Edmund Sydeco Y Sionzon, Petitioner, vs. People OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

5/14/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 740
G.R. No. 202692. November 12, 2014.*

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The rule

according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s
findings of fact does hold sway when it appears in the record that
facts and circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.
—Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at
times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does hold sway when, as
here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstances of
weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misapplied in a case under appeal. Corollary, it is basic that an
appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide open
for review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation
of evidence. Peace officers and traffic enforcers, like other public
officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties with
prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually
exercise in the management of their own affairs.
Criminal Law; Land Transportation and Traffic Code; Traffic
Violations; Reckless Driving; Swerving; Words and Phrases;
“Swerving,” as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement
wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside
from a direct course of action or movement. The act may become
punishable when there is a sign indicating that swerving is
prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature of reckless
driving, a concept defined under Republic Act (RA) No. 4136.—In
fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to
stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or
suspected of having committed one. “Swerving,” as ordinarily
understood, refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a
lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or
movement. The act may become punishable when there is a sign
indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes
the nature of reckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136,
as: SECTION 48. Reckless Driving.—No person shall operate a
motor
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www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001796b973c71b69bf272003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/23
* THIRD DIVISION.
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Sydeco vs. People
vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable

caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing,
curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the
conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger
the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause
excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Swerving is not necessarily
indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless
driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must
be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required.—Swerving is not necessarily indicative
of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required. Nothing in the records indicate that the
area was a “no swerving or overtaking zone.” Moreover, the
swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m.
when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human
traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons
is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car,
they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under
Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle,
ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of their
pick-up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly
because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle.
Same; Resistance and Serious Disobedience; The two (2) key
elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under
Art. 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) That a person in
authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official
duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the
offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.—
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the
confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand,
and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of
the vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his
insistence on a plain view search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures
cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. He may
have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of

this would make him a criminal. It remains to
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Sydeco vs. People
stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down,

committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting a
reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to avoid
the road block established. He came to a full stop when so
required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious
disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a
person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of
official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That
the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.
Land Transportation and Traffic Code; Checkpoints; There is,
to stress, nothing in Republic Act (RA) No. 4136 that authorized
the checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his
companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search.
—There is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the
checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his
companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search.
And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion
of the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence
refers to as a “stop and frisk” action. As SPO4 Bodino no less
testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of
the vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but
because of their intention to invite him to Station 9 so he could
rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation,
the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of
their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the
process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the
face. None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the
petitioner’s allegation about being physically hurt before being
brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication.
What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them
to subdue the fifty-five-year-old petitioner. Both actions were done
in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136.
Criminal Law; Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013;
Drunk Driving; The Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013
(Republic Act [RA] No. 10586) which also penalizes driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined under its Sec. 3(e)
as the “act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood
alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath

analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly
by the (Department of Health [DOH]), the (National Police
Commission [NA-
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Sydeco vs. People
POLCOM]) and the (Department of Transportation and

Communications [DOTC]).—It cannot be emphasized enough that
smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are
differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with
legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in
contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of
driving under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of
course changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk
and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA), a term defined
under its Sec. 3(e) as the “act of operating a motor vehicle while
the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being
subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of
intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the
[NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of
RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle
weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood alcohol
concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that
said driver is driving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from
the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of
driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he
had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone
conclusively, for reaching during the period material the
threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a
BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC, penal laws shall
be given retroactive insofar as they are favorable to the accused.
Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136.
Verily, even by force of Art. 22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e)
of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the
charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the
supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Same; Same; Same; The absence of conclusive proof being
under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the
forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle
argues against or at least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for
drunken driving and resisting arrest.—Conviction must come only
after it survives the test of reason. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.

Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and
usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived
drivers under the influence of alcohol and executing an arrest, the
blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial court and the
CA on the presumption of regu-
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Sydeco vs. People
larity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As

stressed in People v. Ambrosio, 427 SCRA 312 (2004), the
presumption of regularity is merely just that, a presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the
evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this
presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates
all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the
absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor
while driving coupled with the forceful manner the police yanked
petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt
on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
Same; Criminal Liability; In case of doubt as to the moral
certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or at
least in favor of the milder form of criminal liability.—In case of
doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in
favor of innocence or at least in favor of the milder form of
criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost
elementary, that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies
on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oscar G. Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for
review under Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011 Decision1
and
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1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the

concurrence of Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Leoncia Real-
Dimagiba, Annex “A” Petition, Rollo, pp. 25-37.
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July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33567. The assailed issuances affirmed
the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in
turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco)
guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for
Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 41365
and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed against petitioner Sydeco
with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch
14 of that court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated
informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for
the first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the
second, respectively read:
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2 Annex “E,” Petition, id., at pp. 51-52.

3 Annex “H,” Petition, id., at pp. 90-98.
4 Annex “K,” Petition, id., at pp. 105-120.
5 Land Transportation and Traffic Code:
SECTION 56. Penalty for Violation.—The following penalties shall be
imposed for violations of this Act: x x x
(f) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor x x x a
fine of not less than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not less than
three nor more than six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.
6 Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in
authority or the agents of such person.—The penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or
seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person,
while engaged in the performance of official duties; When the disobedience
to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty
of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed

upon the offender.
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Sydeco vs. People
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and owner of
a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage
and operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue,
Malate, in said city, while under the influence of liquor, in
violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136.
Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2
Virgilio Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III,
bona fide member of the Philippine National Police, Malate Police
Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual
performance of their official duties as such police officers, by then
and there resisting, shoving and pushing, the hands of said
officers while the latter was placing him under
arrest for violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.

By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the
cases as falling under, thus to be governed by, the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded “Not
Guilty” to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the
prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of
SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8
and Ms. Laura
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7 One of the apprehending officers.

8 Investigating Officer.
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Sydeco vs. People
Delos Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while

in the witness box, among which was Exh. “A,” with sub-
markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest10 executed by SPO2
Bodino and two other police officers. The defense’s
witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself,
his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized
in and/or as may be deduced from, the CA decision now on
appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar
(Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and
another officer were manning a checkpoint established
along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave., Malate,
Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they
spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick-up with plate
number XAE 988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The
team members, all in uniform, flagged the vehicle down
and asked the petitioner to alight from the vehicle so he
could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,
before he resumes driving.11 Petitioner, who the policemen
claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and
insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice,
petitioner started talking rudely to the policemen and in
fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: “P…g ina mo, bakit
mo ako hinuhuli.” At that remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who
earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had seen him
swerving and driving under the influence of liquor,
proceeded to arrest petitioner who put up resistance.
Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the
police eventually succeeded in subduing him who was then
brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined
and found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical
Certificate issued by that
_______________
9 Medical Records Custodian of Ospital ng Maynila.

10 Annex “P” of Petition, Rollo, p. 126.
11 Id., at p. 108.
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Sydeco vs. People
hospital, marked as Exh. “F.” Petitioner was then

turned over to the Malate Police Station for disposition.12
Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed to be a victim in
the incident in question, adding in this regard that he has
in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery
and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. In
his Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit14
appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early
morning of June 12, 2006, he together with Joenilo Pano
and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in
his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City,
were on the way home from onboard his pick-up when
signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately
referred to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of
the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked the
petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body
and vehicle search, a directive he refused to heed owing to
a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the
vehicle window, uttering, “plain view lang boss, plain view
lang.” Obviously irked by this remark, one of the
policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turned out, then told the
petitioner that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of
empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s
explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles
adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as
P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the
mouth and poked a gun at his head, at the same time
blurting, “P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito
marami ka pang sinasabi.” The officers then pulled the
petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the
police mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his
companions to call up his wife. The policemen then brought
petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded
in securing a medical certificate under the signature of one
Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of
alcoholic
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12 Annex “R,” Petition, id., at p. 129.

