REPUBLIC OF THE PHI LIPPIN ES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,
-versus - CA-G.R. SP No. 70014

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

PASAY CITY, BRANCH 6,
NOW PRESIDED BY THE HON
ERNESTO A. REYES et. al
REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE
OF RIZAL AND REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE
OF BULACAN
,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT
OF JUDGMENT
(With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction)
________________________________________________
____

PETITIONER REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by counsel,

respectfully states:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

The instant case relates to the reconstitution of three (3) fake titles,
namely: OCT No. T-01-4, TCT No. T-408 and TCT No. T-498. The
alleged OCT No. T-01-4 purportedly covers “the whole archipelago
and represents four (4) regions: Luzon, Visayas, Palawan-Zamboanga
embracing (Tagean) Kalayaan and Sabah, and that Mindanao
region.” Further, alleged TCT Nos. T-408 and T-498 (which are
purportedly derivative titles of alleged OCT No. T-01-4) purportedly
cover some FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (500,000) HECTARES
of land. The sheer area covered constitutes more than conclusive
evidence regarding the spurious character of said titles.

The instant petition is being filed effectively in defense of the

integrity of the Philippines as a State since what are being assailed
herein arc rulings of the respondent Court which recognize the
ridiculous claim of private respondents to the entire Philippine
archipelago, or to properties originally consisting of 169,912,500
hectares, or more than 16 Billion Square Meters, of plains,
mountains, forests and seas.

Private respondent Julian Tallano claims to be a Prince who

descended from a. King (Luisong Tagean) whose sons included Rajah
Soliman and Lapu-Lapu The absurd nature of private respondents’
claim is patent on the face of the decisions/orders sought to be set
aside herein. The Decision with Compromise Agreement, for instance,
traces the claim to an alleged grant by the British Government to t he
alleged royal ancestor (King Luisong Tagean) of one of the private
respondents who supposedly assisted the British in conquering the
Philippine Islands some time in the 1700s.

The same decision makes reference to an alleged redemption of the

mortgage of the Philippines to the United States of America in 1764
at a time when the United States had not yet declared its
independence (in 1776) from the British Empire. Despite the patent
absurdities of the assailed rulings which raise serious and unending
doubts as to their origin, the respondent Court mandated their
execution to the prejudice of the millions of affected occupants of the
area, most probably including the members of this Honorable Court
and the Supreme Court, as well.

Apparently unmindful of the dire consequences of its rulings, the

respondent Court initially caused the reconstitution of TCT No. 408
which alone covers ONE BILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TWO
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED (1,252,763,700) SQUARE METERS of Metro
Manila. This order of reconstitution was issued despite the glaring
impossibility of complying with the jurisdictional requisites for
reconstitution, particularly those pertaining to the service of
individual notices to the millions of actual occupants in the subject
area.

NATURE AND TIMELINESS

OF THE PETITION

This is a petition Under Section 9(2) of the Judicial Reorganization

Act of 1980 and Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for the
annulment of the following alleged decisions/orders/titles/other
documents which were ordered reconstituted.

Annexes
1. Decision With Compromise ANNEX A
Agreement
dated February 4,
1972 consisting of 139 pages
allegedly rendered by Judge
Enrique Agana;

2. Clarificatory Order dated March ANNEX B

21, 1974 consisting of 30 pages,
allegedly rendered by Judge
Enrique Agana; and

3. Decision dated November 4, 1975 Annex C

consisting of 44 pages, allegedly
rendered by Judge Enrique Agana

THE PARTIES

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is a sovereign political

entity with capacity to sue. It may be served with judicial processes
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) at 134 Amorsolo
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City.

The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 6, now being

presided by Judge Ernesto A. Reyes, formerly Court of First Instance,
Branch 28, is the trial court which purportedly rendered the assailed
Decisions/Order sough to be annulled.

Private respondents, ANACLETQ MADRIGAL ACOPIADO,

ANACLETO MADRIGAL ACOP and JULIAN M. TALLANO, intervenors in
the case a quo, would benefit from the implementation of the
assailed Decisions/Order sought to be annulled herein and the
alleged writs and other documents issued pursuant thereto. It must
be emphasized at this point that whether intervenors Anacleto
Madrigal Acopiado and Anacleto Madrigal Acop are one and the same
person is unclear or could not be determined with certainty from the
case records.

RELEVANT FACTS AND ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On July 1, 1997, Robert M. del Rio, representing himself as the

attorney-in-fact of Anacleto Madrigal Acopiado and Julian Tallano
(intervenors in the case a quo), filed a Petition For Reconstitution of
an alleged Decision dated November 4, i975 (Annex C hereof)
purportedly promulgated by Branch XXVIII of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, then presided by Judge Enrique Agana, in
Civil Case No. 3957-P. Said decision was supposedly lost / destroyed
on account of the fire which gutted the Pasay City Hall on January
18, 1992.

