1. G.R. No.

198994, February 03, 2016

IRIS MORALES, PETITIONER, VS. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO
MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondentOlondriz heirs filed a petition with the Las
Piñas RTC for the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator on
July 4, 2003.

On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent
left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for hex appointment as
special administratrix.

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.
On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation and moved to suspend the intestate proceedings
in order to give way to the probate proceedings. The respondent heirs opposed Morales' motion for
suspension and her petition for allowance of the will.

On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because Francisco
was preterited from the will.

On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of
preterition. Thus, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate
the existence of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.

After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of evidence for the evidentiary
hearing was scheduled on May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving her
right to present evidence on the issue of preterition.

On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs' motion for reconsideration of the
revocation of the Letters of Administration and (2) Morales' motion to be appointed Special
Administratrix of the estate. The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not
hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears that the probate of the will might become an idle
ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is
an heir of the decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the
evidentiary hearings, Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as
administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30, 2007, for lack of merit.

On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC. Morales
alleged that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding intestate despite the existence
of the will.
On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales' petition for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate
proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the
direct line annuls the institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into intestate
succession.[4] Thus, the continuation of the probate proceedings would be superfluous and impractical
because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The CA concluded that the RTC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12, 2011. Hence, she filed the
present petition for review on certiorari on December 5, 2011.

Issues:

W/N Francisco was preterited from the will; and that Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of
heirs and opened the case into intestacy.

Ruling:

2. preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator's
inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,  shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not
impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.

In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or
devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless
Morales could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his
preterition.

The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco's preterition annulled the
institution of heirs. The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total
intestacy of the inheritance. The decedent's will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null
and void. The conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous.
2. G.R. No. 204793, June 08, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF CONSUELO SANTIAGO GARCIA

CATALINO TANCHANCO AND RONALDO TANCHANCO, PETITIONERS, v. NATIVIDAD GARCIA SANTOS,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Consuelo was married to Anastacio Garcia (Anastacio) who passed away on August 14, 1985. They had
two daughters, Remedios Garcia Tanchanco (Remedios) and Natividad Garcia Santos (Natividad).
Remedios predeceased Consuelo in 1985 and left behind her children, which included
CatalinoTanchanco (Catalino) and Ronaldo Tanchanco (Ronaldo, collectively Tanchancos).

On April 4, 1997, Consuelo, at 91 years old, passed away leaving behind an estate consisting of several
personal and real properties.

On August 11, 1997, Catalino filed a petition before the RTC of Pasay City to settle the intestate estate of
Consuelo Catalino alleged that the legal heirs of Consuelo are: Catalino, Ricardo, Ronaldo and Carmela,
all surnamed Tanchanco (children of Remedios), and Melissa and Gerard Tanchanco (issues of Rodolfo
Tanchanco, Remedios' son who predeceased her and Consuelo), and Natividad, the remaining living
daughter of Consuelo. Catalino additionally alleged that Consuelo's properties are in the possession of
Natividad and her son, Alberto G. Santos (Alberto), who have been dissipating and misappropriating the
said properties. Withal, Catalino prayed

1. for his appointment as the special administrator of Consuelo's intestate estate and the issuance
of letters of administration in his favor;
2. for a conduct of an inventory of the estate;
3. for Natividad and all other heirs who are in possession of the estate's properties to surrender
the same and to account for the proceeds of all the sales of Consuelo's assets made during the
last years of her life;
4. for all heirs and persons having control of Consuelo's properties be prohibited from disposing
the same without the court's prior approval;
5. for Natividad to produce Consuelo's alleged will to determine its validity;
6. for Natividad to desist from disposing the properties of Consuelo's estate; and
7. for other reliefs and remedies.

Natividad filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that she already filed a petition for the probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Consuelo before Branch 115 of the RTC of Pasay City. Natividad asked that
Consuelo's Last Will and Testament, entitled HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiyani Consuelo Santiago Garcia,
be allowed and approved. Moreover, as the named executrix in the will, Natividad prayed that letters
testamentary be issued in her favor.

The Tanchancos filed an Opposition to Natividad's petition for probate alleging that the will's attestation
clause did not state the number of pages and that the will was written in Tagalog, and not the English
language usually used by Consuelo in most of her legal documents. They also pointed out that Consuelo
could not have gone to Makati where the purported will was notarized considering her failing health and
the distance of her residence in Pasay City. Moreover, they alleged that Consuelo's signature was
forged. Thus, they prayed for the disallowance of probate and for the proceedings to be converted into
an intestate one.

However, Natividad contended that there was substantial compliance with Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Although the attestation clause did not state the number of pages comprising the will, the same was
clearly indicated in the acknowledgment portion. Furthermore, the Tanchancos' allegations were not
supported by proof. Conversely, the Tanchancos rebutted that the number of pages should be found in
the body of the will and not just in the acknowledgment portion.

The subject will was witnessed by Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico (Atty. Tantuico), Atty. Ma. Isabel C. Lallana
(Atty. Lallana), and Atty. Aberico T. Paras (Atty. Paras) and notarized by Atty. Nunilo O. Marapao, Jr.
(Atty. Marapao).

Atty. Marapao testified that he specifically remembered the will in question because it was his first time
to notarize aill written in Tagalog. He was familiar with the other witnesses and their signatures because
they were his colleagues at Quasha Ancheta Peña and Nolasco (Quasha Law Office) and because he was
present during the signing of the will. He also identified Consuelo's signature as he was present when
she signed the will.17

Atty. Marapao averred that he assisted Atty. Lallana in drafting the will. He described Consuelo as very
alert and sane, and not suffering from any ailment at the time. The will was written in Tagalog at the
request of Consuelo although she was conversant in English. Their usual practice during the execution of
a will is to ask the testator some questions to determine whether he or she is of sound mind. If they find
everything in order, they would sign the will and then let the testator sign the same. Subsequently, the
will would be notarized.

Issues:

W/N THE CA ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF THE DECEDENT'S WILL DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE WILL DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW UNDER ARTICLE 805 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.

W/N THE CA ERRED ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF THE DECEDENT'S WILL DESPITE
CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED BY THE PETITIONERS [TANCHANCOS] THAT INDICATE BAD FAITH, FORGERY
OR FRAUD, OR UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE x xx ATTENDED THE EXECUTION OF
THE WILL, RENDERING THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE UNDER ART. 809 OF THE CIVIL CODE
INAPPLICABLE.