13 Annex “T,” Petition, id., at p. 134.
14 Annex “U,” Petition, id., at pp. 136-138.
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breath, although he refused to be examined and no

alcohol breath examination was conducted. He was
thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m. of June 12, 2006 and
released in the afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his
release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual medical
examination where the resulting medical certificate
indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but
negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed
his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp.
Aguilar and the other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under
Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not to place the erring driver under arrest, but
to confiscate his driver’s license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having

established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, his
conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced.
Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal
Case No. 052527-CN; and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months
and pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal
Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land
Transportation Office the result of this case, stating further the
data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.
_______________
15 SECTION 58. Duty of Clerks of Court.—It is hereby made the

duty of clerks of the Court of First Instance, the City Court or

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Sydeco vs. People
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main

submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1) according credit to
the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although
the records custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented
to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician, and 2)
upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of

P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3
Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino
appeared in court to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC
affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, addressing the
first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following wise:
Dr. Balucating’s failure to testify relative to petitioner’s
alcoholic breath, as indicated in the medical certificate, is
not fatal as such testimony would only serve to corroborate
the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting that
under the Rules of Court,17 observations of the police
officers regarding the peti-
_______________
Municipal Court trying traffic violation cases to certify to the

Commission the result of any case, whether criminal or civil, involving
violations of any provision of this Act or of other laws and ordinances
relating to motor vehicles. Said certificate shall specifically contain the
name of the driver or owner of the vehicle involved, his address, the
number of his license and/or of the certificate or registration of his vehicle,
and the date thereof, and the offense of which he was convicted or
acquitted.
16 Rollo, pp. 90-98.
17 Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses.—The opinion of a witness
for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
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Sydeco vs. People
tioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion

of the latter’s drunken state on the day he was
apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the
prosecution has the discretion as to how many witnesses it
needs to present before the trial court, the positive
testimony of a single credible witness as to the guilt of the
accused being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction.
The RTC cited established jurisprudence19 enunciating the
rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the

greatest number as “[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered.”
Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for
review, the recourse docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33567.
By a Decision dated December 28, 2011, as would be
reiterated in a Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellate
court affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

dated February 22, 2010 of the RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duties by the police officers; and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate
issued by Dr. Harvey Balucating, in the absence of his testimony
before the Court.

The petition is meritorious.
_______________
18 Rollo, p. 45.
19 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008, 574
SCRA 78, 90.
300

Sydeco vs. People
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality

at times, to the trial court’s findings of fact does hold sway
when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and
circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal
prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review,
inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of
evidence.21
Peace officers and traffic enforcers, like other public
officials and employees are bound to discharge their duties
with prudence, caution and attention, which careful men
usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in

the subject area and during the period material appeared
not to have performed their duties as required by law, or at
least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They
spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They
then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did
not demand the presentation of the driver’s license or issue
any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as
required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA
4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License.—Law

enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized
by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any
violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto,
or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the
license of the driver
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20 People v. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, July 20, 2001, 361 SCRA 622.
21 Tan v. People, G.R. No. 148194, April 12, 2002, 381 SCRA 74;
Olimpio Pangonorom Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. People, G.R.
No. 143380, April 11, 2005, 455 SCRA 211.
22 Balais v. Abuda, A.M. No. R-565-P, November 27, 1986, 146 SCRA
56.
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Sydeco vs. People
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by

the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two
hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period
so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become
invalid thereafter. x x x (Emphasis added)

Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer
one or two routinary questions out of respect to what the
Court has, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,23 adverted to as
the motorists’ right of “free passage without [intrusive]
interruption,” P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in
what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when
utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they
ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding
after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of

the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence
of alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his “plain view
search” line. The remark apparently pissed the police
officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at
petitioner and his companions as “mga lasing” (drunk) and
to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to an
otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano,
graphically described this particular event in his
sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga

pulis, nag-flashlight sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa amin na kami ay magsi-baba at
buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon
at pinigilan niya ako at ang aking kasama kong waitress na
bumaba.
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23 G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 690.
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Sydeco vs. People
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulis ang salitang “PLAIN VIEW

LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG” pero iyon ay hindi nila
pinansin. Sa halip ay isang pulis ang nagsabi na “MGA LASING
KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER.”
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang
kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang ang isang pulis ang biglang
sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo
si Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya
subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril.
x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya ay pinagtulungan siya ng mga
pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang mailabas siya ay
pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang
hawak ang kanilang baril.24

Pano’s above account ironically finds in a way
collaboration from the arresting officers themselves who
admitted that they originally had no intention to search the
vehicle in question nor subject its occupants to a body
search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint

affidavit:
x x x x
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for
violation of RA 4136 (Driving under the influence of liquor), and
violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x
committed on or about 3:30 AM, June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate,
Manila. x x x He began to raise his voice and converse with us
rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty and
performing our job. P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we
saw him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor that
was why we are inviting him to our police station in which
our intention was to make him rest for a moment before he
continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis added)
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 139-140.
303
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Sydeco vs. People
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was

signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed
any crime or suspected of having committed one.
“Swerving,” as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement
wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn
aside from a direct course of action or movement.25 The act
may become punishable when there is a sign indicating
that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the
nature of reckless driving, a concept defined under RA
4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving.—No person shall operate a

motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable
caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing,
curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the
conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger
the property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause
excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent
behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To
constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of
a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the

consequences is required.26 Nothing in the records indicate
that the area was a “no swerving or overtaking zone.”
Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case,
occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually
clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger
to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When
the police officers stopped the petitioner’s car, they did not
issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29
of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the
petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick-up
and concluded that the petitioner was
_______________
25 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., 1997.

26 Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA
348, 357.
304

Sydeco vs. People
then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at

the trunk of the vehicle. On redirect examination, SPO4
Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly

prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the charged in for Viol. of
Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoy namin na amoy alak
siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that
you spotted the vehicle of the accused swerving, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you
approached the vehicle of the accused?
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, “Bakit daw
siya pinahihinto?”
x x x x
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with us going to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what

triggered the confrontational stand-off between the police
team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the
latter’s refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and
vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view
search only. Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be
considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may have
sounded boorish or spoken crudely at
_______________
27 Records, p. 491.
28 Abenes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23.
305
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 305

Sydeco vs. People
that time, but none of this would make him a criminal.

It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when
flagged down, committed a crime or performed an overt act
warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He
did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to
a full stop when so required to stop. The two key elements
of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art.
151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his
agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives
a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender
resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his
apprehending team are persons in authority or agents of a
person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely
petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right against
unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of
the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let
alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151
of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed
differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality
of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the
courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they
are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover, there is, to
stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-
manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions
to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and
_______________
29 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 18th ed., p. 154 (2008).
30 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Article III,
Section 2.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
31 Ynot v. IAC, No. L-74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659.
306

Sydeco vs. People
body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was

no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that
would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a “stop and
frisk” action. As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only
reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle
was not because he has committed a crime, but because of
their intention to invite him to Station 9 so he could rest
before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful
invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act indicative of
overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of
the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a
gun and punched him on the face. None of the police
officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s
allegation about being physically hurt before being brought
to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication.
What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3)
of them to subdue the fifty-five-year-old petitioner. Both
actions were done in excess of their authority granted
under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed
no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact
challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every
turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr.
Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos
Santos, the medical record custodian of the Ospital ng
Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a
record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision,
merely stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were
not testified upon by the doctor who issued it. Instead, the
Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by

the Prosecution to testify on the said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was
unable to testify to affirm the contents of the Medical Certificate
he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this
court finds that the observation of herein private complainants as
to the accused’s behavior and condition after the incident was
sufficient.
307
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 307

Sydeco vs. People
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may
be received in evidence regarding . . .
x x x x
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
“at the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed
the same.”32

In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did
not rely on the medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on
June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the
former was not able to testify as to its contents, but on the
testimony of SPO4 Bodino, on the assumption that he and
his fellow police officers were acting in the regular
performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized
enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the
influence of liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is
difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty
whether a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of
RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under the influence
of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with
the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged
Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term
defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the “act of operating a motor
vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level
has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test reached
the level of intoxication as established jointly by the
[DOH],
_______________
32 Rollo, pp. 110-111.

