Geoffrey Hodgson’s book called “Conceptualizing Capitalism.

” has all of the elements which are

providing an illiberal theory on property. It adds a counter to the basic nature of modern political theory,
with its placement of the individual as prior to society and political organisation, be it the state or any
other form which we must enter into by consent.

Hodgson takes pains to provide clear and precise definitions to terms. The first concept he attacks is law.
He is quite correct in my eyes to dismiss liberalism and Marxism therefore practically viewing them as
interchangeable. An example would be with Hayek’s conception of law, being mere custom formalized is
just nonsense, as is Marx’s placement of law in the superstructure posterior to capital.

Law is defined clearly as that which is provided by an institutionalized judiciary. This law arose not as a
formalization of custom, but exactly when, and where, exceptions to custom occurred. Custom is then that
which is not institutionalized by an judiciary, but this doesn’t mean this is “spontaneous order” and we
should be careful to not fall into the liberal trap of going into a trance like state in which we mythologize
custom as a Utopian paradise of non-coercion and ground up development. It isn’t and wasn’t. All
actions, all accepted standards were done so in accordance with authority, either explicitly or implicitly.

The upshot of this clear separation of custom and law is that law is associated directly with complex
organised political systems, and becomes a key stone of the next clarification of names – property and
possession.
In the Analysis put forward by Hodgson we reach a rejection of both Liberalism and Marxism, who he
again treats collectively. All of these groups conflate possession and property at all times. He doesn’t
seem to fully get the ramifications of this, but I can provide this now – all groups conflate this because
they treat the individual as prior to society and political organisation, this is because they all derive from
the same development in the wake of the collapse of the English monarchy in the 16th century. The move
from feudal conceptions of property and the revolutionary political fallout created this state of affairs. It’s
precisely here that we can see the collective nature of all modern political theory. The delineation of
primary and secondary property allows us to clean up this definition somewhat with the help of Hodgson,
and refer to primary property as “possession” and secondary property as “property.” Possession is the
simple act of possessing something. The State, i.e. the sovereign in effect, being sovereign, possesses all
within its control. It is not the sovereign’s property, because property is legally acknowledged ownership,
for which we need a legal and political institution to recognize. It is simple possession, hence why a
sovereign needs armies i.e. a monopoly on violence to maintain possession. Property, as we just noted,
requires legal status, which is provided by a political organisation above it.

How simple is this? Possession is the act of possessing. Property is the act of ownership as recognized by
law. Law is administered and is a function of a judiciary and legal system maintained by a political
organisation. Custom is collectively acknowledged conduct in accordance with authority. But why would
these concepts be conflated so much by all modern political theory from the 1600s to the present?

Funny enough Hodgson makes connections with falsely perceived opposites, such as in Marx and Mises
on page 105 and page 106 in his book:

“Consider the Austrian school economist Ludwig Von Mises. He argued that legal concepts could be
largely relegated from economics and sociology. Hence for Mises, ownership was natural and ahistorical
rather than legal or institutional. A physical rather than a social relationship, it was deemed independent
of law or any other social institution. Mises downgraded the institutions required for the protection and
enforcement of the capacity to have and neglected the social aspects of ownership and consumption,
which may signal identity, power, or status. Contrary to Mises, the law does not simply add a normative
justification for having something: it also reinforces the de facto ability to use and hold onto the asset.

The resemblance to Marx’s dismissal of law is uncanny: both Marx and Mises concentrated on raw
physical power over objects rather than legal rights. Marx’s numerous discussions of “property” had little
to say about legal rights, and he conflated property with possession. Hence Marx in 1844 addressed
”private property” and argued that “an object is only ours when we have it-…when we directly possess,
eat, drink, wear, inhabit it, etc.,-in short, when we use it.” With both Marx and Von Mises, effective power
over something is conflated with a de facto right. Legal and moral aspects of property are overshadowed.”

Now of course they both would do this. Marxism like Liberalism is trying to define away the state in the
issue of property. This is the key issue of modern political theory. All modern theory is fundamentally
anarchist, it just varies in how delusional it is on this point. If all property is really possession, then we
have to try to explain how and why people stay together – Hobbes. At which point the state is really a
kind of alien entity which is called in as an umpire, or a stationary bandit that enforces these peer to peer
agreements between property holders. When the likes of Adam Smith then talk about governance and
sovereignty whilst holding the labor theory of value, he makes no sense.

Now staying on the topic of property, I would like to build off the two broad models of property
distribution which I believe nicely illustrate the gulf between liberals and non-liberals.

The first model of property is one in which property is conflated with possession. Each individual, or
corporation, in society owns property which was produced from some process irrespective of governance.
Marxism and liberalism both hold to this conception of the origin of property. In this conception of
property, the state is obviously secondary. The second model is one in which possession and property are
different things. Possession is mere holding of something, whilst property is the legally recognized right
to usage, possession, enjoyment etc. No political theory really deals in this area. There is a reason for this.

