for and during the plan’s
execution. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation
and is subject to modification based on the actual conditions or situation existing at the
time of execution.
(2) (U) Politico-Military Situation. Summarize the politico-military situation that would
establish the preconditions under which this plan might be executed. At a minimum,
identify the US national security objectives and interests served by this plan and the
interagency capabilities needed to return to normalcy or to establish a new normalcy.
(3) (U) Policy Coordination. Identify what coordination and support requirements might
be necessary to initiate interagency planning.
(4) (U) Planning and Execution Coordination. Describe the proposed concept for
interagency coordination during both planning and execution to ensure unity of effort and
appropriate deconfliction. Outline how the process supports the operation.
b. (U) Assumptions. List key assumptions that might impact or influence interagency
planning.
c. (U) Legal Considerations. List any legal considerations that may affect interagency
participation.
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2. (U) Mission. Provide the command’s mission from the base order.
3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Concept of Operations. Outline the primary objectives and desired effects of each
phase. Describe the concept for interagency coordination and how it supports the concept of
military operations. Outline the commander’s interorganizational cooperaton for each phase
and what resources, capabilities, and liaison from other US Government agencies can support
each of these objectives. Comment on the desirability and feasibility of government, non-
governmental, and private organization participation in the operation. Identify the resources or
capabilities from the each agency that will support each of these objectives and comment on
the desirability and level of nongovernmental participation in the operation.
(1) (U) Commander’s Intent. Describe the commander’s intent and optimal level of
involvement by other US Government agencies for each phase. Be sure to identify the
desired end state for each phase and list the anticipated desired actions of the major US
Government agencies to support these end states.
(2) (U) Major Areas of US Government Response. Define the areas of requested action and
responsibility from US Government agencies and non-governmental organizations based
on the concept of operations.
(3) (U) Level of Integration. Describe the level of integration envisioned between the
military, US Government agencies, and non-governmental organizations as operations
transition between phases.
b. (U) Tasks and Milestones. Identify the foreseen tasks and required milestones necessary
before handing off responsibilities to civilian authorities.
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Include general instructions applicable to other US
Government agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
4. (U) Administration and Logistics. Provide concept for furnishing administrative and logistic
support to US Government agencies and international organizations/nongovernmental
organizations participating in the operation. Include the following:
a. (U) Personnel and personal property accounting.
b. (U) Availability of security and force protection.
c. (U) Availability of medical care.
d. (U) Availability of transportation assets in theater and in the host nation.
e. (U) Availability of all classes of supply.
f. (U) Availability of maintenance support for vehicles, administrative, and support
equipment.
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g. (U) Use of office administrative equipment and personnel

h. (U) Availability and use of communications assets
5. (U) Command and Control. Identify any unique command relationships established for the
purposes of interagency coordination, such as a joint interagency coordination group or
interagency coordination directorate. Describe the proposed organizational relationship and chain
of responsibility between the commander and other US Government agencies and international
organizations.
a. (U) US Government. Identify the chain of authority for US Government agencies.
b. (U) International Organizations. Identify the expected chain of authority for
intergovernmental organizations should they become involved.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
APPENDICES:
As required. Could include detailed information on key interagency, international organization
and nongovernmental organization stakeholders, such as mission, current and planned programs,
locations, point of contact information, or assessments.
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
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186
SAMPLE FORMAT OF ANNEX X (EXECUTION CHECKLIST)
Annex X (Execution Checklist) provides a convenient and useful listing of key events and tasks
that must be conducted by the force to accomplish the mission. The synchronization matrix is the
key MCPP tool used to create the execution checklist. The execution checklist allows subordinate
commands and supporting and adjacent forces to coordinate their actions and maintain situational
awareness. The execution checklist also serves as an excellent command and control and
information management tool for the combat operations center. Critical events and tasks are
included in the execution checklist. Events and tasks should be listed in the order of envisioned
execution.
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MCWP 5-10
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ANNEX X TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODE WORD) (U)
EXECUTION CHECKLIST (U)(U) Generally displayed as a spreadsheet, with the applicable
following items listed in order of expected execution:
 Line number
 Unit
 Task
 Condition
 Location
 Communications nets
 Brevity code
 Planned date/time
 Blank space for recording actual date/time the task is initiated or completed
 Blank space for recording notes
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
Name
Rank and Service
Title
OFFICIAL:
s/ Name
Rank and Service
Title
Page number
CLASSIFICATION
188
GLOSSARY
SECTION I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACE............................................................................................................ aviation combat element
APEX ........................................................................................... Adaptive Planning and Execution
ARG ............................................................................................................amphibious ready group
ASCOPE ...................................... areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CAP ................................................................................................................. crisis action planning