Ruling:

1. An examination of Consuelo's will shows that it complied with the formalities required by the law,
except that the attestation clause failed to indicate the total number of pages upon which the will was
written. To address this concern, Natividad enumerated the following attributes of the attestation clause
and the will itself, which the Court affirms:

a. The pages are completely and correlatively numbered using the same typewriting font on all the
pages of the will;
b. All indications point to the fact that the will was typewritten using the same typewriter;
 c. There are no erasures or alterations in the will;
d. The notarial acknowledgment states unequivocally or with clarity that the will consists of five (5)
pages including the attestation clause (i.e.[,] the "pagpapatunay") and the notarial
acknowledgment itself (i.e.[,] the "pagpapatotoongito")
e. All of the pages of the entire will were properly signed on the appropriate portions by the
testator and the instrumental witnesses;
f. All of the signatures of the testator and the instrumental witnesses on all the pages of the will
are genuine if only for the fact that they are identical/similar throughout;
g. The oppositors have not adduced, and in fact waived the presentation of, any kind of evidence
to impugn the authenticity of any of the signatures appearing in the will;
h. The oppositors have not adduced, and in fact waived the presentation of, any kind of evidence
tending to show that the will was allegedly executed by undue influence or any fraudulent or
improper/unlawful means[.

Notably, the case of Caneda v. Court of Appeals explained that:

x xx [U]nder Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will
invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805.
In this regard, however, the manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be
limited to merely an examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or
written.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but
the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation
clause of a will.

2. We are inclined to affirm the findings and ruling of the CA as these were based on a careful
consideration of the evidence and supported by prevailing law and jurisprudence. The Court concurs
with the CA in holding that the trial court erred in lending credence to the allegations of the Tanchancos
which are bereft of substantiation that Consuelo's signature was forged or that undue duress was
employed in the execution of the will in question.

It is settled that "the law favors testacy over intestacy"120 and hence, "the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is
probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory." In a similar way,
"testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose."

About the claim of forgery, the same remains unsubstantiated because the Tanchancos merely surmised
that there were discrepancies in Consuelo's signatures in the Residence Certificates and in the will, and
insisted that the said signatures should not be "perfectly written" and instead should be "crooked" due
to Consuelo's age.
Based on the Court's assessment, the signatures in Consuelo's Residence Certificates134 were similar
with her signature in the contested will. As found by the CA, "[a] close scrutiny of the signatures
appearing in the 1986, 1988 and 1989 residence certificates of the decedent and comparing them with
the signatures of the testatrix in the contested Will failed to disclose a convincing, definitive and
conclusive showing of forgery. The appealed decision of the court a quo [RTC] likewise failed to discuss
how it came to its conclusion that the will contains forged signatures of Consuelo which is one of the
reasons it was denied probate. Other than the self-serving allegations of the oppositors-appellees,no
evidence was ever presented in court that would indubitably establish forgery of the decedent's
signature in the contested will."

Bare allegations without corroborating proof that Consuelo was under duress in executing the will
cannot be considered.

The will should be allowed probate

Considering the foregoing, the will of Consuelo should be allowed probate as it complied with the
formalities required by the law. The Tanchancos failed to prove that the same was executed through
force or under duress, or that the signature of the testator was procured through fraud as provided
under Article 839138 of the Civil Code and Rule 76, Section 9139 of the Rules of Court.
3. G.R. No. 237133, January 20, 2021

MIGDONIO RACCA AND MIAM GRACE DIANNE RACCA, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIA LOLITA A. ECHAGUE,
RESPONDENT.

Facts:

On March 28, 2017, Maria Lolita A. Echague (respondent) filed before the RTC a Petition for the
allowance of the will of the late AmparoFeridoRacca (Amparo) and issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. Respondent averred in the petition that Amparo executed a notarial will before her death on
September 9, 2015 and bequeathed an undivided portion of a parcel of land consisting one-fourth (1/4)
of her estate, or 412.5 square meters, in favor of her grandnephew Migdon Chris Laurence Ferido.
Respondent also named herein petitioners MigdonioRacca (Migdonio) and Miam Grace Dianne
FeridoRacca (Miam), Amparo's husband and daughter, respectively, as Amparo's known heirs.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order on April 18, 2017 setting
the case for hearing on June 21 , 2017 at 8:30 a.m. On even date, the trial court issued the
corresponding Notice of Hearing.

The hearing proceeded on June 21, 2017 but herein petitioners failed to appear, thus prompting the trial
court to declare them in default

On July 11, 2017, petitioners filed a Motion to Lift Order of General Default[ on the ground of excusable
negligence. They alleged that Migdonio received a copy of the Notice of Hearing only on June 19, 2017
or two (2) days prior to the scheduled hearing. Since Migdonio is already of advanced age, being 78
years old, and not in perfect health, he could not immediately act on the notice within such a short
period of time. Miam, on the other hand, did not receive any notice. Due to their ignorance of
procedural rules and financial constraints, petitioners were not immediately able to secure a counsel to
represent their interest. Petitioners also manifested in the motion that Amparo was mentally incapable
to make a will based on the medical certificate issued by her attending physician.

In its August 16, 2017 Order, the RTC denied petitioners' motion. It held that the jurisdictional
requirements of publication and posting of notices had been substantially complied with.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its November 20, 2017
Order. Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present petition before the Court.

Issue:

W/N known heirs of the testator are still entitled to personal notice despite the publication and
posting of the notice of the hearing

Ruling:

Yes, Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the 1997 Rules of Court, requires a copy of the notice of hearing to be sent to the
known heirs whose residences are known, this is mandatory and cannot be satisfied by mere publication
under Sec. 3 of the same Rules.
It should be emphasized that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. By extrinsic validity, the testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity
pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. These matters do not necessitate
the issuance of an order of default against parties who failed to appear in the proceedings despite the
publication of the notice of hearing. After all, the probate of a will is mandatory and cannot be left to the
discretion of the persons interested in the estate of the deceased.
4. G.R. No. 214415, October 15, 2018

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA C. PACIOLES AND EMMANUEL C. CHING,
PETITIONER,
VS.
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Upon the death of MiguelitaChingPacioles (Miguelita), she left several real properties, stock
investments, bank deposits and interests. She was survived by her husband, respondent Emilio B.
Pacioles, Jr. (Emilio), their two minor children, Miguelita's mother, MiguelaChuatoco-Ching (Miguela),
now deceased and Miguelita's brother, herein petitioner Emmanuel C. Ching (Emmanuel).

