TIADRP Final v1-2

Final
Tribhuvan International Airport

Disaster Response Plan
Version 1.2
Babarmahal, Kathmandu, Nepal December 2012
1
FOREWORD
Earthquake preparedness in Nepal is not a new concept. The native sons and daughters of
my country are aware that this beautiful place tucked next to the soaring Himalayan
Mountains can erupt in a violent fit at any time due to the collision and friction of
unfathomable power. There are institutions, organizations and volunteers using
substantial and positive energy to work towards better preparedness and risk reduction
measures. This includes the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) and the Tribhuvan
International Airport (TIA) Civil Aviation Office (CAO). Given Nepal’s remote nature and
dynamic and challenging topography, it is essential that we ensure that Nepal’s only
international airport stands ready to assist the people of Nepal in recovering quickly from
any type of disaster, especially an earthquake. It is easy to become complacent. However,
the people of Nepal cannot afford too to act in such a manner. Our lives depend on it.
Over the past two years, CAAN and TIA have been taking great strides to ensure the
airport is prepared to face disaster situations and overcome the calamities they may
present. Efforts have touched all facets of aviation safety, with specific focus on gaining a
better understanding of the aerodrome’s current vulnerability, condition, strength and
subsurface characteristics. In April 2011, CAAN and TIACAO worked with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and others to identify
seismic vulnerability of structural and non-structural elements at the airfield. The team
prepared a list of recommendations for future actions and retrofitting measures. We are
actively pursuing support and donors to execute those projects. In January 2012, we again
worked with USACE, FAA, and the U.S. Air Force to perform a pavement strength and
condition survey of the runway, taxiways and aprons to determine the durability of the
system. In February 2012, we worked with USACE to perform a geotechnical subsurface
investigation of the aerodrome. From this information, we now have a greater
understanding of our risk as it relates to liquefaction, slope stability and water table.
CAAN and TIACAO are using this information to enhance our readiness.
I
In partnership with our friends from USACE, FAA and the University of British Columbia,
we have been hard at work since July 2012 to enhance our existing emergency response
plan to include preparedness measures for an earthquake. Herein, you will find our initial
effort, which we intend to revise often as we test and practice the plan. The plan will help
us ensure the airfield can be recovered as quickly as possible after an earthquake.
Given Nepal’s primary lifeline to the outside world runs through the Tribhuvan
International Airport, it is critical that we ensure we are ready to respond in the wake of
catastrophic. It is my great hope that this plan will assist the people of Nepal in this effort,
and strong efforts will be encouraged for other organizations and institutions throughout
Nepal to use this plan as a model to do the same.
Dr. Punya Raj Shakya

Officiating Director
Department of Aerodrome Safety and Standards
II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal and the Tribhuvan International Airport would like to
acknowledge the U.S. Pacific Command for providing funding to support the development
of the Tribhuvan International Airport Disaster Response Plan. Additionally, gratitude is
extended to the following individuals that helped prepare this document and make the plan
a reality.
1. Dr. Punya Raj Shakya, Tribhuvan International Airport, Officiating Director,

Department of Aerodrome Safety and Standard
2. Mr. Deo Chandra Lal Karn, Tribhuvan International Airport, Deputy Director
3. Mr. Santosh Gyawali, U.S. Agency for International Development, Disaster Risk
Reduction Specialist
CONTRIBUTORS
The following individuals and organizations assisted with the development of this
document.
University of British Columbia
4. Mr. Bishnu Pandey, Project Engineer & Coordinator

5. Dr. Carlos Ventura, Seismic Advisor
6. Dr. W.D. Liam Finn, Geotechnical Advisor
Federal Aviation Authority
7. Mr. Pablo Riofrio, Technical Director

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
8. Mr. Sean Dowling, Emergency Planning Advisor

9. Mr. Justin Pummell, Project Manager
III
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Emergency preparedness is commonly defined as the process of ensuring that an

organization (1) has complied with preventive measures, (2) is in a state of readiness to
contain the effects of a forecasted disastrous event to minimize loss of life, injury, and
damage to property, (3) can provide rescue, relief, rehabilitation, and other services in the
aftermath of the disaster, and (4) has the capability and resources to continue to sustain
its essential functions without being overwhelmed by the demand placed on them. The
Tribhuvan International Airport Disaster Response Plan (TIADRP) is designed to support
the airport in achieving the necessary preparedness measures described in the above
definition.
The TIADRP has been developed in partnership with a range of subject matter experts, but
most importantly through intense, honest and deliberate interviews, discussions, and
brainstorming sessions with employees and first responders at TIA. Representatives from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
University of British Columbia (UBC) have supported the authorship of this plan, but the
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) and the Tribhuvan International Airport Civil
Aviation Office (TIACAO) owns it. It is through their hard work, coordination,
communication and dedication that this plan has been prepared.
GOAL
The goal of this project was to support the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal and the
Tribhuvan International Airport better prepare the country’s only international airport to
plan for, respond to, and recover from a large-scale emergency situation.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to develop a disaster response plan for Tribhuvan
International Airport in case of an earthquake, which can be applied to all hazards.
IV
OBJECTIVES
The main objectives are:
1. Centralize aviation requirements for emergency response and recovery into one
document;
2. Identify critical land-use requirements at TIA for emergency response/recovery;
3. Analyze subsurface and geotechnical data to derive a hazard plan that includes a
liquefaction potential map;
4. Prepare a response document that can tie into Nepal's National Disaster Response
Framework;
5. Ensure the final plan maximizes airfield operations, space, and equipment to
support disaster relief operations; and
6. Encourage interaction and communication of all stakeholders.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Nepal is one of the most earthquake prone countries in the world. A detailed review of the
existing earthquake catalogue for the region indicates that devastating earthquakes are
inevitable in the long term and a major earthquake is likely to occur in the near future. In
the past, big earthquakes in Nepal have caused a huge number of casualties and damage to
structures. The Great Nepal-Bihar earthquake in 1934 reportedly killed 8,519 persons and
damaged 80,000 buildings just within Nepal’s borders. The earthquake destroyed 20
percent, and damaged 40 percent, of Kathmandu’s building stock. However, a large
earthquake today near Kathmandu, which is the cultural, political and economic heart of
the country, would cause a far greater human tragedy, extensive physical damage, cultural
loss and economic crisis than was caused by past earthquakes. With the city’s burgeoning
population, uncontrolled development, and a construction practice that has actually
degraded over the last decades, it is becoming increasingly vulnerable to earthquakes
with each passing year.
Recent earthquakes in developing countries, particularly those not prepared enough to

absorb the shock, suggests that an earthquake of large scale near Kathmandu today could
V
cause similar death and devastation of a degree that has been observed in Kashmir,
Pakistan and most recently in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The consequences for Nepal if a
comparable or bigger disaster happens in Kathmandu would likely be worse than in Port–
au-Prince because the Kathmandu Valley is landlocked within a rugged mountainous
valley and the city’s ability to connect with the outside is limited to ground transportation
(susceptible to be dysfunctional in major earthquakes) and air transportation.
Tribhuvan International Airport is expected to be the only means of transportation for

international aid and relief operations after a catastrophic earthquake hits the country.
However, without an emergency response plan in place, TIA is not designed to meet the
operational demands required to properly respond to a catastrophic event, which
requires expeditious handling of response and recovery missions.
The critical needs in regards to the continued operation of the airport for a smooth supply
of emergency aids and relief operation missions are:
 Seismic vulnerability assessment of the airport system.

