THE

RISEAND DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN

“EMPIRE”
The Rise and Decline of the American “Empire”

Power and its Limits in Comparative Perspective

GEIR LUNDESTAD
Norwegian Nobel Institute
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

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 Preface

In most of my academic writings I have focused on various aspects of the

role of the United States in the world after 1945. While it is difficult to
compete with the many American historians who write about US foreign
policy, based on a lifetime of study and living in the country, perhaps we
foreign historians may make an advantage of our inevitable
shortcomings. Foreign policy is, by definition, policy toward some
outside party; we are this outside party. We foreigners may be
particularly sensitive to the “receiving end”—those other countries that
the United States is dealing with.
Americans have a tendency to assume that the United States is
unique. America is built on this belief. John F. Kennedy referred to ”our
right to the moral leadership of this planet.” Ronald Reagan affirmed
that ”The American dream lives—not only in the hearts and minds of
our countrymen, but in the hearts and minds of millions of the world’s
people in both free and oppressed societies who look to us for
leadership. As long as that dream lives, as long as we continue to defend
it, America has a future, and all mankind has reason to hope.” In his
inaugural address, Barack Obama spoke to the entire world ”from the
grandest capitals, to the small village where my father was born: know
that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child
who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once
more.”
Foreigners have a natural skepticism of such claims to specialness.
None expressed this better than that close friend of the United States,
Winston Churchill, when in 1945 he was faced with yet another
American lecture about the evils of power politics: ”Is having a Navy
twice as strong as any other power ‘power politics’? Is having an
overwhelming Air Force, with bases all over the world, ’power politics’?
Is having all the gold in the world buried in a cavern ’power politics’? If
not, what is ’power politics’?”1 Every country is of course unique in
certain ways; it also resembles other countries in many ways. Detailed
study, not faith, can tell us how special a country really is.
Three comparative questions have long fascinated me. The first is the
relative strength of the United States. How strong has the United States
really been in the years after the Second World War, and how strong is it
today? Strength is a relative term, and the basis of comparison will be
both other countries and earlier periods in the recent history of the
United States. My conclusion is that the United States has clearly been
the most important power since 1945. Predictions that the Soviet Union,
Japan, and the European Union would come to surpass the US have not
proved correct. Now China is definitely the main challenger. It may well
happen that the size of China’s economy will surpass that of the United
States in the course of surprisingly few years. The United States is
undoubtedly in relative decline. China and several other leading
countries are growing much faster than the US; America’s debt is piling
up; the effects of its still vast military lead are smaller than Washington
had hoped, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, on a
per capita economic basis, in military strength, and in the importance of
its allies, China will continue to lag far behind the United States.
The second question is the expansion of the United States. Militarily,
politically, economically, and culturally the United States expanded even
politically, economically, and culturally the United States expanded even
more than Britain had done in its imperial heyday. What distinguishes
America’s expansion from the expansion of other Great Powers? I have
long argued that the American version of ”empire” was an empire by
invitation, particularly in crucial Western Europe. This is a further effort
to explore the nature of the expansion of the United States. My
conclusion on this point is that while invitations are still being issued to
the US (related to the first point), an American ”empire” by invitation
hardly exists any longer. If it does, it is primarily in East Asia, and in
much more modified form than in America’s strongest decades—after
1945 in Western Europe, and again, in the 1990s, in Central and Eastern
Europe. However, despite its decline, the United States is still the only
truly global superpower. Others, like China, are becoming increasingly
global economically, but in most other respects they are still primarily
regional. Nevertheless, in every part of the world, the US role is limited
by at least one major regional power.
The third question is the paradoxical nature of power in international
relations. What could the United States actually achieve? It is easy to
demonstrate both the power and the defeats of a Great Power, even a
superpower. The United States had been an ”empire”; it still dominated
the international structure; at the same time it suffered significant
setbacks. How do these aspects fit together? Throughout history, empires
have risen and fallen. Changes could be very dramatic. One day the
Soviet Union was the world’s second leading power; the next it was
gone. The conclusion here is that while no power has ever been
omnipotent or more successful than the United States, a whole array of
local factors has come to take on ever greater importance. Globalization
is accompanied by fragmentation in a very complex mixture, and even
is accompanied by fragmentation in a very complex mixture, and even
very small groups can now offer serious resistance against the mighty
United States. The present account is a tentative discussion of these
complex questions.
 Acknowledgments

This book represents the summing up of my thinking on themes and

topics I have worked on as an historian since I started my career in
1970. I have written and edited several books on the origins of the Cold
War, on American-European relations, and on more general
developments in international politics, in all cases primarily dealing with
the years after the Second World War.
I am grateful to the University of Tromsø, where I had some good
years from 1974 to 1989, and to the Norwegian Nobel Institute, where I
have been working with great inspiration since 1990. Without the
Institute’s superb library my work would have been much more difficult.
I learned an awful lot from my time at Harvard University (1978-79,
1983) and at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC (1988-89).
Through the research program at the Nobel Institute we were able to
bring more than 100 top historians and political scientists from all over
the world to Oslo. What a treat this has been! I have learned from each
and every one of them.
Virtually all of my books have been published by Oxford University
Press (OUP), and I am highly appreciative of their good work. English is
not my mother tongue. After Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote about my
first book that it was written in ”clear, but occasionally awkward
English,” I told OUP’s copy-editors I did not want to see that phrase
again. Anthony Mercer has been the copy-editor for the present volume;
we shall see what the reviewers write this time. I have very much
enjoyed working with him. I am particularly grateful to senior editor
enjoyed working with him. I am particularly grateful to senior editor
Dominic Byatt for the interest he has shown in my work.
I would like to thank the four readers at OUP who commented on the
present manuscript in some detail, and participants at seminars in the
United States and Norway who offered suggestions for improvement.
Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my wife Aase. She once
said it was small compensation for my many mental and physical
absences to be thanked in the acknowledgments. Yet, when I stopped
doing so, she made her displeasure known. So, here we go again. Thanks
also to our grandchildren J0rgen, Oscar, Alfred, and Helmer for the
inspiration they continually provide.
G.L.

September, 2011
 Contents

Tables

Abbreviations

Introduction: The Rise and Fall of Great Powers

Part I: Power

1. America’s Position
2. America’s Challengers
3. War, Realism, and Power Transitions
4. Expansion

Part II: The Limits of Power

5. The Impotence of Omnipotence

6. The Long Lines of History
7. Visions and Defeats
Conclusion

Index
 Tables

1. Relative shares of world manufacturing output (1750-1900)

2. Debt statistics
3. The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2010
4. List of countries by GDP
5. GDP (PPP) per capita list
 Abbreviations

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security

Treaty

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, and China

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China

BRICI BRIC + Indonesia

BRICS BRIC + South Africa

BRICSAM BRIC + South Africa and Mexico

CDE Conference on Disarmament in Europe

CDU Christian Democratic Union

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CESDP Common European Security and Defence Policy

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe

CoCom Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export

Controls

ECA Economic Cooperation Administration

ECB European Central Bank

EDC European Defense Community

EDC European Defense Community

EFSF European Financial Stability Facility

Euratom European Atomic Energy Community

FDI foreign direct investment

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP gross domestic product

GL Geir Lundestad

GNP gross national product

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IMEMO Institute of World Economy and International

Relations

IMF International Monetary Fund

INF intermediate-range nuclear missiles

MFN most favored nation

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development

OEEC Organisation for European Economic

Cooperation

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PPP purchasing power parity

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative

SDP Social Democratic Party

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

WEU Western European Union

WTO World Trade Organization

 Introduction

The Rise and Fall of Great Powers

Whether we call them superpowers, Great Powers, empires, or

hegemons, one thing seems certain: they come and go, they rise and fall.
No state has managed to remain permanently Number One; although
few, if any, historical laws exist, it is most unlikely that any state will in
the future be able to remain permanently on top. As we learned from our
Eurocentric history books, the Roman Empire rose and fell; so did the
Carolingian Empire (732–814), the Hapsburg Empire, and, allegedly,
three German Reichs; so did the British and the French colonial empires;
and by 1991 the Soviet empire had not only collapsed, but the Soviet
Union itself was dissolved into its 15 constituent parts.
In a wider geographical context, after the fall of the Roman Empire
the vast Muslim expansion started with Mohammed in the 620s, and
ended with the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258. The conquered
territory stretched from the initial base in Saudi Arabia, to Spain in the
west, and Uzbekistan in the east. The Mongols under Genghis Khan
(1162–1227) and Tamerlane (1336–1405) established one of the biggest
empires ever, combining ruthlessness with surprising ethnic and
religious tolerance. As John Darwin has argued, Tamerlane’s “empire
was the last attempt to challenge the partition of Eurasia between the
states of the Far West, Islamic Middle Eurasia and Confucian East Asia.”1
Yet that vast empire was soon divided into several different parts.
Empires in Byzantium (395–1453), and various versions in different
centuries in Iran, rose and fell. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) threatened even Vienna,
until it started its protracted decline that ended with modern Turkey.
The Mogul Empire in India flourished for a few centuries until even
its last formal remnants were abolished in 1857. China remained
dominant much longer. Centuries earlier its position had been quite
similar to that of the Roman Empire. The two empires were broadly
comparable in terms of size and population, and for a certain period
even somewhat alike in chronological terms, although the Chinese
empire lasted well beyond the fall of Rome in 395.

Table 1. Relative shares of world manufacturing output (1750–1900)

It has been estimated that as late as 1800 China’s share of world

manufacturing output was still 33.3 percent, and India’s 19.7, while
Europe as a whole produced 28.1 percent. Even at this late stage,
production was still primarily a reflection of population. The greater the
population, the greater was generally the production. As a matter of
course China viewed itself as the leader of the world, as could be
witnessed in Emperor Qianlong’s reply to Lord Macartney in 1793 when
the latter, on behalf of King George III, asked for the establishment of
trade and diplomatic relations between Britain and China: “We have
never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need for
your country’s manufactures. Therefore, O king, as regards your request
to send someone to remain at the capital, while it is not in harmony with
the regulations of the Celestial Empire we also feel very much that it is
of no advantage to your country.”2
With the financial and industrial revolutions throughout the
nineteenth century, this situation changed rapidly, so that in 1900
China’s and India’s percentages had been reduced to 6.2 and 1.7 percent
respectively, while Britain’s share alone was 18.5 and that of the United
States 23.6. (See Table 1.)
Thus the Eastern expansion was replaced by a huge Western wave
that, to simplify matters vastly, could be said to have started in 1492
when Columbus discovered America and the Reconquista in Spain was
completed with the fall of Grenada, reversing the wave of Muslim
expansion. First Spain and Portugal, then Britain and France, and even
smaller European countries, established their vast colonial empires.
From its small base, Britain came to control about 20–25 percent of the
world’s territory and population. North and South America, Australia,
much of Asia, and even more of Africa, came under European control.
Colonial control appeared to last forever, but of course it did not. The
United States was the first colony to establish its independence. To
almost everybody’s surprise, after India’s independence following the
Second World War, the colonial empires quickly ended.
The rise of the United States (and Russia) had been talked about since
the 1830s. They had the territory and would have the resources and the
population to become the world’s leading powers. Very soon after the
Civil War the United States had the world’s largest gross national
product (GNP).3 Its military force was, with a partial exception for the
US Navy, still quite limited; its strategic focus was on the Western
hemisphere and the Pacific. In Europe it intervened in the First World
War, but then withdrew, more convinced than ever of the merits of
“isolationism.”
Since the Second World War the United States has clearly been the
single most important power in the world. Apparently no country had
dominated the world to the extent that the US did in 1945. And in the
1990s, after a couple of difficult decades, it even enjoyed its “unipolar
moment”; with the collapse of the Soviet Union the US had no military
competitor, and its vast economy blossomed.
Still, America’s fall was frequently predicted, with glee or with fear.
Some referred to the general laws of history; no country could dominate
forever. Soviet leaders predicted the inevitable global triumph of
communism. Doubts were frequently expressed even inside America.
“God’s own country” was allegedly in constant danger of falling behind,
particularly militarily, be it, in the 1950s, the “bomber” or the even
more dangerous “missile” gap and the shock of Sputnik, and, in the
1970s to early 1980s, the alleged gap in intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs). There were always some who had an interest in
missiles (ICBMs). There were always some who had an interest in
warning about the decline of the United States. There were Vietnam,
Nixon’s “five great power centers” (the US, Western Europe, Japan,
Russia and China), and Carter’s diagnosis of national “malaise.”
Yet, most Americans probably believed that America’s predominance
would last forever. Ronald Reagan proclaimed “morning in America”
and celebrated its uniqueness and exemption from the laws of history.
Few leading American politicians disagreed. You do not become popular
in the United States by predicting the fall of “God’s own country.” On
the other hand, many leading American political economists had been
suggesting that, in various ways, the relative position of the United
States was slipping. Robert Gilpin, David Calleo, and Robert Keohane
were among the most prominent ones.4 Yet, at the end of Reagan’s
presidency Professor Paul Kennedy at Yale did more than anyone else to
revive the modern study of the rise and fall of the Great Powers. He
clearly saw the United States as declining.5 Many, also outside the Soviet
leadership, had earlier agreed that the Soviet Union would come to
overtake the United States. In the 1980s Japan clearly emerged as the
leading challenger. Kennedy himself came to think that the twenty-first
century would ultimately belong to Japan. Despite its problems, which
after all were smaller than the problems of any other Great Power,
“Japan appears to have constructed a machine that can go by itself.”6
This future was not to be. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed because of
its many “internal contradictions.” A few years later Japan went into a
political and economic crisis that still has not been resolved almost
twenty years later.
In between bouts of Euro-pessimism there were those who thought
that the European Union would, or should, overtake the US. After the
end of the Cold War and the apparent economic unification of Europe, a
series of books were written about the superiority of European values
and attitudes. European lifestyles were celebrated, but the question
remained of how powerful this new Europe would be in international
politics. T. R. Reid argued that “That’s the key point: the leaders and the
people of the EU are determined to change a world that had been
dominated by the Americans. Indeed, that goal has become a powerful
motivator for the New Europe—to create a United States of Europe that
is not the United States of America.”7 This was not to be either. While
increasing its geographical membership dramatically, in foreign and
security policies, and in some respects even in economic policies, such as
taxation and budget decisions, the EU was unable to move much beyond
the confines of the nation state.
Today all the talk is about the glorious future of China. The market is
flooded by books and articles about its rapid rise. With the Chinese
economy booming, and the American one in trouble, the projections for
when China’s gross domestic product will surpass that of the United
States with, presumably, China becoming the world’s leading power, are
constantly being moved forward in time.
The many books and articles about the decline and even the fall of the
United States continued to meet with almost universal opposition from
US politicians. Most leading academics, particularly in the United States,
also criticized Paul Kennedy’s predictions, from the early opposition of
Joseph S. Nye and Samuel Huntington,8 to the recent one of Josef Joffe,
and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. Joffe argued that
“Addicted to constant reinvention, it (the United States, GL) should not
fall prey to the rigor mortis that overwhelmed the Ottoman, Austrian,
Russian and Soviet empires.”9 Brooks and Wohlforth categorically state
that “The main feature of the distribution of capabilities today is thus
unprecedented American primacy.”10 No country presumably ever had
such a lead militarily, economically, and technologically as the United
States still does. G. John Ikenberry recently presented the liberal version
of American optimism. He thought that the United States might be able
to incorporate China in the liberal world order it had created. As he
stated, “I argue that the future is actually quite bright for a one-world
system organized around open and loosely rule-based principles and
institutions—and in which the United States remains centrally
positioned.”11
At one stage, even Paul Kennedy himself argued that the “forecasters
of doom missed a number of important points”: the weakness of the
Soviet Union, the remarkable capacity of the United States to “re-tool”
itself, the new technologies. He was of course himself the prime example
of those “forecasters.”12 In recent years Kennedy has again become more
pessimistic about the future of the United States, and even he stresses
the rise of China, although he has his doubts about China becoming “the
new global hegemon.” He has in fact argued that the United States
should be pursuing an element of appeasement in its foreign policy,
though the word itself should be avoided: “we shall make a concession
here, a concession there, though hopefully it will be disguised in the
form of policies such as ‘power sharing’ and ‘mutual compromise’ and
the dreadful ‘A’ word will not appear.”13
 Naturally middle positions developed. The most striking one was
found in Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World. In the opening
sentence of the book he states that “This is a book not about the decline
of America but rather about the rise of everyone else.” In many ways
Zakaria remained optimistic about the United States. “Unipolarity
continues to be the defining reality of the international system for now
… ”; the United States has the opportunity to “remain the pivotal player
in a richer, more dynamic, more exciting world.” Still, if the rest of the
world, particularly China and India, did rise, this would inevitably lead
to at least the relative decline of the US, and power is almost always
relative.14 In absolute terms very few powers actually decline; almost all
of them are richer and more powerful today than they ever were before.
Joseph Nye placed himself in the dead center of the debate: “The United
States is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms, there is a
reasonable probability that it will remain more powerful than any single
state in the coming decades,”15 a fairly modest statement in view of
what the American position had been. In analyzing power at the
international level, Nye tried to combine realism and liberalism, hard
power and soft power, into a liberal realist smart power analysis,
whatever that might be.16
No one can of course be certain what the future holds. The record of
academics in making projections about the future is not particularly
encouraging. Reality is just too complex to be captured by simple
formulas. History does not really repeat itself. The general causations of
social scientists are often based on an incomplete use of the historical
record. Still, the present account is skeptical to analyses that foresee a
dramatic decline, even a collapse, for the United States, at least in a
short-term perspective. Particularly militarily, the United States, despite
the undisputed general decline since the 1990s, is still in a league of its
own. On the other hand, those who insist most strongly on the continued
US lead tend to underplay the dramatic changes that have taken place
since the turn of the millennium, particularly on the economic side. The
deficits in the federal budget and in current accounts represent huge
challenges to the United States. By focusing so much on a few limited
long-term data sets, these academics tend to miss the flux and dynamism
of the current situation.
So, while it would seem obvious that sooner or later the United States
will be replaced as Number One, most Americans, despite their recurrent
periods of doubt, continue to believe that the US is largely immune to
“the laws of history.” America’s mission in history will continue.
Foreigners are skeptical about the mission and America’s exemption
from the laws of history, but who would actually overtake the US? The
challengers came … and went.17
Only the future can tell what will happen; historians certainly cannot.
We make “predictions” about the past, not the future. Yet, sometimes it
is just too tempting to speculate about the future. But speculation it is.
Part I
Power
 1
America’s Position

AMERICA’S VAST STRENGTH

In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the position of the United
States was frequently compared with that of Great Britain in 1815 at the
end of the Napoleonic Wars. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin thus
argued in 1947 that “… the US was in the position today where Britain
was at the end of the Napoleonic wars.” British professor and politician
Harold Laski was definitely closer to the truth when he stated that
“America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height
of its power nor Great Britain in the period of its economic supremacy
enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive …”1
In his famous article in Life in 1941, Henry R. Luce had announced
the “American Century” with great optimism in his own curious blend of
nationalism and internationalism: “Most important of all, we have that
indefinable, unmistakable sign of leadership: prestige. And unlike the
prestige of Rome or Genghis Khan or 19th century England, American
prestige throughout the world is faith in the good intentions as well as
the ultimate intelligence and ultimate strength of the whole of the
American people.”2 It was a little odd to announce America’s century
when four decades had already passed without Washington assuming the
mantle of leadership—and Luce certainly underestimated the importance
of both economic and military power—but in predicting the future he
was still basically correct.
In 1945 the United States was really in a league of its own compared
to any of its predecessors. In the nineteenth century Britain probably had
the world’s largest gross national product (GNP), but only for a short
period around 1860. In 1870 the United States and Russia each had
higher production. Throughout much of the century Britain was the
industrial leader and remained the mercantile leader, but at no time did
it produce more than roughly one-third of the world’s total
manufactures. In 1945 the United States alone produced almost as much
as the rest of the world put together, a situation presumably never seen
before in history and unlikely ever to happen again. The US lead tended
to be greater the more advanced the technology. In the decade 1940–50
the United States was behind 82 percent of major inventions, discoveries
and innovations. The highest corresponding percentage for Britain had
been 47 percent in 1750–75.3
With 6 percent of the world’s population the United States had 46
percent of the world’s electrical power, and held 49.8 percent of the
world’s monetary gold, reserve currencies, and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) reserves. Just like Britain’s overall lead in the nineteenth
century had been based on its huge coal supplies, the US lead in the
twentieth, particularly after 1945, was based on its oil resources. For the
first three-quarters of the century the United States was the world’s
leading oil producer; in addition, American companies controlled
additional resources in many parts of the world. Only in the 1970s did
production in the Soviet Union and in Saudi Arabia surpass that in the
US. Then, too, the balance of power definitely shifted away from
American distributors to local producers.4 Overall Soviet GNP figures are
not known, but a very rough guess is that total Soviet production in
1945 was perhaps a quarter of that in the US. Quite likely it was even
smaller than that.
The strong economy provided the basis for America’s military
strength. Until 1949 it had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. After the
Soviet Union exploded its bomb, the US still had a strong lead at least
until the early 1970s. It had by far the strongest air force in the world.
Before the Second World War the Royal Navy had still been somewhat
larger than the US Navy, but in December 1947 Admiral Chester Nimitz
could argue that the US Navy now had a “control of the sea more
absolute than ever possessed by the British.” True, after demobilization
the United States had a smaller army than that of the Soviet Union, but
the Second World War had illustrated how quickly the US could mobilize
even a full-scale army.
In various ways the United States frequently intervened with armed
force of one sort or another. In the period 1946 to 1965, at least 168
such instances were recorded, with by far the highest frequency
occurring in the years 1956 to 1965. Most of these interventions were in
Third World countries. By comparison, Moscow intervened only around
ten times in Third World countries in the same period. Most of America’s
interventions were rather small scale; many received support both
locally and internationally. Interventions could also be invited. The
American response to the various crises over Berlin provided the best
example of this.5
The atomic bomb and the dollar were the supreme signs of America’s
power. The bomb was an American invention, although British scientists
certainly played a role in the early phase of its development. The United
States consistently maintained a qualitative lead in the nuclear arms race
with the Soviet Union. The bomb was not used again after August 1945.
Despite the constant search by strategists and military for new “windows
of vulnerability,” which only new types of nuclear weapons would then
be able to close, it was very difficult to foresee any scenario where the
new weapon would actually be directly employed. In this sense President
Charles de Gaulle may have been right when he argued that it was
unlikely that the United States would risk the obliteration of New York
or Washington, DC for Hamburg or Paris. Yet, as early as August 1945,
Truman had told de Gaulle that “the bomb should give pause to
countries which might be tempted to commit aggressions.”6
It was not easy for Washington both to deter the Russians and to
reassure the Europeans. The second part was actually more difficult than
the first. Or, as British defense minister Denis Healey formulated it: “it
takes only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the
Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”7
The Soviet Union could never be entirely certain that the United States
would not retaliate by using nuclear weapons. This was the nature of
deterrence. America’s allies pressed for a nuclear guarantee; they had
their persistent doubts about its effectiveness, but they generally
assumed it would remain effective. So the bomb was seen to protect not
only the United States, which was after all not so directly threatened,
but also many of its allies around the world, particularly its most
important ones. Ultimately the bomb was at the heart of America’s
commitment to crucial NATO allies, and to additional key allies such as
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, although several wars in Asia and
Africa showed the limitations of America’s guarantee. Even today, with
the end of the Soviet Union, most of the NATO allies still want the
United States to maintain a nuclear land presence in Europe, and not
simply a more general or sea-based deterrence.8
After 1945 the United States was able to set up a “liberal
internationalist” order of surprising force and duration. The UN and,
even more important in this context, the Bretton Woods institutions, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, were set up
immediately after the Second World War. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) followed in 1948, as did the Atlantic-oriented
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), from 1960
renamed the more global Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Through these economic organizations
Washington provided a set of global institutions and rules of
considerable importance. G. John Ikenberry has argued that “The United
States has presided over this ensemble of governance institutions, but it
has tended to do so through the exercise of liberal hegemony rather than
imperial control.”9
The dollar was the symbol of America’s economic supremacy. In
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s phrase, the dollar was the “exorbitant
privilege” of the United States. The United States had access to a “gold
mine of paper” which gave it advantages not fully available even to
Britain in its heyday. While it cost the Bureau of Engraving a few cents
to produce a 100 dollar bill, other countries had to pay the full 100
dollars to obtain one. The dollar’s reserve status in the world gave the
United States great advantages compared to all other countries. The US
could run up deficits which no other country could.10
Through the IMF, where the US was by far the single most important
member, and its bilateral diplomacy, the United States helped maintain
the international structure of exchange rates. The dollar was long tied to
gold, and all the other international currencies were tied to the dollar, in
a way similar to what had been the case under the classical gold
standard (1870–1914) under British leadership. Yet the role of the dollar
was significantly stronger than that of the pound under the gold
standard. Due to the imbalance in trade between the United States and
Western Europe, full convertibility in trade between the two sides of the
Atlantic was introduced only in 1958, but the basic structure of the
Bretton Woods system lasted from 1945, and certainly until 1971–73
when the dollar was taken off the gold standard and exchange rates were
permitted to float freely. In fact, the central role of the dollar continues
to this very day, despite the many ideas, especially from, first, the
French, and now, more hesitantly, even the Chinese, for a broader, more
international standard.
After 1945 the United States long maintained a flow of capital to
borrowers in the same way as the British had done in the nineteenth
century. Even more than in the British case, virtually every country in
the world received some form of economic support, and in most cases
the United States was the most important source of such support. In
addition, the United States dominated the World Bank, as it did the IMF,
through economically weighted voting arrangements and in other ways.
In financial crises the United States served as the lender of last resort.
The Marshall Plan was the best example of this role; the clearest sign of
its success was perhaps the call for new Marshall Plans in ever new parts
of the world. Under the Marshall Plan, as Theodore H. White wrote from
France, the American expert “has become … as much a stock character
as was the British traveler of the nineteenth century, as 2,000 years ago
the Roman centurion must have been in conquering Greece.”11 Only
later did it emerge that the Marshall Plan was probably far less
important for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe than was
perceived at the time. Yet, perceptions exert their own force politically,
culturally, and even economically.
The United States provided a market for distress goods from political
friends, and supplied such goods itself. The unilateral concessions
provided to the struggling Japanese in the 1950s were the most striking
example here. The United States competed with West Germany to be the
world’s leading exporter; recently it has been surpassed by both China
and Germany. It remained by far the world’s largest importer. The
resulting deficit may definitely have had its disadvantages, but there
were also advantages. It resulted in a higher standard of living for
Americans; it also brought in new investment; it could even give
Washington leverage vis-à-vis other countries. With the huge amounts in
question, the advantage was not always with the exporter.12
Washington was the leader in coordinating international
macroeconomic policies, particularly trade policies. Under America’s
leadership world trade moved steadily in a more liberal direction. The
GATT system, based on the most favored nation (MFN) principle, was
the key in this context. To a large extent the United States even
dominated the international property regime. In the nineteenth century,
Britain had established a regime strongly biased in favor of the British
investor. Expropriations of foreign investments were strongly
discouraged. Challenges to this system were generally defeated through
a combination of bondholder sanctions and use of the Royal Navy. After
1945 the United States was able to establish a similarly strong property
regime in the non-communist world biased in favor of (American)
multinationals. Sometimes challenges to this property regime were
defeated through covert means (Iran, 1953; Guatemala, 1954). In
addition to its military and economic power, the United States long
possessed some crucial additional strengths. Isolationism had ended; the
US was prepared to play an active role almost all over the world. For
several decades presidential leadership and bipartisanship between
Democrats and Republicans to a large extent characterized the American
political system. The Republican right occasionally objected to the
Truman administration’s initiatives, but almost without exception it lost
out, in part because key Republicans supported the administration. Only
in the 1970s did this basic system begin to crumble.
Internationally the United States represented values that were seen as
attractive by millions around the world. It stood for democracy and self-
determination, for international cooperation and freer trade. These
values were never fully practiced, even in the US itself. The Truman
administration, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson in particular, in
Dean Rusk’s phrase, generally “overlooked the brown, black, and yellow
peoples of the world.” The Eisenhower administration did little to end
racial segregation, particularly in the South. Southerners, from James
Byrnes to William Fulbright, had to support the racism of their region if
they wanted to maintain their political base. This tension in values
lasted well into the 1960s. Protectionist elements have always been part
lasted well into the 1960s. Protectionist elements have always been part
of US foreign economic policies—also after 1945, when the United States
pushed for a more liberal order from a position of overwhelming
strength. There were always some sectors, even in the US, which
allegedly would benefit from “temporary” protection.
Yet these fundamental values still served to support the overall US
role and buttress its tremendous power. The support for these ideals did
not necessarily require their full implementation in practice, although
naturally that helped. Implementation was almost always relative,
compared to others, and particularly compared to the Soviet Union. It
certainly helped that America was also the richest country in the world,
with broad-based material benefits that citizens of most other countries
could only dream of. America’s popular culture quickly spread to the
most distant corners of the world. This process was well under way in
the interwar years, but the pace picked up considerably after the Second
World War.
The United States had its problems and suffered its defeats. The Soviet
Union gained control in Eastern Europe; the communists won the civil
war in China. Yet no previous Great Power had seen the entire world as
its staging ground. Even Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union had
had clearly defined geographical priorities, despite Hitler’s
Weltanschauung and the Soviet Union’s universalist aspirations. Soon the
United States expected to play a leading role in virtually all important
parts of the worlds. This was ambition on a grander scale than any other
empire. Almost all previous versions had been basically regional. The
biggest of all the recent ones, the vast British Empire, was
geographically very comprehensive, but in the very center of
international politics, on the European continent, Britain’s influence was
quite limited.

QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS

America had its pessimistic moments. America has always been

challenged; it always will be. As Charles Dickens observed in 1844, “If
its individual citizens, to a man, are to be believed, (America) always is
depressed, and always is stagnated, and always in an alarming crisis, and
never was otherwise.”13 Thus, during the Cold War the Soviets often felt
“ten feet tall.” Yet the basic mood was optimistic. In the long run the
United States was bound to win. It had unrivalled power; it fought the
good fight. Even George F. Kennan, that strong critic of the moralistic–
legalistic tradition in American foreign policy, wrote that the American
people should be grateful to Providence for the Kremlin’s implacable
challenge since it “has made their entire security as a nation dependent
on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of
moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to
bear.”14 In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy optimistically stated
that America “shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship,
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of
liberty.” As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote, with special reference to these
early days of the Kennedy administration, but really with much wider
relevance: “Euphoria reigned; we thought for a moment that the world
was plastic and the future unlimited.”15
By the 1970s both the statistics and the mood had changed. While in
1945 the United States had produced almost as much as the rest of the
world put together, this slipped to approximately 40 percent in 1950, 30
percent in 1960, and 25 percent in 1975. By 1960 the French, West
German, Italian, and Japanese economies had constituted respectively
17, 26, 10, and 15 percent of the American economy; in 1975 these
percentages stood at 22, 28, 13, and 33 percent. They all grew faster
than the United States.16
In October 1957, Sputnik, the world’s first artificial earth satellite,
underlined Soviet progress. Khrushchev spoke about the goal of the
Soviet Union being “to catch up with and overtake the West,” actually
surpassing the United States in several crucial economic fields, including
milk, meat, and butter— even about “burying” the capitalist system in
the long run. At the huge party congress in 1957 celebrating the October
Revolution, Khrushchev stated that “Comrades, the calculations of our
planners show that, within the next fifteen years, the Soviet Union will
be able not only to catch up with but also to surpass the present volume
of output of important products in the USA.” Mao Tse-Tung immediately
announced that China would outstrip Great Britain within 15 years:
“Comrade Khrushchev tells us that the Soviet Union will overtake the
United States in fifteen years. I can tell you that in fifteen years we may
well catch up with or overtake Britain.” This was the beginning of
China’s Great Leap Forward.17
Economic progress appeared much faster in the Soviet Union than in
the West. Thus, in a paradoxical example, in the summer of 1960 some
leading Norwegian politicians were afraid that in 10–15 years the rapid
economic expansion on the Kola Peninsula could lead to political loyalty
conflicts on the Norwegian side of the border where economic
development was apparently much slower.18 Norwegians would want to
move to the Soviet Union. A few decades later there were indeed huge
differences, but in Norway’s favor.
Yet it gradually became clear that where the Soviets did presumably
take the lead, the fields were no longer so crucial. Who needed all that
steel and cement when the future belonged to much more advanced
technologies? After having visited the United States in 1959, Khrushchev
was clearly impressed: “They are really rich. Rich indeed.”19 On the
civilian side, most definitely including agriculture, the Soviet Union was
far behind. Only in some military fields could the Soviet Union actually
rival the US. This equality was the basis of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaties (SALT) of the 1970s.
While Korea had been a draw, the Vietnam war was widely perceived
as a major defeat for the US. In turn, it led to a reaction against the
“imperial” presidency, and to internal bitterness and division. The war
also seemed to make a mockery of America’s ideals of democracy and
international cooperation. The Nixon economic shocks of the early 1970s
led to the end of the dollar’s convertibility into gold, to devaluation, and
to strengthened protectionism.
In the 1970s there was a lot of talk, even in high circles, about the
decline of the United States. In 1971, Richard Nixon referred to the good
old days of 1947, when the United States had been the undisputed
leader, both militarily and economically. Now, however, and looking
five to ten years ahead, he stated: “First, instead of just America being
number one in the world from an economic standpoint, the pre-eminent
world power, and instead of there being just two superpowers, when we
think in economic terms and economic potentialities, there are five great
power centers in the world today.” He referred to the US, the Soviet
Union, Western Europe, Japan, and China. Nixon even compared the
United States to past empires: “I think of what happened to Greece and
Rome; what is left—only the pillars.”20 The 1970s was clearly the
decade when the references to the decline of the United States were the
strongest. In various ways the Nixon administration tried to build up
regional powers that could take some of the load off America’s
shoulders.21
Ronald Reagan changed the rhetoric dramatically. For eight full years
America was celebrated in terms even more extravagant than those used
by Kennedy twenty years earlier. True, there had been the setbacks in
the 1970s. “How did all this happen?” Reagan rhetorically asked. He
gave the answer himself: “America had simply ceased to be a leader in
the world.” In 1988 he celebrated his own achievements: “… a complete
turnaround, a revolution. Some years ago, America was weak and
freedom everywhere was under siege; today, America is strong and
democracy is everywhere on the move …”22
Academic observers argued that Reagan had certainly changed the
rhetoric, but perhaps not really reality. In his The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers (1987), Paul Kennedy argued to critical and popular
acclaim that the United States was in decline and was bound to go the
way of earlier Great Powers. His advice to Reagan was that the president
manage America’s decline gracefully, so that “the relative erosion of the
United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not
accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but
longer-term disadvantage.”23 What was more implicit in Rise and Fall
was then explicitly presented in Kennedy’s Preparing for the Twenty-First
Century six years later: Japan was clearly America’s successor among the
superpowers.
In the barrage of statistics in Kennedy’s two books the most important
set was clearly the share of world production held by the United States.
Kennedy more or less assumed that America’s decline—from almost 50
percent in 1945, down to 25 percent in 1975—would continue. Japan’s
curve, on the other hand, would be extended upwards; sooner or later a
Japan on the way up was bound to surpass the United States on the way
down.
Kennedy was clearly wrong. The US share of world production
remained at around 25 percent. There was no significant further
slippage. No sooner was Rise and Fall out than the Soviet Union
collapsed, a phenomenon not exactly foreseen in the book. And, no
sooner was Preparing for the Twenty-First Century out than Japan entered
into a long period of economic decline and political sclerosis. So much
for predictions about the future, even from the most eminent of
historians.

AMERICA’S “UNIPOLAR MOMENT”

In fact, the 1990s were to be America’s unipolar moment. Charles

Krauthammer’s original article “The Unipolar Moment” was published in
Foreign Affairs in 1990/91.24 In it, he argued that the new order would
last for at least a generation or for “decades.” Both Bill Clinton and
Madeleine Albright proclaimed that the United States was indeed “the
indispensable nation”; it allegedly “stands taller and sees further into the
future” than other actors. In fact, in his State of the Union Address in
January 2000, Clinton stated that “the state of the union is the strongest
it has ever been.”
True, America’s relative economic position had been much stronger in
1945 than it was at the end of the Cold War. Yet, in the early years
American military strength had always been balanced by Soviet power.
In fact, in the years after 1945 the Soviet expansion was to a very large
extent based on the strength of the Red Army. Now there was no Soviet
Union and no Red Army. The US had no significant other military rival
either. Washington had dreamed of one world in 1945, but ended up
with two antagonistic camps, East and West. Now, for the first time, the
United States had the possibility to dominate the entire globe. The Cold
War East quickly disintegrated, slowly to be replaced by the traditional
East of East Asia.
The Soviet Union’s problems and eventual disappearance, and Russia’s
weakness, facilitated a string of US-led military invasions which started
in the traditional Latin American backyard, in Panama in 1989,
continued with the Gulf War in 1991, the interventions in Somalia in
1992–93, in Haiti in 1994, in Bosnia in 1994–95, in Kosovo in 1999, in
Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, and climaxed with the Iraq War
of 2003. The Somalia experience was seen as a failure and became a
crucial factor in the decision not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide
in 1994. The rest were generally considered successes, at least in a short-
term perspective. The Gulf and Iraq wars were huge military operations,
with the United States transferring up to 500,000 soldiers to the other
side of the globe. No other military power could even dream of
performing such operations. Some of these operations were done with
the approval of the world community. Others, particularly Kosovo and
Iraq, were done without such approval. It did not matter much. No one
was going to challenge the United States anyway.
Political science realists argued that no alliance had survived the
disappearance of the threat against which the alliance had been directed.
Yet NATO not only survived the end of the Soviet Union; it seemed to
become increasingly popular with the addition of many new members.
Kenneth Waltz, the father of neo-realism, blamed Bill Clinton for thus
reversing the alleged laws of history by undertaking various actions to
keep NATO alive.25 So much for political science laws. Realists had also
argued that when one power became predominant, other states would
inevitably balance against it. In the 1990s there was very little balancing
against the United States. Relations with Yeltsin’s Russia were
improving, in part because the two presidents got along so well; and
with Jiang Zemin’s China they were satisfactory, despite the
consequences of the harsh measures taken by the Chinese leaders against
the demonstrators on Tiananmen Square in June 1989.
America’s leading allies in Europe and Asia definitely wanted to
continue the alliance structure, even in the new post-Cold War world. In
1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members of
NATO; many others were to follow a few years later. In connection with
the war in Afghanistan the US established bases in several countries in
Central Asia (formerly part of the Soviet Union). It was difficult to
imagine a more complete demonstration of US power at the expense of
Russia, the troubled inheritor of the Soviet legacy, and China, allegedly
the rising power. Despite initial cuts in defense spending in Clinton’s first
years, such spending soon rose a great deal. America’s lead over any
possible combination of enemies was huge. Also, for that reason, any
effort to balance the United States appeared futile. Not even a
combination of all the possible challengers to the US would fully
measure up, and most of the challengers had a better relationship with
Washington than with most of their potential allies.
The American economy blossomed in the 1990s. Growth was high;
employment increased rapidly. More than 22 million jobs were created
in the Clinton years, a high number compared both to earlier periods in
American history, and to other parts of the world in the 1990s. For the
first time in decades the federal budget was balanced, due to a
combination of higher taxes, reductions in some expenditures, and
higher growth. America and much of the world marveled particularly at
the growth in productivity. The United States had seemingly found the
key to ever-renewed success; the new information technology apparently
provided a great deal of the answer. Many books and articles were
written celebrating various aspects of the American political–economic
model—books and articles that continued well past the turn of the
millennium. History had come to an end in that no real alternative
existed to the American political–economic model; peace, democracy,
and free markets had all proved their superiority.26 With the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and Japan’s growing economic problems, there
appeared to be no true economic competitor to the US. The American
economic model was spreading to ever new corners of the world. Even
in Scandinavia, home of the alleged alternative between communism
and capitalism, deregulation and the free market took control.
Democracy was experiencing a “third wave” across much of the
world; Eastern and Central Europe, even the new Russia, almost all
countries in Latin America, many in Asia, and even some in Africa,
became more or less democratic. America’s “soft power” was spreading
rapidly. The proliferation of television channels and new media
presented golden opportunities for America’s mass culture. Bill Clinton
had his problems, with a definite lack of political and personal
discipline, and he was never able to find that elusive new term that was
to characterize his overall foreign policy in the way “containment” had
done during the Cold War (the Kennan “sweepstakes”). Yet he remained
popular in the United States and in much of the rest of the world as well.
He had a unique ability to convince almost anyone that he was actually
on their side, whether he was talking to Third Way Europeans, troubled
Russians, or the increasingly important Chinese.27
Some of the rising neo-conservatives had difficulties with the wave of
American interventions, at least initially. They despised Bill Clinton and
virtually anything he stood for. “Nation building” was a term they
disliked. They also felt that many of Clinton’s interventions had a
humanitarian objective which they did not share. Interventions were
meant to take care of Great Power interests, little else. Military power
was not be used for such additional purposes. There would also be rising
costs in terms of human lives and money. This attitude was clearly
noticeable even in the first months after George W. Bush took over as
president in January 2001. Yet, more and more, the following question
was asked: When America was so strong, and its intentions were so
good, and many Americans were really taking both for granted, why
should it not use its unipolar moment to reorganize the world? Soon this
question was asked both by the growing number of (neo-)conservatives
and by liberals. Shocked into action by the events of September 11,
2001, the Bush administration went on the offensive. Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, which the administration had not really focused much on before
September 11, were to be swept out of Afghanistan. First Iraq, and then,
hopefully, Iran and North Korea, were to experience regime change.
Reagan had allegedly liberated Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Bush would now set the Middle East free. The United States did not
really need permanent allies. In Donald Rumsfeld’s words: “The mission
determined the coalition; the coalition did not determine the mission.” If
the US just took the lead and showed the way, much of the world would
follow. In June 2002, President Bush declared that “America has, and
intends to keep, military strength beyond challenge, thereby making
destabilizing arms races pointless and limiting rivalries to trade and
other pursuits.”28

AMERICA’S DECLINE

The world looks much different today. Charles Krauthammer, who had
proclaimed the unipolar moment in 1990, declared in 2002 that if
America did not wreck its economy, unipolarity would last 40 years.29 In
the sense that the United States could do almost anything it liked,
unipolarity lasted only a few more years. While the operations in
Afghanistan went surprisingly well, with small US forces overthrowing
the Taliban with local support, after the initial victory the United States
was soon to face much larger problems in Iraq than it had ever dreamed
of; George W. Bush was to prove a rather unpopular president in much
of the world outside the United States; and, most importantly, the United
States was to face financial problems of such a magnitude that they
could potentially threaten its overall position as the world’s leading
power.
True, the United States is still clearly the pre-eminent military power
in the world. It spends almost as much on defense as all the other Great
Powers added together. US military supremacy is still at the core of the
many alliances, bilateral treaties, and bases involving the United States.
America is definitely still the leading guarantor of the security of other
countries. Thus, when so many Eastern and Central European states were
eager to join NATO, it was primarily to get the much sought-after
military guarantee from Washington. When China rises, many of its
neighbors either renew their alliances with the US—such as Japan and
South Korea—or they seek stronger ties for the first time, like India.
When so many countries are willing to participate in the American-led
war in Afghanistan against the Taliban, this is to a large extent because
they feel that a satisfactory long-term relationship with the United States
requires that they do so. A refusal to do so would also have a negative
impact on NATO.
Yet the events in Iraq and Afghanistan have dramatically illustrated
the limitations of US military power. The expectation of the Bush
administration had been for a short war with early withdrawal of the
American forces, the establishing of a popular Iraqi government which
would lead to the transformation of politics in the entire Arab world,
and the financing of all this through rapidly increasing Iraqi oil
production.30
None of this happened. The march to Baghdad was quick, but then
the problems started. With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government, the
dissolution of the Iraqi army, and the purge of Baathist officials, chaos
followed. Elections were held and, slowly, more popular structures
emerged; but the new governments did not pursue the policies the
United States had favored. Any popular government was unable either to
establish peace with Israel, or pursue a containment policy vis-à-vis Iran.
With so much chaos, oil production remained stagnant, and the costs of
the war for the US increased rapidly.
No one wants to fight a conventional war against the United States.
So opponents of the US fight asymmetrical wars in the way we saw first
in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. They are not able to defeat the US; but
neither is the US able to defeat them entirely. Then the inevitable
question arises of who is able to keep at it the longest.
George W. Bush’s policies were unpopular in most parts of the world,
particularly in Western Europe and in the Muslim world. The standing of
the United States fell considerably. The Bush administration was
criticized strongly and frequently, but many points of criticism went well
beyond the administration. The use of force, lack of concern about the
environment, the death penalty and America’s social problems, and the
rise of the religious right were some of the points raised. America and
some of its allies, particularly in Europe, were drifting apart. As we shall
see, Obama made the United States more popular again in many circles.
Economically the United States still has by far the biggest gross
domestic product (GDP) in the world. China’s economy overtook that of
Japan in the second quarter of 2010 and thus became the second largest
Japan in the second quarter of 2010 and thus became the second largest
in the world. Today, it is still only about 40 percent of that of the United
States. While the US share of world GDP had declined—from almost 50
percent in 1945, to around 25 percent in the mid-1970s—there was no
really significant further decline, so that in 2010–11 it still remained at
around 22–23 percent. The majority of the most advanced companies in
the world are still American. American science and universities still lead
the world, as can be seen in the number of Nobel Prizes received, and in
the many rankings of universities in the world. American productivity
and even the growth in productivity are still high, although not
necessarily the highest in the world in every respect.
Most importantly, the United States was running up huge new deficits
in its federal budget. The projected deficit for the 2011 fiscal year was
1.3 trillion dollars—or almost 11 percent of America’s entire economic
output: among the highest in the world. Total government debt came to
almost exactly 100 percent of GDP, and was expected to become even
higher before it started to go down. America was becoming “an empire
of debt.” Only Japan, among the major powers, and some smaller
countries, both in Europe and elsewhere, were worse off in this respect.
(See Table 2.)
There were two major reasons for the huge US deficits. First, the
policies of the Bush administration had a very negative effect. At the end
of his administration, Bill Clinton had actually been able to balance the
federal budget, but tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 reduced income
substantially, by roughly two trillion dollars over ten years. And the tax
cuts were not accompanied by cuts in expenditure; on the contrary, the
increase in expenditure was very large. The new prescription-drug
benefit to Medicare was very expensive; so were the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.

Table 2. Debt statistics

Second, the financial and economic crisis of 2007–09 had much

 Second, the financial and economic crisis of 2007–09 had much
greater effects than even the Bush policies, although the two were of
course related. Thus, the huge debts—federal, state, and private—were
probably an important cause of the crisis. Economists and business
people had not really learned to manage their affairs so as to produce a
constantly growing economy, as they had so proudly believed they
would. The recession that started in the housing industry in the US in
2007 spread to the banks and industrial giants of America, and to much
of the rest of the world. Huge crisis packages had to be passed under
both Bush and Obama to save the financial system and to stimulate the
economy. Naturally, in this situation, tax income also fell, so the deficit
exploded. This was clearly the most dramatic economic setback since
1945.
Although the first signs of recovery could be seen in the middle of
2009, the United States was badly hit. The prospects for the future were
also quite troublesome. Particularly after 2020, the rapid increase in the
number of elderly people will have dramatic consequences for social
security and health expenses. Then, interest on the rising debt will
increase exponentially. Rising debt will most likely also hold down
economic growth.31
It was less important that, during the recession, the (traditionally)
even more serious deficit in US current accounts now actually fell
somewhat, because imports declined even more than exports. The US
had long been the world’s biggest debtor. Now its debts had become so
huge that basic questions were being asked about America’s economic
future. It was running up big deficits in most categories:

• fifteen out of thirty-two major categories of capital goods, and all

 • fifteen out of thirty-two major categories of capital goods, and all
but three of twenty-five categories of consumer goods
• the traditional huge exporter of agricultural products had turned
into a net importer of food, feed, and beverages
• there was a considerable deficit even in the trade of advanced
technology products
• the country’s international investment position had turned negative
in 1986, and in the following decades this deficit exploded.32

The US had lectured the rest of the world about the importance of
balancing its books; otherwise collapse would follow. Washington had,
however, made one huge exception for itself. Now reality might finally
be catching up with it.
Power normally shifts immeasurably almost every day, but now the
shifts could be measured virtually every day. While the US had a
dramatic recession and a very slow recovery, China’s setback came in
the form of (only) 6 percent growth and a quick recovery. There was a
tendency in some circles to assume that the debt problem would just go
away. After all, the US debt had been much higher after the Second
World War than it was now. Rapid growth after 1945 had taken care of
most of that problem. Now, however, the debt problem was long term,
and the prospects for growth much more limited.
No one could be certain of the consequences of the problem. The
optimists pointed out that the federal government was having little
trouble raising the money required, and at interest rates that were very
low by historical standards.33 Unlike the euro countries, the United
States had its own central bank and its own currency. This made it easier
for the US to handle its debts than was the case for euro debtors. The
default risk was seen as much smaller.
Pessimists emphasized that although the United States was still a
superpower with the world’s leading currency, and was generally able to
handle its growing debt, market forces could ultimately descend on it in
the way they descended on various European countries with only
marginally larger debts than those of the US.34 Then the government
might have to impose draconian measures almost overnight. Endless
discussions about how to reduce the budget deficit, between President
Obama and the Republican House of Representatives, resulted only in
short-term solutions. And had not the decline and fall of Great Britain
after the Second World War been accompanied by a series of more or
less failed measures to adjust to new economic circumstances? As we
shall see, there was also the question of how long the Chinese would
continue to finance America’s deficits. A foreign policy crisis could well
lead to dramatic action, as when Washington had forced London to stop
the Suez invasion in 1956 when Britain needed additional financial
support from the US. The deepest question was the one Larry H.
Summers, Obama’s first chief economic adviser, used to ask before he re-
entered government, “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain
the world’s biggest power?”35 This was a key question—maybe the key
question—for the future role of the United States.
The soaring deficits were bound to limit America’s freedom of action
severely. New large-scale military interventions would be very difficult
to undertake. This was clearly one of several factors in the Obama
administration’s reluctance to carry out military action against Iran, and
to provide only late and limited action against Muammar Gaddafi’s
to provide only late and limited action against Muammar Gaddafi’s
Libya in March 2011. Existing interventions ought to be ended or at least
reduced as quickly as possible; Obama thus insisted on withdrawing
according to schedule from Iraq and Afghanistan, although the schedule
was more flexible in the latter case. All forms of aid and assistance had
to be dispensed much more carefully than before. So after the
revolutions in North Africa in 2011, Washington offered rather limited
economic assistance to the new governments. Even the defense budget
would be negatively affected, although the political elite in both parties
favored higher defense spending than did the public. While political
leaders had their own priorities, the public clearly wanted Washington
to focus much more on the domestic situation, and less on the needs of
various foreigners. All this was bound to result in a lower profile for the
United States.
If Washington was able to cooperate with other capitals, the transition
to a somewhat lower profile would be easier. There was therefore a
definite need for the United States to work closely with other leading
countries in the new “multi-partner” world. However, there was no
guarantee that this multi-partner world, in the administration’s
language, would not develop into a multi-polar world, with the
uncertainties that would then follow.36 The United States was quite
simply overextended, and it badly needed help in shouldering its global
burdens. Rising powers such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and
Nigeria, in addition to the EU and Japan, had to be integrated into a
world where the US would be carrying a smaller load than in the past.

BARACK OBAMA’S FOREIGN POLICY: WHAT CAN THE US

 DO AND NOT DO?