On August 20, 1992, Emilio filed a petition for the settlement of Miguelita's estate with prayer for his
appointment as its regular administrator. Thereafter, Emilio and Emmanuel were appointed as co-
administrators.

However, the appointment of Emmanuel was nullified in the CA Decision dated July 22, 2002 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 46763.

Among the properties left by Miguelita and included in the inventory of her estate were her two dollar
accounts with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-San Francisco Del Monte (SFDM) Branch (subject
BPI account), the subject matter of the instant case.

However, said dollar accounts were closed and consolidated into a single account (consolidated
account) which is Account No. 003248-2799-14 under the names of Emilio and MiguelaChuatoco or
Emmanuel upon their written request addressed to the bank.

On September 30, 2011, Emilio filed a motion to allow him to withdraw money from the subject BPI
account to defray the cost of property taxes due on the real properties of Miguelita's estate.

Issue:
W/N the intestate court not erred in allowing the withdrawal of funds from the subject BPI account
without the consent of a co-depositor.

Ruling:

Yes, the intestate court erred in allowing the withdrawal of funds. We recognize the functions and duties
of an administrator of an estate. One of which is to administer all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of any other person for him,
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon.
In this case, there were two administrators of Miguelita's estate, i.e., Emilio and Emmanuel. However, it
is important to highlight that Emmanuel's appointment was revoked by the CA in its Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 46763. Necessarily, as the revocation of Emmanuel's appointment as administrator was
established, his right over the funds contained in the joint account no longer exists. It must be
emphasized that his right over the same merely emanates from his being a co-administrator.

Considering the nature of a joint account, we cannot but adhere to banking laws which requires the
consent of all the depositors before any withdrawal could be made. However, since Emmanuel no
longer has a right over the subject joint account in view of his removal as a co-administrator, it is
necessary that his name should be removed as an account holder and co-depositor of Emilio in a proper
forum for Emilio to be able to completely perform his functions and duties as an administrator.
On this note, emphasis must be made on the jurisdiction of a trial court, sitting as an intestate court, as
regards the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased. Such jurisdiction continues until after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
Thus, proper proceedings must be had before the intestate court so that the subject joint account
should be administered solely by Emilio, who is the lone administrator. The case is remanded to the
intestate court for proper proceedings.
5. G.R. No. 237449, December 02, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF AIDA A. BAMBAO, LINDA A. KUCSKAR, PETITIONER,
VS.
COSME B. SEKITO, JR., RESPONDENT.

Facts:

On October 28, 1999, Aida A. Bambao (Aida), a naturalized American citizen, executed a Last Will and
Testament (will)[3] in California where she nominated her cousin, Cosme B. Sekito, Jr. (Cosme), as a
special independent executor over her assets located in the Philippines, thus:

I, AIDA A. BAMBAO, a resident of California, declare this to be my Will and hereby revoke all
former Wills and Codicils.

x xxx

x xxI nominate COSME B. SEKITO, JR. to serve as special independent Executor over all assets which are
located in the Philippines, x xx. The special independent Executor over the Philippines shall have the
individual signature authority capable of transacting all Trust business with regard to any assets located
in the Philippines.

x xxx

By: [Sgd.] AIDA A. BAMBAO

ATTESTATION

The testator, AIDA A. BAMBAO, on the date last above written, declared to us that the above instrument
is her Will and requested us to act as witnesses to it. At this point in time the testator appeared to be of
sound and disposing mind. Her publication and subscription of the Will appeared to be a free and
voluntary act. Wherefore, each of us at her request now signs as a witness in the presence of the
testatrix and in the presence of each other. Each of us knows that each signature appearing hereon is a
true signature of the person who signed. We[,] the undersigned, are of the age of majority.

We declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true
and correct. Executed on October 28, 1999 at Newport Beach, California.

[Signed:] Witness 1
Witness 2

On February 5, 2000, Aida died a widow in her residence at Long Beach, California.[5] On March 27,
2000, Cosme filed a Petition for the Allowance of Will/Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 264, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11042.Cosme prayed that
he be appointed as the Special Administrator of Aida's estate pending the issuance of letters
testamentary, and as guardian ad litem of Aida's adopted minor child, Elsa Bambao. Meanwhile, Linda A.
Kucskar (Linda), the decedent's sister, and one of the heirs named in the will, opposed the petition and
claimed that she is the one defraying all of Elsa's expenses. Linda added that Aida left a real estate
property in Calbayog City which was excluded in the petition.

Linda argues that Aida's will should not have been considered for probate. The foreign law governing the
formalities of the will was not alleged and proven. The will also failed to conform with Philippine laws.
Specifically, the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, the witnesses did not sign on each
and every page, there were only two witnesses, and the attestation clause omitted the total number of
pages.

Issue: W/N Aida's will should be considered for probate in our courts.

Ruling:

No, Philippine laws require that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it has been
proved and allowed. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article (Art.) 816 of the Civil Code is instructive,
viz:

ART. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Here, it is undisputed that Aida is a naturalized American citizen and that she executed the will in
California, United States of America where she was residing at the time of her death. As such, the
Philippine courts must examine the formalities of Aida's will in accordance with California law. Yet, it is
settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in this jurisdiction,[18] and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them.[19] Like any other fact, they must be properly pleaded and
proved.

We have scoured the records and found no copy of the pertinent California law presented as evidence
pursuant to the requirements of the rules.

In sum, Aida's will should have been disallowed because it failed to comply with the legal formalities It is
regrettable that this case has dragged on and up to this Court unnecessarily only for Us to come to the
conclusion that the foreign law was not alleged and proven, and that the Will does not comply with
Philippine laws. On this score, We stress that the requirements for proving foreign laws and judgments
are not mere technicalities, and Our courts are not at liberty to exercise judicial notice without
contravening Our own rules on evidence.
6. G.R. No. 246997, May 05, 2021

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF CECILIA
ESGUERRA COSICO,

THELMA ESGUERRA GUIA, PETITIONER,

VS.
JOSE M. COSICO, JR., MANUEL M. COSICO, MINERVA M. COSICO, AND ELEANOR M. COSICO-CHAVEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Cecilia Esguerra Cosico (Cecilia) was born in 1932 to Jose Cosico, Sr. and Corazon Esguerra (Corazon).
She was born with a physical disability and was known in the locality as a "lumpo." Corazon passed away
when Cecilia was just one (1) year old and the latter was left in the care and custody of her maternal
aunt, Mercedes Esguerra Guia (Mercedes). Mercedes raised Cecilia in their home in Schetilig Avenue,
San Pablo City, together with Mercedes's legally adopted daughter, petitioner Thelma Esguerra Guia
(Thelma). Because of her physical condition, Cecilia spent most of her days in her bedroom. She never
attended school nor learned to read or write.