While the petition purported to be accompanied, inter alia, by a true

copy of the subject decision certified by the Office of the Solicitor
General and affidavits of two (2) court employees, an examination of
the case record, however, shows that only an uncertified xerox COPY
of said alleged decision was attached thereto.

With all due respect, we believe the said Decision cannot be

implemented by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet,
because of the following grounds:

1. There is no law authorizing the reconstitution of lost owner ’s copy

of title administratively. Under the Land Registration Act
(Act 141) as amended by the Property Registration Decree (P.D.
1529), if a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, a suggestion of
the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered
owner or other person in interest before the Regional Trial
Court of the province or city where the land is situated. In other
words, the procedure is judicial in character.

2. Assuming arguendo that the lost owner’s copy of TCT No. 408
maybe reconstituted administratively, we believe the same should not
be given due course because of the dubious origin of said title,
among others, us shown hereunder:

a) Plan 11-69, as mentioned on the face of the title has not yet been
applied for original registration as appearing in our Survey Book.

b) Decree No. 297 covers a parcel of land in Cavite, Cavite and not in
Parañaque as per our records.

c) The alleged derivative title of TCT No. 408, which is OCT No. 01-4
is a well-known Spanish title.

d) Plan Psu-2031 mentioned at the back of the title is the same

private survey number involves in the survey in the so called
“Hacienda de Maricaban”, which supposedly covered large tracts of
land, including portions of Taguig, Parañaque and Pasay City,
registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
3. Without passing on its authenticity, it is opined that the revived
decision dated November 4, 1975 cannot be enforced by execution.
Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
revived judgment is enforcible by motion within five years and by
another action within ten years from its finality.

The LRA made additional findings on the spurious nature of the

alleged TCT No. 408 which were contained in its 1st Endorsement to
the OSG dated December 5,
1997 to wit:

We believe the instant petition should not be given clue course

because of the following grounds:

1. TCT No. 408 purportedly issued in the name of Gregorio

Madrigal Acopiado is of dubious origin as shown hereunder:

a) Plan 11-69, as mentioned on the face of the title has not yet
been applied for original registration as appearing in our Survey
Book.

b) Decree No. 297 covers a parcel of land in Cavite, Cavite and

not in Parañaque as per our records.

c) The alleged derivative title of TCT No. 408, which is OCT No.
01-4 is a well-known Spanish title.

d) Plan Psu-2031 mentioned at the back of the title is the same

private survey number involves in the survey in the so called
“Hacienda de Maricaban” which supposedly covered large tracts
of land, including portions of Taguig, Parañaque and Pasay
City, registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. The instant motion is bereft of legal basis.

Section 51 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) reads

as follows:

Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered

owner. — An owner or registered land may convey, mortgage,
lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with
existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But
no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except
a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as
 a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to
the Register of Deeds to make registration.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed:

1. That this Honorable Court issues a writ of execution

commanding the Deputy Sheriff of this Honorable Court to
implement the Decision of November 4, 1975 as
reconstituted in the following places, namely:

(a) Manila,
(b) Makati,
(c) Pasay,
(d) Parañaque,
(e) LaPiñas,
(f) Taguig,
(g) Pateros,
(h) Pedro Tunasan, Laguna,
(1) Carrnona,
(j) Gen. Mariano Alvares,
(k) Dasmariñas,
(1) Tanza
(m) Imus,
(n) Zapote, and
(o) Bacoor, all of Cavite where portions of the property covered by
TCT No. 408 are located:

2. That the writ of execution includes an order:

(a) Commanding the Law Enforcement Authorities such as the station

commanders or the Philippine National Police, of the corresponding
places where execution shall take place, the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Military to arrest any and all persons, be he
private individual, a government employee, supervisor, junior or
middle manager, general manager, director or president of any ,
firm, company, partnership, corporation, etc., who shall, obstruct the
enforcement of the ‘writ and the administration of justice;

(b) Authorizing the Sheriff to break and destroy any locked gate,
door or enclosure which hampers him from putting into effect the
coercive power or process of this Honorable Court in order that the
above Decision may not be rendered nugatory; as well as post the
necessary guard or guards to secure any house, building, enclosure
or structure after the implementation of the writ.
 3. That among the biggest of subsequent occupants of a portion
of the entire landholding of the registered owner is the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), which at the same
time has disposed of by sale of several areas at fantastic prices
to the prejudice of the registered owner or his heirs, who have
filed a separate motion for substitution with this Honorable
Court;