CAT........................................................................................................................crisis action team
CCIR ....................................................................... commander’s critical information requirement
CJCSM ...................................................................... Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
COA ......................................................................................................................... course of action
COG ........................................................................................................................ center of gravity
COMMSTRAT ...................................................................communication strategy and operations
CONOPS ......................................................................................................... concept of operations
CSNE ............................................................................ commander’s significant notification event
CSS .............................................................................................................. combat service support
DOD ............................................................................................................. Department of Defense

DSM ............................................................................................................. decision support matrix
DST .......................................................................................................... decision support template
EPW .............................................................................................................. enemy prisoner of war
FFIR .................................................................................... friendly force information requirement

FRAGO .................................................................................................................fragmentary order
G-1 ...................................................... assistant chief of staff for personnel/personnel staff section

G-2 ................................................ assistant chief of staff for intelligence/intelligence staff section
G-3 ............assistant chief of staff for operations and training/operations and training staff section
G-4 ........................................................... assistant chief of staff for logistics/logistics staff section
G-5 .................................................................... assistant chief of staff for plans/plans staff section
G-6 .................... assistant chief of staff for communications/communications system staff section
HHQ ................................................................................................................... higher headquarters

HPT .......................................................................................................................high-payoff target
HVT ....................................................................................................................... high-value target
IPB .................................................................................. intelligence preparation of the battlespace

MCWP 5-10
ISR ............................................................................intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JP ............................................................................................................................. joint publication
LOO ........................................................................................................................ line of operation
MAGTF............................................................................................... Marine air-ground task force

MCDP ....................................................................................... Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP .............................................................................................. Marine Corps planning process
MCRP .......................................................................................Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP........................................................................................... Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP .................................................................................. Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEB ................................................................................................... Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF ....................................................................................................... Marine expeditionary force
METT-T ........... mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
MEU......................................................................................................... Marine expeditionary unit
MSE ........................................................................................................ major subordinate element
MSEL ........................................................................................................ master scenario event list
N-2 .................................................................................. Navy component intelligence staff officer

NAI ................................................................................................................ named area of interest
NGO ..................................................................................................nongovernmental organization
OPLAN .......................................................................................................................operation plan

OPORD ..................................................................................................................... operation order
OPT .......................................................................................................... operational planning team
PIR .................................................................................................priority intelligence requirement

PMESII .................................. political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
R&S................................................................................................ reconnaissance and surveillance

R2P2............................................................................................... rapid response planning process
RCPA .......................................................................................... relative combat power assessment
RFI ............................................................................................................... request for information
S-2 ......................................................................................... intelligence officer/intelligence office

S-3 ..................................................... operations and training officer/operations and training office
S-4 .................................................................................................... logistics officer/logistics office
SME ................................................................................................................. subject matter expert
SOP ..................................................................................................... standing operating procedure
TAI ...................................................................................................................target area of interest