In 1996, when she was sixty-four (64) years old, Cecilia decided to execute her last will and testament.
Through Thelma's balae Liberato B. Benedictos (Liberato), Cecilia asked Atty. Danton Q. Bueser, then a
notary public (now a retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals), for assistance in preparing the
last will. For the purpose of this case though, we shall refer to him as Atty. Bueser.

On September 8, 1996, Atty. Bueser and Liberato went to Cecilia's house. Atty. Bueser and Cecilia talked
inside the latter's bedroom while Liberato stayed outside by the door. Liberato heard Cecilia call
Mercedes whom she directed to collect documents from the steel cabinet. Mercedes complied and
handed over the documents to Atty. Bueser.

On September 10, 1996, Atty. Bueser and Liberato returned to Cecilia's house with the finished copy of
her last will and testament denominated HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya which consisted of four (4) pages.

Reynaldo M. Gigante (Reynaldo) and Ricardo C. Pandino (Ricardo) were also present at Cecilia's house
that night upon her request. Reynaldo was the son of Cecilia's helper, while Ricardo was a neighbor who
regularly went to the house to buy coconuts from Mercedes.

In the presence of Liberato, Reynaldo, and Ricardo who served as notarial witnesses to Cecilia's
HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya, Atty. Bueser read the contents of the document to Cecilia and carefully
explained to her its effects and consequences. He then asked her if she fully understood its contents and
whether it was done according to her wishes. Cecilia confirmed.
After Atty. Bueser read and explained the contents of the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya, Cecilia affixed
her thumbmark to the will on top of her printed name and on the lower left portion of the first and
second pages of the document – all in the presence of Atty. Bueser and her notarial witnesses.
Subsequently, in the presence of Liberato, Reynaldo, and Ricardo, both Cecilia and Atty. Bueser signed
on the left margin of the first two pages of the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya and at the end of the
attestation clause.

On March 22, 2006, Cecilia died at the age of seventy-four (74). Following her death, Mercedes obtained
a copy of the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya, had it photocopied and gave her spouse Gomerciendo Guia
and Thelma a copy each.

On May 9, 2009, Mercedes died.

On July 6, 2010, Thelma filed a Petition for probate of Cecilia's will and for her appointment as
administrator of the latter's estate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Br. 32, San Pablo City.

On September 23, 2010, Cecilia's half siblings from the same father, respondents Jose. M. Cosico, Jr.,
Manuel M. Cosico, Minerva M. Cosico, and Eleanor M. Cosico-Chavez (respondents) opposed the
petition. They essentially alleged that the formalities for the execution of a valid will under Articles 805
to 809 of the Civil Code were not complied with. More, Cecilia was not mentally capacitated at the time
she purportedly executed her will; if at all, she signed it under duress and improper pressure from the
beneficiary; the alleged thumbprint of Cecilia was procured through fraud; and Cecilia did not intend the
document denominated HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya to be her last will and testament.

The trial court essentially ruled that Cecilia freely and voluntarily executed the will, during which time,
she was of sound mind. The HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya was executed in accordance with the formal
and essential requisites of law.

By Decision dated December 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that Cecilia's HulingHabilin
at Pagpapasiya was void since it violated Article 808 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

W/N the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya executed was in compliance with Article 808 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

Yes, the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya executed was in compliance with Article 808 of the Civil Code

Article 808 of the Civil Code requires that the contents of a last will and testament be read to the
testator twice, once by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary, viz.:

Article 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.While the law imposes
the requirement only when the testator is blind, the Court has expanded its coverage to those who are
illiterate.

At any rate, the Court refuses to entertain such a possibility of fraud because Atty. Bueser, aside from
having observed all other formalities, handed copies of the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya to the notarial
witnesses for their signatures. This gave them the opportunity to read a short four (4)-page document
which they all flipped through from pages one (1) through four (4) to affix their respective signatures,
essentially negating any possibility of fraud, trickery, or misrepresentation.

the purpose of a will is to grant the wishes of a person upon his/her death, especially with respect to the
disposition of his/her worldly possessions

Here, we find that upholding respondents' position and the Court of Appeals' ruling would only frustrate
Cecilia's will. A review of the document itself, the testimonies of the witnesses, and the record shows
that the intention of the testator had been established and protected from fraud or trickery.

Notably, Atty. Bueser read and explained the contents of the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya to Cecilia.
Meanwhile, Liberato and Reynaldo listened and understood the explanation of Atty. Bueser. It is also
undisputed that Cecilia made no denial or correction to what she had heard.

At any rate, the Court refuses to entertain such a possibility of fraud because Atty. Bueser, aside from
having observed all other formalities, handed copies of the HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya to the notarial
witnesses for their signatures. This gave them the opportunity to read a short four (4)-page document
which they all flipped through from pages one (1) through four (4) to affix their respective signatures,
essentially negating any possibility of fraud, trickery, or misrepresentation.

More, the notarial witnesses heard Atty. Bueser read and explain to Cecilia her HulingHabilin at
Pagpapasiya which gave both Cecilia and themselves the opportunity to object to any provision in the
will that may not have been according to her wishes. As it was, no objections were made.

In sum, Article 808 is meant to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but is never
intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy testamentary privilege. Here, the danger that Article
808 is designed to prevent is undoubtedly nonexistent. As such, the trial court correctly ruled that the
HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya had substantially complied with its spirit for the purpose of admitting it to
probate.