Individuals may make a difference, but their significance is increased

when they act in harmony with larger historical forces. Or, as Karl Marx
put it in the opening paragraphs of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Napoleon: “Men make their own History, but they do not make it as they
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”
As Joseph Nye has stressed, resources do not automatically produce
certain outcomes. The United States may have the greatest resources in
today’s world, but these have to be converted into policies and,
ultimately, outcomes, through leadership, strategy, organization, etc.
Thus, the power-conversion strategies of the various powers are
crucial.37
The shift from George W. Bush to Barack Obama is a case in point.
The nationalistic policies of the Bush administration were putting the
United States at odds with many governments and, even more so, with
public opinion around much of the world. This undoubtedly had a
negative effect on the general position of the United States. It was also
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish clearly between the
policies of the Bush administration and the role of the United States
itself. Bush was becoming America.
The change to Obama saw a sharp rise in America’s popularity,
particularly in Western Europe, but also in most of the rest of Europe,
Latin America, and Africa. This rise in popularity was less pronounced in
the Arab world, and with the governments and publics of the Asian
giants, Japan, India, and China, (where it was difficult to speak about
public opinion). In June 2010, after about 18 months in power, Obama
was still seen as likely to do the right thing in world affairs by 90
percent of Germans, 87 percent of the French, and 84 percent of Britons,
compared to 65 percent of Americans. His popularity was also on the
rise in Russia and China; as expected, he had the greatest difficulties in
the Muslim world. Later on, there was a clear downward slide in the
United States, where fewer than half said they approved of Obama’s
policies, while elsewhere his popularity held up surprisingly well,
particularly in Western Europe.38
There was bound to be disappointment about Obama; he could not
possibly live up to all his promises. And despite the big shift from Bush
to Obama, America was still, to a large extent, the same country. The
United States was not as reform-oriented as many observers thought; in
fact, Obama himself was not so reform-oriented as many on the political
left had hoped. Change was limited, except that the US had done what
had been thought impossible— elected a black president in a country
still overwhelmingly white. The United States was right in the middle of
the most serious recession since the 1930s, and Obama’s first urgent task
was to avoid a total financial collapse in the US and elsewhere. His
freedom of action was further limited by America’s political system in
general, and its deep polarization in particular.
Yet individuals can indeed make a difference. No one dreamed about
celebrating China’s aloof leaders in the way the world did the new
American president. This is undoubtedly one important aspect of
superpower status as well. It does not contradict the fact that there were
definite limits to what Obama could achieve through his foreign policy.
Still, the fact that the United States had elected a black, progressive
Still, the fact that the United States had elected a black, progressive
president—Obama avoided the term “liberal”—who spoke to the world
in the most inspiring of terms, apparently made all the many
generalizations about the United States being an increasingly
conservative and nationalist country obsolete.
Barack Obama’s presidency provides an illustration of what the
United States can and cannot do. Without doubt, the American president
is the most powerful individual in the world. America holds more power
than any other country. Despite America’s system of checks and
balances, the president generally dominates the scene, particularly the
foreign policy arena. In some form or other most American presidents
develop ambitious agendas which they want to carry out during their
term(s) in office. This definitely applies to Barack Obama.39
Obama wanted to promote international cooperation and multilateral
diplomacy. He had an ambitious agenda for nuclear arms control, and
even established a nuclear-free world as his ultimate objective—though
he added that this nuclear-free world might not happen in his own
lifetime. In part, as a result of his ambitious nuclear agenda, he wanted
to press the reset button in relations with Russia. And he favored
cooperation with the new emerging China. Dialogue and negotiation
were to be preferred in his diplomacy in the Middle East, and even in
relations with the most challenging countries, such as Iran and North
Korea. The United States was to ratify several international treaties that
it had earlier opposed, or at least not ratified. The use of torture was to
be ended; Guantanamo was to be closed. Obama wanted to pursue an
international agreement to stop global warming.
In theory, in trying to achieve all these and many other objectives, the
 In theory, in trying to achieve all these and many other objectives, the
United States had a huge arsenal at its disposal—from nuclear and
conventional weapons, to all kinds of economic instruments and political
appeals. Obama’s popularity was impressive. In fact, as we have seen, it
quickly became evident that his popularity was considerably greater in
many foreign countries than in the United States itself. At home, though
Obama was soon to run into a wall of opposition from Republicans on
the domestic side, he had more support from many of them on the
foreign policy side; they liked Obama’s tough side, in the form of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, far better than his various initiatives to
strengthen multilateralist principles.
In reality, however, America’s instruments were more circumscribed
than this description seemed to indicate. Even before the atomic bombs
were dropped in August 1945 over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American
politicians had wondered how they could exploit the supreme new
weapon diplomatically. The answer was generally that this could not be
done explicitly; the atomic bomb was just too dramatic an instrument to
be used as a direct threat. It was also assumed that the world would
respond negatively to any American effort to act as some sort of “nuclear
bully.” Washington just had to hope that its enemies would be
sufficiently impressed to make the necessary concessions anyway.
The bomb primarily served as a effective deterrent vis-à-vis Great
Power attacks on the United States and its major allies; the great number
of smaller wars the United States was involved in demonstrated that
deterrence went only so far. During the Cold War there may well have
been a Long Peace in Europe, but other factors worked alongside nuclear
weapons to produce this striking result: the dramatic consequences of
even a conventional war, as demonstrated during the Second World War,
and the stability provided by the bloc structure and the overall roles of
the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet, outside Europe, the military
conflicts were many. Some of them were also quite significant in scope,
particularly the Korean and Vietnam wars. In diplomatic negotiations
there are few definitive examples of the power of nuclear weapons.
By the time Obama came to power the use of conventional weapons
was also severely circumscribed. He had promised to withdraw
American troops from Iraq, although he left some room for a non-combat
presence even after 2011. He did step up the US military role in
Afghanistan significantly, and in Pakistan in a more limited, but still
dramatic, way. These campaigns strained America’s resources,
particularly its military manpower. Iraq also demonstrated how wrong
things could go. The invasion in March 2003 had been quite successful
in a narrow military sense; the real problems started when victory was
declared on May 1. If the intervention in Iraq had gone as planned, and
the Bush administration had done any meaningful planning for the post-
war phase, it would have put tremendous pressure on Iran and North
Korea. At the time, Iran showed a willingness to bargain; but with its
emphasis on regime change, the Bush administration showed little
interest.
Now, with Obama in power, the military option was not taken
entirely off the table vis-à-vis these two countries. In fact, this option
was stated time and again, but its credibility was limited by past
experience. This was particularly the case with North Korea when it
produced an atomic bomb. America’s partners in the Six-Party Talks
clearly favored negotiations; Seoul lay within easy range of North
Korean artillery. The rulers in Teheran and Pyongyang must have rated
Korean artillery. The rulers in Teheran and Pyongyang must have rated
the chances of a US military response as fairly low. The consequences of
a military strike would just be too dramatic. Washington was left to
work with an escalating series of sanctions whose effects were less than
hoped for, although they had more bite with Iran than with the more
isolated North Korea.
So although Obama might have the best of intentions, diplomatic
breakthroughs could only be guaranteed if they were in the interest not
only of the United States but of the other side involved. Russia favored
new agreements limiting strategic nuclear weapons. Such agreements
could enhance its status as the nuclear equal of the United States, but at
a somewhat reduced economic cost, which would be quite attractive for
a hard-pressed Russia. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
agreement of April 2010 provided hope for further bilateral and
international agreements. Obama’s vision of a nuclear-free world had
stimulated optimism, though there was absolutely no sign of any of the
other nuclear powers being willing to abandon their nuclear weapons.
Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and even Iran had all demonstrated
the advantages that many still perceived these weapons to have. Once
you had nuclear weapons, the danger of an attack—in this case from the
United States—declined substantially.
Obama did stretch out his hand to Iran and North Korea, but they
were simply not willing to abandon their nuclear programs. Obama
agreed to work directly with the existing governments, thus ending all
talk of regime change, even when the government in Teheran was
directly challenged in elections and demonstrations. This disappointed
some of Obama’s supporters. And it did not help either country much.
 Obama’s freedom to act was also curtailed by a whole set of domestic
factors. He had not even promised to end “rendition” and military
tribunals. He did end torture by US personnel, but Guantanamo could
not be closed within the promised one year since many prisoners could
not be transferred elsewhere. Opposition, not only from Republicans, but
also from Democrats (particularly in coal-and oil-producing states),
limited the president’s freedom of action as far as global warming was
concerned. There had been little or no support for the Kyoto treaty, even
under Bill Clinton. The limited result Obama achieved in Copenhagen in
December 2010 was perhaps the most he could get through the
American Congress. It may in fact have gone too far, particularly after
the Republican victory in the 2010 Congressional elections. Copenhagen
illustrated the president’s role; he probably did more than anyone else to
secure an agreement, but the agreement did little to solve the problems
at hand.
While Obama had ultimately been able to get his economic crisis
package through Congress in 2009–10, after the Republican victory in
the Congressional elections in 2010 the situation changed. The initiative
was now with the more fiscally fundamentalist Tea Party movement of
the party. Endless negotiations were carried out. Obama had to sacrifice
tax increases for the rich; cuts in discretionary spending were to be deep.
Growth faltered; a double-dip recession threatened. It was obvious that
when Obama’s economic leadership was so limited at home, he could
not really lead the world either in these challenging times. The world
stood without an effective international leader.
In the Middle East Obama acted under severe international and
national constraints. Israel had its most conservative–nationalist
government ever; and the Palestinians were more divided than ever
government ever; and the Palestinians were more divided than ever
before—though in the spring of 2011 there were new efforts to bring
about reconciliation between the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) and Hamas. As has been said, Israel might ostensibly be interested
in the peace process itself, to keep the Palestinians calm, but not so
much in the result, as this would inevitably involve substantial
concessions and internal division. The Palestinians, on the other hand,
might be interested in the agreement itself, but not in the process, as it
would be a tortuous one for them. It was not easy to see how an
agreement could be reached when this was the situation for the two
main parties involved.
There was broad agreement that only the United States, if anyone,
could force the parties to the conference table, and, later, into an
agreement. Since Israel, the strongest party, with possession of almost all
of the disputed territory, had to make most of the difficult concessions,
leverage over the Israelis was what counted. But also, for domestic
American reasons, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the Obama
administration to force such decisions on the Israelis. In fact, in the past,
several US administrations had applied considerable pressure on Israel,
particularly those of Dwight D. Eisenhower and George H. W. Bush. And
virtually all administrations had had more limited disagreements with
Israel. The US did, after all, have significant interests in the Arab world;
the oil companies had consistently pushed for the US to pursue an
“American,” not an “Israeli,” policy in the Middle East.
Yet it remained hard to imagine the United States forcing Israel to
make the necessary concessions. Limited pressure was one thing; being
willing to withhold economic and military aid was entirely different. The
Israelis had come to expect occasional tough talk from Washington, but
Tel Aviv pretty much excluded the possibility of the United States going
to extreme lengths to force Israel’s hand. The Jewish lobby in America
was extremely well organized; the Christian right was a fervent believer
in Israel; and, most importantly, there was a basic sympathy throughout
most of the US toward the Israelis. There was hardly any domestic
political risk in supporting Israel; but there was a great deal of risk in
supporting the Palestinians, particularly for Obama, since support for
Israel was traditionally even stronger among Democrats than
Republicans. Thus, more than 70 percent of American Jews still favored
the Democrats. As George H. W. Bush had clearly understood, the Jews
would not vote for him regardless.40 There were signs of change: many
Jews in America were moving toward the center, even toward the left as
far as Israel’s position was concerned; US identification with Israel was
having negative effects, crucially in Iraq and Afghanistan. However,
these signs did not change the larger picture of solid US support for
Israel. At least not yet.41

AN AMERICAN DOMESTIC BALANCE SHEET

As we have seen with all the predictions about the rise and fall of the
various Great Powers, it is impossible to make accurate predictions
about the future. And, at best, the predictions about the fall of the
United States have so far proved premature. Though America’s problems
need to be addressed, the US still has a strong basis for economic growth
in its considerable resources, the largest and deepest financial markets in
the world, and, even more, its highly educated and generationally
the world, and, even more, its highly educated and generationally
balanced population.
The higher up the age scale, the greater the US lead in research and
education, despite rising problems financing its higher (particularly
public) education, and barriers to admitting foreign students after
September 11. US spending on research is still considerably higher than
in EU countries. In fact, the United States spends more on research and
development than the next seven largest spenders put together; on a per
capita basis among the developed countries, only Sweden and Finland
spend more. Scientists throughout the world find American scientists the
most popular working partners; and the results, whether judged in Nobel
Prizes or in business innovation, are impressive.42 In addition, there are
the many foreign leaders who have been educated in the United States.
It has been estimated that 46 current—and 165 former— foreign heads
of government were educated in the United States.43
With the exception of the young population of India, the United States
probably also has the economically most desirable age structure among
the Great Powers. The American population is still rapidly growing, and
is expected to grow further in the future, possibly reaching 500 million
by 2050, and one billion by 2100. In fact, America boasts the highest
fertility rate; 50 percent higher than Russia, Germany, and Japan, and
well above that of China. In addition, one has to add the impact of
continued large-scale immigration. Twenty years ago the Soviet Union
had a population considerably larger than that of the United States. But
Russia’s low birth and extremely high mortality rates have reduced that
country’s population to about 140 million. By 2050, Russia’s population
may be only one-third that of the United States, though Moscow plans
otherwise.44 China’s one-child policy will lead to the rapid aging of its
population, with the problems that inevitably follow. In relative terms
the United States will maintain a youthful and dynamic population.
In the developed world immigration will become an even more
crucial issue than today. The United States attracts highly skilled
immigrants from all over the world, even Europe. It is estimated that in
the future more than half the people moving to developing countries
may go to the United States, and it is likely to remain the favorite
destination for educated and skilled migrants. Concern has been
expressed about the continued ability of the US to handle the large rise
in its Hispanic population, from about 16 percent of the population
today, to roughly 30 percent in 2050. The US has recently seen a
significant political backlash against illegal immigration. But there is still
a reason to be optimistic about the assimilation process when compared
to Europe’s increasing problems with its Muslim population. China and
Japan are culturally resistant to diversity and are unlikely to welcome
immigrants, a distinct disadvantage in our increasingly globalized world.
As David Brooks argues, “… the United States is a universal nation … A
nation of immigrants is more permeable than say, Chinese society.”45
The combination of large-scale immigration, excellent universities, and a
huge unrestricted national market, is likely to give the United States an
edge in the future.
However, in the new millennium, the United States also faces many
problems—some old; some new. The educational system is struggling,
particularly at the lower levels, and many international studies indicate
that the US is lagging far behind the leaders. It is another matter that, at
this level, America had not really done well for many decades.46 The US
legal system is carrying justice to extreme lengths, and is also extremely
costly. Its health care was the most expensive in the world, delivering
wonderful care to many, but poor results for large parts of the
population. In some fields, such as infant mortality, the US is at the very
bottom of international comparisons of industrialized countries. Even life
expectancy is relatively low in the United States. Obama’s health reform
promises better results for most of the many uninsured, but it is very
controversial and the costs uncertain. And despite the fall in serious
crime over several decades, the murder rate in the US is still the highest
in the developed world.47
Inequality has grown greatly in the United States. The share of total
income going to the top 1 percent has increased from roughly 8 percent
in the 1960s, to more than 20 percent today.48 The lack of real growth
in most people’s income has undoubtedly contributed to increased
hostility in American politics; such inequalities are even greater in
China, but the two countries cannot really be compared on this point.
They are just too different for that.
The polarization of the two main political parties was becoming a
serious matter. Most Americans were extremely proud of their
constitutional system, but the many checks and balances could often
block necessary action. Certain structural developments had made the
situation worse. The shift of the South into the Republican column had
unified the Democrats, who had lost most of their conservative wing.
The conservative nationalist Southern input and the Republican losses in
the Northeast made the Republicans too much more of a unified
conservative force. The gerrymandering of the Congressional districts
made for limited competition between the two parties and more
competition within parties, often resulting in a weakening of moderate
candidates. The gradual disappearance of national independent media,
in the form of television companies and newspapers with broad support,
was also important. More and more Americans could choose their own
media—cable television, political radio, social media—without facing
anything that contradicted their prejudices. This was not a good climate
for dialogue and debate. The increased polarization under Obama could
also have been influenced by the race issue; a majority of the white
population voted against him for president, particularly in the South,
where there were strong expressions of antagonism toward him.
Even the 1990s had been highly polarized, however, with the
Republicans working for the impeachment of Bill Clinton. The highly
contentious election of George W. Bush strengthened this trend. With the
weakest of popular mandates he ruled, particularly in his first four years,
rather firmly. The triumph of Barack Obama was then seen as a strong
swing to the left—so strong in fact, that some conservatives feared for
America’s democratic future. This did not bode well for America. On the
other hand, the picture should not be seen as too bleak. On the foreign
policy side there was more domestic cooperation, as could be witnessed
over Iraq and Afghanistan. When America faced its huge financial crisis
in 2008–09, Congress was ultimately able to respond somewhat more
concertedly. And Barack Obama was finally able to get his health reform
through Congress, although that happened without Republican votes.
Yet, in 2011, the Republicans were becoming increasingly skeptical of
“Obama’s wars”; they cost too much and gave the president too much
power. The Republicans, who for so long had been tough on the Soviet
power. The Republicans, who for so long had been tough on the Soviet
Union, were now turning away from foreign interventions. Ever new
budget disputes arose. With the rising debt the situation was serious
indeed.
It was not impossible to see a solution to America’s economic
problems. As various commissions suggested, the federal budget could be
balanced through a combination of drastic cuts in expenditures and new
taxes. If the Americans were willing to pay for their gas at anything like
a European price, this would bring substantial new income and also
reduce the current account deficit and US dependence on imported oil.
But the United States is not Europe. Republicans have made opposition
to taxes a “theological” issue; Democrats strongly dislike cuts in the
social programs they have worked so hard for. This is a recipe for
gridlock, as we have already seen in California and several other states.
Yet the many gridlocks of the past have ultimately been broken.
Again the question arises of how long the United States can remain
Number One. Doubts about US supremacy had initially been expressed
by believers in the Soviet experiment, then by academics who argued the
case for Japan, and later by some who saw even the EU rising to the top.
In much of the world, however, the leadership role of the United States
had been taken for granted, for good or bad. Now a rapidly increasing
number of observers all over the world were looking into the future and
concluding that America’s century—it was actually only a good half-
century after 1945—might be over. And, according to recent polls, about
60 percent of Americans also believe that their country is both heading
in the wrong direction and in long-term decline.49
No country could forever remain Number One. But the fact that
America’s fall has been predicted so many times before ought to
America’s fall has been predicted so many times before ought to
stimulate further reflection. There are few, if any, laws in history. One
possible such law, however, may be that no country can remain the
leading country in the world forever. Sooner or later the United States
will be overtaken by some other power, although previous challengers
have come and gone. Whether the new leader will be China, and the
transition will take place in the first half of the twenty-first century, still
remains to be seen.
 2
America’s Challengers

As of today, the United States is still the world’s only true superpower.
Militarily, politically, and culturally it is the only country with a really
significant role in virtually every region of the world. All the other Great
Powers are, with the exception of trade and possibly even investment,
primarily regional in their approach, particularly militarily, although
this regional role may of course become more global over time. And,
although the United States is the only country to have such a global role,
its position has increasingly become limited by the growing roles of
these various regional powers. In every region of the world there is a
regional power that will increasingly challenge the United States for the
leading role. To mention just one example, in the diplomacy surrounding
the situation in Zimbabwe, no country has more influence than South
Africa. But what is perhaps most striking about Zimbabwe is how limited
the influence of all outside powers is. If a country insists on going its
own separate way, it has considerable freedom to do so.
In 2001 Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs coined the term BRIC countries
for Brazil, Russia, India, and China. He wanted to focus attention on the
fact that these four countries contained 25 percent of the world’s
landmass and 40 percent of the world’s population. By 2050 their
economies could eclipse the combined economies of the current richest
countries in the world. He did not argue that BRIC would become a new
political unit, although in 2009 the countries actually started meeting for
consultations. In fact, they are all characterized by an insistence on their
own national sovereignty, a fact which gives them a common
perspective, but also limits the extent of their cooperation.1 O’Neill’s
analysis was primarily a prognosis about the shift in world economic
power in the future. Other terms have also been used: BRICS includes
South Africa, BRICI Indonesia, BRICSAM both South Africa and Mexico,
and BASIC encompasses Brazil, South Africa, India, and China.
Among the BRIC countries, Brazil is often seen as having the weakest
claim to Great Power status, although it has a population that is
considerably larger than that of Russia (193 million as opposed to 142),
a territory that is larger than that of the United States (if you exclude
Alaska), and a gross domestic product slightly greater than that of both
Russia and India. Brazil has more arable land than any other country in
the world, is already the world’s leading producer of several different
farm products, and among the leaders in minerals, water, energy, and
airplanes. Its federal budget has gone from serious deficits to big
reserves.
Yet, despite the considerable economic progress Brazil has made, it
still has major social and economic problems to deal with. Poverty and
illiteracy have been reduced, as has inequality, but much remains to be
done. This certainly includes the inferior position of the black
population. Violence remains high. The gap between the prosperous
south and the poor north and northeast is widening. Its informal
economy is still much too large. The quality of its educational system,
the degree of the country’s innovation, and its basic infrastructure still
lag behind. Brazil’s separate geographical position reduces its role in
international politics; partly for this reason it plays a smaller military
role than other BRIC countries. This is to some degree compensated by
its rapidly increasing role in international peacekeeping, from Haiti to
Lebanon. Its political influence is also primarily focused on the Western
hemisphere. Even here both Mexico and Argentina are ambivalent about
recognizing Brazil’s regional supremacy (with the United States), as seen
in the discussions about permanent membership on the UN Security
Council. Brazil’s efforts to play an important role even outside the
Western hemisphere have met with setbacks, as could recently be seen in
its joint diplomacy with Turkey over Iran.2
India’s challenge is the most long term. In the 1990s India finally
ended its decades of what was often derisively called “the Hindu rate of
growth,” where growth rates just barely exceeded the increase in
population. Economic growth was now substantial—around 7–9 percent
—far higher than in the West, although slower than in China. India had
many highly educated English-speaking men and women who could
participate in the global economy on the ever-growing service side, even
including new medical services. The entrepreneurial spirit was
considerable and innovation was growing. Its democracy was bound to
be a factor of strength over time. India’s population would soon overtake
China’s as the largest in the world. Its population was young and
vibrant. Culturally Bollywood was surpassing Hollywood, in volume in
1980, and somewhat later even in income. In large parts of Asia and
Africa Indian films had tremendous appeal.3
With its growing economic base India was also investing more in
defense. It had the third largest military force in the world, after China
and the United States, and was upgrading this force technologically.
With two aircraft carriers under construction, India was developing
significant capabilities for power projection.4 It even had a space
program. Its diplomatic offensive covered both most parts of Asia and
certain parts of Africa. After decades of lecturing the world about morals
from a weak position of power, it now pursued a more normal
diplomacy. After decades of relying on the Soviet Union, particularly for
weapons and energy, after the end of the Cold War New Delhi slowly
developed a closer relationship with Washington. This was capped by
the 2005 agreement between the two countries about civilian nuclear
cooperation, based on the indirect recognition by Washington of India’s
status as a nuclear military power. Indian scientists, particularly within
computer science, moved freely between the United States (particularly
California) and India, stimulating important scientific and economic
developments in both countries. Yet there was still a considerable
traditional anti-American sentiment in India.
At the same time, India’s minuses were obvious. With the exception of
certain pockets, it was still a poor country. Life had not really changed
that much in most of India’s thousands of villages. Pessimism was deep
in the countryside, as the appalling number of suicides indicated. India
had huge domestic needs to take care of. Its gross domestic product was
less than one-third of China’s. Its infrastructure—its ports, roads, and
railroads—was also very inferior to China’s, as any visitor to the country
could quickly testify to. The differences in the successful handling of the
2008 Olympics in China and the somewhat chaotic 2010 Commonwealth
Games in India proved the point. However, in the long run, some argued
that the Indian model would outperform the Chinese. The two were
different in that India relied more on domestic consumption compared to
China’s export-led growth, on services more than manufacturing, on
private enterprise rather than state-led companies, and on democracy
private enterprise rather than state-led companies, and on democracy
rather than one-party rule.
While India was now finally working harder to end illiteracy, the lack
of effort in previous generations meant that the female literacy rate was
still only 65 percent, compared to China’s more than 90 percent. In
many parts of the country girls were still lagging far behind in
education. Women were often treated badly. The traditional problems
with castes and tribes remained, despite some progress. Life expectancy
was still low at 63 years for men and 64 for women, compared to 70 and
74 in China. India’s main concerns related to its more traditional
enemies, Pakistan and China; it had unsolved border issues with both of
them, and its diplomacy focused first and foremost on these two
countries. Its military forces were not really up to Great Power
standards. The Indian Ocean had never really been, and certainly was
not now, an “Indian” ocean; many different navies, including those of
the United States and increasingly also China, operated in these waters.
Although India had not collapsed, as some had long predicted,
domestically it was now plagued by serious separatism in the Northeast,
and Naxalite groups in central India. These problems only seemed to be
getting worse.5
The Soviet Union had been one of two superpowers during the Cold
War. After the end of the Cold War, Russia still had the world’s second
largest nuclear arsenal. It even tried to maintain some sort of nuclear
parity with the United States, although declining resources made this
equality somewhat fictitious. Its military forces had been reduced from
3.4 million to one million personnel. This was still quite substantial,
though the forces lacked modern equipment and were also plagued by
morale problems, as could be seen in the various military actions
morale problems, as could be seen in the various military actions
undertaken in the Caucasus region and in Georgia in 2008. In an effort
to update its forces Russia was buying four Mistral-class amphibious
assault ships from France. This would be Russia’s most significant
acquisition of foreign weapons since the Second World War, and thus a
sign of the new times. Russia’s own arms sales soon fell. Even here
Russia was not fully competitive in the international market.
The Russian economy had more or less collapsed in the 1990s. The
reforms undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev had only made the situation
worse. The drop in production was of a size most often seen during wars.
There were reports of local starvation. Russian life expectancy fell to
Third World levels, actually below 60 years for men. The population
declined. This indicated a deep social crisis, with alcoholism, widespread
accidents, and declining hospital standards. In 2009 life expectancy had
increased to 74 years for women and 62 for men. Despite alcoholism
undoubtedly being more prevalent among men, this huge discrepancy
was still something of a mystery.6
The total collapse in the ruble in 1998 actually helped the economy.
With a weak ruble the Russians could now gain new markets.
Statistically Russia now had a GDP larger than that of Sweden, but
smaller than that of the Netherlands. In the new millennium the
increasing price of oil changed this situation dramatically. Exports grew
considerably, but were largely limited to oil and gas, certain other raw
materials and, still, weapons. In 2010–11 its GNP was slightly smaller
than that of Canada and India. Many countries in Eastern, but also some
in Western Europe, were quite dependent on Russian energy, but this
also made Russia dependent on hard-cash earnings from the Europeans.
While oil and gas had long been abundant, based on the exploitation of
While oil and gas had long been abundant, based on the exploitation of
the sources most easily available, Moscow now had to move further out
and deeper down to reach new sources. This made it more dependent on
foreign technology.
The state of the Russian economy definitely resembled “Dutch
disease,” when an increase in income from natural resources (in this case
oil and gas) pushed up the country’s currency, making exports more
expensive and imports cheaper. The economic crisis of 2007–09
demonstrated how vulnerable even the stronger Russian economy was.
Debt was piling up. With the low price of oil, budgets had to be cut
severely. It became evident that, with disappointingly few exceptions,
little real transformation had taken place in the Russian economy. It had
a considerable resource base and the educational system had been
relatively good, although it faced many problems. But the individual
attitudes that could, in the long run, transform Russia were largely
missing. The state still played a dominant role; political interference was
rampant; conditions for foreign investors were uncertain. Corruption
remained endemic; Russia actually ranked among the most corrupt
countries in the entire world.
The nationalist–authoritarian style of the Putin government may have
had its political advantages at home, but limited both the Russian
economy and Russia’s appeal abroad, certainly in the West. Putin had
proclaimed the collapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the last century.” Some of the old Soviet republics still
followed Russia’s leadership, but others had taken up much less
cooperative positions. Russia’s efforts to work with China to limit the US
role brought some striking rhetoric, but rather limited concrete results,
with the exception of increased arms sales. China in particular was more
with the exception of increased arms sales. China in particular was more
interested in cooperating with the United States than with Russia.
Under President Medvedev—but with Prime Minister Putin still being
the dominant figure—Russia was determined to regain as much of the
former Soviet position as possible. Putin might have called the collapse
of the Soviet Union the greatest tragedy in the twentieth century, but the
past could not be resurrected. The liberated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe were determined to chart their own course. In 2010–11
there were actually signs that Moscow was trying to establish a basis of
cooperation with these countries, particularly with Poland, moving away
from the traditional spheres-of-influence notions that had antagonized
the Europeans. The lingering problems in Chechnya and other parts of
the Caucasus continued, although somewhat reduced. Apparent progress
could suddenly be interrupted by spectacular terrorist actions in Moscow
itself. And the war with Georgia in 2008 strained relations with that
country.
Japan’s future had long looked bright, as evidenced in book titles
from the 1970s to the 1990s.7 Starting with the Korean War Japanese
growth rates had been very impressive indeed, year after year, decade
after decade. The world had allegedly seen nothing quite like this before.
Many observers thought Japan was destined to overtake the United
States economically. Japan was becoming the leader in many of the most
advanced sectors, such as semiconductors and computers. The Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), “the pilot agency,” appeared
to be guiding Japan to a glorious future. Traditional capitalism was
apparently losing out to a new planned economy. As US Vice President
Walter Mondale asked a group of American electrical workers, “What are
our kids supposed to do? Sweep up around the Japanese computers?” In
the 1980s the Reagan administration tried, in various ways, to contain
the Japanese threat. In a preview of the present situation with regard to
China, Tokyo was encouraged to let the yen appreciate, pressure was
applied to open the Japanese market, Japan was more or less forced to
accept voluntary export restraints on cars, machine tools, and other
goods. Nothing seemed to really work, although the United States did
rebound technologically. In the 1970s Japan actually surpassed the
United States in per capita income, something which is impossible for
China in the foreseeable future.8
Then, in the early 1990s, when its future appeared particularly bright
to so many, Japan suffered serious setbacks. The predictions about Japan
becoming Number One and overtaking the United States were silenced.
MITI was doing nothing right. It turned out that the Japanese economy
was not so planned after all. In 2003 the country finally seemed to be on
the way out of its economic problems. This did not last long, however.
The economic crisis after 2007 hit Japan more severely than almost any
other major power. It had long had the second largest economy in the
world, but in 2010 it was surpassed by China; and although their
economies were only one-third the size of the US economy, Japan was
now clearly behind the US on a per capita basis as well. The bad years
had taken their toll: Japan’s debt was more than twice the size of its
GDP, in part the legacy of huge public works projects that had long
fueled the politics of Japanese governments. No Great Power had such
enormous debts as Japan. Such a large debt was only possible because it
was owed almost exclusively to Japanese savers still willing to make the
necessary investment, not to the outside world. Deflation made the debt
even more troublesome and was also a great problem in itself.
Among Japan’s more structural problems the rapidly aging population
stood out. No Great Power has as old a population as Japan, and the
imbalance would grow dramatically in the next decades. The country’s
population is expected to fall from 127 million now to 90 million in
2055. About 40 percent of the population will be over 65. The labor
force will shrink greatly. This combination of rapid aging and a smaller
labor force threatened the country’s public finances dramatically. Old
people are expensive. Japanese education was impressive in many ways,
and spending on education and research was among the highest in the
world. Its scientists even won a fair number of Nobel science prizes. Its
leading companies were well known for their high quality. But Japan
suffered from a lack of appreciation of the importance of creativity at
the highest levels. In the final analysis, creativity meant going beyond
the past, even rebelling against it, a concept that was difficult for most
Japanese to understand.9
The Japanese, who clung to the popular myth of their nation as
uniformly middle class, were shocked to discover that the country’s
poverty rate, at 15.7 percent, was close to the 17.1 percent of the United
States, which allegedly represented a more ruthless capitalist model.10
Women were discriminated against in many different ways, and breaking
through the “bamboo ceiling” was a slow process. As a consequence
many women married late or not at all. The banking sector badly needed
reform, but it came only slowly. The pride of the country—the car
companies—also ran into problems. No sooner had Toyota become the
world’s largest car company than it had to recall large numbers of the
cars produced.
Japan’s economic problems were closely related to its political ones.
In its heyday the Japanese model of close cooperation among politicians,
bureaucrats, and businessmen had been seen as the recipe for the
country’s success. Resources were allegedly not wasted, as was
presumably the case in more purely capitalist countries. There may
possibly have been some truth to this, but over time this cooperation
deteriorated into conformism and corruption. Reform became
increasingly difficult, and even reformist prime minister Junichiro
Koizumi achieved only rather limited results. The Liberal–Democrats,
who had ruled Japan virtually without interruption for more than 50
years, were in an ever deeper crisis. Again, the opposition Democrats,
who triumphed in the August 2009 elections, promised reform. Very
little actually happened. In a consensus-oriented society such as Japan’s
it was exceedingly difficult to bring about substantial reform to deal
with Japan’s deep economic and political problems. Expectations of
dramatic change were soon downplayed. In June 2010 the new prime
minister, Yokio Hatoyama, resigned after some turbulent months in
office, leaving the crisis as deep as ever. New Japanese governments
now came and went in rapid order. Japan had six prime ministers in five
years. It was obvious that such governments were utterly unable to deal
with the many problems Japan was now facing.
In the past, when crises were sufficiently deep—such as after Japan’s
opening to the world in the 1850s, after 1945 and the end of the Second
World War, and even, in a much more limited form, after the oil crisis of
the 1970s—Japan had been able to undertake large-scale reform. Then
change had been both comprehensive and swift. The problem now seems
to be that while there is a definite need for change, not everybody
to be that while there is a definite need for change, not everybody
recognizes this. There is no consensus in favor of dramatic reform. Some
parts of the Japanese economy still function reasonably well; many earn
a very good living. There was no total collapse as there had been in the
1850s and after 1945. While the triple catastrophe of
earthquake/tsunami/nuclear reactor problems in March 2011 threatened
to set Japan back considerably, at least in the short run, it was possible
that the crisis would also provide the shock that could finally bring
about a new reform period.
Japan still limited its defense spending to 1 percent of GNP, although
this included some statistical tricks to keep it under the limit. As long as
the economy had grown, this 1 percent had meant a rapid increase. With
no or only modest growth, the situation changed. Japan’s will to play an
international role outside the economic field was also limited. Only very
slowly did it agree to take on international missions and, when it
reluctantly did, everything possible was done to restrict the loss of life,
including undertaking few if any real military activities. Japan’s
lingering unwillingness to deal with the legacy of the Second World War
still harmed its standing with neighbors China and South Korea. The lack
of support in its own region, and the uniqueness of Japanese culture,
limited Japan’s popularity in many parts of the world. Its discrimination
against non-Japanese groups, some of whom had lived in Japan for a
very long time, did not give a good impression of the country abroad. In
a world of growing global interdependence, pluralism was not something
the Japanese really appreciated, much less welcomed. They remained
convinced that only the Japanese could understand Japan and point the
way forward. It was unclear what Japan’s message to the world was. For
some time now it had been hard work and material rewards, but despite
the Japanese still working fairly hard, although not quite as hard as they
used to, the results were not as impressive as they had been in the past.
In a few areas, however, such as consumer technology, automobiles and,
increasingly limited kinds of food, Japan exerted considerable influence.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

For some years after the turn of the millennium the European Union
(EU) was seen by many as the most likely challenger to the United
States. The book titles told the story: The European Superpower: The New
Europe and its Challenge to America; Why Europe will run the 21st Century;
The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American
Supremacy.11 In 2011 the EU had a population that was two hundred
million larger than that of the United States. It also had a combined GDP
slightly larger than that of the US. The EU was trying to develop
approaches to international relations based on norms and rules that were
attractive to states and individuals around the world. Over time the EU
had managed to combine geographical widening and a deepening of
content. It had gone from six to nine to twelve, and then on to twenty-
five and the current twenty-seven members. Additional states were
hoping to get in. European integration had started with limited
economic cooperation, then evolved into a full-fledged single integrated
market with a common currency for many of its members, and finally a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), now renamed the Common
European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).
The achievements were there for all to see. From a long-term
 The achievements were there for all to see. From a long-term
historical perspective, against the background of two world wars with
their focus on Europe, it was difficult to believe that European
integration had developed as far as it had. Europe had become an ever-
growing “zone of peace.” Germany and France had become each other’s
closest partners; democracy had been consolidated in the Southern
European countries with an authoritarian past; at the end of the Cold
War Europe had become “whole and free” and almost all the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe had been accepted as members of the EU.
The requirement was that the new members become fully democratic
and market-oriented. In the future, Turkey could become the EU’s bridge
between Europe and Asia, Christians and Muslims, although this
prospect was highly controversial within the EU.
These achievements were frequently underestimated by impatient
people, such as Americans and journalists. Yet the EU had obvious
limitations. Its CESDP was more a proclamation of hope than a reality.
The ever-growing number of members had different views on virtually
any major foreign policy question, whether this was the EU’s
relationship with the United States or Russia, or the use of force in
various parts of the world. While in the economic area the EU had gone
far beyond the confines of the nation state, in the security area and in
the inhabitants’ own personal identification the nation state remained
strong.
After the end of the Cold War defense budgets in Europe had declined
in real terms, with a partial exception only for Britain and France, the
two countries with the biggest military capacity. While there was a
definite will to increase the EU’s role in the world, the willingness to
increase defense expenditures to achieve this goal was virtually non-
existent. The EU countries combined actually had a larger military force
than the United States, but with twenty-seven national armies, twenty-
three air forces, and twenty navies— most of them still being rather
national in their orientation—the EU’s military strength was much
smaller than that of the US. The EU did not live up to the various
military objectives adopted for its force projection, and in fact had major
difficulties undertaking any really significant military operations outside
the borders of the member countries. The operations the EU countries
did carry out were small in size and limited in scope; the bigger ones,
such as in Bosnia and in Afghanistan, were undertaken in cooperation
with NATO.12
Still, Robert Kagan’s famous phrase that “Americans are from Mars,
Europeans are from Venus” is clearly overstated.13 America itself had
often been reluctant to intervene, as could be seen in anything from its
traditional isolationism, including the events leading up to the outbreak
of the Second World War both in Asia and in Europe, to Bill Clinton’s
doubts about Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Correspondingly, while the EU
countries were spending less than half of what the US was spending on
defense, and even less on research and development, in combination the
EU countries were spending more on defense than China, Russia, India,
and Brazil did together.14 Despite the EU’s many crises, the Europeans
were slowly doing more, even in the way of military operations. It was
very easy to underestimate the effects of the many small steps taken.
(See Table 3.)
If the United States wanted military partners—and it did—the most
reliable and effective ones were still to be found in Europe. And, in
fairness, almost to the end the Bush administration had been opposed to
EU countries carrying out military operations on their own. Everything
should be done inside NATO. Even the Clinton administration had
warned against “duplication, decoupling, and discrimination” within
NATO.15 At the very end, however, the Bush administration had changed
its tone. When America was so hard-pressed it was obviously a good idea
for Europe to do more. The Obama administration felt the same to the
extent that it was increasingly frustrated by the slow pace of the EU’s
efforts to strengthen its foreign policy role. There was little or no risk
that the EU would gang up on the United States anyway. Too many
members were too close to, and too dependent on, Washington for that
to happen. In 2009 France even rejoined NATO’s integrated military
structure. However, in Libya in the spring of 2011, France and Britain
took the lead in going to war against Gaddafi’s regime in support of the
beleaguered Libyan opposition. The US, so different from in previous
crises, was determined to remain in the background. Germany and many
other EU countries stayed out of the war. In September, Gaddafi had to
give up power. It was far from clear what policies the new government
would pursue.
Time and again the EU countries would stress the value of non-
military means. Most important, inside Europe, the war-torn continent,
the EU represented an ever-widening zone of peace. War among the
member countries was unimaginable. This was something dramatically
new in Europe’s history. By holding out prospects for membership the
EU could exert major influence on prospective new members. The
problem was getting new members to live up to their obligations after
they had joined. Thus, there was a widespread impression in many EU
countries that Rumania and Bulgaria, in particular, had been admitted
too early. With the EU now taking in few new members this instrument
was also losing its force.

Table 3. The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2010

Spending figures are in US$, at current prices and exchange rates.
Countries are ranked according to military spending calculated using
market exchange rates (MEW). Figures for military spending calculated
using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates are also given.
 Many saw the EU as an increasingly separate pole in international
relations, stressing international cooperation and law, the limits of
national sovereignty, nonproliferation, trade liberalization, social justice,
and environmental action. This list was also clearly meant to
differentiate Europe from the United States. There was indeed support in
Europe, and elsewhere, for such notions. But the trouble was that the
most rapidly rising new states were even more nationalistic and state-
centered than the United States; they normally reacted against any form
of intervention from the outside, whether it fell under “the responsibility
to protect” or not; they were in favor of building up their own defenses
—for some of them this even included nuclear weapons; and they tended
to downplay their own contributions to alleviating climate concerns, or
promoting further trade liberalization. This certainly applied to China
and India, and largely even to South Africa and Brazil.16 None of the
BRIC countries supported Western military action against Libya in the
spring of 2011.
The EU countries combined gave much more development assistance
than did the United States; they also contributed significant forces to
peacekeeping after wars. Some talked about a division of labor, with the
US doing most of the fighting and the EU most of the reconstruction
after a war. There was a certain trend in this direction, but no clear-cut
division was possible. With so few resources for non-territorial defense,
and with very limited military integration, Europe’s relative role was
bound to be limited. It would also mean the continued dependence of
most EU countries on the United States. If the EU were to develop into a
new superpower, it could not continue to rely on the United States even
for its own protection, as was evident in the European desire to continue
the conventional American, and even nuclear, presence in Europe,
although in a much reduced form compared to the Cold War decades.
The EU also had problems with its engine. Franco–German
cooperation had been at the heart of Europe’s integration. The duo had
provided the necessary leadership on most occasions when integration
was advanced. Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, François
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl—even Jacques Chirac and Gerhard
Schrøder—had worked closely together, despite their differences. Nicolas
Sarkozy and Angela Merkel struggled more;17 their personalities simply
clashed, and the financial crisis exposed major differences in French and
German economic thinking. The chaos on the European side over the
Iraq War in 2003, and the collapse of the proposed European
Constitutional treaty a few years later, illustrated that Franco–German
leadership could take the EU only so far. In fact, a certain dissatisfaction
in other EU countries with this self-appointed Franco–German leadership
added to the difficulties.
On the other hand, it was difficult to see what the alternative was.
With its negative attitude to European political integration and to the
euro, Britain had to a large extent tied its own hands. Italian, Spanish,
and Polish claims to leadership made the situation even more
unresolved. This emphasis on the member states further illustrated the
limited competence of the EU Commission and the more supranational
bodies outside the traditional economic area, although the European
Parliament steadily increased its powers. The ultimate adoption of the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, after a second referendum in Ireland, finally gave
the EU a president and a foreign minister, although the official title of
the latter was the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.
But both the selection process and the individuals chosen underlined the
fact that the leading powers in the EU were not really going to yield to
Brussels; they preferred to keep control of security matters in their own
capitals, which was bound to limit the role of the EU. The number of top
politicians who abandoned a national career for Brussels was small,
politicians who abandoned a national career for Brussels was small,
particularly from the larger member countries.
The introduction of the euro had apparently gone remarkably well. It
soon became clear, however, that problems were emerging, although
they were offset by the general economic growth. Already debt-ridden
countries in the South could continue borrowing because of the low
interest rate they got in joining the euro. Even Germany and France
broke the rules of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact to keep deficits
down. In fighting the economic recession of 2008–11, most of the
initiative remained with the nation states. Only slowly did the EU come
to play a larger role. Most of the early crisis packages to stimulate
demand and avoid bankruptcy were worked out in the national capitals,
with the EU only augmenting and coordinating these.
With the huge new spending added to the already substantial debt
problems of some EU countries, particularly Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal, crises arose. The EU members had great difficulties coming up
with the necessary assistance for the most threatened countries. And
while the creditors deliberated— with Germany definitely in the lead,
working with France, and the European Central Bank (ECB) playing an
important role—the necessary economic packages to the debtors became
even larger. The situation appeared to require new levels of EU
solidarity, and strengthened powers for the authorities in Brussels, to
prevent similar situations happening again. Bigger loans were needed;
few yet talked about transferring tax money. A European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) was set up. If the strong Northern countries did
not support the weak Southern ones (and Ireland), the whole EU
structure could be in trouble. But why should Germans support Greeks
who retired at an earlier age than they did themselves (though the actual
difference in the retirement age was smaller than most Germans
thought)? Taxpayers in Germany were strongly opposed to bailing out
governments in the South that had shown such limited interest in
efficient tax collection. Spain and Italy feared that the contagion would
spread to them, as it actually did. In Greece there was a great deal of
opposition to the tough measures that had to be undertaken in return for
the loans. It was debatable whether they would actually take the
recommended medicine. With a Greek economy in recession, the loans
appeared unmanageable.18
In this situation, the EU either needed to move forward to new levels
of coordination, or the achievements of the past—in the form of the euro
—were threatened. That left Germany and the other creditors little
choice. Germany and the ECB again and again had to take the lead,
despite their natural caution, although there were certainly differences
between the two; they were sometimes backed by an impatient France,
with the EU Commission largely on the outside. Berlin insisted that, in
return, the debtors become more “German” in their economic policies.
Deficits had to be cut, state property sold off, wage indexation ended,
and the retirement age increased. Many members of the EU responded
negatively to these far-reaching recommendations, and compromises had
to be worked out.19 These developments also created tension between
those members of the EU that had adopted the euro and who made most
of the financial decisions, and those left on the outside.
The situation in North Africa in early 2011 presented similar
challenges to the EU. Thousands and thousands of refugees fled the
countries in turmoil. Many of these individuals came to an Italy that was
countries in turmoil. Many of these individuals came to an Italy that was
not in any way prepared to handle such large numbers. Many continued
on to France. Again, the dilemma was the same. Either the EU had to
handle the issue with some form of solidarity, or the whole 1985
Schengen Agreement for passport-free movement among the twenty-five
participating countries could be threatened.
In A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public
Spheres, Thomas Risse argued that the EU had indeed developed a sense
of community. “More than 50 percent of European citizens hold …
Europeanized national identities.”20 He also contended that a “common
communicative space” was developing. European media were discussing
the same issues at the same time in a common frame of reference. As
was clear from Risse’s own work, however, the importance of these
findings could easily be overstated. For most of the 50 percent their own
national identity came first; the European one a clear second. Forty
percent held exclusively national identities. In some EU countries, led by
Britain, they constituted a definite majority. As has been argued, this
was indeed a European “non-emotional identity,” as opposed to the
emotional identity attached to the nation states.21 On the issue of
communicative space it remained true that Europe had no common
language, although English was making good progress in this respect.
Media primarily had a national orientation. It may be true that certain
quality papers were discussing the same European issues, but this fact
did not really apply to television and tabloids. The attempt in the 1990s
to establish a truly European newspaper, The European, had failed
miserably. Sales dwindled and losses increased. With such a limited
sense of community, it remained difficult to see how the EU could make
further substantial progress toward integration.
 The EU was finding it difficult to go beyond what it had already
achieved in terms of integration. While, over several decades, it had
been able to combine geographical widening with a deepening content,
this was becoming increasingly difficult with twenty-seven members.
The members were just too many and too different. Virtually nobody
was prepared to make the big jump to a federalist structure. Helmut
Kohl had, in a way, been the last leading politician to even sketch that
goal.
The EU had to move on if it was going to solve the many substantial
problems it faced. The nation states had insisted on keeping control over
taxes and social benefits. Although, in theory, the EU had an integrated
labor market, in practice only a very small segment of workers moved
from one country to another. Some observers, particularly in the US, had
argued that monetary union under such circumstances was almost
impossible. In times of economic growth these structural problems were
hardly noticed. With the recession they became urgent. The spirit of
federalism was now virtually dead in Germany, but it was felt to be
impossible to give up the euro. This meant that integration had to be
continued in the form of additional financial contributions and new
legislation to introduce some European oversight of national economies
and avoid similar crises in the future.
To a lesser extent the same logic applied to the foreign and security
policy. With ever new crises coming up the EU had to continue to
respond; otherwise it would be giving up the effort to establish joint
policies. But the intervention in Libya in March 2011 showed an EU in
great disarray. France and Britain were now the two activists; Germany
wanted no military role whatsoever, and even abstained at the UN
Security Council, along with Russia and China, in giving the intervention
force a mandate. Among the smaller EU countries, some supported the
intervention, others did not. Britain and France were the two countries
that counted militarily; they were used to intervening. The economic
recession also stimulated further integration between the two countries.
Thus, in November 2010, financially hard-pressed Britain (under its new
Conservative–Liberal government) and France launched ambitious plans
for comprehensive military cooperation, including shared use of aircraft
carriers and a joint expeditionary force.22 However, this was more
cooperation between the two most important military powers in the EU,
than European integration as such. It also remained unclear exactly how
far this cooperation would actually go. In the past, French–British
military cooperation would have meant a major step forward for the EU;
now, however, Germany was becoming increasingly skeptical of any
such use of force.
There was little doubt that optimism concerning the EU’s prospects
was markedly declining. The emphasis was now definitely on the
problems of the EU, not on its possibilities. Would some countries simply
have to abandon the euro? There was little will to undertake further
constitutional reform, although the various economic measures would
sooner or later require such changes. Charles Kupchan, who had been
among the first observers to raise the EU to potential superpower status,
now predicted that “The European Union is dying—not a dramatic or
sudden death, but one so slow and steady that we may look across the
Atlantic one day soon and realize that the project of European
integration that we’ve taken for granted over the past half-century is no
more.” Others saw the EU becoming and behaving as a small power in
foreign policy, not exerting, and not really expecting to have, much
influence on the world’s basic security questions.23
Thus, the EU, as always, represented a work in progress. It would
never reach the levels of integration of the United States. The European
nation states had existed for hundreds of years; they were still the
primary unit in the governing of the continent. In 1998, Jacques Chirac
had stated that “we (are) not in the process of building the United States
of Europe, but the united Europe of States.”
There was still considerable truth to the saying that the EU was “an
economic giant, but a political and military dwarf.” It was also often
treated as such by Russia and China, and even by the United States. Even
internal EU documents stressed that the EU could only deal with its
strategic partners “when the EU becomes a ‘strategic’ actor itself, i.e.
develops a true strategic culture and global policies.”24 Many questioned
the EU’s lack of focus. And it turned out that in 2010 EU foreign
ministers had only discussed China’s international position once in the
last four years. Under such circumstances, there was little reason for
China to take the EU particularly seriously on the foreign policy front, as
opposed to the economic side.25 Instead of Germany working to give the
EU a seat on the UN Security Council, Berlin pressed for a seat of its
own; so the EU would be represented by three national countries.
But the EU had made remarkable progress in terms of integration.
One step back most often led to two steps forward. From a historical
perspective it was very impressive indeed that European countries had
been able to reach such a level of integration. The EU had integrated
Western Europe, helped consolidate democracy in Southern Europe, and
made Europe whole and free through the inclusion of Central and
made Europe whole and free through the inclusion of Central and
Eastern Europe. Certain mechanisms left it virtually no alternative to
continuing integration; otherwise there might be a partial collapse. And,
after the United States, the EU countries still represented the second
most powerful unit in the world, but definitely not the most dynamic
one.

CHINA’S FUTURE

So, in 2011, China was undoubtedly perceived as the main challenger to

the United States. China had much going for it. Since the change in
economic policy started in 1978, China had experienced economic
growth not seen before in history. The new policy had surpassed the
wildest expectations and the most optimistic of Five-Year Plans. Deng
Xiaoping had stressed the policy’s improvisational nature—China would
“cross the river by feeling for stones.” His program was based on “the
four modernizations” (industry, agriculture, science and technology, and
national defense.) The possible “fifth modernization” (of the political
system) was left out. Deng’s overall guideline was announced in his
famous “24-character statement”: “Observe carefully; secure our
position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacity and bide our time;
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”26 For
decades these guidelines would be followed.
Despite definite doubts about the details of official Chinese statistics,
there could be no question about the exceptional nature of this growth.
On a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis China’s growth was even more
sensational. Although PPP is useful in measuring local living standards,
particularly in less developed countries, it is generally seen to make less
sense in comparisons of international economies. It is also difficult to
establish the many numbers needed to make meaningful PPP
comparisons. Most statistics are therefore based on current exchange
rates. This method offers better indications of a country’s international
purchasing power and relative economic strength. The US position was
roughly the same under both sets of calculations. In addition, many
observers argued that China’s currency was under-valued by anywhere
from 15 to 40 percent. If this were to be corrected, its GDP would
increase correspondingly, without the country’s real living standards
being directly affected at all. (See Tables 4 and 5.)
Year after year, decade after decade, China’s GDP appeared to grow
by 10 percent or more. In 2007 the size of China’s economy surpassed
that of Germany and became the third largest in the world. In 2009
China also surpassed Germany as the world’s biggest exporter. It was the
second biggest importer after the United States, and was overtaking the
US as the world’s leading manufacturer and producer of climate gases.
Then, in the second quarter of 2010, China overtook Japan as the second
largest economy in the world.
As with Japan and the EU, the book titles told it all: The New Asian
Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East; When China
Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western
World; The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will
Dominate the Twenty-First Century.27 Growth curves were extended into
the future, and depending on exactly what numbers you put in, China’s
GDP would surpass that of the United States sometime in the 2020s, if
not earlier. If the Chinese and American economies continued to grow at
the same pace as over the past 10 years (10.5 and 1.7 percent
respectively), and nothing else changed, China’s GDP would overtake
America’s in 2022.28 With virtually no growth in the US, this date was
constantly being brought forward, first to 2019, then even to 2016.
According to one PPP estimate, China’s GDP had actually surpassed that
of the United States in 2010.29

Table 4. List of countries by GDP (Nominal)

 This transfer of leadership was far from certain, however, as China’s
GDP today, in market exchange terms, is still only 40 percent that of the
US. And it should be remembered that if and when China’s GDP does
surpass that of the US, China will still be a relatively poor country. In
fact, with a population more than four times that of the United States,
per capita income would be only one-fourth of what it would be in the
US. Despite the tremendous progress made, China today is still relatively
poor. On a list of countries ranked by GDP per capita, China comes in at
around number 90, roughly at the same level as Ecuador, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Albania, even in PPP terms. Although there are a few
countries in the world with a higher GDP per person than the United
States—such as Qatar, Luxembourg, Singapore, Norway, and Brunei—
none of them counts in the Great Power game.