33 Sec. 5. Punishable Act.—It shall be unlawful for any person to
drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous
drugs and/or similar substances.
308

Sydeco vs. People
the [NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC].” And under Sec. 3(g)

of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle
with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms
who has BAC [blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or
higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver is driving
under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA
10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be convicted of driving
under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he
had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone
conclusively, for reaching during the period material the
threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA,
i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34
penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar as they are
favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly
modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force of Art.
22 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone,
petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of
driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed
inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila, per its Resolution35 of November 21, 2006 found, on
the strength of another physical examination from the
same Ospital ng Maynila conducted by Dr. Devega on the
petitioner on the same day, June 12, but later hour,
probable cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp.
Aguilar, et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that
the police indeed manhandled the petitioner and belied, or
at least cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucating’s
finding as to petitioner’s true state.
_______________
34 Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
35 Rollo, pp. 167-170.
309
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 309

Sydeco vs. People
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the

petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost no time in
commencing the appropriate criminal charges against the
police officers and Dr. Balucating, whom he accused of
issuing Exh. “F” even without examining him. The element
of immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s
profession of innocence, particularly of the charge of
disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to
be overlooked is the fact that petitioner, in so filing his
complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by
improper motive, the police officers being complete
strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had a
legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that
petitioner would expose himself to harm’s way by filing a
harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of
reason.36 It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.37
Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard
and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by
perceived drivers under the influence of alcohol and
executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic
invocation by the trial court and the CA on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the
presumption of regularity is merely just that, a
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts
as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case, the
absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of
liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the
police yanked petitioner
_______________
36 People v. Castro, No. L-42478, October 4, 1989, 385 SCRA 24.
37 People v. Dramayo, No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.

38 G.R. No. 135378, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 312.
310

Sydeco vs. People
out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on

the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting
arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability,
the balance tips in favor of innocence or at least in favor of
the milder form of criminal liability. This is as it should be.
For, it is basic, almost elementary, that the burden of
proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution
which must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the
appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes
charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal
Case No. 052528-CN.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Brion,** Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,***

JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation

and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. (Luz vs.
People, 667 SCRA 421 [2012])
_______________
* * Designated additional member per Raffle dated November 10, 2014.

* ** Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1866 dated
November 4, 2014.
311
VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 311

Sydeco vs. People
Procedure Being Observed in Flagging Down Vehicles

During the Conduct of Checkpoints. (Id.)
——o0o——
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5/14/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 740

G.R. No. 202692. November 12, 2014.*

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The rule

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 289

vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable

have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down,

alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 291

POLCOM]) and the (Department of Transportation and

circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account.

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

larity in the conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 293

July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in

2 Annex “E,” Petition, id., at pp. 51-52.

of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN

7 One of the apprehending officers.

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 295

Sydeco vs. People

Delos Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while

9 Medical Records Custodian of Ospital ng Maynila.

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

hospital, marked as Exh. “F.” Petitioner was then

12 Annex “R,” Petition, id., at p. 129.

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 297

breath, although he refused to be examined and no

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having

15 SECTION 58. Duty of Clerks of Court.—It is hereby made the

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main

upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of

Municipal Court trying traffic violation cases to certify to the

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 299

tioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion

rule that preponderance is not necessarily with the

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality

In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License.—Law

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 301

concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by

after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of

x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga

23 G.R. No. 156320, February 14, 2007, 515 SCRA 690.

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulis ang salitang “PLAIN VIEW

search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint

24 Rollo, pp. 139-140.

VOL. 740, NOVEMBER 12, 2014 303

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was

SECTION 48. Reckless Driving.—No person shall operate a

a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the

Brion, Villarama, Jr., Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,*