Beginning with the first model, we can make a point that I think follows from this conception of property,
and that is that governance in this conception is merely an organisation among corporations and
individuals. The primary organisation for sure, but still merely an organisation among society. To draw
this out further, we can note that this is the underpinning of social contract theory. All in society do not
need governance, or rather, the sovereign to exist per se, but they wish to have governance to ensure
organisation is kept. This is taken to logical extremes by anarchists of all flavours, and anarcho-capitalists
are great examples. This is not new of course, and this forms the very basis of Hobbes's theorising. The
solution is that all must enter a covenant and surrender rights that they hold by not being under
governance, in exchange for the security provided by collectively submitting to a government. Now of
course this gets weakened for a more Utopian conception as we shall see.

I hold that it’s clear that the social contract theory of governance is fundamentally an anarchist concept of
society. What is striking is that Hobbes theorising leads to a necessary conclusion of government as being
a mere organisation among others which we don’t need. He manages this by working on first principles
the “state of nature” which willfully ignores historical records which undermines it. He even cites his
ideas regarding property which directly refutes his theorising on covenants i.e. social contracts.

- All Private Estates Of Land Proceed Originally From The Arbitrary Distribution Of The Sovereign -

“In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land itself: wherein the Sovereign assigned to
every man a portion, according as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall
judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the
Wilderness; but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise;
which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar
the Priest, and Joshua their General: who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by
subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made nevertheless but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for
the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was
therefore Arbitrary. And though a People coming into possession of a land by warre, do not always
exterminate the ancient Inhabitants, as did the Jewes, but leave to many, or most, or all of them their
Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people of
England held all theirs of William the Conqueror.”

This is historically accurate, and based on record especially in the case of England and would no doubt
have been considered common sense at the time of Hobbes. He then puts forward his celebrated contract
theory as shown in his famous passage:

“Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one
man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon
claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of the
body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by
confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of
proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things;
as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, as Prudence, while we look after somewhat, I find
yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equal
time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may
perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men
think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others,
whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that
however they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet
they will hardly believe there are many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and
other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is
not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with
his share.

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The
notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have no place. Where there is no common Power, there
is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinal virtues. Justice,
and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man
that was alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities that relate to men in
Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but only that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as
he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.``

Now the problem you have with these passages is that Hobbes isn’t making any sense. The first passage
makes sense, as does Hobbes acknowledgement of the difference between possession and property. He
specifically acknowledges property is granted by the sovereign, but the contract theory then undermines
this because it makes government an optional state of affairs and places this possession as an individual
matter. These individuals who all have possessions individually secured or not very secure, but still on the
scale of existing could just as easily have bilateral contracts recognising property as put forward by
anarcho-capitalists, or set up a constitution to which they all referred to you get the point – why do they
need to agree to a sovereign like a king? So it is not surprising given this that no one pays attention to
Hobbe’s theories on property at all and only care about his covenant. His ideas on property as stated in the
first passage don’t fit his contract theory. Instead, Locke is taken as the guiding star and he took Hobbes
incoherence on this matter and pushed it to full into a vastly more coherent theory regarding the covenant
craziness because Hobbes was maintaining an incoherent unprincipled exception in asserting property
comes from the sovereign whilst putting forward the anarchist contract theory – how can the state grant
something which it doesn’t possess in the first place? It is an organisation among organisations. To do so
it must be granted this possession from all these individual actors who possess everything collectively to
then disperse, which is what Hobbes drives at when he says in Attributing Of Absolute Proprietary To
The Subjects:

“A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth, is, “That every private man has an
absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excluded the Right of the Sovereign.” Every man has indeed a
Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it only from the Sovereign Power;
without the protection whereof, every other man should have equal Right to the same. But if the Right of
the Sovereign is also excluded, he cannot perform the office they have put him into; which is, to defend
them both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no
longer a Common-wealth. And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Sovereign
Representative to their Goods; much less to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they
Represent the Sovereign himself.”

In effect, we should act and allow the sovereign total control even though we don’t really have to so that
we can have a “commonwealth.” Therefore I’m unable to conclude that Hobbes is doing anything more
than running himself in a circle. He has set up an elaborate piece of fabrication based on first principles
which are easily debunked. Has there ever existed a society of individuals each able to individually
maintain possession, who then pool this possession with a sovereign and abide by all of their rules? Why
are we even reasoning from this point? What are we talking about here? At this point, we need to place
Hobbes and Locke in their time and place to get a footing. This passage is from Locke’s entry on the state
of nature page on wiki:

“John Locke considers the state of nature in his Second Treatise on Civil Government written around the
time of the Exclusion Crisis in England during the 1680s. For Locke, in the state of nature all men are free
“to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature.” “The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it”, and that law is the reason.
Locke believes that reason teaches that “no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty, and or property”
and that transgressions of this may be punished. This view of the state of nature is partly deduced from
Christian belief unlike Hobbes, whose philosophy is not dependent upon any prior theology.
Although it may be natural to assume that Locke was responding to Hobbes, Locke never refers to
Hobbes by name, and may instead have been responding to other writers of the day, like Robert Filmer. In
fact, Locke’s First Treatise is entirely a response to Filmer’s Patriarcha, and takes a step by step method to
refuting Filmer’s theory set out in Patriarcha. The conservative party at the time had rallied behind
Filmer’s Patriarcha, whereas the Whigs, scared of another prosecution of Anglicans and Protestants,
rallied behind the theory set out by Locke in his Two Treatises of Government as it gave a clear theory as
to why the people would be justified in overthrowing a monarchy which abuses the trust they had placed
in it”

So we see, both Locke and Hobbes with their state of nature theorising place possession (Hobbes) and
then possession and property (Locke) as being anterior to the state and they are working in a period of
time in which certain sections of society became sufficiently powerful to push this conception because it
suited them, not because it was right, or makes sense when placed under scrutiny. Which is why it is
understandable why Marx would put forward his base and superstructure concept, and why the modern
state is tied in with the bourgeois – it has a giant lump of truth in it with conceptions of society formation
based upon anarchistic foundations aka liberalism.

So if we take the action of dismissing both Hobbes and Locke as being confused nonsense that only
succeeded because of historical contingency we then have two tasks we must use. One is to rework the
first model I outlined in which the sovereign/state is one amongst many, and who is tasked with specific
roles and given specific rights as part of a social contract. The first task is to justify the necessary status of
the individual as pre-societal in the face of overwhelming, crushing evidence to the contrary. The second
is to then develop an explanation why these individuals engage in societal behaviour which requires a
rejection of biological and anthropological evidence by the way. The third task is to then ask yourself why
you are doing this given task one and two make no sense. Meaning Liberalism and Marxism are
fundamentally incoherent worldviews ontologically speaking.

Furthermore if we concentrate on the status of the origin of property it further refutes the various strains
of thought this liberal anarchism. The first instance we have the Tory conception which was expressed by
Filmer. Now Filmer’s concept of property has been dismissed ad nauseum for being based on biblical
grounds unlike Locke’s which were based on biblical grounds, but there is a difference in that Locke’s
ideas were developed in service to the Whig’s position in society and they won, so there is that. Why were
Locke’s positions popular with the Whigs, whilst Filmer’s were popular with the Tory loyalists? Locke’s
position was one supportive of rebellion, anarchism and oligarchy – which is what the Whigs were about.
We can really consider this a case of two power centers forming two distinct cultures based on their
specific interests: Monarchy versus Liberalism and Liberalism won.

History shows that the Whigs won so effectively that they purged Filmer Tories from every effective
position of power in England following the failed Jacobite Rebellion. From this point on, every Tory
position would be based on the grounds of Locke and we see the modern conservative is born. Every
single incarnation of Toryism would forever be reborn on some new absurd position trying to justify a
position built upon the ever shifting basis of anarchist property tied in with the individual coming before
society, or communism if you will later on. We have had Burkean conservatism, Peelite conservatism,
modern American conservatism, compassionate conservatism and now America First – it is the never
ending joke.

Now, when we read Locke and his refutation of Filmer, it is worthwhile comparing the means of
persuasion employed by both writers, and to observe their differing tones. For example, here is Filmer
offering a logical, well thought out, appropriately historically supported positions on the nature of kings:

“Whereas many out of an imaginary Fear pretend the Power of the People to be necessary for the
repression of the Insolencies of Tyrants; wherein they propound a Remedy far worse than the Disease,
neither is the Disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think. Let us be judged by the History
even of our own Nation: We have enjoyed a Succession of Kings from the Conquest now for above 600
years a time far longer than ever yet any Popular State could continue, we reckon to the Number of
twenty six of these Princes since the Norman Race, and yet not one of these is taxed by our Historians for
Tyrannical Government. It is true, two of these Kings have been Deposed by the People, and barbarously
Murthered, but neither of them for Tyranny”

And now we can turn to Locke who tells you that IF WE DON’T HAVE FREEDOM, AND LIBERTY
MEN WILL SODOMISE AND EAT THEIR OWN BABIES!!!!!!

“But if the example of what hath been done, be the rule of what ought to be, history would have furnished
our author with instances of this absolute fatherly power in its height and perfection, and he might have
shewed us in Peru, people that begot children on purpose to fatten and eat them. The story is so
remarkable, that I cannot but set it down in the author’s words. “In some provinces, says he, they were so
liquorish after man’s flesh, that they would not have the patience to stay till the breath was out of the
body, but would suck the blood as it ran from the wounds of the dying man; they had public shambles of
man’s flesh, and their madness herein was to that degree, that they spared not their own children, which
they had begot on strangers taken in war: for they made their captives their mistresses, and choicely
nourished the children they had by them, till about thirteen years old they butchered and eat them; and
they served the mothers after the same fashion, when they grew past child bearing, and ceased to bring
them any more roasters.