Table 5. GDP (PPP) per capita list

 The economic crisis of 2007–10 promised to speed up China’s rise
considerably. Growth fell noticeably, but only down to 6–8 percent for a
year or two. The government worked out substantial infrastructure
packages to pick up the pace again, and China was soon back to its
normal rapid rate. In the United States there was virtually no growth at
all until well into 2011. The US was also becoming increasingly
dependent on China to finance its two huge deficits, in the federal
budget and in its current accounts. China’s growth had been facilitated
by the open American market. In turn, its huge surplus financed huge US
deficits. China’s savings paid for America’s debts. As long as America’s
growth had been strong, the system worked reasonably well; with
limited growth, America had to work harder to attract China’s money.
China was now suggesting that the end of the dollar’s domination might
be approaching. There could be no doubt about the basic direction:
China was rapidly becoming a key economic player.
Many other factors also worked in China’s favor. Its population, at
more than 1.3 billion, was still the largest in the world, although it
would soon be surpassed by that of India. McKinsey projected that by
2030 there will be 221 cities in China with a population over one
million; there are ten such cities in the United States today.30 Over a 50-
year period, life expectancy had increased from the 40s to the 70s. The
population is expected to peak at around 1.4 billion, but it will then
decline due to the one-child policy. In fact, from a long-term perspective,
the rapidly aging Chinese population will not be conducive to economic
growth. The prospects are that China is likely to be one of the few
countries where the population becomes old before it becomes rich; it
will turn from a relatively young country to an old one. In 25 years’ time
there will be only three workers to each retired person; with a
retirement age of 60 (and in many cases even lower), this is bound to
present problems, despite pensions being small, and in many cases non-
existent, which will of course become a problem in itself. The number of
people over 65 will rise to 300 million by 2050—a threefold increase.
The preference for boys meant that the current ratio between male and
female babies is 119 to 100; there are 32 million more males under the
age of 20. This is bound to result in a great deal of frustration.31
Geographically, China’s location is favorable as the country has easy
access to important regions such as Central and South (East) Asia, as
well as the Pacific. It was both a land power and a sea power, with the
advantages that brought to the country.32 From about 1500 BC, China
had a centralized, rather unified culture, so unlike the diversity of India.
For centuries it also had a highly developed culture, in many ways
leading the world in inventions and sophistication, although signs of
decline could be seen as early as the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–
1644), and then multiplying under the Qing or Manchu dynasties (1644–
1912). More than 90 percent of the population is Han Chinese. Although
Han is sometimes rather broadly interpreted, this fact still clearly
strengthens the unity of the country.
After the turbulence of the 1970s, and even 1989, China’s political
leadership now appears quite unified. The torch of leadership was
peacefully passed from one generation to the next. Rapid economic
growth, and the stress on Chinese nationalism and culture, had made the
Chinese rather proud of their country’s achievements. The Communist
Party emphasized its ability to reform itself from within, taking into
account the interests of ever wider groups of the people, including even
those of leading business people.33 The Olympics in Beijing in 2008, and
the World Expo in Shanghai in 2010, represented great triumphs.
Historically, the Chinese were used to seeing themselves as the center of
the universe—as the leaders in East Asia (if not the world), with various
vassals paying different forms of tribute to the ruler in Beijing, and with
relationships varying from total subjugation to equality. “Barbarian”
superiority did not come naturally to the Chinese;34 now China seemed
to be regaining its traditional historic role.
China was also increasing its defense budget rapidly. While the US
defense budget had increased by 81.3 percent from 2001 to 2010, the
Chinese budget had increased by 189 percent, faster than any other
Great Power. China had the world’s second largest defense budget. It
grew even more rapidly than the country’s economy. China had a small,
but modern, nuclear force. It had demonstrated its capacity to shoot
down satellites in space. And its ambitious space program aimed to put a
man on the moon. China was developing a jet fighter with stealth
technology, though doubts were expressed in the US about exactly how
“stealthy” this technology actually was. Its navy was beginning to appear
further and further out in the Pacific, even in waters it had not been in
before, at least not for many centuries and in such numbers. China was
trying, although with considerable difficulty, to develop a modern
aircraft carrier. It launched its first one in 2011. Its armed forces were
the largest in the world, with around two million troops, although they
were being reduced and modernized. While the role of its armed forces
had long been to defend “Chinese territory,” it was now, more broadly,
to protect “Chinese interests.” China took part in UN-led operations.
 Again, there was talk of China surpassing the United States in defense
spending in a few decades’ time, but the military gap was much larger in
America’s favor than the economic one. After all, China was still
spending only about 2 percent of GNP on defense, more than the
European average, but less than Britain and France, at least until now,
and quite a bit less than the US at around 4–5 percent. China was
actually spending only one-sixth of what the US was spending on
defense. Its nuclear force was probably too small to survive an American
first strike. The United States had 11 aircraft carrier groups and many
other forms of offensive power. It could project its force virtually
anywhere in the world. As Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates stated in
May 2010 when concern was expressed about the state of the US Navy:
its displacement exceeds “at least the next 13 navies in the world
combined, of which 11 are our allies or partners.”35
While the United States had allies and bases all over the world, China
had few, if any, traditional allies and true bases abroad—though it was
developing port facilities in a few countries such as Pakistan, Burma, and
Sri Lanka. China did not really have the capabilities for global power
projection, at least not yet, as was seen in the considerable problems it
had developing its first aircraft carrier, and its lack of long-range
bombers. In August 2010 even the Pentagon concluded that “China’s
ability to sustain military power at a distance, today, remains limited.”36
It was, however, an increasingly important regional actor, also militarily.
And the Pacific, particularly the Western part, could no longer simply be
considered an American lake.
Commercially, and in part diplomatically—but not militarily—China
was becoming an active player virtually all over the world. Its rapidly
expanding economy required immense resources, particularly energy,
though China had vast coal and even oil reserves. Still, this was not in
any way enough, and even factories had to close due to the lack of
energy. China had been an important oil exporter; it started importing
oil in 1993, and its production now represents less than half of its
consumption. Energy needs dictated much of China’s foreign policy.
Demand for energy in China is expected to rise by 75 percent by 2035,
and China will then account for 22 percent of world demand for energy,
up from 17 percent currently.37 It imported more oil from the Middle
East than did the United States.
China’s huge current accounts surplus was invested in a rapidly
increasing number of countries all over the world. Even in Europe China
was becoming an important economic actor in virtually all countries,
from Greece to Iceland. Beijing’s stress on non-intervention in domestic
affairs made it popular, not only among relative outcasts such as North
Korea, Iran, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Venezuela, and others, but also
in many other countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While,
traditionally, China played no significant role in Latin America, it is now
Brazil and Chile’s largest trade partner, although it is still far behind the
US in total trade and investment in Latin America. Even in Antarctica
China’s new engagement showed.38 Its rapid economic growth made it
an attractive model in the many countries that longed for better living
conditions. For some Third World leaders the control exerted by the
Party was also a positive feature of China’s growth model.
Still, in 2009, Chinese companies invested 48 billion dollars overseas,
around 1 percent of China’s GNP; US companies, on the other hand,
invested 340 billion dollars, around 2.4 percent of its GNP. In total
accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI) there was still no
comparison: 211 billion dollars for China, as opposed to 3.245 trillion
for the US.39 Even Mao’s China had become involved in the foreign aid
business in the 1960s, particularly in Africa. Now China was becoming a
much more important actor in this field. Its rapidly growing foreign aid
was perceived quite positively, but it was still quite small compared to
Western aid. Thus, in 2006, China’s aid to Africa amounted to half a
billion dollars; aid from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries to 30 billion. China later promised to
double its aid.40 Some of the Chinese projects were remarkably
successful. The Chinese were also seen as a useful antidote to excessive
dependence on the West. But the number of negative reports was also
increasing: the Chinese put their own interests first, were too demanding
as employers, did not respect local customs, brought in too many
Chinese at the expense of local labor, and so on.
China also had a certain measure of “soft power.” Features of its
culture were exported to other parts of the world—arts, medicine,
cuisine, sports, martial arts, and even language—as Chinese became
more popular. Beijing worked hard through 24-hour news channels,
news agencies, newspapers, and a rapidly increasing number of
Confucius Institutes in cities around the world, to strengthen support for
China’s case in a wider sense. Respect for family, and even for the state,
was appreciated in many parts of the world. Most important, again, was
China’s economic success. A “Beijing consensus” was allegedly spreading
around the developing world, and the Chinese growth model was
proving its superiority. The country’s favorability ratings increased
dramatically in the years of George W. Bush—less so under Obama—and
frequently surpassed those of the United States, not only in Africa, but
also in some Asian, but only a few European, countries.41
Chinese culture was in many ways unique, and not as easily
transferable as American culture and politics, or even Soviet culture had
temporarily been. China’s neo-Confucianism is rather diverse, but its
present emphasis on obedience to authority and its anti-democratic vein
is, after all, based on the country’s own traditions. But its emphasis on
meritocracy and harmony probably has a wider international appeal. On
the whole, neo-Confucianism probably evoked sympathy in some parts
of the world, but even more opposition. In Beijing’s world view strong
elements of ethno-centrism existed. China was the center; the rest of us
were “barbarians.” Beneath the surface of formal equality, even
traditional elements of racism could be found in the Chinese population,
primarily directed against black people. It was very difficult to become a
naturalized Chinese citizen. In a world where the status of women was
rapidly being upgraded, despite official strictures Chinese women were
lagging behind, particularly in politics—less so in economic life. Beijing’s
insistence on non-intervention and national sovereignty might be
attractive to many, but the question remained of how effective such an
ideology would be in coping with the many challenges that could only
be addressed at the global level, such as the environment, terrorism,
disease, and even good governance.
Soft power is a popular concept, but often difficult to relate to other
forms of power. Most countries of the world want to modernize and this
often includes adopting the technology of the West and many aspects of
its culture. Yet, cell phones, Coca-Cola, and blue jeans do not necessarily
lead to human rights and a Western political orientation. Many
countries, from China to Iran, prove the point. No one could, however,
be certain of the borderlines. Even nationalistic Chinese youth argued,
with reference to the United States: “But we can’t do what they do
culturally: produce things like Tom and Jerry cartoons, Transformers,
Avatar, Inception, iPhones, Barbies. America has things we really, really
like, on a cultural level.”42
China shared borders with fourteen countries. Historically there had
been many border disputes. Now, however, it had sorted out most of
these disputes, including the ones with Russia that had led to such
serious conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. China acted quite reasonably in
solving these disputes, getting only 6 percent of the disputed territory
with Nepal, 8 percent with Burma, and 29 percent with Mongolia. It was
showing a great deal of interest in promoting cross-border networks,
although from a position of strength.43 The bitter conflict with India
over substantial territories remained, however, preventing full
rapprochement between the two countries; and there is conflict over the
Paracel (with Taiwan and Vietnam), the Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea (with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei), and the Senkaku or Diaoyutai islands (with Japan). Chinese
commentators began to describe the South China Sea as one of its “core
interests,” on a par with Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet.44 China was
clearly on the offensive even in the East China and Yellow seas. In some
of the island cases codes of conduct promoting peaceful solutions to limit
conflict were attempted, but these were not really successful.
Occasionally rather difficult incidents occurred which fired up public
opinion, both in China and in the other countries involved. The issues
involved not only ownership of the islands, but also control over sea
lanes and potentially large reserves of oil and natural gas. China showed
little willingness to compromise on these; neither did most of the other
states involved. The US insisted on open shipping lanes, here as
elsewhere.
A steep rise such as China’s had to have repercussions for existing
alliances and loyalties. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of China
were important factors behind the rapprochement that took place,
starting in the 1990s, between the United States and India. Some of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries—such as
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Singapore—strengthened their ties with
Washington. They were particularly concerned about China’s attempts to
reinforce its role in the South China Sea, and encouraged the US Navy to
show the American flag even there to counter any idea that the South
China Sea was Chinese.
Allies in the area—Japan, and to some extent South Korea—moved
even closer to the US, in part influenced by the increasingly worrisome
situation in North Korea.45 However, in South Korea, and even in Japan,
foreign policy conclusions were also influenced by left–right political
divisions, though in 2011 this factor appeared to diminish because of the
seriousness of the outside threat. The left became less critical of the
United States. In diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea, China’s role was
crucial. Here the US and China cooperated to some extent. Both were
concerned about North Korea developing its own nuclear weapons and
means of delivery, but Beijing was much more protective of the
continued existence of the North Korean regime than was Washington.
And again, if proof were needed, North Korea’s stubbornness illustrated
that national and local factors frequently prevailed over Great Power
considerations.
Few, if any, countries tried to actively create a balance against China.
Not even the United States attempted to do this. Elements of
containment and accommodation were clearly found alongside each
other. Virtually all countries wanted good relations with the United
States and China at the same time, for obvious economic, political, and
military reasons. Since China was definitely rising, most countries in the
region increasingly appreciated the United States providing some form of
counterbalance. If forced to choose, which they were not, the guess was
that some of the countries in Southeast Asia would probably opt for
China.46 Japan and South Korea of course already had their alliances
with the US.
The rise of China to the status it had previously enjoyed had
frequently been predicted, but something had always happened in the
past to prevent it from truly happening. It is impossible to be precise
about the future. My own guess is that the momentum in China’s
development is so dynamic that in some years’ time its economy will
become the largest in the world. From a long-term historical perspective
that will appear quite dramatic. The United States has, after all, had the
largest economy in the world since around 1870. However, it is doubtful
that China will then be able to move on to challenge the United States
for the overall leadership position. China will still be lagging far behind
the United States in military strength, in the wealth of its citizens on a
per capita basis, in the number and strength of its allies, and in the
attractiveness of its culture. Furthermore, in the long run, China is facing
serious structural problems that will have to be addressed if its rapid
growth in virtually all categories is to continue. It is far from clear that
the country will be able to address these deficiencies in a satisfactory
way.
There would seem to be three primary challenges to China’s long-term
rise to superpower status: the nature of the political system, China’s
ethnic–national composition, and the many tensions in China’s economic
policies.
First, China’s political history combines long periods of great stability
with various forms of outburst. The long-cherished American dream of
the rise of a friendly China was crushed by the Communist Revolution of
1949. Under communism the swings of the pendulum have been wide,
not to say wild. The Soviet model was tried; Mao’s dramatic experiments
ended in total failure. The fact that they had been tried at all said a lot
about the unpredictability of China. The emphasis on economic growth
has now been pursued for more than three decades, but has led to
periodic tensions within the Communist Party, particularly in 1989.
Then the leadership had been badly divided until Deng Xiaoping had
taken command and clamped down both on leadership division and
popular demonstrations.
The question of the long-term political legitimacy of the regime is still
unresolved. The Communist Party remains firmly in power, but the
communist fervor is largely gone. Although the authorities treasure
“shengshi,” the combination of peace and prosperity, it is evident that
while China has now achieved material prosperity, there is not really
much social peace. The overall priority is now to make money. As Deng
had famously declared, “I don’t care whether a cat is black or white. As
long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.” Or, as another less prominent
leader had stated even more bluntly: “We are the Communist Party and
we will decide what communism means.”47
The regime undoubtedly gained legitimacy through the fast growth
and the pride that most Chinese took in the country’s rapidly increasing
influence. The Party was also trying, with some success, to co-opt the
rising new elites. But changes were being made with or without the
permission of the authorities. The government could limit the role of
Google, but not really of the Internet in general. Groups that had been
frowned upon, such as homosexuals and lesbians, increasingly appeared
in the open.
The uprising in 1989 had involved many different cities; it was still a
festering sore. The communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union had all collapsed. This made a great impression on the Chinese
leadership who were determined to avoid any such outcome. Political
reform was put on hold; virtually all the emphasis went into the
economic side. Yet, ever new dissidents appeared on the scene. In other
rapidly industrializing countries in Asia, in the long term economic
growth had almost inevitably strengthened political democracy. Would
not this happen at some stage even in China?
The authorities in Beijing displayed considerable nervousness about
the political situation. The self-confidence of the leaders was perhaps not
that great after all. Dissidents and activists of various kinds, including
the religious Falun Gong, were given long prison sentences or sent into
exile; all the various means of communication were closely supervised,
although not always successfully. In December 2008 Charter 08 was
although not always successfully. In December 2008 Charter 08 was
publicized and signed by hundreds of critics of the Chinese regime, and
also by ordinary citizens. It openly advocated a constitutional
democracy. The awarding in 2010 of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu
Xiaobo, who had been sentenced to eleven years in prison, led the
Chinese authorities to intervene against many human rights activists.
Every effort was made to encourage foreign ambassadors to stay away
from the Nobel ceremony in Oslo, with only limited success. The prize
clearly touched a raw nerve.
The number of “mass incidents” told of a great deal of restlessness in
the country. This number, as reported by the authorities themselves,
increased rapidly to more than 87,000 in 2005. Numbers for later years
were withheld, but a study indicates that it may have jumped to 280,000
in 2010.48 Most of these protests were local and reflected accidents of
several different sorts, property disputes, closed factories, increased
prices. It did not remain out of the question, however, that the protests
could coalesce and become more comprehensive in scope and better
organized. Would not that restlessness only increase as the results of
economic growth were more and more taken for granted, and as
expectations had a tendency to increase even more quickly than
economic results?49
Because of the one-child policy China would also face serious
problems, with a rapidly aging population and possibly also with the
spoiled “little emperors” (the result of policy), as these youngsters were
entering society with high expectations. They were individualistic, merit-
focused and consumer-oriented. More and more of the many university
graduates were having problems finding suitable jobs. Later, many of
these spoiled children would have to support their parents in the care
the latter required in their old age, since the government did so little in
this field. In 2011 this private care was even made into a legal
obligation. This was indeed, in Mao’s terms, “managing contradictions.”
Recent research indicates that even if the authorities were to reverse the
one-child policy, it is now so ingrained that it will be hard to change. It
now represents the typical drop in birthrates that occurs as societies
modernize.50
If major political change were to take place in China, many assumed
it would come as a result of pressure from below. The masses would
force the leadership to modify its policies. Yet this was not necessarily
so; it could also happen because debates at the top of the political
hierarchy would become so heated that one or more of the leaders
would be tempted to take this debate to the masses in some way. This
had been one aspect of the Cultural Revolution. It was of course possible
that one-party rule would continue into an indefinite future. But why
would China remain a permanent exception to the general trend of the
people ultimately insisting on taking control in some form? In 2011 even
the Arab Middle East, which had been one of the other major
authoritarian holdouts in the world, was affected by large-scale protests
and even revolutions in several countries. The Chinese had been much
more economically successful than the Arabs, but they still had
important features in common: corruption, growing inequality, and a
lack of political reform.51
Second, another major challenge related to the fact that although
(allegedly) more than 90 percent of the population is Han Chinese, close
to 10 percent from 55 different nationalities is a vast number with a
total population of more than 1,300 million. Beijing is very concerned
about the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet. Depending on the exact
definition of empire used, China’s role in these provinces may be
considered imperial. As had happened after 1949 in Inner Mongolia,
Beijing was encouraging thousands and thousands of Han Chinese to
move to the two provinces to shift the population balance against the
minorities. Ethnic–national disputes fused with an economic growth that
easily disturbed native cultures, although this growth was still
considerably slower than along the coast. The outbursts in the two
provinces were treated with great severity by the Chinese authorities,
but they seemed to flare up again at irregular intervals.
In this respect 2008 and 2009 were bad years for the Chinese
authorities. The widespread rebellion in Tibet in 2008 illustrated that
Tibetans had not become reconciled to China’s rule, despite economic
growth and the massive influx of Han Chinese into Tibet. The Dalai
Lama was still a highly revered person in most of Tibet. The Uighur
uprising in Xinjiang in 2009 was even more threatening. It was more
violent, had connections with Muslim groups in other neighboring
countries, and was better organized, despite repressive measures
undertaken by the authorities.
Third, although the Chinese economic model has produced great
results, the big question remains: can these results really be expected to
continue in the future? Experience tells us that economic growth lines
cannot be extended indefinitely. In the Soviet Union growth had been
extremely high for several decades, until it slowed down dramatically in
the 1970s and stopped entirely in the 1980s. The same had happened in
Japan, where the growth of the 1950s–1980s had been replaced by slow
Japan, where the growth of the 1950s–1980s had been replaced by slow
and no growth since the 1990s. In less mature economies dramatic
results could be achieved by relatively simple means. The transition from
agriculture to industry almost always led to high growth. In mature
economies it was much more difficult to maintain such high growth
rates. This was particularly the case as the service sector replaced
agriculture and even industry as the leading one.
As its economy grew from a relatively low base, and as it was no
longer making up for the dramatic setbacks of Mao’s long era—the Great
Leap Forward (1958–61), and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76)—
China’s growth would also be harder to achieve. The country had
actually been lagging far behind the modern tigers—South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Now it was beginning to catch up
with them. No one could answer the question of how far into the future
the growth lines could be extended. Japan’s history provided a warning.
After 40 years of explosive growth, the country’s economy had ground to
a screeching halt. Models that work exceedingly well at a certain level of
development may work less well, or even be counterproductive, at a
higher level. Thus, the same factors, whether they be elite cooperation in
Japan or Confucianism in China, may in fact explain both rise and fall,
although at different stages of development.52
Growth also created its own problems. In 2010–11 signs of stress were
growing in the Chinese economy: many banks were experiencing
problems, bubbles existed, particularly in the real estate market, with a
growing number of properties remaining unsold, and, most ominously,
inflation was definitely picking up and stayed high even after certain
corrective actions had been taken. The increase in food prices was
particularly worrisome. The price of Chinese goods sold abroad was
going up considerably. This was bound to have a negative impact on the
export volume.53 The Chinese authorities were beginning to address
these problems, but priority was still given to the rapid rise in
production, particularly in exports. The list of environmental problems
was long and growing: mining accidents were frequent, water supplies
were worryingly low (although they were even lower in India), air
quality in virtually all big cities was terrible. The huge Three Gorges
Dam project raised serious questions, certainly including environmental
ones. The ultimate environmental question was, of course, what were
the limits to growth? How long could the furious pace of growth be
maintained simply from an environmental point of view?
Despite reforms, the legal system and the courts were still arbitrary
and often corrupt; they had to be improved and, in particular, property
rights respected, if investors were to feel secure. The vast corruption had
to be limited. Sometimes the death penalty was imposed for some of the
worst cases of corruption, but with very limited long-term effect.
China had made huge strides in education, including higher
education. Over the past decade the number of Chinese who enrolled at
a university quintupled. China was experiencing a “meteoric rise” in the
publication of scientific papers. From 2004 to 2008, more than one in
ten scientific articles came out of China, up from fewer than one in
twenty the previous decade. China moved from sixth to second place on
the world list. The United States definitely remained in first place, but its
share of publications dropped from one in four to one in five.
There was reason to believe, however, that China’s scientific influence
was lagging behind its output.54 As has been argued, “The traditional
Asia approaches may work well for training engineers, but they are less
suited for fostering innovation.” Rote learning could take you only so
far. Creativity at the highest levels was a problem in China, as in several
other Asian countries. Progress flowed more from imitation, tinkering,
and steady improvement; less from true creativity and originality. In
pursuing one’s intellectual interests, wherever they might lead, India
may well have a long-term advantage over China. In sensitive areas the
Chinese leadership set definite limits as to what kinds of research could
be performed, and what conclusions should be reached.55 China’s many
new universities had far to go before they could rival good Western
universities. Although the number of Chinese patents was growing
rapidly, questions were raised about the quality of these inventions.56
Not a single Chinese scientist was awarded any Nobel science prize.
China’s record in protecting intellectual property rights was probably
the worst in the world. Unlike Taiwan and Thailand, where
counterfeiting was largely carried out in the private sector, in China the
state sector also participated on a large scale. Various agreements
between the US and China appeared to make little difference. And even
counterfeiting could only take you so far. It has to be added that some of
the more advanced products were simply assembled and stamped “Made
in China”; they were not really developed there. Much of the advanced
production going on in China involves export processing. Semi-finished
and finished components are brought in from various countries and then
assembled and exported at low cost and stamped. Path-breaking new
research and development are seldom done in China; when the results
are, with some delay, imported into China, the West has moved on to
even more advanced products, though China is working hard to transfer
as many of these processes as possible to China itself.57 This is part of
the process of the increasing globalization of production, which affects
the entire world; but it also tells us something about China’s role in this
process, certainly compared to the United States.
It was true that China was making determined efforts to move up the
industrial pyramid; also because wages were moving upwards and low-
cost manufacturing was facing increased competition from other
countries.58 These efforts met with success in many areas (solar and
other forms of alternative energy, high-speed trains). This was very
impressive indeed, although there were incidents of grave pollution
within the solar industry and several serious accidents with high-speed
trains that slowed down this program. Western companies investing in
China were not only encouraged, but pressured, to give up their most
modern technology; for instance, General Electric was sharing its most
sophisticated airplane electronics with a state-owned company. China
was even buying advanced American companies, in areas such as solar
energy.59
Inequalities were deep and getting deeper, with some benefiting
hugely from the economic growth, and others much less so, or not at all.
This was also the pattern in many other developing countries. China was
enormous, and that too encouraged huge variations. In China, the richest
10 percent of the population earned twenty-three times more than the
poorest 10 percent. In the United States and Germany the corresponding
numbers were 15.9 and 6.9 times respectively.60
Even in China the number of available workers would begin to
decline by 2015, the result of the one-child policy and the drying up of
youth escaping rural drudgery. In 2011 indications were that the low
fertility had less to do with the one-child policy, and more with new
attitudes to children evolving in other developing countries as well.
Despite the general increase in wages, which could become a problem in
itself, and the Party’s supervision of work-places, industrial unrest was
becoming increasingly frequent. Under the Hukou system, which binds
the Chinese to a particular place and is only partially modified even
now, migrant workers (in particular) did not receive fair treatment;
neither did their children. In the spring and summer of 2011 there were
several incidents involving protests from migrant workers. Strikes also
erupted in modern factories paying relatively high wages. As long as
these strikes took place in foreign-owned companies the authorities did
little or nothing. There were even demands for free unions. Thousands
and thousands of labor disputes were brought before the courts.61
As economies advance from a low base, growth rates almost always
decline. If that happened China could have difficulties, since it was
assumed that 6–8 percent growth was more or less required to avoid
unemployment problems. Although there was a steep rise in the number
of private companies, the Chinese economy was still very state-
dominated. All the main “commanding heights” companies were state-
owned—defense, energy, finance, telecommunications, mining and
metals, ports and railroads—and private companies largely dealt with
clothing, food, and factory-assembled exports. China had some huge
companies that had had spectacular success on foreign stock markets,
but these were, almost without exception, only partially privatized
quasi-state monopolies—certainly huge, but not very innovative.62 The
land was still largely state-owned, and farmers had to pay rent for it;
price controls were prevalent; competition was quite limited. Could such
an economy function effectively in the long run? If it did, many Western
economic textbooks would have to be rewritten.
The economic model emphasized exports, and therefore insisted on a
cheap yuan or renminbi. This led to rapidly rising dissatisfaction abroad
as more and more companies lost out to Chinese competition; it was also
domestically controversial in that it limited domestic spending and
welfare. So, in this respect, the outside world and the Chinese consumer
had a common interest. Household spending, at 36 percent of GDP, was
at the lowest level by far for any major economy. In 2011 there were
definite signs that investment, not only in housing, but also in education
and even social welfare, was finally improving. This was badly needed as
the system of social assistance in China was extremely limited.63
Sooner or later the expectation was that the Chinese economic model
had to be transformed. The growth in wages meant not only that China
would have to move up the industrial ladder as it faced competition
from ever new competitors paying lower wages; it would probably also
mean increased imports and a somewhat more balanced economic
relationship with the outside world. When, in 2010, the authorities
finally agreed to the appreciation of the yuan, the rise in its value was
still quite limited, although the rise could be useful in combating the
growing inflation. The slow but growing shift in favor of domestic
consumption was important in itself, and would probably also have a
gradual impact on the currency. In 2010–11 there were signs that
China’s trade surplus was beginning to come down. In the first quarter of
2011 China actually ran its first trade deficit since 2004, but this soon
changed again. Beijing, however, made it clear that the exchange rate
was an issue the authorities would decide on their own.64 And the
experience with Japan in the 1970s proved that the appreciation of a
currency did not necessarily lead to reduced deficits. Japan’s surplus in
its trade with the US had in fact increased rapidly, despite the
appreciation of the yen. In both cases there were many other barriers to
imports than simply the exchange rate, however skewed that might be.
The effects of appreciation also depended very much on the nature of the
goods being exported and imported. The yuan’s appreciation could,
under certain circumstances, actually work against the United States.
Many saw the whole issue as a demonstration of the weakened position
of the United States.65
If China were to play a larger role in international finance, and the
role of the dollar were to diminish, China would sooner or later have to
address the question of the yuan’s convertibility. Yet, for the leadership
in Beijing, convertibility would mean a loss of economic and even some
political control. The authorities were simply not prepared to give up
power over either the exchange rate or the interest level. At least not
yet.
Many observers agreed on the list of long-term problems in the
Chinese economy: the high number of unprofitable state companies,
Party interference in the economy, the Party’s suspicion of private
Chinese companies, insolvent banks, overcapacity in many sectors,
corruption, inequalities. Even Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated that
China’s growth was “unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.”66
The disagreement was about how serious these problems were. In fact, in
2002, Gordon Chang had predicted the imminent collapse of China,
largely because of these problems. He was obviously wrong.67 China
actually made considerable progress in alleviating some of them. The
state sector has been drastically reorganized and even downsized,
although there are many different forms of state ownership. Massive
urban layoffs had created higher unemployment rates, which now seem
to have passed. Rural markets for agricultural commodities worked
much better. Ironically, many of the most serious problems now seemed
to involve not so much the transition from a command to a market
economy, but the authorities’ inability to provide standard public goods.
The health care system, environmental protection, and anti-corruption
efforts were the most glaring examples.68 Regardless of this, the
problems were many and tangible. As yet, they were not of sufficient
importance to slow down the rapid economic growth; but they could of
course have a larger impact as the very high growth rates inevitably had
to fall.
While China was becoming the primary challenger to the leadership
of the United States, the two were also cooperating in different ways.
While, in virtually all US campaigns since 1980, the new president had
criticized his predecessor for having been too friendly toward the
Chinese, even newcomers had soon come to favor cooperation with
China. There were strong forces pulling the two giants together, and the
United States and China were becoming increasingly interdependent.
The US had supported China’s successful membership of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001. The open American market had been
crucial to China’s growth, as it had been in Japan’s case as well. In 2008,
Chinese exports to the United States amounted to almost 8 percent of
China’s GNP, and a significant share of these exports came from
China’s GNP, and a significant share of these exports came from
American companies that had been established in China. Virtually all the
major US companies were represented there. In 2008, foreign enterprises
accounted for 55 percent of China’s total exports, and for 54 percent of
its imports. What would happen to these numbers if American–Chinese
relations seriously deteriorated?
The US was by far the world’s largest importer, while China was
surpassing Germany as the largest exporter. The huge surpluses China
had in its foreign trade were then, to a large extent, invested in the US,
so China was actually financing parts of America’s rapidly growing
debt69. When demand in the United States collapsed during the
economic crisis of 2008–09, exports from China were badly hit too. This
interdependence limited conflict; but it also cut so many different ways,
and it could sometimes be difficult to tell who actually held the upper
hand in this complex relationship.
There was no doubt that US economic policies increasingly had to be
carried out with an eye on the likely response from Beijing. As Hillary
Clinton asked the then Australian prime minister, Kevin Rudd: “How do
you deal toughly with your bank?”70 China’s position as the world’s
largest creditor had strengthened its position tremendously. The US
position as the world’s largest debtor had weakened its role, although it
still had few problems in financing its debt. The world was awash in
cheap money in 2010–11, but that could easily change. International
financial structures had to be adjusted, reflecting the rise of Asia, and
especially China. And since China was also surpassing the United States
as the world’s greatest polluter, there could be no effective global
environmental policy unless the two countries contributed.
 It had to be remembered that while trade across the Pacific had
surpassed that across the Atlantic in the late 1970s, and the gap had
widened since, on the investment side the story was a different one.
American investment in Europe and European investment in America
were much larger than in China and East Asia.71 Americans and
Europeans, despite the problems they were facing, were also
ideologically and culturally much closer to each other than they were to
the Japanese, not to mention the Chinese.
The Chinese had probably started investing in size in the United
States in the 1990s because of rapid US economic growth. In many ways
the US still had the most advanced economy in the world, and there was
also much to learn. As growth began to falter the Chinese may have
emphasized the security of US Treasury bonds. In an uncertain world,
when even the United States was hit, many still felt safest with America.
There was also the problem of where else to go. As one Chinese official
told an American audience in February 2009, “except for US Treasuries,
what can you hold? … US Treasuries are the safe haven. For everyone,
including China, it is the only option … We hate you guys. Once you
start issuing 1–2 trillion dollars … we know that the dollar is going to
depreciate, so we hate you guys, but there is nothing much we can
do.”72 Finally, there was also the question of the political benefits for the
Chinese in investing in the United States.
Many worried about what would happen if the Chinese stopped
investing in the US. This would harm America, but would also certainly
harm China as it would have a negative impact on Chinese exports to the
US, and on the already huge Chinese investment in the US. Dependency
cut both ways. If China started to dump dollars, it would also hurt itself.
To translate John Maynard Keynes’s famous quote: “If I owe you a
pound I have a problem; but if I owe you a million, the problem is
yours.” When the United States owes China billions, that is Washington’s
problem. When it owes China trillions, such amounts quickly become
Beijing’s problem. If China dumped dollars, the greenback would fall in
value. That would have a negative side, but it would also make
American goods more competitive. Some argued that this effect might
actually be desirable for the American economy. Finally, there was an
overriding political interest in maintaining good relations with what
were more and more clearly becoming the two most important powers in
the world.
On her first visit to China as Secretary of State in the Obama
administration, Hillary Clinton stated, with reference to issues such as
human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan, that had traditionally plagued
American–Chinese relations: “those issues can’t interfere with the global
economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis.”
This clearly illustrated how China had become a crucial partner in all
the most important issues of today. Traditional issues had to be
downplayed. It was indeed a dramatic new situation, and clearly
strengthened China’s hand.
Soon, however, the Obama administration was willing to take up the
traditional issues as well. Washington wanted to counteract the
impression that China could exploit US weaknesses. Arms were still
exported to Taiwan; President Obama received the Dalai Lama;
Washington protested against the treatment of Liu Xiaobo and other
Chinese dissidents, and against the censorship of Google in China. There
were also serious issues in the priority fields. First among them came the
were also serious issues in the priority fields. First among them came the
question of the low exchange rate of the yuan. As Chinese products
flooded Western markets, and as China’s current account surplus grew
dramatically, irritation in Western capitals—certainly including
Washington—rapidly increased.
In Pentagon circles, and among realist political scientists, the rise of
China was seen as potentially destabilizing. In the past, such a rise of
new powers had allegedly always created conflict, even war. The rise of
France under Louis XIV and Napoleon had led to major European wars.
The rise of Germany was generally perceived as the underlying factor
behind the First and the Second World Wars. China did strengthen its
military forces substantially. But realist models based on European
history did not necessarily fit the situation in Asia where, as we have
seen, a mixture of balancing and accommodation existed. For one thing,
European countries were located close to each other; China and the
United States were geographically far apart (although some of America’s
allies were close to China). In its National Security Strategy, from 2010,
the Obama administration vows to “monitor China’s military
modernization program”, but also states that disagreements on human
rights “should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest.”73
In most of the world the rise of China was primarily seen in economic
terms. It was certainly a threat to established industries in the United
States and in Europe. Trade disputes were proliferating. China had long
seen itself as the victim of the actions of others and the spokesperson for
the poor masses of the world. For more than a hundred years before the
revolution in 1949 it had suffered “national humiliation”; the
exploitation of China’s territory by foreign powers.74 Now, while
insisting that China was still a developing country with many
limitations, its leaders were more and more emphasizing the peaceful,
and even inevitable, nature of its rise. While both Russia and China had
a common interest in balancing America’s great influence somewhat,
they both (and certainly China) had an even stronger interest in
cooperating with the United States. China was also interested in working
with the EU to limit the influence of the American hegemon, but Beijing
had apparent difficulties understanding what the EU was all about, and
in political matters ended up mostly working with individual EU
countries. Although references to the G-2 or to “Chinamerica” were to be
avoided, the Chinese took considerable pleasure in moving up the power
tables in the way they did. Hu Jintao’s standard phrase was to talk about
the “peaceful rise” of China, later modified to “peaceful development” to
sound less offensive. Nevertheless, to describe the new world, Chinese
academics came up with the following formula: “one superpower
working together with several big powers,” or even “World No. 1 vs
World No. 2.” In 2010 some Chinese leaders openly referred to the
country as a Great Power, a “world power,” and even a “quasi-
superpower.”75
The big evolution was that while China had earlier seen itself as an
outsider in opposition to the dominant powers and institutions, it was
now becoming more of an insider, though certainly one that was trying
to reform many aspects of the international system. China had to be
given its due influence in the UN and the entire UN system; the
International Monetary Fund had to be reformed to reflect China’s rise
and the fall not so much of the United States as of Europe; the G-20 was
to be the new important forum at the expense of the dwindling G-7(8);
and trade rounds and environmental agreements had to reflect China’s
importance. China did not present many concrete proposals to solve the
world’s problems; it still left that largely to others. Yet, more and more,
no overall agreements could be worked out without China on board.
After Hong Kong and Macao had been brought into the “homeland,”
China’s primary military concern still related to Taiwan’s status and its
potential for independence. While China held firm to the one-China
policy, there was every reason to believe that Beijing understood that
China’s continued rapid economic growth depended on peace and
stability in the region. In 2006–09 China adopted constructive policies
on several international issues. It participated in crafting sanctions
against North Korea, backed a UN plan for peace and stability in Darfur,
sent peacekeepers to several places (including taking part in the
international effort to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia), and made
somewhat constructive moves as concerned Haiti, East Timor, and even
Burma. In the UN debate on Responsibility to Protect, Beijing tried to
avoid obstruction, although the emphasis was on preventing abuses from
occurring in the first place. For a country that stressed noninterference
in domestic matters, these were important developments.76
But by 2010–11 there were many signs that China was becoming
more determined in international affairs, and that the United States was
beginning to push back. China gave definite priority to its own interests
in most of the growing financial disputes with the United States and
much of the industrialized world, including the increasingly
controversial currency question. The list of highly sensitive issues now
also included China’s intellectual property theft and the myriad of small
protectionist barriers China had erected to limit certain Western imports.
The Obama administration, and, even more, the US Congress were
becoming increasingly critical of China’s policies, particularly anything
that smacked of discrimination against the US. It was difficult for many
Americans to accept that China was becoming a major exporter of
technologically advanced products, such as solar panels.77 It did not help
that the United States itself discriminated against Chinese investment in
areas of sensitive national interest, however that term happened to be
interpreted in Washington.
China’s firm line in the South China Sea was a dramatic indication of
Beijing’s new determination. In response, Vietnam invited the US Navy
to visit the area, and the aircraft carrier George Washington did. In the
territorial dispute with Japan, which actually led to minor skirmishes,
China held back rare earth minerals in an effort to influence Japan’s
position, a break with China’s principle of not mixing economic and
political questions.78 When the Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, Beijing made it perfectly clear
that it would tolerate no interference in domestic matters.79 China’s
rearmament was continuing at a brisk pace, with the Chinese military
occasionally taking great pride in showing off some of their latest
weapons; this naturally had a negative effect in the United States. The
Europeans, on the other hand, were continuing to discuss lifting
restrictions on exports of military hardware to China, to Washington’s
disappointment.
In the events in Libya in February–March 2011, China played a more
constructive role. While officially still abhorring interference in other
countries’ internal affairs, it voted for sanctions against Gaddafi’s
government, dispatched a warship and aircraft to evacuate Chinese
citizens from Libya, and refrained from voting against the international
military intervention.80
With China continuing its rapid growth—not only economically, but
also militarily—the future did not look too bright. The United States was
definitely not going to sit still while China improved its position. Was
China, then, a status quo or a revisionist power? Clearly both elements
were represented. China was both a “responsible stakeholder” and a
revisionist power. Elizabeth Economy went further and argued, “Never
mind notions of a responsible stakeholder; China has become a
revolutionary power.”81 There could be little doubt that China was
trying, with some success, to modify the international system. However,
it was no longer revolutionary in the sense it had been under Mao, and
that earlier Great Powers had been. Unlike the Soviet Union it did not
have a revolutionary ideology, communism, under which the whole
world was ultimately to be dominated. On the contrary, China insisted
on noninterference in domestic matters, a position for which a great
many other countries had considerable sympathy. It sometimes tried to
contain international crises and play an internationally useful role vis-à-
vis rogue states such as North Korea and even Iran, although naturally
the United States would have liked it to be much more constructive.
China did not try to establish colonies in the way so many European
Great Powers had done. And it had stopped supporting insurgencies
against its neighbors.82
China generally respected markets, international trade, and many
international institutions. It coordinated its stimulus packages to turn the
economic recession around. It did not withdraw its huge support for the
United States through loans and investment, although there were vague
signs that it could come to re-evaluate its policies. In fact China was
taking over much of the traditional British, and then American, role as
the lender of last resort, thus contributing to the stabilization of the
world economy. When the debt crisis hit several EU countries in 2010–
11, China offered substantial assistance in the form of buying bonds and
investing in these countries too.83 Naturally it did this for its own
economic and political reasons, but it was still very much appreciated by
the countries concerned. This was hardly the behavior of a revolutionary
power.
China was eagerly joining a whole series of international
organizations, some of which, such as the WTO, could influence even its
domestic decision-making. A few of these organizations were skeptical
toward the West. Thus, in 1996, the Chinese took the initiative in
establishing the Shanghai Five which in 2001 evolved into the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. Despite the occasional denunciations of
“hegemony” in the form of the United States, the organization played a
limited role. China helped to create the more open ASEAN Plus Three
(China, Japan, South Korea). It also contributed to many international
relief efforts, even to non-combat peacekeeping operations, and
cooperated with the United States in fighting terrorism and piracy.84
Nevertheless, China clearly disagreed with the West on sovereignty
(although actually less with the US than with the EU countries),
sanctions, and the use of force (the opposition to force was not very
revolutionary). It even signed some significant human rights covenants,
but did not really implement them. China limited use of the death
penalty somewhat, and of torture in exacting confessions. It was out-
investing the United States in clean-energy technologies, though its
fundamental interest appeared to be increased energy security rather
than the environment—for instance, it is not yet reducing its vast coal
production. China was actually exporting solar panels to the US and
European markets, although this was done through state subsidies that
probably broke WTO rules.85 In a rapidly globalizing world, China’s
insistence on its full sovereignty, desperately trying to build firewalls
against anything that could threaten its political system, made the
solution of global problems, from the environment to North Korea’s
puzzling actions, that more difficult to achieve.
Yet occasionally China was actually willing to modify this full
sovereignty line ever so slightly. It accepted the dispute mechanism of
the WTO, some international cooperation about the environment, and
even some UN sanctions against Iran. And it could be helpful on North
Korea, Darfur, the Gulf of Aden, and Libya.86 China was therefore both
nationalistic and marginally prepared to share certain global
responsibilities. It had solved most of its historically difficult border
issues, but Taiwan could still potentially lead to war, even with the
United States. So could, in the worst-case scenario, the situation in North
Korea.
In the near future China’s emphasis seems likely to be on a peaceful
environment for the country’s rise to Great Power status. In the West the
hope was that China could gradually be co-opted into a Western-
dominated world order. G. John Ikenberry argues that neither Russia nor
China are inevitable enemies of the existing hugely successful Western
international order. The task ahead must be to make them become full
members. The only certain way to make China an enemy was to treat it
as one.87 Edward G. Steinfeld even contended that China was gradually
joining an American-dominated global economic system and that its
authoritarianism was “self-obsolescing.” China would become just like
Taiwan. That seemed much too optimistic.88
Henry Kissinger believed that the competition between the United
States and China “is more likely to be economic and social than military.
A country with huge domestic tasks is not going to throw itself into a
strategic confrontation or a quest for world domination. Weapons of
mass destruction define a key distinction from Europe’s pre-World War I
period.”89 Aaron Friedberg is less certain. In political science terms not
only realism, but also liberalism, with its emphasis on the different
political systems, would suggest there could be conflict. Friedberg thinks
China’s ultimate goal is to “win without fighting,” displacing the United
States as the leading power definitely in East Asia, perhaps even in all of
Asia, while avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States. To
prevent such a development the United States has to preserve “a
favorable balance of power.”90
But was any Chinese–American reconciliation really possible without
some form of grand bargain with China? Such bargains seem to have
fallen out of favor in the modern world; they simply sound too cynical.
Ikenberry argues that “The big bargain that the United States will want
to strike is this: to accommodate China by offering it status and position
within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and
accommodation of Washington’s core strategic interests, which include
remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia.”91 In other
words, a continuation of the status quo with the US as the only global
power, and China strictly limited, even within its own region. This is
probably not much of a bargain for the Chinese.
To some extent the United States and China actually shared a concern
with national sovereignty, although China’s extraordinary insistence on
this clearly presented a special problem when most of the world’s
challenges could only be solved through forms of international
cooperation. In the longer term nobody could really tell what would
happen, particularly if the economic growth collapsed. On the one hand,
China’s economic and military growth would give it capabilities which
could be more actively exploited, primarily regionally, but also
elsewhere. On the other hand, why would the country do anything that
could represent a risk to a successful economic model that was
producing such good results?
This is speculation. There could be no doubt about China’s rapidly
increasing importance in international relations. A new world was being
created; or rather, elements of the old world were re-emerging. The size
of China’s economy could well surpass that of the United States in a few
years. Yet, there might still be reasons to hold off making the most
optimistic predictions about the future of Asia and China. On a per
capita basis China would still be a relatively poor country by the
standards of Great Powers. Its military strength would probably also
continue to lag far behind that of the United States. Its alliance structure
would also be much weaker. Or, to be more precise, China had virtually
no real allies. Yet, more and more, China was insisting that its voice be
heard and respected, most clearly in East Asia, but also on global issues
heard and respected, most clearly in East Asia, but also on global issues
in general.
 3
War, Realism, and Power Transitions

Niall Ferguson has argued that imperial collapses are very sudden.1 The
collapse of the Soviet Union would appear to be a case in point,
although it reflected deep structural changes that had been going on for
quite some time. When Britain had to withdraw from India, Palestine,
Greece, and Turkey in 1946–48, this, again, was quite dramatic, but the
result of long-term processes. Yet, we are certain of the results only
when we see the consequences. Today the signs of American decline are
obvious. Should we therefore conclude that America’s days are already
numbered? Many of us feel that it may still be a bit premature to make
such a prediction, at least with relevance for the near future.
Small changes happen every day that affect the relative situation of
the world’s Great Powers. Certain developments speed up the process
considerably. Major wars often transfer the mantle of leadership directly
from one country to another. Some powers are defeated; sometimes the
winners spend so much of their strength that even victory leads to
decline. The wars of Louis XIV (1643–1713) and of the French
Revolution and Napoleon (1792–1815) ended French attempts at
dominating Europe and marked the rise of Britain and, in the Napoleonic
wars, also Russia. Germany became the leading continental power after
wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–71). The
First World War resulted in the fall of four empires, those of Germany,
Russia, Austria–Hungary, and of the Ottoman Empire. The last two of
these units never reappeared as Great Powers.
 The Second World War led to similarly huge changes. Germany and
Japan were on the losing side. Although they ultimately recovered from
the war, it took several decades and their policies were strongly
influenced by the negative experiences of the Second World War. France
had suffered a loss of prestige in 1940, from which it never fully
recovered, despite the strong exertions of Charles de Gaulle. Great
Britain had fought longer than any other Great Power during the war,
but its moral record could not hide its economic sacrifices and political
problems. After the war it soon became economically, politically, and
militarily dependent on the United States. Japan’s victories in the early
phase of the Second World War stimulated the independence movements
in Asia. The colonial magic was gone. The yellow, and presumably even
the black, man could defeat the white. European colonialism crumbled
with the concessions the British had to make in India. To the surprise of
many, what the British gave in India could not long be withheld by
others, even in Africa. The other colonial powers had to follow Britain’s
path, more or less willingly. So total was Europe’s defeat that the
continent was put under the supervision of the two new powers that
really counted, relatively indirectly by the United States in the West, and
more directly by the Soviet Union in the East.
The Cold War focused primarily on Europe, but its casualties were
suffered in Korea, in Vietnam, and in other places in Asia and Africa.
Although the Soviet Union participated largely by proxy in most of these
Third World conflicts, its militarization was an important factor in its
ultimate collapse. When the Soviet Union had, at least in the military
respect, become almost the equal of the United States, its existence came
to an end. This collapse was indeed sudden, although certain warning
signs had long been evident, which only became obvious with hindsight.
signs had long been evident, which only became obvious with hindsight.
In the long run the Soviet Union could not be America’s equal when its
economy was so much smaller and in such decline. As we shall see,
Moscow’s military spending may well have amounted to more than 30
percent of its total gross national product, a definite example of
“imperial overstretch” if there ever was one. The United States spent
around 4–5 percent of its GNP on military and other “imperial”
expenses; only for a few years during the Korean War did it spend more
than 10 percent. Starting in the 1960s the communist ideology had also
gradually lost its force; in the 1980s hardly anybody believed that the
future of the world belonged to Soviet Communism. Mikhail Gorbachev’s
efforts to reform the system ended in the collapse not only of
communism, but also of the Soviet Union itself. But nobody did more
than Gorbachev to bring the Cold War to an end. For this he did indeed
deserve the Nobel Peace Prize.
Economic depressions also affect the Great Powers differently. The
Great Depression of the 1930s started in the United States, and the US
was among those hardest hit; but from a longer-term perspective we see
that it hastened the transition from Great Britain to the United States as
the world’s economic leader. Britain was no longer able to protect the
hegemonic or imperial functions it had earlier undertaken. Growing
protectionism and the troubles of the pound further undermined
Britain’s role. Although the United States was temperamentally and
politically unable to supersede Britain in the 1930s, the experiences of
Pearl Harbor and the Second World War finally ended these restraints.
The oil shocks of the 1970s shifted the balance away from the oil
consumers to the oil producers. Creditors were definitely in a better
position than debtors, although the debt of the United States was very
different from that of the countries of the Third World. As long as its
economy was so dynamic, many were still willing to invest in the US.
Yet the fact that in the course of the 1980s the United States became the
world’s largest debtor was bound to influence its role negatively. As we
have seen, the days of the United States telling the rest of the world how
to behave economically are largely gone, although old habits do not
disappear overnight. When all the old Great Powers of the world were so
negatively affected by the recession of 2007–10, and China was able to
resume its very high growth so quickly, historical processes are indeed
greatly speeded up. By how much is gradually becoming clear to us all.
All in all, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the American
position in the world is certainly relatively weaker today than it was in
the first decades after 1945, and also weaker than at the end of the Cold
War in the 1990s. America’s financial and economic problems are so
grave that they are bound to affect its overall role negatively. Still, no
single power, or combination of powers, is yet able to challenge the
United States for the top leadership position. The United States is still
the world’s only true superpower. All its challengers are really still
regional Great Powers, although the size of their respective regions
varies considerably.
Despite the dramatic effects of the asymmetric power experienced
every day in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is still in a league of
its own militarily.2 It spends six times as much on defense as does the
second largest military spender, China. The US does not have the largest
forces, but it has the most advanced and the only ones with a global
reach. It can transfer hundred of thousands of troops to almost any
distant corner of the world, as was seen during the Vietnam, Gulf, and
Iraq wars. In its National Security Strategy of 2010, the Obama
administration proclaimed that “we will maintain the military
superiority that has secured our country, and underpinned global
security, for decades.”3
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is still primarily concentrating
on Taiwan and the South China Sea and, increasingly, the Western
Pacific. India’s forces focus heavily on Pakistan and China. Pakistan is, in
turn, even more obsessed about India. Russia’s strategic vision does not
extend much beyond the “near abroad” of the old Soviet territory, with
the emphasis on the Caucasus and Central Asia, and with some attention
being paid to its old sphere of interest in Central and Eastern Europe.
Japan is reluctant to undertake any mission whatsoever that can lead to
the loss of life; so is Germany, although not quite to the same extreme
extent. Britain and France, and thereby also the EU, still have some
capacities for power projection, but their major missions are generally
carried out in close cooperation with NATO and the United States. With
huge debts and financial retrenchment, that will be the case even more
in the future, unless Britain and France are really able to implement
joint policies.4 The war in Libya in 2011 showed their ambition to try to
do so; it did, however, also show the limits of what they could
accomplish. For many different kinds of resources they were dependent
on the United States, even when the US, as in this case, was “leading
from behind.5
Despite the problems of the dollar, it remained the only really global
currency. The French, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), the Chinese, and others had talked about alternatives,
from the German mark, to special drawing rights, the euro, and the
renminbi. However, the dollar was still used in 85 percent of all foreign
exchange transactions worldwide; 62 percent of world currency reserves
were held in dollars, although this was down from 73 percent in 2001;
65 percent of China’s 2.5 trillion dollar reserves are in dollars; and fifty-
four countries had their currencies pegged to the dollar—twenty-seven
to the euro. There were many reasons for the dollar’s predominance: the
size of the US economy, its large and very liquid financial markets, the
incumbency of the dollar, and the low risk associated with the US
treasury market. The trend was in the direction of reductions in these
numbers, but the trend was slow. The euro in particular was becoming
more important; its share of total foreign currency reserves increased
from 18 percent in 2001 to 26 percent in mid-2010. Yet, all the
alternatives, in 2011 definitely including the euro, also had their
drawbacks. It was therefore likely that the dollar would remain the first
among equals, while the others would primarily be taking on added
regional importance.6
At least in the immediate future the United States will continue to
have the world’s largest economy. In a few years China’s gross domestic
product may well come to surpass that of the US, although today China’s
GDP is still only equal to 40.2 percent of that of the US, up from 17.9
percent in 2005. If the day comes when China actually surpasses the US,
it will, as we have seen, still be a relatively poor country since it will
have a population four times larger than that of the US. America’s vast
military lead, and the fact that it still has a GDP so much larger than that
of China, have led some realist observers to proclaim that “The main
feature of the distribution of capabilities today is thus unprecedented
American primacy.”7
This realist case may appear to be strong, but it definitely needs
considerable modification. It leaves the impression that little or nothing
has happened to the American position since the end of the Second
World War. First, as I have already tried to indicate, the American
position was in most respects considerably stronger in the first decades
after 1945 and in the 1990s. There can be little doubt that America’s
position today, however strong, is weaker than in the 1990s.
Second, it is always a question of which numbers you focus on. On the
economic side, the United States has held up well as far as GDP numbers
are concerned. But if you look at the deficits in the federal budget and in
current accounts the story is quite different. These numbers are almost
entirely overlooked by realists in their rather exclusive focus on GDP.
America’s deficit problems are grave and undoubtedly represent the
most serious challenge to its supreme status. This is what Niall Ferguson
refers to when he suggests that America’s decline and fall may well be
precipitous. Alarm bells should be ringing very loudly indeed since
previous falls have almost all been associated with fiscal crises. These
cases were all “marked by sharp imbalances between revenues and
expenditures, as well as difficulties with financing public debt.”8 In
debates, Ferguson suggested that the collapse could actually take place
within the next two years. President Obama and the Republican House
of Representatives are trying to bring about a more balanced federal
budget, still with limited success. A downgrade of the US by one of the
rating agencies is striking, although this is still primarily a warning of
what could follow if the parties are not able to work out further
compromise.9
Third, numbers and perceptions may well be quite different.
Perceptions matter, whatever they are based on. Thus, Soviet power was
overestimated because there was the expectation of what would happen
in the future, which of course nobody could know for certain. The same
is the case with China’s position today. The big new factor in
international relations is indeed the economic rise of China. It is most
definitely real and can be witnessed every day all around the globe, but
this rise is further reinforced by our perceptions about the future. Thus,
even the official US National Intelligence Council, which in 2004 had
foreseen the continued domination of the international system by the
United States, argued in its November 2008 report Global Trends 2025
that “the international system—as constructed following the Second
World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 … (It) will be a
global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow
between developed and developing countries.” Similarly, when so many
more in East Asia believe that China rather than the United States will
be “Asia’s future power center,” this becomes a factor in itself, at least
until this prediction may be replaced by a newer one.10
 4
Expansion

“EMPIRE”—A DISCUSSION OF THE TERM

The proper meaning of the term “empire” has long been debated.1 Many
want to reserve the term for its narrow use, referring to the formal
political control of one state over another’s external and internal policy.
In this sense the term will most frequently be applied to the historical
period often described as the “Age of Imperialism” (climaxing in the
years from the 1870s to the First World War). Others favor a broader
definition, where empire simply means a hierarchical system of
relationships with one power clearly being much stronger than any
other. The stronger power also has to exercise considerable influence in
at least some areas outside its home territory. Under such a definition,
not only the Soviet sphere of influence, but also the wider and looser
American one, could be called an “empire.” I have generally followed
this latter usage.
The term is therefore meant as a descriptive one, although some
continue to see it as negative. As Felipe Fernández-Armesto has
observed, a few historians have seen empires as good, so the US is an
empire after all (Ferguson); many more saw empires as bad, so the US is
not an empire (Parsons).2 This was not always so. George Washington
referred to the newborn republic as “a rising empire.” In its early history
the United States was frequently referred to as an “empire of liberty.”
Thus, Thomas Jefferson saw this “empire of liberty” as a collection of
states loosely bound together in a federal union. The term suggested size
and strength, but for Jefferson and others “empire” did not have to
signify oppression. That was just the British version. This internal empire
soon spanned the entire American continent. The means of that dramatic
expansion were many—military, diplomatic, political, economic, and
cultural. Only with the Civil War and the later rise of the United States
to a position similar to that of the leading European powers did “empire”
take on more negative connotations.3
Many saw the role of the United States as imperial at the time of the
Spanish–American War. Then, the United States did indeed acquire
colonies on the European model. Later, however, America, with only a
few exceptions, came to frown on the use of the term empire about the
US role. Americans like to see their country as special—different from all
other powers. The European powers were imperial; the United States
was certainly not. Only with the presidency of George W. Bush and the
Iraq War did this change, not at the official level (although some
unauthorized usage could be found even here), but at the academic and
popular level.
Zbigniew Brzezinski insisted that “empire” could be a descriptive, not
a normative, term. It simply told us something about the supreme
position of the United States: “I use the term “empire” as morally neutral
to describe a hierarchical system of political relationships, radiating
from a center. Such an empire’s morality is defined by how its imperial
power is wielded, with what degree of consent on the part of those
within its scope, and to what ends. This is where the distinctions
between the American and Soviet imperial systems are the sharpest.”4
Arthur Schlesinger, another friend of American power, asked “Who can
doubt that there is an American empire?—an ‘informal’ empire, not
colonial in polity, but still richly equipped with imperial paraphernalia:
troops, ships, planes, bases, proconsuls, local collaborators, all spread
wide around the luckless planet?”5
Americans have also frowned on the term “power politics,” despite
the United States undoubtedly undertaking such practices normally
associated with the Old World. As we have already seen, no one
captured the European reaction to such claims to special status better
than Winston Churchill.
When I first started using the term “empire” in the 1980s, many
expressed a strong dislike to such a term being applied also to the United
States. Today the situation is significantly different. Many historians and
political scientists are using the term; a few even see it as a term of
approval. “Empire” allegedly brings more order into a chaotic world.
Some political economists still prefer the term “hegemon,” but they
usually stress only the economic power of the country in question. When
we study power, we should look at all its aspects, not only the economic
side. By doing so, we are also encouraged to compare the ways in which
the different powers exerted their power. The United States, like other
Great Powers, was special in some respects, not in others.
My argument is that the United States was definitely a stronger power
after 1945 than was the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century or
the Soviet Union in the twentieth. Territorially all three powers
expanded considerably, both directly and indirectly. If this were indeed
the case, why then call only the British and the Soviet versions
the case, why then call only the British and the Soviet versions
“empires”? It is true that in organizing its sphere of influence the United
States, on the whole, used much less force than either the British or the
Soviets, although this was a difference in degree, not in principle. Yet
this fact did not necessarily take anything away from the effectiveness of
US power; in some regions the American version clearly outlasted the
Soviet one. Great Powers generally order their spheres in accordance
with their own strong and weak sides and their ideals and values. There
was a British version of empire, a Soviet one, and an American one. We
should be able to say something about what characterized each of them.
The effectiveness of an outside power’s control may be entirely
separate from its more formal aspects. First, even within the formal
British Empire there was sometimes the form without the reality. For
most practical purposes the white dominions had all become
independent states well before the Second World War. This was reflected
in Arthur Balfour’s formula from 1926, under which Britain and the
dominions were stated to be “autonomous communities within the
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in
any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a
common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of
the British Commonwealth of Nations.”6 Here it was considerably clearer
what the Empire was not than what it actually was.
Second, there was the reality of empire without the form. Certain
areas were formally outside the British Empire, but Britain could
nevertheless be almost as influential there as in several of the formally
ruled areas. British influence in parts of China, in parts of the Ottoman
Empire (particularly in Egypt), and in Argentina (“the sixth dominion”)
at times rivaled that in the dominions. This is what historians Robinson
and Gallagher have called Britain’s “informal empire.” British rule in
India was quite complex; some areas were under direct British rule,
others were ruled indirectly through local rulers. The same was the case
in Africa. Although the distinction between direct and indirect rule could
be more formal than real, it too underlines the diversity within the
British Empire. Similar complexities had existed within other empires,
such as the old Athenian and Roman ones. Formal political control thus
becomes a somewhat incomplete criterion for empire.7
In this context it should be noted that most prominent British experts
on the British Empire who have compared the roles of Britain and the
United States show little or no hesitation in describing the US role after
1945 as an American empire. (Porter, Darwin, Ferguson, even Robinson
and Gallagher.) With the diversities within the British Empire—direct
and indirect rule, formal and informal empire—there were indeed
marked similarities between the two empires. Most foreigners, and even
some Americans, react negatively to reserving the term hegemony,
instead of empire, for the American role. If this is done, “We arrive at
the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that a hegemon can be more
powerful than an empire.”8 In an effort to get away from these
complexities John Darwin has started referring to “world systems”—i.e.
the British world system, instead of empire. The new term is meant to
convey that “British imperialism was a global phenomenon; that its
fortunes were governed by global conditions; and that its power derived
less from the assertion of imperial authority than from the fusing
together of disparate elements.”9 It is highly doubtful that this new term
will resolve the debate.
 In his new book, Liberal Leviathan, G. John Ikenberry discusses the
difference between liberal hegemony, the term he prefers for the
American role, and empire, a term he rejects, although he has some
sympathy for the use of the term. Among the differences he stresses that
a liberal hegemon acts within a wider order of rules and institutions.
Even “the leading state operates within them. In an imperial order, the
core state operates above the law—outside the hierarchical structures
that shape and constrain weaker and peripheral units.” This clearly is a
matter of degree, not of principle, as it could be argued that the United
States frequently acts outside the order (several interventions without
international mandate, opposition to the International Criminal Court
and to the Kyoto Protocol, non-ratification of many international
conventions, ending the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, occasionally
somewhat unilateral roles in NATO and other organizations, including
vetoes in the Security Council).10
In the flood of new books on comparative aspects of empire, Timothy
Parsons, in his The Rule of Empires, uses a very narrow definition—so
narrow in fact that when the Roman Empire bestowed citizenship on all
residents of the empire in AD 212 “Rome ceased to be truly imperial.”
Empire always involved suppression; “no one became an imperial
subject voluntarily.”11 This naturally excludes any consideration of the
United States as an empire. On the other hand, in their very
comprehensive Empires in World History, Jane Burbank and Frederick
Cooper take a different view. Throughout the long sweep of history
empires were the norm and nation states “a blip on the historical
horizon.” Empires were remarkably durable and they “accommodated,
created, and manipulated differences among populations.” The United
States had “its own imperial trajectory” and “deployed an array of
imperial strategies abroad: it occupied countries, dispatched troops to
dislodge hostile leaders, sponsored proxy wars against foes, made use of
enclave colonies and military bases on foreign soil, sent out missionaries
and, more recently, supplied development aid and expertise.”12
There can be little doubt that the Soviet Union exerted far more
effective control over Eastern Europe—particularly in the years 1948 to
1953, but also later—than Britain generally did over most areas of
imperial rule. The non-contiguous parts of the Soviet Empire, such as
Vietnam and Cuba, had a much freer position. Still, since the Eastern
European countries were all formally fully independent, even the Soviet
Empire could not be called one under the narrow definition of empire.
Robinson has worked out more timeless definitions of “informal
empire,” but they are probably too vague to be really useful. But the
complexity of imperial rule remains. Within the American “empire”
some important areas were, at least temporarily, under direct American
occupation—Japan, the American zone in Germany. There, and in
certain Caribbean/Central American and Pacific states, the American
role could be just as striking as in some of the more directly ruled parts
of the British Empire. On the whole, however, Britain had a formal
empire, but few imperial institutions. The United States had no formal
empire, but more developed institutions—in the form of alliances,
security treaties, and partly also economic arrangements—than the
British.13
So when the term “empire” is used about the American role, it
generally refers to an informal hierarchical structure and a large-scale
expansion. (The quotation marks are to make it clear that the term is
expansion. (The quotation marks are to make it clear that the term is
used in its widest sense.) The states within this empire were generally
politically independent; many, if not most of them, were political
democracies, but they were still tied to America through important
military, political, and economic arrangements. The American influence
was more pronounced in shaping the overall structure (in NATO, for
instance, or the integration of Germany and Japan in a Western system)
than in forcing individual countries to make specific policy choices they
would not otherwise have made (for instance compelling them to do
certain things in their domestic policy which they did not really want to
do). The American “empire” generally implied America’s “power to” do
certain things, less often “power over” certain countries or outcomes.
The administration of George W. Bush frowned upon the use of the
term “empire,” although certain members, including Vice President
Cheney, used it in less formal contexts, and then with admiration for
what the United States could achieve if it exerted its full power. The
Bush administration had ambitions worthy of an empire. Just as Ronald
Reagan had allegedly liberated Eastern and Central Europe and the
Soviet Union, thereby ending the Cold War, Bush would liberate
Afghanistan and Iraq and, later, presumably Iran and North Korea. This
would reorder not only the Middle East, but much of the world. America
had the strength and the means necessary to carry out such a hugely
ambitious mission. This was indeed empire, without inverted commas.14
But it was not to be. After initial victories, America soon faced great
problems, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. So big were these problems
that nothing became of the expected follow-up in Iran and North Korea;
regime change had to be abandoned in these two countries. Instead, in
its second term, the Bush administration needed the support of its allies
to get out of some of the problems it had created in its first four years. In
much of the world George W. Bush had become the most unpopular
president in recent US history. Then the economic problems, that had
gradually become more serious, took on an explosive character in 2007–
08. America was definitely in decline. Barack Obama could bring back
America’s popularity, but not its economic strength. America was still
the world’s leading power, but it had to work in cooperation with its
various allies around the world and reduce its number of enemies as best
it could. The days of empire, in almost any form, were virtually gone.