 Specific post-earthquake assessment template for the airport to be used in the
immediate aftermath of the earthquake.
 Provision of a rapid repair kit for the runway.
Through this plan and previous efforts, TIA can stand ready to respond and recover from a
large natural disaster.
APPROACH
The approach for undertaking the tasks is characterized by the following:
The development of the plan built upon previous work already performed by CAAN, TIA
and others. The plan incorporated information, results, and recommendations from
Subject Matter Experts (SME) who visited Kathmandu before to make a visual assessment
of TIA and assist Nepalese stakeholder in carrying out further studies.
VI
 The plan used stakeholder input, among others, in the form of views, strategy and
programs for preparation of this document.
 Secondary data was used wherever available in authentic form. Site visits were
conducted and first-hand information was collected for major and critical points
and also for sample verifications.
 Relevant international methodologies were adapted for Nepalese context while
developing the methodology for post-earthquake evaluation and airport earthquake
emergency plan. Relevant methodologies from the United States, Canada, Japan and
Spain were also considered.
 The draft plan incorporates continuous feedback from stakeholders and will always
remain a dynamic document that changes and improves.
METHODOLOGY
The following methodology has been implemented:
Collection and Review of Pertinent Data and Information
All available data, information and maps, including geotechnical reports and other
assessment of airport facilities were collected and reviewed. They were verified by field
inspection as much as possible. The outcome familiarized stakeholders on the current
status of the Tribhuvan International Airport.
Interaction with Key Persons of the Concerned Authorities
Aviation specialists and earthquake engineers interacted with key persons of the
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and Aerodrome community to collect
information regarding strategy, programs and organizational strengths in emergency
response and relief operation. The interaction was in the form of a workshop, meetings
and discussions that took place for two weeks in July 2012.
Development of Emergency Response and Recovery Strategy for Airport
Aviation specialists and earthquake engineers worked out a development strategy for
emergency response and recovery of the airport system after a possible severe
VII
earthquake. Interactions with Civil Aviation Authorities, private aviation companies,
international governmental organizations, the military, and other agencies were the major
factor defining the strategy. Areas of improvements in institutional capacity, provision of
system redundancy and operational improvement were discussed, documented and
included in this plan.
Development of Strategy for Emergency Aid Handling
A workshop was held in Kathmandu in July 2012 and September 2012 inviting
stakeholders, donor agencies and diplomatic missions to get input for their contribution
towards managing the aid supply in the airport. A sectoral approach was taken to manage
the aid supply. A comprehensive strategy was formulated with roles and responsibilities
in line with commitment from the agencies.
Preparation of Report
A written text has been prepared describing the findings and recommendations of the
project in this final report. In addition, the following has been delivered with this report:
 Airport Earthquake Emergency Response Plan for Tribhuvan International Airport.

A self-standing airport earthquake emergency plan has been developed. The plan
considers two phases: emergency response of the airport covering activities before,
during and immediately after the earthquake; and airport operation for emergency
aid supply in the aftermath of the earthquake for smooth transit and distribution of
emergency personnel and relief material to the affected areas.
 Guidelines for post-earthquake assessment of the airport system and infrastructure.
The methodology included in the guidelines provides a step-by-step procedure for
conducting post-earthquake assessment of airport facilities and criteria for tagging
them (Green, yellow and Red). This is based on rapid visual inspection techniques.
 Rapid repair kit for airport runway. This includes a list of items and their storage in
non-emergency time and usage in the aftermath in case the runway gets damaged
during a major earthquake.
VIII
SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND USE
The TIADRP is a living document, and as such, requires continuous update to be relevant
and beneficial. In the preparation of the document, it has a primary focus on earthquake
hazards. Therefore, its application to other hazards can be cross-referenced, but may not
match specific requirements and/or needs in all circumstances. The plan still requires
revision, modification and input from CAAN and TIACAO before it is considered final.
During the preparation of the plan, the team met with as many stakeholders as possible.
In some instances, the team was not able to meet with every aviation stakeholder, and
their contributions to this plan are still required.
OWNERSHIP
This document is owned, managed and maintained by the Civil Aviation Authority of
Nepal and the Tribhuvan International Airport Civil Aviation Office. Contributions to the
document are made by various supporting partners that are described in detail in this
plan.
IX
Disaster Response Plan (TIADRP)
This document deals with the specific disaster scenario of an earthquake.

However, the plan is also adaptable to all natural disasters.
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

(CAAN)
Babarmahal, Kathmandu, Nepal
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION-1 GENERAL .................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 USE OF AIRPORT DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN (TIADRP) .................................................................................................... 1
1.1.1. PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1.2. AUTHORITY ......................................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1.3. ACTIVATION OF TIADRP ................................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1.4. NESTING OF TIAEEP WITHIN NDRF AND UN LOGISTIC CLUSTER PLAN ............................................................ 2
1.1.5. DISTRIBUTION OF PLAN ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.1.6. AMENDMENT ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1.7. REQUIREMENT OF CHANGE .............................................................................................................................................. 3
1.1.8. DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 BASIS OF TIADRP ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.1. SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.2. APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2.3. EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS CONSIDERED FOR THE PLAN ............................................................................................ 4
1.2.4. ASSUMPTIONS .................................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.5. EMERGENCY RESTORATION GOALS ................................................................................................................................ 6
1.2.6. EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE ACTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 6
1.3 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY INFORMATION FLOW CHART.................................................................................................... 8
1.4 MATRIX OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................................................. 9
SECTION-2 COMMAND & CONTROL ..................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.1 PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2 COMMAND & CONTROL AND LINE OF SUCCESSION ............................................................................................................. 10
2.3 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC) .................................................................................................................................. 10
2.3.1. ACTIVATION ...................................................................................................................................................................... 10

2.3.2. AUTHORITY ....................................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.3.3. OFFICIALS .......................................................................................................................................................................... 11
2.4 AIRPORT EMERGENCY OPERATION POST (AEOP) ............................................................................................................ 12
2.4.1. ACTIVATION ...................................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.4.2. OPERATION COMMANDER .............................................................................................................................................. 12
2.5 COMMAND & CONTROL CHAIN................................................................................................................................................ 13
2.6 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY OPERATION ASSIGNMENTS (GENERAL) ............................................................................... 13
2.6.1. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEPAL (CAAN) ..................................................................................................... 13
2.6.2. TIA CIVIL AVIATION OFFICE (GM’S OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATION DIVISION ) ................................................. 14
2.6.3. FLIGHT OPERATION DEPARTMENT, TIACAO ............................................................................................................ 14
2.6.4. AIRPORT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING DIVISION , TIACAO..................................................................................... 14
2.6.5. AIRPORT TECHNICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT .......................................................................................................... 15
2.6.6. AIRPORT OPERATION DEPARTMENT ........................................................................................................................... 15
2.6.7. AIRPORT CIVIL ENGINEERING DIVISION .................................................................................................................... 16
2.6.8. METROPOLITAN POLICE TIA SECURITY GUARD OFFICE .......................................................................................... 16
2.6.9. NEPAL ARMY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 16
2.6.10. AIRLINES AND AIRCRAFT OPERATORS ......................................................................................................................... 17
2.6.11. KATHMANDU MEDICAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL (KMC) ................................................................................................ 17
2.6.12. NEPAL OIL CORPORATION ............................................................................................................................................. 18
2.6.13. NEPAL EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER (NEOC)/M INISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS ....................................... 18
2.6.14. UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR ............................................................................................................................. 19
2.6.15. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, WFP (UN LOGISTIC CLUSTER LEAD AGENCY ) ...................................................... 19
2.6.16. IMMIGRATION OFFICE, TIA ........................................................................................................................................... 19
2.6.17. CUSTOM OFFICE, TIA ..................................................................................................................................................... 20
SECTION-3 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 21
3.1 PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 21

3.2 COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE ................................................................................................................................................ 21
3.2.1. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE (0-24 HOURS) ....................................................................................................................... 23
3.2.2. RESPONSE (24-72 HOURS) ........................................................................................................................................... 24
3.2.3. IMMEDIATE RECOVERY / DISASTER RELIEF OPERATION (72 HOURS ONWARDS ) .............................................. 26
3.3 AIRPORT TRAFFIC SERVICE FREQUENCIES AND BACK UP COMMUNICATION .................................................................. 28
3.4 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION WITH NEOC ........................................................................................................................ 28
3.5 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY ................................................................................................................................... 28
SECTION-4 EMERGENCY ACTIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF AN EARTHQUAKE ............................................... 29
4.1 RESPONSE ACTIONS TO EARTHQUAKE SHAKING ................................................................................................................... 29
4.2 ACTION ITEMS ............................................................................................................................................................................ 30
4.2.1. ACTION BY TIA GENERAL MANAGER (GM) OR MANAGER ON DUTY (MOD) ..................................................... 30
4.2.2. ACTION BY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICES ........................................................................................................... 30
4.2.3. ACTION BY TERMINAL MANAGEMENT SECTIONS (INTERNATIONAL , DOMESTIC AND CARGO TERMINALS )31
4.2.4. ACTION BY AIRPORT OPERATION DEPARTMENT ..................................................................................................... 31
4.2.5. ACTION BY RESCUE & FIREFIGHTING SERVICES ....................................................................................................... 32
4.2.6. ACTION BY DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEPAL (CAAN) .................................................... 33
4.2.7. ACTION BY AIRPORT SECURITY POLICE ....................................................................................................................... 33
4.2.8. ACTION BY ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE N EPAL ARMY AT TIA ........................................................................... 34
SECTION- 5 AIRPORT EMERGENCY RESTORATION ......................................................................................................................... 35
5.1 AIRPORT EMERGENCY RESTORATION TEAM ........................................................................................................................ 35
5.2 RAPID VISUAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF AIRFIELD............................................................................................................ 36
5.3 RAPID VISUAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURES...................................................................................................... 36
5.4 RAPID VISUAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF UTILITIES AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS (OFC) OF BUILDINGS ........ 37
5.4.1. ASSESSMENT OF UTILITIES ............................................................................................................................................ 37
5.4.2. ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION , NAVIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE (CNS) AND ATS FACILITIES ............ 38
5.4.3. ASSESSMENT OF ARCHITECTURAL / FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS .......................................................................... 38