Be it then, as Sir Robert says, that anciently it was usual for men to sell and castrate their children,
Observations, 155. Let it be, that they exposed them; add to it, if you please, for this is still greater power,
that they begat them for their tables, to fat and eat them: if this proves a right to do so, we may, by the
same argument, justify adultery, incest and sodomy, for there are examples of these too, both ancient and
modern; sins, which I suppose have their principal aggravation from this, that they cross the main
intention of nature, which willeth the increase of mankind, and the continuation of the species in the
highest perfection, and the distinction of families, with the security of the marriage bed, as necessary
thereunto.”
Not very flattering and demonstrates the weakness of Locke’s position, which is why I think he
concentrated as pedantically as possible on Filmer’s claim of descent from Adam. It is the weakest part of
Filmer’s arguments and frankly we can do without it and cut straight to the reasoning behind both author’s
positions. Locke’s reasoning is without basis in my opinion as it works from a state of nature which has
never existed. So why are we still taking his writing as a serious and respectable body of work? Why do I
need to argue past this point? His claims of the independence of the individual and the labor theory of
property are obscenely wrong. Everything about his thinking is disastrously wrong but given it was a
rejection of absolutism it was useful, and anything pushing individualism has been warmly received by
the modern state for its destructive value. The advocate of individualism is the foot soldier of a centralised
state. Now, some may have trouble with this concept because on the face of it the contradictory nature is
hard to get past, but it is only a contradiction if you don’t think it through and realise the destruction of
individualism is aimed at everything and everyone except the centralising power, which in this case was
democratic governance seated in parliament.

Filmer on the other hand has many serious points to make which don’t rest on biblical exegesis at all, and
instead rest on logic. Take for example his issue with the idea of law bounding the king:

“The Father of a Family governs by no other Law than by his own Will; not by the Laws and Wills of his
Sons or Servants. There is no Nation that allows Children any Action or Remedy for being unjustly
Governed; and yet for all this, every Father is bound by the Law of Nature to do his best for the
preservation of his Family; but much more is a King always tyed by the same Law of Nature to keep this
general Ground, That the safety of the Kingdom be his Chief Law: He must remember, That the Profit of
every Man in particular, and of all together in general, is not always one and the same; and that the
Publick is to be preferred before the Private; And that the force of Laws must not be so great as natural
Equity it self, which cannot fully be comprised in any Laws whatsoever, but is to be left to the Religious
Achievement of those who know how to manage the Affairs of State, and wisely to Balance the particular
Profit with the Counterpoize of the Public, according to the infinite variety of Times, Places, Persons; a
Proof unanswerable, for the superiority of Princes above Laws, is this, That there were Kings long before
there were any Laws: For a long time the Word of a King was the only Law; and if Practice as saith Sir
Walter Raleigh declared with the Greatness of Authority, even the best Kings of Judah and Israel were not
tied to any Law; but they did whatsoever they pleased in the greatest Matters.”

It is clear what he is saying here is that A) those lower on the rung of authority cannot bind those higher
as this make no sense, and B) The sovereign is bound by consequences. Further to this, he notes the
following regarding law:

“Whereas being subject to the Higher Powers, some have strained these Words to signifie the Laws of the
Land, or else to mean the Highest Power, as well Aristocratic and Democratic, as Regal: It seems St. Paul
looked for such Interpretation, and therefore thought fit to be his own Expositor, and to let it be known,
that by Power he understood a Monarch that carried a Sword: Wilt thou not be afraid of the Power? that
is, the Ruler that carried the Sword, for he is the Minister of God to thee for he beareth not the Sword in
vain. It is not the Law that is the Minister of God, or that carries the Sword, but the Ruler or Magistrate;
so they that say the Law governs the Kingdom, may as well say that the Carpenters Rule builds an House,
and not the Carpenter; for the Law is but the Rule or Instrument of the Ruler.”

Here he is saying rule of law is nonsensical. Law is merely a tool in the hands of someone. Were he alive
today, he would no doubt be amazed at the manner in which modern conservatives look at the law and the
constitution in particular as some form of magic document that rules. On other issues, Filmer is no less
logically robust, whilst Locke rests on assertions and not arguments. Anything based on the state of nature
is not an argument and shouldn’t be accepted as one, it is an assertion based on a point of faith (that we
are born free and equal.) One such robust position is in the underlying logic behind the patriarchal model
put forward by Filmer. While we can merely set aside the whole issue of progeny from Adam, we can
nonetheless maintain Filmer’s conclusion that governance does indeed mirror a paternal relationship, and
that authority can only flow down from those with authority to those with less. Take for example Filmer’s
questioning of Bellarmine’s assertion of the people being able to choose their king:

“Had the Patriarchs their Power given them by their own Children? Bellarmine does not say it, but the
Contrary: If then the Fatherhood enjoyed this Authority for so many Ages by the Law of Nature, when
was it lost, or when forfeited, or how is it devolved to the Liberty of the Multitude?”