4. That although the possession of BCDA may be said to have a

color of law, claiming as it does that its occupancy is authorized
by Republic Act No. 7227, it remains nevertheless illegal
because the same was passed by Congress without due process
of law, the property in question being of private ownership;

5. That the plaintiff and private defendants, having been declared

in default, are not entitled to notice of this motion;

On January 2, 1998, the OSG received private respondent Acopiado’s

Reply to Comment filed by Atty. Melecio V. Emata dated December
23, 1997 which raised the following arguments:

1. That the non-existence of a law requiring reconstitution of title

duplicate certificate is a defense that has become moot and
academic;

2. That the dubious character of the title in question was never

raised at the trial or in a motion for reconsideration; and

3. That the procedural time limitation on the execution by writ of

a decision does not apply to land registration cases;

If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served

on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is
deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and
void, even if otherwise the said order should have been final and
executory.(Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 234
SCRA 455)

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which mandates that:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and

executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations a judgment may be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry
and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.

Whether or not the subject clarificatory judgment and writ of

execution are valid and/or can be executed is material to intervenor
motion though on its face it merely seeks their admission into the
records. It would be safe to assume that the admission, of these
documents is not solely for admission’s sake. intervenor can certainly
be expected to eventually seek execution of the subject court
processes.

On April 18, 2001, the OSG received the Petition for Reconstitution
with Motion for the Issuance of an AliasWrit of Execution Possession
and Demolition of even date filed by Atty. Teresito Abella on behalf
of Don Anacleto Madrigal Acop and Julian M. Tallano seeking, inter
alia, the reconstitution and execution of:
(a) the, alleged Decision with Compromise Agreement dated
February 4, 1972
(b) the alleged Clarificatory Decision dated January 19, 1976 and
(c) the alleged Third Alias Writ of Execution, Possession and
Demolition dated May 23, 1989

GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION

I

THE ASSAILED ALLEGED DECISIONS / ORDER IN CIVIL CASE NO.

3957 - P ARE VOID BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE ALLEGED
OCT NO. T- 01 - 4 AND THE ALLEGED DERIVATIVE TITLES, I.E., TCT
NOS. 4 0 8 AND 4 9 8, IN SAID CASE, WHICH IS AN ORDINARY
CIVIL ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE OR RECOVERY OF
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION AND NOT A LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING WHERE A RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE CAN BE
VALIDLY ORDERED.

II

THE ASSAIIJED ALLEGED DECISIONS/ ORDER IN CIVIL CASE NO.

3957-P ARE VOID BECAUSE, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE
RESPONDENT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
RECONSTITUTION OF A TORRENS TITLE IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3957-P,
THE ASSAILED ALLEGED DECISIONS/ ORDER WOULD
NONETHELESS BE VOID BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT COURT DID
NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION DUE TO NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF
PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL. GAZETTE AND NOTICE TO ALL THE
OCCUPANTS OR PERSONS IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY, THE
OWNERS OF THE ADJOINING PROPERTIES AND ALL OTHER
INTERESTED PARTIES.
III

THE ASSAILED ALLEGED DECISIONS/ ORDER IN CIVIL CASE NO.

3957-P ARE VOID BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE ALLEGED
OCT NO. T-01-4 AND THE ALLEGED TCT NOS. 408 AND 498 WHICH
RECONSTITUTION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE TORRENS TITLES EXISTING ALL OVER THE
COUNTRY.
IV

THE ASSAILED ALLEGED DECISIONS/ ORDERS IN CIVIL CASE NO.

3957-P ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED THROUGH
EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
V

THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT COURT ORDERING THE

RECONSTITUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSAILED
DECISIONS/ ORDER ARE VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT THE MANDATORY
AND JURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF
COURT RECORDS WAS NOT FOLLOWED.

VI

RESPONDENT COURT’S ORDERS DATED JULY 7, 1997, JULY 11,

2001 AND OCTOBER 8, 2001 ARE LIKEWISE INVALID DUE TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION DUE TO THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
JURISDICTIONAL REQUISITES FOR THERE CONSTITUTION OF
TITLES UNDER R.A. NO. 26.

VII

EVEN ASSUMING ARGUE NDO THAT THERE WAS A VALID

RECONSTITUTION OF THE ALLEGED DECISIONS/ORDER AND
OTHER RECORDS, THE SAME CAN NO LONGER BE ENFORCED ON
ACCOUNT OFPRESCRIPTION; HENCE, THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF
THE RESPONDENT COURT WHICH ORDERED THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SAID ALLEGED DECISIONS/ORDER WERE ISSUED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION.
 VIII

THE ALLEGED DECISIONS/ORDER, WRITS AND OTHER

DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING THE ALLEGED TCT NOS. 408 AND 498,
WHICH WERE ILLEGALLY RECONSTITUTED BY RESPONDENT COURT
ARE INTRINSICALLY VOID AND SPURIOUS ON THEIR FACE; THUS,
THE SAME SHOULD BE ANNULLED OR CANCELLED.