WHAT RIGHT TO EXPAND?

In A Good Speed to Virginia in 1609, Robert Gray asked “By what right or
warrant we can enter into the land of these Savages, take away their
rightful inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their place, being
unwronged or unprovoked by them.”15 This was a crucial question, but
virtually all Great Powers came to think they had the right to do so. Part
of the answer lay in the simple fact that they had the power to expand;
therefore they did so.
Another part lay in the rather untroubled conviction that although the
expansion might benefit the home country, it would certainly also
benefit the colony or the area in question. This quickly led to the idea of
higher and lower civilizations which has been an element in Western
thinking at least since the Crusades. Certain civilizations quite simply
stood “higher” in their degree of development than did others.
Therefore, they had not only the right, but also the obligation, to
expand. In this way they could bring “the natives” definite advantages,
whether they be political rights, material benefits, or religious
conversion.16 As Lord Palmerston stated about one of the most important
elements in Britain’s expansion, “Commerce is the best pioneer of
civilization.” Free trade would, in his view, lead “civilization with one
hand, and peace with the other to render mankind happier, wiser,
better.”17 The Romans and the Chinese were preoccupied with fighting
“the barbarians”; the British felt “the white man’s burden” and the
French the “mission civilisatrice”; the Americans were spreading “peace
and liberty” around the world. It would be a big mistake to write off
such sentiments as self-delusional propaganda, although there could
certainly be an element of that as well. Even the highest ideals can be
influenced by the most material of interests.
Great Powers almost always expand, sooner or later, directly or
indirectly, but they expand in ways which, at least in the longer run, are
in accordance with the instruments available and the political and
cultural values of the power in question. The way in which the Great
Powers organize their spheres of influence—or their “empires,” if you
will—can thus be quite different. But what they have in common is that
they, in some form or other, control, or at least have substantial
influence on, the basic orientation of the areas in question.
As Thomas F. Madden has argued in Empires of Trust, there were
striking similarities between the Roman Empire (particularly under the
Republic up to 27 BC), and the American one (particularly after the
Second World War). Both Rome and the United States were initially
colonies themselves; their motives and means of expansion were similar,
with the fear of outside threats a predominant factor; their military
supremacy was definite, and in both cases the imperial capital, not the
allies, paid most of the expenses for defense. They both showed an initial
reluctance to expand at the expense of “civilized” powers (Greece and
Western Europe respectively), not of more primitive societies (Spain and
Gaul in the case of Rome, Indians and Mexicans in Washington’s). There
were gradations of control within the empire, from rather directly
imposed rule, to invitations to the imperial capital to play a larger role.
There were clear limits as to how Rome and Washington could behave
toward their allies. The importance of alliances is remarkable. They
institutionalized the supremacy of Rome and Washington, but also
limited the freedom of action of the imperial capital. Therefore, they
were “empires of trust.” In fact, neither Rome nor Washington liked the
term “empire.” They saw themselves more as first among equals and the
allies as free. However, there could little doubt about their respective
supremacies. One of their most highly appreciated functions was to keep
peace within their empires.18
In Why America Is Not a New Rome Vaclav Smil argues that it may be
tempting to call America an empire because of its “political strength,
cultural allure, strategic might, and economic weight …” Yet, he
concludes, this label should be resisted. The United States was definitely
not the new Rome. “Clearly, the United States does not rule and it does
not command. It leads; it has allies, not subjects; and a leader, unlike an
absolute sovereign, cannot demand submission.” He, like many others,
ends up calling the US role “hegemony.”19 There is certainly something
to Smil’s argument, but as we shall shortly see, and as Madden indicates,
the difference between hegemony and empire may be less clear-cut than
he thinks. Even empires come in different forms, reflecting the respective
strengths and values of the powers in question.
In Rome’s case the role of Greece was strikingly similar to Western
Europe’s role within the American empire. Thus, while Rome and
Washington certainly dominated, Greek and European culture were in
many ways considered superior, at least by those ruled, but sometimes
even by the ruler. The Greek charges of arrogance and lack of
consultation bore a striking resemblance to the European situation.
Rome and Washington in turn felt that these allies could be rather
tiresome. Greece’s special and respected position within the Roman
Empire was the background for the British desire to play the role of
Greeks within the American empire.
Historical China also had its empire in the form of its tributary
system. Korea, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and even the Ryukyu Islands
were central parts of this system. Between 1662 and 1911 well over 500
tribute missions from some 60 different countries are said to have called
at Beijing.20 These countries were all heavily influenced by many
different aspects of Chinese culture. China tried to control them without
the use of excessive military expenditure or violence, although
occasionally there would be a deliberate show of force. The states were
expected to show their subservience in different ways, including the
language of diplomatic documents and ritual prostrations (kowtow)
before the Chinese emperor. Direct military intervention became part of
this system only very late in China’s imperial history. Despite the clear
notions of hierarchy and inequality involved, the Chinese liked to
emphasize the consensual nature of this system. In part the whole
arrangement rested on the voluntary compliance of the East Asian kings.
The geographical borders of the Chinese system could be quite fluid,
occasionally going beyond even East and Southeast Asia.21
Britain possessed a strong navy and at least initially expanded
primarily in areas that could be reached by the Royal Navy. It enjoyed
an economic superiority and cultural notions that facilitated its
expansion. The cultural side was often summed up as the “white man’s
burden” or, more narrowly, “the Westminster model.” Britain would
bring progress and civilization, British concepts of law and order, and
various British standards—in anything from language to private
deportment—to different parts of the world.
Britain’s approach to ruling the Empire was flexible and pragmatic.
There were direct and indirect rule. There were evolution and
incremental steps visà-vis the dominions and, to a lesser extent, India. In
hindsight this was often seen as preparations for independence. At the
time when most of these measures were introduced they were primarily
meant to strengthen Britain’s long-term role. There was less evolution in
Africa. As late as toward the end of the Second World War, Labour
deputy leader Herbert Morrison affirmed that independence for African
colonies would be “like giving a child of ten a latchkey, a bank account
and a shotgun.”22
The Soviet Union had a strong army and generally ruled where the
Red Army had reached. In Marxism–Leninism it possessed an ideology
that could at any time explain why it was expanding and had the right to
do so. “The Kremlin model” required considerable loyalty, even
obedience, to the Soviet rulers.
 Under Stalin the Soviet demands for loyalty were very high indeed.
After a period of transition in the years immediately after the Second
World War purges took place, soon even inside the Communist Party.
Thus, the domination of the Party became near total in Central and
Eastern Europe. Those individuals who showed signs of independence
were killed or imprisoned, or, if they could not be reached, like Tito,
were denounced and isolated. Five-year models of industrialization were
introduced and agriculture largely collectivized. Rarely were the
connections between domestic and foreign policy as clearly seen as in
the Soviet case under Stalin. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the main
characteristics of the political and economic systems remained, although
the element of force and violence was reduced.23
The United States had a wide assortment of instruments, certainly
military, but also economic, political, and cultural, and expanded in
many different ways.24 America was to bring peace, liberty, and, at least
after the 1930s, freer trade to the world. While the overall structure was
flexible, limits did exist. After 1945 the most important requirement of
“the Washington model” was that the country in question supported
Washington over Moscow in the Cold War. The United States expected
its friends to stand up and be counted. As the history-conscious President
Harry Truman put it: “We are faced with the most terrible responsibility
that any nation ever faced. From Darius I’s Persia, Alexander’s Greece,
Hadrian’s Rome, Victoria’s Britain, no nation or group of nations has had
our responsibilities.”25 It was now America’s task “to save the world
from totalitarianism.”
Domestically the United States was a federation. Within the overall
US ideology and political structure, different approaches could be found
US ideology and political structure, different approaches could be found
in the forty-eight and, when Alaska and Hawaii were added, the fifty
states. In addition there was a federal district, the capital Washington,
DC, and a whole series of territories and islands in the Pacific and the
Caribbean with different formal arrangements. This diversity made it
relatively easy for Washington to add states to its “empire.” West
Germany and Japan were occupied states; most others were fully
independent states, but in many ways dependent on the United States.
Through the open American political system they could lobby for their
requirements and desires. The United States was an incredibly strong
power, but its political system was more open to outside influence than
virtually any other.
Initially at least, after 1945, there were also forces on the right which
Washington wanted to keep at bay, either because they had been tainted
by collaboration with fascism during the Second World War, or because
they were seen as extreme in their nationalism, such as was the case
with Gaullism in France. Soon, however, the containment of the right
lost out almost entirely to the containment of the left.
In Western Europe and a few other places Washington could
cooperate with regimes that were democratic, anti-communist, and in
favor of freer trade. This was the best of all worlds. In so many other
parts of the world these basic values were frequently at odds with each
other, as seen for instance in the civil war in China in the 1940s, or in
Vietnam in the 1960s. This often led Washington to a rather desperate
search for “a third road” that could combine these values, often to no
avail, since this alternative was weak or even nonexistent in many
places.
The United States had Great Power interests which sometimes clashed
 The United States had Great Power interests which sometimes clashed
with the values it often proclaimed, even the support for democratic
rule. This had happened for decades, even centuries, in America’s
domestic treatment of its Native and African Americans. The United
States had long been the most democratic country on earth, in the rights
enjoyed by its white, male population. But this had never prevented the
country from discriminating against other groups.
The same discrepancy could be found in US foreign policy. There
were cases where Washington did not support democracies when they
were too far to the left. Thus, in the fall of 1946 the broad-based
coalition government in Czechoslovakia, with the communists in a
prominent role, still had overwhelming local support. Nevertheless,
Secretary of State James Byrnes decided to stop further aid to Prague.26
The government was out of favor, primarily because it tended to support
Moscow on foreign policy issues. About the situation in Indochina in
1954 President Eisenhower himself wrote in his memoirs that “I have
never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in
Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the
time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have
voted for the communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief
of State Bao Dai.”27 This realization did not stop the Eisenhower
administration from taking strong measures to prevent Ho’s coming to
power. In Chile in 1973 the CIA certainly played a role in the overthrow
of democratically elected leftist President Salvador Allende, although he
was supported by only a minority of Chileans.
On the right, particularly in Latin America and Asia, the United States
frequently worked closely with non-democratic regimes. Occasionally
this was the case even inside Europe. During the Cold War Portugal and
this was the case even inside Europe. During the Cold War Portugal and
Spain consistently fell short of democratic standards; Greece and Turkey
often did so. Salazar’s Portugal was still a founding member of the
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and NATO.
Franco’s Spain was not permitted to take part in either organization, but
that was increasingly because of opposition from certain Western
European countries. Thus, in 1951–52, the United States entered into
bilateral agreements which made Spain an indirect member of the
Western Alliance. In Greece, the Americans actually wrote both the
Greek application for aid, and the thank-you notes in connection with
the Truman Doctrine. In Greece and Turkey local administration had
broken down to such an extent that under the Marshall Plan Americans
were closely involved in running their national bureaucracies.
Occasionally the United States interfered covertly to influence
developments. In Italy in 1947 Washington encouraged the non-
communists to throw the communists out of the government, and in
1948 far exceeded normal limits in supporting the Christian Democrats
in the election. There, as in several other European countries,
Washington encouraged the breakup of unions and parties dominated by
communists or “fellow travelers.” In 1953 the CIA intervened to help
overthrow the radical nationalist Mosaddeq in Iran, and the leftist
Arbenz in Guatemala the following year. The situation in the Philippines
was somewhat different in that here a combination of overt and covert
means was used to support the American favorite, Magsaysay, and defeat
the Huk rebels.
With the exception of the Philippines, these operations were all rather
small scale; they were still successful from the American point of view.
One reason they succeeded was that they could draw upon various local
One reason they succeeded was that they could draw upon various local
forces—often the army—and at least some popular support. So, in Iran, a
few CIA agents and a few hundred thousand dollars helped bring the
Shah back. The CIA–Guatemalan group that started the action against
the Arbenz government comprised no more than 150–300 men.
Where the United States tried to overthrow either well-organized
governments, and/or broadly supported ones, it failed, even in the
heyday of American expansion. That was the case in Albania in 1951–
52, in Tibet from the mid-1950s, in Indonesia in 1958, and in Cuba in
1961. In the Cuban case many policymakers had the parallel with
Guatemala in 1954 very much in mind. Cuba, one of the countries where
America’s influence had traditionally been the strongest, was to illustrate
the limits of Washington’s power, even on its own doorstep.

THE EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES28

The First World War and the October Revolution actually resulted in a
contraction of the new Soviet state (the independence of Poland,
Finland, and the Baltic States, border changes with Rumania and
Turkey.) In the interwar period the only significant expansion took place
in Outer Mongolia. In 1944–45 the Soviet Union not only regained most
of the territory it had lost after the First World War, but also expanded
its rule considerably. The expansion was largely the work of the Red
Army. Moscow came to exercise close control over Eastern Europe, and
much looser control over North Korea. The communists won a
momentous victory in China. That victory was based on only limited
support from the Soviets, but it certainly strengthened the Soviet
position, at least temporarily, i.e. in the 1950s. The communists also won
in North Vietnam, but Soviet domination there was modified by
Vietnam’s distance from Moscow and by a strong nationalism. Since the
Soviet Union by itself constituted one-sixth of the earth’s land area, this
could be regarded as the largest contiguous empire the world had ever
seen. However, Soviet expansion was limited to its border areas. In the
first ten to fifteen years after the Second World War the Soviet Union
was not a global superpower at all. So Stalin did not really have a Latin
American or African policy.29
In that respect the British Empire was different. Before the First World
War Britain’s Empire constituted 23 percent of the world’s population
and 20 percent of its area. (It actually grew somewhat after the First
World War, but the signs of breakdown were becoming increasingly
clear, as witnessed in Ireland and in India.) The British Empire was more
than four times the size of the Roman one, and its population did not fall
much short of the combined populations of the contemporary French,
German, and Russian empires. Despite its vast complexities the British
Empire basically fell into two categories, both scattered over very
diverse areas. One was the white dominions: Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa; the other the “colored” colonies, with India
as “the jewel in the crown.” Britain also dominated the seas and most of
the world’s strategic strong points: Gibraltar, Cape Town, Suez, and
Singapore.
The expansion of Great Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was the result of Britain’s strength and the weakness of the
periphery. Manchu China was declining; so were Mogul India and the
Ottoman Empire; Africa was “backward” and characterized by a high
Ottoman Empire; Africa was “backward” and characterized by a high
turnover of regimes. Before the Second World War at least one billion
people outside Europe were controlled by a few Western states. As has so
often been said, the sun never set on the British Empire, or even on the
smaller French one.
The American “empire” after the Second World War was in important
ways more comprehensive than either the Soviet or even the British
Empire. American expansion was global, unlike Soviet expansion, which
was limited to its border areas, however vast these border areas might
be. Compared to the British Empire the American “empire” came to
include units which were much more important strategically, politically,
and economically. The British Empire was in most respects a coalition of
peripheries, to overstate the case a little. India was celebrated for its
importance. In Curzon’s words, “as long as we rule India we are the
greatest power in the world. If we lose it, we shall drop straight away to
a third-rate power.”30 Despite such rhetoric even India was of limited
importance in Great Power politics. Britain’s influence was weakest in
the very center of Great Power politics, on the European continent. Huge
changes, such as the unification of Italy and Germany, took place
without the United Kingdom being a major actor in these events.
Like the British Empire, the American one also reflected the strength
of the mother country. But unlike the British Empire, the American
“empire” did not so much spring from the weakness of the periphery
(although it did that too), as from the weakness of most of the
traditional power centers. The American “empire” was geographically
just as comprehensive as the British, and, what was more important,
came to include four of the six power centers of the postwar years: The
United States itself, Britain, Western Europe with most of Germany, and
Japan. (The remaining two were the Soviet Union and China.) The
American “empire” was also more impressive in that it emerged largely
in the course of a ten-year period after the Second World War, while the
British Empire developed gradually over two to three centuries.
The term “isolationism,” as applied to the period up to the Second
World War, may easily give the wrong impression of America’s policies.
It was certainly not isolated from the rest of the world; in most respects
—for instance, immigration, culture, and trade—it was in close contact
with most of the world. The United States did, however, stay out of
alliances outside the Western hemisphere. “Unilateralism” was probably
a better term. Republicans, from Henry Cabot Lodge after the First
World War and Robert Taft after the Second, to even some neo-
conservatives in the 1990s, disliked alliances since they limited US
freedom of action. They wanted the United States to act on its own. Yet
there is no doubt that the American role expanded tremendously after
the Second World War. The expansion was military, political, economic,
and cultural.
The United States had no allies before the war and no US troops were
stationed on territory it did not directly control. After the war
Washington entered into numerous alliances, and bases were established
in different corners of the world. Geographically the postwar expansion
was least noticeable in Latin America, because this had traditionally
been the US backyard. The Monroe Doctrine had been Washington’s
unilateral proclamation of its special role in the Western hemisphere. In
1940–41, FDR extended the Doctrine hundreds of miles out to sea,
implied that Canada fell under it, and even broadened it to cover
Greenland (1940) and Iceland (1941). Privately, the president believed
Greenland (1940) and Iceland (1941). Privately, the president believed
that the Canaries, the Azores, and even West Africa should be covered
because of their strategic importance to the Western hemisphere.
After the war the special role of the United States was given at least
indirect multilateral sanction in the form of the Act of Chapultepec
(1945), the Rio Treaty (1947), and the Organization of American States
(1948). Until the late 1950s American policymakers took Latin America
for granted to such an extent that, for instance, all of the Western
hemisphere received less economic assistance than did the Benelux
countries alone. This began to change only in Eisenhower’s last years
and was speeded up with Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress,
although, as so often happened under Kennedy, the rhetorical change
was greater than the practical results. When needed to contain leftist
challenges, Washington reinforced its position through military
interventions, although not always with success (Guatemala, 1954;
Cuba, 1961; Dominican Republic, 1965).
The American position in the Pacific had also been strong before the
war, with the possession of Hawaii and the Philippines. After the war
Ernest Bevin soon complained that the Monroe Doctrine was being
extended to the Pacific. The Philippines were given their promised
independence, but remained closely tied to the United States
economically and militarily. The Japanese Mandated Islands came under
American control, with only the thinnest of concessions to the suzerainty
of the United Nations. American influence in South Korea remained
strong despite the US forces being pulled back in 1948. The Korean War
brought the forces back, and the American commitment to South Korea’s
defense was now expressed in a long-term security treaty.
 The new American role in Japan was the most important change
brought about by the war in Asia. The United States was the sole
occupier of Japan and the allies from the war had only the most limited
influence on the American occupation. After the peace treaty of 1951
Japan was tied to the United States through a security treaty and
comprehensive American base rights, under which Japan’s defense
became an American responsibility and Japan’s foreign policy to a large
extent an extension of Washington’s.
The Second World War had indicated that both Australia and New
Zealand would now look primarily to the United States, and not to
Britain, for their defense. In 1951 this understanding was formalized
through the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
(ANZUS). Britain was excluded from taking part, rather pointedly
demonstrating the decline of Britain in this part of the world too.
The biggest overall change took place in the American–European
relationship. The United States did not withdraw from Europe as it was
generally, and somewhat simplistically, seen to have done after the First
World War. The US first extended considerable bilateral aid to many
European countries, primarily those in Western Europe; then this aid was
given a dramatically new framework through the Marshall Plan, where
practically all the Western European countries, including Sweden,
Switzerland, and Austria, participated. In September 1946, Secretary of
State James Byrnes made it clear that American troops would remain in
Germany for the duration of the occupation. The American commitment
was then given a more lasting and multilateral form through NATO. The
United States, Canada, and the ten founding European members were
later joined by Greece and Turkey (1952), and West Germany (1955).
 The United States was far and away the dominating member of
NATO. Indeed the major point of the alliance was to tie the Americans as
closely as possible to the defense of Western Europe. The original
commitment was expanded in scope through the integrated military
command, the increase in the American troop strength, and military
assistance programs, all in turn based on the perception of an enhanced
threat largely resulting from the outbreak of the Korean War. The
integration of West Germany into a Western framework, just a few years
after the war—first economically through the Marshall Plan, and then
militarily through NATO—was a dramatic expression of the American
role. So Washington’s influence was predominant in both (most of)
Germany and Japan, the two main aggressor states of the Second World
War. The United States alone basically filled the vacuums in these two
core countries.
The financially strapped British were leaving more and more of their
commitments to the Americans. The organization of the Bizone in
Germany was an indirect way of relieving the British burden. The
Truman Doctrine in March 1947 represented the official proclamation
that the United States was replacing Britain in Greece and Turkey. From
a historical perspective, the United States was not only replacing Great
Britain as the organizer of the European opposition to the strongest
continental power, but was also playing a much more active role in
shaping the continent than Britain had done even in its heyday. The
United States helped to form a new Europe through the Marshall Plan
and NATO, and in many other, both direct and indirect, ways.
In the Middle East the situation was considerably more complex than
in Europe. Here too the Western mantle of leadership was being
transferred from Britain to the United States, but the transfer was both
transferred from Britain to the United States, but the transfer was both
slower and had stronger elements of conflict than in Europe. The various
British withdrawals, starting with Palestine in 1948 and ending with the
Persian Gulf in the late 1960s, left considerable bitterness between
London and Washington. In American eyes the British were, in some
cases, too slow in leaving (generally in the 1940s and 1950s); in others
they were too quick (in the 1960s). The British frequently felt that they
were being undercut either by the Jewish lobby or the big oil companies,
or by both. The outbursts against Washington could be strong. Thus, in
1954, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden felt that the Americans were not
only trying to replace the French and run Indochina themselves, but that
“they want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to run the world.”
However, it soon proved impossible for policymakers in Washington
to put the local situation in the Middle East, and even elsewhere, into
the East–West framework which came so naturally in Europe. Strong
American support for Israel did not preclude an expanding role toward
the Arabs as well. Before the Second World War, American oil
companies had been operating in Iraq, Bahrein, Kuwait, and Saudi
Arabia. From at least 1943, Washington pursued an active policy toward
Saudi Arabia in particular, and continued Lend–Lease aid after it had
been cut to other countries. This led the British minister to Saudi Arabia
comment that “it was too bad that an American oil company did not
hold oil concessions in the United Kingdom,” so that the British too
could continue to receive Lend–Lease. The outcome of the American–
British oil rivalry was a division of responsibility; American companies
would control the fields in Saudi Arabia, while British companies would
take the lead in Iraq and Iran. The United States also obtained base
rights in Saudi Arabia, at first in direct competition with the British.
Dhahran became a key base in the Middle East, and in return the US
provided economic and military support. In 1946 the United States was
to take over another traditional British function— namely the role of
containing Russian/Soviet influence in Iran. After the overthrow of
Mosaddeq in 1953 American oil companies even got a 40 percent
interest in the oil fields there.
The United States became increasingly involved in extending
economic and military assistance to Israel and to most Arab countries.
The Truman, and particularly the Eisenhower, administration favored an
extension of the pact system into the Middle East, but when the Baghdad
Pact was finally created in 1955—with Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran,
and Iraq as members—the US formally remained on the outside, in part
because of Washington’s Israeli connection, in part because of the
conflict between Britain and Egypt.
The Suez intervention sharply reduced British influence in the Middle
East. Not only was the United States the main factor behind the British–
French decision to halt the invasion, but, as in Greece in 1947, it also
stepped in to try to fill the vacuum which the reduced British role
created. This was the intention of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. As
Eisenhower himself stated, “the existing vacuum in the Middle East must
be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia.”31 Now the
United States took over as the predominant Great Power in the region,
although it could still cooperate with Britain, as the joint invasion of
Lebanon–Jordan in 1958 demonstrated. Kennedy tried to improve
relations even with Nasser’s more radical Egypt, but these efforts to
broaden the American role largely failed, partly because of American
support for Israel, but probably even more because of rivalry between
moderate and radical Arab forces, as revealed in the Saudi–Egyptian
conflict in Yemen.
The dismantling of colonial empires was one of the most important
and dramatic phenomena of the postwar years. It was the result of a
complex interaction of forces on the international, metropolitan, and
colonial levels. In some instances the United States actually tried to
uphold the old order. This was particularly the case when the
independence movement was seen as communist-dominated, as in
Indochina. In most instances, however, Washington tried to bring about
compromises which could provide for political stability, and generally
such stability was identified with slow advances toward independence.
American anti-colonialism helped bring about a change in Britain, the
key country in the decolonization process, and also the one closest to the
US. Various impulses, from Franklin Roosevelt’s rhetoric, to
Washington’s very direct pressure on the Netherlands over Indonesia,
stimulated the conclusion that the age of the empire was over. And with
colonial self-confidence also undermined in this way, the transfer of
power became a much more rapid process than any had thought likely
before, and even during, the Second World War. As Louis and Robinson
have argued, “In the shadow of their powerful American ally the British
followed certain golden rules more warily than ever: handle the colonies
with kid gloves; concede to subjects rather than risk confrontation with
them; and above all avoid all dangers of possible uprisings, armed
repression, and colonial wars. Only thus could the possibility of
American intervention in the African empire be averted.”32
Similar reasoning of course applied to Asia. There too the American
 Similar reasoning of course applied to Asia. There too the American
position expanded dramatically. In South Asia the United States played a
role in encouraging the British to give up colonial rule, although
Washington increasingly deferred to London as the independence
process was speeded up. After having tried to balance India and
Pakistan, the United States became exasperated with India’s neutrality
and Nehru’s morality lectures and sided with pro-Western Pakistan. But
the alliance with Pakistan, and Dulles’s occasional denunciations of
neutrality, should not hide the fact that the Eisenhower administration
wanted to maintain fairly close ties even with India and, for instance,
came to increase American economic assistance to New Delhi. Kennedy
attempted to strengthen these ties further, through military aid against
the Chinese and increased economic support, but India’s neutral position
and the American allegiance to Pakistan meant that there would be no
dramatic improvement in US–Indian relations.
In Southeast Asia the interests of the United States had traditionally
been limited to the Philippines and to rubber and tin imports from
Malaya. Soon, however, Washington came to play an increasing role,
first in Indonesia, where a small European power—the Netherlands—
tried to defeat a non-communist nationalist movement, but then also in
Indochina, where France was struggling to hold on against the
communist-led Vietminh. In Indonesia, Washington’s threat to suspend
economic and military assistance was an important factor in the Dutch
decision to finally give up. In the early years after the war the United
States largely deferred to France, primarily because of the overriding
importance of France in the Cold War in Europe. In Vietnam the United
States tried to promote a nationalist alternative at the same time as it
financed a rapidly increasing share of France’s expenses in fighting the
Vietminh. After the French defeat and the Geneva Conference of 1954,
the United States took the initiative in creating the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO), with Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and the United States as
members. In addition came the separate security treaty with Taiwan
(and the treaties with Japan and South Korea).
In 1945–46 the Joint Chiefs’ lists of essential bases illustrated how
dramatically the war had expanded US security requirements. The six
most essential ones were found in widely scattered parts of the world:
Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, Casablanca, the Galapagos, and Panama.
There is no agreed definition of a base, but, by one count, in 1955 the
United States had 450 bases in thirty-six countries. In the late 1960s, at
its maximum, the United States had one million troops stationed abroad,
far more than Britain had had at any time.33
While the United States emerged as the world’s main creditor after the
First World War, both Britain and France were still creditor states at the
time. After the Second World War the United States was virtually the
only major source of credit. (Canada and Sweden represented much
smaller sources.) Practically every Western European country, certainly
including Britain and France, wanted fresh economic assistance from the
US, in this case from the government. (The more limited American
credits extended after the First World War came largely from private
sources.)
American expansion was, in some respects, least striking on the
economic side. In part this was because here, unlike in military and
diplomatic matters, the United States had played an important role even
before the Second World War. In absolute figures there was a
before the Second World War. In absolute figures there was a
tremendous increase in American exports and imports. The United States
became the world’s largest trader, finally surpassing the United
Kingdom. In 1943–47 exports were above “normal” as a percentage of
gross national product, but they soon fell back to their traditional 3–5
percent range. During, and immediately after, the war imports remained
below 3 percent of GNP; this was somewhat lower than the historical
average, and extremely low by international standards. In most Western
European countries, including Britain, exports and imports regularly
constituted 30–40 percent, or more, of GNP. Only socialist–autarchic
countries like the Soviet Union, and less developed and geographically
isolated countries, had lower percentages than the United States. A
pronounced increase in America’s trading role would only take place in
the 1970s, with its rapidly increasing oil imports and, in part as a
consequence of this, its growing exports.
American investment abroad increased considerably, but well into the
1950s most of the growth was limited to the more traditional areas of
the Western hemisphere, Canada, and Latin America. In fact the growth
in Europe was so slow that only in 1957 did American investments there
surpass European ones in the United States. In the late 1950s, however,
American investment in Western Europe started to grow rapidly.

THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICA’S ALLIES

Britain had traditionally practiced a diplomacy of “splendid isolation.”

The fact that it stood alone could be seen as a sign of strength, but the
lack of allies can also become a sign of weakness. In war and conflict the
power with strong allies naturally has an advantage over one standing
power with strong allies naturally has an advantage over one standing
alone, other factors being equal. Gradually Britain’s isolation was
abandoned. The country could not be prepared for war in all parts of its
far-flung empire. In 1894–95 London concluded that it did not have the
power or the interest in going to war against the United States. And in
1902 it concluded its first Great Power alliance with Japan. Even in
Europe London had to reduce its traditional political distance to the
continent. Germany’s rapid build-up led to understandings with France
in 1904, and with Russia in 1907—not alliances as such, but definite
modifications of past policies.
The Soviet Union also had its alliances and treaties, first with its
Eastern and Central European partners, then with China under Mao. The
fact that the Soviet Union and China, the world’s most populous country,
concluded an alliance in 1950, and cooperated relatively well
throughout that decade, greatly helped the Soviet position. The alliance
appeared to confirm Soviet claims that the future did indeed belong to
communism. Correspondingly, when the alliance started to break up ten
years later, and armed conflict between the two countries even occurred
in the late 1960s, it severely weakened Moscow’s position. Suddenly the
United States could exploit the rivalry between the two communist
giants. In the first years after 1945 the Soviet Union had exploited its
allies in Eastern Europe; some decades later it had to subsidize these
allies in various ways to keep them reasonably happy, in part because of
the conflict with China.
The United States was considerably stronger than either Britain or the
Soviet Union. Washington too had traditionally shunned alliances and
also practiced a diplomacy of “isolationism.” After 1945 it could
probably have continued more or less on its own. Instead, it reversed
course and was soon prepared to enter into a comprehensive system of
alliances and treaties. This reflected the dramatic changes imposed by
the Second World War and by the Soviet threat; it also illustrated
America’s new-found strength and self-confidence. No longer was there
any danger of the Old World undermining the American experiment.
Now the United States would dominate much of Europe.
The system of alliances greatly underpinned US strength. America
cooperated with many of the leading powers of the world—Britain,
France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan.34 It did this from a position of
strength. Their resources were, in some respects, added to the huge
resources of the United States. Naturally Washington sometimes had to
enter into compromises with the various capitals, but with America’s
strength so overwhelming, and the lack of alternative leaders for the
West so obvious, its position was very strong indeed. As we shall see, it
was in fact so strong that in many ways the Europeans invited the United
States to assume the leading role it came to play after the Second World
War. Similarly, illustrating the complementary nature of their interests,
most administrations in Washington worked hard to build up a more
integrated Europe, so clearly different from the divide-and-rule policies
normally pursued by imperial powers. But the underlying assumption
was always that even this more integrated Europe would be following
America’s lead in most basic matters.35
American–European cooperation was based on the shared assumption
that Europe was the area of the world that mattered most. The struggle
between East and West had long been primarily a struggle over Europe.
The Cold War, just like the Second World War, would be won or lost in
The Cold War, just like the Second World War, would be won or lost in
Europe. The less important non-European issues soon created conflict
between the United States and some of its European allies. First the
European allies felt they got too little support from Washington in
upholding their colonial roles; then, when the US dominated in Asia and
the Middle East, it in turn felt it did not get the assistance it deserved.
Suez and Vietnam were expressions of this respective state of affairs.
On the security side, whenever NATO had to decide on one policy
which simply had to commit all the member states, including the United
States itself, the American voice would decide. Thus, NATO strategy
became an extension of US strategy. Under Eisenhower massive
retaliation was adopted first by Washington, then by NATO. Under
Kennedy–Johnson flexible response became the new doctrine, both for
the US and NATO. Although there was more of a time lag in the latter
case, a fact which illustrated both the skepticism and the rising influence
of the Europeans, particularly the French, there could be little doubt that
American authorities would decide American strategy and thereby
indirectly also NATO’s strategy. On the other hand, in most imperial
relationships the “vassals” would be called up to do much of the early
fighting. In Western Europe, on the contrary, US troops would be in the
first line of defense against any Red Army invasion. The combination of
America’s nuclear deterrence and its forces along the Iron Curtain was
the guarantee against any Soviet attack.
In many other cases as well American domination could be rather
striking. It is hard to imagine that, so soon after the war, the Europeans
would have agreed to the reconstruction and rearming of West Germany,
if it had not been both for America’s insistence that this be done, and an
American presence which could provide assurance against a renewed
German threat. In East Asia it proved impossible to construct one
German threat. In East Asia it proved impossible to construct one
comprehensive security arrangement, in great part because Japan could
not be brought together with its former enemies. There, a complex
network of separate alliances and security treaties was established.
Again, the United States was the linchpin in all this.
When the United States really insisted on a certain course of action,
the countries most dependent on it had little choice. This was, once
more, best illustrated in the Japanese and German cases, the defeated
countries. Thus, in 1950, and much to his dislike, Prime Minister Shigeru
Yoshida had to promise to undertake a limited rearmament; and in
1951–52 he had little choice but to recognize Taiwan, and to severely
curtail even economic contacts with “Red China.” In 1956 the Japanese
showed an interest in exploring the conditions under which a peace
treaty could be concluded with the Soviet Union based on a compromise
solution as far as the disputed northern islands were concerned. After
John Foster Dulles made it clear that the formal cession of Kunashiri and
Etorofu to the Soviets would mean that the United States could claim
Okinawa, the Japanese reverted to their original position of claiming all
the disputed northern islands.
In Germany, even after the Bonn–Paris conventions of 1952 and the
Paris Agreements of 1954, restraints remained on German sovereignty.
In the 1950s West Germany’s foreign policy was formulated in close
cooperation with the United States. In 1962–63 the Kennedy
administration was able to stop German exports of oil and gas pipelines
to the Soviet Union. When, in January 1963, after de Gaulle had said
“No” to Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community,
France and West Germany concluded the Franco–German Élysée Treaty,
Washington made it clear that Bonn had now gone too far. The treaty
Washington made it clear that Bonn had now gone too far. The treaty
could only be ratified in the Bundestag after the necessary declarations
of loyalty to NATO and to the US had been made in a new preamble to
the treaty. Even after the conclusion of the treaty the United States
clearly remained Bonn’s most important reference point.
Naturally, America had less influence in the unoccupied countries.
None the less Washington’s attitude became an important element for
policymakers in all the countries within the American “empire.” This
was especially true on the foreign policy side. Even Churchill, the senior
Western statesman, was not able to bring about the three-power summit
he ached to have after Stalin’s death. When the British prime minister
suggested that he would go alone to Moscow, Eisenhower responded that
if he did, “the effect on Congress which is this week taking up
consideration of our Mutual Defense Program and extension of our
Reciprocal Trade Act would be unpredictable.”36 Churchill stayed at
home. Frequently, allied governments kept an eye on Washington’s
reaction, even when they dealt with economic and social matters. Unless
you had a good reason, actions which could be seen as offensive to
America were to be avoided.
Suez provided the most dramatic example of the influence the United
States could have on its two most important allies, Britain and France.
The Eisenhower administration was unable to prevent the British–
French–Israeli operation against Egypt. Washington was quite simply not
asked, in large part due to the allies’ faulty appraisal that the United
States would come to accept the operation once it really got under way.
That proved a serious misreading of Eisenhower’s attitude. And when
Washington instead refused financial support through the International
Monetary Fund, threatened to withhold deliveries of oil and to cut off
the supply of intelligence information in this tense period, the strong
American response became the crucial factor in making the British, and
then the French, halt their operation and pull out. The lesson was clear:
Britain “could never again resort to military action outside British
territories, without at least American acquiescence.”37
After the uncertainties of the first years after 1945, the US had
gradually developed clear-cut objectives vis-à-vis Western Europe. On
the whole, it was able to secure these objectives. By far the single most
important objective was to limit Soviet expansion. After the “fall” of
Czechoslovakia in 1948, no European country joined the Soviet bloc. To
fight “Soviet Communism” the resources of the United States and
Western Europe had to be coordinated. To Washington this meant that
Western Europe had to be fitted into an Atlantic framework, and NATO
was the most important part of that framework. NATO was originally set
up on European initiative, especially Britain’s. But once London had
persuaded Washington, in March 1948, to commit itself to the idea of an
Atlantic security organization, the United States was to heavily influence
—sometimes to decide more or less on its own—the policies of this
organization: who the members were to be, its military strategy, its
overall attitude toward the Soviet Union, and, to a much lesser extent,
the level of defense spending in the member countries.
On the economic side the Atlantic framework was constituted
primarily by the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). The
OEEC had not become as strong an organization as the United States had
hoped, but it still played a prominent role in administering American
economic assistance and coordinating the overall economic policies of its
members. The United States was not a direct member, but still exerted
great influence on the organization, particularly during the Marshall
Plan years. When, in 1961, the OEEC was transformed into the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
United States was brought directly into the organization (together with
Canada). Through GATT, Washington could fit Europe’s efforts at
economic integration into the Atlantic framework in such a way that the
integration did not hurt America’s economic interests too much,
although the GATT rounds of the 1940s and 1950s were rather modest
affairs. CoCom regulated the trade of the NATO members, and to some
extent even of the neutral European states, with the Soviet Union and its
Eastern European allies. The US had been instrumental in setting up
CoCom, but could not prevent a great reduction in the number of
embargoed goods, particularly after Stalin’s death in 1953.38
From 1950 it became essential for the United States to have the larger
part of Germany—West Germany—on its side, even militarily. This could
either take place directly, through West German membership of NATO,
or, more indirectly, through membership of a European defense structure
linked to NATO. Washington frequently pushed much harder for
European integration than did even its continental allies. This could be
seen in Washington’s insistence on a joint economic plan to administer
the Marshall money, in its emphasis, even its threats, to bring about the
highly integrated European Defence Community in 1953–54, and in its
consistent push for an economic, and even a political, structure in
Europe that more resembled that in the United States.
 On the domestic side, the overriding American goal was to keep the
communists and their “fellow travelers” out of power. From 1947 on it
became essential to keep the communists out. With the exception of
Iceland in 1956–58, where a leftist bloc including communists actually
participated in the government, the United States was able to fulfill this
objective in all the NATO countries, until the revolution in Portugal in
1974. Iceland was so small, and such a special case, that this limited any
fear of its example spreading to other countries; the American air base at
Keflavik remained (despite its controversial nature in Iceland, especially
at the time), and measures were taken to keep particularly sensitive
documents out of communist hands.
The United States also wanted to keep Western Europe—and the rest
of the world for that matter—open to American culture. In this area too
the US was quite successful. American movies, literature, music, and
other forms of expression steadily spread. The United States became the
country to visit for aspiring politicians, business people, scholars, and
even artists.
These were all significant American successes. Within the Atlantic
community everybody took it for granted that the United States was the
leader. Whenever something important happened, the other countries
looked to the US for guidance. By acting first, so to speak, Washington
was normally able to set the parameters within which the other capitals
determined their course of action. Even when the US did not speak first,
the allies always had to figure out the American response before
deciding how to act. This defining function was crucial. When capitals
disagreed with Washington, they had to justify their actions to the US
administration in power.
 On the whole America secured its objectives through close
cooperation with the Europeans. When the two sides of the Atlantic had
strong common interests, there was normally little need for Washington
to use its sharper instruments of influence. The deepest reason, however,
for America’s success in Europe was undoubtedly the fact that
Washington’s basic overall objectives were shared, to such a large extent,
by most European governments and peoples.

WHY THE EUROPEAN INVITATIONS? DID THEY

DETERMINE US POLICY?39

Almost any form of rule, even an empire, operates on the basis of some
sort of consent from the ruled peoples. Within the Soviet Empire the
communist parties enjoyed rather limited support in Poland, Rumania,
and Hungary, despite the many individuals and organizations
accommodating themselves to the new future; in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia, where the communists and other pro-Soviet forces were
considerably stronger, so was the support. Culturally and economically
most Eastern Europeans considered the Soviets inferior to themselves. In
most of Eastern Europe the basis for the consent of the population,
however passive and indirect, was quite simply that they saw no
alternative to the Red Army. The Soviet presence was pervasive, and the
people generally remained calm. When Soviet interests were threatened,
Moscow intervened through the Red Army (East Germany, 1953,
Hungary, 1956, and Czechoslovakia, 1968). Where the local communists
had an independent power base, they soon broke away from Soviet rule,
as in Yugoslavia, Albania, and China.
The British Empire rested on a somewhat different mixture of active
support and passive loyalty. In most of the dominions, with their large
populations of British descent, support could be strong, particularly if
the dominions kept moving toward higher degrees of self-government. In
the “colored” parts the situation was much more complex. Examples can
be found of the British being explicitly invited to rule over certain areas.
In the early phase the extension of British rule more generally rested on
the conclusion of treaties with local rulers. This was the case in Africa,
although these treaties were often “unequal.” Later the British tended to
“neglect” even such formalities, and opposition to British rule increased.
Frequently they faced some form of active resistance. Then the threat,
and the occasional use of armed force, became important for both the
introduction and the maintenance of British rule.
Both the British and the local peoples generally believed in the
superiority of the white man (and the Anglo-Saxons in particular). With
Britain’s political ideals and limited resources, imperial control had to be
rather “thin.” In 1909 the population of the Empire was 7.7 times
greater than that of Britain itself; the area ratio was 1:94. In India an
administration of 2,000–3,000, an armed force of 60,000–70,000 (and a
slightly higher number of dependents) ruled over 200–300 million
people. In Northern Nigeria, during the interwar period, more than 10
million people were ruled by some 250 administrative officers. There
were areas where white men were hardly seen at all. When the local
populations started actively to resist, British rule was more or less bound
to collapse.
After 1945 foreign rule over other peoples was coming to be
 After 1945 foreign rule over other peoples was coming to be
challenged almost everywhere it existed. Traditional superiority thinking
had been shattered by the excesses of Hitler and the triumphs of the
Japanese. In East Asia the yellow man had defeated the white. The
magic of colonial rule was gone; it could not be restored. Colonialism
was certainly out of favor in Washington. However, America was so
strong, it could exert its influence more indirectly. Here the parallel to
British informal rule in the 1840s–70s is evident. When Britain was at its
peak, informal rule not only sufficed for British objectives, it often
flowed, more or less naturally, from its position of supremacy. In this
case, annexation became a sign of weakness, an admission that more
direct means had to be used to control the local scene.
With certain exceptions, such as in the postwar occupations—in
Vietnam in the 1960s, and in West Germany in general—the direct
American military presence was generally rather limited. Occasionally
the United States, too, intervened with direct force or through covert
activities. Yet, on the whole, intervention was both undesirable and
unnecessary. Washington’s supremacy was more in accordance with the
will of the local populations than was Moscow’s, and even London’s,
authority. Soviet rule was to a large extent imposed; British rule
survived as long as it did because it was not opposed. As I have
frequently argued, American “rule” was frequently invited. In this sense
the American “empire” can be called an empire by invitation. Power is
often defined as the ability to get others to do what you want them to
do. The most striking aspect of America’s power after 1945 was the
extent to which the Europeans actively worked to increase the US role in
Western Europe. This was indeed “empire by invitation.”
 It is no mystery why the Europeans invited the Americans in. In fact,
the reasons were rather obvious. First, as we have seen, Western Europe
needed economic assistance, and only the United States could provide
substantial assistance. Second, the forces of the political center in most
Western European countries wanted American support to strengthen
their position, both domestically vis-à-vis the more extreme forces on the
left and right, and often also internationally vis-à-vis other countries.
The challenge from the left was strongest in France and Italy, where the
communists and their allies regularly polled more than 20 percent of the
vote. The challenge from the right was also strongest in France, although
the Gaullist vote fluctuated a great deal. Internationally, Alessandro
Brogi has demonstrated how a complicated mixture of cooperation with
the United States and independence of it characterized both France’s
constant search for grandeur, and even Italy’s for grandezza. Washington
had it in its power to promote or relegate countries in their constant
struggle for prestige and status.40 Third, the Europeans wanted as much
military support and as strong military guarantees as possible to guard
against Soviet–Communist expansion. Although Washington had no
particular desire to give Europe billions of dollars in assistance, the
Truman administration definitely shared Europe’s desire to contain the
Soviet–Communist threat.
The Western Europeans invited the Americans into Europe despite the
conditions set by Washington, whether in the form of currency
convertibility, as in the December 1945 loan to Britain, the freer import
of Hollywood movies, as in the Blum–Byrnes Agreement, or special
shipping clauses, as in most American loans to Western Europe. Under
the Marshall Plan the Europeans had to agree to a stronger OEEC
organization than some of them had wanted, and to a more restrictive
organization than some of them had wanted, and to a more restrictive
level of trade between Western and Eastern Europe.
On the military side, most European governments wanted a
substantial American military presence. This presence could certainly
expose them to risks, but sometimes, when the initiative came from
Washington, as with the B-29 bombers stationed in Britain in response to
the Berlin crisis of 1948, the British agreed so quickly and
uncompromisingly that Secretary of State Marshall had to check with
Bevin if London had actually fully considered the implications. (Only
later did it become publicly known that the aircraft had not yet been
modified to carry nuclear weapons.)
For the Europeans there was always the possibility that they would be
overwhelmed by the formidable power of the United States. But the US
was far away, and it was better to be controlled by somebody that far
away than by some European competitor with whom you had
experienced a rather mixed history. An additional reason why the
Europeans confidently invited the Americans in was that the Europeans
were consistently able to transform US initiatives into something less
threatening than they at first seemed. True, the price might still be high,
as in the American–British loan negotiations. But if the price were too
high, reality would frequently intervene in the sense that the agreement
would break down, as was seen in the collapse of the pound and the
resulting suspension of the convertibility London had promised to
undertake in return for the loan.
In the Marshall Plan negotiations the British successfully opposed
American efforts to make the OEEC strong and supranational. London
could not be forced to take part in supranational European integration,
then or later, entirely against its own will. Britain was simply too strong,
then or later, entirely against its own will. Britain was simply too strong,
too important, too unified, and too highly considered in Washington to
be directly pushed into such responsibilities. Scandinavians and other
lukewarm integrationists could then hide behind the British.
Under the Marshall Plan the counterpart funds seemingly provided
the best leverage for the Truman administration. Each government had
to deposit local currency funds equal to the amount of dollar assistance
received. These counterpart funds could only be used with the consent of
the United States. In Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Greece the missions
of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) exerted a great deal
of authority. Germany and Austria were occupied countries where
naturally the occupying power would have considerable influence. In
Greece and Turkey local administrations had broken down to such an
extent that here too the US would be rather directly involved in running
the countries. This was rather different from the situation in most
Marshall Plan countries.
In Britain and Norway the counterpart funds were generally used for
debt retirement, a fact that obviously gave the ECA little influence on
where the money was invested. Certain concessions were gradually
made to the ECA representatives’ wish for a more investment-oriented
policy, but the two countries were able to continue their basic policies.
In Italy the government invested too little, in the opinion of ECA.
Counterpart funds were held back to make the Italians perform better,
with some, although limited, success. In France, ECA’s complaints were
the opposite: the Monnet Plan was too ambitious. In addition, fiscal
reform was consistently postponed, communists were not purged, among
other factors. Elaborate plans were drawn up to make Paris follow
American desires, again with only limited success. In the end the
Truman administration was caught between a rock and a hard place. If it
did not push hard, the French, and the Italians, would do little or
nothing; if it pushed hard, weak centrist governments might fall, and
that was clearly even less acceptable to the US. In the flood of new
American ideas and proposals to reform the European economies, the
Europeans were frequently able to pick those they liked and reject those
they liked less.41
The story was rather similar when it came to American efforts to limit
trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In December 1947 the
Truman administration initiated a strategic embargo on trade in certain
products with these countries (the A-1 list composed of military
commodities, and the B-1 list containing semi-strategic or “dual-
purpose” goods.) In the summer of 1948 Washington started work on
having these lists adopted by the European Recovery Program (ERP)
countries, and a permanent coordinating committee (CoCom) was set up
to monitor trade with the communist countries. The American position
was soon strengthened by the increased international tension as a result
of the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, the Soviet explosion
of its first atomic bomb, and the outbreak of the Korean War.
Nevertheless, with Britain in the lead, egged on especially by Denmark
and Norway, the Western Europeans were able to substantially modify
both the A-1 and, particularly, the B-1 list to take account of European
economic interests. One reason they succeeded as well as they did was
that after 1952 President Dwight D. Eisenhower clearly saw himself in a
middle position between most Europeans on the one hand, and a hard-
line Congress on the other.
 On the military side, the increases in European defense spending were
generally smaller than Washington would have preferred. The European
governments had their own interest in increasing defense expenditure,
but the optimal combination was one of the Americans spending rather
more, and the Europeans rather less. Those countries that were skeptical
about an explicit American presence, such as exposed Norway and
Denmark, could pursue a policy of no allied bases on their territory
(except in crucial Greenland in Denmark’s case). Initially, at least,
Washington had considerable sympathy for their special needs. And all
European governments seemingly had leverage with the United States.
Strong governments had this because they were strong; weak
governments had it precisely because they were weak— often so weak
that they risked being replaced by alternatives considerably less to
Washington’s liking.
It is factors such as these that have led Alan Milward and others to
argue not only that the Marshall Plan was not particularly important for
the recovery of Western Europe, but also that America’s design for
Western Europe was largely defeated.42 Similar comments have been
made about some of the other American initiatives discussed.
But these arguments go only so far. Milward probably somewhat
underestimated the economic importance of the Marshall Plan. With the
exception of agriculture, the European Recovery Program, as the
Marshall Plan was officially known, actually reached or surpassed all its
major production targets. The direct economic significance of the
Marshall Plan was considerable, although it certainly did not “save”
Western Europe single-handedly. Marshall funds did account for 10 to 20
percent of capital formation in the European countries in 1948–49, and
less than 10 percent in 1950–51.
less than 10 percent in 1950–51.
Milward definitely underestimated the plan’s political and
psychological importance. In this sense, many did believe it had saved
Western Europe. Then this belief developed a reality of its own. The
Marshall Plan also gave Europeans a more positive perception of the
United States. George Kennan may have gone too far, but he was
certainly on to something when he stated that “The psychological
success at the outset was so amazing that we felt that the psychological
effect was four-fifths accomplished before the first supplies arrived.”43
Even more important in this context, although the Truman
administration definitely did not achieve its maximum objectives,
European governments always had to keep at least one eye on
Washington’s response to the policies they pursued. Thus, in May 1949,
the British Cabinet even feared that “increased investments in the social
services might influence Congress in their appropriations from Marshall
aid.”44
At the more structural level, despite certain shortcomings the political
success of the ERP was still spectacular. It helped achieve political
stabilization in Western Europe, externally vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,
and internally vis-àvis local communists; it promoted some measure of
European integration; it made the western zones of Germany part of this
stabilization and integration; it changed European perceptions of the
United States dramatically for the better, from Washington’s point of
view; and it mobilized the American public around a comprehensive US
role in Europe. On this level, the success of the Truman administration
could be seen as astounding. The same basic argument can be made with
reference to NATO.
Naturally for the Europeans nothing beat having the United States
involved without the Americans exerting much influence on national
policies. But having one’s cake and eating it is an impossible
combination in international politics too. The United States would not
have become involved in European politics after 1945 to the extent that
it did unless Washington had had its own reasons to do so, and the
Europeans had wanted this to happen. Agreements between free
governments presuppose a mutuality of interests. Otherwise the
agreements presumably would not have been concluded.
It has been argued that America’s foreign policy was determined
primarily by America’s own interests, not by the invitations from
outside. This point is obviously true, so true in fact that I have
consistently made it explicitly clear myself: “I just take it for granted
that the United States had important strategic, political, and economic
motives of its own for taking on such a comprehensive world role.”45
Indeed, any invitations had to be combined with America’s own
interests. After 1945, European invitations were extended to a United
States disposed to respond in a much more affirmative way than it had
done in 1918–20 when Britain and France, in particular, had issued
somewhat similar invitations.
At the same time, however, it should be stressed that the European
invitations after the Second World War were definitely more insistent,
lasted longer, and came from many more countries than on the earlier
occasion. While little is really known about the state of public opinion in
Europe after the First World War, if we are to generalize about public
opinion after the Second World War the invitations extended to the
United States by most Western European governments clearly came to
receive the basic support of most of the populations involved.46
From the perspective of American–European relations it would have
been interesting to study the European response to America’s new role
after 1945, even if the response had had little or no effect on US actions.
Yet the invitations definitely did have an effect. Obviously there would
not have been any economic assistance if the Europeans had not wanted
it. Considering Washington’s initially lukewarm response to Bevin’s pleas
for an Atlantic security system, it seems likely that the setting up of
NATO would have been substantially delayed, at least, if it had not been
for the European invitations. The heart of NATO, Article 5, would
probably not have had even its semi-automatic form if the Europeans
had not pushed as hard as they did for an even more automatic
American response to potential Soviet aggression.
The experience after the First World War indicated that European
invitations alone were not enough to change America’s attitude,
although it is not really possible to tell what would have happened if the
invitations then had been as insistent, lasted as long, and come from as
many countries as they did after the Second World War. After 1945, with
the United States determined to play a much more active role, the
invitations did not force the Americans to do anything they did not
really want to do, but they certainly influenced at least the timing and
scope of America’s actions toward Western Europe.