190
TRAP ............................................................................. tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel
US ................................................................................................................................ United States
WARNORD ................................................................................................................ warning order
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SECTION II. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acceptability—The plan review criterion for assessing whether a contemplated course of action is
proportional, worth the cost, consistent with the law of war; and is militarily and politically
supportable. See also feasibility. (DOD Dictionary)
adversary—A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the
use of force may be envisaged. (DOD Dictionary)
adversary template—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) A model that portrays the adversary’s frontage depths, echelon spacing, and force
composition as well as the disposition of adversary combat, combat support, and combat service
support units for a given operation. It portrays how the adversary would like to fight if
unconstrained by the operational environment. (MCRP 1-10.2)
area of influence—A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing
operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or
control. (DOD Dictionary)
area of interest—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. Also called AOI. See also area of influence.
(DOD Dictionary)
area of operations—An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces
that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO.
See also area of responsibility. (DOD Dictionary)
area of responsibility—The geographical area associated with a combatant command within
which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also
called AOR.
assumption—A specific supposition of the operational environment that is assumed to be true, in
the absence of positive proof, essential for the continuation of planning. (DOD Dictionary)
avenue of approach—An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its
objective or to key terrain in its path. Also called AA. (DOD Dictionary)
battlespace—The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully
apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea,
space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic
spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas, areas of interest, and areas
of influence. (MCRP 1-10.2)
branch—The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission,
orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated
events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. See also sequel.
(DOD Dictionary. Part 4 of a 4-part definition.)
192
campaign—A series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives
within a given time and space. (DOD Dictionary)
center of gravity—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) A key source of strength without which an enemy cannot function. Also called COG.
(MCRP 1-10.2)
collection plan—A systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available collection
capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources to satisfy specific
information requirements. (DOD Dictionary)
commander’s critical information requirement— (See DOD Dictionary for core definition.
Marine Corps amplification follows.) Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and
the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness,
planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision making. The two subcategories are
priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. Also called CCIR.
(MCRP 1-10.2)
commander’s intent—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) A commander’s clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks
assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement that guides the exercise
of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP 1-10.2)
concept of operations—A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what
the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. Also
called CONOPS. (DOD Dictionary)
constraint—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.)
Something that must be done that limits freedom of action. Constraints are included in the rules of
engagement, commander’s guidance, or instructions from higher headquarters. See also restraint.
(MCRP 1-10.2)
contingency—A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists,
subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect United States interests.
(DOD Dictionary).
critical thinking—Purposeful and reflective judgment about what to believe or what to do in
response to observations, experience, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. (MCRP 1-10.2.)
critical vulnerability—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) An aspect of a center of gravity that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to
an enemy’s and/or adversary’s ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it
undermines a key strength. Also called CV. (MCRP 1-10.2)
D-day—The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. (DOD
Dictionary)
193
MCWP 5-10
decision point—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.)
An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a
critical decision. (MCRP 1-10.2)
decisive action—Any action the commander deems fundamental to achieving mission success.
See also shaping action; sustaining action. (Note: Decisive actions are part of a purpose-based
battlespace framework.) (MCRP 1-10.2)
decision support template—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps
amplification follows.) A staff product initially used in the wargaming process that graphically
represents the decision points and projected situations and indicates when, where, and under what
conditions a decision is most likely to be required to initiate a specific activity (such as a branch
or sequel) or event (such as lifting or shifting of fires). Also called DST. (MCRP 1-10.2)
design—The conception and articulation of a framework for solving a problem. (MCRP 1-10.2)
end state—The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s
objectives. (DOD Dictionary)
event template— (See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.)
A model against which enemy activity can be recorded and compared. It represents a sequential
projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicate the enemy’s ability
to adopt a particular course of action. It is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and
surveillance planning. (MCRP 1-10.2)
feasibility—The plan review criterion for assessing whether the assigned mission can be
accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. See also
acceptability. (DOD Dictionary)
fragmentary order— (See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) An abbreviated form of an operation order, usually issued on a day-to-day basis, that
eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued
in sections. Also called FRAGO. (MCRP 1-10.2)
friendly force information requirement—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine
Corps amplification follows.) Information the commander needs about friendly forces in order to
develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on
unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly
force information requirement. Also called FFIR. (MCRP 1-10.2)
H-hour— 1. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. 2. In
amphibious operations, the time the first landing craft or amphibious vehicle of the waterborne
wave lands or is scheduled to land on the beach and, in some cases, the commencement of
countermine breaching operations. (DOD Dictionary)
high-payoff target—A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success
of the friendly course of action. Also called HPT. See also high-value target; target. (DOD
Dictionary)
194
high-value target—A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the
mission. Also called HVT. See also high-payoff target; target. (DOD Dictionary)
information environment—The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect,
process, disseminate, or act on information. (DOD Dictionary)
information requirements—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps
amplification follows.) All information elements the commander and staff require to successfully
conduct operations, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of mission, enemy, terrain
and weather, troops and support available—time available.Also called IRs. (MCRP 1-10.2)
intelligence preparation of the battlespace—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine
Corps amplification follows.) The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and
