Aws Architecture Guide
Aws Architecture Guide
APRIL 2021
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Audience................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Related Documentation....................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................... 5
Public-Cloud Concepts......................................................................................................................................... 7
Scaling Methods.................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Security Integration............................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Virtual Compute.................................................................................................................................................................................. 12
Connecting VPCs.................................................................................................................................................................................22
Resiliency Constructs......................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Design Models..................................................................................................................................................... 44
Summary............................................................................................................................................................... 81
Preface
GUIDE TYPES
Overview guides provide high-level introductions to technologies or concepts.
Reference architecture guides provide an architectural overview for using Palo Alto Networks® technologies
to provide visibility, control, and protection to applications built in a specific environment. These guides
are required reading prior to using their companion deployment guides.
Deployment guides provide decision criteria for deployment scenarios, as well as procedures for combining
Palo Alto Networks technologies with third-party technologies in an integrated design.
DOCUMENT CONVENTIONS
Cautions warn about possible data loss, hardware damage, or compromise of security.
Blue text indicates a configuration variable for which you need to substitute the correct value for your
environment.
• Command-line commands.
• User-interface elements.
• Navigational paths.
• A value to be entered.
An external dynamic list is a file hosted on an external web server so that the firewall can import objects.
ABOUT PROCEDURES
These guides sometimes describe other companies’ products. Although steps and screen-shots were
up-to-date at the time of publication, those companies might have since changed their user interface,
processes, or requirements.
https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/referencearchitectures
• Updated PAN-OS® to 10.0.5, including the VM-Series firewall capacities and system requirements
• Update the bootstrapping methods to include basic configuration with user data
• Updated the design models and structure for this guide to based on Gateway Load Balancer (GWLB)
and overlay routing
This guide:
• Provides an architectural overview for using VM-Series firewalls to provide visibility, control, and
protection to your applications built on AWS.
• Links the technical design aspects of AWS and the Palo Alto Networks solutions and then explores
several technical design models. The design models include two options that span the scale of
enterprise-level operational environments.
• Provides a framework for architectural discussions between Palo Alto Networks and your
organization.
• Is required reading prior to using the Palo Alto Networks deployment guides for AWS. The
deployment guides provide decision criteria for deployment scenarios, as well as procedures for
enabling features of the AWS and the Palo Alto Networks VM-Series firewalls in order to achieve an
integrated design.
AUDIENCE
This guide is for technical readers, including system architects and design engineers, who want to
deploy the Palo Alto Networks VM-Series firewalls and Panorama™ within a public-cloud data center
infrastructure. This guide assumes the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of applications,
networking, virtualization, security, and high availability. The reader should also possess a basic
understanding of network and data center architectures.
To be successful, you must have a working knowledge of networking and policy in PAN-OS.
RELATED DOCUMENTATION
The following documents support this guide:
• Panorama on AWS: Deployment Guide—Details the deployment of Palo Alto Networks Panorama
management nodes in the AWS VPC. This guide includes setup of Panorama in a high-availability
configuration and setup of Cortex™ Data Lake.
Introduction
Organizations are adopting AWS in order to deploy applications and services on a public-cloud
infrastructure for a variety of reasons, including:
• Business agility—Infrastructure resources are available when and where they are needed,
minimizing IT staffing requirements and providing faster, predictable time-to-market.
Virtualization in both public- and private-cloud infrastructures has permitted IT to respond to
business requirements within minutes instead of days or weeks.
• Better use of resources—Projects are more efficient, and there are fewer operational issues,
permitting employees to spend more time adding business value. Employees have the resources
needed to bring value to the organization.
• Operational vs capital expenditure—Costs are aligned directly with usage, providing a utility
model for IT infrastructure that requires little-to-no capital expense. Gone are the large capital
expenditures and time delays associated with building private data center infrastructure.
Although Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers are responsible for ensuring the security and
availability of their infrastructure, organizations are ultimately still responsible for the security of their
applications and data. The security requirements are similar to on-premises deployments, but the specific
implementation details of how to properly architect security technology in a public-cloud environment,
such as Google Cloud Platform, are different.
Public-Cloud Concepts
Organizations generally move to the public cloud with the goals of increasing scale and reducing time to
deployment. Achieving these goals requires application architectures that are built specifically for the
public cloud. Before you can architect for the public cloud, you must understand how it is different from
traditional on-premises environments.
SCALING METHODS
Traditionally, organizations scale on-premises deployments through the purchase of devices that have
increased performance capacity. Scaling up an on-premises deployment in this method makes sense
because organizations typically purchase the devices in order to satisfy the performance requirements
during the devices’ lifetime.
Public-cloud environments focus on scaling out the deployment instead of scaling up. This architectural
difference stems primarily from the capability of public-cloud environments to dynamically increase or
decrease the number of resources allocated to your environment. In the public cloud, infrastructure used
to satisfy performance requirements can have a lifetime in minutes instead of years. Instead of purchasing
extra capacity for use at some time in the future, the dynamic nature of the public cloud allows you to
allocate just the right amount of resources required to service the application.
In practice, to architect an application for the cloud, you need to distribute functionality, and you should
build each functional area to scale out as necessary. Typically, this means a load balancer distributes
traffic across a pool of identically configured resources. When changes occur in the application traffic,
the number of resources you have allocated to the pool can dynamically increase or decrease. This design
method provides scale and resiliency. However, the application architecture must take into account that
the resources are transient. For example, you should not store the application state in the networking
infrastructure or in the frontend application servers. Instead, store state information on the client or
persistent storage services.
The ability to scale a cloud architecture extends not only to the capacity of an application but also
the capacity to deploy applications globally. Scaling an application to a new region in a traditional
on-premises deployment requires significant investment and planning. Public-cloud architectures are
location-agnostic, and you can deploy them globally in a consistent amount of time.
Automation is so core to cloud design that many cloud application architectures deploy new capabilities
through the automated build-out of new resources instead of updating the existing ones. This type of
cloud architecture provides several benefits, including the ability to phase in the changes to a subset of
the traffic and the ability to quickly roll back the changes by redirecting traffic from the new resources to
the old.
SECURITY INTEGRATION
VM-Series firewalls enable you to securely implement scalable cloud architectures and reduce time to
deployment. You leverage the following capabilities of VM-Series firewalls in order to achieve this:
• Application visibility—VM-Series firewalls natively analyze all traffic in a single pass to determine
the application, content, and user identity. The application, content, and user are core elements of
your security policy that are used for visibility, reporting, and incident investigation.
• Advanced attack prevention at the application level—Attacks, much like many applications, can
use any port, rendering traditional prevention mechanisms ineffective. VM-Series firewalls allow
you to use Threat Prevention and the WildFire® cloud-based threat analysis services. These services
apply application-specific threat prevention policies that block exploits, malware, and previously
unknown threats from infecting your cloud.
Services have default configurations that might be secure upon implementation, but to ensure the
integrity of the data itself, it is up to the customer to make the assessment and lock those service
configurations down.
Security and compliance risks in cloud computing threaten an organization’s ability to drive digital
business. The dynamic nature of the cloud, the potential complexity of having multiple cloud service
providers in the environment, and the massive volume of cloud workloads make security and compliance
cumbersome.
Public-cloud environments use a decentralized administration framework that often suffers from a
corresponding lack of any centralized visibility. Additionally, compliance within these environments
is complex to manage. Incident response requires the ability to rapidly detect and respond to threats.
However, public-cloud capabilities are limited in these areas.
Prisma™ Cloud offers comprehensive and consistent cloud infrastructure protection that enables
organizations to effectively transition to the public cloud by managing security and compliance risks
within their public-cloud infrastructure.
• Implement DevOps threat monitoring, which identifies risky configurations, network intrusions,
and host vulnerabilities for the management plane. This complements the capabilities of the VM-
Series firewall to secure the in-line dataplane.
• Gain forensic capabilities that permit the investigation of current threats or past incidents to
quickly determine the root cause.
By using industry best practices for proactive security assessment and configuration management, Prisma
Cloud makes cloud-computing assets harder to exploit. Prisma Cloud enables organizations to implement
continuous monitoring of the AWS infrastructure and provides an essential, automated, up-to-date
status of security posture that they can use to make cost-effective, risk-based decisions about service
configuration and vulnerabilities inherent in cloud deployments.
Organizations can also use Prisma Cloud to prevent the AWS infrastructure from falling out of compliance.
Visibility into the actual security posture of the cloud prevents failed audits and the subsequent fines
associated with data breaches and non-compliance.
Regions
Regions enable you to place services and applications in proximity to your customers, as well as to meet
government regulatory requirements for customer data residency. Regions represent AWS physical data
center locations distributed around the globe. A region consists of several physically separate and co-
located data center buildings, which provides maximum fault-tolerance and stability. The AWS backbone
that provides redundant encrypted transport provides a path for communications between regions.
Availability Zones
Availability zones, or zones, provide a logical data center within a region. They consist of one or more
physical data centers that interconnect with low-latency network links and have separate cooling and
power. No two availability zones share a common facility. Availability zones provide inherent fault
tolerance, and you distribute well-architected applications across multiple zones within a region.
VIRTUAL COMPUTE
Virtual machines and related resources like storage are resources that you can deploy or terminate on
demand. You configure a virtual machine’s location by associating it to a region and availability zone.
Most organizations deploy resources based upon an application’s access and availability requirements.
Instance
An instance, also known as Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), represents a virtual machine. Much like their
physical counterparts, instances have various performance characteristics, such as the number of CPUs,
memory, and number of interfaces. You can change the instance type for instances that are in the stopped
state. AWS bases the hourly operating costs on instance type and region.
Instance network interfaces receive IP addresses, default gateways, and DNS servers from the AWS DHCP
service. By default, when you start an instance, DHCP dynamically assigns the first available IP address in
the subnet to the instance’s interface. Stopping an instance releases any IP addresses allocated to it. The
AWS DHCP service does not retain the IP address reservation until the lease time expires. The next time
you start an instance, DHCP again assigns the first available IP address in the subnet to the instance’s
interface. In environments where instances change state often, you should not expect consistent IP
address assignment.
Static IP addressing is available when you require a consistent IP address. When there is only one IP
address on an interface, you do not need to configure static IP addresses in the operating system running
on the instance. Instead, you set up that static IP address in AWS. When you configure a static IP address,
the instance still receives the IP address through DHCP. However, unlike dynamic IP address allocation,
when started, the instance uses the configured IP address, and when stopped, the instance does not
release the IP address. The next time the instance starts, the IP address remains the same.
• A primary private IPv4 address from the address range of your VPC
• Source/destination check
Within the same availability zone, you can detach and reattach ENIs to another instance up to the
maximum number of interfaces supported by the instance type. The ENI characteristics are then
associated with its newly attached instance.
Elastic IP Address
Elastic IP addresses are public IP addresses that belong to AWS or a customer-owned IP address pool.