If we concentrate on theology and not logic, we are doing a great disservice. What is at stake here is
simply this – can those with less authority bind those with more? The logic is obscene. Filmer makes the
point even more strongly in reference to law:

“What though the Government of the People be a thing not to be endured, much less defended, yet many
men please themselves with an Opinion, that though the People may not Govern; yet they may partake
and joyn with a King in the Government, and so make a State mixed of Popular and Regal Power, which
they take to be the best tempered and equallest Form of Government. But the Vanity of this Fancy is too
evident, it is a meer Impossibility or Contradiction, for if a King but once admit the People to be his
Companions, he leaves to be a King, and the State becomes a Democracy; at least, he is but a Titular and
no Real King, that hath not the Sovereignty to Himself; for the having of this alone, and nothing but this
makes a King to be a King. As for that Shew of Popularity which is found in such Kingdoms as have
General Assemblies for Consultation about making Public Laws: It must be remembered that such
Meetings do not share or divide the Sovereignty with the Prince: but do only deliberate and advise their
Supreme Head, who still reserves the Absolute Power in himself; for if in such Assemblies, the King, the
Nobility, and People have equal Shares in the Sovereignty, then the King hath but one Voice, the Nobility
likewise one, and the People one, and then any two of these Voices should have Power to overrule the
third; thus the Nobility and Commons together should have Power to make a Law to bind the King, which
was never yet seen in any Kingdom, but if it could, the State must needs be Popular and not Regal.”

In effect, Filmer is making it absolutely clear that those arguing in favour of constitutional monarchy are
violating logic, and they are. From our 21st century perch, we should be in an excellent place to judge just
who is right on this point – Locke or Filmer? This is where it gets interesting. It is obviously clear from
conventional history and practically all conventional political theory that Locke was completely correct
but seeing as this history and theory is based on Locke, there is a serious problem here. If we start out
with the assertion that X is true, will always be true, and is not to even be questioned, then what will this
say about our results if X is false? Garbage in, garbage out.

We can see this being played out over the issue of spontaneous order which is thoroughly Lockean. Using
Hayek as our sparring partner, we can approach the “spontaneous development” of common law based on
Locke. For Hayek, common law derives from custom which is spontaneous and developed independent of
authority. The Lockean nature of this is pretty obvious. For Filmer this is a fiction:

“If the Nature of Laws be advisedly weighed, the Necessity of the Princes being above them may more
manifest itself; we all know that a Law in General is the command of a Superior Power. Laws are divided
as Bellarmine divides the Word of God into written and unwritten, not for that it is not written at all, but
because it was not written by the first Devisers or Makers of it. The Common Law as the Lord Chancellor
Egerton teacheth us is the Common Custom of the Realm. Now concerning Customs, this must be
considered, that for every Custom there was a time when it was no Custom; and the first President we
now have, had no President when it began; when every Custom began, there was something else than
Custom that made it lawful, or else the beginning of all Customs were unlawful. Customs at first became
Lawful only by some Superiour, which did either Command or Consent unto their beginning. And the
first Power which we find as it is confessed by all men is the Kingly Power, which was both in this and in
all other Nations of the World, long before any Laws, or any other kind of Government was thought of;
from whence we must necessarily insert, that the Common Law it self, or Common Customs of this I and,
were Originally the Laws and Commands of Kings at first unwritten

Nor must we think of the Common Customs which are the Principles of the Common Law, and are but
few to be such, or so many, as are able to give special Rules to determine every particular Cause.
Diversity of Cases are infinite, and impossible to be regulated by any Law; and therefore we find, even in
the Divine Laws which are delivered by Moses, there be only certain Principal Laws, which did not
determine, but only direct the High-priest or Magistrate, whose Judgment in special Cases did determine,
what the General Law intended. It is so with the Common Law, for when there is no perfect Rule, Judges
do resort to those Principles, or Common Law Axiomes, whereupon former Judgments, in Cases
somewhat like, have been delivered by former Judges, who all receive Authority from the King, in his
Right and Name to give Sentence according to the Rules and Presidents of Ancient Times: And where
Presidents have failed, the Judges have resorted to the General Law of Reason, and accordingly given
Judgment, without any Common Law to direct them. Nay, many times, where there have been Presidents
to direct, they, upon better Reason only, have changed the Law, both in Causes Criminal and Civil, and
have not insisted so much on the Examples of former Judges, as examined and corrected their Reasons;
thence it is that some Laws are now obsolete and out of use, and the Practice quite contrary to what it was
in Former Times, as the Lord Chancellor Egerton proves, by several Instances.”
What Filmer is implying here is explosive. He is making the point that laws don’t come into being by
themselves, but are authorised by a higher power in all cases. Common law was not made irrespective of
the sovereign but was, and is, determined by agents acting on his behalf, and transmitting his will either
directly or in accordance with the presumed wishes of the sovereign. The sovereign obviously being
unable to sit in court for all cases and talk with every judge must delegate, and as such has a judiciary
working in accordance with his will. In this instance, we can see that authority is the determiner of all
action within the area of common law, and this holds true across society as a whole if this logic is
maintained. All action that occurs within the authority of the sovereign is by default either within the
sovereign’s will and therefore acceptable, or it is not, and it’s illegal or a threat. Any other definition
nullifies the entire concept of sovereignty as a meaningful term. There is no spontaneous action
independent of authority but all of our means of formally viewing the world political theory, political
science, politically acceptable history are premised on the concept that there is. Notably, in areas with
more practical usage such as property law, this premise is quiet and I am sure quite innocently ignored.