The last will and testament of Cecilia Esguerra Cosico, contained in her HulingHabilin at Pagpapasiya
executed on September 10, 1996 is ADMITTED to probate.
7. G.R. No. 246096, January 13, 2021

SPOUSES BENNY AND NORMITA ROL, PETITIONERS,

VS.
ISABEL URDAS RACHO,* RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Respondent Isabel UrdasRacho (Isabel) alleged that her brother, Loreto Urdas (Loreto), was the
registered owner of a 1,249-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located in the Municipality of Gonzaga,
Cagayan, denominated as Lot No. 1559, as reflected in Original Certificate of Title No. O-1061. On
August 6, 1963, Loreto died without an issue, thus, leaving his siblings, namely, Fausto, Chita, Maria, and
Isabel as his intestate heirs to the said lot. Sometime before the filing of the complaint, Isabel discovered
that: (a) Lot No. 1559 was subdivided into equal 624.50-sq. m. portions, denominated as Lot Nos. 1559-
A and 1559-B; (h) despite Loreto's death in 1963, petitioners made it appear that Loreto sold to them
the subdivided lots through a Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Registered Land dated September 1,
2006 and Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land dated June 19, 2012, respectively; and (c) in light of the
execution of said deeds, new titles covering the subdivided lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-156992 and 032-2012004566 were issued in petitioners' names. As such, Isabel was
constrained to file a complaint for reivindicacion and damages before the RTC against, inter alia,
petitioners.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted that sometime in 1993, they were looking to
purchase a parcel of land. Coincidentally, petitioners were able to meet Fausto's wife and son, namely,
Leoncia, and Allan, who offered to sell them one-half of Lot No. 1559 for P25,000.00, to which they
agreed. Thus, on September 13, 1993 Fausto, Chita, Maria, and Allan executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale (EJSS) concerning the subject lotlot whereby: (a) the subject lot was subdivided
equally into two (2) 624.50-sq. m. portions, denominated as Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B; (b) Lot No.
1559-A was adjudicated to Fausto, Chita, and Maria, who then sold the same to petitioners for the
aforementioned amount; and (c) Lot No. 1559-B was adjudicated to Allan. Thereafter, petitioners built a
house on Lot No. 1559-A and occupied the same peacefully. In 2010, petitioners purchased from Allan
and Leoncia Lot No. 1559-B, for which they executed a Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land[16] dated
September 26, 2011. According to petitioners, they have been in open, continuous, and peaceful
possession of Lot No. 1559-A since 1993 and Lot No. 1559-B since 2010, until Isabel disturbed the same
by filing the instant complaint in June 2013.

In a Decision dated July 8, 2015, the RTC ruled in Isabel's favor, and accordingly, declared null and void
and ordered petitioners to reconvey to Isabel the total area of 312.25-sq. m. from Lot No. 1559, and to
pay her P5,646.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
The RTC found the Deeds of Sale dated September 1, 2006 and June 19, 2012 void for being forgeries,
pointing out that there was no way Loreto could have signed those instruments as he died in 1963. It
also declared void the EJSS as it was executed without the knowledge and consent of one of Loreto's
intestate heirs, i.e., Isabel, and consequently, the Deed of Sale of a Portion of Land dated September 26,
2011 for being a subsequent transfer that emanated from the EJSS. Nonetheless, the RTC found
petitioners to be purchasers in good faith, opining that they acquired Lot No. 1559 for valuable
consideration, not knowing beforehand that their title thereto was a product of fraud. As such, they are
only required to reconvey to Isabel an area of 312.25-sq. m. out of the total area of 1,249-sq. m. of Lot
No. 1559, in order to satisfy the latter's share in Loreto's intestate estate.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated
September 3, 2015. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.

ln a Decision dated September 13, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications, in that the
sale by Fausto, Chita, and Maria to petitioners are valid and binding but only insofar as their respective
undivided interests in the half of Lot No. 1559 is concernedthe CA declared void the EJSS, considering
that, inter alia, Isabel, a legal heir to Loreto's intestate estate, was excluded therefrom. As such, the CA
rendered void the adjudication of Lot No. 1559-B to Allan as he is not a legal heir to Loreto's intestate
estate; and consequently, Allan's transfer of the same to petitioners through the Deed of Sale of a
Portion of Land dated September 26, 2011 is likewise void, pursuant to the maxim nemodat quod non
habet. Nonetheless, the CA deemed valid the sale of Lot No. 1559-A to petitioners, but only insofar as
Fausto, Chita, and Maria's respective aliquot shares.

Further, the CA held that Isabel is not guilty of laches because she was deprived of her hereditary share
without her knowledge and consent; and as such, she is not barred from invoking her right to her
inheritance in Loreto's estate.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 13,
2019; hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the conveyance of Lot No. 1559 to petitioners is null and
void, except as to the portion in Lot No. 1559-A pertaining to Fausto, Chita, and Maria which is deemed
valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The EJSS dated September 13, 1993, the CA correctly declared the same to be null and void,
considering that it was executed without the knowledge and consent of Isabel, a co-heir of Fausto,
Chita, and Maria, to the estate of their deceased brother, Loreto.[29] In a catena of cases, the Court had
consistently ruled that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed to the total exclusion of any of the legal
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the execution of the same, is fraudulent, vicious, and a
total nullity,[30] as in this case. As such, it produced no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of
anyone.[31] Therefore, the contents of the EJSS, namely: (a) the subdivision of Lot No. 1559 to two (2)
equal halves, namely Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1559-B and (b) alienation of the aforementioned halves, first,
to petitioners with consideration and second, to Allan gratuitously, are null and void and cannot be
given any legal effect as well.
to reiterate that the subdivision of Lot No. 1559 into two (2) equal halves, i.e., Lot Nos. 1559-A and 1
559-B, as well as the attempted conveyance of these definite portions to petitioners and Allan, resulted
from the execution of the EJSS - which again, was without the knowledge and consent of Isabel. In
Cabrera v. Ysaac,[32] the Court held that a sale of a definite portion of a co-owned property requires the
consent of all the co-owners. Without such unanimous consent, a co-owner can only convey his
undivided, aliquot interest over a co-owned property; he/she has no right to divide, and thereafter,
convey definite portions thereof, viz.:

If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without
consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned
property. As summarized in Lopez v. Illustre, "[i]f he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land,
he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts,
and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."

Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all co-
owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share.
The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to his or her autonomous
ownership upon future partition.

The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest in the co-ownership. However, this was not the
object of the sale between him and petitioner. The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it
was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has
"no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
because his right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.

In this case, when Loreto died, his siblings, namely, Fausto, Chitn, Maria, and Isabel all became co-
owners of Loreto's intestate estate, i.e., Lot No. 1559, pursuant to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, with all
of them having equal interest therein, i.e., 1/4 of the property. Thus, for the alienation of definite
portions of Lot No. 1559 to be valid, it must be with the consent of all of them. However, the alienations
of definite portions made in the EJSS was without the knowledge and consent of Isabel, and hence, are
null and void.