Public IP addresses are associated with the network interface of an instance. After they are associated,
AWS configures network address translation in the VPC’s internet gateway (IGW), which provides a
1:1 translation between the public IP address and the network interface’s private IP address. When an
instance is in the stopped state, the public IP address remains associated with the instance unless you
intentionally move or delete it.
When deploying a new VPC, you specify a classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) IPv4 address block that
you can then divide into subnets. VPC IP address blocks are reachable only within the VPC or through
services connected to the VPC, such as a VPN. Because AWS isolates VPCs from each other, you can
overlap IP address blocks across VPCs. IPv4 address blocks can be any valid IPv4 address range with a
network prefix in the range of /16 (65,535 hosts) to /28 (16 hosts). The actual number of host addresses
available to you on any subnet is less than the maximum because AWS reserves some addresses for
services. You cannot change a VPC’s original address block, but you can add secondary address blocks.
It’s recommended you choose a CIDR prefix that exceeds your anticipated address space requirements for
the lifetime of the VPC. There are no costs associated with a VPC CIDR address block, and your VPC is only
visible to you.
The primary considerations when choosing a VPC CIDR address block are the same as with any enterprise
network:
• IP address overlap in your entire organization—that is, between your AWS environment and your
organization on-premises IP addressing or other IaaS clouds that you might use
Unlike enterprise networks that are mostly static and where network addressing changes can be difficult,
cloud infrastructure tends to be highly dynamic, which minimizes the need to anticipate growth
requirements far into the future. Instead of upgrading the resources in a VPC, many cloud deployments
build new resources for an upgrade and then delete the old ones. Regardless of network address size, the
general requirement for communications across the enterprise network is for all network addresses to
be unique. The same requirement applies across your VPCs. When you deploy new VPCs, consider using a
unique network address space for each to ensure maximum communications compatibility between VPCs
and back to your organization.
Most VPC IP address ranges fall within the private IP address ranges specified in RFC 1918. However, you
can use publicly routable CIDR address blocks for your VPC. Regardless of the IP address range of your
VPC, AWS does not support direct access to the internet from your VPC’s CIDR address block, including a
publicly routable CIDR address block. You must set up internet access through a gateway service from AWS
or a VPN connection to your organization’s network.
Subnets
A subnet identifies a portion of its parent VPC CIDR address block as belonging to an availability zone. A
subnet is unique to an availability zone and cannot span multiple zones. However, an availability zone can
have many subnets. To associate resources to an availability zone, the zone must have a subnet. At the
time of creating a resource, you assign it to an availability zone by associating it to a subnet within that
zone. A subnet prefix length can be as large as the VPC CIDR address block (VPC with one subnet and one
availability zone) or as small as a /28 prefix length. Subnets within a single VPC cannot overlap.
Subnets are either public subnets, which means they are associated with a route table that has internet
connectivity via an IGW, or they are private subnets that have no route to the internet. Newly deployed
subnets are associated with the main route table of your VPC. In Figure 3, subnets 1 and 2 are public
subnets, and subnets 3 and 4 are private subnets.
Route Tables
Route tables provide source-based control of Layer 3 forwarding within a VPC, which is different than
traditional networking where routing information is bidirectional and might lead to asymmetric routing
paths. Subnets are associated with route tables, and subnets receive their Layer 3 forwarding policy from
their associated route table. A route table can have many subnets attached, but AWS only allows one
route table to attach to a subnet. All route tables contain an entry for the entire VPC CIDR address block
in which they reside. Any instance within the VPC has direct Layer 3 reachability to any other instance
within the same VPC. This behavior has implications for network segmentation because route tables
cannot contain more specific routes than the VPC CIDR address block. Any instance within a VPC can
communicate directly with any other instance, and traditional network segmentation by subnets is not an
option. An instance references the route table associated with its subnet for the default gateway but only
for destinations outside the VPC. Host routing changes on instances are not necessary to direct traffic to a
default gateway, because this is part of route table configuration. Routes external to your VPC can have a
destination that directs traffic to a gateway or another instance.
Route tables can contain dynamic routing information learned from Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
Routes learned dynamically show in a route table as Propagated=YES.
A cursory review of route tables might give the impression of functionality similar to virtual routing and
forwarding, but this is not the case. All route tables contain a route to the entire VPC address space and do
not permit the segmentation of routing information less than the entire VPC CIDR address space within a
VPC. Traditionally, you must configure a device on a network with a default gateway in order to provide a
path outside the local network. In AWS, route tables provide a similar function without the need to change
instance configuration to redirect traffic.
You also use route tables to direct traffic to VM-Series firewalls. Note in Figure 3 that both route tables
1 and 2 contain the entire VPC CIDR address block entry. Route table 1 has a default route pointing to
an IGW, and route table 2 has no default route. A route to 172.16.0.0/16 was learned via BGP, which is
reachable via its virtual private gateway (VGW). Subnets 1 and 2 are assigned to availability zone 2a,
subnet 3 is assigned to availability zone 2b, and subnet 4 is assigned to availability zone 2c.
There are limits to how many routes can be in a route table. The default limit of non-propagated routes in
the table is 50, and you can increase to a limit of 1000. However, this might impact network performance.
The limit to routes advertised by BGP into the VPC is 100, and you cannot increase this limit. Use IP
address summarization upstream or a default route to address scenarios where more than 100 propagated
routes might occur.
Network ACLs:
Security Groups
Security groups (SGs) provide a Layer 4 stateful firewall for control of the source/destination IP addresses
and ports that are permitted. You apply SGs to an instance’s network interface, up to five SGs per
interface. Amazon Machine Images, which are available in the AWS Marketplace, have a default SG
associated with them.
SGs define the network traffic that should be explicitly permitted and deny any traffic not explicitly
permitted. They have separate rules for inbound and outbound traffic from an instance network interface.
SGs are stateful, meaning that they also permit return traffic associated with permitted rules. SGs can
control traffic on any protocol that has a standard protocol number. A VM-Series firewall in the traffic
path is required to enforce traffic at the application layer. When you deploy a new SG, the default setting
contains no inbound rule, and the outbound rule permits all traffic. The effect of this default is to permit
all outbound network traffic originating from your instance and its associated return traffic and to deny
external traffic that is inbound to an instance.
Figure 4 illustrates how you can apply network ACLs to traffic between subnets and SGs to network
interfaces.
Internet Gateway
An internet gateway IGW provides a mapping of an internal VPC IP address to a public IP address owned by
AWS. The IGW maps an IP address to an instance for inbound and outbound network access. The public IP
address can be:
• Random and dynamic, which means that AWS assigns the IP address to an instance at startup and
returned to the pool when you stop the instance. Every time you start the instance, AWS assigns a
new address from its pool.
• Random and assigned to an instance as part of a process, which means that the IP address stays
with the instance unless you intentionally assign it to another instance or delete it and return it to
the pool. This type of public IP address is known as an Elastic IP address.
This 1:1 private-to-public IP address mapping is part of a network interface configuration of each
instance. After deploying a network interface, you can then associate a dynamic or an Elastic IP address to
create the 1:1 IP address translation between public and VPC private IP addresses.
For internet connectivity to your VPC, the VPC must have an associated IGW. The IGW is a horizontally
scaled, redundant, and highly available service. After it is associated, the IGW resides in all availability
zones of your VPC, available to map to any route table or subnet where direct internet access is required.
A customer gateway (CGW) identifies the target IP address of a peer device that terminates IPSec tunnels
from the VGW. The customer gateway is typically a firewall or a router and must be capable of supporting
an IPSec tunnel with required cryptographic algorithms.
VPN connections are the IPSec tunnels between your VGW and CGW. VPN connections represent two
redundant IPSec tunnels from a single CGW to two public IP addresses of the VGW in your subscriber VPC.
• Lower-bandwidth costs
AWS Direct Connect terminates the network connection from the AWS backbone network on a network
device. This same device also terminates your carrier connection, completing the path between your
private network and your AWS infrastructure. Your firewalls exchange BGP routing information with the
AWS network infrastructure. Static routing is not available.
The Direct Connect gateway connects on-premises networks to the VPCs. VPCs connected to the gateway
cannot communicate directly with each other. You configure the on-premise gateway to create a BGP peer
connection to the Direct Connect gateway and not to every VPC. This connection at the gateway eliminates
the configuration and monitoring tasks that would otherwise be required to support BGP peering for each
VPC.
As demand for bandwidth to your on-premises network grows, AWS Direct Connect provides the ability to
extend your private VPC and publicly available AWS services directly to your data center infrastructure by
using dedicated network bandwidth. You can place your network equipment directly in an AWS regional
location, with a direct cross-connect to their backbone network, or you can use a network provider
service, such as LAN extension or MPLS, to extend your AWS infrastructure to your network.
AWS extends the private virtual interfaces configured on the Direct Connect port over 802.1Q trunk links
to your on-premises firewall, one VLAN for each VPC to which you are mapping, as shown in Figure 7.
Direct Connect provides many options for device and location redundancy. Figure 8 illustrates two of
these options. The first option provides redundant connections from a single firewall to your VPC. When
you require multiple instances of Direct Connect, AWS distributes them across redundant AWS backbone
infrastructure. The BGP peering IP addresses must be unique across all virtual interfaces connected to a
VGW. The VLAN is unique to each AWS Direct Connect port because it is only locally significant, so virtual
interfaces can share a common VLAN.
The second option illustrates redundant firewalls distributed across two separate AWS locations servicing
the same region. This option provides redundancy for devices, geographic location, and service providers.
CONNECTING VPCS
The use of multiple VPCs allows you to separate workloads across functional environments or
administrative domains. You can connect VPCs through the use of VPC peering or an AWS transit gateway.
VPC Peering
VPC peering allows you to connect VPCs logically and is a native capability of AWS for creating direct
two-way peer relationships between two VPCs within the same region. The peer relationship permits
traffic only directly between the two peers and does not provide for any transit capabilities from one peer
VPC through another to an external destination. VPC peering is a two-way agreement between member
VPCs. It’s initiated by one VPC to another target VPC, and the target VPC must accept the VPC peering
relationship. The VPCs in a peering relationship can be in the same AWS account or different accounts,
and a VPC can be in multiple VPC peering relationships. After you establish the VPC peering relationship,
there is two-way network connectivity between the entire IP address block of both VPCs.
VPC peering ensures that traffic traversing the peering connection has source and destination IP
addresses of the directly peered VPCs. AWS drops any packets that have a source or destination IP address
outside of the two peered VPCs.
VPC peering architecture uses network policy to permit traffic only between two directly adjacent VPCs.
The following are two example scenarios:
• Multi-tiered application model—For multi-tiered applications, you can use VPC peering to restrict
communication to only directly adjacent application tiers. A typical three-tier application might
use VPC peering to connect frontend web servers in a public-facing VPC to a VPC containing the
application tier. The application-tier VPC would have another VPC peering relationship with a
third VPC containing the database tier. VPC peering provides no external connectivity directly
to the application or database tiers. Figure 10 illustrates how a central VPC with multi-tier VPC
connections could operate.