5.5 AIRFIELD EMERGENCY REPAIRS ............................................................................................................................................. 38
5.6 PROVISION OF AVIATION FUEL ................................................................................................................................................ 39
5.7 SEISMIC VULNERABILITY OF AIRPORT STRUCTURES ............................................................................................................ 39
5.8 ASSESSMENT OF LIQUEFACTION POTENTIAL......................................................................................................................... 40
SECTION-6 LOGISTICS (EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS AND INTERNAL AIRPORT
LOGISTICS) ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 42
6.1 PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 42
6.2 BACKGROUND: DISASTER RELIEF / HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS .......................................................... 42
6.3 SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS ............................................................................................................ 44
6.3.1. SUPPORT TO UN LOGISTICS CLUSTER, HUMANITARIAN STAGING AREA(S) (HSA) ......................................... 44
6.3.2. SUPPORT TO RESCUE, RELIEF AND EVACUATION EMERGENCY AIR OPERATIONS ............................................. 45
6.3.3. COORDINATION OF DISASTER RELIEF FLIGHTS ........................................................................................................ 48
6.3.4. THE CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION CENTER (CMCC) ....................................................................................... 49
6.4 INTERNAL AIRPORT LOGISTICS FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS ....................................................................................... 49
6.5 TIA AIRPORT EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY LAND USE PLAN .............................................................................................. 50
APPENDIX I: TIADRP DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................................................................................................................... 52
APPENDIX II: AIRPORT GRID MAP ..................................................................................................................................................... 53
APPENDIX III: TIA EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY .......................................................................................................... 54
APPENDIX IV: AIRPORT CAPACITY FOR TIA ........................................................................................................................... 57
APPENDIX V: EXAMPLES OF EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE OF AIRFIELD ........................................................................................... 94
1. SAND BOIL ................................................................................................................................................................................. 94
2. DIFFERENTIAL SETTLEMENT ................................................................................................................................................. 96
3. LATERAL SPREADING ............................................................................................................................................................... 97
4. DAMAGE TO PAVEMENT BY SHAKING AND FAILURE OF SOIL UNDERNEATH ............................................................. 98
5. DAMAGE TO PIPELINES , CABLES AND DRAINAGE SYSTEM .......................................................................................... 102
6. GROUND DEFORMATION ..................................................................................................................................................... 103

APPENDIX VI: RAPID VISUAL ASSESSMENT OF MASONRY AND CONCRETE BUILDING COMPONENTS ........................ 104
1. DAMAGE TO MASONRY SOLID WALL ................................................................................................................................ 105
2. DAMAGE TO PIERS ................................................................................................................................................................ 106
3. DAMAGE TO L INTEL / SPANDREL ....................................................................................................................................... 107
4. DAMAGE TO CONCRETE FRAME WITH MASONRY INFILL ....................................................................................... 108
1. RESCUE & FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT ............................................................................................................................ 112
2. ELECTROMETRICAL EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 113
3. VEHICLES AND CIVIL WORK EQUIPMENT ........................................................................................................................ 116
4. GROUND HANDLING EQUIPMENT OF NEPAL AIRLINES ................................................................................................ 116
APPENDIX VIII: EXAMPLE OF RAPID REPAIR OF AIRFIELD PAVEMENT .............................................................................. 118
1. DETERMINING REPAIR METHOD .............................................................................................................................................. 118
2. INITIAL UPHEAVAL DETERMINATION .................................................................................................................................... 118
3. REMOVING UPHEAVAL, EXCAVATING AND FILLING CRATER .......................................................................................... 119
4. INTERMEDIATE PROFILE CHECK .............................................................................................................................................. 119
5. DAMAGED PAVEMENT EDGE CLEANING , LEVELING FILL MATERIAL , AND OVERFILLING ..................................... 119
6. ROUGH LEVELING AND COMPACTING THE FILLED PAVEMENT ....................................................................................... 119
7. FINAL GRADE AND COMPACTION ............................................................................................................................................. 120

SECTION-1 GENERAL
1.1 USE OF AIRPORT DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN (TIADRP)
1.1.1. PURPOSE
The purpose of this plan is to identify the responsibilities and required actions of
agencies and personnel responsible for direction, operation and effective emergency
recovery of airport services and facilities at Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) in
the event of an earthquake that may reduce the normal functionalities of TIA and/or
demand emergency flight operations required for relief work.
1.1.2. AUTHORITY
Tribhuvan International Airport Disaster Response Plan (TIADRP) is approved by
National Civil Aviation Security Committee in accordance with Civil Aviation Security
(Management) Rules 1989 and promulgated by Director General of Civil Aviation
Authority of Nepal (DGCAAN), exercising the power of Appropriate Authority for Civil
Aviation Security within Nepal as designated by National Civil Aviation Security Programme,
Nepal.
1.1.3. ACTIVATION OF TIADRP

This plan will be activated in the event of an earthquake disaster by the authority as
follows:
A. During routine weekday business hours: The Director General (DG) of the Civil
Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN), or DG’s designee/substitute shall have the
authority to initiate the TIAEEP in its entirety or in portion. In case DG is not
available, following will be the line of succession as a substitute to initiate the
TIAEEP:
1. Deputy Director General of CAAN (DDG-1)

The severity level of the situation will determine what level of response is
necessary. Response levels are defined more specifically in section 1.2.3. The
General Manager (GM) of TIA or Director, Airport Operation Department (AOD)
shall communicate the situation at the airport to the DG before the activation of
the TIADRP.
B. During non-business hours: It shall be the responsibility of the Manger on Duty at

Terminal management section (MOD) to activate the TIADRP. It is assumed that
during non-business hours, MOD shall be able to contact the DG and GM or their
substitutes for assistance in initiation of the TIADRP.
All of the agencies and personnel responding to earthquake emergency situation shall
be coordinated under the direction of the Emergency Control Centre established as
per section 2.3. Coordination and cooperation between the agencies shall be
continuous until such time as the emergency situation has been terminated
1.1.4. NESTING OF TIAEEP WITHIN NDRF AND UN LOGISTIC CLUSTER PLAN

This plan also supports the National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF). In the
event of an earthquake, the Airport Emergency Control Centre (ECC) will be in
continuous communication with the National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC)
regarding the status of the airport and flight operations. TIA Civil Aviation Office
(TIACAO) will prioritize restoration of the airport facilities and flight operations to
provide space for UN Logistics Cluster operations and to maximize aircraft
throughput. The NEOC will coordinate the priority disaster relief requirements with
the On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) as mentioned in NDRF and will
communicate priority flights to the ECC so that limited slot allocations may be
properly managed.
1.1.5. DISTRIBUTION OF PLAN

Copies of the TIADRP will be made available to all government and civil agencies
and/or their units, which may require responding to an earthquake emergency at
TIA. The copies will also be provided to the UN Clusters, diplomatic agencies and
other national and international humanitarian agencies which would normally be
expected to provide assistance to deal with an earthquake disaster.
All airlines and aircraft operators serving TIA will also be issued copies of this plan.
Plans will also be provided to domestic airports within Nepal as a backup mechanism.
GM of TIA can provide copies of the plan to other agencies as necessary.
1.1.6. AMENDMENT
Amendments to this plan, when necessary, will be made, published and distributed by
Deputy Director, Aviation security management division, TIACAO upon approval from
DGCAAN in the form of replacement pages. Each page will be dated. A checklist of
current pages will be issued annually. The Custodian of the TIADRP shall ensure that
the amended pages are properly inserted, the old pages destroyed, and the
amendment numbers logged on the Amendment Check Sheet located on Page II.
1.1.7. REQUIREMENT OF CHANGE