As a final point, however, it is equally important to point out that since the EJSS is invalidated, it is as if
Loreto's intestate, which includes Lot No. 1559, has yet to undergo proper settlement proceedings in
accordance with prevailing law. Thus, while Loreto's heirs, namely, Fausto, Chita, Maria, and Isabel, have
indeed acquired rights over Lot No. 1559 at the exact moment of Loreto's death[42] - and consequently,
may convey such rights to third parties, such as what happened in this case when Fausto, Chita, and
Maria sold their rights over the property to petitioners - what they have are only inchoate rights over
the said lot. Otherwise stated, absent any proper settlement proceeding for Loreto's estate due to the
nullity of the EJSS, the ownership of Lot No. 1559 remains in the said estate, with the aforementioned
parties only having inchoate interests therein. [43]
Accordingly, Lot No. 1559 should revert back to Loreto's estate, and only the parties' respective inchoate
interests should be recognized in this case. In particular, these inchoate interests over Lot No. 1559 are
as follows: petitioners, with 3/8 interest Isabel, with 1/4 interest and Fausto, Chita, and Maria, with 1/8
interest each. It goes without saying that each of them are free to resort to the available remedies in
order to settle Loreto's intestate estate, and subsequently, distribute/partition the property under
prevailing laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
8. G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF LUZ GASPE LIPSON AND ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,

ROEL P. GASPI, PETITIONER,

VS.
HONORABLE JUDGE MARIA CLARISSA L. PACIS-TRINIDAD, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, IRIGA
CITY,* RESPONDENT.

Facts:

On February 23, 2011, Luz Gaspe Lipson (Lipson), an American citizen temporarily residing in Iriga City,
executed her last will and testament and designated Roel R Gaspi (Gaspi) as executor.

On October 17, 2015, at 70 years old, Lipson passed away due to lymphoma.

On October 3, 2016, Gaspi filed a Petition for the probate of Lipson's will and the issuance of letters
testamentary without bond in his behalf.

On October 6, 2016, the Regional Trial Courtmotuproprio dismissed the petition for probate for lack of
jurisdiction.

The Regional Trial Court pointed out that Lipson was an American citizen. Thus, her national law must
govern and her will must be probated in the United States of America, and not in the Philippines.

The Regional Trial Court continued that it is only when Lipson's will is probated, according to her
national law, that the Philippines may recognize and execute her will through a petition for recognition
of foreign judgment.

In the Petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Gaspi contends that there is no prohibition under
Philippine law for the probate of wills executed by aliens. He adds that under the Civil Code, the will of
an alien residing abroad is also recognized in the Philippines, if it is made in accordance with the laws of
the alien's place of residence or country, or if done in conformity with Philippine laws.

Respondent likewise posits that petitioner's reliance on the ruling in Palaganas was misplaced, as it
involved the probate of a will executed by an alien abroad, while in this case, the will was executed in
the Philippines by an alien She opines that instead of Article 816 of the Civil Code, upon which Palaganas
was based, the applicable provision was Article 817.

Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has the competence to take cognizance of an alien's will
executed in the Philippines, even if it had not yet been probated before the alien decedent's national
court.

Ruling:

Yes. Generally, the extrinsic validity of the will, which is the preliminary issue in probate of wills, is
governed by the law of the country where the will was executed and presented for probate.
Understandably, the court where a will is presented for probate should, by default, apply only the law of
the forum, as we do not take judicial notice of foreign laws.

This is the situation here. A Filipina who was subsequently naturalized as an American executed a will in
the Philippines to pass real property found in the country. The designated executor now files a petition
for probate in the Philippines.

Respondent motuproprio dismissed the petition for probate, because it purportedly went against the
nationality principle embodied in Article 16 of the Civil Code by not adhering to the required probate
proceedings of Lipson's national law.

The probate of a will only involves its extrinsic validity and does not delve into its intrinsic validity, unless
there are exceptional circumstances which would require the probate court to touch upon the intrinsic
validity of the will.

It was error on respondent's part to conclude that Philippine law cannot be applied to determine the
extrinsic validity of Lipson's will.

Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code provide for the probate of an alien's will. Article 816 reads:

ARTICLE 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Article 816 provides that the will can be submitted for probate here in the Philippines, using either the
law where the decedent resides or our own law. Article 816 of the Civil Code clearly made our own law
applicable, as seen with the phrase "in conformity with those which this Code provides."

On the other hand, Article 817 states:

ARTICLE 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed
in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved
and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the
laws of the Philippines.
Clearly, as to the extrinsic validity of an alien's will, Articles 816 and 817 of the Civil Code both allow the
application of Philippine law.

Here, Lipson's will was executed in Iriga City, Philippines, where she had real property. Thus, Philippine
law on the formalities of wills applies. Assuming that Lipson executed the will in accordance with
Philippine law, the Regional Trial Court did not lack jurisdiction over the petition.
9. G.R. No. 197147, February 03, 2021

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF GLORIA NOVELO VDA. DE CEA,

DIANA C. GOZUM, PETITIONER, VS. NORMA C. PAPPAS, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

In December 1993, Edmundo Cea (Edmundo) died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Gloria, and
their children - Diana Cea Gozum (Diana), who claimed to be a legitimate child, Norma Cea Pappas
(Norma), who was incontestably a legitimate child. He was also survived by Edmundo Cea, Jr.,
(Edmundo, Jr.) who claimed to be an illegitimate son of Edmundo by Leonila Cristy Cortez.[4] In July
1994, Edmundo, Jr. filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Edmundo with the RTC.
Gloria, joined by Diana, filed an opposition to the petition. Eventually, Diana was appointed as the
administratrix of the estate as next of kin. Norma was left out as she was domiciled in the United States
and was unaware of the settlement proceedings until years later.

In October 2002, Gloria died testate. In her last will and testament, she named Salvio Fortuno (Salvio) as
executor. Salvio then filed a petition for the probate of the will and the issuance of letters testamentary
to himself likewise with the RTC of Naga City. Norma filed an opposition. She sought the disallowance of
the will and his appointment as administrator. She also claimed that Diana was not Edmundo's
daughter, but a daughter of one named Prudencia Nocillado to an unknown father.