Transit Gateway
The AWS transit gateway (TGW) service enables you to scale connectivity across thousands of VPCs, AWS
accounts, and on-premises networks. The TGW enables you to control communications between your
VPCs and to connect to your on-premises networks via a single gateway. In contrast to VPC peering, which
interconnects two VPCs only, TGWs can act as a hub in a hub-and-spoke model for interconnecting VPCs.
The spokes peer only to the gateway, which simplifies design and management overhead. You can add new
spokes to the gateway incrementally as your deployment grows.
TGWs provide the ability to centrally manage the connectivity and routing between VPCs and from the
VPCs to any on-premises connections via VPN or Direct Connect. TGWs allow central control of spoke-to-
spoke communication and routing. TGWs support dynamic and static Layer 3 routing between VPCs and
VPNs. Routes determine the next hop depending on the destination IP address of the packet, and they can
point to a VPC or a VPN connection.
TGWs support the attachment of thousands of VPCs. There are two types of attachments: VPC attachments
and VPN attachments.
VPC attachments are attachments from a VPC to the TGW. As part of the VPC attachment, the TGW deploys
an ENI interface in each of the VPCs in-use availability zones. The TGW deploys the ENIs to subnets that
you create in the attached VPCs, one subnet per availability zone. VPC attachments support only static
routing and do not support Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP).
VPN attachments are either VPCs attached via VPN or VPN-attached remote sites. A VPN attachment
consists of two IPSec VPN tunnels per attachment to a CGW. VPN attachments have the advantage of
supporting dynamic routing and ECMP.
You can configure connections between a TGW and on-premises gateways by using a VPN or Direct
Connect. Because a TGW supports ECMP, you can increase bandwidth to on-premises networks by:
• Deploying multiple VPN connections between the TGW and the on-premises firewall.
• Enabling ECMP on both ends of the connections to load-balance traffic over the multiple paths.
You can use TGWs to direct inbound, outbound, and east-west flows through centralized firewalls.
RESILIENCY CONSTRUCTS
Traditional data centers provide network resilience through alternate transport paths and high-
availability platforms like switches, routers, and firewalls. The high-availability platforms had
redundancy mechanisms either within the chassis or between chassis, which often introduced cost
and complexity in the design. As networks scaled to meet higher throughput demands of modern data
centers, more chassis had to be included in the high-availability group to provide more throughput,
further complicating designs and increasing costs. The move to web-based, multi-tier applications allows
network designs to scale more gracefully and provide resiliency to the overall application through a
stateless scale out of resources.
Availability Zones
As discussed earlier in this guide, AWS provides resilience within regions by grouping data center facilities
into availability zones. For resilience, applications and services you deploy in AWS should reside in at least
two availability zones. AWS services like IGW and VGW are resilient in multiple zones.
Load Balancers
Load balancers distribute traffic across a set of resources based on IP traffic criteria such as the DNS,
Layer 4, or Layer 7 information. Load balancers check the traffic targets for health and remove unhealthy
resources, thereby enhancing the application’s resiliency. Targets can be instances, containers, and VPC IP
addresses.
AWS offers several types of load balancers. Gateway load balancers provide resiliency to network
appliances, such as a firewall. The Application Load Balancer and Network Load Balancer are used for
Layer 7 and Layer 4 traffic load balancing.
The GWLB distributes traffic across a set of network appliances, such as firewalls. The GWLB allows for
the scaling of network security without terminating traffic or translating the traffic source or destination
IP address.
To get traffic to a GWLB, you direct the traffic, via a route table, to a Gateway Load Balancer endpoint. A
GWLB endpoint is a VPC endpoint, or network interface, with a private IP address and is associated with a
subnet and zone. A GWLB endpoint can be in a different VPC or even a different account than the GWLB.
The GWLB endpoint sends all traffic it receives to the GWLB through an AWS PrivateLink connection. An
advantage of the separation of the GWLB endpoint and GWLB is that you can place the GWLB endpoint in
a VPC separate from the VPC that contains the GWLB. Because PrivateLink is used to connect the endpoint
to the GWLB, traffic is sent directly to the GWLB and does not follow the routing rules of your VPC
infrastructure, nor do the two VPCs even need to be connected.
The Gateway Load Balancer is associated with one or more Gateway Load Balancer endpoints. Each
association is provided through a VPC endpoint service.
GWLB selects a healthy appliance for each traffic flow from its target group based on the 5-tuple of the
traffic flow. Using the 5-tuple ensures a traffic flow always ends up on the same target appliance.
The GWLB transparently forwards traffic without translating the source or destination IP addressing. To
do forwarding without address translation, GWLB encapsulates the traffic in the Geneve protocol before
sending it to the appliance. Encapsulation allows the GWLB to keep the traffic’s original IP addressing,
while not using it during traffic forwarding decisions between the GWLB and the target appliance. GWLB
adds metadata about the flow to the encapsulation, which allows the GWLB to keep state of the traffic
when it returns from the appliance.
Health checks occur separately from the Geneve encapsulation. Health checks are destined to the
appliance itself, not through the appliance, and can be TCP, HTTP, or HTTPS.
Return traffic from the appliance is forwarded back out the GWLB endpoint that received the incoming
traffic. The route table associated with the GWLB endpoint directs the traffic to its final destination.
The Application Load Balancer (ALB) uses HTTP and HTTPS information to distribute traffic to targets.
Traffic destined for the ALB uses DNS names and not a discrete IP address. AWS assigns a fully qualified
domain name (FQDN) when it deploys the load balancer. The FQDN maps to IP addresses in each
availability zone. If the ALB in one zone fails or has no healthy targets and if it is tied to an external DNS
like the Amazon Route 53 cloud-based DNS, then traffic is directed to an alternate ALB in the other zone.
You can configure an ALB with its listener facing the internet and load balance by using public IP
addressing, or you can configure it to be internal only and load balance by using IP addresses from the
VPC. The ALB targets can be any HTTP or HTTPS applications that are reachable from within the VPC.
The ALB offers content-based routing of connection requests based on either the host field or the URL of
the HTTP header of the client request. ALB uses a round-robin algorithm to distribute traffic and supports
a slow start when adding targets to the group in order to avoid overwhelming the application target. The
ALB determines which targets are healthy based on health checks and HTTP error codes.
The ALB supports terminating HTTPS between the client and the load balancer, and it can manage SSL
certificates.
The Network Load Balancer (NLB) uses TCP/UDP information to distribute traffic to targets.
On a single, static IP address per availability zone, the NLB accepts incoming traffic from clients and
distributes the traffic to targets within the same availability zone. Monitoring the health of the targets,
NLB ensures that only healthy targets get traffic. If all targets in an availability zone are unhealthy and if
you have set up targets in another zone, then the NLB automatically fails-over to the healthy targets in
the other availability zones.
The NLB supports a static IP address assignment, including an Elastic IP address, for the listener of
the load balancer, making it ideal for services that do not use DNS and rely on the IP address to route
connections. If the NLB has no healthy targets and if it is tied to Amazon Route 53 cloud-based DNS, then
traffic is directed to an alternate NLB in another region. You can load balance to any IP address target that
is reachable from within the VPC. This allows the NLB to load balance to any IP address and any interface
on an instance.
Capacities
Firewall throughput (App-ID™ enabled) 2.1 Gbps 4.3 Gbps 9.0 Gbps 10.2 Gbps
Threat Prevention throughput 1.0 Gbps 1.9 Gbps 4.1 Gbps 7.8 Gbps
IPSec VPN throughput 0.9 Gbps 1.6 Gbps 3.0 Gbps 3.3 Gbps
System resources
vCPUs 2 4 8 16
Although the capacity license sets the VM-Series firewalls limits, the size of the instance on which you
deploy the firewall determines the firewall’s performance and functional capacity. In Table 1, the mapping
of the VM-Series firewall to AWS instance size is based on VM-Series model requirements for CPU,
memory, disk capacity, and network interfaces. When deployed on an instance that provides more CPU
than the model or deployment profile supports, VM-Series firewalls using BYOL, do not use the additional
CPU cores.
In smaller VM-Series firewall models, it might seem that an instance size smaller than those listed in
Table 1 would be appropriate; however, smaller instance sizes might not have enough network interfaces.
AWS provides instances with two, three, four, eight, or fifteen network interfaces. Because VM-Series
firewalls reserve an interface for management functionality, two-interface instances are not a viable
option. Four-interface instances meet the requirement of a management, public, and private interface.
For the latest detailed information, see VM-Series on AWS Performance and Capacity. Many factors affect
performance, and Palo Alto Networks recommends you do additional testing in your environment to
ensure the deployment meets your performance and capacity requirements. In general, public-cloud
environments are more efficient when scaling out the number of resources versus scaling up to a larger
instance size.
License Options
You purchase licenses for VM-Series firewalls on AWS through the AWS Marketplace or through
traditional Palo Alto Networks channels.
Note
PAYG
A pay-as-you-go license model is also called a usage-based or pay-per-use license. You can purchase this
type of license from the AWS Marketplace, and you are billed hourly.
With the PAYG license, a VM-Series firewall is licensed and ready for use as soon as you deploy it. You do
not receive a license authorization code. When the firewall is stopped or terminated in AWS, the usage-
based licenses are suspended or terminated.
PAYG licenses support the VM-100, VM-300, VM-500, VM-700 capacity licenses. A PAYG license applies
a VM-Series capacity license based on the hardware allocated to the instance. The PAYG instance checks
the number of hardware resources available to the instance and applies the largest VM-Series firewall
capacity license allowed for the resources available. For example, if the instance has 2 vCPUs and 16 GB of
memory, a VM-100 capacity license is applied based on the number of vCPUs. However, if the instance has
16 vCPUs and 16 GB of memory, a VM-500 license is applied based on the amount of memory.
• Bundle 1—Includes the VM-Series capacity license, Threat Prevention license (IPS, AV, malware
prevention), and a premium support entitlement
• Bundle 2—Includes the VM-Series capacity license, Threat Prevention license (IPS, AV, malware
prevention), DNS Security license, GlobalProtect™ license, WildFire license, PAN-DB URL Filtering
license, and a premium support entitlement
BYOL
A bring-your-own license (BYOL) model allows you to purchase a license from a partner, reseller, or
directly from Palo Alto Networks. In a BYOL model, VM-Series firewalls support all capacities, support
entitlements, and subscription licenses. The BYOL model uses Software NGFW Credits for licensing.
Software NGFW Credits are term-based credits. The term is between 1 and 5 years, which you can use
to fund Software NGFWs (VM-Series and CN-Series, Cloud-Delivered Security Services, and virtual
Panorama appliances.