THE RELATIVE CONTRACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN

 RECENT YEARS

In an absolute and literal sense it is difficult to argue that the United

States has contracted in recent years. Its imports and exports are
increasing virtually every year; so are its cultural contacts with the
world. The number of immigrants coming into the country is still high,
although it has not increased further, in part as a result of September 11
and a political climate less generous to immigration than before. The
United States still plays a military role all over the world. “Friction,” in
the sense of the lingering effects of the past, was important, in that
established organizations have a tendency to continue as before, even
under dramatically changed circumstances. Few organizations just
disappear from the face of the earth. Most of them continue to live on
under new circumstances. So America’s contraction is partial and
relative, compared to the expansion of the new regional powers.
In 1967, at the peak of the Cold War, the United States had had 1,014
overseas military bases scattered all over the world. In 2009 it had 716
such bases, not counting those in the war zones in Iraq and
Afghanistan.47 The defeat in Vietnam had led to the end of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the revolution in Iran a few
years later to the end of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The
end of the Cold War led to a substantial decline in the number of US
troops in Europe, from more than 400,000 at its highest to about 75,000
in 2010. The nuclear presence had been reduced to a very small number
of bombs that could be dropped from aircraft. There is even talk about
phasing these out entirely, but most Europeans, particularly in the East,
want to maintain a minimum American nuclear presence in Europe.
However, NATO definitely continued to operate, and its membership
increased from the traditional fifteen members in Western Europe, to the
present twenty-eight (now including most of Europe), with around
twenty additional countries working in cooperation with NATO in
Afghanistan. Even France came back within the military structure of
NATO. And the United States continued as the undisputed leader of the
organization. However, all this could not hide the fact that NATO no
longer had the crucial importance it had had during the Cold War. The
Cold War had been based on the primacy of Europe. The central conflict
area was in Central Europe, particularly Germany and Berlin; America’s
most important allies were also in Europe. Now “the Greater Middle
East” was undoubtedly the crucial area, followed by East Asia, with
Europe only in third place; and the emphasis within Europe had shifted
on the military strategic side—not the economic one—further east to the
Balkans and Turkey.
Article 5 had been the core of NATO, the principle of “all for one, one
for all,” in the event of a military attack. With the Soviet Union gone,
there was less talk of Article 5, although attitudes varied widely inside
the organization. Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic states were most
skeptical of Russia and insistent on the continued importance of Article
5; the United States, Canada, and Britain generally took a middle
position, while France, Germany, and Italy were generally more
interested in consolidating ties with Russia. NATO became more of a
political organization with the emphasis on providing, at the very least,
coordination on relevant international issues. The war between Georgia
and Russia in 2008 revived the military perspective somewhat. The
result was, however, that membership in NATO for Georgia and Ukraine
was indefinitely postponed. The United States could not offer these states
guarantees when there was actually a substantial chance of war. The
United States had shown some interest in making NATO a more global
organization by taking in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, etc, but there
was much opposition to this in Europe. The idea was dropped, although
cooperation increased at a less formal level.48 NATO was to some extent
being replaced by coalitions of the willing. In Afghanistan virtually all
the NATO allies participated, but so did about twenty other countries.
The invasion of Libya in March 2011 showed a NATO in considerable
disarray, although the organization did eventually coordinate most of
the allied military action. Only nine of the member countries
participated directly in military action.
The weakened interest in Europe was in part the result of the
increased focus on the Greater Middle East. The idea of the Bush
administration—that the United States could handle the military
challenge in this region more or less on its own—was definitely gone,
although even under Obama most of the heavy lifting was still done by
the US. In Afghanistan about two-thirds of the troops were American,
and they were the most active ones. But the most important point in this
context was that, after the initial success, the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq demonstrated the weakness of the United States. In the new form of
asymmetrical warfare destructive technology was available to even the
smallest groups, and they could inflict substantial casualties. Hardly
anything went according to plan. “The surge” did help to improve the
situation in Iraq. The number of American troops was later substantially
reduced; the Iraqis were able to take over most functions. Violence was
reduced. Government services improved. Even here it was difficult to be
entirely optimistic. There were still high levels of violence and political
reconciliation was limited. In Afghanistan the situation was considerably
bleaker. The increase in US troops again improved the military situation,
but the political and economic problems persisted. Several countries
were getting ready to pull their troops out of Afghanistan. Contrary to
what had been Washington’s purpose, Iran had strengthened its position
in the region considerably, Pakistan’s problems had gone from bad to
worse, and Turkey was reviving its contacts with the Muslim world at
the expense of the West.
The occasional pressure in the United States for democratic reform of
the Arab world threatened to backfire in the sense that elections could
bring more extreme elements to power, as seen with Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The democratic uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt,
and several other countries in early 2011 also seemed likely to
strengthen forces that were more critical of the United States and the
West than had been the authoritarian rulers of the past. The fact that the
United States had, almost without exception, supported these rulers
because of a mixture of strategic interests, oil, and Israel, at the expense
of democracy was not a good starting point. Still, even the new
authorities would presumably have an interest in acceptable relations
with a US that was desperately trying to adjust to new circumstances.
The fact that Washington had had some covert contact with the
opposition even earlier helped in this context.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had to diminish any further US
interest in adventures in Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere. In Libya in
2011 the United States decided to “lead from behind.” This was certainly
something new. Europe had to take the lead. With America’s debt
problems there were bound to be reductions in US defense spending,
despite the priority given to military over civilian expenditures. Yet the
reductions in other forms of international spending, in the form of
diplomacy and assistance, were also bound to reduce America’s role in
the world. Even other cuts, for instance in education and health, could
also affect its international standing: America’s universities had
represented one of its most effective forms of soft power, and the public
ones in particular were now facing serious problems.
No power could yet challenge the United States as the global leader.
Militarily China was definitely a regional power. It pursued a policy of
non-alignment which meant that it did not really have formal alliances
with other countries, although it had a series of close partners such as
North Korea, Pakistan, Myanmar. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization encompassed military, economic, and cultural cooperation,
and clearly aimed at reducing the American role in Central Asia, but the
structure was loose and the practical results limited. Even in East Asia,
with its formal alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,
America’s military position was at least as strong as China’s.
Nevertheless, the rise of many different regional powers meant that
the American role in the world was reduced. In every region of the
world there was a power that limited US freedom of action. In the
Western hemisphere Brazil in particular was rising rapidly; in Africa,
South Africa and even Nigeria were taking on new roles; in Asia, China,
India, and (still) Japan had to included; and in Europe, Germany,
France, Britain, and the EU itself (on many issues) were the primary
actors, as was Russia, particularly in the East.49
 Africa, the weakest of the continents, was a case in point. On
important issues for the United States, such as “the war on terror,” the
International Criminal Court, and the US Africa Command, the US faced
opposition, even from its friends. Washington could actually dictate very
little. The leading regional powers—South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya—
and even smaller countries such as Tanzania, Mali, Namibia, and Niger,
have resisted US policies and refused to support key initiatives. The
explanation was found in a complex combination of regional balance of
power factors, domestic opposition to the US, and growing economic
independence from the United States.50
The international structure was also shifting in favor of the new
powers in Asia. Throughout several rounds, voting power within the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was redistributed in
their favor, although primarily at the expense of European powers, less
the United States. International negotiations that had earlier been led to
a considerable extent by the United States now often ended in standstill,
or were even conducted entirely without the US. The Doha round in the
World Trade Organization was never concluded, although many efforts
were made to resuscitate it. Differences, particularly between the United
States on the one hand and China and India on the other were too big to
be bridged. The United States signed, but never ratified, the Kyoto
Treaty on climate change; in the new rounds on climate change the
United States again had to attempt to bring China and India along,
otherwise there would be no new treaty. Treaties banning landmines and
cluster munitions were worked out against the will not only of the
United States but also of Russia, India, and China. This was also a trend
of the times. Even when major powers were united they could not
necessarily stop the rest of the world from proceeding.
Invitations were still being issued to the United States. Virtually all
European countries still wanted the US to be active militarily, politically,
economically, and culturally in their part of the world. In Asia, growing
concern about the rise of China often led to renewed interest in ties with
the United States—not at the expense of China, but to be on the safe side
in case developments in China took a more ominous turn.51 President
Obama could count on widespread sympathy in Africa. The Arab world
hoped that the US would force the necessary concessions from Israel so
that a peace treaty could be worked out with the Palestinians. But
despite the personal admiration for Obama, with the partial exception of
invitations from a few countries in Asia, the new invitations to
Washington lacked the strength and conviction typified by invitations
from Western Europeans in the first years after the Second World War,
and from many of the Eastern Europeans after the end of the Cold War.
 Part II
The Limits of Power
 5
The Impotence of Omnipotence

The Great Powers are indeed great powers. The military, economic,
political, and cultural influence of the United States, the greatest of them
all, is felt in every corner of the world. Through the process of
globalization, which some incorrectly identify as almost the same as
Americanization, impulses from one part of the world are carried to
virtually all other parts. We all witness the big events live as they
happen. Ideas and goods are quickly carried around the world.
Languages, tribes, and groups disappear. In Thomas Friedman’s term, the
world is in many ways very “flat” indeed.1
It is easy to assume that some country or idea is virtually omnipotent.
But if we look more closely we see that the world is also fragmenting.
Empires are dissolved, more and more states are born. The most
powerful idea of all may well be nationalism, the idea that more and
more groups deserve their own country. The Internet is the supreme
symbol of our time. We can communicate with almost anyone instantly,
and are all part of the same virtual universe; yet, at the same time, we
see how the smallest of groups can get together and use this universe for
their own separate purposes. The Internet developed in the United States
and the net carries America’s influence around the world. Yet, tiny
terrorist groups fighting the US use the same means of communication.
In the past the United States fought major territorial units like Nazi
Germany and the Communist Soviet Union. It did not fight them alone.
It was never omnipotent. During the Second World War America had
It was never omnipotent. During the Second World War America had
Stalin’s Soviet Union as a crucial ally. During the Cold War Washington
was finally able to sign on Mao’s China, at least as an indirect ally. Now
small terrorist groups can inflict major damage on the United States, as
so clearly demonstrated on September 11, 2001. In its worldwide
struggle against these groups, the United States carries no guarantee of
success. It needs all the allies it can get.
One superpower, the Soviet Union, collapsed apparently almost
overnight. One day it was the military equal of the US; the next day the
country did not exist. The collapse had much to do with imperial
overstretch. The world’s more traditional empires have all disappeared.
In the long run it was impossible for a limited mother country to rule
over distant provinces. Sooner or later the imperial will to rule
weakened; sooner or later the colonial subjects were able to cut the
imperial connection.
In Great Power terms the United States was far stronger than both the
Soviet Union and the various colonial empires. Yet America’s rule was
also quite vulnerable: it was indirect; the US influenced mostly
independent countries; it could not long rule an area against the will of
the people. Even the mightiest of US presidents could suddenly decide to
pull out of countries they had just pronounced of national interest. And
the groups that forced it to retreat could be very small indeed, as long as
they possessed the relevant and most destructive technology.
The following parts offer some comments on the most intriguing of
questions—the curious combination of power and impotence in the rule
of the Great Powers, including that of the United States. Such questions
cannot really be resolved, only illuminated.
 IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH AND THE FALL OF THE SOVIET
UNION

Sometimes the fall of a superpower can be very rapid, even in

peacetime. The clearest example is undoubtedly what happened to the
Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. Virtually nobody predicted such
a fall. The few who did got the reasons wrong, whether referring to a
war with China (Amalrik), the dissatisfaction of the Muslims (Carrere
d’Encausse), or even the infant mortality rate (Emmanuel Todd). George
Kennan and Zbigniew Brzezinski had also expected change, even
collapse, as had Ronald Reagan and other politicians, but they were not
very specific about what kind of change this would be and exactly when
it would occur. Many reasons explain the Soviet fall: imperial
overstretch, the erosion of the center’s will to rule and the dissatisfaction
of the nationalities in the Soviet Union—although this actually affected
the Muslim groups much less than most others—and a long list of
political, social, and economic problems. If we are to understand how
superpowers can suddenly fall, some comments on the fall of the Soviet
Union appear to be in order. For the second most important actor in
international affairs simply to disappear so swiftly from the face of the
earth was so spectacular that we all, not only political science realists,
have had difficulties understanding what happened.2
Imperial overstretch would appear to be the theory most relevant to a
general discussion of the fall of empires. In 1987 Paul Kennedy
published his best-selling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.3 The book
was to popularize the term “imperial overstretch,” although Kennedy
generally used simply “overstretch.” He did not really define what he
meant by the term (and it is not found in the index of the book.) The
closest he got to indicating the precise point at which “overstretch”
occurs was in a footnote: “… the historical record suggests that if a
particular nation is allocating over the long term (sic, GL) more than 10
percent (and in some cases—when it is structurally weak—more than 5
percent) of GNP to armaments, that is likely to limit its growth rate.”4
Kennedy’s basic argument was that as new powers arose they tended to
assume military expenses. “If, however, too large a proportion of the
state’s resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead
to military purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of
national power over the long run.” Because of these extra military costs,
which aspiring challengers did not have, the leading power(s) were
eventually doomed to decline.5
The stunning sales of Kennedy’s book were probably largely based on
his analysis of the United States and his prediction that the US was
bound to “fall” in the same way that earlier Great Powers had fallen.
Kennedy was rather uninterested in how his “imperial overstretch”
argument applied to the Soviet Union. In The Rise and Fall he certainly
dealt with the problems of the Soviet Union, including the high
percentage of the gross national product devoted to defense spending.
He even argued that, in general, the problems of the United States “are
probably nowhere near as great as those of its Soviet rival.” At the same
time, however, he concluded that “This does not mean that the USSR is
close to collapse, any more than it should be viewed as a country of
almost supernatural strength.”6 No sooner was the book out than the
Soviet Union, not the United States, entered into its terminal phase. In
an analysis published as late as 1992, Kennedy actually saw Gorbachev
as an effective representative of the “managed decline,” “a strategy to
deal with the challenge of relative (sic, GL) decline in peacetime,” that he
advocated both for the Soviet Union and for the United States.7
While it is easy to criticize Kennedy’s emphasis on the decline of the
United States and his downplaying of the crisis in the Soviet Union8, my
purpose here is really to resurrect Kennedy’s general argument about the
importance of “imperial overstretch.” The Soviet Union, not the United
States, fits his theory almost perfectly. Although many different factors
account for the collapse of the Soviet Union, in my opinion “imperial
overstretch” clearly represents one of the most powerful explanations for
the fall of the Soviet Union, and the most relevant in the context of this
book.9
The present author is no great expert on the Soviet Union; the
emphasis on “imperial overstretch” is borrowed from Kennedy. So what
this section attempts to do, more than anything, is to synthesize the
enormous literature on the fall of the Soviet Union and on the end of the
Cold War in the light of Kennedy’s thesis.
The argument comes in three parts: imperial expenses in the Soviet
Union were extremely high; the need to reduce them was a prime
motivation behind Gorbachev’s increasingly drastic changes in Soviet
domestic and foreign policy; these drastic changes were responsible,
more than anything, for bringing first the Cold War, and then the Soviet
Union, to an end.10
In the 1950s and 1960s economic growth had been rapid in the Soviet
Union. Optimism about the future was considerable, as could be
witnessed in Khrushchev’s many statements about when the Soviet
Union would overtake the United States in various fields, including even
agriculture. These statements are easy to caricature in the light of the
Soviet Union’s eventual collapse, but in this period even many non-
communists were exceedingly optimistic about the prospects of the
Soviet Union. In the 1970s and 1980s economic growth began to taper
off significantly, as could be seen even in official statistics. So, when
Gorbachev took over in 1985 there was little or no growth in the Soviet
economy, military expenses were high, and there was very little spillover
from military to civilian technology.11
A more comprehensive public presentation of the Soviet defense
budget was made only in 1989. Then the official budget figure was
published at 77.3 billion rubles, but the lack of a realistic pricing system
made the numbers a great deal less meaningful than they appeared to
be. Similar problems apply to efforts to determine the size of the Soviet
gross national product. Therefore, at present, no accurate figures can be
given for imperial expenses as a percentage of GNP. In fact, it is unlikely
that we will ever be able to give a precise answer to this question.12
From 1975 onwards, Soviet official statistics began to present Soviet
national income as unchanged, at 67 percent of US national income. In
the 1980s the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO) in Moscow estimated Soviet national income to be only about
50 percent of US national income, and the percentage was seen as
falling.13
Western estimates of the size of the Soviet GNP have varied widely.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was long regarded as the leading
authority on the size of the Soviet economy. In 1986 they estimated the
Soviet economy at 57 percent of the US economy; by 1990 this
percentage had allegedly fallen to 52. In hindsight it is obvious that the
agency had a clear tendency to overestimate the size of the Soviet GNP
and to underestimate the growing difficulties in the Soviet economy in
the 1980s. In his memoirs, even CIA director Robert Gates (1991–93)
admits that the “CIA in its statistics overstated the size of the Soviet
economy and relatedly underestimated the burden of military
expenditure on that economy and society.”14
Other studies, for instance by Swedish expert Anders Åslund,
suggested that the CIA’s estimates of the size of the Soviet economy were
at least 20 percentage points too high. In 1990 the chairman of the US
Council of Economic Advisers, Michael Boskin, stated that “Soviet GNP
is probably … only about one-third of the GNP of the U.S.” In 1997 the
European Comparison Project calculated Soviet GNP in 1990 to have
been 32 percent of US GNP, although this was on a per capita basis.
Later estimates by Russian economists have put the figures even lower
than this. Noted Russian economist Girsh Khanin has calculated Soviet
GNP in the mid-1980s to have been only 14 percent of the US one, but
his dramatic conclusions have been challenged.15
Traditionally, Soviet government officials used to state that Soviet
defense expenditure comprised less than 7–8 percent of total GNP, a
figure which appears to have been chosen primarily because it
corresponded roughly with that for the United States at the time.16
According to the CIA’s estimates, the military’s share of Soviet GNP was
calculated to have grown from 12–14 percent at the beginning of the
1970s, to 15–17 percent in the 1980s. This upward trend reflected more
a downward revision of Soviet GNP than an upward revision of defense
spending. Robert Gates writes that he himself mistrusted these figures, “I
believed instinctively that, in this communist variant of Sparta, the
burden of military-related spending was … perhaps between 25 and 40
percent.”17
In their detailed studies of Soviet imperial expenses, Henry Rowen
and Charles Wolf concluded that such expenses were clearly higher than
estimated by the CIA. They set the figure at 25–30 percent of Soviet
GNP. Two factors explain the higher estimate as compared with that of
the CIA. First, Rowen and Wolf argued that the CIA both clearly
underestimated defense expenditure, and overestimated the Soviet GNP.
Second, in their calculations of Soviet imperial expenses Rowen and
Wolf included other expenses than simply the defense budget, such as
trade subsidies, trade credits, economic aid, military aid, covert and
destabilization activities, and, from 1979, the costs of the operation in
Afghanistan. These other costs fluctuated a great deal over time, but
Rowen and Wolf estimated them at an average of 3–4 percent of Soviet
GNP between 1970 and 1983. After that they declined appreciably.18

HOW TO REDUCE SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING?

It is probably impossible to establish the correct figure for Soviet

imperial expenditures, as a percentage of Soviet GNP, in the early 1980s.
Most likely it was in the 25–40 percent range. If the lowest estimates of
Soviet GNP are accepted, then the imperial burden may have reached
35–40 percent of Soviet GNP. In this context, however, what is even
more important than reality itself is what the Soviet leaders themselves
more important than reality itself is what the Soviet leaders themselves
actually believed were the effects of the high defense spending.
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, there
already seems to have been, or at least there soon developed, a
widespread feeling within the political and even the military leadership
that the Soviet Union was devoting too much money to defense
spending. Anatoly Dobrynin reports from his first private meeting with
Gorbachev in April 1985 that Gorbachev “strongly believed that we
could not gain victory ‘over imperialism’ by force of arms, nor could we
solve our domestic problems without ending the arms race.”19
The “real” size of the Soviet defense budget was a closely guarded
secret, known only to a few people. (Gorbachev states that only “two or
three people had access to data on the military–industrial complex.”) In
his memoirs, Gorbachev also writes that after he became General
Secretary it turned out to his surprise that “military expenditure was not
16 percent of the state budget, as we had been told, but rather 40
percent; and its production was not 6 percent but 20 percent of the gross
national product.”20 While the security of the Soviet Union had to be
maintained, Gorbachev also emphasized “the need drastically to reduce
our defence budget—an indispensable condition for improving our
economy.”21
On July 2, 1985, the inexperienced Eduard Shevardnadze was chosen
to succeed the old veteran Andrej Gromyko as Soviet foreign minister.
Shevardnadze also quickly came to the conclusion that something had to
be done with the huge defense budget. With apparent reference to his
thinking in 1986, he writes that “We became a superpower largely
because of our military might. But the bloated size and unrestricted
escalation of this military might was reducing us to the level of a Third
World country, unleashing processes that pushed us to the brink of
catastrophe.”22
The consensus on the need to reduce defense expenditure included
Yegor Ligachev, who soon became Gorbachev’s de facto number two,
and then his conservative rival. Ligachev writes that “After April 1985
we faced the task of curtailing military spending. Without this, large-
scale social programs would not have been implemented; the economy
could not breathe normally with a military budget that comprised 18
percent of the national income.”23 Marshal Sergei Akromeyev and Vice
Foreign Minister Georgii Kornienko similarly indicated in their joint
memoirs that “the USSR was not able to continue after 1985 the military
confrontation with the USA and NATO. The economic possibilities for
such a policy were exhausted.” It is not entirely clear, however, whether
this was an opinion they held in 1985, or whether it was something they
concluded a few years later.24
Some Soviet officials estimated defense spending as a percentage of
GNP even higher than Gorbachev’s 20 percent. By 1991, Chief of the
Soviet General Staff V. N. Lobov apparently put the military’s share at
one-third, or possibly even higher.25 In his The Collapse of the Soviet
Military, William Odom therefore concludes that “A surprisingly broad
consensus existed among most of the Soviet elite that the Soviet
economy was in serious trouble and that the burden of military
expenditure was much to blame.”26
The conclusion seemed obvious: the Soviet economy was in dire
straits. The burden of military spending was, to a large extent, to blame.
To reduce this burden arms control and disarmament had to be
promoted. That in turn implied a basic change in Soviet foreign policy in
general, particularly toward the West.27
Gorbachev certainly represented a huge difference in style compared
to his predecessors. He was much younger, and much more open to new
ideas and to dialogue with Western politicians. Initially, however, in
defense as in other fields, Gorbachev’s reforms were cautious. There was
the belief that modest reform would suffice to solve whatever problems
the socialist system had. In chief reformer Alexander Yakovlev’s words
about the situation in 1985 and the need for perestroika: “The idea of
acceleration was not oriented to abrupt social changes … The
dominating opinion was that in the huge organism (of the socialist
system) it was necessary to turn on some ‘taps’ and to turn off others, to
replace this and to repair that, and then everything would go well.”28
In recommending Gorbachev for the post of General Secretary,
Foreign Minister Andrej Gromyko had not only stated that he had “teeth
of steel,” but also that for Gorbachev “defense and vigilance are a sacred
matter. In current circumstances this is the holy of the holies.” In the
initial Five-Year Plan for 1986–90, military expenditure was to grow
faster than the “net material product”; even the latter was supposed to
accelerate significantly. To the extent that one could hope for a
reduction in Soviet military spending, this should preferably take place
in tandem with a reduction in the American defense budget, although
Gorbachev was more willing than Ligachev and the military to go below
strict parity with the United States.29
More generally, Gorbachev himself refers to the fact that “The inertia
of paternalism made itself felt for a long time.” As late as at the Polish
party congress in June 1986, Gorbachev stated that “threatening the
socialist system, attempting to undermine it from the outside and tear a
country out of the socialist fold, means violating not only the will of the
people, but also the entire order since the Second World War, and in the
final analysis, peace itself.” Gorbachev’s initial idea was to see whether
it was possible to end the war in Afghanistan through one last concerted
military effort.30
Some of Gorbachev’s early ideas for disarmament clearly had a
tactical dimension. From his first conversation with Gorbachev,
Dobrynin reported that the General Secretary was interested in ousting
as many American troops as possible from Europe. A stage-by-stage
withdrawal of US and Soviet troops from Europe would take the
Americans back across the Atlantic, while “the presence of our troops
would be felt most palpably by European states.”31 In his first two years,
Gorbachev had a rather low opinion about the possibility of cooperating
with Reagan; Soviet disarmament proposals could then serve to increase
the split between the United States and Western Europe.32
Still, Gorbachev believed, in the words of his close adviser Anatoly
Chernyaev, that “scaling down the Cold War basically meant scaling
down the arms race.”33 The idea of a nuclear-free world came up in
April 1985, and it surfaced as an official Soviet proposal in January
1986. The proposal was actually made by Akromeyev, but the
inspiration obviously came from political circles. Moscow had presented
similar ideas in the past; the purpose had then been largely
propagandistic in the sense that nobody expected any such nuclear
disarmament to take place. While Gorbachev may well have been sincere
in presenting the proposal, the Soviet military apparently still did not
expect it to go very far.34 It is another matter that with the proposal on
the table, and with developments moving as quickly as they did, it soon
came to take on a force of its own.
In the same way that domestic reforms were rather limited in the first
two years after his coming to power, so foreign policy change too was
moderate in 1985–86. In his memoirs, Gorbachev thus writes about his
first meeting with Reagan, in Geneva in November 1985, that “As I
reread the minutes, I am amazed at the extremely ideological stands
taken by both partners. In retrospect, they read more like the ‘No. 1
Communist’ and the ‘No. 1 Imperialist’ trying to out-argue each other,
rather than a business-like talk between the leaders of the two
superpowers.”35
At the next summit, in Reykjavik in October 1986, Reagan and
Gorbachev apparently got close to agreeing on the elimination of all
nuclear weapons. The two leaders shared a vision of a nuclear-free
world. The difference in views on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
prevented an agreement between them. It was also obvious that few of
the other negotiators on the two sides fully shared the abolitionist views
of their leaders. In the short term, Reykjavik was a disappointment.36
In the Politburo meeting after Reykjavik, Gorbachev affirmed that “It
is impossible to expect any constructive actions or suggestions from the
U.S. administration.” The Soviet Union needed to show that “the
American side is responsible for the breakdown in the agreement over
the questions of reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons.” It should
be demonstrated that the Reagan administration “bears full
responsibility for the failure of the agreement at Reykjavik.” Reagan
could not control his “gang”; he appeared to be a “liar”; “the
normalization of Soviet–American relations is the business of future
generations.”37

THE SMELL OF SUCCESS

None the less, the ground had been laid for huge changes, earlier and
more dramatically on the foreign policy than on the domestic side. The
domestic reforms of 1985–86 produced relatively few significant results;
from the spring and summer of 1987 there was a definite shift in the
direction of more comprehensive reform, particularly as far as glasnost
was concerned. This was to produce a growing split between Gorbachev
and Ligachev. Only more glasnost could produce perestroika, given the
entrenched nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. Yakovlev even concluded
that limited reform was impossible; it was necessary to dismantle the
socialist system as such.
Gorbachev’s problem on the domestic side was that he was so
uncertain about where he actually wanted to take the Soviet Union.
Perestroika was to take place within a basically socialist structure of
ownership, and without dramatically modifying the artificial price
structure; glasnost was still to occur within the confines of the Party’s,
and particularly Gorbachev’s own, unchallenged leadership.38
On the foreign policy side it was much easier. Gorbachev may not
have known exactly where he was heading, even in foreign policy, but if
he wanted to end the arms race and transform the East–West climate,
he wanted to end the arms race and transform the East–West climate,
the solution was obvious: he could do this simply by agreeing to Western
proposals that were already on the table. Bureaucratically, Gorbachev
had much greater freedom to maneuver on the foreign rather than the
domestic side, since many fewer actors were involved on the Soviet side
here.
It can be argued that the theoretical breakthrough for a new foreign
policy came at the 27th party congress (February 25 to March 6, 1986).
Robert Gates writes that “March 6, 1986, should be marked as the
beginning of the end of the Cold War,” although this became apparent
only in retrospect “because the next months were filled with events that
kept suspicion alive on both sides.”39 For generations, communist
thinking had been based on the view that international relations were
dominated by the interests and laws of class warfare. Periods of peaceful
coexistence might be possible between communist and capitalist states,
but even this represented the continuation of the international class
struggle in another form. Now, suddenly, universal values were to take
priority over the class struggle.
The overall tone was set, although it took time to work out concrete
agreements. The earliest and strongest signs of change were seen in
Afghanistan. At the party congress Gorbachev had described the
situation there as a “bleeding wound.” In July 1986 the first Soviet
forces were withdrawn, and in September 1987 Shevardnadze privately
told Secretary of State George Shultz that all Soviet forces would leave
Afghanistan soon. On February 8, 1988, Gorbachev announced to the
Soviet people that the Soviet forces would start withdrawing from
Afghanistan by May 15, and would complete their withdrawal in 10
months.40
It was also important that the Soviet Union changed its position on
the crucial question of verification of arms control agreements. A system
of on-site inspections was accepted which would have been unthinkable
only a few years earlier. The new system was spelled out in September
1986 in the Stockholm Document of the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe (CDE).41
Although the Reykjavik summit was a short-term failure, it proved a
long-term success. Nuclear weapons were not to be abolished, but a
series of concrete agreements were soon worked out. When
Shevardnadze came to Washington in September 1987, he brought with
him a letter containing proposals which were to lead to the treaty
banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF).42
With the signing of the INF treaty, the Washington summit of
December 1987 was guaranteed to be a success. “Gorbymania” was
beginning to break out in the West. Gorbachev told the Politburo that
while, until now, Reagan had been seen as “the expression of the most
conservative section of American capitalism and the master of the
military industrial complex,” he and the American leadership had now
been transformed into individuals with “very normal feelings and
anxieties.”43
Gorbachev’s speech at the UN in December 1988 provided the most
dramatic evidence of his impatience to reduce military expenditure and
end the Cold War. The speech’s main intent “was to show the
international community that mankind was on the threshold of a
fundamentally new era, the traditional principles governing
international relations, which were based on the balance of power and
rivalry, to be superseded by relations founded on creative cooperation
and joint development.”44
In the speech, Gorbachev informed the world that Soviet armed forces
would be unilaterally cut by 500,000, out of a total of five million, and
by the corresponding number of weapons and equipment; six armored
divisions were to be withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary, thus providing a good basis for the agreement on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) which was signed in Paris in November 1990.
Gorbachev had obviously decided that unilateral action was necessary
to end the bureaucratic foot-dragging on both sides. In May 1989 the
Soviet Union, for the first time, published a realistic defense budget. This
budget was to be cut by 14.2 percent, and defense procurement by 19.5
percent. In 1989, conversion from military to civilian production finally
started in earnest.45
Why had Gorbachev decided to move ahead at such a rapid pace?
First, the period from March 1985 had not yielded the results an
impatient Gorbachev had hoped for. Economic growth may have picked
up somewhat in 1985–86, but only marginally. But no real cuts had been
made in Soviet defense spending; and no significant progress had been
made in arms control.
Second, Gorbachev had strengthened his control of the government
and the party considerably. He had had the chance to fill senior
positions with more of his own appointments. Shevardnadze kept
pushing for ever more comprehensive understandings with the West. On
May 28, 1987, Mathias Rust landed his small Cessna aircraft virtually on
Red Square, thereby hugely embarrassing the Soviet military. Gorbachev
was furious. By the end of 1988, the traditionalist Minister of Defense,
Sokolov, had been replaced by middle-of-the-roader Yazov, and all but
two deputy defense ministers, all the first deputy chiefs of the General
Staff, the commander and the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces, all
the commanders of the groups of forces and fleets, and all of the district
commanders, had been changed. In October 1988 Gorbachev became
president of the USSR, thereby giving himself an additional power base
outside the party. Ligachev, who insisted that the class struggle ought
still to form the basis of international relations, was demoted.46
Third, although Gorbachev was basically in control of foreign policy
in 1987–88, he still faced resistance. His greatest opponent, however,
was the lack of concrete results domestically. More and more, Gorbachev
came to appreciate foreign policy, both because it could achieve more
rapid results, and because the growing “Gorbymania” in the West
provided him with additional strength domestically. In his memoirs
Gorbachev writes, with reference to the UN speech, that “I will not deny
that I also hoped that a positive international response to my programme
would strengthen my position and help overcome the growing resistance
to change in the Soviet Union.”47
Related to this—as we have already seen, and shall shortly return to—
when Gorbachev became willing to make dramatic concessions, he then
met with a favorable response from the West, a response which, in turn,
changed his appraisal of Reagan and other Western leaders, and
contributed to further agreements and reforms.
Many books and articles have been written about the end of the Cold
War.48 On the American side, the many participant writers who helped
formulate Washington’s foreign policy naturally want to stress the
contributions made by Presidents Reagan and Bush, and thereby
indirectly by themselves. They have received some support from old-
style Russian writers who see the collapse of the Soviet Union as the
result of Western machinations.
Most historians and political scientists who have written about the
end of the Cold War place primary emphasis on the contributions made
by Gorbachev. In his detailed study of the end of the Cold War,
Raymond Garthoff thus argues that

“The West did not, as is widely believed, win the Cold War through
geopolitical containment and military deterrence. Still less was the
Cold War won by the Reagan build-up and the Reagan Doctrine, as
some have suggested. Instead ‘victory’ came when a new
generation of Soviet leaders realized how badly their system at
home and their policies abroad had failed.”49

In any bipolar relationship the attitudes of both sides count. In general

terms, the West certainly influenced Soviet actions by its political and
economic success. As Gorbachev told a Central Committee Conference in
May 1986, “We are encircled not by invincible armies but by superior
economies.”50 In comparison with the West it was becoming increasingly
evident that the Soviet Union was in an economic, social, and moral
crisis; détente robbed the Soviets of an enemy which had meant much
for the cohesion of the Eastern bloc; and the Helsinki Process set certain
standards of human rights which had important long-term effects in the
Soviet Union.
The containment policy of the United States in particular also greatly
increased the costs of Soviet foreign policy, given the Soviet desire to act
as its military equal. The already expensive arms race threatened to
become even more expensive with the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Dobrynin writes that the Soviet leadership “… was convinced that the
great technical potential of the United States had scored again and
treated Reagan’s statement (on SDI, GL) as a real threat.”51 Shultz saw
SDI as “a terrific bargaining chip.” This it may well have been, though in
the short term it probably also stimulated the further development of
offensive weapons on the Soviet side.52 The cost of the war in
Afghanistan steadily escalated. The “success” of the Soviet Union in the
Third World was ambiguous indeed. The new allies did not necessarily
prove so loyal, and they all definitely came with a considerable price tag
attached.
For Gorbachev’s foreign policy to succeed the West had to cooperate.
Western Europe clearly was prepared to do so. Even Margaret Thatcher’s
Britain occasionally felt that in 1981–83 Ronald Reagan went too far in
his anti-Soviet policies. In 1983–84 Reagan’s attitude to the Soviet Union
changed. He became willing to meet and have serious discussions with
Soviet leaders. The harshness of his Cold War rhetoric was toned down.
This change started well before Gorbachev came to power. As Beth
Fischer argues, the change may have been influenced by the Soviet
shooting down of a Korean airliner, by the war scare in September 1983
(when, for a while, the Kremlin actually appeared to believe that NATO
might attack the Soviet Union), and by the anti-nuclear movie The Day
After.53 Other considerations probably also played their part: the
American build-up had been going on for some time and Reagan could
see the new policy as a reflection of that; a more flexible policy would
stimulate cooperation, both with Congress and with Western Europe;
and opinion polls indicated that the American people wanted both
“strength” and “peace.”54
On the American side, some soon felt that Ronald Reagan was
advancing too fast, and that he was making too many concessions to
Gorbachev. We tend to forget the opposition to the new policy. Even
Nixon and Kissinger, who had worked so hard for détente in the 1970s,
thought Reagan was too impulsive in his cooperation with the
Kremlin.55 Still, the concessions which led to the end of the Cold War
were definitely made by Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. On the arms
control side, the INF treaty became possible when Moscow gave up the
linkage to SDI and to British and French weapons and agreed to
dismantle the SS-20s already deployed. Under the CFE treaty of 1990,
the principle of equal ceilings meant that the Eastern side gave up 50
percent of its tanks and heavy artillery while the Western side gave up
only 10 percent. Later, the Soviet Union even conceded the United States
the right to have the same number of troops in Europe as did the Soviet
Union. And in all the various disarmament treaties the Soviet Union
agreed to a comprehensive system of verification which would have
been unthinkable in the old days.
Gorbachev’s more political concessions were even more far-reaching.
Moscow agreed to pull out of Afghanistan. In Eastern Europe the
Brezhnev Doctrine was abandoned, and although Gorbachev clearly
hoped that reform communists would be able to hold power, he refused
to intervene militarily, and to a large extent even politically, when the
old order was swept away in that momentous half-year in 1989, from
the parliamentary elections in Poland in June, to the fall of Ceauşescu in
December.56 In Germany, Gorbachev eventually agreed not only to the
unification of Germany, but even to the inclusion of the eastern part of
Germany in NATO, although certain restrictions were set on NATO’s
presence in the eastern part.57 In the Soviet Union itself, Gorbachev was
behind the limited use of force in Baku in April 1989, and possibly also
Vilnius in January 1991. In the end, however, he, as opposed to the coup
leaders of August 1991 who were clearly planning a tougher policy to
hold the Soviet Union together, resisted the violent option.58
Under Gorbachev massive historical changes were taking place. The
outer Soviet empire was dismantled; even the Soviet Union was
dissolved, although Gorbachev did his best to prevent an outcome which
was clearly more the result of Boris Yeltsin’s desires than his own;
communism was replaced by a new form of Russian democracy; in the
place of the centrally planned economy came a much more market-
oriented system.
Gorbachev set all these changes in motion. But he clearly did not
foresee the result of the changes he started, and may not even have
favored any of the outcomes mentioned. Yet, by not using force on a
significant scale to hold back change, he accepted the outcomes.
Gorbachev turned more conservative from October 1990 to April 1991.
In the end, however, unlike Czar Alexander II and Khrushchev, he did
not reverse course when the reforms produced results very different from
those he intended.59
By behaving in a constructive and sympathetic way, by showering
Gorbachev with praise and stressing his many foreign policy “successes,”
rather than his domestic failures, the West, and Reagan in particular,
stimulated Gorbachev to make the choices he did.60 But in realpolitik
terms the job of the West was easy: basically to cash in on all the various
concessions Gorbachev made, concessions which resulted in the end of
the Cold War and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union.

THE UNITED STATES AND OVERSTRETCH

Paul Kennedy’s application of the “imperial overstretch” argument in

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers was curiously flawed. First, it might
be argued that the 5–10 percent definition of armaments as a percentage
of GNP, hidden in a footnote, was rather strange in that the qualification
about structural weakness appears to be more important for the fall of a
state than the specific percentage it spent on armaments. Second,
Kennedy used his argument to explain in part the historical fall of Great
Britain, but primarily the coming fall of the United States. In a slightly
later study Kennedy has shown that for much of its imperial history it is
highly doubtful that Britain’s rather low imperial expenses met even the
minimum 5 percent definition he presented in the footnote, let alone the
10 percent.61 After 1945 the United States only spent more than 10
percent of its GNP on defense during and immediately after the Korean
War (fiscal years 1952–55), and at no other time. On the prediction side
(which was so important both for Kennedy’s argument and for his sales),
in the 1990s US defense expenditure even fell well below 5 percent, a
fact which suggests that the United States was no longer negatively
affected by its defense spending.62
However, the overall argument of overstretch would seem to be valid
in explaining not only the fall of the Soviet Union, but also the end of
the Cold War. Kennedy just focused on the wrong cases. Overstretch was
acute for the Soviet Union, much more limited for Great Britain, and
certainly for the United States.
Niall Ferguson has suggested that the fall of empires, even the current
American one, can be precipitous.63 It is difficult to believe that in the
American case this would be because of imperial overstretch in
Kennedy’s narrow sense. Despite America spending more on defense
than all of its major challengers added together, the total amount does
not come to more than 4–5 percent of its GNP, higher than in all of its
likely competitors, but still fairly limited.
Yet defense spending is of course part of the wider picture of the US
deficit in federal spending and, more indirectly, its current accounts.
Spending 4–5 percent on defense when everybody else spends
considerably less, and when public debt is the overriding issue, is not a
good situation to be in. Defense spending will undoubtedly be cut, but
probably not severely as the Republicans want to maintain the high
spending level. In several EU countries we see these very days how
rapidly the situation can change, from years of uncontrolled deficit
spending, to rapid and dramatic cuts in their budgets. The markets
demand action. It is not likely, but far from unimaginable, that
Washington may be forced to undertake similar actions, with the
consequences this could entail for America’s standing in the world. Larry
consequences this could entail for America’s standing in the world. Larry
H. Summer’s question remains of how long the world’s biggest borrower
can also be the world’s leading power. Others ask what kind of
superpower the United States would be when it spends more on interest
payments than on defense, a condition that is likely to occur in a few
years’ time.
 6
The Long Lines of History

Globalization would seem to encourage the idea that we are all not only
living in the same world, but that we are being influenced by the same
forces emanating from one geographical center. The United States is
usually seen as this center. Globalization and Americanization are often
seen as very closely related phenomena, but this is too simplistic a view.
Globalization flows from many sources; it is also accompanied by
fragmentation. From a historical perspective we can see how almost all
the old imperial units have been dissolved, and a rapidly increasing
number of nation states has taken over. These nation states have become
smaller and smaller in terms of territory and population. Imperial rule
broke down due to emerging new standards of legitimacy at an
international, national, and local level. Gradually the Great Powers—
including the Soviet Union—lost their will to rule “the distant
provinces.” The new states became an important force in international
relations, reducing the influence of the Great Powers, even including the
United States. The US generally favored decolonization, but once they
were free, most of the new states chose an independent course.

GLOBALIZATION1

Globalization was certainly not a new phenomenon after 1945.

Throughout the centuries cultures all around the world had established
contact with other cultures. The world religions illustrated how this
happened. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all originated in the Middle
East. Then they spread to the most distant corners of the world. Pests
and plagues illustrated the same basic development, as did economic
transfers, in the form of technological inventions and economic cycles.
The pre-1914 world was in some ways more integrated than the world of
today. Workers could travel much more freely from country to country,
practically all around the world, than they can today. The Great
Depression after 1929 clearly illustrated the economic interdependence
of the world; as such it had a great influence on the way in which
policymakers after 1945 thought about these issues.
What was new after 1945 was the rapid improvement in
communications of all types. Soon we could fly to practically anywhere
in the world, and many of us did travel to ever more distant
destinations. On television we could watch major events unfold almost
anywhere as they happened. Exports and imports rapidly increased,
although for decades they did not exceed the levels before the First
World War, adjusted for the size of the economy. For centuries there had
been multinational companies, such as the British, French, Dutch, and
even other East India Companies, although they had, as their names
indicated, a firm national basis. The number of multinational companies
exploded from 3,500 in 1960 to 40,000 in 1995. The global currency
turnover grew exponentially. Globalization helped to bring rapid
economic growth to most countries of the world. The emergence first of
Japan, then China, and to some extent even India, illustrated this—or
rather their re-emergence, since China and India had, a few centuries
ago, been leading economies and cultures. The housing and banking
crisis that originated in the United States in 2007–08, and then turned
crisis that originated in the United States in 2007–08, and then turned
into a semi-global economic crisis, showed the more problematic side of
globalization.
Ideologies and religions of all kinds spread quickly—democratic or
totalitarian, violent or non-violent. In the interwar years totalitarian
regimes had been on the offensive. Democracy was found largely in
North America and most of Western Europe. Today, almost 60 percent of
the world’s population lives under democratic rule. The main exceptions
are China and large parts of the Muslim world, although important
changes were taking place in 2011 in the Arab world.2 We could all
cross borders as salespeople and tourists, but so could terrorists; goods
and, to a lesser extent, labor could also travel relatively freely, but so
could pollution.
After the creation of the railroads in the nineteenth century it was
said that the small German states had lost their relevance since you
could pass through some of them in half an hour. Germany simply had
to be united. With modern aircraft we can fly across many, if not most,
of the world’s states in that time. Although one overall government has
not developed, many global institutions have evolved. The United
Nations became a stronger and geographically much more
comprehensive organization than the interwar League of Nations. The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has developed into the
more effective World Trade Organization. A whole series of
transnational, non-governmental organizations have become influential
(Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines. Some observers even started referring to the development of
a “global society” or a “global consciousness,” even the “global village.”
The nation state was also being challenged by developments at the
 The nation state was also being challenged by developments at the
regional level. The European Union was the most successful and
comprehensive of these regional institutions. The EU came to include a
rapidly increasing number of new members, and integration spread to
ever new areas. Similar, if not quite so strong, institutions were evolving
in many regions of the world.
Technological improvements are constantly being made which will
improve communication across the world. This aspect of globalization
may well be inevitable and irreversible. Other parts of the process are
clearly more politically driven. Thus, in the 1930s, under the influence
of the Great Depression and totalitarian ideologies, globalization slowed
down considerably. Today, with rising economic problems, there are
signs that the pace might be slowing somewhat, although protectionism
has been better contained than many observers had expected.

FRAGMENTATION

The extent of globalization may easily be exaggerated. Only 2 percent of

students study at universities outside their home countries; only 3
percent of people live outside their country of birth; less than 1 percent
of all American companies have any foreign operations; and the vast
majority of goods are not traded across international borders.3 If we look
more closely, we can even see that the world has, in some respects,
become larger and more fragmented than it used to be, rather than
smaller and more globalized.
In 1945 the United Nations had fifty-one members, fewer than the
number of countries in Africa today; it now has 193 members. Then
there is the small number of states that do not want, or do not feel
financially able, to join. So, depending on the definition used, today
there are at least 200 states. The fate of modern empires and other large
territorial units illustrates the point. The colonial empires were
amazingly quickly dissolved after the Second World War. In 1945
virtually no one, including most colonial leaders, really had any idea
about the dramatic developments that would take place in the ensuing
decades. What the British started in India spread with amazing speed to
the distant colonies of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal.
The Soviet Union was anti-colonial, but this did not prevent it from
having its own “colonies.” In 1989 the Soviet Empire in Central and
Eastern Europe disappeared in the course of half a year. In 1990–91
even the Soviet Union itself was dissolved into its fifteen constituent
republics.
In Europe we have not only seen the breakup of the Soviet Union, but
Yugoslavia split into seven parts (so far), and Czechoslovakia into two.
In Africa the creation of Eritrea represented the first break with the
arbitrary imperial borders—borders which are strongly protected also by
the new rulers. South Sudan followed in 2011. Once the dam breaks, no
one can be sure where the water will flow. In China, more than 90
percent of the population is Han Chinese, but the status of Xinkian and
Tibet (not to mention Taiwan) is still a matter of contention. East Timor
has broken away from Indonesia; Bangladesh has split from Pakistan,
and many questions still remain about Pakistan’s future. India has been
threatened by separatism ever since its creation. Even in liberal–
democratic Canada the Quebec question long remained a festering sore.
And, most paradoxically, the old colonial powers that spread from their
And, most paradoxically, the old colonial powers that spread from their
small territories to encompass huge swaths of land are now themselves
threatened by division. Belgium is in great trouble. Spain has its
rebellious provinces. In Britain, Scotland’s independence is hotly
discussed. France has its Corsica. The United States had its Civil War
that almost broke the union apart. Today the US is virtually alone
among the big powers in that virtually nobody questions its territorial
unity.
Nobody knows how many “nations” there are in the world since it is
up to the various inhabitants to decide how they want to define
themselves, but it has been estimated that there are at least 3,500. In
only half of the world’s states is there a single ethnic group that
comprises at least 75 percent of the population. If, eventually, most
“nations” are to have their own states, then the process has only just
begun. In the early nineteenth century many thought Belgium and
Greece too small to become independent; in the early twentieth century
many thought Iceland and Malta too small. Today there are at least
eighty-seven countries with a population under five million; thirty-five
have fewer than 500,000 inhabitants. Some of the most populous states
in the world, such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Nigeria, are
all poorer than the microstates of Nauru, St Kitts and Nevis (which might
split up), Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Seychelles, and Grenada.
In field after field the many different needs of globalization will
challenge the borders of the nation state. In highly developed service
economies borders will generally mean less than in economies
dominated by industry and agriculture. The challenges of terrorism and
tourism, immigration and climate change will all break down borders.
Interest groups of all different sorts will play an even larger part in
international diplomacy than they have done so far. Yet, in the
foreseeable future, the nation state will remain the basic unit. Inside the
EU, where the traditional nation state is being most directly challenged,
we can still see its strengths, particularly on the security side and in how
its citizens define their own identity. In fact, the continuation of the
nation state and the slow speed, particularly of the non-economic
integration process within the European Union, make it increasingly
difficult for the EU to compete with the leading Great Powers of the day.

WHY BOTH GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION?

In explaining the simultaneous globalization and fragmentation of the

world, it should be noted that, to a large extent, the two processes take
place in different spheres. Although examples of political globalization
and technological–economic fragmentation can be found, it is still true
that globalization is overwhelmingly a technological and economic
process, while the fragmentation is primarily political. It is often
assumed that there is a close relationship between the two spheres—and
of course there often is—but sometimes this is less true than we think.
Both Marxists and economic liberalists have argued that national
boundaries would break down. However, both Marx and Cobden were
largely wrong. The outbreak of the First World War showed that the
workers of Europe did not unite; nor did free trade necessarily lead to
peace. To a large extent the industrial revolution actually coincided with
the rise of the nation state. As Ernest Gellner and others have argued, in
many respects the industrial revolution created nationalism (improved
many respects the industrial revolution created nationalism (improved
communications brought the country together; the creation of a national
school system did the same, as did the introduction of conscription.)
In fact, in several ways technological–economic globalization
probably stimulates political fragmentation. The stronger the
globalization, the stronger the fragmentation. The explanations may be
found at four different levels: political–psychological, ideological–
cultural, technological, and economic.
The political–psychological explanation can easily be grasped by
anyone who has done even the slightest traveling abroad. When we
travel we find many interesting things to see, and we may even become
great admirers of the country we visit. At the same time, however, we
often discover that we become quite patriotic. Abroad we realize who
we are and what our identity means to us. This can be seen not only
among tourists travelling abroad, but also in so-called long-distance
nationalism (the Irish in the United States, Third World students in the
West) and in the blossoming of all kinds of local cultures in the face of
increased pressure from the outside.
Globalization frequently means that white, Christian, rich, Western
culture is exported to other parts of the world, the implication often
being that there must be something wrong with local cultures. It should
not be difficult to understand that this might cause a reaction in many
circles. The entire process of decolonization can be seen from this
perspective, although it certainly also involved turning Western ideals
against Westerners themselves. Modernization was frequently welcomed;
Westernization was more controversial. The striking rise in religious
fundamentalism, which we see in virtually all religions, may in part be a
response to Western culture spreading throughout the world. In Western
Europe religion is declining in significance; in much of the rest of the
world it is becoming increasingly important. Obviously we cannot talk
about the challenge of globalization as the only explanation for
fundamentalism and nationalism, but it may well be an important part
of the explanation.
On the ideological–cultural level, it is true that ideologies cross
borders much more easily than before. Thus, the rise of democracy in
one part of the world often stimulates democracy in other parts as well.
One of the ideologies that spread most easily, however, was nationalism.
In the old days ethnic groups simply disappeared as separate cultures or
were amalgamated into larger groups. This is what happened to Angles,
Saxons, Picts, Vandals, and Visigoths. This process continues today;
groups are still merged into other groups and languages disappear on a
large scale. (There may still be about 6,000 languages in the world, but
2,500 of them may be in danger of disappearing.) However, for many
large groups, nationalism—not assimilation— has become the preferred
alternative. In modern times there have always been historians who help
to create the necessary “invented traditions” or “imagined communities,”
that is, to inform their people and the rest of the world that the “nation”
in question has had a long and distinguished history.
Technologically, to take television as an example, we can now watch
all kinds of events “live” on a huge number of available channels.
However, both indirectly and directly, technological advances stimulate
not only globalization, but also fragmentation. Often technology
becomes so simple that even small groups can exploit it for their own
purposes. Thus, the Welsh language in Wales and the Sami language in
Norway are now doing much better than only a few decades ago. This
Norway are now doing much better than only a few decades ago. This
probably has to do with a combination of the establishment of niche
television and radio stations, and educational reforms benefiting these
languages. Somewhat more surprisingly there is also a clear trend that in
the “global village” international news is losing out to national and local
news. Many would rather learn more about “us” than about “the others.”
The contradictory effects of the Internet have already been mentioned.
Finally, there is the economic level. Often globalization has a negative
effect; and the groups affected work to modify or reverse the globalizing
policies of their respective governments. We see this almost every day in
many countries of the world. There is also the effect, already referred to,
whereby the economy has become so globalized that virtually any
region, however small, can break out and form its own country without
suffering significant negative economic consequences. Globalization has
made the size of a country almost irrelevant to the success of its
economy.

GREAT POWERS AND THEIR WILL TO RULE

For centuries Great Powers were local or regional at best, certainly not
global, despite their own claims to the contrary. In the course of the
200s BC two Great Powers emerged on each side of the Eurasian
landmass: Rome and China. The two empires controlled territories
roughly similar in size and population; their capitals were the largest
cities in the world. Rome was explicitly called “the capital of the world”
(urbs Roma, caput mundi); at its largest the city may have had one
million inhabitants. Yet despite its claim to rule the world, its size and
its great resources (military and otherwise), the Roman world was
primarily Mediterranean. The Chinese empire fluctuated a great deal in
territorial size, but was unique in that it was largely able to maintain its
territorial core for more than two thousand years. The Romans had only
the vaguest notions about China. The Chinese may have known even less
about the Romans.4 In between these two geographical areas, so far
apart, other major empires developed. For 900 years an Indo–Iranian
empire existed. In India more or less imperial constructions rose and fell.
The nomads from Central Asia and elsewhere—from Attila to Genghis
Khan and his successors—threatened all these areas, and for briefer
periods of time created their own huge structures.
With the Age of Exploration a deeper understanding of the world
developed. Spain and Portugal laid claim to huge territories in the
Western hemisphere. With the American and French revolutions of the
eighteenth century, states with true universalist ambitions arose for the
first time. In principle the political rights developed there were to apply
to all the peoples of the earth. For France, the leading country in Europe,
to have such ambitions was perhaps not so surprising. For the distant
United States, on the other side of the Atlantic, thirteen colonies that
had just successfully rebelled against Britain, and with a population of
only four million, this was less expected.
The British Empire, by far the largest and most complex of the
colonial structures, had only limited global aspirations. It was larger
than any other empire, but many different European states, large and
small, claimed huge territories in Asia and Africa. Some of the largest
territories, however, such as most of China and all of Japan, remained
outside these imperial structures. And by the time Asia, and particularly
Africa, came under colonial domination in the nineteenth century,
practically all the colonies of the Western hemisphere had already
become independent states. In the 1930s, when the British Empire was
at its largest, London’s difficulties in Ireland and India indicated what
might follow. Japan’s defeats of the colonial powers in East Asia during
the Second World War represented a huge blow to their empires. The
white man had clearly lost his magic.
In hindsight we clearly see that many imperial powers were gradually
losing their will to maintain their empires. For the British, the Great
Indian Uprising of 1857–58 did not lead to any serious questioning of
Britain’s right to rule India. On the contrary, the “Indian Mutiny,” as it
was called for so long, showed the treacherousness of the Indians. They
first had to be taught a lesson, then civilized. The uprising showed how
much they had to learn. The much more limited events in Amritsar in
1919, where general R. E. H. Dyer ordered Indian Army troops to fire
into a crowd of demonstrators, leaving about 400 Indians dead, were to
lead to some initial celebration of the general, but soon to his early
retirement. Serious questions were raised about Britain’s role in India.5
After Britain had left India in a hurry in 1946–47, riots in Accra in 1948
were sufficient to raise the prospect that London would offer
independence to Africans much more quickly than virtually anyone had
assumed. This was probably more a question of will than of power, as
the weakest of the European colonial powers, Portugal, hung on to its
colonies until the democratic revolution there in 1974–75.
Even in the Soviet case this weakening of the will could actually be
seen. The Red Army intervened without much questioning in 1953 in
East Germany, and again in 1956 in Hungary. In 1968 the Kremlin felt
that some justification had to be offered for its intervention in
Czechoslovakia, in the form of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the
participation of its Warsaw Pact allies. No country could simply abandon
socialism; other socialist countries had a duty to help the Soviet Union
enforce this point of view. In 1980–81 in Poland the Soviet Union did
not intervene at all, but left the response to the Polish party and the
army. Something had shifted dramatically in the relationship between
the ruler and those ruled. When Moscow in the early years after the
Second World War also exploited its new allies economically, thus
paying Poland a small fraction of world prices for its coal, it was perhaps
to be expected. Some decades later, however, the Soviet Union ended up
subsidizing its allies for Moscow’s deliveries of oil and gas.
The mechanisms involved in such developments were complex. In
democracies, in the long run, it gradually became almost impossible to
use substantial force over long periods of time to keep foreign peoples
under control. This was true not only of Britain, but also of France.
Although its colonies were formally incorporated into France, the wars
in Indochina and Algeria ultimately had to be abandoned. The Fourth
Republic collapsed under the burden of the latter. In Portugal,
democracy led to decolonization. For the United States the wars in the
Philippines after the Spanish–American war, in Vietnam in the 1960s
and 1970s, and, most recently, even in Afghanistan and Iraq, led to
crises and gradually brought dramatic withdrawals. A voting public
mostly concerned with domestic matters would not, in the long run, pay
the expenses in money and lives for such foreign (and to a considerable
extent failing) adventures.
In the Soviet case too, similar mechanisms kicked in. As even the
 In the Soviet case too, similar mechanisms kicked in. As even the
elites in the Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central European
countries lost their enthusiasm for the Soviet–Communist system,
changes had to be introduced. As contacts with the West were developed
and the feud with China intensified, even the smaller allies could
bargain with Moscow. The Kremlin needed their support and gradually
had to offer something in return to get it.
The global ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union after
the Second World War were something new in history, if not in theory,
then certainly in practice. The United States had a unique power base
and possessed an ideology which meant that few questions anywhere in
the world were without relevance to its various administrations. The
Soviet Union had more limited power and for a long time primarily
focused on its huge border regions, despite the universalist aspirations of
its communist ideology. Over time, however, as its power increased and
its aspirations grew, Moscow came to claim some sort of equality with
Washington. Few questions were without interest even to the rulers in
the Kremlin, and the Cold War spread to the most distant corners of the
world.

GREAT POWERS AND EMPIRES6

Edward Gibbon stated that “There is nothing more contrary to nature

than the attempt to hold in obedience distant provinces.” Most Great
Powers first consolidate their core areas and then expand by taking
control of territories outside these areas. They become empires, and this
applied to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These
empires generally provided stability compared with the previous order,
but over time the traditional legitimacy—international, national, and
local—on which the empires rested was undermined. In the end they
collapsed. The successor states that arose were often based on ethnic
self-determination; in this respect they were more legitimate than the
old empires, but the new order also tended to be less stable. So the
conclusion is that there often appears to be a tension between peace and
stability on the one hand and modem legitimacy on the other. And a
lack of legitimacy leads to collapse and impotence.
The rise and fall of Great Powers were partly related to war. As we
have seen, nothing contributed more to swift and comprehensive change
in Great Power configurations in the twentieth century than the two
world wars. It may be argued that most of the sweeping changes caused
by the world wars would have happened sooner or later anyway, but, at
the very least, the wars greatly accelerated the fall of certain states and
the rise of others.
Practically all Great Powers developed empires in the sense that they
came to control territories outside their core areas. The falling away of
these “distant provinces” represented a crucial aspect of the decline of
most Great Powers, a point largely ignored by Kennedy in The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers.
When we say that empires fall, we primarily mean that the “distant
provinces” fall away. The outlying areas of the empires could be vast; far
greater than the home countries. While the “distant provinces” fall away,
the core areas usually remain intact. The larger the core area, the better
a Great Power is generally able to retain its position. This is the main
reason why many of the comparisons made between late nineteenth-
/early twentieth-century Britain and today’s United States are
misleading. Britain has a rather limited geographical core; the United
States a much larger one. Thus, the twentieth century was to a large
extent dominated by the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union with
their vast cores, as Tocqueville and others before him had predicted.7
Germany had to give up its hopes for Lebensraum, but with its core
largely intact, it has been able to stage two comebacks as a Great Power;
Japan managed one.
In most cases the geographical line of division between the core and
the more distant lands seemed obvious, although complications could
certainly arise. At the turn of the century, British politicians, with Joseph
Chamberlain in the lead, hoped that imperial federation and customs
union could compensate for Britain’s rather limited base.8 The French,
and the Portuguese as well, tried to do away entirely with the formal
separation between homeland and colonies. These efforts all failed.
However, the fall of the Soviet Union illustrated better than anything the
lack of absolute lines of division between the core and “distant
provinces.” Not only did the outer empire in Eastern Europe fall away,
but the Soviet Union itself collapsed.
In this sense the United States seems rather unique. What
distinguishes it from a traditional empire is the fact that the semi-distant
lands, most of which were captured from Mexico in the 1830s–1840s,
have been so successfully integrated into the larger unit. The same
applies to the 11 states that broke away from the rest of the United
States in the Civil War; after a difficult period of reconstruction they
States in the Civil War; after a difficult period of reconstruction they
were successfully reintegrated into the Union. The more distant lands on
many continents, while being strongly influenced by the US, virtually all
maintained their independence. Today the United States is one of the
few very large states whose territorial integrity is accepted by virtually
all of its citizens.