For Edmundo's intestate estate, it appears that Diana was issued letters of administration. A year later,
Diana was removed as administratrix and was replaced by Norma. Diana moved for reconsideration.
Salvio was designated as administrator because the RTC found that Norma cannot be the administratrix
since she is an American citizen and a non-resident of the Philippines. Salvio was held to be "the most
suited to administer the estate of Edmundo B. Cea considering that it is him who has been considered as
a protege of the deceased and has his shares in the [Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc.], a part of the
estate of Edmundo B. Cea. For Gloria's testate estate, he was also appointed as special administrator in
the meantime until the probate of her will."

On May 17, 2006, Edmundo, Jr. filed a motion to remove Salvio as administrator. The motion was
granted and Norma was restored to the position she took over from Diana. Without specifically touching
on the issue of Norma's American citizenship and non-residency as raised in the earlier order, the court
found that Salvio fell short of his duties as administrator and that Norma is the most suitable person to
replace him.

Salvio and Diana appealed this order. The CA affirmed the RTC.

Norma then filed an omnibus motion against Salvio and Diana to revoke the letters of special
administration issued to Salvio for Gloria's estate, to issue new letters of special administration to her, to
order Diana to cease and desist from discharging the duties and responsibilities of an administratrix.
Salvio and Diana opposed this motion.

The RTC partly granted the motion. Salvio was thus removed as special administrator of Gloria's estate,
new letters of special administration were issued to Norma upon posting of the required bond and until
the probate of Gloria's will, and Salvio and Diana were ordered to cease and desist from discharging the
duties and responsibilities of the administrator of the undivided estate of Edmundo and Gloria.
Salvio and Diana filed a petition for certiorari with the CA imputing to the RTC grave abuse of discretion.
The CA dismissed the petition and held that the RTC has a greater leeway in considering what evidence
or proof is necessary in disposing motions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of the letters of special administration issued in favor of Salvio and the
issuance of new letters of special administration in favor of Norma insofar as Gloria's estate is concerned
proper?

RULING:

Yes, the court finds merit to the proposition of Norma Cea Pappas that the letters of administration
issued in favor of Salvio Fortuno as special administrator of the estate of Gloria N. Cea should be
revoked and another letters of administration be issued in her favor instead. Indeed, since the conjugal
property of the late spouses Edmundo and Gloria Cea remains undivided, it is not only logical but also
practical and economical to vest the administration thereof altogether to Norma Cea Pappas, so she can
work fast to its requisite division into their separate estate. Henceforth, Salvio Fortuno, including Diana
Gozum, should cooperate, coordinate and seek the approval of Norma Cea Pappas of whatever their
dealings and suggestions on the undivided estate.

Even the CA perceived the unfitness of Salvio to be a special administrator for Gloria's estate given his
earlier abandonment of duties as an administrator of Edmundo's estate.

Indeed, Norma's American citizenship is not an obstacle for her appointment as a special administrator
of GIoria's estate. The Rules of Court does not mention foreign citizenship as a ground for incompetence
to be an administrator. We emphasize that Rule 78, Section 1, which may be applied to special
administrators, requires residency in the Philippines, not Filipino citizenship.
10. G.R. No. 245469, December 09, 2020

HEIRS OF FEDELINA SESTOSO ESTELLA REPRESENTED BY VIRGILIA ESTELLA POLIQUIT, AMADEO ESTELLA,
THELMA ESTELLA ALVARADO, NELITA ESTELLA SUMAMPONG, AND REBECCA ESTELLA GUANCO
REPRESENTED BY OMAR E. GUANGCO AND MILANI E.GUANGCO, PETITIONERS, VS. JESUS MARLO O.
ESTELLA, RAMIL O. ESTELLA, AMALIA O. ESTELLA AND GLORIA O. ESTELLA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioners Virgilia E. Poliquit, Amadeo Estella, Thelma E. Alvarado and Nelita E. Sumampong together
with the late Rebecca E. Guanco and Lamberto S. Estella, are the children of the late Fedelina Sestoso
Estella (Fedelina) who was the daughter of Julian Sestoso (Julian) and Epifania Fegarido (Epifania).
Respondents Jesus Marlo O. Estella, Ramil O. Estella, Amalia O. Estella and Gloria O. Estella are the
children of Lamberto S. Estella.

Records show that Julian executed an instrument denominated as "Donacion Mortis Causa Kon Hatag
Nga Pagabalihon Sa Akong Kamatayon. The document was written entirely in the Cebuano language and
stated that Julian donated to his grandson, Lamberto, three parcels of land all located in the town of
Boljoon, Cebu. The instrument is written in two pages. The first page contains the disposition, signature
and thumb mark of the donor, the signature of the donee, the signatures and the Attestation Clause of
the three witnesses - Pablo Romero, Samuel Mendez and Julian Uraga, which attestation clause was
continued on the second page, also signed by the three attesting witness and also bearing the
thumbmark of Julian, the donor. In the attestation clause, it was stated that Julian signed the instrument
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and of Lamberto and that the witnesses witnessed and
signed the instrument in the presence of Julian and Lamberto and of one another.

The instrument was duly notarized with the notarial acknowledgment appearing on the second page
thereof, as well as the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses. In essence, the instrument states
that Julian's donation was made in consideration of his love, affection and gratitude for his grandson,
Lamberto, who has been taking care of him since all of his children were already dead.

Seven days later, Julian died. Several years later, Lamberto also died and is succeeded by his children-
herein respondents. In the year 2000, the tax declarations covering the three parcels of land in the name
of Julian were canceled and new tax declarations were issued in the name of the Heirs of Lamberto
Estella. The cancellation of the old tax declaration and the issuance of the new ones were based on the
Donacion Mortis Causa executed by Julian.

Aggrieved that Julian left all his properties to just one grandchild, herein petitioners, the brothers and
sisters of Lamberto, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Dubious and Inofficious Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa, Partition of Properties and Damages. They claimed that they are the children of
Fedelina, who is the daughter of Julian and Epifania. They sought to declare the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa as null and void for being fraudulent and of dubious authenticity; the subject lots are the conjugal
property of Julian and Epifania and are now co-owned by the heirs of their daughter Fedelina.