You allocate credits by creating a deployment profile in the support portal. The profile’s capabilities are
dependent on the PAN-OS version you deploy:
• VM-Series firewalls on PAN-OS version 10.0.3 and earlier—Compatible with legacy licenses based
on VM-Series Models and security service bundles.
• VM-Series firewalls on PAN-OS version 10.0.4 and later—Flexible number of vCPUs (from 1-16)
and flexible selection of security services. You modify the deployment profile to add or decrease the
number of vCPUs or add new services as they become available.
If you stop using a firewall, a security service, or Panorama deployment, the credits that were allocated to
that resource are refunded to the credit pool and you can reallocate them to a new resource.
You license VM-Series firewalls like a traditionally deployed appliance and apply a license authorization
code. The license authorization code maps the firewall to the deployment profile you created. After you
apply the code to the device, the device registers with the Palo Alto Networks support portal and obtains
information about its capacity and subscriptions. Subscription licenses include Threat Prevention, URL
Filtering, GlobalProtect, WildFire, Enterprise Data Loss Prevention, DNS Security, IoT Security and
SD-WAN.
Bootstrapping
At deployment, VM-Series firewalls have the factory default configuration and a base software image that
varies based on which deployment method you have chosen. You can manually upgrade the software and
update the configuration after deploying the instance, or if you are using a BYOL licensing model, you
can use bootstrapping to license, configure, and update the firewall software at boot time. Bootstrapping
allows you to create a repeatable process of deploying VM-Series firewalls.
You can bootstrap the VM-Series firewall with a basic configuration or a complete configuration.
A basic configuration includes just enough information to get the firewall operational and connected
to Panorama, allowing Panorama to push the additional configuration required to make the firewall
operational. You bootstrap a basic configuration by configuring AWS user data on the VM-Series firewall
instances.
You bootstrap a complete configuration through a bootstrap package. The package can contain everything
required to make the firewall ready for production. In AWS, you implement the bootstrap package
through an AWS S3 file share that contains directories for configuration, content, license, and software.
On the first boot, VM-Series firewalls mount the file share and use the information in the directories to
configure and upgrade the firewall. After the firewall is out of the factory default state, it stops looking for
a bootstrap package.
One of the fundamental design differences between traditional and public-cloud deployments is the
lifetime of resources. One method of achieving resiliency in public-cloud deployments is through the
quick deployment of new resources and the quick destruction of failed resources. One of the requirements
for achieving quick resource build-out and tear-down is current and readily available configuration
information for the resource to use during initial deployment. When the configuration is static, the
simplest method of achieving this for VM-Series firewalls is to use bootstrapping to configure the firewall
policies during firewall deployment.
Management
The first interface attached to the instance (eth0) is the firewall’s management interface. In most
templates, this interface has an Elastic IP address and DNS hostname associated with it in addition to
the internal IP address in the VPC. The firewall’s management interface obtains its internal IP address
through DHCP. The IGW translates the internal IP address to the public IP address when the traffic leaves
the VPC. Because IP addresses might change, use an FQDN to manage the firewall.
Note
If you assign a dynamic public IP address on the instance eth0 interface and
later assign an Elastic IP address to any interface on the same instance, upon
reboot, AWS also replaces the dynamic IP address on eth0 with an Elastic
IP address. The best way to predictably assign a public IP address to your
eth0 management interface is to associate an Elastic IP address to the eth0
interface.
If you are managing the firewalls with Panorama, you might not need an Elastic IP address on the
firewall’s management interface. If Panorama is in the AWS environment or deployed on-premises with
VPN connectivity to the VPC, Panorama can use internal IP addresses to manage the VM-Series firewalls.
As bootstrapped firewalls deploy, they can also automatically pull configuration information from
Panorama. VM-Series firewalls use a VM authorization key and Panorama IP address in the bootstrap
package to authenticate and register to Panorama on its initial boot. You must generate the VM
authorization key in Panorama before creating the bootstrap package. If you provide a device group
and template in the bootstrap package’s basic configuration file, Panorama assigns the firewall to the
appropriate device group and template so that the relevant rulesets are applied, and you can manage the
device in Panorama going forward.
You can deploy Panorama in your on-premises data center or in a public-cloud environment such as AWS.
When deployed in your on-premises data center, Panorama can manage all the PA-Series and VM-Series
firewalls in your organization. If you want a dedicated instance of Panorama for the VM-Series firewalls
deployed on AWS, deploy Panorama on AWS.
When you have an existing Panorama deployment on-premises for firewalls in your data center and
internet edge, you can use it to manage the VM-Series firewalls in AWS. Beyond management, you need to
consider your firewall log collection and retention. Log collection, storage, and analysis is an important
cybersecurity best practice that organizations perform to correlate potential threats and prevent
successful cyber breaches.
The following three deployment mode options are available for Panorama, which, if necessary, allows for
the separation of management and log collection:
• Log Collector mode—One or more log collectors collect and manage logs from the managed devices.
This assumes that another deployment of Panorama is operating in Management-Only mode.
• Management-Only mode—Panorama manages configurations for the managed devices but does
not collect or manage logs.
• Panorama mode—Panorama controls both policy and log management functions for all the
managed devices.
Sending logging data back to the on-premises Panorama can be inefficient, costly, and pose data
privacy and residency issues in some regions. An alternative to sending the logging data black to your
on-premises Panorama is to deploy Panorama dedicated log collectors on AWS and use the on-premises
Panorama for management. Deploying a dedicated log collector on AWS reduces the amount of logging
data that leaves the cloud but still allows your on-premises Panorama to manage the VM-Series firewalls
in AWS and have full visibility to the logs as needed.
There are two design options when deploying Panorama management on AWS. First, you can use
Panorama for management only and use Palo Alto Networks Cortex Data Lake to store the logs generated
by the VM-Series firewalls. Cortex Data Lake is a cloud-based log-collector service that provides resilient
storage and fast search capabilities for large amounts of logging data. Cortex Data Lake emulates a
traditional log collector. The VM-Series firewalls encrypt the logs and then send them to the Cortex Data
Lake over TLS/SSL connections.
Cortex Data Lake allows you to scale your logging storage as your AWS deployment scales because Cortex
bases licensing on storage capacity and not the number of devices sending log data.
The benefit of using Cortex Data Lake goes well beyond scale and convenience when tied into the Palo
Alto Networks Cortex AI-based continuous security platform. Cortex is a scalable ecosystem of security
applications that can apply advanced analytics in concert with Palo Alto Networks enforcement points
to prevent the most advanced attacks. Palo Alto Networks analytics applications such as Cortex XDR and
AutoFocus™, as well as third-party analytics applications that you choose, use Cortex Data Lake as the
primary data repository for all of Palo Alto Networks offerings.
Second, you can use Panorama for both management and log collection. You can deploy the management
and log collection functionality as a shared virtual appliance or on dedicated virtual appliances. For
smaller deployments, you can deploy Panorama and the log collector as a single virtual appliance. For
larger deployments, a dedicated log collector per region allows traffic to stay within the region and reduce
outbound data transfers.
Panorama is available as a virtual appliance for deployment on AWS and supports Management-Only
mode, Panorama mode, and Log Collector mode with the system requirements defined in Table 2.
Panorama on AWS is only available with a BYOL licensing model.
Management-Only
mode Panorama Log Collector
Palo Alto Networks firewalls, including the VM-Series, support dynamic address groups. Dynamic address
groups allow you to create policy that automatically adapts to instance additions, moves, or deletions.
They also enable the flexibility to apply a security policy to the device based on its role.
A dynamic address group uses tags as a filtering criterion in order to determine its members. You can
define tags statically or register them dynamically. You can dynamically register the IP address and
associated tags for AWS instances by using the AWS plugin on Panorama
AWS Instances
Dynamic Address
Group Definition
Sharepoint Servers
10.1.1.2 10.1.6.4 10.3.7.6
VM-Monitoring DB Servers
XML API
Admin Servers
10.1.1.2
Admin Servers Sharepoint Servers
10.8.7.3 Learned Group
Membership
Sharepoint Servers DB Servers
The Panorama plugin for AWS allows you to monitor up to 1000 VPCs on AWS. Panorama relays the
dynamic address group mapping to the VM-Series firewalls, providing scale and flexibility. With the
plugin, Panorama can retrieve a total of 32 tags for each virtual machine: 11 predefined tags and up to 21
user-defined tags.
Note
You can change the SGs and source/dest check feature at the instance level;
however, these changes apply only to the first interface of the instance. For a
VM-Series firewall, the first interface represents the management interface.
To avoid ambiguity, you should apply SGs and disable the source/dest check
feature on the individual network interfaces (management, public, and
private).
Unlike traditional implementations, you can achieve VM-Series firewall resiliency in AWS through
the use of native cloud services. The benefits of configuring resiliency through native public-cloud
services instead of firewall high availability are faster failover and the ability to scale out the firewalls as
needed. However, in a public-cloud resiliency model, the firewalls do not share configuration and state
information. Applications typically deployed in a public-cloud infrastructure, such as web- and service-
oriented architectures, do not rely on the network infrastructure to track session state. Instead, they
track session data within the application infrastructure, which allows the application to scale out and be
resilient independent of the network infrastructure.
The AWS resources and services used to achieve resiliency for the application and firewall include:
• Availability zones—Ensure that a failure or maintenance event in an AWS VPC does not affect all
VM-Series firewalls at the same time.
• Load balancers—Distribute traffic across two or more independent firewalls that are members of
a common target group. Every firewall in the load balancer’s target group actively passes traffic,
allowing firewall capacity to scale out as required. The load balancer monitors the availability of the
firewalls through TCP or HTTPS health checks and updates the availability of targets, as necessary.
You can use a GWLB to distribute traffic across VM-Series firewalls to resiliently and transparently secure
inbound, outbound, and east-west traffic flows. The VM-Series firewalls can transparently secure traffic
flows with GWLB because the GWLB does not require the firewall to translate the IP address of traffic to
ensure traffic symmetry.
The GWLB is deployed in the same VPC as the VM-Series firewalls. Because you cannot modify the GWLB
after deployment, you should deploy the GWLB in all of the region’s availability zones. You should also
configure GWLB to support cross-zone load balancing. Cross-zone load balancing ensures that the GWLB
distributes traffic across the VM-Series firewalls regardless of the availability zone on which the traffic
was received. Without cross-zone load balancing enabled, the GWLB selects only VM-Series firewalls in
the zone form which the traffic is received.
To get traffic to the GWLB and ultimately to the VM-Series firewalls, a route table entry forwards traffic to
a GWLB endpoint that is associated with the GWLB.
GWLB endpoints can live in the same VPC as the GWLB, or they can be in a separate VPC. In a Distributed
design, you deploy the security instances, GWLB, and GWLB endpoints, in the same VPC as the application
instances. When the GWLB endpoint is in a separate VPC, you do not need to have routing connectivity
between VPCs to get the traffic to the GWLB. Instead, the communication between the GWLB endpoint and
the GWLB uses AWS PrivateLink.