OLD AND NEW FORMS OF LEGITIMACY

The falling away of the “distant provinces” was related to deep moral–
political changes leading to a gradually disappearing legitimacy for
imperial rule. In the final analysis empires rested on force, but the use of
such force became increasingly difficult. Little by little imperial rule
came to break with accepted norms at three basic levels: the
international (the world community), the national (in the home
country), and the local (in the colonies or provinces).9 In other words,
imperial rule lost its “legitimacy.”
Legitimacy is here defined as a certain state of affairs being perceived
as “in accordance with established rules, principles, or standards”; in
other words, that this state of affairs “can be justified.”10 The traditional
basis of legitimacy for imperial rule was dynastic. The ruler had the right
to conquer whatever territory he or she was able to conquer; this
territory could then be passed on to their heirs, more or less in the same
way other forms of property were passed on to the next generation.
Early on, emperors came to desire some form of religious blessing for
their rule, since this could strengthen their position. Imperial rulers
could even find it opportune to mobilize popular, or national, sentiment,
but this, again, was not something they had to do. This traditional world
was one of subjects, not citizens.11
Into the twentieth century the Austro–Hungarian Empire, for instance,
reflected the dynastic principle. Many pragmatic reasons, particularly of
a security and economic nature, existed for the continuation of Habsburg
rule, but these did not constitute the basis of imperial rule as such.12
Traditional forms of legitimacy have lingered to this day, but with the
French Revolution the basis for legitimacy began to change. More and
more, rule, including imperial rule, had to be justified with reference to
what it did for the citizens. Modern, as opposed to earlier, empires, had
to provide some form of popular justification for ruling over “distant
provinces.”
As William McNeill has argued, “the norm for civilized governance
was laminated polyethnic empire”.13 But this norm gradually changed to
that of the nation state. The national doctrine came in two basic
versions: the French and the German. In the French version it meant
popular sovereignty and constitutional rule within a more or less given
territory, almost regardless of the ethnic and cultural background of the
various groups living inside that territory. (In France itself, this
background was relatively homogeneous anyway.) France expanded far
beyond its traditional borders of the Atlantic, the Rhine, the Alps, and
the Pyrenees without showing too much concern for the actual support it
enjoyed in the various areas. Later on, France incorporated its colonies
directly into the mother country.
The German version emphasized the connection between the right of
self-determination and cultural and ethnic unity, in the sense that the
various cultural and ethnic groups had this right of self-determination.
The problem was that in Central and Eastern Europe the various peoples
lived side by side, and not in nicely separated areas. The German
version, too, was undoubtedly biased in favor of more traditional
interests, as the rather comprehensive definitions of German territory
from 1848 onwards showed. Some groups were quite simply seen as
more equal than others. Nevertheless, nationalism—in whatever version
—presented a dramatic challenge to any form of imperial rule.
From Europe, the concept of the nation state gradually spread to the
rest of the world, normally in the French version, since the alternative
(the German model) could easily have led to chaos in the form of many
states endlessly quarreling over borders. This change of norms—from
empire to nation states—this erosion of the basis of imperial legitimacy,
came to mean the end of imperial rule.

IMPERIAL RULE AND INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL

LEGITIMACY

In Western Europe, the process of formation of nation states was largely

complete with the unification of Germany in 1870–71. (Norway, Ireland,
and Iceland followed later.) In the eastern part the Ottoman Empire was,
at this time, continuing to disintegrate. Until the First World War
Austria–Hungary held up well, although Vienna’s fear of a breakup was
an important part of the origins of the war itself. The nationality
question only got out of control in 1917–18. As late as January 1918, in
his Fourteen Points, President Wilson still favored “the freest
opportunity of autonomous development” for the peoples of Austria–
Hungary, only later amended to read “complete independence for the
people of Austria–Hungary.” Similarly, only in early 1918 did even the
South Slavs and the Czechs give up reform of the empire into a
multinational federation, for full independence.14
After the First World War, national self-determination became the
norm—the legitimate standard in all of Europe. Even where this norm
was violated in practice, as in the Soviet Union, it was accepted in
theory. The appeasement policy of the 1930s was partly based on the
difficulty of opposing the right of Germans in Austria and
Czechoslovakia to join the mother country. In another way, however,
Germany under Hitler presented an extreme version of imperial
legitimacy in that here the Lebensraum ideology reflected the total
victory of home country considerations over any attempt whatsoever to
achieve support in “non–Aryan” areas.
Outside Europe and the Americas, despite the successes of different
kinds of nationalism in Japan and in China, the system of imperial rule
generally remained strong until the Second World War. In the interwar
period the primary colonial powers, Britain and France, dominated The
League of Nations, and the main revisionist states, Germany, Italy, and
Japan, were not opposed to imperial rule as such. Rather, they wanted
to create empires of their own.
Only after the Second World War, with the domination of the two
anti-colonial powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and with
the increase in the number of new states, did imperial rule gradually lose
its legitimacy at the international level.15 But by then imperial rule was
also losing its legitimacy both at the national level in the home country
and at the local level in the colonies.
The starting point for imperial rule was for it to have legitimacy in
the home area. The basis for this legitimacy varied. The British, like
other colonial powers, were long convinced that they brought progress
and civilization to backward areas of the world. This view was summed
up by one Victorian administrator of India, Fitzjames Stephen, in the
following rather comprehensive way: “The essential parts of European
civilization are peace, order, the supremacy of law, the prevention of
crime, the redress of wrong, the enforcement of contracts, the
development and concentration of the military force of the state, the
construction of public works, the collection and expenditure of the
revenue required for these objects in such a way as to promote to the
utmost the public interest, interfering as little as possible with the
comfort or wealth of the inhabitants, and improvement of the people.”16
This was a tall order; an order almost impossible to fulfill. In the
Soviet case, domestic, as well as foreign, legitimacy was primarily
grounded in Marxist–Leninist ideology. Through the class struggle,
history marched inevitably on from feudalism to capitalism, and on to
socialism and communism. In Eastern Europe this march of history was
expressed in the form of the establishment of the people’s democracies.17
Although communism had only minority support in Eastern Europe, its
expansion there, and later in China, made even many non-communists
around the world feel that communism might well come to represent the
wave of the future.
Since the United States did not see itself as having an empire, it did
not have to provide justifications of this sort. Most Americans agreed
that the United States had to take on the global role it did after 1945 “to
protect democracy against the totalitarian evil of communism.” The
underlying assumption was that Washington did not do this primarily for
its own sake, but for the sake of the many states threatened by Soviet
communism. If the Americans were not wanted, they would presumably
go home.
Most imperial powers lost the will to maintain their empires before
they lost the power to do so, although the two were of course closely
related. Much of the explanation for the loss of will was found in the
erosion of old-fashioned imperial legitimacy. In Britain, many different
forces undermined this kind of legitimacy: the spread of democracy,
which brought new forces to power and made it increasingly difficult to
deny democratic rule to the colonies; the concentration on expanding
the social welfare of the home country; the many different effects of the
First, and particularly the Second, World War, from the destruction of
racist, social Darwinist thinking, to the emphasis on democracy in the
fight against fascism; evolving concepts of interest and security that
undermined the imperial rationale.
Ultimately imperial rule rested on force, but it became increasingly
difficult to use this force. The tolerance level for the use of force varied
from imperial capital to imperial capital. It also changed over time. The
Great Indian Uprising of 1857–58 was suppressed with considerable
ferocity. The ferocity did not weaken the legitimacy in Britain of
imperial rule; it rather strengthened it: the “bettering” of the Indian
would take even longer than had been expected. In 1945 the new
viceroy, Lord Wavell, commented on “the weakness and weariness of the
instrument still at our disposal in the shape of the British element in the
Indian Civil Service.” The massive use of force was now quite simply out
of the question, even for an emotional old imperialist such as Winston
Churchill.18 France, on the other hand, even after the Second World
War, accepted quite massive use of force, as evidenced by the wars in
Indochina and Algeria; but in the end the moral–political crisis over
Algeria led to the fall of the Fourth Republic.
In the Soviet case, at least in hindsight, we can see that Moscow’s will
to use force had been eroding, even before Mikhail Gorbachev took over
in 1985. However, in 1988–89, Soviet physical power remained intact;
but not the will to use this power. At the very moment when the Soviet
Union finally became the equal of the United States in some important
respects, the entire system imploded. A high degree of external
legitimacy could not compensate for the slow erosion in domestic
legitimacy related to faltering economic growth, increasingly serious
nationality, health, and environmental problems, and rife corruption.
Gorbachev knew the system had to be reformed, but had only the
vaguest notion of what the reforms ought to lead to; he gave up the old
basis of communist legitimacy, however weak, without understanding
the need to establish a new one. If he were able to do away with the vast
layers of bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, he assumed that the bonds
between him as the leader and the people could produce remarkable
results. He was convinced that if communism had solved one thing, it
was the problem of nationalism.19 On this point he was massively
wrong. With glasnost, what emerged was not the creative powers of the
people but the strength of nationalism—in the Caucasus, in the Baltic
states, and even in Russia. However, Gorbachev was clear on one point:
force would not be used on a major scale. With popular support for
communist rule dwindling, both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
this meant the end of Soviet rule.20
The growing legitimacy problems of imperial rule made the imperial
power take on a substantial and, generally, an increasing share of the
total expenses involved in maintaining the empire. The subsidies which
imperial capitals often came to supply to the provinces represented an
attempt to stop the erosion of imperial legitimacy. But, in turn, the
growing costs undermined domestic support for the continuation of
imperial rule. A vicious circle was created.
In the British case, the best studies available indicate that while the
absolute expenses involved in running the empire were small, the British
level of taxation in the late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century years
was higher than in its industrial competitors. On the other hand, taxes in
the dependent Empire were 20 to 40 percent lower than in other
“underdeveloped” areas. In India, where the British pressed the hardest
for self-financing, taxes were actually lower than in the Princely States.
For the state, the trend was clear: the colonies cost more and more. The
profits that British individuals and companies, as opposed to the British
state, made were also generally higher before 1885 than after.21
In the Austro–Hungarian case, after the Ausgleich of 1867 the
distribution of common expenses between Austria and Hungary was
renegotiated every ten years. Here the Austrians were actually able to
reduce their share somewhat, but after 1907 they still paid 63.6 and the
Hungarians 36.4 percent of common expenses. (In 1900 the population
relationship was 55.7 percent for Austria, and 41 percent for Hungary.)
But in this case Vienna paid a heavy price for small economic
concessions in the form of increasing Hungarian political autonomy.22
Even in the Soviet case, where the element of consent on the part of
the governed was smaller than in the other empires we are dealing with,
similar developments can be seen. In 1956 the Polish communists
protested, for the first time, against deliveries of coal to the Soviet Union
far below world market prices. In the 1970s the relationship was
reversed. Now the Soviet Union was subsidizing oil and gas deliveries to
Eastern Europe, and in return the Eastern Europeans often paid with
rather shoddy industrial goods which could not be exported to Western
markets. As one study of energy supplies within the Soviet bloc
concludes, “The Soviet insistence, in 1968, on maintaining limits on East
European autonomy also entailed accepting the responsibility for the
cost of making compliance possible.”23 Within the Warsaw Pact the
highest defense expenditures had to be borne by the Soviet side, despite
the Soviet economy clearly being weaker than that of several of its
Eastern European allies.24
Related mechanisms can also be detected within the loosest of all
imperial structures—the American one. After 1945 the United States was
clearly the world’s economic leader. This status undoubtedly involved
economic benefits, but it also involved great expenses—varying from the
more than 100 billion dollars provided in credits and grants from 1945
to 1965, to the many economic concessions made within the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in general, and vis-à-vis the
Japanese in particular.25
 In NATO the United States paid much more for defense than did its
allies. And American troops, not the troops of the “vassals,” were
deployed to suffer the heaviest initial casualties in case of war, a rather
special arrangement in historical terms.26 In an effort to reduce its
expenditures and bring back the troops, the United States promoted
European integration. Such a structure, in which the imperial center did
not even participate, was again a historical novelty. Thus, Vienna
worked hard to centralize decision-making within the Habsburg Empire,
London was always at the center of any Commonwealth arrangement,
and Moscow came out against federative plans for Eastern Europe.27
Even the British and Americans set up their international orders with
their own advantage in mind. But we know the outcome. Under these
very orders, Britain came to be surpassed economically by several other
powers, while the United States in the 1960s and 1970s entered a period
of relative economic decline, vis-à-vis both Western Europe and Japan.

IMPERIAL LEGITIMACY IN THE “DISTANT PROVINCES”

The legitimacy of imperial rule was not only decided in the home
country. The attitudes of the “distant provinces” were even more
important, in part because they had such a decisive impact on attitudes
in the home country. Independence was something the “distant
provinces” seized, at least initially, until decolonization developed into a
flood.
After the early period of establishing control, colonial rule generally
functioned well and met little opposition. For instance, in the 1920s and
1930s the British Empire was generally quieter than it had ever been
before. There was definitely a basis of white supremacist thinking
behind colonial rule. As long as the “provinces” accepted the white
colonialists’ right to rule, few problems existed. But once black and
yellow people rejected white supremacy, imperial rule rested rather
directly on force. After the Second World War the days when “every
white skin automatically extracted a salute” were gone. Many different
factors led to such rejection: western Enlightenment values, often
imbibed by the local elites in their education, first in the metropole, and
later in the colonies themselves; the experiences of colonial troops in the
two world wars; the rise of Marxism–Leninism and the Soviet Union;
and, probably most importantly, Japan’s victories in the early phase of
the Second World War. The yellow man’s victories swept away the idea
of white supremacy.28
In the interwar period, in addition to the Middle East and Ireland,
there was one exception to the imperial calm: India. The Indian Congress
Party changed: in the initial years (after its founding in 1885) it had
been a debate forum for a narrow upper class; after 1919 it became a
well-organized mass movement bent on full independence. Gandhi’s
leadership further transformed the policies of the Congress as well as its
support in the villages. To a large extent, Gandhi was able to set the
political agenda which eventually led to independence. In 1945–46,
India’s towns and villages had slipped beyond British control, the armed
forces were on the verge of mutiny, and Wavell reported that India had
become ungovernable.
Once the gates had been opened in India it proved difficult to close
them elsewhere. This was certainly not realized by contemporary
politicians, whose time frame for independence in Africa was much
longer, if in fact a possibility at all. The demonstrations and riots in
Accra on the Gold Coast (from February 28 to March 4, 1948) led to
twenty-nine dead and 237 injured. Earlier, these events would hardly
have qualified as a major crisis, but now they led directly to Ghana’s
independence nine years later.29 As A. D. Low has argued, “It is not
fanciful to assert that many of the critical battles for British colonial
Africa were fought, not on the banks of the Volta, the Niger, or the
Zambesi, but on the Ganges.”30 The imperial rationale had been
undermined, a pattern had been set, and decolonization accelerated with
incredible speed.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that empires contain within
them the seeds of their destruction. It is simply impossible to run a vast
empire entirely from the imperial center, and once lower units are
formed, sooner or later they will almost inevitably compete with the
imperial center.31 This proved the case with the colonies, where the
units were, to a large extent, artificial creations. It was even more
difficult to hold historical states with well-developed identities in place.
From this perspective the surprise is not that the Austro–Hungarian
Empire collapsed, but that it functioned so well for as long as it did. In
part this was the result of playing off the “historical” nationalities—
Germans, Magyars, and Poles, against the “non-historical” Slovenes,
Croats, Romanians, Ukrainians, etc.—with the Czechs having features of
both.32
The fall of the Soviet Empire resulted in great part from the implosion
of the imperial center. But the basis for Soviet rule was never solid in
that most East Europeans were not only hostile to Moscow; they also
that most East Europeans were not only hostile to Moscow; they also
considered themselves culturally superior to the Russians. This was not a
good foundation for an empire (unless the superior subjects held a
privileged position, as the Greeks did in the Roman Empire, and the
British liked to think they did in the modern American one).
After the Gleichschaltung of the Stalin years, the history of Eastern
Europe after 1953 is the history of the evolution of national forms of
communism where the limits of what Moscow was obliged to permit
were constantly stretched. The interventions of 1953, 1956, and 1968
only temporarily interrupted this process. Even without the imperial
implosion, it seems likely that, sooner rather than later, the development
of these national forms would have broken not only the Soviet mould, as
Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania had already done, but even the
communist one, as Poland and Hungary were getting close to doing in
the 1980s.33
One is tempted to draw a similar, although admittedly quite
speculative, conclusion about the long-term outcome of a victory in
Europe for Hitler’s Germany. But it is unlikely that German supremacy
over such a vast and culturally strong area would have lasted, based as it
was on Lebensraum and racial hierarchy thinking, elements that strongly
limited local support in most parts of Europe.
There may be elements which hold empires together for shorter or
longer periods, such as geographic conditions, economic
complementarity, or ideological bonds. Common defense needs perhaps
represent the strongest of all such bonds, but these needs fluctuate with
the outside threat. Practically all of Austria–Hungary could unite against
the Turkish advance, and the Germans and Magyars could unite against
the Russian–Slavic threat; but with millions of Slavs within the empire,
even the Russian–Slavic threat divided Austria–Hungary.34 Yet, in the
long run, the unifying elements all seem to lose out to the desire for
independence.
The post-1945 American “empire” was built very much on the Soviet–
Communist threat. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, history seemed
to suggest that a gradual but comprehensive redefinition of relations
between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan would take place.
To some extent it has. The fight against terror does not have the unifying
force that Soviet Communism had. NATO certainly still exists, but it has
become a looser organization than during the Cold War. Almost all the
new crises take place outside the traditional NATO area; such crises had
always presented problems for the alliance, as seen over Suez and
Vietnam. Still, Atlantic cooperation continued. NATO was important for
America’s leadership functions. The new allies in Central and Eastern
Europe were virtually all hoping for American security guarantees
against a possibly resurgent Russia; even the old allies in Western
Europe favored a continued role for the United States, in part because it
was so difficult for them to maintain their own defense spending, much
less to increase it.

STABILITY AND LEGITIMACY

What then of the relationship between legitimacy and stability? While

rivalry between Great Powers often results in war, and disagreement
over the borders of their respective spheres may be a more specific
source of tension (for instance the many conflicts throughout history
source of tension (for instance the many conflicts throughout history
over Belgium, Poland, the Yugoslav area, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and
Korea), it is often assumed that Great Powers promote peace, at least
within their imperial borders. But when these powers collapse, it
increases the local level of conflict.
This observation seems to hold true in many cases. Thus, Britain was
generally able to maintain order within its huge empire. In Africa, not
only imperial but also African historians argue that colonialism brought
about a greater degree of peace and stability. The African-dominated
UNESCO General History of Africa concludes that “not even the anti-
colonial and Marxist schools would deny the fact that after the colonial
occupation … most parts of Africa, especially from the end of the First
World War onwards, enjoyed a great degree of continuous peace and
security.”35 In India, British rule may well have prevented a
“Balkanization” on the ruins of the Mogul Empire. The British were able
to control vast territories with few forces; 75,000 British troops,
supported by 150,000 Indian troops, controlled a population of about
300 million.36
Austria–Hungary’s stability was celebrated in the famous 1848 dictum
of the Czech historian and politician František Palacký: “If Austria did
not exist, it would be necessary to invent her,” a dictum which found
echo not only among contemporary statesmen, but also among later
historians.37 Finally, in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989, the Soviet
Union was able to maintain an even more stable structure than had
Austria–Hungary.
However, some qualifications are required. Pax Britannica, like other
orders, did not mean that there was peace everywhere. In such a vast
empire smaller wars were almost always taking place somewhere. In
fact, “there was not a single year in Queen Victoria’s long reign in which
somewhere in the world her soldiers were not fighting for her and for
her empire.”38
More specifically two observations should be made. First, the initial
period, when imperial control was established, was seldom peaceful, and
frequently led to great losses of life among the local populations; the
imperial troops suffered much smaller losses. In Africa the worst
example was probably the Congo, where the population may have been
halved in three to four decades (famine and disease undoubtedly
contributed greatly to this tragic outcome).39 The establishment of
Habsburg control in Central Europe and Soviet control over Eastern
Europe were so closely related to wars with outside powers—the
Ottoman Empire and Nazi Germany respectively—that it is virtually
impossible to separate the two aspects.
Second, as we have seen, empires collapsed in great part because of
local resistance. The British yielded early and were therefore able to give
up power largely peacefully. India had been the prime target of
colonialism; in 1946–47 it took the stage again by gaining its freedom.
(An earlier model was of course found in the independence of first the
United States from Britain, and then of Latin America from Spain and
Portugal.) The French experience in the bloody wars of Indochina and
Algeria illustrated what could take place if an attempt was made to hang
on to power in the face of great opposition. Thus, the peace and stability
of Great Power rule were often limited to the long years in the middle of
its rule, less present in its beginning and its end.
 Whether we are talking about the Pax Britannica, the Pax Sovietica,
or other orders, compared with what preceded and what followed, the
imperial orders generally represented stability. The stability of the long
middle period of the Pax Britannica was replaced by local wars, for
instance between India and Pakistan and in the Middle East. The Cold
War sometimes enhanced the level of conflict, as in Korea and Vietnam,
but often it served to contain violence. When the Cold War ended there
was at first an increase in the number of local conflicts. Conflicts that
had been kept under wraps exploded; the lid flew off in Yugoslavia and
the Caucasus. Gradually, however, the number of conflicts appeared to
diminish. Colonial and post-colonial conflicts became fewer; Cold War
proxy wars more or less ended; democratic rule became stronger; many
forms of international activism to contain or end such conflict
increased.40
When the ethnic nation states were formed, the expectation had been
that this would lead to a more peaceful world. As J. G. Herder expressed
it in the 1780s: “Cabinets may deceive each other; political machines
may exert pressure on each other until one is shattered. Fatherlands do
not march against each other in this way; they live quietly side by side
and help each other like families.”41
Herder’s conclusion was much too simplistic. The complicated, not to
say tense, relationship between stability and legitimacy, and then
legitimacy in the sense of ethnic–national independence, are seen in Asia
and Africa, but are best illustrated in Central and Eastern Europe. The
long period of European peace from 1815 to 1859 rested upon Austrian
control over, or suppression of, Italy. Italy could only be united after the
French had helped defeat the Austrians in 1859. German national
French had helped defeat the Austrians in 1859. German national
aspirations could only be fulfilled after three wars, against Denmark,
Austria, and France. From 1870 to 1914 the Austro–Hungarian order
was remarkably stable and, one might add, rather flexible. But, at least
in modem national(ist) terms, it was based on the suppression of the
national rights of most groups other than the Hungarians and, to a lesser
extent, the Germans.
The interwar order was more legitimate than the Austro–Hungarian
one in the sense that many large ethnic groups finally acquired their
own states, but it was also rather unstable. The new states quarreled
over borders and population rights. With Eastern Europe’s many
different ethnic groups living so interspersed, no order could be fully
legitimate, and the right of Germans to join the mother country proved
only the most explosive of the many unresolved issues.42
The Soviet Empire represented the most clear-cut example of the
tension between stability and legitimacy. Despite the Red Army’s
interventions, on the whole the Soviet order was remarkably stable, and
“the long peace” in Europe was based on Soviet domination of the
Eastern half.43 But this most stable of orders was also the least
legitimate. When the Pax Sovietica collapsed, a host of ethnic–national
questions sprang to the surface. The new post-Cold War order was
clearly more legitimate than the Soviet one, but it was definitely also
less stable.44
One should hasten to add that neither the Austro–Hungarian nor the
Soviet Empire was able to solve the ethnic–national questions which
represented such a problem from a legitimacy point of view. At best they
simply postponed them; at worst they aggravated them. The latter was
almost certainly the effect of the Soviet Empire. In reacting against
oppressive uniformity and the extreme degree of centralization, once the
various ethnic–national forces finally had a chance to express
themselves, they tended to go to the extreme.45
Most of us probably find a positive message in the fact that the
“distant provinces” became independent states. However, this process
now raises serious questions. About 3,500 groups define themselves as
“nations.” This means that so far only a good 5 percent of them have
achieved statehood.46 How many states will there “eventually” be, and
how will the creation of the new states affect peace and stability?
It may well be true that democracies are more peaceful, certainly
toward each other, than other forms of government. Yet the transition
from one form to another often appears to lead to more conflict, as we
have seen in the former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus. After the Cold
War these regions became more democratic, or certainly less
undemocratic, but also less stable than they had been under the
autocratic rule of, respectively, Tito and the Kremlin.
In this overall perspective, the attempt to form new and larger units
out of smaller ones is dramatic. The history of the United States is
interesting, but so special that few conclusions can probably be drawn
on the basis of the American experience. The European Community has
been able to combine geographic widening—from six, to twelve, to
twenty-seven members—with a deepening of the content from a
common market to a fully integrated market with a common currency
for most of its members, and even (at least formally) a common security
and defense policy. In view of three major wars between France and
Germany in seventy-five years, this level of integration is remarkable;
but outside “the four freedoms” the emphasis is still more on the
national than the joint Europeanboth level. The EU’s regulations are
many and quite important, but the EU budget still makes up only around
1 percent of the total EU gross domestic product, compared to about 25
percent for the federal budget in the US. The nation states of the EU
spend an average of 45 percent of their GDPs.47
 7
Visions and Defeats

America’s vision was of one world, inspired by American ideals. These

ideals were presumably relevant for all countries and all peoples. The
United States also became by far the strongest country in the world.
After 1945, despite the power and the will to influence the entire globe,
the United States suffered many defeats. The Soviet Union came to
control Central and Eastern Europe. Communism took charge in China.
Although the United States was able to fulfill almost all its most
important objectives in key areas Western Europe and Japan, it also met
with half-successes and even defeats in relations with its allies. “Empire”
was combined with many different local forces. That had almost always
been the case with empires. In the end they were all defeated. It turned
out that even small states could successfully challenge the United States.
The new decentralized technology made it possible even for single
individuals, in the form of terrorists, to challenge the US. Why was even
the mighty United States so impotent?

AMERICA’S VISIONS AND AMERICA’SFEARS

America was constantly tempted to create a world in its image. It was

“the city upon the hill”; it stood for “life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.” So many of its presidents saw themselves on a mission. The
mandate to change the world came not only from the American people:
sometimes it came from the foreign inhabitants themselves; often it was
sometimes it came from the foreign inhabitants themselves; often it was
implied, or even directly stated, that God had a hand in America’s
actions.
In the twentieth century Woodrow Wilson was the first clear-cut
representative of this faith. In January 1918 he set out his Fourteen
Points to change the world. The most important of these points was the
creation of The League of Nations. In Europe after the First World War
he was seen as the great savior, the spokesman for millions. Frustration
followed for Wilson, the League, and millions of Europeans. During the
Second World War Franklin D. Roosevelt was to present a similar vision
through the Atlantic Charter and other key documents, in part inspired
by Wilson, but also haunted by his failure. It turned out that FDR was
much more successful than Wilson had been, although he was not yet
convinced of his success when he died on April 12, 1945. Washington
was to create so many of the institutions that lasted for so many decades;
many of them, from the United Nations, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, to NATO, are of great importance even
today.
Again and again, America’s presidents saw themselves not only as the
most powerful individual in the world, but as the designated leader of
the world. They virtually all expected success, whether we are talking
about John F. Kennedy’s “best and the brightest,” Ronald Reagan’s
optimism that allegedly liberated not only Eastern and Central Europe
but also the Soviet Union itself, and George W. Bush’s mission to set Iraq
and the Middle East free. Or, in Bill Clinton’s seemingly more moderate
version: “We cannot, indeed we should not, do everything or be
everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and
where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.”
where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.”
Hubris was never far away.1 Yet there was also the fear of failure.
And even the smallest of failures could lead to the unraveling of great
structures. This was the point of the domino theories proclaimed in
different versions by so many administrations. The original version came
from President Eisenhower when he stated at a press conference on April
7, 1954, that “Finally, you have broader considerations that might
follow what you would call the “falling domino” principle. You have a
row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will
happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly.”2
Most Americans had probably always seen even international
relations as a struggle between good and evil. But the collapse of
isolationism during the Second World War showed that there was no
way in which America could isolate itself from the corrupt Old World.
The devil was always there, ready to do his work. Hitler was the modern
version of the devil. America had failed to stop him. It therefore had a
guilty conscience. The lesson learned from the Second World War was
that the West had done something terribly wrong when it had not tried
to stop Hitler early, when he could be stopped. This lesson was then
applied to the Cold War. There were many reasons why the United
States could not just grant the Soviet Union a sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe. One was that establishing such a glacis would
presumably only encourage Stalin to press for more in the next layer of
states.
Compromise was often bad. Soviet threats were almost always seen in
the most comprehensive light. The Korean War was really a diversion for
the big attack that would follow in crucial Europe. The Vietnam War was
a battle for the hearts and minds of Southeast Asia, and then Japan. Or it
was a worldwide test of the Chinese model of wars of national liberation.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was aimed at the Persian Gulf and
the oil resources of the Middle East. In almost every case Washington’s
analyses were wrong, or at least quite seriously overstated.
In almost every administration there is a constant debate between the
globalizers, who see things in a global perspective, and the regional and
local specialists who want to emphasize the peculiarities of each and
every crisis. In most cases the globalizers win. The highest positions are
generally held by those who are able to see the connections between the
various crises. Area specialists rarely become presidents or secretaries of
state. The public are also generally more persuaded by an analysis that
simplifies matters, instead of one based on local complexities that makes
generalizations difficult. However, time and again it is ultimately
discovered that the local factors have not received their due attention.
And if the analysis is incorrect or misleading, the chances of failure
increase dramatically. This is one basic reason why power sometimes
leads to impotence.
Hitler appeared to illustrate the validity of the domino theory.
Developments in one country often influenced events in another,
particularly if they were neighbors. It was a fact that Soviet expansion in
some countries had also led to control in other countries, although in
Eastern Europe this had primarily been determined by the positions of
the Red Army when the Second World War ended. In 1989 the collapse
of Soviet–Communist rule in one Central and Eastern European country
led to the collapse of such rule in all the countries. This was logical in
the sense that Soviet rule was crucial in all, with the exception of
Romania.
Romania.
It could often be difficult to predict the nature or even the direction of
the change, if and when developments in one country influenced those
in another. A country could try to balance negative development in one
way or another; or it could bandwagon, and move with the change. The
domino theory assumed the latter and underestimated chances of the
former. Yet, what policymakers believed was crucial. Thus, in February
1965, President Johnson explained to Senator Everett Dirksen that “We
know from Munich that when you give, the dictators feed on raw meat.
If they take South Vietnam, they take Thailand, they take Indonesia,
they take Burma, they come right back to the Philippines.” In fact,
policymakers of many different stripes believed in their own versions of
the domino theory—that events in one area clearly influenced
developments elsewhere. Thus, in April 1965, Zhou Enlai told the
Pakistani president that if the United States thwarted the Vietnamese
communists, anti-American forces in the rest of the world “will suffer
heavy losses.” Leading politicians in many smaller countries expressed
similar views. The war in Vietnam would have consequences not only in
Southeast Asia, but also in parts of the world far from the region.3
In Vietnam it was true that what happened in that country would
influence its neighbors. The Vietnamese communists had made no secret
of their Indochinese perspective. They also wanted to determine
developments in Cambodia and Laos. In the end, however, Thailand and
Indonesia followed their own paths. It may well be that the fighting of
the Americans and the South Vietnamese gave these countries extra time
to organize their societies so as to counteract Vietnam’s enhanced
position. Of course Indonesians and Thais had their own interests and
agendas; they were not simply dominoes ready to fall. The situation in
agendas; they were not simply dominoes ready to fall. The situation in
1975, when South Vietnam fell, was very different from what it had
been ten years earlier. And it was never clear in the first place whether
the Vietnamese communists had any plans to take control in these
countries. One thing soon became obvious, however, if it had not been
clear all along: the Vietnamese were achieving their own goals, not those
of the Soviet Union or China.
Domino effects could also be seen outside the East–West framework.
In late 2010 to early 2011, demonstrations against authoritarian rule in
Tunisia stimulated similar demonstrations in many other Arab countries.
The governments in Tunisia and Egypt collapsed. In Libya, civil war
raged until Gaddafi finally fell. Most other regimes were forced to make
serious concessions to the demonstrators. Here the common factor was
the long-time domination of an authoritarian ruler combined with high
population growth and highly unsatisfactory economic and social
conditions. Yet the outcomes varied depending on local circumstances in
the countries concerned. Most of the regimes did after all survive, at
least in the short run.

AMERICA’S DEFEATS AND AMERICA’S SUCCESSES

With its vast objectives, it was to be expected that even the most
powerful country in the world, the United States, like all previous Great
Powers, would face defeats. After all, although clearly the leading
country, the US was far from omnipotent. During the Second World War
Washington thus dreamed of One World; but there would soon be two—
East and West. In the East the United States exercised very little
East and West. In the East the United States exercised very little
influence indeed.
In the first five years after 1945 the US met with two major defeats, in
Eastern Europe and in China. Eastern Europe was the Soviet Union’s
priority area; it was already controlled by the Red Army as a result of
the war against Germany. Only a new major war could possibly end
Soviet control there. After four years of fighting together against Nazi
Germany, a new war was entirely out of the question. China was the
world’s most populous country. The United States largely chose to stay
out of the civil war there: the country was simply too large for any
outside power to control; America’s resources, however vast, were
limited; the Soviet Union basically stayed out; Chiang Kai-shek was far
from the ideal ally. Still, “the fall” of Eastern Europe and of China
brought serious Republican charges against the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations. How could America, so strong and so pure, be defeated?
Was not America omnipotent? The Republicans found their explanation
in domestic treason. Presumably no outside power could defeat the US.
Later there were to be other setbacks. The Korean War ended in a
draw, which could in some ways be seen as an American achievement
considering Korea’s distance from the US and the opposition it faced
there. The Vietnam War ended in defeat, although only after the United
States had pulled out most of its troops. Some of America’s most useful
allies fell from power without the United States being able to protect
them. New enemies emerged, whether these be Fidel Castro in Havana,
or Muslim clerics in Teheran. But America also fought successful wars
far from home. Saddam Hussein was thrown out of Kuwait and out of
power in Iraq, and Slobodan Milošović out of Kosovo and even Belgrade,
although in the latter case the direct US role was quite limited. Later
events in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that it was one thing to win the
initial war, quite something else to run a distant country after that early
phase of the war was over, although the signs in Iraq are now slightly
optimistic.
It is little surprise then that many American presidents at the end of
their terms expressed a sense of frustration. The powers of the president
might be considerable, but in the end they were much more limited than
the presidents themselves or their advisers had imagined beforehand.
When National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was later asked what
most surprised him about the Vietnam War, he replied it was “the
endurance of the enemy.” Washington’s assumption was that the enemy
almost always had a breaking point. Once you reached that, America
was bound to triumph.4
American politicians were not the only ones to feel this. When asked
what drove his policies, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
answered, “events, my boy, events.” In the Middle East, the Arab tail
often wagged the Soviet dog. In 1967, Soviet Prime Minister Andrej
Kosygin was furious: “Whatever I do, things will be either bad, or really
bad. … If we publicly state the whole truth—that our Syrian allies did
not consult us—then firstly, no one will believe us, and secondly, they’ll
ask: ‘Who’s supposed to be the lead partner in this alliance—the Soviet
Union or Syria?’” In 1967 the Soviet Union did not want a war in the
Middle East, but it certainly did not want to lose its influence in Syria or
elsewhere. This limited Moscow’s ability to influence events and stop the
drift toward war.5
 Even an offensive step, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979, can be seen in a similar light. It was far from an effort
to realize an age-old Russian dream to gain direct access to the Persian
Gulf. Instead, as Odd Arne Westad has argued, the aging Soviet
leadership had initially been opposed to such an invasion, but in the end
it “saw no other way to respond than through a military intervention” if
it were to maintain the investment it had already made in the country.
And then Moscow actually intervened against a regime that the Soviet
leaders had spent so much effort and money to protect.6 In North Korea
only the Chinese had any leverage. But even they did not have much of
it. Beijing’s fear of the regime in Pyongyang simply imploding,
weakening China’s position and leading to thousands and thousands of
refugees, severely limited what could be achieved. This was the
communist version of the “tyranny of the weak.”
Compared to that other superpower, the Soviet Union, the United
States was actually doing remarkably well. In the long run it was
impossible for Moscow to claim military equality with Washington when
the Soviet economy was so much smaller than the American one. And in
the end, the Soviet Union collapsed.
Yet there was a discrepancy between America’s vast strength and the
more limited influence it frequently came to exert even over its allies
and friends, not to mention its enemies.

THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE: IF SO

STRONG, WHY SO MANY CONCESSIONS?7
America was the undisputed leader of the “free world.” It exerted great
power over the military, political, and economic structure within which
all America’s allies had to operate. As we have already seen,
Washington’s basic objectives were all largely fulfilled, although most
countries went rather less far on the road to economic multilateralism
than Washington desired. Much of the rest could be seen as details. The
United States had tremendous influence in the occupied countries, and
this influence continued in somewhat modified form even after West
Germany became formally independent. Washington also frequently had
a very significant impact on matters in non-occupied countries. This was
particularly true when Washington had considerable local support for its
position, as was almost always the case.
Despite its tremendous strength, the United States frequently
compromised. There were American half-successes such as the increasing
cooperation and integration of the Western European countries, the
introduction of full currency convertibility in 1958, the imposition of
restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe, and the increased defense
expenditures in Western Europe. These were only half-successes in that
Britain, and the smaller countries that still followed Britain in such
matters, refused to join any supranational European grouping, be this
the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), or the European Common Market; full currency
convertibility came at least ten years later than the Americans had
hoped; and as soon as the Cold War subsided somewhat, particularly
after Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War, European trade
restrictions and defense increases were modified more than Washington
would have liked. The different countries simply followed different
policies, although some deference was naturally shown to what the
policies, although some deference was naturally shown to what the
Americans wanted.
Then there were the outright refusals to heed America’s advice. With
exceptions such as Suez in 1956, and the German treatment of the
Franco–German treaty in 1963, the United States rarely dictated even to
its allies in Western Europe what they were to do. The rejection of the
European Defense Community (EDC) by the French National Assembly in
1954 was the most striking example. Washington’s threats of an
“agonizing reappraisal” of its role in Europe if the plan was defeated did
not help. France did reject the EDC, although Paris could not stop the
rearmament of West Germany, which now took place through NATO and
the Western European Union (WEU). More American defeats were to
follow after the coming to power of General de Gaulle in 1958. De
Gaulle refused to let Britain into the EEC, tried to make West Germany
follow France’s security lead, and ultimately took France out of NATO’s
military organization. Britain never played the kind of constructive role
in European integration many administrations in Washington hoped for.
The Europeans consistently did less for NATO’s defense than Washington
desired. Once President Eisenhower even blurted out in frustration: “I
get weary of the European habit of taking our money, resenting any
slight hint as to what they should do, and then assuming, in addition, full
right to criticize us as bitterly as they may desire. In fact, it sometimes
appears that their indulgence in this kind of criticism varies in direct
ratio to the amount of help we give them.”8
The troop issue was quite problematic. Eisenhower insisted that the
American troops were in Europe only as a temporary measure. The
Europeans ought to handle the long-term problem by themselves. As
early as at the end of his first year, the president was nevertheless forced
to conclude that “Unhappily, however, the European nations have been
slow in building up their military forces and have now come to expect
our forces to remain in Europe indefinitely.”9 Many later American
presidents came to a similar conclusion. In the nuclear field, first the
British, and then the French, built their own forces, generally to
Washington’s dislike, particularly under Kennedy.
America’s defeats were not as dramatic as they sounded. The EDC lost
out, but West Germany was brought into NATO; the Europeans did
increase the number of troops, and their failure to do even more had the
somewhat redeeming effect of further strengthening America’s
domination of NATO; the British did not join Europe, but worked closely
with Washington and integrated their deterrent with America’s; de
Gaulle’s first years in power were actually seen by Washington as
relatively positive. When America felt its overall position was
threatened, it could act swiftly and directly. Suez in 1956 and the
Franco–German treaty in 1963 were to provide the clearest evidence of
Washington’s ability to put even the largest allies in their place.
However, there was a discrepancy between America’s vast strength
and the more limited influence it frequently exerted over its allies and
friends. Many reasons can be found for this. One set of reasons had to do
with the ways in which Washington more or less directly weakened its
own leverage.
First, sometimes the United States consciously promoted
arrangements that reduced its role because it recognized its own strength
as excessive. As William Borden has argued, “the sheer economic
supremacy of the United States … caused a tremendous imbalance in the
world economy that threatened both the prosperity of the United States
and its foreign policy objectives.”10 Western Europe (and Japan) had to
be rebuilt and integrated; within limits, discrimination against US goods
was even encouraged. Yet, there was nothing automatic here. In the
interwar period the United States had shown that it was quite possible to
pursue policies far less enlightened than it did after the Second World
War.
Second, American leverage was limited by its official ideology; any
country had the right to choose its own government and policies. (This
applied especially in Western Europe vis-à-vis the democratic
governments there.) Cold War revisionists are fond of quoting William
Clayton, the negotiator of the 1945 loan to Britain, when in response to
criticism that he had not done enough to stop socialism, he stated that
“We loaded the British loan negotiations with all the conditions that the
traffic would bear.” He went on to say, however, and this part is less
frequently quoted: “I don’t know of anything that we could or should do
to prevent England or other countries from socializing certain of their
industries if that is the policy they wish to follow. The attempt to force
such countries to adopt policies with respect to their domestic economies
contrary to their wishes would, in my opinion, be an unwarranted
interference in their domestic affairs.”11 Similarly, in France,
Washington certainly came to regret de Gaulle’s anti-NATO and anti-US
policies, but there was very little it could do as long as the French people
had expressed their preference for the general as clearly as they had.
On some occasions Washington actually circumscribed its own
influence quite directly. Thus, the European Recovery Program, which
undoubtedly represented the single strongest American lever, was to be
worked out primarily by the Europeans themselves. Although the
American role clearly exceeded the “friendly advice” foreseen, much was
indeed left to the Europeans. For instance, to a large extent they decided
themselves how the American aid was to be divided up among the
participating countries. In a rather paradoxical twist, Belgian leader
Paul-Henri Spaak in 1954 blamed the United States for the lack of
unification in Western Europe. The alleged reason was Washington’s
“over-generous policy”: the Americans “had missed a golden opportunity
when at the outset of the Marshall Plan they did not make all Marshall
aid contingent upon the creation of a unified political community in
Europe.”12
Third, occasionally the American political system was an obstacle to
strong and concerted action. America was strong, but in many ways it
was weakly organized. The system’s many checks and balances
frequently made decision-making a rather cumbersome process. The
divided nature of the American political system, in addition to its
openness, also gave foreigners rather unique access to it, and a chance to
influence the outcome. Within the executive branch there would almost
always be some who defended the position others wanted to modify. For
instance, the Treasury Department on the whole favored a relatively
pure multilateral world open to American business, while the State
Department showed much greater sympathy for political considerations,
including the views of foreigners. The State Department tended to
receive the support of both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
“Localitis,” in the form of strong sympathy for a foreign country, was
widespread within the geographical offices of the State Department and
most local US embassies.
Then there was another related set of reasons that served to weaken
the bargaining power of the US and strengthen that of the allies. These
reasons were not, as the first set, primarily products of America’s
political system or own decisions. Instead, they either flowed from more
indirect circumstances, or had to do with the nature of America’s
partners.
First, since the Europeans realized perfectly well that Washington had
essential reasons of its own for pursuing the policies it did, American
threats to back out of Europe tended to lack credibility. This is another
way of saying that before the United States was really committed to
Europe, it had great leverage. Once the commitment had been made, the
leverage lessened. Whatever leverage remained after the formation of
NATO and the build-up of American strength in 1950–51 was
significantly reduced with Eisenhower’s election in 1952, and the
gradual disappearance of the unilateralist–isolationist alternative.
This point was well illustrated in the French EDC debate. Dulles’s
threat of an “agonizing reappraisal” of the American role in Europe was
quite simply not credible. Even before the negative vote in the French
National Assembly, the key American ambassadors in Europe reported
that “the agonizing reappraisal had not in general been taken
seriously.”13 The Americans would not withdraw. At the time, the
alternative of bringing West Germany directly into NATO was well
known in advance, and was seen by quite a few on both sides of the
Atlantic as at least as satisfactory as the EDC solution itself. However,
this was rarely explicitly stated because so much prestige had been
committed to the EDC, and because it was feared that to suggest
alternatives would only prolong the French process further.
More generally, whenever Washington reflected on the possibility of
threatening to “bring the boys home,” four main reasons strongly
discouraged this course. First, such threats could, even if they were not
actually carried out, strengthen the Soviet Union in its competition with
the West. This was definitely not the image of allied relations that
Washington wanted to project. If carried out, Moscow would achieve
one of its main objectives and the risk of war might presumably even
increase. Second, the threats would also stimulate Adenauer and West
Germany’s “neurotic fears regarding US disengagement from Europe.” At
worst they might even encourage West Germany to develop its own
nuclear weapons to compensate for the American withdrawals. Third,
after de Gaulle had come to power, the threats to withdraw would play
directly into the general’s hands in that they seemed to confirm his
warnings about the unreliability of the United States. Finally, as just
mentioned, threats lacked credibility because the US had its own reasons
for staying in Europe.14
With the US in, Washington was bound to dominate NATO. Political
economists have made us realize that public or collective goods theory
applies to alliances as well as to national and local matters. One aspect
of the domination was that since the hegemon—the United States—
would provide most of the goods in question—for instance security—
largely on its own, there was less of an incentive for the allies to come
up with substantial contributions of their own, particularly if these were
as small in real size and as controversial domestically as they often were.
The great temptation for the allies was then to take America’s role for
The great temptation for the allies was then to take America’s role for
granted, and to pursue policies that demanded less of themselves.
Second, some countries were so strong and so insistent on certain
points that if the United States were to get its way, this would at best be
only after a bitter struggle. Britain was America’s closest ally, but on
some questions also its main challenge. It was financially weak, but it
still carried considerable political weight. When, in 1947, the British
were forced to make sterling convertible, leading to the collapse of
Britain’s foreign exchange position, Washington could not very well
drive Britain into bankruptcy. Britain also simply refused to join
continental schemes that would dilute its sovereignty. Here too
Washington eventually adjusted. Finally, the Attlee government had
established a comprehensive system of social welfare and economic
regulations. Many US policymakers thought this system went too far.
They could do little to change it, however, and once it was “permitted”
in Britain, it had to be accepted in the smaller Western European
countries as well. In this respect the protection offered by the British was
a prominent element in the policies of, especially, the Scandinavians.
There is also the phenomenon already referred to earlier as “the
tyranny of the weak.” Attempts to apply pressure on the Europeans
might, as one official put it, be a “successful operation, but the patient
would be dead.” This was the primary reason why, for instance, the
many ways of using Marshall Plan counterpart funds to pressure various
centrist governments in France so often failed. The alternatives—the
communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right—were simply
unpalatable to Washington. In the EDC debate both Eisenhower and
Churchill thus referred to what they called “the tyrannical weakness of
the French Chamber.”
the French Chamber.”
Even occupied West Germany had considerable leverage in its
dealings with the United States. Adenauer was dependent on the United
States, but the United States also became dependent on Adenauer and
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). If the “Allied” Chancellor did not
do well, Kurt Schumacher and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) would
probably take over. Initially Washington had preferred a CDU–SPD
coalition government, but with the SPD coming out so strongly against
NATO, support for Adenauer’s party was stepped up. In a longer
perspective, holding Germany down could lead to resurgence of
nationalism, possibly even to a new Hitler, or, more likely, bring about
its increased cooperation with the Soviet Union—another Rapallo, like
the original one from 1922. Thus, one State Department memorandum
concluded that Adenauer was “bargaining with us from what is
essentially a position of strength.”15
 Conclusion

POWERS MOVING UP AND POWERS MOVING DOWN

The world is a complex place. Obviously no single power can dictate

solutions for all of the world’s almost 200 countries. Some of them are
just too strong and too proud to be told what to do. Others are, in a
sense, too weak to be dictated to. If Washington simply dictated a
solution, a government could fall; then more extreme parties would gain
influence. Washington’s choices were always limited. Realities on the
ground consistently limited Washington’s leverage. This was the
meaning of President Kennedy’s famous statement in May 1961 in the
context of the Dominican Republic. There were three choices in
descending order of preference: “a decent democratic regime, a
continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim
at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure
that we can avoid the third.”1
Global norms and standards may be spreading, whether they be
political, economic, or cultural. In this sense globalization is making
more and more of us more and more alike—in what we desire
materially, in the technology we use, the food we eat, the music we
listen to, and the way we dress. At the same time, however, ever new
groups of people insist on their own nation states, various forms of
religious fundamentalism are proliferating, and individuals insist on
developing their own norms, sometimes totally at odds with their own
wider communities. As we have seen, globalization and fragmentation
wider communities. As we have seen, globalization and fragmentation
work in conjunction; they are even, to some extent, dependent on each
other.
The international political and economic systems certainly produced
structures and policies that had an impact on virtually all the countries
of the world. The leading powers of the world definitely influenced the
policy choices of others, particularly the smaller states. Yet there was no
shortage of evidence that the world was constantly changing and that
states and individuals could respond to these changes in many different
ways.
Although the United States remained the leading power throughout
the years analyzed in this book, the balance between its strengths and
weaknesses changed. Other powers moved up and down in the
hierarchy. In 1945, when the United Nations was established, the United
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain were the obvious leading
powers. They were the three “superpowers” when the term was first
used toward the very end of the Second World War. China was included
on the Security Council because the United States insisted, and France
primarily because Britain pressed for its inclusion.
The Great Powers of today are different. Britain and France have
much weaker claims to such status than they did in 1945. Germany is
now the leading economic power in Europe. The European Union has
become increasingly important, but is far from unified in its security and
defense policy, or even in its economic and financial policy. The Soviet
Union has been replaced by Russia. China has solidified its claim to
Great Power status. The obvious omissions on the Security Council are
Japan (now with the world’s third largest economy), India (with its
rising economy and status), and possible regional Great Powers, such as
rising economy and status), and possible regional Great Powers, such as
Brazil and South Africa.
Japan, China, South Korea, and several other countries in East Asia
provide dramatic evidence of how quickly states can move up
economically. The Soviet Union provides the grand example of how
quickly powers can collapse; Zimbabwe and even Argentina show how a
state can rapidly slide down the economic ladder. In 1960, South Korea
and Ghana were at the same economic level; so were Indonesia and
Nigeria. In 2010, on a per capita basis, South Korea was at least at the
level of Spain, Greece, and Portugal, and almost 20 times richer than
Ghana; Indonesia was two times richer than Nigeria.2
Most countries behaved fairly predictably in relation to the rest of the
world, but those that absolutely insisted on going their own separate
way certainly had the opportunity to do so. The weakest of the colonial
powers, Portugal, kept its colonies longer than virtually anyone else;
Cuba, although the neighbor of the world’s most powerful country, could
challenge the United States decade after decade; North Korea, bordering
on China and Russia, pursued its own fiercely nationalistic course, more
or less immune to advice from any outsider; South Africa long defied the
world’s basic norms, until in 1989–90 it decided to change its course;
Burma and Zimbabwe moved their own very separate ways; and Rwanda
and Cambodia killed off large parts of their populations without the
world doing anything of significance to stop the parties involved. In
Somalia, nothing seemed to work; neither outside efforts nor domestic
reconciliation. War continued year after year, despite the country’s 7–8
million inhabitants speaking the same language (Somali) and practicing
the same religion (Sunni Islam). No basic cultural or ethnic differences
existed. Society seemed to be ruled by clans, sub-clans, and subsub-clans.
This was indeed “the narcissism of minor difference” that Sigmund
Freud had discussed.
If we look at Washington’s lists of rogue states we find they have been
remarkably similar for more than three decades. The list reached its
climax in George W. Bush’s condemnation of the Axis of Evil in January
2002, and the ensuing invasion of Iraq in March 2003. But Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea had been broadly condemned for many years. So also
had Libya, Syria, Burma, Zimbabwe, and Cuba. The sad outcome of the
invasion of Iraq discouraged a repeat of any similar action in these other
countries.
Negotiation ended Libya’s nuclear program and its support of
terrorism; in 2011 the regime itself collapsed, in part due to foreign
intervention, although primarily by Britain and France. Nevertheless, if
the dictators of the world refused to listen, there was normally little the
outside world could do to change the outcome. Sanctions rarely
overthrew governments. At any one time the United States applied an
almost endless list of different kinds of sanctions against a great number
of governments. Only when such sanctions worked in concert with
strong local factors of opposition, such as in South Africa, might they
change the situation dramatically.
Indeed, big powers do not always secure big outcomes; they often get
only small outcomes. Due to the divisions of the international
community, rogue states almost always had alternative powers they
could work with. South Africa was more important to Zimbabwe than
the US and the EU; in Burma’s case, China, India, and countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were more significant
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were more significant
than the West; and for North Korea, China was clearly the crucial power.
Even intelligence organizations, such as the CIA, were unable to
produce the striking results of the past, partly because some of their
previous actions were no longer acceptable at home, and partly because
the local scene was even more complicated than before. And actions—
such as in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973—had
only succeeded because they had crucial backing from important groups
in the country itself, although probably not from the majority of the
people in any of the three countries. Darioush Bayandor has suggested
that the fall of Mosaddeq in August 1953 flowed largely from domestic
factors, and that the role of the CIA and MI6 is vastly overstated.3 In
Guatemala the army played a crucial role. Allende in Chile never had the
support of the majority of the people.
Successes of the past, real or mythical, had a tendency to become the
failures of the future, as the knowledge about the transgressions of the
past strengthened the groups that were critical of the United States. This
has certainly been the effect in all three countries mentioned. The same
happened in the Soviet case. In the long run, Moscow’s interventions in
Eastern Europe in 1953, 1956, and 1968 undermined the Soviet role and
ultimately helped prepare the ground for the momentous changes in
1989.
Many different elements tended to weaken the impact of even the
world’s superpowers, particularly when they were in decline. In the
Third World the number of independent countries had dramatically
increased; they now held a majority in most international forums.
Flagrant interference in their affairs was becoming less acceptable and
more difficult. Democratic rule might be spreading in the world, but so
more difficult. Democratic rule might be spreading in the world, but so
was nationalism. It strengthened resistance to most forms of foreign rule,
and often made it difficult even for superpowers to acquire, and
certainly to manipulate, clients. Local regimes were generally better
organized and could mobilize larger parts of the population than before,
some on the basis of political, others religious, doctrines.
Technology was being diffused, particularly modern weapons.
Whereas in 1950 only five Third World countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, India, and China) could build anything more than small arms,
by 1980 that number had increased to twenty-six, and the range of
products had grown to include much heavier weapons in 2011, even in
some cases nuclear ones (India, Pakistan, North Korea, potentially even
Iran). What they did not produce themselves, they could purchase, if
necessarily, covertly. Not only countries, but even small groups could
now, through modern weapons technology, cause terrible losses, even to
a superpower. Asymmetrical warfare was taking its toll almost
everywhere a superpower intervened. Terrorist actions could lead to
quick exits, as shown by the Reagan administration’s withdrawal from
Lebanon in 1983, and the Clinton administration’s departure from
Somalia ten years later. The days of small Western colonial groups with
machine guns defeating thousands of “natives” were definitely gone.
Now it was the other way around; a few terrorists could defeat
thousands of Western troops.
In the light of the Jasmine Revolutions in the Arab world in 2011
there has been much focus on the effects of the Internet and social
media. These were allegedly a major explanation for the collapse of
regimes that had been in power for decades. People could connect
independently of the government in ways that were impossible until the
independently of the government in ways that were impossible until the
new media developed. The opposition could swiftly assemble and work
out positions as developments quickly unfolded.
There would seem to be much to this argument. Compared to the days
of radio and television that could relatively easily be controlled by the
government, control was much more difficult with social media. As has
been said, the traditional one-to-many geometry of communication was
replaced by the many-to-many model. This left much more scope for
independent action.
A few argued, however, that social media represented a means of
transmission that could be used by many different forces. Governments
have always tried to push back and shape developments in their own
mold, as was the case with radio and television. This has happened with
social media too. For instance, the government in Egypt shut the Internet
down for five days. The Syrian government cut power entirely in parts of
the country. The Chinese government pushed Google out, shut off the
entire Internet in Xinjiang for a period in 2009, and worked hard every
day to prevent the spread of materials that undermined its cause. In
many respects it was successful, although there would frequently be
ways around the barriers thrown up. The authorities would use the new
media for their own purposes; they would often get the necessary
passwords from members of the opposition and could thus hack,
infiltrate, and create chaos. These actions undoubtedly had their effects.
If really desperate, governments could of course still put demonstrators
in prison, or even shoot them.
Many revolutions failed, even with the help of the Internet and social
media. In the Arab world, some governments collapsed; others survived.
The efforts to overthrow the government in Iran after the falsified
presidential elections in 2009 failed; even in Europe the authoritarian
regime in Belarus survived. Many factors always have to be taken into
account in explaining such changes. Yet the conclusion is probably that
the new media strengthened bottom-up political activity at the expense
of centralized government.4
And, most significant for the relationship between small powers and
big powers, the locals were frequently much more committed to their
cause than was the outside power. Kissinger stated that “I can’t believe a
fourth-rate country like North Vietnam doesn’t have a breaking point.”
But, as Ho Chi Minh told a French diplomat in 1945, “You will kill ten of
our men, but we will kill one of yours, and it is you who will finish by
wearing yourself out.” General Vo Nguyen Giap made the same point
after the Vietnam War was over: “Despite its military power, America
misgauged the limits of its power. In war there are two factors—human
beings and weapons. Ultimately, though, human beings are the decisive
factor. Human beings! Human beings!”5 Admittedly Vietnam was an
extreme case, but the basic point applied to other areas as well. Most
American presidents after the Second World War had in fact withdrawn
from one or more exposed areas—Truman from China, Johnson and
Nixon from Vietnam, Reagan from Lebanon, George H. W. Bush and Bill
Clinton from Somalia, Obama from Iraq. When their presidencies were
threatened, they withdrew, whatever promises they had made earlier.
Countries are indeed moving up and down. So are companies. The list
of the world’s leading companies fifty years ago looks remarkably
different from an equivalent list today. Companies from many different
countries, certainly including China (Sinopec, State Grid, China National
Petroleum) are now on the list; so are American companies that did not
even exist only a few decades ago (Microsoft, Google, Facebook).6 Even
single individuals can do large-scale damage, as many a lone terrorist
shows. Individuals can also face up to the world’s greatest powers, as
when dissidents in Eastern and Central Europe played such an important
role in ending Soviet domination. Now the same battle is being waged in
China. Could individuals such as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate for
2010, Liu Xiaobo, possibly influence the future of the rapidly growing
China?