Approaching the matter from a non-liberal perspective, and using, say for example, Filmer’s refusal to
accept the sovereign can be bound by lower powers, or that authority can be reversed, we get the
Jouvenelian theory of history. In this history, revolutions are led by elites in a position of authority, the
entire concept of democracy is rendered a sham by following the trail and determining which institution is
sovereign. It will promote its own common good just as the sovereign, and the republican governance
structure comes into view as the mere surface camouflage that it is. In short, we go from Lockean
consensus history based on a giant lie, to a realistic history based on a giant uncomfortable truth regarding
authority.

We can even see Filmer acknowledging the determining factor of power on theory, thus presaging his own
banishment from polite discourse on page 7:

“SIy divers other learned Men, which affirms,

Mankind is naturally endowed and born with Freedom from all Subjection, and at liberty to choose what
Form of Government it please: And that the Power which any one Man hath over others, was at first
bestowed according to the discretion of the Multitude.

This Tenant was first hatched in the Schools, and hath been fostered by all succeeding Papists for good
Divinity. The Divines also of the Reformed Churches have entertained it, and the Common People
everywhere tenderly embrace it, as being most plausible to Flesh and blood, for that it prodigally
distributes a Portion of Liberty to the meanest of the Multitude, who magnifier Liberty, as if the height of
Humane Felicity were only to be found in it, never remembering That the desire of Liberty was the first
Cause of the Fall of Adam.

But howsoever this Vulgar Opinion hath of late obtained a great Reputation, yet it is not to be found in the
Ancient Fathers and Doctors of the Primitive Church: It contradicts the Doctrine and History of the Holy
Scriptures, the constant Practice of all Ancient Monarchies, and the very Principles of the Law of Nature.
It is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in Divinity, or dangerous in Policy.
Yet upon the ground of this Doctrine both Jesuites, and some other zealous favourers of the Geneva
Discipline, have built a perilous Conclusion, which is, That the People or Multitude have Power to
punish, or deprive the Prince, if he transgress the Laws of the Kingdom; witness Parsons and Buchanan:
the first under the name of Dolman, in the Third Chapter of his First Book labours to prove, that Kings
have been lawfully chastised by their Commonwealths: The latter in his Book De jure Regni apud Scotos,
maintains A Liberty of the People to depose their Prince. Cardinal Bellarmine and Calvin, both look
asquinte this way.”

By acknowledging that Catholic and Calvinists have the issue of being able to depose the king as the basis
of their opinions, Filmer is observing that interest and the actor’s particular role in the power system
underpinning theology and theory. Power in effect being above culture. Both the Jesuits, and the
Calvinists being the theologians of the Papacy and the oligarchic parliamentary sections of society
respectively, were developing justifications for undermining monarchy. This is precisely why all modern
theory outside of the Sovereign authority of the State, is based upon the insanity of anarchism trying to
define the state away. All of it is based on disrupting hierarchy.

It is important to note that markets are not a capitalist phenomena. Let us look at what Deng Xiaoping,
former leader of the People’s Republic of China, had to say.

“We cannot say that a market economy exists only under capitalism. Market economy was in its
embryonic stages as early as feudalist society.”

Deng Xiaoping makes an important point here. He cares to point out that markets have existed since
Feudal society. Yes, this is indeed true. Markets are not a purely capitalist phenomena. In fact, capitalism
destroys the competition of the market economy with the formation of monopolies in its monopoly stage
that arose in recent centuries.

But, what then, is the origin of markets? In order to determine the start date, along with the arising of the
state, we have to look before the existence of the state, and, therefore, before the existence of markets.

What Marx, Engels, Stalin, and other Marxists would call primitive communism was the primary stage of
human development. It was the time of the hunter gatherer, which we spent most of our existence in that
said state, until the development of agriculture in the agricultural revolution. The hunter gatherer societies
had a common method of organization, for the sake of the community’s survival. This was a distributed
system. This system was typically managed by the women of the community, while the males of the said
community would go out to hunt and gather, not a misnomer.