Each TIADRP custodian will be held responsible for ensuring that any part of the plan
affecting their unit or organization is kept current. When any change to information
in the plan becomes necessary, especially emergency telephone numbers and/or
internal procedures, the Custodian shall indicate those changes immediately in
writing to:
General Manager
Tribhuvan International Airport Civil Aviation Office
GPO Box 7950
Gauchar, Kathmandu, Nepal
Tel. 977-1-4-4113161
Fax 977-1-4-4113180
AFTN VNKTYDYX
Email planstat@tiairport.com.np
1.1.8. DISTRIBUTION LIST

The distribution list of this document is in Appendix I.
1.2 BASIS OF TIADRP
1.2.1. SCOPE
The Tribhuvan International Airport Disaster Response Plan (TIADRP) identifies
roles and responsibilities of CAAN, TIACAO and other agencies involved in airport
operation in the event of earthquake. It deals with response actions of airport tenants
on the onset of an earthquake event; immediate actions of airport facility assessment;
and emergency actions related to airport services including flight operations, land-
use, emergency recovery of critical facilities and short-term storage and transit of
domestic and foreign humanitarian assistance coming to Kathmandu via air.
This plan is a subset of the Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) and shall be taken as a
standalone document for earthquake emergencies. For other aviation and aviation
security emergency types the main AEP document shall be referenced and used.
The TIADRP includes only action items that are directly related to airport earthquake
emergency services and passage of relief aid supply through TIA. It is bound by the
Nepal Civil Aviation Rules (2002), Nepal Civil Aviation Authority Act (1996) and the
National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF).
1.2.2. APPLICABILITY
The TIADRP is applicable for major earthquakes with moderate to significant damage
as defined in section 1.2.3. The plan may also be used for response to any large scale
natural disaster.
In a catastrophe situation, a Notice to Airman (NOTAM) shall be issued to divert

approaching flights to alternative airports and no flight operations will be made. In
such a situation, the rest of this plan will not be applicable. Airport restoration will be
initiated as part of the recovery process.
1.2.3. EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS CONSIDERED FOR THE PLAN

The TIADRP activation level is dependent upon the level of earthquake severity. The
following levels of earthquake severity are considered for this plan.
A. Catastrophe: The severity of the earthquake is profound. As such, most of the
airport runway and other critical facilities are destroyed and/or severely
damaged. No flight operations are possible for an extended period of time in the
aftermath of the earthquake.
B. Major earthquake with moderate to significant damage: The severity of the

earthquake disaster is medium to high. As such, airport facility damage is
moderate to significant, requiring immediate repair for emergency flight
operations. The runway is available, but requires rapid runway repair.
C. Significant earthquake in the country with no or minimal damage: The damage to

the airport from an earthquake is minimal with no functional loss. The earthquake
may, however, induce significant damage to other parts of the country, requiring
major relief aid transport through Tribhuvan International Airport.
1.2.4. ASSUMPTIONS
This plan is primarily based on the disaster scenario described in Section 1.2.3-B. If
actual field conditions are significantly different, the Emergency Control Center will
make decisions to address the situation at hand.
The following assumptions are made in the TIADRP.
A. There will be no other concurrent large disaster in Nepal.
B. There will be no labor strike, and normal operations are carried out with the full
airport staff on hand.
C. The airport runway is well maintained and fully functional for normal operations.
D. The Nepal Army (NA) is functional in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake

event and is available for immediate action.
E. Full access to the airport is feasible within 72 hours after an earthquake disaster.
F. A temporary power supply at the airport is available for emergency operations.

1.2.5. EMERGENCY RESTORATION GOALS
Emergency response actions stipulated in this plan are based on the following goals:
A. Restore Airport Perimeter Security

B. Restore Flight Operations.
a. Restoration of Runway, Taxiway, and Ramp Areas:
i. Complete rapid repairs to maximize runway length and ramp areas
and restore taxiways
b. Restore Navigational Aid (NAVAID) and Air Traffic Control systems in
increments:
i. Visual Flight Rules (VFR), Daylight Operations
ii. Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Operations
C. Restore Fuel Operations
D. Establish Emergency Customs and Immigration
E. Restore Terminal Facilities
F. Support Logistics Cluster Operations
G. Maximize aircraft Throughput (In accordance with Appendix IV: Calculation of
Aircraft Throughput)
1.2.6. EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE ACTIONS
Earthquake emergency response actions and operations at the airport are
characterised by the following phases:
A. Immediate Response (0-24 hrs): Action items that needs to be taken during the
earthquake shaking and right after the shaking stops include
 Follow personal and collective safety procedures (duck-cover-hold) and
evacuation.
 Conduct internal emergency communication.
 conduct Emergency Medical, Search and Rescue, and firefighting operations, if
necessary .
 Activate Emergency Control Centre and TIA Earthquake Emergency Plan.
 Contact NEOC
 Communicate to all responders and agencies
 Establish Airport Perimeter security.
 Establish Emergency Air Traffic Control
 Issue NOTAM on airport operating status
 Make public communication at the airport for guidance to passengers and
whereabouts of approaching flights.
 Manage public affairs communications regarding the airport status through
NEOC
 Activate Airport earthquake restoration team for rapid screening assessment
of airport facilities (runway/taxiways, utilities, Air Traffic Control
facilities/equipment and NAVAIDS, fuel farm, access roads, terminals and
cargo facilities)
B. Response (24-72 hrs): Items for immediate actions include:

 Carry out airfield emergency repairs
 Conduct Emergency Air Traffic Control including expanded rotary wing
emergency flight operations
 Activate Emergency Helicopter Landing Zone (refer to section 6.5)
 Maintain Communications with NEOC / coordinate flight slot allocation / daily
situation reports.
 Establish Emergency Customs and Immigration
 Support Logistics Cluster with space and set up of Humanitarian Staging
Area(s) (HSA) in accordance with the Land Use Plan (refer to section 6.5)
 Maintain Airport Perimeter Security
 Establish Aircraft parking areas and additional grading
 Continue Public Information and NOTAMs as required
C. Immediate Recovery/Disaster Relief Operations (72 hrs – 30 days): Actions are

made to restore the airport facilities to maximize the emergency flight operations
and Throughput. Other major actions include:
 Restore infrastructure with temporary repairs.
 Conduct detailed evaluation of infrastructure for more permanent repairs.
 Restore NAVAID equipment to establish VFR Daylight / IFR operations
 Provide continuous fuelling alternatives for emergency aircraft
 Restore security fences and increase security to protect assets
 Continue Support of Logistics Cluster
 Restore commercial airline operations for emergency relief and evacuation
flights
 Restore airport access roads and bridges
 Manage temporary debris dump site
 Maximize throughputs/ slot management for air traffic
 Make daily situation reports to NEOC
 Issue updated NOTAM
 Continue Public Information as required
1.3 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY INFORMATION FLOW CHART
1.4 MATRIX OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Law enforcement
Communication
Fire and rescue
Operation and
management
Control and
positioning
command
Relief aid
Medical
Ministry of Home Affairs/
P S P S S - S
NEOC
Civil aviation authority of
S S - - S S
Nepal
Emergency Control Centre P P S S S S S
TIA GM office P P S S S P P
Flight Operation Dept./ TIA S S - - - P S
Technical Service Dept./ TIA - S - S - S S
Airport Operation Dept./ TIA S S S S - P P
Rescue & Firefighting Services - S - P S - -
Civil Engineering Div./ TIA - S - - - S S
Kathmandu Medical Hospital - S - - P - S
Nepal Oil Corporation - S - S - S S
Nepal police S S P S S S S
Armed police force - S S P S - -
Nepal Army - S S P S S S
Airline Managers - S - - - S S
Ministry of physical planning - - - - - S -
Dept. of immigration/ custom - - S - - S S
OSOCC - P - S S S P
UN log. Cluster ( WFP led) - S - - S S P
Note: P= Primary, S = Secondary
SECTION-2 COMMAND & CONTROL
2.1 PURPOSE
The Command & Control section will provide an overview of the mechanism used by
the Tribhuvan International Airport to command and control the earthquake
emergency situation by effective response and recovery activities. Command &
Control provides for those actions essential to saving lives, protecting assets,
supporting relief activities, restoring the airport for enhanced operations at the
shortest time possible and returning the airport to normal after an earthquake.
2.2 COMMAND & CONTROL AND LINE OF SUCCESSION

The Director General (DG) of the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) shall be
responsible for command and control of all personnel and agencies during an
earthquake emergency. In case the DG is not available, the following will be the main
line of succession for command and control authority:

2.3 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)
2.3.1. ACTIVATION
The Emergency Control Center located at the Tribhuvan International Airport,
International Terminal Building (2nd floor) will be activated by the Director General
of CAAN or the authority in-charge of Command & Control for earthquake emergency
situations. If the facility is not functional due to damage by an earthquake, the official
in-charge of Command and Control shall activate the ECC office and notify agencies
and authorities of the alternate location and contact details along with notice to
assemble.
2.3.2. AUTHORITY
The ECC shall assume the responsibilities of overall direction and authority of
decision making regarding the operations at TIA during an earthquake emergency
period. It shall coordinate with National Emergency Operation Center (NEOC) of the
Ministry of Home Affairs and other government agencies directly associated to the
emergency operation at TIA.
If necessary, it will coordinate with national and international airports to deal with
the situation.
The ECC will provide direction to the Operation Commander (defined in section 2.4.2)
for implementation of decisions made. This will also notify the status of airport
facilities and services to NEOC at a regular interval and when needed.
2.3.3. OFFICIALS
Director General, CAAN or designate/ substitute will serve as the lead of the ECC
The ECC shall be manned by the following officials:
- Deputy Director General, Air Navigation Services Directorate, CAAN

- Deputy Director General, Civil Aviation Safety Regulation Directorate, CAAN
- Deputy Director General, Aerodrome Operations Directorate, CAAN
- General Manager, Tribhuvan International Airport Civil Aviation Office
- Chief, Engineering directorate, Nepal Army
- Representative, Headquarters, Armed Police Force
- Deputy Inspector General (DIG), International Airport Security Guard,
Metropolitan Police
- Chief, Immigration Office, TIA
- Chief, Customs Office, TIA
- Chief, Nepal Oil Corporation Office ,TIA
- Chief, Vigilance Sub Section of National Bureau of Investigation, TIA
- Representative, Kathmandu Medical College
- Airport Station Managers, Aircraft operators of international and domestic
airlines
- Airport station Managers, Helicopter operators, TIA
- Representative, Ministry of Home Affairs
2.4 AIRPORT EMERGENCY OPERATION POST (AEOP)
2.4.1. ACTIVATION
The Director General of CAAN will activate the Airport Emergency Operation Post
(AEOP). The post will be set up at the GM’s office or alternate place designated by the
GM.
2.4.2. OPERATION COMMANDER

The General Manager of TIA or designee/substitute will serve as the Operation
Commander. Following officers will provide direct assistance to the Operation
Commander:
- Director, Flight Operation Department TIA, Civil Aviation Office

- Director, Airport Operation Department, TIA Civil Aviation Office
- Director, Technical Services Department, TIA Civil Aviation Office
- Chief, Airport Security Police, TIA
- Chief, Rescue and Firefighting Division, TIA Civil Aviation Office
- Chief Manager, Aviation Security Management Division, TIA Civil Aviation
Office
- Chief Manager, Terminal Management Division, TIA Civil Aviation Office
- Chief Manager, Airside Management Division, TIA Civil Aviation Office
- Chief, Civil Engineering Division, TIA Civil Aviation Office
- Chief, Administration Division, TIA Civil Aviation Office
The Operation Commander will lead the operation post and give the command to TIA
divisions and units for implementation of emergency operation actions. All TIA units
will coordinate with the Operation Commander in performing their respective duties
after an earthquake emergency situation.
The operation commander will receive directions from and provide the continuous
situation update to the ECC. The TIA Administration Division will provide all logistic
support to the AEOP.
2.5 COMMAND & CONTROL CHAIN
2.6 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY OPERATION ASSIGNMENTS (GENERAL)

The following emergency operation assignments of agencies have been defined in support of
the TIADRP.
2.6.1. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEPAL (CAAN)

- Receive the earthquake emergency situation report from the manager on duty
at TIA in the immediate aftermath of earthquake.
- Activate the TIA Earthquake Emergency Plan and activate the Emergency
Control Centre (ECC).
- Provide command and control of TIA and coordinate with the Ministry of
Home Affairs’ NEOC and other government agencies for effective emergency
operations at TIA (through the ECC).
- Receive continuous update of TIA in regards to damage situation, airport
capacity, flight operation, handling of disaster aid supply (logistics) and other
necessary (through ECC)
- Provide status updates regarding emergency airport services (through ECC) to
the Ministry of Home Affairs’ NEOC
2.6.2. TIA CIVIL AVIATION OFFICE (GM’S OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATION DIVISION)
- Initiate actions for activation of the TIA earthquake emergency plan.
- Set up and manage the Airport Earthquake Emergency Operation Post.
- Act as Operation Commander of the earthquake emergency situation and
mobilize all departments, divisions and units for implementation of emergency
actions.
- Report to CAAN and Emergency Control Centre on the airport situation.
- Implement the decisions made by the ECC.
2.6.3. FLIGHT OPERATION DEPARTMENT, TIACAO
- Receive notice of the earthquake emergency situation from the Operation
commander in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake.
- Control movements of airborne aircrafts and issue NOTAMS, as necessary.
- Control ground movements of aircrafts, vehicles and personnel in the
manoeuvring area of the airport after getting updates from Aviation Security
management division (AVSEC)
- Provide flight updates to the Operation Commander and Emergency Control
Centre.
- Implement the slot allocation schedule for flight operations as instructed by
the Operation Commander.
- Provide additional support as needed and instructed by Operation
Commander.
2.6.4. AIRPORT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING DIVISION, TIACAO
- Conduct an immediate fire assessment of buildings, equipment and
installations after earthquake shaking stops and provide a status briefing to
- Suppress and extinguish all fires.
- Establish evacuee holding areas at safe locations and assist in the movement of
airport survivors to this area.
- Provide assistance to medical personnel as needed.
- Provide regular fire service category updates to the Operation Commander.
Commander.
2.6.5. AIRPORT TECHNICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT
- Conduct an immediate assessment of NAVAIDs, communication, RADAR and
electro-mechanical equipment after the earthquake shaking has stopped
- Provide a status briefing to the Operation Commander.
- Operate NAVAID, communication, RADAR and electro-mechanical equipment
as needed for emergency flight operations and airport services.
- Provide a Communication Specialist to the Airport Emergency Operation Post
(AEOP) and Emergency Control Centre (ECC) to help monitor communications.
- Provide electrical, mechanical, electronic and telecommunication
engineers/technicians to the Airport Emergency Restoration Team defined in
section 5.2 to fix the problem by earthquake damage to equipment.
Commander.
2.6.6. AIRPORT OPERATION DEPARTMENT
- Conduct evacuation of airport tenants and transient passengers as soon as the
earthquake shaking stops.
- Conduct a quick assessment of the runway and other airport facilities together
with the Civil Engineering Division as soon as possible after the earthquake
event and report the status to the Operation Commander.
- Conduct throughput calculations for reduced facilities and report to the
Operation Commander every four hours or less.
- Control and manage domestic and international terminals for emergency
services.
- Coordinate with security agencies for security arrangements.
- Coordinate with humanitarian agencies and their staffs for handling and
movement of relief materials at TIA airport facilities.
Commander.
2.6.7. AIRPORT CIVIL ENGINEERING DIVISION
- Conduct quick assessment of civil infrastructures, including airfield and open
spaces as soon as possible after the earthquake event and report the status to
- Lead the Airport Emergency Restoration Team and conduct Rapid Screening
Assessment (RSA) and emergency repairs of critical operation facilities.
- Provide support to establish Humanitarian Staging Areas (HSA) facilities and
other temporary structures in support for the emergency airport operation
and implementation of earthquake emergency land use plan.
Commander.
2.6.8. METROPOLITAN POLICE TIA SECURITY GUARD OFFICE
- Provide security to the airport facilities, including airside area and Landside
restricted areas.
- Provide traffic and crowd control.
- Take actions to assist movement of Emergency Vehicles and other vehicles of
relief supplies.
- Establish temporary facility for security corridors to aid with emergency
airport operations.
- Assist the Operation Commander as needed.
- Provide additional support as required and instructed by Police Officials
representing the ECC.
2.6.9. NEPAL ARMY
- Carry out collapsed structure search and rescue (CSSR) operations in the
airport getting necessary supports from Armed Police Force (AFP) as soon as
possible after the earthquake.
- Provide security corridors around the entire airport premise.
- Provide support to the Fire Services Division to suppress post-earthquake
fires.
- Provide rescue and transportation support to the Emergency Control Centre
officials.
- Provide support to the Airport Emergency Restoration Team to repair the
facilities, if necessary
- Provide additional support to the Nepal Police and the Nepal Armed Police to
maintain security as required and instructed by the ECC.
- Provide support to relief operations as required and instructed by the ECC.
2.6.10. AIRLINES AND AIRCRAFT OPERATORS
- Provide any/all details of inbound aircraft to TIA to the Operation Commander
immediately after a major earthquake event.
- Assist the Airport Operation Department to manage transient passengers for
evacuation and safe movement out of the airport.
- Assist the TIA Terminal Management Division with passenger details on
inbound and outbound flights to notify family and friends.
- Provide ground handling personnel and equipment to the TIA Airside
Management Division for use in the emergency airport operation and
management of relief aid supplies.
Commander.
2.6.11. KATHMANDU MEDICAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL (KMC)
- Serve as Emergency Medical Coordinator for TIA after a major earthquake
event.
- Provide medical doctors, nurses, ambulances and technicians as needed and as
available to TIA.
- Assess the scope of the medical situation and relay any requirements for
additional medical support and/or ambulances to the Emergency Control
Centre and to hospital staff.
- Provide primary medical support to injured individuals and administer
casualty identification.
- Provide emergency medical services to the airport during earthquake
emergency condition to include triage, stabilization, first aid and any other
necessary medical care and organize disposition of most critical cases to KMC
and other hospitals in Kathmandu.
- Prepare Hospital Intensive Care and Emergency room for possible arrival of
mass casualties airlifted to Kathmandu from other parts of the country.
- Coordinate planning, response and recovery efforts with other hospitals in
Kathmandu for influx of mass casualty from TIA.
- Provide additional support related to emergency medical services as
requested by the Earthquake Emergency Commander.
2.6.12. NEPAL OIL CORPORATION
- Assess the airport fuel farm facility for any damage and carry out immediate
damage control measures.
- Report the situation of the fuel farm and availability of aviation fuel to the
Emergency Control Centre.
- Manage and supply fuel to the aircrafts providing emergency services
provided that fuel farm is not completely damaged
- Coordinate with Airport Emergency Restoration Team for quick fix of
minor/medium damage aiming to provide supply in the emergency.
2.6.13. NEPAL EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER (NEOC)/MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
- Receive the CAAN situation report after an earthquake event.
- Coordinate search & rescue support agencies to the airport by mobilizing
security as necessary
- Coordinate and supply security arrangement as needed for the airport.
- Receive continuous updates from the airport on its capacity for flight
operations.
- Coordinate with the On Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) as per
National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF), make decisions on the
priority of humanitarian flights to operate at the Tribhuvan International
Airport and coordinate the Earthquake Emergency Commander for its
implementation.
- Facilitate with other ministries and government agencies for necessary
support to airport operations.
- Coordinate with the UN Logistics Cluster group and provide necessary
instructions to the EEC in relation to staging, storing, and movement of relief
material in and out of the airport.
- Provide instruction to EEC on any decisions made by the government of Nepal
in relation to airport operations for effective response, rescue and relief in the
aftermath of earthquake.
- Coordinate public media releases of the airport status.
2.6.14. UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR
- Get the status report of the airport from the Ministry of Home affairs
/Government of Nepal and establish equipment and human resource priorities
for emergency airport operations.
- Provide detailed information on international rescue and relief assistance
flights as coordinated with the Government of Nepal to the Earthquake
Emergency Commander.
- Provide details of space, security and logistic needs at the airport in relation to
the Land Use Map and to the Operation Commander.
2.6.15. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, WFP (UN LOGISTIC CLUSTER LEAD AGENCY)
- Coordinate with the NEOC through OSOCC for logistical needs and the
necessary arrangement of space and security as per Land Use Plan (section
6.5) at the airport.
- Provide details of personnel and equipment and their movements at the
airport to the Operation Commander.
- Coordinate with the Airport Operation Division for staging the tent area,
storing and movement of goods.
2.6.16. IMMIGRATION OFFICE, TIA
- Grant visas to International Humanitarian Communities (IHC) as per the
provision established by the Government of Nepal for major disasters
requiring international assistance for rescue and relief.
- Coordinate with NEOC/ MOHA for any specific need for effective border
control.
2.6.17. CUSTOM OFFICE, TIA
- Grant custom exemptions, where appropriate, to International Humanitarian
Communities (IHC) for relief goods and equipment as per the provision
established by the Government of Nepal for major disasters requiring
international assistance for rescue and relief.
- Coordinate with the ECC to define and inform potential emergency equipment
that may be brought to Nepal in support of earthquake emergency relief
measures.