DISCUSSION

I. THE ASSAILED ALLEGED

DECISIONS/ORDER IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 3957-P ARE VOID
BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT
COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
TO ORDERTHE RECONS-TITUTION
OFTHE ALLEGED OCT NO. T-01-4
AND THE ALLEGED DERIVATIVE
TITLES I.E., TCT NOS. 408 AND
498, IN SAID CASE WHICH IS AN
ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION FOR
QUIETING OF TITLE OF RECOVERY
OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
AND NOT A LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING WHERE A
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE CAN
BE VALIDLY ORDERED.

A cursory reading of the assailed alleged Decisions/ Order in Civil

Case No. 3957-P readily reveals that the case a quo is one for
quieting of title or recovery of ownership and possession (accion
reinvindicatoria,1 over virtually the entire Philippine archipelago. As
such, the same partakes of an ordinary civil action, which is an action
in personam. Like any ordinary civil action, an accion rein vindicatoria
is in the nature of an action in personam since it is directed against
particular persons and the judgment is binding only upon the parties
impleaded or their successors-in-interest. An accion rein vindicatoria
is properly cognizable by a court sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction.

On the other hand, it is well settled that land registration proceedings

are proceedings in rem [Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212
SCRA 633 (1992)], where notice to the whole world is given in order
to bind the same. Although the petition filed in Civil Case No. 3957-P
included a prayer for the reconstitution of the alleged OCT No. T- 01-
4 and the alleged derivative titles, i.e., TCT Nos. 408 and 498 said
prayer did not convert said ordinary civil action into a land
registration proceeding. In other words, the reconstitution was
merely an incident to the alleged principal action of quieting of title
or recovery of ownership and possession; but being an in rem action,
it cannot be merged with the action in personam.

Indeed, land registration proceedings are distinct from ordinary civil

actions. The distinction between the two (2) actions/proceedings has
been described as follows:

Nature of land registration or cadastral jurisdiction as distinguished

from that in ordinary civil actions. — It has been stated that land
registration or cadastral proceedings are as separate and distinct
from ordinary civil actions as are the latter from criminal actions
(Cavan vs. Wislizenus, 48 Phil. 632). This distinction proceeds from
the special character of land registration or cadastral cases, as may
be seen from the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as
amended, as well as of the Cadastral Act. The proceedings under
both Acts are in rem against the land and the buildings and
improvements thereon, and the decrees entered therein operate
directly on the land and the buildings and improvements thereon,
and vest and establish title thereto (Act No. 496, sec. 2, as amended;
Act No. 2259, sec. 11; Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120). In these proceedings, the whole
world is made a party and therefore is bound by the decision therein.

In an ordinary civil case, on the other hand, the action is purely

personal between the specific parties involved and the judgment
resulting there from would bind only such parties and no other
(Castillo vs. Ramos, 78 Phil. 809). Furthermore, in the former
proceedings, the court’s power is confined: (1) to the determination
as to whether the applicants or claimants are entitled to the lots and,
after finding that they are, to the confirmation of their title to, and
registration of, the lots in their name (Abellera vs. De Guzman, 47
O.G. 4611); and (2) to the determination of questions “as may come
before it under (the Land Registration) Act” (Sec. 2, Act 496).

This clear separation and distinction between land registration

proceedings arid ordinary civil actions has necessitated the rule that
what properly pertains to the general jurisdiction of the courts in
ordinary civil actions should not be brought to them as courts of land
registration or cadastral courtswith the limited and special jurisdiction
characteristic of such courts (Castillo va Ramos, supra; Government
vs. Abad, 103 Phil. 725; Director of Lands vs. De Belzunce, 47 O.G.
1820).
II. THE ASSAILED ALLEGED
DECISIONS/ORDER IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 3957-P ARE VOID
BECAUSE, EVEN ASSUMING
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT
HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER
THE RECONSTITUTION OF A
TORRENS TITLE IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 3957-P, THE ASSAILED
ALLEGED DECISIONS/
ORDER WOULD
NONE-THELESS BE VOID
BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENT COURT
DID NOTACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER
THE PETITION DUETO
NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE
JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF
PUBLICATION IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE AND
NOTICE TO ALL THE
OCCUPANTS OR
PERSONS IN POSSESSION
OF THE PROPERTY, THE
OWNERS OF THE
ADJOINING PROPERTIES
AND ALL OTHER
INTERESTED PARTIES.