environment in a specific geographic area. Also called IPB. (MCRP1-10.2)
joint planning process—An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to
analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a campaign or joint operation plan
or order. Also called JPP. (DOD Dictionary)
line of operation—A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to
the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an
objective(s). Also called LOO. (DOD Dictionary)
main effort—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most
critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power
and is directed against a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 1-10.2)
Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-step methodology that helps organize the thought
processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military
operations. It focuses on the mission and the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy
of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the
establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of problem framing, course of
action development, course of action war game, course of action comparison and decision, orders
development, and transition. Also called MCPP. (Note: Tenets of the MCPP include top-down
planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning.) (MCRP 1-10.2).
mission—The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore. (DOD Dictionary)
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available–time available—1. In the
context of information management, the major subject categories into which relevant information
is grouped for military operations. 2. In the context of tactics, the major factors considered during
mission analysis. Also called METT-T. (MCRP 1-10.2)
named area of interest—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is
expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within a named area of interest will help to confirm
or deny a particular enemy course of action. Also called NAI. (MCRP 1-10.2)
195
MCWP 5-10
operational approach—A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and
actions required to accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary)
operational planning team—A group built around the future operations section that integrates
the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives
or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the seven warfighting functions, staff
liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called OPT. (Upon promulgation of this publication,
the modified definition is approved for use and will be included in the next edition of MCRP 1-
10.2.)
operation assessment—1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of
employing capabilities during military operations in achieving stated objectives. 2. Determination
of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (DOD
Dictionary)
operation order—A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose
of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (DOD Dictionary)
operation plan—A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of
operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. Also
called OPLAN. See also operation order. (DOD Dictionary)
planning order—A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the
development, adaptation, or refinement of a plan/order. Also called PLANORD. (DOD
Dictionary)
priority intelligence requirement—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps
amplification follows.) An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically
affect the overall success of the command’s mission. Also called PIR. (MCRP 1-10.2)
rapid response planning process—A time-constrained version of the full, six-step Marine Corps
Planning Process developed to enable the Marine expeditionary unit to plan and begin execution
of certain tasks within a 6-hour time period. Also called R2P2. (MCRP 1-10.2)
rear area—That area extending forward from a command’s rear boundary to the rear of the area
assigned to the command’s subordinate units. This area is provided primarily for the performance
of combat service support functions. (MCRP 1-10.2)
restraint—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) 1.
Something that a commander is prohibited from doing that may limit freedom of action. 2.
Something that a commander prohibits subordinates from doing. See also constraint. (Note:
Restraints are included in the rules of engagement, commander’s guidance, or instructions from
higher headquarters.) (MCRP 1-10.2)
risk—1. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. 2. The chance of hazard or bad
consequences resulting in exposure to possible injury or loss. Risk level is expressed in terms of
hazard probability or severity. (Upon promulgation of this publication, the modified definition is
approved for use and will be included in the next edition of MCRP 1-10.2.)
196
sequel—The subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current
operation or phase. See also branch. (DOD Dictionary)
shaping actions—The lethal and nonlethal activities conducted throughout the battlespace to
attack an enemy capability or force or to influence the enemy commander’s decision-making. See
also decisive action; sustaining actions. (Note: Shaping actions are part of a purpose-based
situational awareness—Knowledge and understanding of the current situation that promotes
timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the
battlespace in order to facilitate decision-making. An informational perspective and skill that foster
an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. Also called
SA. (MCRP 1-10.2)
situational understanding—The product of applying analysis and synthesis to relevant
information to determine the relationship among the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops
and support—time available variables to facilitate decision-making. (MCRP 1-10.2)
situation template— (See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification
follows.) A series of projections that portray, based on enemy doctrine, the most probable
disposition and location of enemy forces within constraints imposed by weather and terrain.
(MCRP 1-10.2)
spot report—A concise narrative report of essential information covering events or conditions
that may have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations that is
afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. Also called
SPOTREP. (Note: In reconnaissance and surveillance usage, spot report is not to be used.) (DOD
Dictionary)
staff estimate—A continual evaluation of how factors in a staff section’s functional area support
and impact the planning and execution of the mission. (DOD Dictionary)
supporting effort—Designated subordinate unit(s) whose mission is designed to directly
contribute to the su ccess of the main effort. (MCRP 1-10.2)
supporting plan—An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate
commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s
plan. (DOD Dictionary)
sustaining actions—Activities conducted to prepare and support friendly forces (e.g., planning,
logistics, force protection) that promote unity of effort and extend operational reach. See also
decisive action; shaping actions. (Note: Sustaining actions are part of a purpose-based
synchronization matrix—A format for the staff to record the results of wargaming and
synchronize the course of action across time, space, and purpose in relation to an enemy’s and/or
adversary’s course of action. (Upon promulgation of this publication, the modified definition is
approved for use and will be included in the next edition of MCRP 1-10.2)
197
MCWP 5-10
target—An entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible
engagement or other action. (DOD Dictionary)
target area of interest— The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and
engaged by friendly forces. Also called TAI. See also area of interest; high-value target; target.
(DOD Dictionary)
targeting—The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response
to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. See also target. (DOD Dictionary)
wargaming—A step-by-step process of action, reaction, and counteraction for visualizing the
execution of each friendly course of action in relation to enemy/adversary courses of action and
reactions. It explores the possible branches and sequels to the primary plan resulting in a final plan
and decision points for critical actions. (MCRP 1-10.2)
warning order—1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning
directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a
commander. Also called WARNORD. (DOD Dictionary)
198
REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS
Department of Defense Issuances
Department of Defense Directive (DODD)