SECTION-3 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
3.1 PURPOSE
This section provides information on how TIA will establish and use emergency
communication systems after an earthquake. This section also describes the general
procedure of notification between agencies. More specific details of notification
actions at the instance of the earthquake event including public announcement to
passengers are included in Section 4- Emergency Actions in the Immediate Aftermath
of an Earthquake.
3.2 COMMUNICATION STRUCTURE

Earthquake emergency communication depends on the earthquake response phase:
3.2.1. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE (0-24 HOURS)
As soon as shaking stops, all staff has safely evacuated to pre-defined assembly areas
and roll call is completed, all department directors and division chiefs shall report to
the General Manager (GM) of TIA or Manager on Duty (MOD).
The GM or designee/substitute
- Establishes communication with Nepal Army and Rescue &Firefighting

Services (RFFS), TIA at Airport for rescue operations.
- Get status of fire breakouts from RFFS and instructs for fire suppressing.
- Instructs Flight Operation Department (FOD), Technical Services Department
(TSD) and Airport Operation Department (AOD) to conduct quick assessment
of possible functional loss.
- Instructs Airport Operation Department (AOD) to dispatch team for quick
assessment of damages to infrastructure/facilities that prohibits flight
operation in coordination with Civil Engineering Division (CED) and Technical
Service Department.
- Instructs Air Traffic Control Services (ATCS) to notify all approaching flights
for possible diversion and holding departures as needed.
Upon receiving initial information damage situation report, GM or
designate/substitute
- Notifies Director General (DG) of Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal or designee/

substitute the extent of damage and current situation. Instructs ATCS to
confirm that the airport operation status
- Instructs Terminal Management Division for follow–on action with airlines.
- Notifies security agencies (Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, and Nepal Police)
to protect the airport against intrusion, secure critical airport facilities and
manage crowds.
- Communicates with Nepal Oil Corporation and Kathmandu Medical college
damage about the damage situation and emergency standby.
Air Traffic Control Services
- Communicate with approaching flights that runway is closed and issue holding
instruction until quick assessment is completed.
- Instruct outbound flights to hold in position unless further instruction is given.
- Provide the airport status to airborne flights and departing flights and give
necessary instructions.
Upon receiving instruction from the GM, Terminal Management Division shall notify
all airlines the emergency situation and instruct to halt flights, if needed.
Director General (DG) of CAAN or designate/ substitute shall notify the airport
emergency situation to:
- Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism

- Secretary of Civil Aviation and Tourism
- Secretary of Home Affairs
- Secretary of Physical Planning, Works and Transport Development
- National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC)
- Nepal Army, Headquarters
- Armed Police Force, Headquarters
- Chief of Metropolitan Police, Nepal Police
- Chief District Officers of Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur
- Director General , Department of Immigration
- Director General, Department of Customs
- Chief Executive Officer ( CEO), Kathmandu Medical College Hospital
- General Manager of Nepal Oil Corporation
If an earthquake occurs during non-business hours, the Manager on Duty (MOD) at
the airport shall notify the emergency situation to authorities and agencies listed
above in this subsection.
3.2.2. RESPONSE (24-72 HOURS)