The needs of the community was the primary justification of who would get what from this distributive
system. The needs, yes, distribution according to need. This is primitive communism. Now, this is
definitely before the periods of markets, and the state, a central apparatus of force, a class monopoly, you
name it, whatever you wanna call it, did not yet exist. Bands of males were the ones who would collect
food, not armies who would raid castles to steal from other nations.

And, of course, eventually the agricultural revolution happened. With this event, developed human
society emerged. Civilizations, full scale civilizations, with towns and cities, emerged. Massive
populations of humans would reside in one area, permanently. People would not venture, people would
not move around and uplift themselves. They were residents of towns and cities.

With this rose the need of a central apparatus to govern these cities and their populations. But also the
need to defend from other civilizations. Here we see the arrival of the state, the organ of class rule,
apparatus of force, whatever you want to call it. It’s here.

I previously mentioned in the above paragraph how this central apparatus was also used to defend
respective civilizations from foreign threats and the like. So with this came the need to sustain these and
to enhance their power and the states’ power projection. The old primitive communal method of
distribution according to need was outdated. It would no longer be able to manage upkeep the armies,
which had quickly upgraded from bands of hunting and gathering males, let alone upkeeping with entire
populations in the new towns and cities.

So what was the solution? The m word, yes, the m word: markets. As Deng so accurately said, markets
are earlier than capitalism, but also earlier than feudalism, but come from the ashes of primitivism. The
book Debt: The First 5000 Years by David Graeber provides the best argument for this.

The state used these markets to upkeep both their armies and civilization. Currencies, such as silver, were
used to measure supply and demand for resources such as food and construction materials. The demand
for something would affect its supply. The state demanded food and armor from the new markets, so the
markets provided. This could not be done with primitive communal distribution.

This system existed not only for the earliest civilizations, but also for the Egyptians, the ancient Jews, the
Greeks, the Romans, and so forth. It even remained around the time of Charlamagne’s armies!

So, what can be determined? Yes, markets are not capitalist. They existed before capitalism. But what
else? Markets arose following the demise of the primitive communal system and the occurrence of the
agricultural revolution, due to the former’s contribution to developed human civilization. Markets and the
state were linked. They needed each other.

What does the October revolution of 1917 and the March on Rome have in common? They
were both progressive forces in a place riddled with agrarian reactionary, monarchies, which in
effect inhibited the productive forces from being harnessed in their respectable nations, As the
preface, the importance of the state is immense due to it being an instrument for imperialism,
which is the basis for productive forces, which both the kingdom of Italy and the Soviet Union
harnessed to create productive industrialization in the growth of the proletarian class.
One of the most fundamental assertions made by Marxists and other left oriented ideologies
about the state and its purpose, is that it's objectively and apparatus about the mediation and
the reconciliation of class antagonisms that this apparatus arose of the utmost necessity to
suppress a lower class, to coerce into service to a higher class. As Frederick Engals once put it
in the origin of the family, private property and the state:

“because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, because they rose
at the same time in the midst of conflict between these classes. It is, as a rule, the state of the
most powerful, economically dominant class, which through the medium of the state becomes
the most politically dominant class as well. And thus acquires in the meaning of holding down
exploiting the oppressed class.”

This is the view that dominates Marxist circles, even left-wing circles overall. This one sided
view that the state is merely just a tool for class oppression. While the state indeed is used for
the suppression of classes within capital society, to water down the entire apparatus and to
demean it to such an extreme, even though within the modern world, especially in the
developed nations, it is used more often than not for administration and management rather
than pure suppression of class antagonisms.

By “management and administration,” what is exactly meant by this? The complexities of

modern society necessitate the formation of complex hierarchies and bureaucracies all over the
place, from the workplace, all the way to civilian governance. Because the world is more
interconnected now than it has been in any period of human history beforehand, the need to
manage these vast connections is more vital than ever.

From the large-scale urbanization, which took place following the industrial revolution, to the rise
of the modern metropolis. Humans are living closer together than they have ever been before in
human history, with modern infrastructure, it is now possible to connect millions, if not billions of
people together in common communication that works, which leads to large amounts of inputs
and information being transmitted through these networks with an apparatus being required to
oversee the management and operations networks and apparatus to defend the vest networks
and enforce the dictates of these administrative bodies as needed in order to keep the system
functioning and in check.

With the correlation of governments on administrative bodies, only increasing as technology

develops. So too, does their capacity to develop economically. No longer can economies be
classified by simple categorizations of mining, production, and the sort. Production is becoming
more complex and more automated, which in turn only leads to the development of new
industries, new sectors, new cities.

How can this all be managed without bureaucracy and an armed apparatus? Without the state
to enforce the dictates of the bureaucracy. It is simply not possible. If we were to transition to
socialism, to a planned economy, they must make sure that all sectors of the economy, which
are under public ownership, follow the plan properly. For failure to comply will result in economic
malfunctioning, which will be quite detrimental. Just as a private firm punishes underperforming
assets to work harder by cutting funding or threatening with closures or layoffs, public
enterprises need to know the consequences of not following the plan properly.