GWLB supports multiple GWLB endpoints. GWLB endpoints are zone-specific, and you can deploy them
only into a zone in which the GWLB is deployed. No matter the number of GWLB endpoints, all GWLB
endpoints are associated with a single endpoint service attached to the GWLB. The endpoint service
terminates the PrivateLink session from the GWLB endpoints and hands the traffic off to the GWLB. The
endpoint service automatically deploys in the same zones as the GWLB.
When the GWLB receives traffic from the endpoint, the GWLB picks a healthy firewall instance from its
target group, encapsulates the traffic by using the Geneve protocol, adds type-length-values (TLVs) to the
encapsulation that identifies the source GWLB endpoint and session information, and sends the traffic to
the target firewall.
All traffic traversing the GWLB uses a single listener and target group. You can specify the GWLB target
as an instance or an IP address. If you define the target as an instance, the GWLB sends the traffic to the
instance’s first interface. By default, this interface is the firewall’s management interface, so you must
enable the swap-interface option on the firewall to make the first interface a dataplane interface. If you
define the target as an IP address, you do not have to swap interfaces.
When the firewall receives the encapsulated traffic from the GWLB and Geneve parsing is enabled on
the firewall, the firewall associates the encapsulated traffic to the zone of the interface that received the
traffic.
You can use endpoints to separate applications and traffic flows. However, if all the endpoints map to the
same zone on the firewall, the security policy would be challenging to implement. The solution to this
challenge is to map the endpoints to zones.
To separate the traffic flows based on which GWLB endpoint sent the traffic, you associate the GWLB
endpoints to firewall subinterfaces on the firewall. When deployed on AWS, VM-Series firewall
subinterfaces are logical interfaces associated with a dataplane interface, used only to map an endpoint
to a zone. The subinterfaces are not used for traffic forwarding and do not have an IP address. Because
the GWLB endpoint ID is part of the Geneve header, the firewall can use the association to apply a zone to
incoming traffic. If you have GWLB endpoints in multiple availability zones for resiliency, all servicing the
same traffic flows, then you must map all the GWLB endpoints for that traffic profile to the same VM-
Series firewall zone.
Caution
After the firewall receives traffic from the GWLB and maps it to a zone, the firewall can process the traffic
with or without overlay routing enabled. With overlay routing enabled, the firewall uses its routing table
to determine the egress interface. If the egress interface is the same dataplane interface on which it was
received, the firewall behaves the same way as if overlay routing isn’t enabled.
If the egress interface is a different interface, for example a separate interface used for outbound traffic,
the firewall sends the traffic out of the firewall, unencapsulated, and any return traffic is associated with
the Geneve session and re-encapsulated before being returned to the GWLB. This traffic flow, because it
transitions two interfaces, each with a unique zone, is inter-zone traffic.
We recommend enabling overlay routing. It allows the firewalls to support outbound traffic flows where
the firewall is doing the egress address translation, enabling an easier security policy, better logging, and
enabling design models where the VM-Series firewalls support outbound traffic flows without using an
AWS NAT gateway.
When overlay routing is disabled, the firewall does not use its routing table to determine the egress
interface for the traffic. Instead, traffic always egresses the same dataplane interface on which it was
received and is sent back to the GWLB. When overlay routing is disabled, all traffic received from the
GWLB is intra-zone.
Whether or not overlay routing is enabled when the firewall returns traffic to the GWLB, the GWLB uses
the session information in the Geneve header to return the traffic to the originating GWLB endpoint.
The traffic then egresses the endpoint and uses the endpoint’s routing table to be forwarded to the
destination.
Return traffic from the destination must be symmetrically forwarded back to the same GWLB endpoint.
Because address translation is not being used, the symmetrical traffic forwarding is determined by the
destination’s routing table.
Health checks from the GWLB determine the health of the target firewalls. The GWLB sends health checks
to the firewall’s dataplane interface IP address. You cannot configure the health checks to monitor the full
path to the private resources.
To configure the firewall to respond to the health checks, enable an interface management profile on
the firewall’s dataplane interface that permits access to either the SSH or HTTPS service. You should not
configure the management profile on the subinterfaces, because health checks are destined only for the
dataplane interface.
Because health checks come from the GWLB IP addresses, the firewall must also have a route to every
subnet into which the GWLB is deployed.
Additionally, you need to allow the SSH or HTTPS traffic that is sourced from the GWLB subnets in the
firewall’s security policy. Because the dataplane interface is also used for unmapped GWLB endpoints, do
not configure an overly permissive security policy for health checks.
Design Models
There are many ways to use the previous sections’ concepts in order to secure application environments
in AWS. The design models in this section offer example architectures that secure inbound and outbound
traffic flows, traffic between VPCs, and the connection to your on-premises networks.
All of the design models use a separate management VPC to centralize management so that a single
Panorama deployment can manage VM-Series firewalls deployed across all of your organization’s VPCs.
Panorama streamlines and consolidates core tasks and capabilities, enabling you to view all your firewall
traffic, manage all aspects of device configuration, push global policies, and generate reports on traffic
patterns or security incidents. You deploy Panorama in Management-Only mode and securely access it
over the public internet. The VM-Series firewalls encrypt and send all firewall logs to Cortex Data Lake
over TLS/SSL connections.
The design models presented here differ in how they provide resiliency, scale, and services for the design.
The design models in this reference design are:
• Isolated—Supports outbound and inbound traffic flows. This design model does not support
east-west traffic flows between VPCs. This design is useful for regional security where one or more
isolated VPCs need protection.
• Scale—Is this deployment an initial move into the cloud and a proof of concept? Will the application
load need to scale quickly and modularly? Are there requirements for outbound, inbound, and east-
west flows? The Isolated design model provides outbound and inbound security to one or more VPCs
but does not provide VPC-to-VPC connectivity or security. The Centralized design model offers
the benefits of a highly scalable design for multiple VPCs connecting to a central hub for inbound,
outbound, and VPC-to-VPC traffic control and visibility.
In the Centralized design model, you segment application resources across multiple VPCs that connect in a
hub-and-spoke topology. The hub of the topology, or transit gateway, is the central point of connectivity
between VPCs and on-premises resources attached through a VPN or AWS Direct Connect.
This model has a dedicated VPC for security services where VM-Series firewalls are deployed for traffic
inspection and control. The security VPC does not contain any application resources. The security VPC
centralizes resources that multiple workloads can share.
The TGW ensures that all spoke-to-spoke and spoke-to-on-premises traffic transits the VM-series
firewalls.
Because this design uses Panorama to manage the VM-Series firewalls, and because you might have
multiple sets of firewalls to manage, deploy Panorama in a VPC dedicated to management. Use another
VPC to deploy the VM-Series firewalls. Like with the spoke VPCs, deploy Panorama and the VM-Series
firewalls across availability zones for resiliency.
The TGW has VPC attachments in the availability zones of each spoke VPC, the management VPC, and the
security VPC.
TGW route tables behave like route domains. You can create isolated networks, allowing you to steer and
control traffic flow between VPCs and on-premises connections by deploying multiple route tables on
the TGW and associating the attachments to them. This design uses two TGW route tables: security and
spokes.
You set which TGW route table an attachment uses by associating the attachment to a route table. An
attachment can only be associated with one TGW route table. Each TGW route table can associate with
multiple attachments. Associate the VPN attachment for the on-premises networks, as well as the
VPC attachments for the spokes and management VPCs, to the spokes route table. Associate the VPC
attachment for the security VPC to the security route table.
The spokes route table on the TGW has the security VPC routes propagated to it and a static default route
pointing to the security VPC. The spokes route table does not have more specific routes to other VPCs or
on-premises networks to ensure that spoke-to-spoke communication can occur only through the VM-
Series firewalls in the security VPC.
The security route table on the TGW allows the VM-Series firewalls to reach all VPCs and on-premises
networks. Propagate routes from every attachment to the security route table. You can use static routes
in the TGW route table for on-premises connections, or you can propagate routes over BGP from a VPN
attachment into a TGW route table. Routes propagated with BGP support ECMP.
Security VPC
This design deploys a VPC dedicated to security. In the security VPC, you deploy the VM-Series firewalls in
separate availability zones and deploy a GWLB to distribute traffic to the firewalls.
When deploying the security VPC, configure it with a non-overlapping IP address block that is
appropriately sized for your organization’s needs. For resiliency, use multiple availability zones and
consider breaking your subnet ranges into availability zone-based blocks that you can summarize in
security groups and routing tables.
To supply inbound and outbound internet access, you must deploy an IGW into the VPC. The IGW performs
network address translation of the management interface’s private IP address to its associated public IP
address and allows outbound traffic from the firewall to reach the internet.
VM-Series Firewalls
Although the VM-Series firewall supports multiple interface deployment configurations such as virtual
wire, Layer 2, and tap mode, VM-Series firewall interfaces on AWS are always Layer 3 interfaces because
of AWS networking requirements. In AWS, you should always configure VM-Series firewall interfaces to
obtain their IP address through DHCP.
Because this design model uses overlay routing, the VM-Series firewall requires three Ethernet interfaces:
a management interface, a private dataplane interface for traffic from the GWLB, and a public dataplane
interface for outbound traffic.
When you deploy a VM-Series instance from the AWS Marketplace, it has a single interface by default. You
have to create the additional interfaces and associate them with the VM-Series instance. You also need to
create two Elastic IP addresses. Assign one to the management interface so you can manage the firewall
and the other to the public interface so the VM-Series firewall can support outbound traffic flows.
Although the dataplane interfaces both get their IP addresses from DHCP, only the public interface should
accept the default route.
Attach each firewall interface to separate subnets. The management and public subnets have separate
route tables as follows:
• The management route table has all the management subnets assigned to it, a default route to the
IGW for internet access, and a route to the TGW for access to Panorama.
• The public route table has all the public subnets assigned to it and a default route to the IGW for
internet access.
You do not need to modify the default routing of the subnets dedicated to the private dataplane interface.
However, you should configure a security group on the firewall’s private dataplane interface that allows
health checks and UDP traffic destined to port 6081 from all the GWLB subnets. The security group should
deny all other traffic.
The private dataplane interface should have at least one subinterface. The GWLB endpoints should map
to subinterfaces instead of the dataplane interface. Mapping all endpoints to a subinterface allows you to
have a restrictive security policy on the dataplane interface that allows health checks only from the GWLB
subnets. This security policy provides a layer of protection if an endpoint is misconfigured or newly added
to the GWLB.
Note
Although the firewall does not use the subinterfaces for traffic forwarding,
you must configure them to receive a DHCP address and to have a unique VLAN
number. AWS does not assign the subinterface an IP address, which is expected
and does not affect traffic forwarding with a GWLB.