As previously discussed, the respondent Court does not have

jurisdiction to render the assailed alleged Decisions/Order which
ordered the reconstitution of the alleged OCT No. T- 01- 4 and the
alleged TCT Nos. 408 and 498. But even assuming arguendo that the
respondent Court had jurisdiction to render the assailed alleged
Decisions/Order, the same would nonetheless be void because there
is absolutely no showing from the assailed alleged Decisions/Order
that there was compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of
publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette and the
service of notice to all occupants of the subject property, the
adjoining owners and other interested parties.

Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26, provide:

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in
sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2 (f) with the proper Court of First Instance,
by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an
interest in. the property. The petition shall state or contain, among
other things, the following:
(a) that the owner ’s duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost
or destroyed;
(b) that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate had been
issued, or, if any had been issued; the same had been lost or
destroyed;
(c) the location, area and boundaries of the property;
(d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if
any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements.

In Republic ‘of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110

(1999), it was held:

The Court sees merit in the petition.

Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of Republic Act

No. 26, denotes the restoration in the original form and condition of a
lost be destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece
of land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to have after observing
the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the
same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. Among
the conditions explicitly required by the law is publication of the
petition twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and its
posting at the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. This
directive is mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been held to be
jurisdictional.

III. THE ASSAILED ALLEGED

DECISION/ORDER IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 3957-P
ARE VOID BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENT COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION TO
ORDER THE
RECONSTITUTION OF THE
ALLEGED OCT NO. T-01-04
AND THE ALLEGED TCT
NOS. 408 AND 498 WHICH
RECONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE
TORRENS TITLES
EXISTING ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.

The alleged TCT Nos. 408 and 498 cover an unimaginably large tract
of land totaling approximately 500,000 hectares (or more than 5
billion square meters), including the following parcels:

PARCEL I
Las Piñas 4,150 hectares
Muntinglupa 4,870 hectares
Parañaque 3,830 hectares
Pasay City 1,390 hectares

PARCEL II
Manila 3,830 hectares
Makati 2,700 hectares
Pasig 2,040 hectares
Mandaluyong 2,600 hectares
San Juan 1, 040 hectares
San Juan 1,040 hectares

Total 26,250 hectares

PARCEL III
Pateros 1,040 hectares
Taguig 3,370 hectares

Total land area in

Greater Manila Area 30,660 hectares

PARCEL IV
San Pedro, Laguna 8,250 hectares
Binan 8,550 hectares
Carmona 5,215 hectares
GMA 7,105 hectares
Silang 7,918 hectares
Imus 6,211 hectares
Naic 5,815 hectares
Noveleta 5,310 hectares
General Trias 5,800 hectares
Ternate 7,125 hectares
It is a notorious fact that the areas embraced by said alleged OCT
No. T-01-04, TCT Nos. 408 and 498 are already covered by
Torrens titles that have been subsisting in the respective Registries
of Deeds even long before or during the alleged reconstitution
preceding.

This fact can properly be taken judicial notice of under Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court. The issuance of a reconstituted title over property
that is covered by an existing title is proscribed since it constitutes a
collateral attack on said existing title. The circumstance that the
action was directly brought to recover a parcel of land does not alter
the truth that the proceeding involves a collateral attack upon a
Torrens title because the land in controversy lies within the
boundaries determined by that title [Domingo v. Santos Ongsiako Lim
Y Sia, 55 Phil. 363 (1930)]. A certificate of title cannot be subject to
collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law [ Carreon v. Court of
Appeals, 291 SCRA (1998)].

IV. THE ASSAILED ALLEGED

DECISIONS/ORDER IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 3957-P
ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY
WERE OBTAINED
TUROUGH EXTRINSIC
FRAUD.

An action for reconveyance, by its very nature, should necessarily

implead those what are in possession of the subject properly. It is
precisely against these possessors that the property is sought to be
recovered.

In Civil Case No. 3957-P, however, the millions of occupants and

registered owners of lots covered by the alleged TCT No. 408 and
TCT No. 498 were not impleaded as defendants. This omission,
which effectively deprived said possessors and registered owners of
their day in court, constitutes extrinsic fraud that warrants annulment
of the proceedings and any resultant ruling therefrom.

In Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318 (1969), the

Supreme Court defined extrinsic fraud as any fraudulent act of the
successful party in a litigation, which is committed outside the trial of
the case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting
fully and fairly his side of the case. The extrinsic fraud committed in
Civil Case No. 3957-P appears to be a worse variation since the
affected possessors and registered owners were not even impleaded
as parties to the case and, as such, were totally unaware of the
proceeding that was intended to deprive them of their properties.