FINAL WORDS

Superpowers are still super, in the sense that they can accomplish things
that nobody else can. If they are really super, they create their own
spheres of influence, even their own empires. In many ways the United
States played an imperial role in the world after the Second World War.
It was able to set up a liberal political and economic order based on the
UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization,
NATO, and a host of other regional organizations. Washington was able
to incorporate its Second World War enemies, West Germany and Japan,
firmly into this new order and, decades later, so many of the allies of the
former Soviet Union. The US even kept its biggest allies in their place
when this was needed, as Suez in 1956 made so explicit vis-à-vis Britain
and France; and it kept communists and communist sympathizers out of
the governments of virtually all the alliance countries. American
investment and culture spread to the most distant corners of the world.
When needed, the United States reserved the right both to intervene
more or less unilaterally almost anywhere around the globe to maintain
this order, and to make its own exceptions to the general principles of
democracy and free trade it normally promoted. So strong and self-
confident was the United States in fact that it tried to promote regional
centers which, at least in the long run, could limit America’s own power
—successfully so in Europe, less so in East Asia. In historical terms these
were impressive achievements. And much of this order is still with us
today. The question now is whether the order will be extended to
include even China.
America’s general position, certainly including its vast military might,
often made the US preferable as the ultimate military guarantor in case
everything should go wrong, whether this be in Europe against an
unpredictable Russia, or in Asia against a surging China. Washington’s
political weight showed in most negotiations. Only the United States was
involved in the solution of all the most difficult issues, whether these be
North Korea, Israel/Palestine, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or even the
Balkans, the Caucasus, Sudan, or Congo.
In today’s world the United States is the only truly global power;
others, such as China and the EU, are still primarily regional powers,
although with certain global aspirations. With the limits of America’s
military and economic power so clearly demonstrated in recent years, it
is, however, questionable to refer to an American “empire.” The US has
suffered major military defeats; its debt is piling up; not only China but
other powers are clearly rising; and the process of globalization is, in
several ways, making the world playing field more level. In the
several ways, making the world playing field more level. In the
economic sphere the focus is broadening, from the traditional Western
powers and Japan, to include China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, South
Africa, and others. The G-7 and G-8 (with Russia) are being replaced by
the G-20. Negotiations about world trade and climate change are now
being determined more and more by the United States, China, and even
India. It is symptomatic of the lack of unified leadership that many of
these negotiations no longer produce as significant results as in the past.
The questions are many. Why did the Soviet Union collapse? Why did
the countries of East Asia enjoy more rapid growth than most other
countries? And, when we reach the individual level where the various
decisions are made that together constitute “development,” what makes
one person change, whereas another sticks to a traditional pattern?
With regard to Great Power politics, development and poverty, as in
most North–South and East–West issues, comprehensive explanations
must always be supplemented with a knowledge of local conditions.
Such conditions tend to modify nearly any generalization. Local diversity
is difficult to grasp, and virtually impossible to cover in any book
surveying the world situation after 1945; it is easily downplayed, or
even entirely forgotten, in the stream of top-level international events.
Yet, despite the growing significance of political, economic, and cultural
globalization, many different local factors still remain crucial.
 Index

Accra 157, 168

Acheson, Dean 16
Act of Chapultepec (1945) 106
Adenauer, Konrad Hermann Joseph 184–6
Adomeit, Hannes 135n.13, 136n.17, 138n.20,147n.57
Afghanistan:
the British Empire and 95n.9
the Soviet Union and 137, 140, 142, 145–6
Soviet invasion of 177, 180
war in 21, 23–8, 31–2, 34, 37, 48, 88, 97–8, 124–6, 158, 170, 179,
193
see also Taliban, the; terrorism Africa:
aid to 63
British colonial rule in 3, 87, 94, 101, 110, 118, 156–7, 160n.9, 168
China and 63
colonialism in 170n.35, 171n.39
democracy in 22
ethnic-national independence in 172
history of 170, 171n.39
Indian films in 41
North 28, 53
partition of 95n.7
Soviet policy and 105
 Soviet policy and 105
US relations with 29, 64, 110, 127–8
war in 13
West 106, 168n.29
see also Algeria; BASIC; Congo, the; Eritrea; Ghana; Kenya; Libya;
Namibia; Nigeria; South Africa; Sudan; Zimbabwe African
Americans 102
Ajayi, J. F. Ade 170n.35
Akromeyev, Sergei 138, 140
Al Qaeda 23
see also terrorism
Albania 59, 104, 118, 169
Albright, Madeleine 20
Alderman, Liz 82n.83
Alexander II, Czar 147
Algeria 158, 164, 171
see also Africa
Allende, Salvador 103, 189
Alliance for Progress 106
Alter, Jonathan 30n.39
Altman, Roger C. and Haass, Richard N. 27n.31
Amalrik, Andrei A. 132, 133n.2
Ambrose, Stephen E. 176n.2, 182nn.8, 9
America, see Latin America; South America; United States of America
 (USA) Amnesty International 152
Amritsar 157
Andornino, Giovanni 61n.34, 100nn.20, 21
Antarctica 63
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 96
Antigua 153
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty) 107
Arab world 29, 34, 126, 128, 151, 190–1
Arab forces 109
Arbenz, Jacobo 103–4
Argentina 26, 40, 94, 95n.9, 188, 190
arms race with the USA 13
Art, Robert J. 82n.81
Ash, Timothy Garton 169n.33
Asia:
British colonial rule in 3, 156–7
democracy 22
Europe and 48
Central 21, 60, 88, 127, 156
China and 63, 78, 91, 128, 193
Confucian East 1
East Asia 20, 61, 65n.43, 77, 84–5, 91, 100, 114, 118, 125, 127, 157,
188, 192–3
financial structures in 77
independence movements in 87, 172
 independence movements in 87, 172
Indian films in 41
industrialization in 68, 71, 80n.75
‘New Asian Hemisphere’ 57
Northeast 97
South 110
Southeast 60, 66, 100, 110, 177–8
Turkey in 48
US relations with 21, 64, 91, 103, 113, 127
war in 13, 49, 107
see also ASEAN; China; India; Japan; Kuwait; Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) Åslund, Anders 134n.9, 135n.11, 136,
142n.38
Asseburg, Muriel and Kempin, Ronja 48n.12
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 65, 83, 189
Ataç, C. Akça 97n.14
Athenian empire 95
see also Greece
Atlantic Charter 175–6
Attila the Hun 156
Attlee, Clement 185
Ausgleich (1867) 166
Australia 3, 26, 50, 58–9, 105, 107, 111, 125
see also ANZUS
Austria 5, 59, 86, 107, 120, 166, 172
 Vienna 1, 165–7
Austria-Hungary 86, 161–2, 166–73
see also Austria; Hapsburg Empire; Hungary ‘Axis of Evil’ 189
Azores, the 106, 111

Ba’athism 24
Baghdad, see Iraq
Baghdad Pact 109
Bahrein 108
Baku 147
Balfour, Arthur 94
Balkans, the 125, 193
Baltic States 104, 125, 165
see also Lithuania
Bangladesh, People’s Republic of 153
Bao Dai 103
Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie 174n.47
Barboza, David 71n.53, 72n.58, 73nn.59, 61, 74n.63
Barbuda 153
Barnett, Thomas P. M. 89n.4
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) 39–40
Bayandor, Darioush 189
Baylis, John et al. 150n.1
Beinart, Peter 23n.28, 34n.41, 176n.1
Belarus 191
Belarus 191
Belgium 59, 153, 170
Brussels 52, 56n.24
Belgrade 179
Benelux countries 106
Berlin:
Berlin crisis (1948) 120
Cold War in 125
crises over 13
European Union and 53, 56
Wall, fall of 23n. 27
Bevin, Ernest 11, 107, 120, 123
Bickers, Robert 79n.74
Blake, Robert and Louis, William Roger 164n.18
Blechman, Barry M. and Kaplan, Stephen S. 13n.5
Blum-Byrnes Agreement 119
Boahen, A. Adu 170n.35, 171n.39
Bollywood 41
Borden, William S. 182
Boskin, Michael 136
Bosnia and Herzegovina 21, 48, 49, 59
Bowden, Brett 98n.16
Bowley, Graham 28n.34
Bowring, Philip 73n.61
Boyle, Peter 115n.36
Bradsher, Keith 71n.53, 73n.59, 81n.77
Bradsher, Keith 71n.53, 73n.59, 81n.77
Bradsher, Keith and Dempsey, Julia 81n.78, 82n.83, 83n.85
Brady, Anne-Marie 63n.38
Brautigam, Deborah 63n.40
Brazil 26, 29, 50–1, 58–9, 80n.75, 127, 188, 190, 193
black population in 40
defence expenditure in 49
education system in 40
GDP 40
inequality in 40
infrastructure of 40
international peacekeeping and 40
social and economic problems in 40
see also BASIC; BRIC
Brett, Teddy et al. 122n.44
Brettell, Anna 68n.49
Bretton Woods system 14
Brezhnev, Leonid 101
Brezhnev Doctrine 146, 157
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, China, India) 39–40, 51
BRICI (BRIC + Indonesia) 39
BRICS (BRIC + South Africa) 39
BRICSAM (BRIC + South Africa and Mexico) 39
Bridge, F.R. 161n.12, 171n.37
British Commonwealth of Nations 94, 167
British Commonwealth of Nations 94, 167
British Empire:
vs American “Empire” 105–6
dominions of 118
fall of the 168n.29, 101n.22
formal aspects of the 94–7
history of the 98n.15, 99n.17, 105, 156–7, 167
in India 157
influence of the 17
see also Africa; Asia; United Kingdom Brogi, Alessandro 119
Brooks, David 36, 38n.49
Brooks, Stephen G. 5
Brooks, Stephen G. and Wohlforth, William C.5, 90n.7
Brown, Archie 134n.9, 142n.38, 147n.59
Brunei 59, 65
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 93, 132, 182n.9
Bulgaria 50, 117, 147n.56
Bull, Hedley 163n.15
Bull, Hedley and Watson, Adam 163n.15,168n.28
Bundy, McGeorge 179
Burbank, Jane and Cooper, Frederick 96
Burma, see Myanmar
Burns, John F. 55n.22
Bush, George W. 23–6, 29, 34, 37, 64, 93, 98, 145, 189, 191
Bush administration 23, 25, 29, 32, 49, 97–8, 126
 Bush administration 23, 25, 29, 32, 49, 97–8, 126
Byrnes, James 16, 103, 107
Byzantine Empire 1

Cabot Lodge, Henry 106

Cain, P. J. and Hopkins, A. G. 164n.18, 168n.28
Calleo, David 4
Cambodia 178, 188
Canada 50, 105–7, 111–12, 116, 125, 153
GDP 26, 43, 58–9
Canary Islands, the 106
see also Spain
capitalism:
communism and 22
from feudalism to 163
Japan and 44
in the USA 143
Caribbean, the 97, 102
Carolingian Empire 1
Carrere d’Encausse, Hélène 132, 133n.2, 134n.9
Carter, Jimmy 3
Caryl, Christian 81n.79
Casablanca 111
Castañeda, Jorge G. 39n.1, 51n.16
Castle, Stephen 56n.25
Castro, Fidel 179, 187
Castro, Fidel 179, 187
Caucasus region 42, 44, 88, 165, 172–3, 193
Ceauşescu, Nicolae 147
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 124
Chamberlain, Joseph 159
Chang, Gordon 75
Chechnya 44
Chen Jian 56n.26
Cheney, Dick 97
Chernyaev, Anatoly 140
Chile 63, 103, 189
China:
Africa and 63
anti-democratic vein 64
Asia and 63, 78, 91, 128, 193
Beijing 61, 63–4, 66, 68–9, 73, 77–81, 100, 180
Beijing Olympics 61
Brunei and 65
Burma and 65
China National Petroleum 192
Civil war 121
the Cold War and 131
Communist Party 61, 63, 67, 73–4
Communist Revolution 67, 175
Cultural Revolution 70
Cultural Revolution 70
culture (‘soft power’) 63–4, 100
currency power 75
defence 49, 61
East China Sea 65
economy 70
education and 71
environmental issues in 68n.49, 71
the European Union and 55–6
fertility rate in 35
Five-Year Plan 56
GDP 5, 57–8, 74, 89
GNP 62, 63, 76
Google and 67
Great Leap Forward 70
as a ‘great power’ 67, 79, 83, 85
Han Chinese 61, 69–70, 153
homosexuality in 67
Hukou system 73
immigration policy in 35
India and 42, 65
inequality in 36, 73
Japan and 65, 46
life expectancy in 42, 59
Malaysia and 65
Manchu dynasty 61
Manchu dynasty 61
media, the, in 63
Ming dynasty 61
Mongolia and 65
navy, Chinese 42, 61
neo-Confucianism 64, 70
Nepal and 65
nuclear power 61
one-child policy 35, 69
one-party rule 41
Pakistan and 62, 65
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 88
Philippines, the, and 65, 104
population of 58–60
Qing dynasty 61
as a quasi-superpower 79
retirement age 60
Russia and 65
South China Sea 65–6, 81, 88
Three Gorges Dam Project 71
Tiananmen Square 21
United Nations and 61
US relations with 60
women, position of 64
World War I and 79n.74
World War I and 79n.74
see also Asia; BASIC
Chirac, Jacques 51, 55
Chollet, Derek and Goldgeier, James 23n.27
Christensen, Thomas J. 80n.76, 83n.86
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 185–6
Chua, Amy 36n.45
Churchill, Winston 93, 114–15, 164, 185
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 58, 103–4, 135–8, 189
Clark, Ian 150n.1
Clayton, William 183
Clinton, Bill 20–5, 33, 37, 49, 176, 190, 192
Clinton, Hillary 77–8
CNN 62n.36, 71n.54, 77n.70, 192n.6
Cobden, Richard 154
Cold War, the:
China and 131
containment during 22
end of the 4, 20, 41–2, 48, 55–6, 88, 97, 124, 128, 133–4, 140–8, 173,
181
France during 110, 119n.40
impact of 87, 158
internationalization and 18n.18
Italy during 199n.40
the Middle East and 180n.5
 mood during 17, 51, 101
NATO and 125, 170
peak of 124
Portugal and Spain during 103
revisionists of 183
Scandinavia during 111n.33, 121n.41, 183n.11
US Presidents during 136–7, 146
war and 31, 113, 172, 176
Collett, Nigel 157n.5
Colombia 190
Columbus, Christopher 2
Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) 48
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 48
Commonwealth games 41
communism:
vs capitalism 22
global influence of 3, 82
socialism and 163
Soviet 82, 87, 112, 115, 147, 164–5, 169–70
see also China: Communist Party; Communist Revolution Conference
on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) 143
Confucius Institutes 63
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the 171, 193
see also Africa
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 143, 146
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 143, 146
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) 116,
121
Cox, Michael 7n.17
Croatia 169
Cross, Colin 101n.22, 168n.29
Crusades, the 98
Cuba 96, 104, 107, 179, 188–9
Cui Liru 79n.75
Curzon, Lord 105
Cyprus 95n.9
Czech Republic 21
Prague 103
Czechoslovakia, the former:
communism in 117
“fall” of 115
government of 103
Habsburg Empire and 162
national identity of 169
revolt in (1968) 118, 147n.56, 157
Soviet armed forces in 143
splitting of 153

Dalai Lama 70, 78

Darfur 80, 83
Darwin, John 1, 95
Darwin, John 1, 95
Darwinist thought 164
Davis, Lance E. and Huttenback, Robert A. 148n.61, 165n.21
de Gaulle, Charles 13, 86, 102, 114, 181–4
Deák, István 161n.12, 162n.14
debt, statistics of 25–8
democracy:
American 16, 18–19, 22, 126, 151
Chinese 68
communism and 163
European 48, 56, 151
general principles of 192
global spread of 22, 155, 164
Indian 40–1
Portuguese 158
Russian 147
Dempsey, Judy 30n.38
Deng Xiaoping 56, 67
Denmark 59, 86, 121, 172
Copenhagen 33
see also Scandinavia
Dhahran 109
Dickens, Charles 17
Dikötter, Frank 18n.17
Dirksen, Everett 177
Dirksen, Everett 177
Dobrynin, Anatoly 137–8, 140, 145, 146n.54, 148n.60
Doder, Dusko and Branson, Louise 145n.50
Dominica 153
Dominican Republic 107, 187
Draper, Theodore 159n.7
Drezner, Daniel W. 77n.72
Dulles, John Foster 114
Dunlop, John B. 134n.9, 142n.38
Durfee, Don and Pomfret, James 71n.55
Dyer, R. E. H. 157

East Timor 80, 153

Eberstadt, Nicholas 35n.44; 43n.6
Eckes, Alfred E. 89n.6, 166n.25
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 120–1
Economy, Elizabeth 81, 82n.81
Ecuador 59
Eden, Anthony 108
Egypt 94, 95n.9, 108–9, 115, 126, 178, 191
see also Suez
Eichengreen, Barry 14n.10, 89n.6
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 34, 103, 106, 109, 115, 121, 176, 181–5
Eisenhower administration 16, 103, 109, 113
Eisenhower Doctrine 109
Ellman, Michael and Kontorovich, Vladimir 138n.24, 139nn.26, 28, 29,
Ellman, Michael and Kontorovich, Vladimir 138n.24, 139nn.26, 28, 29,
140n.30, 142n.38, 143n.44, 145nn.51, 52
Emmott, Bill 42n.5
‘empire’ 92–3
Enlai, Zhou 177
Ericson, Richard E. 136n.15
Eritrea 153
Erlanger, Steven 51n.17
Europe:
euro, the 52–5, 89
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC/Euratom) 181
European Central Bank (ECB) 52, 53
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 181
European Common Market 181
European Comparison Project 136
European Constitutional treaty 51
European Council 56n.24
European Defense Community (EDC) 116, 181–2, 184–5
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 52
European Recovery Program (ERP) 121–2, 183
European Union (EU) 4, 26, 29, 35, 47–56, 58, 149, 152, 154, 173–4,
189, 193
Commission of the 52, 53
European Parliament 52
GDP 174
 High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy 52
Stability and Growth Pact 52
Western European Union (WEU) 181, 183, 188
Eurostat 26
see also Austria; Baltic States; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Bulgaria; Caucasus region; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic;
Denmark; Finland; France; Geneva; Germany; Greece; Greenland;
Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Kosovo; Lithuania; Luxembourg;
Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Scandinavia; Spain;
Sweden; Turkey; United Kingdom Facebook 192
Fackler, Martin 45n.10, 66n.45
Fallows, James 44n.7
Falun Gong 68
Farnsworth, Eric 63n.38
Farwell, Byron 171n.38
Ferguson, Niall 76n.69, 86, 90, 92, 95, 149
Fernández-Armesto, Felipe 92
Fieldhouse, D. K. 165n.21, 171n.36
Finland 35, 59, 104
see also Helsinki Process; Scandinavia Firth, Noel E. and Noren, James
H. 135n.12
Fischer, Beth A. 146
Fishman, Ted C. 57n.27, 60n.31
Florig, Dennis 97n.13
foreign direct investment (FDI) 63
Førland, Tor Egil 116n.38
France 2–3, 26, 42, 48–50, 52, 54–5, 58–9, 62, 80n.75, 86, 89, 99, 110–
11, 113, 115, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127, 153, 158, 163, 172, 174,
182–3, 189, 192
the euro and 52
economy of 17
Fourth Republic 158, 164
French Empire 1, 105, 171
French National Assembly 181, 184
French Revolution 86, 156, 161
military cooperation with the UK 55
Paris 13, 121, 143, 181
weaponry in 146
see also Gaul, Franco–German cooperation, Franco–German Élysée
Treaty Franco, General Francisco 103
Franco–German Élysée Treaty 114, 181–2
Fravel, M. Taylor 65n.43
Freeland, Chrystia 36n.48
French, Patrick 41n.3, 42n.5
Freud, Sigmund 189
‘friction’ 124
Friedberg, Aaron L. 77n.72, 79n.75, 84, 105n.30, 111n.33, 128n.51,
159n.8, 171n.36
Friedman, Thomas 131n.1
Fukuyama, Francis 22n.26
Fulbright, William 16

G-2 (Group of Two) 79

G-7 (Group of Seven) 80, 193
G-8 (Group of Eight) 193
G-20 (Group of Twenty) 26, 80, 193
Gaddafi, Muammar 28, 49, 81, 178
Gaddis, John Lewis 111n.33, 144n.48, 148n.62, 173n.43
Gaddy, Clifford G. 135n.11, 139n.29, 143n.45
Galapagos Islands 111
Gandhi, Mohandas K. 41n.4, 168
Garthoff, Raymond L. 143n.41, 145, 146n.54
Gates, Robert M. 62, 136–7, 142, 146n.53
Gaul 99
Gaza 126
Gedmin, Jeffrey 165n.20
Gellner, Ernest 154
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 14, 15, 116, 152, 166,
192
Geneva Conference 110
George III, king of England 2
Georgia 42, 44, 125
Germany 2, 26, 48, 50–9, 76, 78, 80n.75, 86, 89,97, 105–6, 116, 120,
122, 125, 127, 147, 151, 159, 161–3, 169, 172, 174, 179
 122, 125, 127, 147, 151, 159, 161–3, 169, 172, 174, 179
Bizone 108
Bonn 114
Bundestag 114
East 118, 143, 157
fertility rate 35
German empire 86, 105
Hamburg 13
Nazi Germany 131, 171, 179
West 15, 102, 107–8, 112–18, 181, 184, 192
see also Berlin; Lebensraum; Gleichschaltung
Ghana 168, 188
see also Africa
Giap, General Vo Nguyen 191
Gibbon, Edward 158
Gibianski, Leonid 167n.27
Gibraltar 95n.9, 105
Gifford, Prosser and Louis, William Roger 110n.32, 160n.9, 168nn.29,
30
Gilpin, Robert 4
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 14, 51
Glaser, Charles 79n.73
glasnost 141, 165 see also Perestroika
Gleichschaltung 169
globalization 6, 72, 131, 150–8, 187, 193
globalization 6, 72, 131, 150–8, 187, 193
Gold Coast 168
Goldman Sachs 39
Goldstein, Gordon M. 179n.4
Golley, Jane and Song, Ligang 63n.40
Goodman, Melvin A. 136nn.14, 15, 138n.22
Google 67, 78, 191–2
Gopal, Sarvepalli 164n.18
Gorbachev, Mikhail 42, 48, 87, 132–48, 164–5
Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, General Bernard E. 24n.30
Gray, Robert 98
Great Britain, see United Kingdom Great Depression, the 87, 151–2
Greece 52–3, 63, 86, 99–100, 103, 107–9, 120, 153, 188
Greek Empire 15, 19, 102, 169
see also Athenian Empire
Greenland 106, 111, 121
Greenpeace 152
Grenada 2, 153
Gromyko, Andrej 138–9
Guantanamo 31, 33
see also torture
Guatemala 16, 103–4, 107, 189
Guibernau, Montserrat 54n.21
Gulf of Aden 83
Gulf War (1991) 21, 88
Gulf War (1991) 21, 88
Guoguang Wu, 67n.47

Hachigian, Nina and Peng Yuan 79n.75

Haiti 21, 40, 49, 80
Halper, Stefan 57n.27, 79n.75
Hamas 33, 126
Hammond, Daniel R. 74n.63
Hapsburg Empire 1–2, 161, 167
Hargreaves, John D. 168n.29
Hart, Andrew F. and Jones, Bruce D. 127n.49
Haseler, Stephen 47n.11
Haslam, Jonathan 101n.23, 105n.29
Hatoyama, Yokio 46
Hauser, Christine and Saltmarsh, Matthew 90n.9
Havel, Václav 173n.45
Healey, Denis 13
‘hegemon’:
vs ‘hegemony’ 82, 93, 95
notion of 1, 5
and the USA 14, 15n.12, 79, 87, 100
Helsinki Process 145
see also Finland
Herder, J. G. 172
Hertle, Hans-Hermann 147n.57
Hezbollah 126
Hezbollah 126
see also Lebanon; terrorism
Hill, Steven 55n.23
Himka, John-Paul 169n.32
Hinsley, F. H. 95n.7
Hiro, Dilip 12n.4, 41n.3
Hitler, Adolf 16, 118, 162, 169, 176–7, 186
Ho Chi Minh 103, 191
see also Vietnam
Ho, Peter and Edmonds, Richard Louis 68n.49
Holbig, Heike and Gilley, Bruce 61n.33
Holslag, Jonathan 56n.25, 65n.43
Hong Kong 59, 70, 80
Hosking, Geoffrey 134n.9
Howard, Michael 134n.7, 173n.42
Howorth, Jolyon 49n.14
Hu Jintao 79
Hungary 21, 117, 118, 143, 147n.56, 157, 166, 169, 172
see also Austria-Hungary
Hunter, Alan 64n.42
Huntington, Samuel P. 5, 151n.2
Hussein, Saddam 24, 179
Hyam, Ronald 164n.18

Iceland 59, 63, 106, 111, 116, 153, 162

 see also Reykjavik Summit; Scandinavia Ikenberry, G. John 5, 14, 83–
4, 95–6
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 12, 14–15, 26, 50, 58, 80, 115, 127,
176, 192
Immerman, Richard H. 93nn.3, 5
India 1, 2, 6, 24, 26, 29, 32, 35, 39–42, 50–1, 58, 80n.75, 86, 95n.9,
127, 128, 188–90
Bollywood 41
British rule in 87, 94, 101, 105, 118, 151, 153, 156, 165, 168, 170–1,
193
caste system 42
conflict with U.S. 65
defence 40–1, 49
economic growth in 40, 70
GDP 40–1
GNP 43
Great Indian Uprising/Indian Mutiny 157, 164
independence in 3, 165, 171
life expectancy in 42
New Delhi 41
as a nuclear power 41
population in 40
women’s rights in 42
see also BASIC
Indian Congress Party 168
Indian Congress Party 168
Indian Ocean 42
Indochina 103, 108, 110, 158, 164, 171, 178
Indo-Iranian empire 156
Indonesia 26, 39, 104, 110, 153, 177–8, 188, 193
see also BRICI
Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) 135
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 3
intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) 143
treaty 143, 146
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 128, 152
International Criminal Court (ICC) 96, 127
Iran 1, 16, 23, 25, 31–2, 40, 63–4, 82–3, 95n.8, 97–8, 103–4, 109, 124,
126, 189–93
Tehran 32–3, 179
Iraq 23–6, 28, 31–2, 34, 37, 88, 97–8, 108–9, 124, 126, 158, 176, 179,
192
Baghdad 24
invasion of 32, 189
war in 21, 51, 88, 93
Ireland 52, 59, 105, 154, 157, 162, 168
Iron Curtain 114
isolationism 3, 16, 49, 106, 112, 176
Israel 25, 32–4, 59, 108–9, 115, 126, 128, 193
Tel Aviv 34
 see also Palestine
Italy 2, 17, 26, 50, 52–3, 58–9, 103, 105, 113, 119–21, 163, 172

Jackson, William D. 140n.32, 141n.37; 143nn.42, 43

Jacques, Martin 57n.27
Japan 2, 3, 4, 13, 15, 19, 20, 22, 24–6, 29, 44–7, 50, 58–9, 66, 76,
80n.75, 81, 87–8, 97, 102, 106–7, 108, 111–112, 114, 118, 125, 127,
151, 157, 163, 166–8, 170, 175, 177, 182, 188, 192–3
banking system in 46
and China 44
currency power of 75
economy of 17, 45, 70
education system in 45
Etorofu 114
fertility rate in 35
GDP 45
GNP 46
Hiroshima 31
Kunashiri 114
Liberal-Democrat party 46
Nagasaki 31
Okinawa 114
population of 45
poverty rate in 45
supremacy of 38
 Tokyo 44–5
see also Pearl Harbor
Japanese Mandated Islands 107
Jasmine Revolutions 190
Jefferson, Thomas 92
Jiang Zemin 21
Joffe, Josef 5
Johansen, Per Anders 125n.48
Johnson, Chalmers 44n.7, 124n.47
Johnson, Ian 74n.62
Johnson, Lyndon 113, 177, 191
Jones, Ben 55n.22
Jordan 109
Judd, Denis 157n.5

Kagan, Robert 49
Kahn, Herman 44n.7
Kai-shek, Chiang 179
Kang, David C. 65n.43, 91n.10
Kann, Robert A. 161n.12, 162n.14, 166n.22, 169n.34
Kaplan, Lawrence S. 167n.26
Kaplan, Robert D. 60n.32
Kaplan, Stephen S. 13n.5
Kapur, Akash 42n.5
Karnow, Stanley 191n.5
Karnow, Stanley 191n.5
Kennan, George F. 17, 22, 122, 132
Kennedy, John F. 17, 19, 106, 109–10, 113–14, 176, 182, 187
Kennedy, Paul 2, 4–6, 19–20, 44n.7, 75n.65, 133–4, 148–9, 159
Kenya 127
see also Africa
Keohane, Robert 4
Keynes, John Maynard 78
Khan, Genghis 1, 11, 156
Khanin, Girsh 136
Khrushchev, Nikita 18, 101, 135, 147
Kindleberger, Charles P. 166n.25
Kissinger, Henry 79n.75, 84, 146, 191
Koenker, Diane P. and Bachman, Ronald D. 141n.37, 142n.40
Kohl, Helmut 51, 54
Koizumi, Junichiro 46
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of (North Korea) 23, 31–2, 63, 66,
80, 82–3, 97–8, 104, 126–7, 180, 188–9, 190, 193
and nuclear weapons 66
Pyongyang 32
Korea, Republic of (South Korea) 13, 24, 26, 46, 50, 58–9, 66, 70, 107,
111, 127, 188
Seoul 32
Korean War 18, 31, 44, 87, 107–8, 121, 148, 170, 172, 177, 179, 181
Kornienko, Georgii 138
Kosovo 21, 179
Kosovo 21, 179
Kosygin, Andrej 179
Kotkin, Joel 36n.45
Krauthammer, Charles 20, 23
Krugman, Paul 28n.33, 53n.19
Kulish, Nicholas 30n.38
Kupchan, Charles 47n.11, 55
Kuwait 108, 179
Kynge, James 75n.64
Kyoto:
Nobel conference in 45n.9
protocol 96
Treaty 33, 128

Labott, Elise 77n.70

Ladwig, Walter C. III, 41n.4
LaFraniere, Sharon 69n.50
LaFraniere, Sharon and Wassener, Bettina 75n.64
Lake, David A. 97
Landler, Mark and Chan, Sewell 81n.79
Landler, Mark et al. 66n.45
Landon, Thomas Jr. 53n.18
Laos 178
Laron, Guy 180n.5
Laski, Harold 11
Latin America 21, 29, 63, 103, 105–6, 112, 171
Latin America 21, 29, 63, 103, 105–6, 112, 171
see also South America
League of Nations 152, 163, 175
Lebanon 40, 109, 126, 190–1
see also Hezbollah
Lebensraum 159, 162, 169
Lee, William T. 138n.25
Leffler, Melvyn P. 144n.48, 146n.55
legitimacy:
imperial 167–70
national 162–7
old and new forms of 160–2
stability and 170–4
Lend-Lease aid 108
Leonard, Mark 47n.11
Leonhardt, David 75nn.64, 65, 81n.77
Lévesque, Jacques 147n.56
Levin, Richard C. 71n.55
liberalism 6, 23, 30, 84
Libya 28, 49, 51, 54, 81, 83, 89, 125–6, 178, 189
Lieberman, Robert C. 36n.48
Ligachev, Yegor 138–41, 144
Lin Limin 80n.75
Lisbon Treaty 52
Lithuania:
Lithuania:
Vilnius 147
see also Baltic States
Litwak, Robert S. 19n.21
Liu Liping 79n.75
Lobov, V. N. 138
localitis 184
Lohr, Steve 44n.8, 72n.56
Lohr, Steve and Barboza, David 73n.59
Long Peace 31
Lonsdale, John 171n.39
Louis XIV, king of France 78, 86
Louis, William Roger and Robinson, Ronald 110n.32, 160n.9
Low, D. A. 168
Luce, Henry R. 11
Lundestad, Geir:
on American “Empire” 12n.3, 123nn.45, 46, 166n.25
on Cold War relations 56n.26, 111n.33, 121n.41, 146n.54, 183n.11
on the fall of ‘great powers’ 133n.4, 158n.6, 161n.13, 162n.14,
170n.35
on US policy and Eastern Europe 103n.26
on US policy and European integration 113n.35
Luxembourg 59
Lynn, Martin 99n.17

Macartney, Lord 2
Macartney, Lord 2
Macao 80
Macmillan, Harold 179
Madden, Thomas F. 99–100
Mahbubani, Kishore 57n.27
Malaysia 65
Mali 127
Malia, Martin 134n.9
Malone, David M. and Mukherjee, Rohan 65n.43
Malta 95n.9, 153
Mandelbaum, Michael 22n.26, 27n.31
Mann, James 97n.14, 146n.55
manufacturing output, global (1750–1900) 2
Mao Tse-Tung 18, 63, 67, 69–70, 82, 112, 131
market exchange rates (MER) 50
Marshall Plan 15, 103, 107–8, 116, 119–20, 122, 183, 185
Marx, Karl 29, 154
Marxism-Leninism 101, 163, 167
Mason, David S. 64n.41
Massey, Joseph A. and Sands, Lee M. 75n.65
Matlock, Jack F. Jr., 143n.43, 148n.60
May, Ernest 167n.26
Mayall, James 161n.11
McCauley, Martin 134n.9, 142n.38, 147n.58
McCormick, John 47n.11
McCormick, John 47n.11
McGiffert Ekedahl, Carolyn and Goodman, Melvin A. 138n.22
McKinsey & Co. 60
McNeill, William 161
Mead, Walter Russell 22n.26
Mearsheimer, John J. 173n.44
Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M. 34 n.40
Medicare 26
Medvedev, Dmitry A. 44
Mee, Charles L. Jr. 122n.43
Mengzi, Fu 80n.75
Merkel, Angela 51
Mexico 26, 39–40, 58, 160
see also BRICSAM
Microsoft 192
Middle East 31, 33–4, 62, 69, 97, 108–9, 113, 125–6, 150, 168, 172,
176–7, 179–80
see also Bahrain; Cyprus; Dhahran; Egypt; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Kuwait;
Lebanon; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Turkey; United Arab
Emirates (UAE); Yemen military expenditure 50
Miller, John 165n.20
Miller, Ken 63n.39
Millis, Walter 102n.25
Milošovic, Slobodan 179
Milward, Alan S. et al. 122
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 44–5
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 44–5
Minxin Pei 75n.67
Mitterrand, François 51
Mogul Empire 1, 170
Mondale, Walter 44
Mongolia 1, 65
Inner 69
Outer 104
Monnet Plan 121
Monroe Doctrine 106–7
Moravcsik, Andrew 49n.14
Morozov, Evgeny 191n.4
Morrison, Herbert 101
Mosaddeq, Mohammad 103, 109, 189
most favored nation (MFN) principle 15
Motyl, Alexander J. 168n.31
Moyar, Mark 178n.3
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 136nn.14, 15
Mulgan, Aurelia George 45n.9
Muslims 36, 48, 70, 126, 132, 179
Muslim expansion 1–2
‘Moslem world’ 25, 30, 151
Mutual Defense Program 115
Myanmar 63, 80, 100, 127, 177, 188–9

Namibia 127
Namibia 127
see also Africa
Napolean Bonaparte 78, 86
Napoleonic Wars 11, 86
Nasser, Gamar Abdel 109
Nathan, Andrew J. and Scobell, Andrew 64n.41
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 13–14, 21, 23–4, 48–9, 89,
96–7, 103, 107–8, 113–16, 123, 125, 138, 146–7, 166, 170, 176,
181–6, 192
Article 5 123, 125
Nauru 153
Naxalite groups 42
Nelson, Daniel N. and Lepgold, Joseph 166n.24
neo-Confucianism 64
Nepal 65
Netherlands, the 59, 110, 153
GDP 43
Nevis 153
New Zealand 105, 107, 111, 125
see also ANZUS
Nicholson, Chris V. 62n.37
Niger, the 127, 168
Nigeria 29, 118, 127, 153, 188
see also Africa
Nimitz, Admiral Chester 12
Nimitz, Admiral Chester 12
Nixon, Richard 3, 19, 146, 191
Nobel Prize 25, 35, 45, 68, 71
Nobel Peace Prize 79nn.75, 81, 87, 192
Norris, Floyd 75n.64
Norrlof, Carla 15n.12
Norway 18, 59, 120–1, 155, 162
Oslo 68
see also Scandinavia
Nove, Alec 135n.11
nuclear:
agenda 31
arms race 13, 31
free world 31, 140
power 42
presence in Europe 51
weapons 32
see also Cold War
Nye, Joseph S. 5–6, 17n.13, 29, 35n.43, 36n.47, 64n.42, 191n.4

O’Brien, Patrick K. 148n.61, 165n.21

O’Neill, Jim 39
Obama, Barack 25–6, 28–64, 90, 98, 128, 192
Obama administration 28, 37, 49, 78–9, 81, 126
Obama’s foreign policy 29–34
Oberdorfer, Don 141n.36
Oberdorfer, Don 141n.36
October Revolution 18, 104
Odom, William 138, 139nn.26, 27, 29, 140n.30, 142n.40, 143nn.44, 45,
144n.46, 147n.58
Oi, Jean C. et al. 76n.68
Olympic games 41, 61
Onishi, Norimitsu 66n.45
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 14,
63, 116
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 14, 103, 116,
119–20
Organization of American States (OAS) 106
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 89
Ott, Marvin C. 65n.43, 66n.46
Ottoman Empire 1, 5, 86, 94, 105, 162, 171

Pagden, Anthony 98n.15

Painter, David S. 12n.4
Pakistan 2, 32, 88, 109–11, 126–7, 153, 177, 190, 193
China and 62, 65
European Union and 48
India and 42, 172
Palacký, František 171
Palestine 33, 86, 108, 193
see also Israel
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 33
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 33
Palmerston, Lord 98
Panama 21, 111
Parchami, Ali 99n.18
Paris Agreement 114
Parsons, Timothy H. 92, 96
Paterson, Thomas G. 17n.15
Patrick, Stewart 29n.36, 39n.1
Pax Brittanica 171–2
Pax Sovietica 172–3
Pearl Harbor 87
see also Japan; USA: Hawaii; war: Second World War Perestroika 141
see also glasnost
Persia 102
Persian Gulf 95n.9, 108, 177, 180
Peterson, Torbjørn 60n.31
Philippines, the 65, 104, 107, 110–11, 158, 177
Pipes, Richard 169n.33
Poland 21, 42, 44, 52, 104, 117, 125, 147, 157, 166, 169–70
Porter, Bernard 94–5, 159n.8, 163n.16, 164n.18
Portugal 3, 52, 103, 116, 153, 156–8, 171, 188
Prestowitz, Clyde V. Jr., 44nn.7, 8
purchasing power parity (PPP) 50, 57–9
Putin, Vladimir 43–4

Qatar 59
Qatar 59
Qianlong, Emperor 2

Rapallo, Treaty of (1922) 186

Reagan, Ronald 3–4, 19, 23, 44, 97, 132, 140–1, 143–7, 176, 190–1
realism 6, 86
Reciprocal Trade Act 115
Reconquista 2
Red Army 20, 101, 104, 114, 118, 157, 173, 177, 179
Reid, T. R. 4, 47n.11
Reisinger, William M. 166n.23
‘rendition’ 33
Reykjavik Summit 141–3
see also Iceland
Reynolds, David 93n.3
Ricks, Thomas E. 24n.30
Rifkin, Jeremy 47n.11
Rio Treaty 106
Risse, Thomas 53
Roberts, J. M. 163n.16
Robinson, Eugene 173n.46
Robinson, Ronald 95–6
Robinson, Ronald and Gallagher, J. 94–5
Roett, Riordan 40n.2
Roman Empire 1–2, 11, 94, 96, 99, 102, 105, 156, 169
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 106, 110, 175–6, 179
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 106, 110, 175–6, 179
Rother, Larry 40n.2
Rowen, Henry S. and Charles Wolf, Jr. 136–7
Rudd, Kevin 77
Romania 50, 104, 117, 125, 147n.56, 169, 177
Rumsfeld, Donald 23
Rusk, Dean 16
Russia 2–3, 11, 23, 26, 30–2, 50, 54–5, 58–9, 65, 79, 80n.75, 83, 86–8,
112, 125, 127–8, 165, 170, 188, 193
birth and mortality rates in 35
GDP 40, 43
GNP 43, 87
see also Japan: Etorofu; Kunashiri; Soviet Union (USSR) Rust, Mathias
144
Rwanda 49
genocide in 21, 188

Saft, James 89n.6

Salazar, António de Oliveira 103
Sanger, David E. 28n.35
Sanger, David E. and Baker, Peter 79n.73, 88n.3
Sarkozy, Nicolas 51
Sarotte, Mary Elise 147n.57
Saudi Arabia 1, 12, 26, 50, 108–9
Scandinavia 21, 120, 185
 see also Denmark; Finland; Iceland; Norway; Sweden Scheidel, Walter
156n.4
Schengen Agreement 53
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. 17, 93, 187n.1
Schmidt, Helmut 51
Schröder, Gerhard 51
Schumacher, Kurt 186
Schwartz, Thomas A. 191n.5
Segal, Adam 35n.42
Senkaku (Diaoyutai) islands 65
Seychelles 153
Shambaugh, David 64n.41
Shanghai 95n.9
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 82, 127
Shanghai Five 82
Shanghai
World Expo 61
Shevardnadze, Eduard 138, 142–4
Shirk, Susan L. 75n.67
Shultz, George 138n.22, 141n.36, 142, 143n.42, 145
Sieff, Martin 42n.5
Singapore 59, 66, 70, 105
Sinopec 192
Six-Party Talks 32
Sked, Alan 161n.12, 166n.22
Sked, Alan 161n.12, 166n.22
Skidelsky, Robert 77n.72
Smil, Vaclav 27n.32, 99–100
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 186
Sokolov, Sergei 144
Somalia 21, 80, 188, 190, 192
South Africa 26, 29, 39, 51, 97, 105, 127, 188–9, 193
Cape Town 105
see also BASIC; BRICS; BRICSAM
South America 3, 97n.13
see also Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Latin America;
Venezuela Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 111, 124
Soviet Union (USSR), the former:
China and 112
collapse of the 13, 20–2, 43–4, 65, 68, 86, 132–48, 160, 170, 180, 193
communism in the 101, 119, 158, 164–5, 170, 177
defence spending in 137–8, 143
dissolution of 1, 3, 153
Eastern Europe and 116, 121, 125, 175–9
expansion of the 104, 106
Five-Year Plan 139
Germany and 186
GNP 12, 111, 135–8
growth in 70, 135–6
imperial overstretch 133, 148
 imperial overstretch 133, 148
India and 41, 82, 86
Japan and 114
as a nuclear power 42
overtaking the West 18–19
population of 35
President of the 144
production in 12
socialism in 157–9
‘Soviet Empire’ 1, 5, 93, 105, 117, 169, 173
structure of the 171
as a superpower 42–5, 132, 188
Syria and 180
universalist aspirations 16
US relations with 4, 13, 23, 31, 37, 94–7, 115, 132–4, 138, 163–5
weakness of 5, 21
Western Europe and 122, 184
see also Baltic States; Belarus; Cold War; communism; Georgia;
Ukraine; Red Army; Russia; Uzbekistan Spaak, Paul-Henri 183
Spain 1–2, 52–3, 58–9, 99, 103, 153, 156, 171, 188
see also Canary Islands, the Spanish-American War 93, 158
Spear, Percival 164n.18
Spence, Jonathan D. 2n.2, 100n.21
Spratly Islands 65
sport, see Commonwealth games; Olympic games Sputnik 3, 18
Sri Lanka 62
Sri Lanka 62
St Kitts 153
Stalin, Joseph 16, 101, 105, 115–16, 131, 169, 176, 181
State Grid 192
Stein, Jess M. 160n.10
Steinberg, Dmitri 136n.16
Steinfeld, Edward G. 72n.57, 84
Stent, Angela E. 147n.57
Stephen, Fitzjames 163
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay 66n.45
Strand, Tron 125n.48
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) 18
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 32
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 141, 145, 146
Sudan 63, 95n.9, 153, 193
see also Africa
Suez 28, 105, 113, 115, 170, 181–2
see also Egypt
Summers, Larry H. 28, 149
Sun Liping 68n.48
Suny, Ronald Grigor 134n.9
Sweden 35, 107, 111
GDP 43, 59
see also Scandinavia
Sweig, Julia E. 40n.2
Sweig, Julia E. 40n.2
Switzerland 59, 107
Geneva 140
Syria 179–80, 189, 191
Szabo, Stephen 24n.29

Taft, Robert 106

Taiwan 13, 59, 65, 70, 72, 78, 80, 83–4, 88, 111, 114, 127, 153
Taliban, the 23–4
see also Afghanistan; terrorism Tamerlane 1, 95n.8
Tannenwald, Nina 140n.34
Tanzania 127
Tatlow, Didi Kirsten 64n.42, 68n.48, 69n.51, 73n.60
Taubman, William 18nn.18, 19
terrorism:
September 11 (2001) 23, 124, 131
see also Al Qaeda; Hezbollah; Taliban, the Thailand 72, 100, 111, 177–
8
Thatcher, Margaret 146
Themnér, Lotta and Wallensteen, Peter 172n.40
Third World 2, 12, 145, 154, 190
conflicts 87
debtors 88
leaders 63
Three Gorges Dam Project 71
Tibet 65, 69–70, 78, 104, 153
Tibet 65, 69–70, 78, 104, 153
see also Dalai Lama
Tito, Marshall Josip Broz 101, 173
Tocqueville, Alexis de 159
Todd, Emmanuel 132, 133n.2
Toje, Asle 55n.23
Tonegawa, Susumu 45n.9
Tønnesson, Stein 57n.27, 75n.67
torture 31, 33, 83
see also Guantanamo
Trujillo regime 187
Truman, Harry 13, 102, 184, 191
Truman administration 16, 109, 119–23, 179
Truman Doctrine 103, 108
Tunisia 126, 178
Turkey 1, 26, 40, 48, 50, 86, 103–4, 107, 109, 120, 125–6, 169

Ukraine 125, 169

unipolarity 6, 20–4
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 59
United Kingdom (UK): 2, 3, 11, 26, 28, 49, 54–5, 62, 86–7, 89, 100–2,
108–9, 111, 113, 115, 125, 148, 158–9, 163–4, 167, 181–3, 185,
188–9, 192
Conservative-Liberal government 55
defence policy in 48, 55
the European Union and 48, 52
 the European Union and 48, 52
GNP 11
India and the 87, 153
London 28, 108, 112, 115, 118, 120, 57, 167
MI6 189
Royal Navy 12, 15, 100
Scotland 153
US relations with 21
Wales 155
see also British Empire
United Nations (UN): 14, 61, 80, 107, 152, 175, 188, 192
Responsibility to Protect 80
Security Council 40, 54, 96, 188
United States of America (USA):
Alaska 40, 102
American:
Century 11
civil war 3, 93, 153, 160
independence 3
Revolution 156
Americanization 150
as a great power 94
Bureau of the Census 36n.47, 48n.62, 77n.71
Bureau of Engraving 14
California 38, 41
California 38, 41
China and 60
Congress 33, 37, 121, 146
congressional elections, mid-term (2010) 33
Council of Economic Advisers 136
crime/murder rate 36
death penalty in 25
Democrats 16, 33, 34, 37
Department of Commerce 18n.16
economic growth in 22, 34
education system 35, 36
environmental policy in 25
federal budget of 25, 37
fertility rate in 35
financial markets in 34
foreign economic policies 16
foreign policy in 17, 37
GNP 3, 87, 111, 148–9
Hawaii 102, 107
Pearl Harbor 87
health care system 36
hispanic population in 35
Hollywood 41
inequality in 36
infant mortality rates 36
international cooperation and 18, 31
 international cooperation and 18, 31
interventions in 22
legal system 36
life expectancy 36
media in 37
military in 21, 23, 41
multilateral diplomacy, policy of 31
National Intelligence Council 90
National Security Strategy 78, 88
Native American Indians 99, 102
neo-conservatives 23
New York 13
Pentagon, drop The 62
population of 34–5
Republicans 16, 31, 33–4, 37, 149, 179
Republican House of Representatives 28, 90
Tea Party movement 33
the ‘Union’ 160
US-Africa Command 127
US Navy 3, 12, 42, 62, 66, 81
see also ANZUS
USSR, see Soviet Union
Uzbekistan 1

van de Walle, Nicolas 63n.40

van Wolferen, Karel 44n.7
Venezuela 63
Victoria, queen of England 102, 171
Vietnam 3, 65, 81, 87, 96, 100, 102, 104, 110, 113, 118, 170, 172, 177,
191
see also Ho Chi Minh
Vietnam War 18, 31, 65, 88, 124, 158, 177–9, 191
Vincent, R. J. 168n.28
Vogel, Ezra F. 44n.7
Von Drehle, David 36n.47

Walter, Carl E. and Howie, Fraser J. T. 75n.67

Waltz, Kenneth 21
Walzer, Michael 172n.41
Wandruszka, Adam and Urbanitsch, Peter 161n.12
Wang Feng and Hvistendahl, Mara 60n.31
Wang Jisi 65n.44
war:
First World War:
Africa and the 170
Age of Imperialism and the 92
Austria-Hungary and the 162–6
British Empire and the 105
China and the 79n.74
fall of empire and the 86
 international trade and the 151
outbreak of the 154, 161n.12
USA and the 3, 106–7, 111, 123–4
Soviet Union and the 104
Second World War:
Africa and the 101
Australia and the 107
British Empire post-28, 94
as a conventional war 31
fascism during 102, 164
France post-164
Germany and the 78, 86, 108
imperial rule after 152, 162–3, 188
Indian independence after 3
institutions set up post-14
Japan and the 46–7, 86–7, 108, 157, 168
outbreak of the 49
New Zealand and the 107
position of USA post-3, 11, 16, 27, 86, 90–1, 99, 105–13, 175–8,
182, 191–2
public opinion after 123–4, 128
racism post-164, 167–8
Soviet Union and the 42, 101, 104, 131, 139, 157–8
US Navy and the 12
 see also Afghanistan: war in; China: civil war; Cold War; Gulf War; Iraq
War; Korean War; Napoleonic Wars; Pearl Harbor; Spanish-
American War; USA: American Civil War; Vietnam War Warner,
Geoffrey 115n.37
Warsaw Pact 144, 157, 166
Washington, D.C. 13, 102
Washington, George 11, 92
Wassener, Bettina 75n.64
Wavell, Lord 164, 168
Welch Larson, Deborah and Shevchenko, Alexei 83n.84
Weltanschauung 16
Wen Jiabao 75
Werdigier, Julia 62n.37
Westad, Odd Arne 136n.15, 144n.48, 167n.27, 180
Western Alliance 103
Wheatley, Alan 74n.62
Whitaker, Beth Elise 127n.50
White, Stephen 142n.40
White, Theodore H. 15
Wikileaks 125n.48
Wildavsky, Ben 36n.46
Williamson, Stanley R. Jr. 161n.12, 166n.22
Wilson, Paul 173n.45
Wilson, Woodrow 162, 175–6
Wines, Michael 66n.45, 70n.52, 74n.62
Wines, Michael 66n.45, 70n.52, 74n.62
Wohlforth, William C. 5, 140nn.33, 34, 141n.36, 142n.40, 145n.52
Wong, Edward 65n.44, 66n.45, 73n.61
World Bank 14–15, 58, 127, 176, 192
World Trade Organization (WTO) 76, 82–3, 127, 152, 192
Wu, Tim 191n.4

Xiaobo, Liu 68, 78, 81, 192

Xinjiang 65, 69–70, 191
Xinkian 153
Xuetong, Yan 81n.80

Yakovlev, Alexander 139, 141

Yale University 4
Yang, Yao 58n.29
Yazov, Dmitry 144
Yellow Sea 65
Yeltsin, Boris 21, 147
Yemen 109
Yoshida, Shigeru 114
Yost, David S. 13n.8
Yuan Peng 79n.75
Yugoslavia 118, 153, 169–70, 172–3

Zakaria, Fareed 6, 36n.47

Zelikow, Philip and Rice, Condoleezza 147n.57
Zengage, T. R. and Ratcliffe, C. T. 44n.7
Zengage, T. R. and Ratcliffe, C. T. 44n.7
Zimbabwe 39, 63, 188–9
see also Africa
Zubok, Vladislav M. 134n.9, 142n.48, 144n.48
 1 Quoted from Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War

against Japan, 1941–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 515.

 1 John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–2000 (Penguin

Books, 2008) is the most recent, inspiring, and comprehensive treatment of these huge historical
processes. The quotation is on 5–6.
2 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), 122–3.

3 The statistics in this book, taken from other accounts, are sometimes based on gross national

product (GNP), but more often on gross domestic product (GDP). GDP is a nation’s total output
of goods and services in a given period, usually one year. GNP is GDP + total gains from
overseas investment—income earned by foreign nationals domestically.
4 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1981); David P. Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982);
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
5 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict

from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).

6 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 161.

7 T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American

Supremacy (Penguin, 2004), 6.

8 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Understating U.S. Strength,” Foreign Policy, 72 (Fall 1988), 105–29; Nye,

Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990); Samuel P. Huntington,
“The US—Decline or Renewal?,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988/89), 76–96.
9 Josef Joffe, Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America (New York: Norton, 2006); Joffe,

“The Default Power,” Foreign Affairs, 88:5 (2009), 35.

10 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations

and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). The
quotation is from 35.
11 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American

World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 336.

12 For this article, see Paul Kennedy, “The Next American Century?,” World Policy Journal,

16:1 (Spring 1999), 52–8.

In 2002, Kennedy even wrote that: “It seems to me that there is no point in the Europeans and
Chinese wringing their hands about US predominance, and wishing it would go away. It is as if,
among the various inhabitants of the apes and monkeys cage at the London Zoo, one creature has
grown bigger and bigger—and bigger—until it became a 500 lb gorilla.” “The Eagle Has Landed:
The New U.S. Global Military Position,” Financial Times, February 1, 2002.
13 Paul Kennedy, “A Time to Appease,” The National Interest (July/August 2010), 7–17,

quotations on 14, 15. See also his “Rise and Fall,” The World Today (August/September 2010), 6–
9; “Marching to Different Tunes,” International Herald Tribune (November 27–28, 2010), 8; and
“Back to Normalcy,” The New Republic, 241:20 (2010).
14 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 218–19.

15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in

Perspective,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2010), 2–12. The quotation is from 11–12.
For Nye’s longer study, see his The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
16 Nye, The Future of Power, 231.

17 For a leading European academic who is skeptical about the view of American decline, see

Michael Cox, “Power Shift? Not Yet,” The World Today (October 2010), 20–2.
 1 Much of what follows in the next few pages is based on my The American “Empire” and Other

Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford–Oslo: Oxford University Press,
1990), particularly 39–46. More complete documentation will be found there.
2 Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Life Magazine (February 17, 1941).

3 Lundestad, The American “Empire,” 40.

4 David S. Painter, “Coal, Oil, and the Sinews of Imperial Power in the 19th and 20th

Centuries,” preliminary manuscript, September 2010. For an account of the new multipolar
world that pays considerable attention to oil and energy, see Dilip Hiro, After Empire: The Birth of
a Multipolar World (New York: Nation Books, 2010).
5 Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a

Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1978), 14, 23–8, 547–53; Stephen S. Kaplan,
Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC: Brookings,
1981), 42.
6 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1945, IV, Memorandum of

Conversation Truman–de Gaulle, August 22, 1945, 710.

7 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 243.