Petitioners assert that the donation executed by Julian is a donation mortis causa, not a donation inter
vivos since the donation is to be effective only upon the death of Julian and the transfer of ownership of
the three parcels of land will pass to Lamberto only upon the death of Julian. Petitioners also argued
that the donation is void for failure to comply with the requirements for the validity of its execution
particularly on the attestation clause and that it is inofficious since it prejudiced the legitime of
petitioners.

Respondents maintain that the CA was correct in holding that the instrument was a donation inter vivos
because it does not impose any condition that the title or ownership to the three parcels of land shall
only be transferred after the death of the donor; there is nothing in the instrument which states that the
donor intends to retain ownership of the three parcels of land while still alive; neither did not the donor
impose as condition that the transfer should be revocable before the donor's death; and that the
instrument does not contain a provision that the transfer shall be void if the donor should survive the
donee. Respondents also aver that the CA did not err when it reversed the ruling of the RTC and upheld
the validity of the donation in favor of Lamberto.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether or not the Donacion Mortis Causa Kon Hatag nga Pagabalhinon sa akong Kamatayon is
a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos

RULING:

1. An assiduous review of the subject instrument would show that deed executed by Julian is a
donation mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to
the donee while the donor is still alive.

Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in donation inter vivos, the
donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death and
must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the
Civil Code. However, if the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning
that full or naked ownership will pass to the donee only upon the donor's death, then, it is a
donation mortis causa, which should be embodied in a last will and testament.

Notably, the phrase in the title "Kon Hatag Nga Pagabalihon Sa Akong Kamatayon" literally
means "Donation or gift that will be transferred upon my death." In their Comment,
respondents do not refute that the phrase "hatag nga pagabalihon sa akong kamatayon" when
translated means "transferred upon my death." This only means that Julian intended to transfer
the ownership of the subject properties to Lamberto upon his death and not during his lifetime.
The CA erroneously interpreted the phrase "ibilin and ihatag" as "to leave and give now,"
(present tense) since such phrase may also be interpreted to mean "to leave and give" (future
tense). What must be taken into consideration are the circumstances surrounding its execution
and the clear intention of Julian. The phrase "upon my death" clearly confirms the nature of the
donation as mortis causa. It is evident that the donation was made to take effect after the death
of Julian and not during his lifetime. Moreover, contrary to the findings of the CA, the donation
has no acceptance clause. The phrase, "Ako, si Lamberto S. Estella, ang maong nahasulat sa itaas
magpasalamat ako ug dako" when translated means that Lamberto's is grateful to his
grandfather, and there was no express statement of acceptance.
G.R. No. 240199

SPOUSES ISIDRO R. SALITICO AND CONRADA C. SALITICO, Petitioners

vs.
HEIRS OF RESURRECCION  MARTINEZ FELIX, NAMELY: LUCIANO, CORAZON AND
*

CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED FELIX, RECAREDO P. HERNANDEZ, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF AMANDA H. BURGOS, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS, Respondents

Facts:

Amanda is the registered owner of a 1,413-square-meter parcel of land registered in her name under
Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-1908, located in Bambang, Bulacan (subject property).

By virtue of a document entitled Huling Habilin ni Amanda H. Burgos  dated May 7, 1986 (Huling
5

Habilin), the subject property was inherited by the niece of Amanda, Resurreccion, as a devisee.
The pertinent provision of the Huling Habilin provides:

Sa aking pamangkin nasi RESURRECCION MARTINEZ-FELIX, 'RESY', ay aking inaaboy ang apat
(4) na parselang lupang palayan na napapaloob sa mga titulong sumusunod:

xxxx 6

Thereafter, Resurreccion, as the new owner of the subject property, executed a document entitled
Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa  dated November 10, 1998, which transferred ownership over the parcel of
7

land in favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico. The latter then took physical possession of the subject
property.

Subsequently, a proceeding for the probate of the Huling Habilin was undertaken before the RTC,
Branch 22 (Probate Court). Respondent Recaredo was appointed as the executor of the Huling
Habilin. The latter then filed and presented the Huling Habilin before the Probate Court, which
approved it on February 6, 2008. The Probate Court likewise issued a Certificate of Allowance on
January 12, 2009.

On March 9, 2010, the petitioners Sps. Salitico received a demand letter requiring them to vacate
the subject property and surrender possession over it to the respondents heirs. To protect their
interest over the subject property, the petitioners Sps. Salitico executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim dated March 17, 2009, which was however denied registration by the respondent RD on
November 3, 2009.

In their Complaint before the RTC, the petitioners Sps. Salitico sought the delivery and return in their
favor of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 and the execution of the corresponding Deed of
Absolute Sale by way of confirming the Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa.

On February 11, 2013, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment,  which was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order  dated June 5, 2013.
8 9

The petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was
partially granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 18, 2013.
1
in its Decision, the RTC found that Resurreccion had indeed validly sold the subject
property which she inherited from Amanda to the petitioners Sps. Salitico.
Nevertheless, the RTC held that the action filed by the petitioners Sps. Salitico is
premature on the ground that it was not shown that the Probate Court had already
fully settled the Estate of Amanda, Hence, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for the
sole reason that the petitioners Sps. Salitico's cause of action had supposedly not
yet accrued, as the Estate of Amanda has not yet been fully settled by the Probate
Court.

Hence, on June 16, 2015, the petitioners Sps. Salitico filed their Noti

In the assailed Decision, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the pendency of the
probate proceedings before the Probate Court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court, which states that no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court. The CA also cited Rule 90, Section 1, which
states that no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax have been made, unless the distributees or any of them give a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned on the payment of the said obligations.

Issue:

W/N a transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
specific property in his/her name before final settlement of the Estate.

Ruling:

No. ticle 777 of the Civil Code provision signifies is that there is no legal bar
preventing an heir from disposing his/her hereditary share and transferring such
share to another person, inasmuch as the right thereto is vested or transmitted to the
heir from the moment of the death of the decedent or testator. The rule, however,
does not state that the transferee may already compel the issuance of a new
certificate of title covering the specific property in his/her name.

While an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another person,
before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order
in anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first
be had.

Therefore, despite the existence of a valid contract of sale between Resurreccion

and the petitioners Sps. Salitico, which ordinarily would warrant the delivery of the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT P-1908 in favor of the latter, pending the final
settlement of the Estate of Amanda, and absent any order of final distribution or an
order in anticipation of a final distribution from the Probate Court, the RD cannot be
compelled at this time to cancel OCT P-1908 and issue a new certificate of title in
favor of the petitioners Sps. Salitico.