In the instant case, the issuance of the alleged reconstituted titles in

a proceeding wherein affected parties holding valid and subsisting
Torrens titles over their properties are deprived of their rights over
said properties without due process of law, undermines, the integrity
of the Torrens System to the detriment and prejudice of the public
interest which petitioner has a duty to protect. That is, we submit,
the highest form of subversion, nay treachery, upon the integrity of
the Philippines as a State.

V. THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF

RESPONDENT COURT
ORDERING THE
RECONSTITUTION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ASSAILED DECISIONS/
ORDER ARE VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION
CONSIDERING THAT THE
MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL
PROCEDURE FOR THE
RECONSTITUTION OF
COURT RECORDS WAS NOT
FOLLOWED.

The assailed Orders of the respondent Court dated July 7, 1997, July
11, 2001 and October 8, 2001
ordered the reconstitution of the alleged Decision/Order (Annexes
A, B and D hereof) and the alleged writs, titles and other documents
issued pursuant thereto However, the mandatory procedure for
reconstitution of the alleged Decisions/Order was not followed since
the respondent Court merely relied on a deposition and not on
evidence given in open court:

As culled from the testimony of Mr. Tallano and more importantly on.
petitioner’s exhibit “C” and “D” i.e., the transcribed stenographic
notes and commissioner’s report on the deposition proceeding, it was
preponderantly shown that former Judge Sayo consistently affirmed
that he issued the Third Alias Writ of Execution, Possession and
Demolition on May 24, 1989. He likewise affirmed and identified the
signature appearing above this printed name on the certified
photocopy of the said Order shown to him and admitted that truly,
the signature was his (TSN June 6, 2001 p. 6, Deposition). He also
confirmed that he executed the duly notarized certification (Exh. “B”
and its sub-markings) attesting to the veracity and genuineness of
his signature is appearing on the Order of Third Alias Writ of
Execution, Possession and Demolition (TSN June 6, 20001, p. 7,
Deposition).

VI. RESPONDENT COURT’S

ORDERS DATED JULY 7,
1997, JULY 11, 2001 ARE
LIKEWISE INVALID DUE
TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION DUE TO
THE FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE
JURISDICTIONAL
REQUISITES FOR THE
RECONSTITUTION OF
TITLES UNDER R.A. NO. 26.

The Petition for Reconstitution dated June 27, 1997 filed by Robert
M,. del Rio as Attorney-in- Fact of Intervenors Anacleto Madrigal
Acopiado and Julian Tallano reads:

Petitioner Robert M. del Rio, acting for and in behalf of Intervenors

Anacleto Madrigal Acopiado and Julian Tallano and to this
Honorable Court most respectfully petition for the reconstitution of
the decision of the above-entitled case which was totally
lost/destroyed due to the fire which gutted this court on January 18,
1992.

Attached hereto are the certified true copies of the decision and
certified true copy of the decision of the Office of the Solicitor
General and also the affidavits of two employees of the court from
the year 1975, 1973 respectively to the present, attesting to the fact
that they were employees of the court when the decision was
promulgated by the then Judge Enrique A. Agana, then the presiding
judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal 7th Judicial Dist., Branch
XXVIII, Pasay City and now Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI, Pasay
City.

Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing the

attached documents be admitted in lieu of the originals which were
lost/ destroyed and the records of this case be considered
reconstituted.
VII. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO
THAT THERE WAS A VALID
RECONSTITUTION OF THE
ALLEGED D E C I S I O N S !
ORDER, THE SAME CAN NO
LONGER BE ENFORCED 9N
ACCOUNT ‘ OF
PRESCRIPTION; HENCE THE
ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT WHICH
ORDERED THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAID
ALLEGED DECISIONS /
ORDER WERE ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION.

It bears emphasis that in its assailed Order dated October 8, 2001,

respondent Court improperly and irregularly ruled that prescription
has not barred the enforcement of the alleged Decision with
Compromise Agreement dated February 4, 1972 and the alleged
Decision dated November 4, 1975 (Annexes A and C hereof):

In this instant case, it would be palpably unfair to downplay the

Decision with Compromise Agreement of February 4, 1972 of which
the Solicitor General was then party to that agreement. Besides, that
judgment granting exemption of the five (5) year prescription period
for execution has long become final and executory. Whether the
judgment so rendered and Compromise Agreement entered or
agreed upon by and between the parties was correct or erroneous is
of no moment by now because it became the law of the case. (at
page 3)

In the first place, the records of the Office of the Solicitor General do
not show the existence, among others, not only of said Decision
dated February 4, 1972 but also of said alleged Compromise
Agreement. Thus, the same cannot be used as a basis by respondent
Judge. Further, the ruling of the respondent Court is based on a
wrong premise, for it unabashedly assumes that the alleged
“exemption of the five (5) year prescriptive period for execution”
allegedly embodied in the alleged Decision dated February 4, 1972 is
valid, legal and enforceable.