8 David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs, 85:4

(2009), 755–80. The NATO meeting in Lisbon in November 2010 confirmed that most European
NATO allies still preferred an American nuclear land presence in Europe, however limited.
9 G. John Ikenberry, “A Crisis of Global Governance?,” Current History, 109 (November 2010),

315–21. For fuller accounts, see his After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding
of Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) and, most recently,
Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011).
10 For a good account of these privileges, see Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise

and Fall of the Dollar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), particularly 2–6.
11 Theodore H. White, Fire in the Ashes (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), 359. See also White,

In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 273–318.
12 For a recent treatment of these questions, see Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage: US

Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

13 Charles Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit, quoted in Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (Public
Affairs, 2011), 156.
14 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, 29 (Summer 1947),

581–2.
15 Thomas G. Paterson, Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 15.

16 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government

Printing Office, 1982), 880.

17 The most recent account of these matters is Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History

of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 13–14.

18 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New York: Norton, 2003), 508–13;

Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Øystein Pharo, Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1963 [Cold
War and Internationalization 1949–1963] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 227.
19 Taubman, Khrushchev, 393.

20 The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Richard M. Nixon, 1971 (Washington,

DC: 1972), 804, 812.

21 For a fine study of this process, see Robert S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine:

American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
22 The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Ronald Reagan, 1982 (Washington,

DC: 1983), 78; and 1983 (Washington, DC: 1984), 265, 271.
23 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict

from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 534.

24 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 70/1 America and the World

1990/91 (Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), 23–33.

25 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, 25:1 (2000),

5–41. See also G. John Ikenberry, American Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002).
26 For some examples, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York:

Free Press, 1992); Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy,
and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2002); Mandelbaum, The Case
for Goliath (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War:
America’s Grand Strategy in a World at Risk (New York: Knopf, 2004); Mead, God and Gold: Britain,
America and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007).
27 The best book on the 1990s is Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the

Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11—the Misunderstood Years between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start
of the War on Terror (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).
28 For an interesting account of this period, see Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History

of American Hubris (London: HarperCollins, 2010).

29 Stephen Szabo, “The Washington Bubble: Why US Foreign Policy is Oversized,” Current

History, 108 (2009), 369. In more traditional political science realist terms, it could be argued
that unipolarity lasted much longer.
30 For the conduct of the war from the American side, see Michael R. Gordon and General

Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York:
Pantheon, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin,
2006); and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–
2008 (Penguin, 2009).
31 In explaining these developments I have found Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass,

“American Profligacy and American Power: The Consequences of Fiscal Irresponsibility,” Foreign
Affairs, 89:6 (November/December 2010), 25–34 most useful. See also Michael Mandelbaum, The
Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (New York: Public Affairs,
2010).
32 For a most interesting treatment of these issues, see Vaclav Smil, Why America is Not a New

Rome (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2010), 67–9.

33 Paul Krugman, “Dumbing Deficits Down,” International Herald Tribune (March 12–13,

2011), 7.
34 See, for instance, Graham Bowley, “Debt Could Cost U.S. its Triple-A Status, Rating

Agencies Warn,” International Herald Tribune (January 15–16, 2011), 12.

35 David E. Sanger, “Behind Deficit, Fear of Eclipse,” International Herald Tribune (February 3,

2010), 14.
36 For a stimulating discussion of this question, see Stewart Patrick, “Global Governance

Reform,” Contemporary International Relations (July/August 2010), 33–70, particularly 37–9.

37 Nye, The Future of Power, 9–10.
 38 Nicholas Kulish, “Obama Still Very Popular Abroad, Says Global Survey,” International

Herald Tribune (June 18, 2010), 3; Judy Dempsey, “Europe Still Likes Obama Despite Foreign
Policy Doubts,” International Herald Tribune (September 16, 2010), 2.
39 The best early account of the Obama administration is found in Jonathan Alter, The

Promise: President Obama, Year One (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).
40 For a somewhat overstated account of the influence of the Jewish lobby, see John J.

Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 2007). The pro-Israeli attitude goes far beyond the traditional Jewish lobby,
important as it is.
41 Peter Beinart, “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” New York Review of

Books (June 10, 2010), 16–20.

42 Adam Segal, Advantage: How American Innovation Can Overcome the Asian Challenge (New

York: Norton, 2011), 236–7, 247; OECD statistics, 2008.

43 Nye, The Future of Power, 96, 106.

44 Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Enigma of Russian Mortality,” Current History, 109 (2010), 288–

94.
45 David Brooks, “The Crossroads Nation,” International Herald Tribune (November 10, 2010),

9; Joel Kotkin, The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050 (Penguin Press, 2010), 1–29; Amy
Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—And Why They Fall (New York:
Doubleday, 2007) pays particular attention to the skills of the population, and in this context the
importance of immigration for the position of the Great Powers.
46 Ben Wildavsky, “Relax, America. Chinese Math Whizzes and Indian Engineers Aren’t

Stealing Your Kids’ Future,” Foreign Policy (March/April 2011), 49–52.

47 For a discussion of some of these factors, see Fareed Zakaria, “Yes, America Is in Decline,”

Time (March 14, 2011) and David Von Drehle, “No, America Is Still No. 1,” Time (March 14,
2011), 28–35; Nye, The Future of Power, 187–202. Many of the relevant statistics are found in
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011 (Washington DC, 2010),
Chapter 30: International Statistics.
48 Robert C. Lieberman, “Why the Rich are Getting Richer,” Foreign Affairs (January/February

2011), 154. 80 percent of the total increase in income from 1980 to 2005 went to the top 1
percent of the population. For this, see Chrystia Freeland, “The Super-Rich Pull Even Further
Ahead,” International Herald Tribune (January 26, 2011), 1.
 49 For an optimistic interpretation of the meaning of these facts, see David Brooks, “Relax.

America’s Future is Exceedingly Bright,” International Herald Tribune (April 4, 2010), 6.

 1 Jorge G. Castañeda, “Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the

Helm Would Hurt Global Governance,” Foreign Affairs, 89:5 (2010), 109–22; Stewart Patrick,
“Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” Foreign Affairs, 89:6
(November/December 2010), 44–53.
2 For a recent article discussing some of these factors, see Julia E. Sweig, “A New Global

Player: Brazil’s Far-Flung Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, 89:6 (November/December 2010), 173–84.
For the most recent histories of modern Brazil, see Riordan Roett, The New Brazil (Washington,
DC: Brookings, 2010) and Larry Rother, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
3 For an interesting discussion of some of these factors, see Dilip Hiro, After Empire: The Birth

of a Multipolar World (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 247–9. A most recent treatment of India
in general is Patrick French, India: A Portrait: An Intimate Biography of 1.2 Billion People (London:
Allen Lane, 2011).
4 Walter C. Ladwig III, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become

a Conventional Great Power?,” Asian Survey, 50:6 (2010), 1162–83.

5 For a discussion of some of these dimensions, see Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle

between China, India and Japan will Shape our Next Decade (London: Allen Lane, 2008). More
general is Martin Sieff, Shifting Superpowers: The New and Emerging Relationship between the United
States, China, and India (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2009). For particularly useful articles,
see Akash Kapur, “Lighting the Path to Development,” International Herald Tribune (November 5,
2010), 2; “A Bumpier but Freer Road,” The Economist (October 2, 2010), 67–9. For a stimulating,
recent account of developments in India, see Patrick French, India: A Portrait.
6 Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Enigma of Russian Mortality,” Current History, 109 (October 2010),

288–94.
7 The best known ones were Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and

Response (New York: Prentice Hall, 1971); Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for
America (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); T. R. Zengage and C. T. Ratcliffe, The Japanese
Century (Hong Kong: Longman Group, 1988); Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr., Trading Places: How We
Allowed Japan to Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of
Japanese Power (New York: Knopf, 1989); Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Random House, 1993); James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East
Asian Economic and Political System (New York: Vintage, 1994).
 8 This is the story told in Prestowitz, Trading Places. The Mondale quote is from Steve Lohr,

“Challenge from China puts U.S. on familiar path,” International Herald Tribune (January 24,
2011), 16.
9 I have vivid memories of Nobel conferences in Tokyo and Kyoto in 2002. The topic was

creativity. The Japanese Nobel laureates present were almost without exception very harsh in
their ciriticism of Japanese education on this point. Several of them had done much of their work
in the United States. One of them, Susumu Tonegawa (Nobel Prize for medicine in 1987), had
chosen to become an American citizen. See also Aurelia George Mulgan, “Why Japan Can’t
Lead,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2009), 101–10.
10 Martin Fackler, “New Openness in Japan Leads Nation to Wake Up to Poverty,”

International Herald Tribune (April 21, 2010), 1.

11 John McCormick, The European Superpower: The New Europe and its Challenge to America

(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997); Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy
and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Knopf, 2002); Stephen Haseler, Super-
State: The New Europe and its Challenge to America (London: Tauris, 2004); T. R. Reid, The United
States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy (Penguin, 2004); Jeremy
Rifkin, The European Dream, How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American
Dream (Penguin, 2004); Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st Century (London: Fourth
Estate, 2005).
12 For a recent survey of these operations, see Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, “ESDP in

Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning,” Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15

(2011), 178–99.
13 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New

York: Vintage, 2004).

14 The positive version of the EU’s development is found in Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe, the

Second Superpower,” Current History, 109 (March 2010), 91–8. See also Jolyon Howorth, Security
and defense policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007).
15 For the United States and European integration, see my “Empire” by Integration: The United

States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For the
treatment of the Clinton administration, see 17–25.
16 Castañeda, “Not Ready for Prime Time,” 109–22.

17 For an analysis of the Sarkozy–Merkel relationship, see Steven Erlanger, “The Odd Couple
at Europe’s Helm,” International Herald Tribune (January 15–16, 2011), 1, 4.
18 Landon Thomas Jr., “Market Fears Lead Spain and Italy to Assail Greece,” International

Herald Tribune (May 24, 2011), 1, 16.

19 Paul Krugman, “The Triumph and Tragedy of the Euro,” International Herald Tribune

(January 14, 2011), 6, 8; Paul Taylor, “Berlin Flexes Muscles, and E.U. Chafes,” International
Herald Tribune (February 22, 2011), 21.
20 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 2010), 5.

21 Montserrat Guibernau, “The Birth of a United Europe: On Why the EU has Generated a

‘Non-Emotional’ Identity,” Nations and Nationalism, 17:2 (2011), 302–15.

22 John F. Burns, “Britain and France Unite on Military Roles,” International Herald Tribune

(November 3, 2010), 1, 3; Ben Jones, Franco–British Military Cooperation: A New Engine for
European Defence? (European Union Institute for Security Studies: Occasional Paper, February
2011).
23 Charles Kupchan, “As Nationalism Rises, Will the European Union Fail?,” Washington Post

(August 29, 2010); Asle Toje, The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010). For a remarkable sign of continued optimism, see Steven Hill,
Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2010).
24 Paper prepared for the European Council, Brussels, September 16, 2010.

25 Stephen Castle, “Aiming to Amplify E.U.’s Global Voice,” International Herald Tribune,

(September 16, 2010), 4. See also Jonathan Holslag, “The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU–China
Strategic Partnership,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 49:2 (2011), 293–313.
26 Chen Jian, “China’s Prolonged Rise: Legitimacy Challenges and Dilemmas in the Reform

and Opening-Up Era,” in Geir Lundestad, International Relations Since the End of the Cold War
(forthcoming).
27 Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the

East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of
the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London: Allen Lane, 2009); Stefan Halper,
The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Basic Books, 2010). See also Ted C. Fishman, China Inc.: How the Rise of the Next
Superpower Challenges America and the World (New York: Scribner, 2005). For a useful survey of
the new literature about China, see Stein Tønnesson, “Hvor går Kina?” [“Where is China
headed?”], unpublished manuscript, 2010.
28 “The World’s Biggest Economy: Dating Game,” The Economist (December 18, 2010), 129.

29 Yao Yang, “When Will China’s Economy Overtake America’s?,” Yao Yang Project Syndicate

(June 2, 2011); “Economics Focus: The Celestial Economy,” The Economist (September 10, 2011),
78.
30 Foreign Policy (September/October 2010), 1.

31 Wang Feng and Mara Hvistendahl, “China’s Population Destiny: The Looming Crisis,”

Current History, 109 (September 2010), 244–51; Ted C. Fishman, “Graying Nations, Shifting
Power,” International Herald Tribune (October 16–17, 2010), 10, 12; Torbjørn Peterson, “For
mange eldre kinesere” [“Too Many Old Chinese”], Aftenposten (September 28, 2010), 16.
32 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2010),

22–41.
33 Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics and Policy, 38:3

(June 2010), 395–422.

34 Giovanni Andornino, “The Nature and Linkages of China’s Tributary System under the

Ming and Qing Dynasties,” Working Papers of the Global Economic History Network (GEHN),
21/06 (March 2006), 15.
35 Robert Gates, speech given to the Navy League on May 3, 2010, at National Harbor,

Maryland.
36 SIPRI Yearbook, 2010, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), particularly 201–7. The

quotation is from CNN.com, August 18, 2010.

37 Julia Werdigier, “China Will Lead Surge in Energy Demand,” International Herald Tribune

(November 10, 2010), 19; Chris V. Nicholson, “A Globe-Trotting China Scouts Oil Deals,”
International Herald Tribune (March 15, 2011), 20.
38 Eric Farnsworth, “The New Mercantilism: China’s Emerging Role in the Americas,” Current

History, 110 (February 2011), 56–61; Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Rise in Antarctica?,” Asian
Survey, 50:4 (July/August 2010), 759–85.
39 Ken Miller, “Coping With China’s Financial Power,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2010), 96–

109, particularly 102.

40 Foreign Affairs, Book review by Nicolas van de Walle, 88:6 (November/December 2009),
174; Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why and How
Much?,” in Jane Golley and Ligang Song, eds., China Update 2011 (Canberra: Australia National
University, 2011), 203–22.
41 David S. Mason, The End of the American Century, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009)

197; Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “Human Rights and China’s Soft Power Expansion,”
China Rights Forum (2009, no. 4), 10–23; David Shambaugh, “China Flexes its Soft Power,”
International Herald Tribune (June 8, 2010), 6.
42 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Confucius and iPhones in This Future,” International Herald Tribune

(January 13, 2010), 2. For an interesting discussion of China and soft power, see Alan Hunter,
“Soft Power: China on the Global Stage,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2:3 (2009), 373–
98. The concept of soft power did of course originate with Joseph S. Nye.
43 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2010), 89–90; M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International
Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security, 30:2
(Fall 2005), 46–83; Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Road to Influence”, Asian Survey, 50:4 (July–
August 2010), 641–62; David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and
Cooperation,” Survival, 52:1 (February–March 2010), 137–58; Marvin C. Ott, “Deep Danger:
Competing Claims in the South China Sea,” Current History, 110 (September 2011), 236–241.
44 The Economist (June 12, 2010), 65–6; Banyan, “Carps among the Spratlys,” The Economist

(March 12, 2011), 62; Banyan, “Not littorally Shangri-La,” The Economist (June 11, 2011), 54. A
prominent Chinese academic suggested that “these reckless statements, made with no official
authorization, created a great deal of confusion.” For this, see Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a
Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011), 71. The truth
is apparently that the statements did come from unofficial commentators, but were never denied
by leading officials. A public denial would quite simply send the wrong signals. For this, see
Edward Wong, “Beijing Lets a Delicate Issue Lie,” International Herald Tribune (March 31, 2011),
2.
45 Edward Wong, “Asians Look to the U.S. as Frictions Rise with China,” International Herald

Tribune (September 23, 2010); Mark Landler, Jim Yardley, and Michael Wines, “As China Rises,
Neighbors Look to Alliances New and Old,” International Herald Tribune (November 1, 2010), 8;
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “India Gets a Boost in Bid to Join Larger U.N. Council,” International Herald
Tribune (December 9, 2010), 1, 5; Noritmitsu Onishi, “U.S. and China Court Indonesia,”
International Herald Tribune (December 10–11, 2010), 1, 6; Martin Fackler, “Japan Shifts Defense
Strategy as China Grows More Assertive,” International Herald Tribune (March 1, 2011), 1, 8.
 46 Marvin Ott, “Asia’s Clouded Horizon,” International Herald Tribune (September 29, 2010), 8.

47 The Economist (June 19, 2010), 75. See also Guoguang Wu, “Muddling Through Crises:

China in 2009,” Asian Survey, 50:1 (January/February 2010), 25–39.

48 The 2010 number comes from a study by sociologist Sun Liping of Tsinghua University. For

this, see Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Indifference as a Mode of Operation at China Schools,”
International Herald Tribune (May 19, 2011), 2.
49 At the somewhat less dramatic level, complaints about pollution simply exploded. The

number of incidents about which people sent letters or visited Environmental Protection Bureaus
increased from 111,359 in 1991, to 682,744 in 2004. There is reason to believe that the increase
has continued. For this, see Anna Brettell, “Channeling Dissent: The Institutionalization of
Environmental Complaint Resolution,” in Peter Ho and Richard Louis Edmonds (eds.), China’s
Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of a Social Movement (London: Routledge, 2008),
111–50, particularly 113–21.
50 Sharon LaFraniere, “For Families, Finances Beat the One-Child Rule in China,” International

Herald Tribune (April 7, 2011), 1, 7.

51 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Arab Revolts Seen Through China’s Prism,” International Herald

Tribune, (February 24, 2011), 2.

52 Michael Wines, “For China, a Cautionary Tale from Japan,” International Herald Tribune

(May 27, 2010), 15; “BRIC Wall,” The Economist (April 16, 2011), 76.
53 David Barboza, “Rapid Growth Breeds Host of Worries for China,” International Herald

Tribune (December 14, 2010), 17; Keith Bradsher, “Chinese Inflation Spreads Beyond its Borders,”
International Herald Tribune (January 13, 2011), 13; Keith Bradsher, “Rising Prices in China Send
Ripples Around Globe,” International Herald Tribune (January 31, 2011), 14, 16.
54 “China Shoots up Rankings as Science Power, Study Finds” (March 30, 2011), CNN.com.

55 Richard C. Levin, “The Rise of Asia’s Universities,” International Herald Tribune (April 21,

2010), 6; Don Durfee and James Pomfret, “China Struggles to Find a Formula for Innovation,”
International Herald Tribune (May 6, 2011), 16. In some sensitive fields debate was growing, as
long as criticism of China’s own policies was avoided. Thus, in the journal Contemporary
International Relations, published by China’s foreign policy institutes, different points of view
could be found on overall issues of international affairs.
56 Steve Lohr, “Building a More Innovative Society by Government Decree,” International

Herald Tribune (January 3, 2011), 14, 16; “Climbing Mount Publishable,” The Economist
(November 13, 2010), 89–90.
57 Edward G. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 85–8; “Still full of ideas, but not making jobs,” The
Economist (April 30, 2011), 44–5; Schumpeter, “Bamboo Innovation,” The Economist (May 7,
2011), 64.
58 David Barboza, “Chinese Industry Seeks a New Edge,” International Herald Tribune

(September 17, 2010), 1.

59 Steve Lohr and David Barboza, “Worth Billions, G.E. Jet Engine Deal puts Secrets at Risk,”

International Herald Tribune (January 18, 2011), 1, 15; Keith Bradsher, “U.S. Solar Panel Producer
Decides the Grass is Greener in China,” International Herald Tribune (January 15–16, 2011), 1, 15.
60 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Poor Hidden by Glare of New Wealth,” International Herald Tribune

(September 3, 2010), 2; Tatlow, “Costs Rise, and China’s Poor Struggle, “International Herald
Tribune (December 10, 2010), 2.
61 Numerous articles were published about these matters. See for instance Philip Bowring,

“China’s Dwindling Resource,” International Herald Tribune (June 4, 2010), 7; “Labor Strife in
China Sends Ripples Worldwide,” International Herald Tribune (May 31, 2010), 16; David
Barboza, “China Workers’ Gains Cause Global Ripples,” International Herald Tribune (June 8,
2010), 17; Edward Wong, “In China, Workers’ Voices Carry Only So Far,” International Herald
Tribune (June 22, 2010), 18; “The Rising Power of China’s Workers,” The Economist (July 31,
2010), 46–8; “The most surprising demographic crisis,” The Economist (May 7, 2011), 52–3.
62 Michael Wines, “China Puts its Cash Where the State is,” International Herald Tribune

(August 31, 2010), 1, 15; Ian Johnson, “The Party: Impenetrable, All Powerful,” New York Review
of Books, 57 (September 30, 2010), 71; “Let a Million Flowers Bloom,” The Economist, March 12,
2011, 71–4.
63 Daniel R. Hammond, “Social Assistance in China, 1993–2002: Institutions, Feedback, and

Policy Actors in the Chinese Policy Process,” Asian Politics & Policy, 3:1 (January 2011), 69–93;
Alan Wheatley, “Waiting for the Chinese Consumer,” International Herald Tribune (September 14,
2010), 22; David Barboza, “Warming up Renminbi for World Stage,” International Herald Tribune
(February 12–13, 2011), 18; Alan Wheatley, “China’s Plan for Creating Consumers,” International
Herald Tribune (March 15, 2011), 22.
64 David Leonhardt, “China Seeks Orderly Shift to Consumer Economy,” International Herald

Tribune (November 27–28, 2010), 1, 16; Sharon LaFraniere and Bettina Wassener, “China Trims
Trade Surplus in Tilt Towards Consumers,” International Herald Tribune (January 11, 2011), 14;
from news reports, “Trade Deficit is China’s First Since ’04,” International Herald Tribune (April
11, 2011), 18; Bettina Wassener, “Beijing Lets Renminbi Move Above Key Level,” International
Herald Tribune (April 30–May 1, 2011), 11; Floyd Norris, “As Pattern Shifts, China Surplus Falls,”
International Herald Tribune (September 17–18, 2011), 12. Some were quite optimistic about how
China’s economy would become more domestically directed. See for instance James Kynge,
“China: An Inwardly-Animated Economy,” Asian Affairs, 41:3 (November 2010), 436–43.
65 Joseph A. Massey and Lee M. Sands, “The Yen’s Lesson for the Yuan,” International Herald

Tribune (August 25, 2010), 6; David Leonhardt, “Chinese See a Lesson in the Yen’s Tale,”
International Herald Tribune (September 23, 2010), 24; Paul Kennedy, “Don’t Surrender U.S.
Influence to Beijing,” International Herald Tribune (September 30, 2010), 12.
66 “China: Don’t Worry, Be Happy,” The Economist (March 19, 2011), 49.

67 Tønnesson, “Hvor går Kina?,” 18–25, suggested this line of thinking. See also Gordon

Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (London: Arrow, 2002); Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped
Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2006); Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its
Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie,
Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise (Singapore: Wiley,
2011).
68 Jean C. Oi, Scott Rozelle, and Xueguang Zhou (eds.), Growing Pains: Tensions and

Opportunity in China’s Transformation (Stanford: Shorenstein Center, 2010) particularly xxiii–xxiv.

69 About one-third of the US deficit was financed from other US government sources

(primarily social security), one-third came from US pension funds, and one-third from abroad,
with China as the major funder with 16 percent of the overall total. For this, see Niall Ferguson,
“Debt Debate: China’s View,” Newsweek (August 7, 2011), Internet.
70 Elise Labott, “Analysis: Keeping a Check on America’s Banker,” CNN.com, January 18,

2011.
71 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2010 (Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, 2009), 782.

72 Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power

Politics,” International Security, 34:2 (Fall 2009), 7–45. The quotation is from 41. See also Aaron
L. Friedberg, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US–China Rivalry,” Survival, 52:4
(August–September 2010), 31–54; Robert Skidelsky, “The World Finance Crisis & the American
Mission,” New York Review of Books (July 16, 2009), 31–3.
 73 David Sanger and Peter Baker, “Obama Gives Broader View on National Security,”

International Herald Tribune (May 28, 2010), 1, 6. See also Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead
to War?: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011), 80–91.
74 The most recent history takes 1832 as the starting point of foreign exploitation. Much of

the system actually disintegrated at the time of the First World War. For this, see Robert Bickers,
The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832–1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2011).
75 Halper, The Beijing Consensus, 143; Cui Liru, “A Multipolar World in the Globalization Era,”

Contemporary International Relations (CIR), 20 (September 2010), 3; Yuan Peng, “Where are
China–U.S. Relations Headed?,” CIR, 20 (September 2010), 54–5; Nina Hachigian and Yuan
Peng, “The US–China Expectations Gap: An Exchange,” Survival, 52:4 (August–September 2010),
67–86, particularly 73–4. I had breakfast with the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister for Europe on
June 7, 2010, where we discussed some of these matters in addition to the Nobel Peace Prize. For
a recent interpretation stressing the moderate rise of China, see Liu Liping, “China Can Hardly
Rule the World,” CIR, 21:1 (January–February 2011), 4–10. See also Henry Kissinger, On China
(New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 497–513; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy. China,
America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: Norton, 2011), 120–41. For very different
interpretations within the same issue of CIR, 21:2, March/April 2011, see Fu Mengzi, “China’s
International Influence,” where he writes that the “Beijing Consensus” sees “the U.S. as still being
at the top of the pyramid, followed by the UK, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Brazil, India, and
China.” (8–9) and Lin Limin, “Chaos and Change in Symbiosis: The World in 2010,” where the
author states that “Europe is slumbering, if not moribund, while the Asia–Pacific is thriving.
Therefore, the twenty-first century will belong to the latter region, rather than to Europe and
America.” (96)
76 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s

Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011), 54–67, particularly 55–7; Rosemary
Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 42–61.
77 Keith Bradsher, “U.S. Throws Down Challenge to World’s Leading Producer of Solar

Panels,” International Herald Tribune (January 10, 2011), 15; David Leonhardt, “Looking Past
China’s Grip on Currency,” International Herald Tribune (January 13, 2011), 18.
78 Keith Bradsher and Judy Dempsey, “China Curbs Flow of Crucial Minerals,” International

Herald Tribune (October 20, 2010), 1, 16.

79 Christian Caryl, “Unveiling Hidden China,” New York Review of Books (December 9, 2010),
32–7; Banyan, “Great Disorder Under Heaven,” The Economist (December 18, 2010), 104; Mark
Landler and Sewell Chan, “U.S. Takes Harder Line on a Bolder China,” International Herald
Tribune (October 26, 2010), 1, 5.
80 Yan Xuetong, “How Assertive Should a Great Power Be?,” International Herald Tribune

(April 1, 2011), 6.
81 Elizabeth Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,”

Foreign Affairs, 89:6 (November/December 2010), 142–52. The quotation is from 142. For a less
dramatic discussion, see Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for
the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly, 125:3 (Fall 2010), 359–91.
82 For a useful survey, see the special section in The Economist on China’s place in the world,

“Brushwood and Gall,” The Economist (December 4, 2010), 1–16.

83 In a series of articles, see, for instance, Liz Alderman, “Beijing Seen Striving for Influence in

Europe,” International Herald Tribune (November 2, 2010), 1, 18; Liz Alderman, “In Embracing
Europe, China Helps Itself,” International Herald Tribune (January 7, 2011), 1, 14; Charlemagne,
“Mr China Goes Shopping,” The Economist (January 15, 2011), 30; Keith Bradsher, “China Ready
to Help Prop Up Europe—For a Price,” International Herald Tribune (September 16, 2011), 15, 16.
84 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian

Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security, 34:4 (Spring 2010), 63–95.

85 Keith Bradsher, “China Builds Lead on Clean Energy,” International Herald Tribune

(September 9, 2010), 1, 16; Wilson Center, Centerpoint (July/August 2010); Keith Bradsher,
“China Makes Wind Power on own Terms,” International Herald Tribune (December 15, 2010), 1,
19.
86 Thomas J. Christensen, “Why the World Needs an Assertive China,” International Herald

Tribune (February 21, 2011), 6.

87 G. John Ikenberry, “The Liberal International Order and its Discontents,” Millennium, 38: 3

(2010), 509–21.
88 Steinfeld, Playing Our Game, 218–34; for an interesting discussion of China’s role, see also

Amitai Etzioni, “Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?,” International Affairs, 87:3 (May 2011),
539–53.
89 Kissinger, On China, 525–26.

90 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 1–8, 264–84. See also Friedberg’s “Hegemony with

Chinese Characteristics,” The National Interest (July/August 2011), 18–27.

 91 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American

World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 356. See also 342–8.
 1 Niall Ferguson, “Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos,” Foreign Affairs

(March/April 2010).
2 The best military data are found in the SIPRI Yearbook, 2011 (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2011). See particularly 183.

3 David E. Sanger and Peter Baker, “Obama Gives Broader View on National Security,”

International Herald Tribune (May 28, 2010), 1, 6.

4 Thomas P. M. Barnett, Great Powers. America and the World After Bush (New York: Berkley,

2009).
5 For a short summing up of the various contributions in the Libyan war, see The Economist

(September 3, 2011), 51–2.

6 Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2011), 2–4, 39–96, 121–52; Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., The Contemporary Global
Economy: A History Since 1980 (Chichester: Wiley–Blackwell, 2011), 196–9; James Saft,
“Welcoming the Dollar’s Demotion,” International Herald Tribune (May 20, 2011), 18.
7 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations

and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 35. For the
most recent numbers, see CNN World, “China’s world GDP rises,” April 5, 2011.
8 Ferguson, “Complexity and Collapse,” 30.

9 Christine Hauser and Matthew Saltmarsh, “U.S. Rating Threat Unsettles Markets,”

International Herald Tribune, (April 19, 2011), 1, 18.

10 The NIC report is available on the Internet. See also David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace,

Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 70.
 1 An early discussion of the term is found in my The American “Empire” and Other Studies of

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford–Oslo: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37–
9. The current section is substantially revised and extended.
2 Felipe Fernández-Armesto, “Imperial Measures,” Times Literary Supplement (TLS) (September

24, 2010), 8–9.

3 Richard H. Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin

Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) 1–19; David Reynolds,
America, Empire of Liberty: A New History (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
4 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.–Soviet Contest (New York: Atlantic

Monthly Press, 1986), 16.

5 Immerman, Empire for Liberty, 12.

6 For a good survey of British imperialism, see Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share. A Short History

of British Imperialism 1850–1970 (London: Longman, 1975 and later editions). The quotation is
from 267–8.
7 R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, “The Partition of Africa,” in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), Material

Progress and World-Wide Problems, 1870–1898, The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 11
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 593–640.
8 Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire: Britain, America and the World (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2006), 93–133; John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise & Fall of Global Empires,
1400–2000 (Penguin Books, 2008), particularly 479–85; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and
Fall of the American Empire (Penguin Books, 2005), particularly 10.
9 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xi. Darwin also argues that the British system
“embraced an extraordinary range of constitutional, diplomatic, political, commercial and
cultural relationships. It contained colonies of rule (including the huge “sub-empire” of India),
settlement colonies (mostly self-governing by the late nineteenth century), protectorates,
condominia (like the Sudan), mandates (after 1920), naval and military fortresses (like Gibraltar
and Malta), “occupations” (like Egypt and Cyprus), treaty-ports and “concessions” (Shanghai was
the most famous), “informal” colonies of commercial pre-eminence (like Argentina), “spheres of
interference” … like Iran, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and (not least) a rebellious province
at home.” (1).
In an even later work, Darwin has written that “Lacking the means and the manpower to
govern by force, the British almost invariably chose to seek out the local power-holders and offer
a bargain. Emirs, sheikhs, pashas, chiefs, khans and zemindars could stay in their place and rule
their own roost, so long as they offered (and sanctioned) no challenge to imperial authority.”
John Darwin, “Empire and Ethnicity,” Nations and Nationalism, 16:3 (2010), 383–401. The
quotation is from 386.
10 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American

World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), particularly 71–5. The quotation is
from 73.
11 Timothy H. Parsons, The Rule of Empires. Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them,

And Why They Always Fall (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8, 25.
12 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of

Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), inside jacket, 2, 3, 456–7.

13 In his interesting article “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the

Rehabilitation of US Authority,” Global Governance, 16 (2010), 471–84, David A. Lake starts out
in the following way: “The United States is not an empire. Over the past century, however, it has
built and sustained informal empires over states in the Caribbean littoral, spheres of exclusive
political and economic influence over countries in South America, and after 1945 protectorates
over allies in Western Europe and Northeast Asia in which it controls key segments of their
foreign policies.” See also Dennis Florig, “Hegemonic Overreach vs. Imperial Overstretch,” Review
of International Studies, 36:4 (2010), 1103–19.
14 For a fine account of the thinking in the Bush administration, see James Mann, Rise of the

Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004). See also C. Akça Ataç, “Re-
entering the Cosmopolitan Phase of Imperium: Remarks on Obama’s Presidency and Discussions
of American Empire,” Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, 14:1–2, (Spring–Summer 2009),
1–23.
15 Anthony Pagden, “The Struggle for Legitimacy and the Image of Empire in the Atlantic to

c.1700,” in Nicholas Canny (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume I: The Origins of
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 37.
16 Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago: The

University of Chicago Press, 2009).

17 Martin Lynn, “British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,”

in Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth Century
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 107.
 18 Thomas F. Madden, Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America is Building—a New

World (New York: Dutton, 2008). See also Ali Parchami, Hegemonic Peace and Empire: The Pax
Romana, Britannica, and Americana (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
19 Vaclav Smil, Why America Is Not a New Rome (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 53–4.

20 Giovanni Andornino, “The Nature and Linkages of China’s Tributary System under the

Ming and Qing Dynasties,” Working Papers of the Global Economic History Network (GEHN),
21/06 (March 2006), 15–16.
21 Andornino, “The Nature and Linkages”; Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China

(New York: Norton, 1990), 117–36.

22 Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, 1918–1968 (London: Paladin, 1970), 270–1.

23 The best recent account of Soviet foreign policy is Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War:

From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).
24 Much of what follows in this section is based on my The American “Empire.” Fuller

documentation and references will be found there.

25 Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 281.

26 Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe 1943–1947. Universalism in

an Area Not of Essential Interest to the United States (Oslo–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975),
167–73.
27 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953–1956 (New York: Signet, 1965), 449. See

also 409.
28 Much of what follows in this section and in the next on America’s allies follows my The

American “Empire,” 46–54, 62–70. Further documentation and references will be found there.
29 Latin America and Africa are hardly mentioned in the Stalin years in the newest account of

Soviet foreign policy, Haslam’s fine Russia’s Cold War.

30 Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–

1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 218–20.

31 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956–61: The White House Years (New York: Signet

Books, 1965), 178.

32 William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, “The United States and the Liquidation of the

British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941–1951” in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, The
Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940–1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982),
31–55. The quotation is from 49.
33 John Lewis Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?,” Foreign Affairs, 52:2

(January 1974), 388–402; Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 220, 277; Geir Lundestad, America,
Scandinavia, and the Cold War 1945–1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 23–4.
34 I have dealt with the alliance relationship in my The United States and Western Europe Since

1945. From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
35 Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–

1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

36 Peter Boyle, “The ‘Special’ Relationship with Washington,” in John Young (ed.), The Foreign

Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration 1951–55 (Leicester: Leicester University Press,

1988), 43.
37 The quotation is from Geoffrey Warner, “The Anglo–American Special Relationship,”

Diplomatic History, 13:4 (October 1989), 487.

38 For the most recent historical account of CoCom, see Tor Egil Førland, Cold Economic

Warfare: CoCom and the Forging of Strategic Export Controls (Dordrecht: Republic of letters, 2009).
39 I have written about “empire” by invitation for almost 30 years. For some of my earlier

efforts, see “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal
of Peace Research, 23:3 (September 1986), 263–77; The American ‘Empire,’ 54–62; “‘Empire by
Invitation’ in the American Century,” Diplomatic History, 23:2 (Spring 1999), 189–217.
40 Alessandro Brogi, A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in

France and Italy, 1944–1958 (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

41 Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 109–66.

42 See Alan S. Milward The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51 (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984) and also Milward, George Brennan, and Federico Romero, The European
Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992).
43 Charles L. Mee Jr., The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the Pax Americana (New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1984), 246.

44 The quotation is from Cabinet Papers, EPC 5 (49), 23.5.49, Cab 134/192, found in Teddy

Brett, Steve Gilliat, and Andrew Pople, “Planned Trade, Labour Party Policy and US Intervention:
The Successes and Failures of Post-war Reconstruction,” History Workshop, 13 (Spring 1982),
138.
45 Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation?,” Journal of Peace Research, 268.

46 Lundestad, “‘Empire by Invitation’ in the American Century,” 189–217.

47 Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope (New York:

Metropolitan Books, 2010), 110–13, 121, 127.

48 WikiLeaks had interesting reports on the state of affairs in NATO. For this, see Tron Strand

and Per Anders Johansen, “Uforsonlig splittelse i NATO” [“Irreconcilable Division in NATO”],
Aftenposten, February 12, 2011, 6–7 and “Advarte mot russiske kjemiske våpen” [“Warned
Against Russian Chemical Weapons”], Aftenposten, February 13, 2011, 16–17.
49 For an interesting discussion of these shifts, see Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, “How

Do Rising Powers Rise?,” Survival, 52:6 (December 2010–January 2011), 63–88.

50 Beth Elise Whitaker, “Soft balancing among weak states? Evidence from Africa,”

International Affairs, 86:5 (2010), 1109–27.

51 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US–China Rivalry,”

Survival, 52:4 (August–September 2010), 45–6.

 1 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York:

Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005).

2 For some of the many relevant books, see Andrei A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive

Until 1984? (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, L’Empire éclaté (Paris:
Flammarion, 1978); Emmanuel Todd, The Final Fall: An Essay on the Decomposition of the Soviet
Sphere (New York: Karz, 1979).
3 This and the next two sections basically follow my “‘Imperial Overstretch’, Mikhail

Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War,” Cold War History, 1:1 (August 2000), 1–20.
4 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict

from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 609, note 18. Kennedy also used the term
“strategical overstretch.”
A general definition of “overstretch” is given in Paul Kennedy, “Conclusions,” in Geir
Lundestad (ed.), The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994): it “merely means that there exists a mismatch between a Great Power’s
obligations and its capabilities, between its desired policies and its actual resources.” (374)
5 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall, xvi.

6 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall, 513, 514.

7 Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategies and Less-than-Grand Strategies: A Twentieth-Century

Critique,” in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill (eds.), War, Strategy, and
International Politics: Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
239–40. See also Kennedy, The Rise and Fall, 534–5.
8 I have written about the debate caused by the publication of The Rise and Fall in The

American “Empire” and Other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford–
Oslo: Oxford University Press, 1990), particularly 85–7, 105–15, and in “‘Empire by Invitation’ in
the American Century,” Diplomatic History, 23:2 (Spring 1999), 216–17.
9 In the rapidly growing literature on Gorbachev and the fall of the Soviet Union I have used

the following extensively: Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996); Martin McCauley, Gorbachev (London: Longman, 1998); Anders Åslund, Gorbachev’s
Struggle for Economic Reform (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989); John B. Dunlop, The Rise of
Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Hélène
Carrère d’Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations (New York: Basic
books, 1993); Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to
Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Among more general accounts
I have primarily used Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the
Successor States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Geoffrey Hosking, A History of the
Soviet Union 1917–1991 (Final edition, London: Fontana Press, 1992); Martin Malia, The Soviet
Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991 (New York: The Free Press, 1994).
10 My more general treatment of the end of the Cold War can be found in East, West, North,

South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945 (Sixth edition, London: Sage, 2010),
101–8.
11 Soviet economic history through the Khrushchev years is well analyzed in Alec Nove, An

Economic History of the U.S.S.R. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969). The best account of the
growing problems in the 1980s is probably Åslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform. For
the limited spillover from the military to the civilian sector, see Clifford G. Gaddy, The Price of
the Past: Russia’s Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings,
1996).
12 Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950–

1990 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998) 190–1.

13 Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev

(Baden–Baden: Nomos, 1998), 143.

Soviet definitions of national income differ from western definitions of GNP by excluding
depreciation and the non-material components of services. During the 1980s, GNP may have
been roughly one-third to two-fifths greater than national income. For this, see Firth and Noren,
Soviet Defense Spending, 189.
14 Thus, in the 1980s, the CIA concluded that the Soviet Union had many serious economic

problems, but nevertheless it continued to forecast that the Soviet economy would continue to
grow at a 2 percent rate per year. For this, see Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate
Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996), 382–9. The quotation is from 564. For the numbers given, see also Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 196–8;
Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr., “The CIA’s Credibility,” The National Interest (Winter
1995/96), 111–12; Melvin A. Goodman, “Ending the CIA’s Cold War Legacy,” Foreign Policy, 106
(Spring 1997), 141.
15 Goodman, “Ending the CIA’s Cold War Legacy,” 141–2; Moynihan, Secrecy, 196–8; Rowen

and Wolf, “The CIA’s Credibility,” 112; Odd Arne Westad, “Secrets of the Second World: The
Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History, 21:2 (Spring
1997), 261–2. A discussion of Khanin’s work is found in Richard E. Ericson, “The Soviet
Statistical Debate: Khanin vs. TsSU” in Henry Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. (eds.), The
Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden (San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1990), 63–92.
16 Dmitri Steinberg, “The Soviet Defence Burden: Estimating Hidden Defence Costs,” Soviet

Studies, 44:2 (1992), 237.

17 Gates, From the Shadows, 318–19; Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch, 147.

18 Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. (eds.), The Future of the Soviet Empire (New York: St.

Martin’s, 1987), 121–40; Rowen and Wolf, The Impoverished Superpower, 1–12; Rowen and Wolf,
“The CIA’s Credibility,” 112.
19 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents

(New York: Random House, 1995), 570.

20 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Bantam Books, 1997), 277; Adomeit, Imperial

Overstretch, 147–8. For the secrecy, see also Dobrynin, In Confidence, 618.
21 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 564.

22 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (London: Sinclair–Stevenson, 1991),

54. See also Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, The Wars of Eduard
Shevardnadze (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 52–3, 58–61. Eduard Shevardnadze had no
previous experience in foreign policy. Thus, his appointment came as a great surprise, not least
to Anatoly Dobrynin who told Secretary of State George Shultz that “Our foreign policy is going
down the drain. They have named an agricultural type.” For this, see George Shultz, Turmoil and
Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 572.
23 Yegor K. Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 329. Ligachev’s

18 percent of the national income was considerably below Gorbachev’s 20 percent of GNP. Still
even Ligachev clearly thought the defense burden excessive.
24 Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet System and the

Memoir Literature,” Europe–Asia Studies, 49:2 (1997), 261.

25 William T. Lee, “The CIA’s Credibility,” The National Interest (Winter 1995/96), 113.

26 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press,

2000), 115. See also ibid., 104, 118–19, 442, note 59; Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of
the Soviet System and the Memoir Literature,” 261–2.
 27 This point is most succinctly summed up in Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 115.

28 Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet System and the Memoir Literature,”

262.
29 Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military,91–2; Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of

the Soviet System and the Memoir Literature,” 267; Gaddy, The Price of the Past, 56, 62. For
Gromyko’s account of Gorbachev’s early days, see Andrei Gromyko, Memories: From Stalin to
Gorbachev (London: Arrow Books, 1989), 437–40.
30 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 599–602, the quotation is from 601; Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet

Military, 102–4; Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet System and the Memoir
Literature,” 267. See also my East, West, North, South, 208–11.
31 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 570.

32 William D. Jackson, “Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988,” Political Science

Quarterly, 113:4 (1998–9), 621–2.

33 William Wohlforth (ed.), Witnesses to the End of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,

1996), 15, 166.

34 Wohlforth, Witnesses to the End of the Cold War, 164; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 596–8; Nina

Tannenwald, “Conference on Understanding the End of the Cold War,” Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, 11 (Winter 1998), 11.
35 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 523. Despite his appraisal of the Geneva meeting, Gorbachev did not

find Reagan “as hopeless as some believed.” For this, see Dobrynin, In Confidence, 592–3.
36 There are many accounts of the Reykjavik meeting. See, for instance, Don Oberdorfer, From

the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins, 1998), 155–209. For versions presented by some of the leading participants, see
Wohlforth, Witnesses to the End of the Cold War, 163–88; Gorbachev, Memoirs, 534–42; Shultz,
Turmoil and Triumph, 751–80.
37 Cold War International History Project, 4 (Fall 1994), 84–5. See also Diane P. Koenker and

Ronald D. Bachman (eds.), Revelations from the Russian Archives: Documents in English Translation
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1997), 705–7; Jackson, “Soviet Reassessment of Ronald
Reagan, 1985–1988,” 625–34.
38 For a summing up of the memoir literature on the 1987 change, see Ellman and

Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet System and the Memoir Literature,” 262, 271, 272. For
more general studies, see Åslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform, 25–37; Brown, The
Gorbachev Factor, 147–50, 160–9; Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, 6–
16; McCauley, Gorbachev,50–132; Zubok, A Failed Empire, 294–302.
39 Gates, From the Shadows, 380. See also ibid., 381–2.

40 According to later figures more than 13,000 servicemen lost their lives in combat in the

war in Afghanistan; the financial cost was about 5 billion rubles annually. For this, see Odom,
The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 102–4, 247–51; Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Third edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 212. See also Koenker and Bachman, Revelations
from the Russian Archives, 765–6; Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 26, 47–8; Shultz,
Turmoil and Triumph, 1086–92; Wohlforth, Witnesses to the End of the Cold War, 141–5.
41 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold

War (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1994), 275–6, 284.

42 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 985–6. See also Jackson, “Soviet Reassessment of Ronald

Reagan, 1985–1988,” 634–7.

43 Jackson, “Soviet Reassessment of Ronald Reagan, 1985–1988,” 637–43. The quotation is

from 637. See also Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account
of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 150–2.
44 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 594. See also Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet

System and the Memoir Literature,” 267; Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 115, 144–6.
45 Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 231–3; Gaddy, The Price of the Past, 61–2.

46 Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 107–11.

47 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 593–4.

48 I have presented a short survey of these writings in my East, West, North, South, 101–8;

Vladislav M. Zubok, “Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of ‘The Turn’” in Odd
Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank
Cass, 2000), 343–67. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (London: Allen Lane, 2005) and
Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
49 Garthoff, The Great Transition, 751–78, the quotation is from 753.

50 Quoted in Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York:

Viking, 1990), 207.

 51 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 526–32, the quotation is from 528. See also Ellman and

Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet System and the Memoir Literature,” 261–2.
52 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 701–2, 710, 716–17; Wohlforth, Witnesses to the End of the

Cold War, 5–6, 31–3, 48. Gorbachev states with reference to SDI that “Even today I must not
initiate the reader into certain detail.” For this, see Ellman and Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the
Soviet System and the Memoir Literature,” 267.
53 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Columbia:

University of Missouri Press, 1997). For the war scare, see also Gates, From the Shadows, 270–3.
54 Garthoff, The Great Transition, 142–68; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 563; Lundestad, East, West,

North, South, 106–7.

55 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 338–450; James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A

History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Viking, 2009).
56 The best account of the events in Eastern Europe is found in Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma

of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1997). In his memoirs Gorbachev writes that “It goes without saying that the events in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, and later in Rumania and Bulgaria, caused us great concern. However, not
once did we contemplate the possibility of going back on the fundamental principles of the new
political thinking—freedom of choice and non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.”
For this, see Gorbachev, Memoirs, 674.
57 A good account of the unification of Germany is still found in Philip Zelikow and

Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). See also Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch; Angela E. Stent,
Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999); Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die Unbeabsichtigte
Selbstauflösung des SED–Staates (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996); Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989:
The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
58 For a short discussion of Gorbachev’s use of force inside the Soviet Union, see McCauley,

Gorbachev, 273–5. By August 1991 the Soviet Union had probably disintegrated too far for the
coup to have been successful. For this point of view, see Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military,
392–7.
59 The most recent favorable treatment of Gorbachev in long-term perspective is Archie

Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (London: Bodley Head, 2009), part 5.
 60 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 611; Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 667–70.

61 Paul Kennedy, “The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism 1846–1914: Comment,” Past

& Present, 125 (November 1989), 186–92. See also Patrick K. O’Brien, “The Costs and Benefits of
British Imperialism 1846–1914,” Past & Present, 120 (August 1988), 163–99 and O’Brien’s reply
to Kennedy’s comment in Past & Present, 125 (November 1989), 192–9; Lance E. Davis and
Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British
Imperialism, 1860–1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), particularly 304–5,
315–16.
62 See for instance the statistics in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical

Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982),
359. For later years see, for instance, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 2011 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2010), 332.
63 Niall Ferguson, “Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos,” Foreign Affairs

(March/April 2010).
 1 I have written somewhat more extensively about globalization and fragmentation in my

“Why Does Globalization Encourage Fragmentation?,” International Politics, 41 (2004), 265–76.

Many of the statements that follow are further documented there. Among the enormous
literature, I have found Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the
Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and John Baylis, Steve Smith, and
Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
particularly useful.
2 The best account is still Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late

Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

3 Schumpeter, “The Case Against Globaloney,” The Economist (April 23, 2011), 65.

4 For comparisons between China and Rome, see Walter Scheidel (ed.), Rome and China:

Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
5 For a short account of Amritsar and its consequences, see Denis Judd, Empire: The British

Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: Fontana, 1996), 258–72. For the long
account, see Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer (London: Hambledon,
2005).
6 The following section is based on Geir Lundestad (ed.), The Fall of Great Powers: Peace,

Stability, and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), particularly 383–402.
7 Theodore Draper, Present History: On Nuclear War, Detente, and Other Controversies (New

York: Vintage Books, 1984), 323–51.

8 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share. A Short History of British Imperialism 1850–1970 (London:

Longman, 1975 and later editions), 129–39; Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the
Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 49–51,
83–8.
9 This section is in part inspired by William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, “The United

States and the Liquidation of the British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941–1951” in Prosser Gifford
and William Roger Louis, The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940–1960 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982), 31–56.
10 Jess M. Stein, The Random House College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1984), 765;

The Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 558.
11 For some interesting comments on early legitimacy, see James Mayall, Nationalism and

International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 26–32.

 12 Among the many histories of Austria–Hungary I have relied most upon Robert A. Kann, A

History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974);
Stanley R. Williamson, Jr., Austria–Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London:
Macmillan, 1991); F.R. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers 1815–1918 (New
York: Berg, 1990); Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918 (London:
Longman, 1989); Adam Wandruszka und Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–
1918. Band VI. Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen (Wien: Verlag
der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989); István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A
Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990).
13 William McNeill, “Introductory Historical Commentary,” in Lundestad, The Fall of Great

Powers,3–21.
14 Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918, 487–520. See also István Deák’s

contribution in Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers, 81–102.

15 For a fine short analysis of this process, see Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal

International Society,” in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 117–26.
16 Quoted from J. M. Roberts, The Triumph of the West: The Origins, Rise, and Legacy of Western

Civilization (London: BBC, 1985), 318. See also Porter, The Lion’s Share, 134–8.
17 See, for instance, Soviet Foreign Policy. Volume II: 1945–1980 (Moscow: Progress Publishers,

1981), 16–17.
18 The Wavell quote is from P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and

Deconstruction 1914–1990 (London: Longman, 1993), 195. An interesting appraisal of Churchill is

Robert Blake and William Roger Louis (eds.), Churchill: A Major New Assessment of his Life in
Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). See particularly the chapters by Ronald
Hyam, “Churchill and the Empire,” 167–85, and by Sarvepalli Gopal, “Churchill and India,” 457–
71. For India in general, see for instance Percival Spear, A History of India (Penguin Books, 1965).
Useful, as always, is also Porter, The Lion’s Share, particularly 254, 289.
19 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York:

Harper and Row, 1987).

20 Gorbachev, Perestroika; Adam B. Ulam, The Communists: The Story of Power and Lost Illusions

1948–1991 (New York: Scribner, 1992). John Miller, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of Soviet
Power (New York: St. Martin, 1993); Jeffrey Gedmin, The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the
Collapse of East Germany (Washington, DC: AE1 Press, 1992).
21 Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political

Economy of British Imperialism, 1860–1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 315–
16. Patrick K. O’Brien, “The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism 1846–1914,” Past & Present,
120 (August 1988), 163–200 and Past & Present, 125 (November 1989), 192–9; D. K. Fieldhouse,
The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century (London: Macmillan,
1982), 380–94.
22 Williamson, Austria–Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 11–15; Kann, A History

of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918, 605; Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 233.
23 William M. Reisinger, Energy and the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Politics after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1992), 112.

24 Daniel N. Nelson and Joseph Lepgold, “Alliances and Burden-Sharing: A NATO–Warsaw

Pact Comparison,” Defense Analysis, 2:3 (1986), 205–24, particularly 220.

25 Charles P. Kindleberger, “Hierarchy versus Inertial Cooperation,” International Organization,

40:4 (Autumn 1986), particularly 841; Lundestad, The American “Empire” and Other Studies of
U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford–Oslo: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37–
9, 63–5. See also Alfred E. Eckes, “Trading American Interests,” Foreign Affairs (1992), 135–54.
26 Ernest May, “The American Commitment to Germany, 1949–1955,” in Lawrence S. Kaplan

(ed.), American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1991), 76.
27 For an interesting article on the Soviet case, see Leonid Gibianski, “The 1948 Soviet–

Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the ‘Socialist Camp’ Model,” in Odd Arne Westad, Sven
Holtsmark, and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–89 (Houndmills:
St. Martin’s, 1994), 26–46.
28 For a stimulating treatment of the racial aspect, see R. J. Vincent, “Racial Equality,” in Bull

and Watson, The Expansion of International Society, 239–54. See also Cain and Hopkins, British
Imperialism, 195–6.
29 For the Accra riots, see Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, 1918–1968 (London:

Paladin, 1970), 278–9. See also John D. Hargreaves, “Toward the Transfer of Power in British
West Africa,” in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, The Transfer of Power in Africa:
Decolonization 1940–1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 135–6.
30 D. A. Low, “The Asian Mirror to Tropical Africa’s Independence” in Gifford and Louis, The
Transfer of Power in Africa, 3.
31 Alexander J. Motyl, “From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet

Empire in Comparative Perspective,” in Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good (eds.), Nationalism
and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin, 1992), 15–43.
32 John-Paul Himka, “Nationality Problems in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union:

The Perspective of History,” in Rudolph and Good, Nationalism and Empire, 82 in particular.
33 Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (Cambridge:

Granta Books, 1989) and Ash, We the people: The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest,
Berlin and Prague (Cambridge: Granta Books, 1990). See also Richard Pipes, Communism: The
Vanished Specter, Norwegian Nobel Institute Spring Lecture 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994) 52–67.
34 Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 25–7, 337–8, 607–8.

35 A. Adu Boahen, “Colonialism in Africa: its Impact and Significance,” in A. Adu Boahen,

Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935, UNESCO General History of Africa, Volume VII
(London: Heineman, 1985), 785. For a somewhat different emphasis, see J. F. Ade Ajayi’s
contribution in Lundestad, The Fall of Great Powers, 215–34. This more negative view should,
however, be compared with his own more standard chapters in Ajayi (ed.), Africa in the
Nineteenth Century until the 1880s, UNESCO General History of Africa, Volume VI (London:
Heineman, 1989), particularly 5, 788–9, 791.
36 Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 220–1; Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 277–8.

37 Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers, 41.

38 Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York: Norton, 1972), 1.

39 Boahen, “Colonialism in Africa,” 785; John Lonsdale, “The European Scramble and

Conquest in African History” in Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson (eds.), The Cambridge History
of Africa. Volume 6 from 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 680–766,
particularly 748.
40 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2010,” Journal of Peace

Research, 48:4 (2011), 526–36.

41 The Herder quotation is from M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919

(London: Longman, 1993), 196. For a modern argument along similar lines, see Michael Walzer,
“The Reform of the International System” in Øyvind Østerud (ed.), Studies of War and Peace
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 227–50.
 42 My thinking on this point has been influenced by Michael Howard, “The Causes of War” in

Østerud, Studies of War and Peace, particularly 26–7.

43 John Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1987), 215–45.

44 The most pessimistic analysis of the new situation was found in John Mearsheimer, “Back

to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, 15:1 (Summer
1990), 5–56.
45 For an interesting statement on this point, see Václav Havel, “The Post-Communist

Nightmare,” tr. Paul Wilson, New York Review of Books (May 27, 1993), 8–10.
46 Eugene Robinson, “Experts Fear Rise in Bosnia-Type Ethnic Conflicts as Peoples Fight for

Identity,” International Herald Tribune (August 20, 1992), 5.

47 Amélie Barbier-Gauchard, “Thinking the EU budget and public spending in Europe: the

need to use an aggressive approach,” Policy Brief Notre Europe, 29 (2011).

 1 This is the theme of Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris

(London: HarperCollins, 2010).

2 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (Simon & Schuster, 1984), 180, 197, 236–7.

The quotation is from 180.

3 Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2006), 375–91.

4 Gordon M. Goldstein, Lessons In Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam

(New York: Times Books, 2008), 225–6.

5 Guy Laron, “The Cold War and the Middle East. Playing with Fire: The Soviet–Syrian–Israeli

Triangle, 1965–1967,” Cold War History, 10:2 (May 2010), 163–84.

6 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),

316–30. The quotation is from 325.

7 With some revisions, this section largely follows my The American “Empire” and Other Studies

of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective (Oxford–Oslo: Oxford University Press, 1990),
70–81.
8 Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, 143–4.

9 Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, 143–5. The quotation is from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game

Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.–Soviet Contest (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 176.
10 William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese

Trade Recovery, 1947–1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 5.

11 Geir Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War 1945–1949 (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1980), 114.

12 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1952–54, VI: 1, Ambassador Dillon to

the Department of State, April 26, 1954, 385.

13 FRUS, 1952–54, VI: 1, Memorandum by Assistant Secretary Merchant to the Secretary of

State, June 11, 1954, 691.

14 National Archives, Record Group 59, The Papers of Charles E. Bohlen, Box 26,

Memorandum for the President: Answers to Eight Questions, June 17, 1962.
15 FRUS, 1951, III, Hillenbrand to the Director of the Office of German Political Affairs,

October 1, 1951, 1,539.

 1 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 769.

2 See Tables 4 and 5 in the present volume.

3 Darioush Bayandor, Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited (Basingstoke and New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

4 The various positions are spelled out in Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public

Affairs, 2011), 113–51; Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New
York: Knopf, 2011); Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New
York: Public Affairs, 2011).
5 Thomas A. Schwartz, “Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle Against

Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:1 (2011), 121–41, (the
quotation is from 129); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997), 20–1.
6 Global 500, 2010, CNN Money, Fortune (February 10, 2011).