You must also enable Geneve parsing and overlay routing on the firewall.
Note
If you don’t enable Geneve parsing, the firewall sees traffic destined to the
dataplane interface IP address with a destination port of 6081. With parsing
enabled, the firewall is able to look inside the encapsulation to the actual
traffic.
You can automate the VM-Series configuration management by using Panorama in the management
VPC to provide a secure, scalable, and automated architecture. Bootstrapping speeds up the process of
configuring and licensing the firewall and making it operational on the network. This process allows the
deployment of the firewall with only a basic configuration so that it can connect to Panorama and obtain
the complete working configuration.
Although you can enable Geneve parsing and map the GWLB endpoints to subinterfaces after deployment,
it must be done directly on the firewall and cannot be configured in Panorama. Because a manual per-
device configuration can be challenging as you scale out devices, you should configure Geneve parsing and
overlay routing during bootstrap instead.
GWLB
A GWLB in the security VPC transparently distributes traffic across the VM-Series firewalls. You should
deploy the GWLB in all of the security VPC’s availability zones, with a single endpoint service.
The GWLB targets the VM-Series firewalls instances and uses HTTPS health checks to monitor their
availability.
TGW Attachment
The security VPC attaches to the TGW through a VPC attachment. The VPC attachments terminate into the
security VPC in dedicated subnets, one per availability zone.
Enable appliance mode on the attachments in the security VPC in order to ensure that traffic routes
through the same attachment zone even when the source and destination of the traffic are in different
zones. If appliance mode is not enabled, it is possible to have asymmetric traffic flowing through different
firewalls, which the firewalls drop.
Outbound Traffic
This design uses overlay routing for outbound security on the VM-Series firewalls. Outbound traffic from
instances in the spoke VPCs traverses the TGW and egresses the AWS environment through the VM-Series
firewalls.
Default routes in the spoke VPCs direct outbound traffic to the TGW. To direct traffic to the security VPC,
the TGW uses the spokes route table and the static default route pointing to the security VPC.
To support outbound traffic flows, the security VPC has GWLB endpoints in each of the availability zones
in which the firewalls are deployed. The GWLB endpoints are associated with dedicated subnets, which
allows them to have a unique routing table. The route tables in the security VPC for outbound traffic are as
follows:
• A routing table for each of the TGW attachment subnets directs all traffic from the TGW to the
GWLB endpoint in the attachment’s availability zone.
• A routing table the GWLB endpoint subnets directs return traffic to the spoke VPCs address space
to the TGW. In most cases, routes to the RFC 1918 address space is the simplest method for a
configuration that does not need to be modified as you add spoke VPCs to the TGW.
You do not need to modify the default routing of the subnets dedicated to the GWLB. By default, they can
reach all the IP addresses within the security VPC.
On the VM-Series firewalls, map the GWLB endpoints to a subinterface on the private dataplane interface.
The subinterface must have a unique zone and VLAN number. The zone is used in policy, and the VLAN
number is not used in traffic forwarding.
The firewall also has routes to the spoke VPC address space—or for simplicity, routes to all the RFC 1918
address space—that point to the private dataplane interface’s default gateway.
1. In the application VPC, the instance in the application VPC sends traffic to a service on the
internet. The route table applied to the instance’s subnet directs traffic to the TGW attachment in
its availability zone.
2. On the TGW, the application VPC is associated with the spokes route table. The TGW uses the
static route in the that route table to forward the traffic to the security VPC.
3. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the TGW attachment has a
default route that forwards traffic to the GWLB endpoint in the attachment’s availability zone.
4. In the security VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the GWLB which chooses a VM-
Series firewall from its target group. Because cross-zone load balancing is enabled, it could be
any available firewall.
5. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB and associates it with the private zone, which is
configured on the subinterface that is mapped to the GWLB endpoints in the security VPC.
6. The firewall applies the decryption, NAT, and security policies before forwarding it out its
public dataplane interface based on the default route learned from DHCP on that interface.
The outbound traffic’s source IP address is translated to the IP address of the firewall’s public
interface.
7. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the firewall’s public
interface has a default route that forwards traffic to the IGW. The IGW translates the source IP
address of the outbound traffic to the EIP associated with the firewall’s public interface and
forwards the traffic to the internet.
1. In the security VPC, the IGW translates the destination IP address of the return traffic to the
firewall’s public interface’s IP address.
2. The firewall receives the traffic and associates the return traffic with an active session on the
firewall. The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPC out the
private interface. Because this is the same interface that received the traffic from the GWLB,
the firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation, to return the traffic to the GWLB.
3. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
4. In the security VPC. The route table associated with the subnet that contains the GWLB endpoint
has a route that forwards traffic destined to the application VPCs address space to the TGW
attachment in its availability zone.
5. On the TGW, the security VPC is associated with the security route table. The TGW uses that route
table to forward traffic to the application VPC.
6. In the application VPC, the TGW attachment forwards the traffic to the instance.
Security Policy
You use VM-Series firewall security policies to limit what applications and resources the private instances
can reach. In most designs, the VM-Series firewall does not need to translate the destination IP address.
The VM-Series firewall security policy allows appropriate application traffic from private instances to
the internet. Using the zones of the private subinterface and the public dataplane interface to define the
policy. You should implement the outbound security policy by using positive security policies (allow-
listing). Security profiles prevent known malware and vulnerabilities from entering the network in return
traffic allowed by the security policy. URL filtering, data loss prevention, file blocking, and data filtering
protect against data exfiltration.
Inbound Traffic
Inbound traffic originates outside the VPC and is destined to applications or services hosted within your
VPCs, such as web servers. You have two options for implementing inbound security resiliency:
• Combined—You can use the VM-Series and GWLB in the security VPC, with distributed GWLB
endpoints in the application VPCs. Unlike with outbound traffic, this design option does not use the
transit gateway for traffic forwarding between the security VPC and the application VPCs.
• Centralized—You can use an AWS load-balancer sandwich design. This design uses a resilient,
public-facing load balancer in the security VPC and a second resilient load balancer on the private
side of the firewalls in the application VPCs. This design option uses the transit gateway for traffic
forwarding between the security VPC and application VPCs.
Note
The combined option uses the GWLB to apply security for inbound traffic
transparently and does not require address translation. The centralized option
does not use the GWLB and requires that the firewall translate the traffic
source IP address to ensure traffic returns to the correct firewall in the security
VPC.
Combined Option
This design option adds distributed inbound security to the existing VM-Series firewalls in the security
VPC and builds upon the previously discussed configuration in order to support outbound traffic flows. If
you have regulatory or other compliance concerns, a separate set of firewalls dedicated to inbound traffic
flows might be more appropriate.
This design uses the GWLB and VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC, with GWLB endpoints in the
application VPCs for the transparent inspection of inbound traffic.
To support inbound security with this design option, modify each application VPC that requires inbound
security as follows:
• Add GWLB endpoints in each of the availability zones and associate them with the GWLB in the
security VPC.
• Add a gateway route table that directs traffic to the subnets in an availability zone to the GWLB
endpoint in that availability zone.
• Add an internet-facing load balancer with the application instances in the VPC as the targets.
• Add a route table for the GWLB endpoint subnets. The route table must direct traffic that is destined
to the internet to the IGW.
• Add a route table for each of the subnets that contain the load balancer. The route tables must direct
traffic that is destined to the internet to the GWLB endpoint in its availability zone.
To support inbound security with this design option, modify the security VPC as follows:
• Add a subinterface on the private dataplane interface for each application VPC.
Note
Because inbound traffic flows with the combined design option are intra-zone,
you should modify the default intra-zone policy to block traffic.
In this design, the VM-Series firewalls inspect and transparently secure traffic before the internet-facing
load balancer receives it. Because this design option uses GWLB for resiliency, the firewalls do not modify
the traffic source or destination IP address.
Because the firewall is in the first device in the traffic path, if you want to filter traffic before the firewall
receives it, you must use a network ACL on the GWLB endpoint subnets. If you are using an ALB, the
firewall decrypts and re-encrypts the traffic before the ALB sees it.
The design option supports one or more application VPCs. Each application VPC that requires inbound
security requires an IGW and GWLB endpoints. The VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC inspect and
secure the traffic, relying on the AWS PrivateLink connection between the GWLB endpoint and the GWLB
to transmit traffic between the application VPC and the security VPC.
The VM-Series firewall security policy allows application traffic to the internet-facing load balancer. VM-
Series firewall security profiles prevent known malware and vulnerabilities from entering the network in
traffic allowed by the security policy.
1. The URL request from the end-user is directed toward example.lb.aws.com. This request is sent
to a DNS. DNS returns an IP address for each of the load balancer’s enabled availability zones.
The client OS picks an IP address and sends the traffic. In the application VPC, the IGW translates
the destination public IP address to the IP address of the load balancer.
2. In the application VPC, the gateway route table associated with the IGW directs the traffic to the
GWLB endpoint in the destination’s availability zone. The GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to
the GWLB in the security VPC.
3. In the security VPC, the GWLB chooses a VM-Series firewall from its target group. Because cross-
zone load balancing is enabled, it could be any available firewall.
4. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB on its private dataplane interface and associates
it with the application’s zone, which is configured on the subinterface that is mapped to the
GWLB endpoints in the application’s VPC.
5. The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPC out the private
interface. The firewall applies security policies before forwarding. The security policy is an
intra-zone policy. Because this is the same interface that received the traffic from the GWLB,
the firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation, to return the traffic to the GWLB.
6. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
7. In the application VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the internet-facing load
balancer.
8. In the application VPC, the internet-facing load balancer receives the traffic and picks a target
from the target group. The targets are the application instances. The load balancer translates
the packet’s destination address to the selected instance interface IP address and translates the
source IP address to the private IP address of the load balancer so that traffic returns to it on the
return flow.
1. In the application VPC, the instance sends return traffic to the load-balancer.
2. In the application VPC, the load balancer modifies the source and destination IP addresses. The
route table applied to the subnet that contains the load balancer has a default route that forwards
traffic to the GWLB endpoint in its availability zone.
3. The GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the GWLB in the security VPC.
4. In the security VPC, the GWLB chooses the same VM-Series firewall from its target group that
was used for the inbound traffic flow.
5. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB on its private dataplane interface. The firewall
receives the traffic and associates the return traffic to an active session on the firewall.
The firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation to return the traffic to the GWLB.
6. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
7. In the application VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the IGW.
8. The IGW translates the source IP address of the outbound traffic to the EIP associated with the
load balancer and forwards the traffic to the internet.
Centralized Option
This design option adds centralized inbound security to the existing VM-Series firewalls in the
security VPC and builds upon the previously discussed configuration to support outbound traffic flows.
A separate set of firewalls dedicated to inbound traffic flows might be more appropriate if you have
regulatory or other compliance concerns. This design option does not use the GWLB for inbound traffic.