On the contrary, the alleged waiver of the prescriptive period for

execution, even assuming arguendo that it exists, is, at the very
least, blatantly ultra vires and illegal and unenforceable for being
contrary to law and public policy and prejudicial to the rights of third,
persons and the Republic.

VIII. THE ALLEGED DECISIONS/

ORDER, WRITS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING
THE ALLEGED TCT NOS. 408
AND 498, WHICH WERE
ILLEGALLY AND
IRREGULARLY ORDERED
RECONSTITUTED BY
RE$RONDENT COURT ARE
INTRINSICALLY VOID AND
SPURIOUS ON THEIR FACE;
THUS, THE SAME SHOULD
BE ANNULLED OR
CANCELLED.

The assailed alleged Decisions/Order and the alleged writs and other
documents issued pursuant thereto, including the alleged TCT Nos.
408 and 498, are clearly of dubious origin. Even on their face, the
alleged Decisions, writs, titles and other documents are replete with
statements and representations that are patently ridiculous, absurd
and preposterous of such magnitude as to sufficiently afford the
taking of judicial notice of their falsity and spurious character,
pursuant to Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Petitioner hereby repleads the foregoing allegations and discussions

to the extent pertinent and additionally, avers the following
discussions in support of its prayer for an injunctive writ.

Despite the pendency of private respondent Acopiado’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2001, the alleged TCT
No. 408 was reconstituted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

Even before the reconstitution of said certificate of title, private

respondents, especially private respondent Taliano, have been
zealous in their efforts to dispossess the registered owners of the
subject properties. They have, in , fact, filed several cases to this
effect.

Among these are:

Case No./Venue Case Title Status
Civil Case No. “Don Jaime M. Dismissed. Q-98-3 5385. Rables as
Administrator (RTC-Br. 77, of the interstate Estate of Quezon City)
Hermogenes Rodriguez vs. Amanda E Re yes, et al.” Civil Case No.
“Don Jaime M. Dismissed. C-152-V-98 Robles, etc. us. Sps. (RTC-13r.
75, Romelito D. Lopez, et al” Valenzuela) Civil Case No. “Don Jaime
M. Rabies, Dismissed. C-17938 etc. vs. Sps. (RTC-Br. 126, Virgilio &
Ligaya Civil Case No. “Don Jaime M. Dismissed. 66707 Robles, etc.
vs. Heirs (RTC-Br, 1 53 of Domingo Viray, Pasig City) etc.” Civil Case
No. “Don Jaime M. Dismissed. C- 181153 Robles, etc. vs. (RTC. Br.
126, Erlinda & Gerundio Caloocan City) Kong, et al,” CA-G.R. SP No.
“Don Jaime M. Dismissed. 54718 Rabies, etc. vs. Hon. (Court of
Appeals) Briccio C. Ygana, et al.” Civil Case No. “The Estate of Don
The Order dated Q-01-45365 Esteban Benitez October 8, 2001 of the
RTC, Branch 111 (RTC-Br. 101, Tallano, et al. vs. The Pasay City in
Quezon City) Beneficiary LRC/Civil Case No. Successors-in- 3957-P
denied interest of Bonifacio the Regalado et al.” Republic’s motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2001 directing the
Republic and the other defendants to comply with the writ of
execution.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the aforedescribed

situation sufficiently constitutes at least one of the grounds for the
issuance of an injunctive writ as enumerated in Section 3, Rule. 58 of
the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary

injunction may be granted when it is established:

(a). That the applicant, is entitled to relief demanded, and. the.

whole, or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the: act or acts complained of or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act

or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant, or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is

attempting to do, ox is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
act probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the and on or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that:

1) Upon the filing of the instant petition, a Temporary Restraining

Order be issued restraining and enjoining, the respondents and their
agents and all persons acting on their behalf and/or under their
direction and control from doing any act geared towards
implementing the assailed alleged Decisions, Orders and writs,
including the conduct of further proceedings by respondent Court in
the case below;
2) The instant Petition be given due course;
3) After due consideration of petitioner’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, which should follow posthaste or as soon as
possible, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining and
enjoining respondent Court from the conduct of further proceedings
in the case below, and all the respondents, including their agents,
and all persons acting on their behalf and/or under their direction
and control from implementing the assailed alleged Decisions, Orders
and writs;
4) After notice and trial, the following alleged Decisions/Order in Civil
Case No. 3957-P be annulled and/ or declared void, to wit:

c. Alleged Certification of Sheriff ’s’ Return dated’ ‘November 17,

1974;
d. Alleged TCT No. T-408;
e. Alleged TCT No. T-498;
f. Alleged Letters of Administration dated June 14, 1972; and
g. Alleged Entry of Judgment dated June 14, 1972.