As soon as the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) and Airport Emergency Operation
Post (AEOP) are established, the following communication shall be made:
Emergency Control Centre (ECC) establishes communication to:
- National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC)

a. To provide situational updates.
b. To receive instructions in regards to emergency flight operations related to
international rescue and relief operation.
c. To request technical assistance and equipment.
- Nepal Army, Armed Police Force (APF) and Metropolitan Police for added
security at the airport as needed.
- Kathmandu Medical Collage Hospital for Emergency Medical Services.
- Nepal Oil Corporation for provision of aviation fuel
- Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism

a. To provide situational updates.
b. To get necessary administration /logistical support.
- Ministry of Physical Planning, Works and Transport Development

a. To provide situational updates on major infrastructure damage
b. To request updates and restoration of access roads and bridges.
c. To request technical assistance and equipment for the restoration of key
facilities and debris clearance required for operation of emergency flights,
if necessary
- Nepal Army Engineering Directorate , TIA

a. To provide situational updates on major infrastructure damage
b. To request updates and restoration of access roads and bridges.
c. To request technical assistance and equipment for the restoration of key
facilities and debris clearance required for operation of emergency flights,
if necessary
- Any other government agencies and organizations as needed for support of

airport emergency operations.
Airport Emergency Operation Post (AEOP) establishes communication to:
- Emergency Control Centre

a. To update the situation of the airport.
b. To receive instruction on implementation of ECC decisions on airport
emergency operations and restoration.
c. To convey the request to other government agencies as needed.
Airport Emergency Operation Post (AEOP) provides instruction to:
- Flight Operation Department/ Air Traffic Control Service for emergency flight
control
- Airport Operation Department/Terminal Management Division to make
communication with airlines and aircraft operators
- The Technical Service Department ( TSD) to restore emergency functionality
of airport equipment including NAVAIDS, VISAIDS, communication, security
equipment, radar, electro-mechanical systems and others..
- The Civil Engineering Division (CED) to conduct a rapid screening assessment
of the runway, taxiways, aprons, utility infrastructure, perimeter road,
terminal and cargo facilities as per section 5.
- Airline and aircraft operators to provide ground handling equipment and
manpower.
Airport Emergency Operation Post (AEOP) communicates with:
- The Nepal Police at TIA for additional security and crowd control personnel.
- The Nepal Army Engineering Directorate for rescue operation and security of
airport facilities.
- The Kathmandu Medical College (KMC) for providing emergency medical
services to tenants and transient passengers at the airport.
3.2.3. IMMEDIATE RECOVERY / DISASTER RELIEF OPERATION (72 HOURS ONWARDS)
The commencement of this phase begins as soon as international relief supply starts
or 72hrs after the earthquake, whichever comes first. The communication structure
established during preceding phase will be maintained in addition to further
communication by:
National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) to:
- The On Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC) for coordination of relief

and rescue efforts by the UN and diplomatic agencies and international
humanitarian organizations.
- The World Food Programme, the UN Logistics Cluster lead, for coordination of
logistical arrangements at the airport for international relief aid materials
coming through air delivery.
- The Central Disaster Relief Committee (CDRC) to report the status of the
airport.
- The Department of Immigration to facilitate visas to the International
Humanitarian Community (IHC).
- The Department of Customs to exempt duty on goods and equipment brought
for rescue and relief.
Emergency Control Centre (ECC) to:
- The Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC)

and engineering professional organizations for detailed evaluation of airport
buildings and facilities.
- The Kathmandu Medical College and other hospitals in Kathmandu to handle
for a mass casualty situation from earthquake in other parts of the country
that required airlift operation to Kathmandu.
- The World Food Programme for local arrangements of logistics at the airport
for international relief aid coming through air.
- No. 11 Brigade, airlines operators for operations of helicopters and small
fixed wing aircrafts to supply the relief goods to the city, if needed.
- NEOC with throughput information.

Airport Emergency Operation Post (AEOP) to
- The agencies involved in international supply of rescue and relief goods for the
movement of their personnel in and out of airport.
3.3 AIRPORT TRAFFIC SERVICE FREQUENCIES AND BACK UP COMMUNICATION
The following frequencies are used by the Control Tower and Area Control to
communicate with aircraft in Nepalese airspace and with aircraft on the ground at
TIA.
Location Frequency
Kathmandu approach 120.6 MHz/125. MHz
Kathmandu Tower 118.1 MHz
Kathmandu Ground 121.9 MHz
There are two frequencies 118.1 and 118.5 as primary and secondary frequencies
respectively.
If existing VHF and HF system get damaged by earthquake, desktop VHF and HF shall
be established by Technical Service Department (TSD) for Air Traffic Control Services.
Note: For an EMERGENCY call, 121.5 MHz is in use at Kathmandu Tower and Area
Control Center.
3.4 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION WITH NEOC

Phone 1: +977-1-4200105
Phone 2: +977-1-4200203
Fax: +977-1-4200103
E-mail: neoc@moha.gov.np
3.5 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

Emergency telephone directory for TIA is listed in Appendix III.
SECTION-4 EMERGENCY ACTIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE
AFTERMATH OF AN EARTHQUAKE
This section identifies the immediate actions to be taken by units and individuals of
the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN), Tribhuvan International Airport Civil
Aviation Office (TIACAO) and other agencies at the airport in response to an
earthquake affecting Tribhuvan International Airport. The action items listed in this
section include details of responsibilities at the initial phase of an emergency
response.
All responding agencies must be familiar with the preceding sections of this
Earthquake Emergency Plan, which describe essential details and general
responsibilities after an earthquake occurs, to ensure immediate actions are
performed accurately and efficiently.
4.1 RESPONSE ACTIONS TO EARTHQUAKE SHAKING

As soon as the shaking from an earthquake stops,
All TIA staff and tenants should:
- Evacuate to designated evacuation locations ( Refer Land use map Section 6.5)
TIA CAO Unit Chiefs should:
- Conduct roll call (head count) and compare with the daily/ shift Roster.
- Report the situation, including information on causalities and missing
personnel, to the General Manager (GM) or Manager on Duty (MOD). This
reporting shall be done manually in-person, if the communication system is
inoperable.
- Recall off-duty staff, as needed.
GM or MOD
- Activate the Siren/Alarm located at roof of International Terminal Building to
implement earthquake emergency procedures at TIA.
4.2 ACTION ITEMS
The following emergency actions shall be taken by agencies, units and individuals
once the earthquake emergency siren is activated by the GM or MOD.
4.2.1. ACTION BY TIA GENERAL MANAGER (GM) OR MANAGER ON DUTY (MOD)

- Assume the role of Operation Commander
- Instruct Airport Operations to suspend all flights
- Instruct the Control Tower to issue appropriate NOTAM.
- Get immediate report of damage to facilities from all TIACAO department
directors and unit chiefs.
- Make primary notification to the Director General of CAAN of the damage and
make recommendations for the activation of the TIA Earthquake Emergency
Plan, as necessary.
- If an earthquake occurs during non-business hours or communication cannot
be established with the CAAN office, then GM or MOD shall activate the TIA
Earthquake Emergency Plan and assume the role of Temporary Earthquake
Emergency Commander until the CAAN Director (or substitute) assume the
position.
- Proceed to the Emergency Control Centre and report the damage situation and
state of airport operations.
- Upon arrival at the airport, the General Manager or substitute shall assume
operational command from the Manager on Duty.
- Continue operational and emergency restoration command and control at TIA
under the direction of the Emergency Control Center until the emergency
situation has ceased.
4.2.2. ACTION BY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICES
- Close the Runway to all fixed wing operations.
- Request (Aeronautical Information Services) to issue NOTAM that airport is
closed until further notice.
- Instruct taxing aircraft to hold in position.
- Report to the Operation Commander about the status and number of affected
airborne flights.
- Obtain the situation report of runways/taxiway from the Operation
Commander and request AIS to issue updated NOTAM for continued operation
based on airport operation status or continued airport closure,.
- Keep informed of all airport post-earthquake activities.
- Resume limited or normal operations as conditions permit, or as authorized by
4.2.3. ACTION BY TERMINAL MANAGEMENT SECTIONS (INTERNATIONAL , DOMESTIC AND
CARGO TERMINALS)
- Make a loud speaker announcement in the terminals that includes the
following information:
i. Announcement of earthquake emergency activation
ii. Suspension of all flight operations
iii. Instruction to ground-side passengers in all terminals to proceed to
Evacuation zone ( refer to land use map)
- Provide appropriate aerodrome clearance passes to staff of the International
Humanitarian Community who require access to operation areas for the
handling of emergency relief supplies. The distribution of clearance passes
should be performed in coordination with the World Food Programme’s
Kathmandu office, which is the UN Logistic Cluster lead.
4.2.4. ACTION BY AIRPORT OPERATION DEPARTMENT
- Establish communications with the Airport Police and coordinate the
evacuation of passengers in the terminal on both the ground-side and air-side
of the airport.
- Instruct Airport Police to proceed to pre-designated Emergency Operation
Security posts.
- Dispatch a team for quick assessment of all airport facilities (in less than 30
minutes). Use the Airport Grid Map (Appendix II) to locate any damage to the:
i. Runway
ii. Taxiways
iii. Apron
iv. Security fence
v. Fuel Farm
vi. Air Traffic Control Tower
vii. Crash Fire Rescue Facility
viii. NAVAIDs
ix. Terminals
The quick inspection team shall constitute staff from Airside management
Division, Electro mechanical Division, Civil Engineering Division and Airport
Police. The team shall communicate with the AEOP through Radio
Telecommunication (RT) set to notify any damages to the aerodrome that
would impose restriction to flight operations.
- Notify the Operation Commander with the details of any observed aerodrome
damage and provide immediate safety recommendations.
- Coordinate with the Civil Engineering Division to identify the longest stretch of
runway and available taxiway in the airfield that aircraft can use for landing,
take-off and taxiing before airport emergency restoration commences.
- Obtain the status of the airfield from the Airport Emergency Restoration team
(defined in section 5.2) regularly.
- Conduct throughput calculations for ‘as is’ conditions and for improved
conditions as airport emergency restoration efforts begin in accordance with
Appendix IV.
- Report the maximum possible throughput numbers to the Operation
Commander.
- Coordinate with humanitarian agencies and their staff for ground-handling
and movement of relief materials at the airport.
4.2.5. ACTION BY RESCUE & FIREFIGHTING SERVICES
The Watch Tower shall:
- Obtain information on fire breakouts, with details on location, extent etc. Fire
breakout information can be obtained directly by the Watch Tower attendant
or through notification by the Police or any other person who reports a fire.
- Brief the Rescue & Fire Fighting (RFF) Chief on the location and extent of all
fires for prioritization and action.
The Rescue & Fire Fighting (RFF) Chief shall:
- Dispatch a team of firefighters to assess buildings and equipment for possible