3025.14 Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens from Threatened Areas Abroad
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI)

1100.22 Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix
Department of Defense Manual (DODM)

5200.01, Vol. 1 DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and
Declassification
Military Standard (MIL-STD)

2525D Department of Defense Interface Standard: Joint Military Symbology
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)
3130.03 Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance
Joint Issuances
Joint Publications (JPs)
1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

3-0 Joint Operations
3-07 Stability
3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation
3-13.4 Military Deception
3-20 Security Cooperation
3-25 Countering Threat Networks
3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters
4-01 The Defense Transportation System
5-0 Joint Planning
Miscellaneous
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Doctrine Note 1-16, Command Red Team
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement (STANAG)
2014 NATO Formats for Orders and Designation of Timing, Locations, and Boundaries
United States Army

MCWP 5-10
Field Manual (FM)
7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations
Training Circular (TC)
7-100.2 Opposing Force Tactics
United States Marine Corps
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting
1-0 Marine Corps Operations w/Changes 1, 2, and 3
4 Logistics
5 Planning
Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-03 Stability Operations
3-32 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations
7-10 Marine Corps Componency
Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)

3-02A MAGTF Network Engagement Activities
3-40.B Tactical-Level Logistics
Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

1-10.2 Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
2-10B.1 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace
5-10.1 Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment
Marine Corps Order (MCO)

3500.27C Risk Management
Miscellaneous Marine Corps Publications
MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) Pamphlets

2-0.1 Red Cell – Green Cell
2-0.2 Intelligence Planner’s Guide
5-0.2 Operational Planning Team Leaders Guide
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) 1540-002-95, Generic Intelligence Requirements
Handbook (GIRH)
Miscellaneous
Operation Plan/Operation Order Format
200

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What is the Marine Corps Planning Process?

What is the Marine Corps Planning Process?

What are the tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process?

What are the tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process?

MCWP 5-10

Marine Corps Planning Process

U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PCN 143 000068 00

Reviewed and approved this date.

Publication Control Number: 143 000068 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

CHAPTER 1. PLANNING OVERVIEW

CHAPTER 2. PROBLEM FRAMING

CHAPTER 3. COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 4. COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

CHAPTER 5. COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

CHAPTER 6. ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

SYNOPSIS OF THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

TENETS OF THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

 Top-Down Planning. Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander

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Figure 2-1. Problem Framing Process.

INTRODUCTION TO MARINE CORPS DESIGN METHODOLOGY

Describe the Current and Desired States of the Operational Environment

Figure 2-2. Current State to Desired State.

Figure 2-3. System Diagram Example.

Figure 2-4. Causal Loop Diagram Example.

Define the Problem Set

Figure 2-5. Problem Set.

Figure 2-6. Problem Set Example.

COMMANDER’S OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Course of Action Development Guidance

ISSUE THE WARNING ORDER

Reframe Throughout Planning and Execution

Figure 2-7. Reframing.

Design and Task Analysis

Center of Gravity Analysis

Relative Combat Power Assessment

Develop the Mission Statement

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Green Cell Activities

Red Cell Activities

Red Team vs. Red Cell

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

Commander’s Significant Notification Events

Requests for Information

Problem Framing Brief

 Problem set review.

DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION

Initial Courses of Action Brief

Completed Course of Action Requirements

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT BRIEF

COMMANDER’S WARGAMING GUIDANCE AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

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War Game Preparations

War Game Billets

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