Instead, it relies on a public ALB/NLB for resiliency and NAT to ensure traffic returns to the correct
firewall.
• Add a route table for the subnets that contain firewall private interfaces. The route table must
direct traffic that is destined to the spoke VPCs address space to the TGW. In most cases, routes to
the RFC 1918 address space are the most straightforward method for a configuration, because you
should not need to modify it as you add spoke VPCs to the TGW.
• Modify the security group on the firewall’s private dataplane interface. Adjust the security group
to allow return traffic from the application VPCs and health checks from the GWLB subnets. Use
an ACL to deny UDP traffic on port 6081 from any network other than the GWLB subnets in the
VPC.
For inbound traffic, the Application Load Balancer terminates incoming connections to its listener
and initiates corresponding new connections to the VM-Series firewalls in the target group. The ALB
is associated with the availability zones that contain VM-Series firewalls. If you configure the ALB for
multiple web applications behind the same VM-Series firewalls, you must define unique target groups
for each application. Each target group contains the same VM-Series firewalls but has unique TCP ports
assigned.
AWS sources all new connections from the Application Load Balancer interfaces in the public subnets. The
destination IP address is the private IP address of the VM-Series firewall’s public interface. Health checks
monitor back-end availability on all specified HTTP and HTTPS ports.
Destination IP address translation rules on the VM-Series firewalls map incoming traffic from the ALB
listener to the private instance or internal load balancer. The VM-Series firewall also applies a source IP
address translation to inbound traffic. The firewall translates the source IP address to the IP address of the
private interface of the firewall, ensuring return traffic flows symmetrically.
The VM-Series firewall security policy allows HTTP and HTTPS application traffic from the load balancer
to the private instances. VM-Series firewall security profiles prevent known malware and vulnerabilities
from entering the network in traffic allowed by the security policy. If you want to support the use of
HTTP and HTTPS back ends on ports other than 80 or 443, you should configure the security policy rules’
services to include the specific service ports in use instead of application-default.
Traffic routing services such as domain name servers and firewall next-hop configurations use FQDN to
resolve load-balancer IP addresses versus hard-coded IP addresses. Using FQDN allows the load balancers
to be dynamic and scale up or down in size and remain resilient; one availability zone might go down, and
the other can continue feeding sessions to the application instances.
1. The URL request from the end-user is directed toward example.lb.aws.com. This request is sent
to a DNS. DNS returns an IP address for each of the load balancer’s enabled availability zones.
The client OS picks an IP address and sends the traffic. The IGW translates the destination public
IP address to the IP address of the load balancer.
2. In the security VPC, the internet-facing load balancer receives the traffic and picks a target from
the target group. The targets are the private IP addresses for the public-facing interface on each
of the VM-Series firewalls. The load balancer translates the packet’s destination address to the
selected VM-Series firewall’s public interface IP address and translates the source IP address to
the private IP address of the load balancer so that traffic returns to it on the return flow.
3. The firewall translates the IP addresses on the incoming traffic. The firewall changes the source
IP address to the IP address of the firewall’s private interface so that the return traffic from the
instance travels back through the same firewall in order to maintain state and translation tables.
The firewall changes the destination IP address to the IP address of the internal load balancer.
The firewall learns the IP addresses for the internal load balancer by sending a DNS request for
the FQDN assigned to the load balancers. This returns multiple IP addresses, one for each of the
subnets or availability zones into which you deployed the load balancer.
4. The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPC out the private
interface.
5. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the firewall’s private
interface has a route that forwards traffic destined to the application VPCs address space to the
TGW attachment in its availability zone.
6. On the TGW, the security VPC is associated with the security route table. The TGW uses that route
table to forward traffic to the application VPC.
7. In the application VPC, the TGW attachment forwards the traffic to the internal load balancer.
8. The internal load balancers have instances in both availability zones and do a round-robin load
balancing to the active instances in the target list, translating the source IP address to its IP
address.
1. In the application VPC, the instance in the application VPC sends return traffic to the load
balancer.
2. In the application VPC, the load balancer sends the return traffic to the firewall. The route table
applied to the load balancer’s subnet directs the traffic to the TGW attachment in its availability
zone.
3. On the TGW, the application VPC is associated with the spokes route table. The TGW uses the
static route in the route table to forward the traffic to the security VPC.
4. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the TGW attachment uses
local routing to direct traffic to the VM-Series firewall interface.
5. The firewall receives the traffic and associates the return traffic to an active session on the
firewall. The firewall translates the source IP address to the firewall’s public interface and
destination IP address to the IP address of the internet-facing load balancer.
6. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the load balancer has a
default route that forwards traffic to the IGW.
7. The IGW translates the source IP address of the outbound traffic to the EIP associated with the
load balancer and forwards the traffic to the internet.
Health checks ensure that each path is operational and that instances are operational. The checks also
monitor the return path is operational as the public load balancer probes through the firewall to the
internal load balancer. The internal load balancers probe the instances in their target group to make sure
they are operational.
East-West Traffic
East-west traffic, or traffic between VPCs, flows through the VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC. This
traffic follows the same path as outbound traffic and does not require additional configuration in the AWS
VPCs beyond what is required for outbound traffic flows.
As with the outbound traffic, you use VM-Series firewall security policies to limit what applications and
resources the instances in each VPC can reach. To differentiate east-west traffic flows from outbound
traffic flows on the VM-Series firewall, use zone information. Outbound traffic flows are inter-zone flows
using the zones applied to the private subinterface and the public dataplane interface. East-west traffic
flows are intra-zone flows and use only the zone applied to the private subinterface.
Note
Because the east-west traffic flows are intra-zone, you should modify the
default intra-zone policy to block traffic.
1. In the first application VPC, an instance sends traffic to an instance in the second application
VPC. The route table applied to the instance’s subnet directs the traffic to the TGW attachment in
its availability zone.
2. On the TGW, the application VPCs are associated with the spokes route table. The TGW uses the
static route in the route table to forward the traffic to the security VPC.
3. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the TGW attachment has a
default route that forwards traffic to the GWLB endpoint in the attachment’s availability zone.
4. In the security VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the GWLB, which chooses a
VM-Series firewall from its target group. Because cross-zone load balancing is enabled, it could
be any available firewall.
5. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB and associates it with the private zone, which is
configured on the subinterface that is mapped to the GWLB endpoints in the security VPC.
6. The firewall applies security policies before forwarding it out its private dataplane interface.
The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPCs out of the private
interface. Because this is the same interface that received the traffic from the GWLB, the firewall
uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve encapsulation to
return the traffic to the GWLB.
7. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
8. In the security VPC, the route table associated with the subnet that contains the GWLB endpoint
has a route that forwards traffic destined for the second application VPC’s address space to the
TGW attachment in its availability zone.
9. On the TGW, the security VPC is associated with the security route table. The TGW uses that route
table to forward traffic to the second application VPC.
10. In the second application VPC, the TGW attachment forwards the traffic to the instance.
1. In the second application VPC, an instance sends return traffic to an instance in the first
application VPC. The route table applied to the instance’s subnet directs the traffic to the TGW
attachment in its availability zone.
2. On the TGW, the application VPCs are associated with the spokes route table. The TGW uses the
static route in the route table to forward the traffic to the security VPC.
3. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the TGW attachment has a
default route that forwards traffic to the GWLB endpoint in the attachment’s availability zone.
4. In the security VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the GWLB, which chooses the
same VM-Series firewall from its target group..
5. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB and associates it with the private zone, which is
configured on the subinterface that is mapped to the GWLB endpoints in the security VPC.
6. The firewall receives the traffic and associates the return traffic to an active session on the
firewall. The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPCs out of the
private interface. Because this is the same interface that received the traffic from the GWLB,
the firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation, to return the traffic to the GWLB.
7. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
8. In the security VPC. The route table associated with the subnet that contains the GWLB endpoint
has a route that forwards traffic destined to the first application VPCs address space to the TGW
attachment in its availability zone.
9. On the TGW, the security VPC is associated with the security route table. The TGW uses that route
table to forward traffic to the second application VPC.
10. In the first application VPC, the TGW attachment forwards the traffic to the instance.
You can backhaul to the TGW with Direct Connect either directly in a colocation facility or from on-
premises as a service through a WAN provider. Dual connectivity is recommended for resiliency.
Figure 42 shows VPN connectivity from on-premises gateways to the TGW via a VPN attachment. There is
a VPN attachment for each CGW, and each attachment is made of two tunnels.
Management Traffic
This design uses Panorama for the management of the firewalls and uses Cortex Data Lake for logging.
You deploy Panorama in an active/standby configuration in a separate, dedicated VPC. You deploy the
firewalls with a management interface that routes to Panorama and the internet for software and content
updates. The firewalls also need connectivity to subscription services and Cortex Data Lake for logging.
This design connects the management VPC to the firewalls via the Transit gateway.
Security VPC
This design deploys a VPC dedicated to security. In the security VPC, you deploy the VM-Series firewalls in
separate availability zones and deploy a GWLB to distribute traffic to the firewalls.
When deploying the security VPC, configure it with a non-overlapping IP address block that is
appropriately sized for your organization’s needs. For resiliency, use multiple availability zones and
consider breaking your subnet ranges into availability zone-based blocks that you can summarize in
security groups and routing tables.
To supply outbound internet access, you must deploy an IGW into the VPC. The IGW performs network
address translation of the management interface’s private IP address to its associated public IP address
and allows outbound traffic from the firewall to reach the internet.
VM-Series Firewalls
Although the VM-Series firewall supports multiple interface deployment configurations such as virtual
wire, Layer 2, and tap mode, VM-Series firewall interfaces on AWS are always Layer 3 interfaces because
of AWS networking requirements. In AWS, you should always configure VM-Series firewall interfaces to
obtain their IP address through DHCP.
Because this design model uses overlay routing, the VM-Series firewall requires three Ethernet interfaces:
a management interface, a private dataplane interface for traffic from the GWLB, and a public dataplane
interface for outbound traffic.
When you deploy a VM-Series instance from the AWS Marketplace, it has a single interface by default. You
have to create the additional interfaces and associate them with the VM-Series instance. You also need to
create two Elastic IP addresses. Assign one to the management interface so you can manage the firewall
and the other to the public interface so the VM-Series firewall can support outbound traffic flows.
Although the dataplane interfaces both get their IP addresses from DHCP, only the public interface should
accept the default route.
Attach each firewall interface to separate subnets. The management and public subnets have separate
route tables, as follows:
• The management route table has all management subnets assigned to it, a default route to the IGW
for internet access, and a route to the VPC peering connection for access to Panorama.
• The public route table has all public subnets assigned to it and a default route to the IGW for
internet access.
You do not need to modify the default routing of the subnets dedicated to the private dataplane interface.
However, you should configure a security group on the firewall’s private dataplane interface that allows
health checks and UDP traffic destined to port 6081 from all the GWLB subnets. The security group should
deny all other traffic.