In this regard, touching on the purpose of the state and its developed expounded role in
reference to capitalist society and socialist society, the state being an apparatus for the overall
management of infrastructure and the planned economy will furthermore defend public property
from private property. Like how traditionally private properties defended in capitalist society. This
is the evolution and historical development of the state. Instead of it withering away or
abolishing it with no regard for how hierarchies form and social networks work.

Traditionally when one apparatus or social framework is done away with, it is typically replaced
in favor of an improved framework, such as advancement of society from feudal jurisdiction to
the structuring of the first implementations of large scale commodity production and the
empowering of the bourgeoisie. For the organization of the bourgeois state machinery, rather
than that of feudal rights.

When Japan where the westernization process marked the end of the shoguns rule and its
replacement by the Imperial system. Even China and the USSR had similar transitions from
feudal landowners, state jurisdictions of authority of the working masses instead of the
bourgeoisie. Would the same reasoning of Marxists evenly come to different conclusions based
on the same premises? The overthrow of the bourgeois state apparatus will inevitably lead to
the creation of a new one.

One which cannot be thrown away. A transition from state to statelessness is impossible, as a
new apparatus must arise to fulfill new duties and responsibilities, which cannot be fulfilled
without a centralized apparatus.

So this explains how in communist society to maintain large-scale civilization and industrial
production, an apparatus of labor organization, which would coordinate production committed by
various industries would need to remain for communism to function properly.

Another important point that Marx has failed to acknowledge, is the importance of the state in
order to maintain geopolitical influence and dominance. Without the state, it makes it infinitely
harder to spread workers' revolution abroad, arguably the best results of revolution being spread
was the various conquests of lesser states Lenin did, and then the acquisition of the Warsaw
Pact states by Stalin.

What makes geopolitical influence and dominance important in regards to communism, apart
from the baseline of remaining afloat and keeping it materially beneficial for your ingroup is
whenever communism emerges from the capitalist birthmark ridden socialism, it will emerge
from a snowballed, hegemony of one nation dedicated to spreading worker's revolution and
proletarian internationalism.

Problem is, in order to maintain his hegemony, the state needed to quell a new sort of
antagonism from various groups: lingual, ethnic, cultural, et cetera, in order to keep its holding,
so it'd be pragmatic to keep the state erected to do so.

Another vital point is in reference to the role of the state in a classless society placed out in
regards to preservation and made sense of culture, this place into, and their critique of most
Marxists.

They completely reject the importance of culture and the maintenance of proper social values,
which they replaced by swallowing up the liberal, progressive nonsense of the bourgeoisie who
spoon feeds them through propaganda and media and other forms of socialization. This
inevitably will lead to regression back to liberalism if a proper culture is not maintained.

In a centralized state, apparatus is required in order to do so. This in an effect is reactionary and
regressive in the utmost historical progression Marxian sense.

The political landscape of Somalia fares no better. It is a patchwork of warlords who have each
parceled out a slice of mud to call his own, to rule according to his whims and fetishes. There
are the Islamic warlords of al-Shabaab in the south, the government strongmen who collaborate
with al-Shabaab when it suits them, the Somaliland separatists who want a separate nation in
the north, and a thousand other men of questionable loyalties.

To most people, Somalia is just another African sand-pie, a footnote at the end of a long and
dismal book of African failures. It takes a certain type of idiot to look at Somalia and see
something promising. I say that it takes a “certain type” of idiot because the vast majority of
idiots are not fooled: they know Somalia is not worth thinking about, so they do not think about it
at all. It requires an idiot of some erudition to see promise in a failed state like Somalia; it
requires the intelligent stupidity of a libertarian.

Libertarians are interested in Somalia primarily because its central government is weak and has
no effective presence throughout most of the nation. For decades, Somalia has been living in
anarchy. Perhaps if libertarians were as rational as they claim to be, after studying Somalia for a
while, they might admit that anarchy is not a very effective solution to much of anything. They
might also admit that certain fundamental differences exist between the races, but that issue will
have to be tackled in some other essay on some other day. Whatever the merits of
decentralization in theory, in practice it mostly involves being subject to the whims of the local
warlord and his cadre.

The libertarian has to search hard to find support for his cause. He speaks in affectionate terms
about how Somalia’s cell phone service is the clearest in Africa. He does not speak much at all
about how the GDP per capita is 400 dollars. He also conveniently forgets to mention that the
life expectancy for the average Somali is merely 52 years. Only five or six nations in the world
have shorter life spans.

At this point, the libertarian might object and say that although these conditions are undeniably
bad, they are still better than when Somalia was ruled by a communist dictatorship. I would
argue, however, that these conditions are such negligible improvements that they can hardly be
called improvements at all. In practice, it seems that anarchy is not realistic.