6) The Reconstituted TCT No. T-408 dated December 21, 2001 which
was issued pursuant to the aforementioned invalid July 7, 1997 Order
of respondent Judge be annulled/cancelled; and
7) The preliminary injunction issued be made permanent.

Other relief’s just and equitable are also prayed for.

Makati City for the City of Manila, Metro Manila,

April 5, 2002.

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village
Makati City 1229

SIMEON V. MARCELO
Solicitor General
IBP Lifetime Roll No. 0145, 9/22/93
CARLOS N. ORTEGA
Assistant Solicitor General
IBP No. 550210, 1-11-02

NESTOR J. BALLACILLO
Assistant Solicitor General
IBP No. 360887, 1/9/02

THOMAS M. LARAGAN
Solicitor
IBP No. 550214, 1-11-02

LUCIANO EMMANUEL L. JOSON JR.

Solicitor
IBP No. 550215, 1-11-02

RICO SEBASTIAN D. LIWANAG

Solicitor
IBP Lifetime Roll No. 0854
Petition for Annulment of Judgment 170
Republic vs. Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 111, et al.,
CA-G.R. SP No. __________
(Civil Case No. 3957-P)
x---------------------------------------------------------x

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF

NON-FORUM SHOPPING

I. NESTOR J. BALLACILLO, an Assistant Solicitor General at

the Office of the Solicitor General, after having been duly
sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:

1. I have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing

Petition;

2. I have read and understood the contents thereof;

3. The allegation therein are true and correct based on

my/petitioner’s personal knowledge and authentic records;

4. The petition proceeds from Civil Case No. 3957-P The

petitioner/OSG (the latter being the only statutory counsel of
the former)/I have not theretofore commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
 Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
that to the best of petitioner’s/my knowledge, no such action is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; that
if I/petitioner should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or
any other tribunal or agency I/ petitioner undertake to promptly
inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency of that
fact within five (5) days therefrom.

6. The foregoing verification and certification is being made by the

OSG through the undersigned affiant pursuant to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
SC Johnson and Son, Inc., arid Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127105,
June 25, 1999 and City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Raymond S.
Estrella, et al., G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2001, where it was ruled
that a certification made by the OSG’ being the only lawyer of the
government agencies and their officials ‘under the 1987
Administrative Code —substantially complies with the Rules.

NESTOR J. BALLACILLO
Solicitor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 9th day of April,

2002, in Makati City, Metro Manila.

THOMAS M. LARAGAN
Solicitor

Copy Furnished:
(By Registered Mail)
HON. ERNESTO A. REYES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 111
Pasay City, Metro Manila

ANACLETO MADRIGAL ACOP

c/o ATTY. TERESITO ABELLA
No. 4435, Catalagan Street
Palanan, Makati City
Metro Manila
c/o JULIAN M. TALLANO
No. 31, BMA Avenue
Tatalon, Quezon City
Metro Manila

ANACLETO MADRIGAL ACOPIADO

c/o ATTY. MELICIO V. EMATA
Ground Floor, Door B
Lagasca Apartments
8259 Constancia Street
Makati City, Metro Manila
c/o ROBERT M. DEL RIO
23 Ipil Street, Project 3
Quezon City, Metro Manila

JULIAN M. TALLANO
No. 31, BMA Avenue
Tatalon, Quezon City
Metro Manila

ROBERT M. DEL RIO

Attorney-in—Fact of Anacleto Madrigal Acopiado
and Julian M. Tallano
23 Ipil Street, Project 3
Quezon City, Metro Manila.

MR. ROMEO C. CAMPOS

Attorney-in-Fact of Julian M. Tallano
No. 3-A, John Street
Multinational Village
Parañaque City, Metro Manila

ATTY. TERESITO ABELLA

Counsel for Anacleto Madrigal Acop
and Julian M. Taliano
No. 4435, Calatagan Street
Palanan, Makati City
Metro Manila

ATTY. MELECIO V. EMATA

Counsel for An acle to Madrigal Acopiado
Ground Floor, Door B
Lagasca Apartments
8259 Constancia Street
Makati City, Metro Manila
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL
Pasig City

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN

Guiguinto, Bulacan

E X P L A N AT I O N
(Under Section 11, Rule 13,
New Rules on Civil Procedure)

This pleading is not served personally because the OSG’ does not
have sufficient personnel to personally serve all the numerous
pleadings it prepares everyday.

THOMAS M. LARAGAN
Solicitor