The private dataplane interface should have at least one subinterface. The GWLB endpoints should map
to subinterfaces instead of the dataplane interface. Mapping all endpoints to a subinterface allows you to
have a restrictive security policy on the dataplane interface that allows health checks only from the GWLB
subnets. This security policy provides a layer of protection if an endpoint is misconfigured or newly added
to the GWLB.
Note
Although the firewall does not use the subinterfaces for traffic forwarding,
you must configure them to receive a DHCP address and to have a unique VLAN
number. AWS does not assign the subinterface an IP address, which is expected
and does not affect traffic forwarding with a GWLB.
You must also enable Geneve parsing and overlay routing on the firewall.
Note
If you don’t enable Geneve parsing, the firewall sees traffic destined to the
dataplane interface IP address with a destination port of 6081. With parsing
enabled, the firewall is able to look inside the encapsulation to the actual
traffic.
You can automate the VM-Series configuration management by using Panorama in the management
VPC to provide a secure, scalable, and automated architecture. Bootstrapping speeds up the process of
configuring and licensing the firewall and making it operational on the network. This process allows
deployment of the firewall with only a basic configuration so that it can connect to Panorama and obtain
the complete operational configuration.
While you can enable Geneve parsing and map the GWLB endpoints to subinterfaces after deployment it
must be done directly on the firewall and cannot be configured in Panorama. Because a manual per-device
configuration can be challenging as you scale out devices, you should configure Geneve parsing and
overlay routing during bootstrap instead.
GWLB
A GWLB in the security VPC transparently distributes traffic across the VM-Series firewalls. The GWLB
should be deployed in all the security VPC’s availability zones, with a single endpoint service.
The GWLB targets the VM-Series firewalls instances and uses HTTPS heath checks to monitor their
availability.
Outbound Traffic
This design uses overlay routing for outbound security on the VM-Series firewalls. Outbound traffic from
instances in the isolated VPCs uses the PrivateLink connections from GWLB endpoints in the applications
VPCs to the GWLB in the security VPC to egress the AWS environment through the VM-Series firewalls.
To support outbound traffic flows, in each of the isolated application VPCs, deploy GWLB endpoints in
each of the availability zones that the instances are deployed into. The GWLB endpoints are associated
with dedicated subnets, which allows them to have a unique routing table.
A routing table for each of the instance subnets direct all outbound traffic to the GWLB endpoint in the
instance’s availability zone. You do not need to modify the default routing of the subnets dedicated to the
GWLB. By default, they can reach all the IP addresses within the isolated application VPC.
On the VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC, create a subinterface on the private dataplane interface for
each isolated application VPC. Map the GWLB endpoints in the VPC to its subinterface. The subinterface
must have a unique zone and VLAN number. The zone is used in policy, and VLAN number is not used in
traffic forwarding.
The firewall also has routes to the isolated application VPC address space—or for simplicity, routes to all
the RFC 1918 address space—that point to the private dataplane interface’s default gateway.
1. In the application VPC, the instance in the application VPC sends traffic to a service on the
internet. The route table applied to the instance’s subnet forwards traffic to the GWLB endpoint
in its availability zone.
2. In the application VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic over PrivateLink to the GWLB in
the security VPC.
3. In the security VPC, the GWLB chooses a VM-Series firewall from its target group. Because cross-
zone load balancing is enabled, it could be any available firewall.
4. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB and associates it with the application VPC’s
zone, which is configured on the subinterface that is mapped to the GWLB endpoints in the
application’s VPC.
5. The firewall applies the Decryption, NAT, and Security policies before forwarding it out its
public dataplane interface based on the default route learned from DHCP on that interface. The
outbound traffic’s source IP address is translated to the firewall’s public interface’s IP address.
6. In the security VPC, the route table applied to the subnet that contains the firewall’s public
interface has a default route that forwards traffic to the IGW. The IGW translates the source IP
address of the outbound traffic to the EIP associated with the firewall’s public interface and
forwards the traffic to the internet.
1. In the security VPC, the IGW translates the destination IP address of the return traffic to the
firewall’s public interface’s IP address.
2. The firewall receives the traffic and associates the return traffic with an active session on the
firewall. The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPC out the
private interface. Because this is the same interface that received the traffic from the GWLB,
the firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation, to return the traffic to the GWLB.
3. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic in the application VPC.
4. In the application VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the instance.
Security Policy
You use VM-Series firewall security policies to limit what applications and resources the private instances
can reach. In most designs, the VM-Series firewall does not need to translate the destination IP address.
The VM-Series firewall security policy allows appropriate application traffic from private instances to
the internet. Using the zones of the private subinterface and the public dataplane interface to define
the policy. You should implement the outbound security policy by using positive security policies (allow
listing). Security profiles prevent known malware and vulnerabilities from entering the network in return
traffic allowed by the security policy. URL filtering, Data Loss Prevention, file blocking, and data filtering
protect against data exfiltration.
Inbound Traffic
Inbound traffic originates outside the VPC and is destined to applications or services hosted within your
VPCs, such as web servers. This design uses the GWLB and VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC, with
GWLB endpoints in the application VPCs for the transparent inspection of inbound traffic.
This design uses the existing VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC and builds upon the previously
discussed configuration to support outbound traffic flows. A separate set of firewalls dedicated to inbound
traffic flows might be more appropriate if you have regulatory or other compliance concerns.
To support inbound security with this design option, modify each application VPC that requires inbound
security as follows:
• Add a gateway route table that directs traffic to the subnets in an availability zone to the GWLB
endpoint in that availability zone.
• Add an internet-facing load balancer with the application instances in the VPC as the targets.
Individual instances with associated EIPs are also supported.
• Add a route table for the GWLB endpoint subnets. The route table must direct traffic that is destined
to the internet to the IGW.
• Add a route table for each of the subnets that contain the load balancer. The route tables must direct
traffic that is destined to the internet to the GWLB endpoint in its availability zone.
Note
Because the east-west traffic flows are intra-zone, you should modify the
default intra-zone policy to block traffic.
In this design, the VM-Series firewalls inspect and transparently secure traffic before the internet-facing
load balancer receives it. Because this design option uses GWLB for resiliency, the firewalls do not modify
the traffic source or destination IP address.
Because the firewall is in the first device in the traffic path, if you want to filter traffic before the firewall
receives it, you must use a network ACL on the GWLB endpoint subnets. If you are using an ALB, the
firewall decrypts and re-encrypts the traffic before the ALB sees it.
The design option supports one or more application VPCs. Each application VPC that requires inbound
security requires and IGW, and GWLB endpoints. The VM-Series firewalls in the security VPC inspect and
secure the traffic, relying on the AWS PrivateLink connection between the GWLB endpoint and the GWLB
to transmit traffic between the application VPC and the security VPC.
The VM-Series firewall security policy allows application traffic to the internet-facing load balancer,
and VM-Series firewall security profiles prevent known malware and vulnerabilities from entering the
network in traffic allowed by the security policy.
1. The URL request from the end-user is directed toward example.lb.aws.com. This request is sent
to a DNS. DNS returns an IP address for each of the load balancer’s enabled availability zones.
The client OS picks an IP address and sends the traffic. In the application VPC, the IGW translates
the destination public IP address to the IP address of the load balancer.
2. In the application VPC, the gateway route table associated with the IGW, directs the traffic to the
GWLB endpoint in the destination’s availability zone. The GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to
the GWLB in the security VPC.
3. In the security VPC, the GWLB chooses a VM-Series firewall from its target group. Because cross-
zone load balancing is enabled it could be any available firewall.
4. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB on its private dataplane interface and associates
it with the application’s zone, which is configured on the subinterface that is mapped to the
GWLB endpoints in the application’s VPC.
5. The firewall’s route table directs the traffic destined to the application VPC out the private
interface. The firewall applies security policies before forwarding. The security policy is an
intra-zone policy. Because this is the same interface that received the traffic from the GWLB,
the firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation, to return the traffic to the GWLB.
6. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
7. In the application VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the internet-facing load
balancer.
8. In the application VPC, the internet-facing load balancer receives the traffic and picks a target
from the target group. The targets are the application instances. The load balancer translates
the packet’s destination address to the selected instance interface IP address and translates the
source IP address to the private IP address of the load balancer so that traffic returns to it on the
return flow.
1. In the application VPC, the instance sends return traffic to the load-balancer.
2. In the application VPC, the load balancer modifies the source and destination IP addresses. The
route table applied to the subnet that contains the load balancer has a default route that forwards
traffic to the GWLB endpoint in its availability zone.
3. The GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the GWLB in the security VPC.
4. In the security VPC, the GWLB chooses the same VM-Series firewall from its target group that
was used for the inbound traffic flow.
5. The firewall receives the traffic from the GWLB on its private dataplane interface. The firewall
receives the traffic and associates the return traffic to an active session on the firewall.
The firewall uses the session information, including the TLVs associated with the Geneve
encapsulation to return the traffic to the GWLB.
6. In the security VPC, the GWLB uses the session information to forward the traffic to the GWLB
endpoint that received the original traffic.
7. In the application VPC, the GWLB endpoint forwards the traffic to the IGW.
8. The IGW translates the source IP address of the outbound traffic to the EIP associated with the
load balancer and forwards the traffic to the internet.
East-West Traffic
VPC networking provides direct reachability between all instances within a VPC, regardless of IP address
and subnet allocation. All instances within a VPC can reach any other instance within the same VPC,
regardless of AWS route tables. You can use AWS security groups and ACLs to permit or deny traffic into or
out of an instance or group of instances.
East-west traffic between subnets within a VPC always goes directly between instances. AWS route tables
cannot override this behavior, and a limitation of this design model is that the VM-Series firewall cannot
have control over or visibility to east-west traffic. You can use network ACLs to restrict traffic between
subnets. Still, they are not a replacement for the visibility and control provided by the VM-Series firewalls.
The Centralized design model provides a scalable design for inspection and control of east-west, inbound,
and outbound traffic.
Management Traffic
This design uses Panorama for the management of the firewalls and uses Cortex Data Lake for logging.
You deploy Panorama in an active/standby configuration in a separate, dedicated VPC. You deploy the
firewalls with a management interface that routes to Panorama and the internet for software and content
updates. The firewalls also need connectivity to subscription services and Cortex Data Lake for logging.
This design connects the management VPC to the security VPC via VPC peering.
Summary
Moving applications to the cloud requires the same enterprise-class security as your private network. The
shared-security model in cloud deployments places the burden of protecting applications and data on
your organization. Deploying Palo Alto Networks VM-Series firewalls in your AWS infrastructure provides
a scalable infrastructure with protections from known and unknown threats, complete application
visibility, a common security policy, and native cloud automation support. Your ability to move
applications to the cloud securely helps you to meet challenging business requirements.
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