fires. The team shall confirm the situation and take necessary steps to prevent
fires, including switching off electrical circuits, isolating chemical spills, etc.
- Dispatch a team of firefighters to known emergency locations to suppress fire
and perform rescue operations. The team shall provide rescue to persons
trapped in buildings where fires are burnings.
- Notify the Operation Commander of any fire breakouts, their location and
status.
- Assist search and rescue teams from the Nepal Army and the Armed Police
Force to rescue trapped persons from collapsed structures at the airport.
- Notify the Kathmandu Metropolitan City Fire Service of any fires at the airport,
and request assistance (if needed).
4.2.6. ACTION BY DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEPAL (CAAN)
- Exercise over all command and control of post-earthquake operations and
restoration work Proceed to the Emergency Control Centre as soon as the TIA
Disaster Response Plan has been activated.
- Obtain a status briefing from the GM or MOD.
- Report the status of TIA to the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation,
Ministry of Home Affairs, and the National Emergency Operation Centre.
- Liaison with the National Emergency Operation Centre, providing regular status
reports of the airport and instructions in regards to flight operations for international
rescue and relief.
4.2.7. ACTION BY AIRPORT SECURITY POLICE
- Restrict any movement towards the airport at all gates, except for officials and
emergency operation vehicles.
- Dispatch additional security forces to the Terminal buildings for crowd control
and evacuation of transient passengers.
- Perform visual inspections of building walls and other fence systems that
separate the ground-side and air-side of the airport and provide a security
cordon, if necessary, to restrict unauthorised movement through damaged
areas.
- Recall off-duty staff as needed.
- Establish contact with the GM or MOD and obtain instructions for dispatching
necessary security forces to any areas that require additional protection or
cordon.
- Coordinate with Airport Operations and dispatch staff for quick assessment of
ground facilities and fence system.
- Assist the Nepal Army, Armed Police Force and medical teams in rescue
operations, as needed.
4.2.8. ACTION BY ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE NEPAL ARMY AT TIA
- Establish contact with the Operation Commander and dispatch additional
forces in coordination with Airport Police to maintain the security perimeter
at the airport, if required.
- Liaison with the Operation Commander on collapsed buildings to commence
rescue operations.
- Execute collapsed structure search and rescue (CSSR) operations in
coordination with the Nepal Armed Police Force and other agencies involved
in rescue operations.
- Report the airport situation to Nepal Army Headquarters.
- Mobilize resources for helicopter operations to provide transportation
support to airport officials and emergency response measures.
SECTION- 5 AIRPORT EMERGENCY RESTORATION
5.1 AIRPORT EMERGENCY RESTORATION TEAM
In the event of a strong earthquake that results in widespread damage to airport
facilities, the Emergency Control Center shall establish an Airport Emergency
Restoration Team (AERT) in consultation with the TIA General Manager. The AERT
will comprise:
i. Civil Engineering Division Chief (Team leader)

ii. Representative of Airport Operation Department Staff
iii. Civil Engineer/Aerodrome Engineer
iv. Technical Service Department Engineers/Technicians ( electromechanical/ COM
NAV AIDS)
v. Rescue & Firefighting Service staff
The AERT shall mobilize resources to conduct rapid visual damage assessment and
emergency restoration of key facilities and equipment. The priority of assessment and
restoration shall be:
i. Runway (airfield) system

ii. Airport Rescue and Firefighting Station (ARFFS)
iii. Fuel Farm
iv. Air Traffic Control facilities
v. NAVAIDS
vi. Access roads
vii. Utilities (including electricity)
viii. Cargo facilities
ix. Terminals
The AERT shall report damage assessment results to the Operation Commander as
soon as an assessment of any facility is completed.
The AERT shall carry out the emergency restoration activities of damaged structures,
equipment and other non-structural items in coordination with Airport Operation
Department and Technical Service Department. Restoration reporting shall be made
to the Operation Commander every four hours, or as necessary.
5.2 RAPID VISUAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF AIRFIELD

The AERT shall prepare report of damage to the airfield based on visual observation.
The report shall contain the following details: location, coverage (length, width and
depth as applicable), extent, potential functional loss and estimated time for
restoration (in hours and days).
S.N. Location Coverage Extent Functional Loss Restoration Time Description
Examples of typical damage of the airfield surface are listed in Appendix V: Examples
of Earthquake Damage of Airfield
5.3 RAPID VISUAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURES

The Airport Emergency Restoration Team (AERT) shall conduct the rapid visual
assessment of building structures and classify damages of components in damage
assessment report. Appendix VI: Rapid Visual Assessment of masonry and concrete
building components will provide guidance for the assessment to buildings in TIA.
The report should contain result of an inspection of all individual structural

components that sustained damage. However, for a structure that is collapsed or
severely damaged, the report may simply state so.
The AERT shall mark inspected structures with the following placards:
I. GREEN : Structural components have not sustained any damage or have

insignificant damage.
II. YELLOW : The structure has one or more components with damage, requiring
structural restoration
III. RED: The structure has collapsed or is severely damaged.
5.4 RAPID VISUAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF UTILITIES AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

(OFC) OF BUILDINGS
5.4.1. ASSESSMENT OF UTILITIES
The AERT shall carry out rapid visual assessment of utilities for functional loss and
physical damage to equipment and plants. Appendix VII lists all available equipment
and plants at TIA.
Assessment of functional loss: The AERT shall check cables and water supply system
at the airport for functional loss. The status of each system and utility shall be
reported to the Operation Commander as soon as possible.
Assessment of damage to the utility components: The AERT shall carry out
assessment of physical damage to components of utilities. Utility components that
require assessment may include:
 Electrical elements- Electrical panel boards, motors/power control

systems, emergency generators, controls, light fixtures, emergency
lighting, transformers, power generators, electric cable ducts, batteries,
Automatic Transfer Switch ( ATS) and other power house components,
flood light poles, building light switch, riser room components etc.
 Telephone system, cable trays, riser room components etc.
 Mechanical Elements: HVAC equipment, boilers, chillers refrigerant gas
piping, pressure vessels, ducts, tanks, pumps, valves etc.
 Water supply system, fire extinguishers Fire protection system,
sprinkler system, piping, valves etc.
The damage assessment report should contain the location, extent of damage and
estimated repair time for each utility component.
5.4.2. ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION, NAVIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE (CNS) AND ATS
FACILITIES
Following departments and units of TIA shall carry out the damage assessment of
equipment and report the results to Operation Commander. The damage assessment
report should contain the location, extent of damage, estimated repair time and
alternative continuity of operation options for each unit.
- Technical Service Department (TSD), TIA shall carry out Rapid screening
assessments of communication, navigation & surveillance (CNS) and ATS
facilities.
- Flight Operation Department shall carry out functional assessment of all ATS
facilities.
- Airside Management Division, AVSEC Division and RFF Division shall carry out
assessment of damages to their facilities.
5.4.3. ASSESSMENT OF ARCHITECTURAL / FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS
The AERT shall inspect all airport buildings for non-structural damage. Any damage
identified that would hamper the operation of a building should be reported to
Operation Commander immediately. The architectural/ functional components that
may sustain damage include all furniture, glazing, canopies, cladding, parapets, light
roofing, detached planters, appendages, doors, cornices, louvers, signs, porches,
balconies, walkways, corbels, veneer attachments, ceilings, doors, ornamentation,
partitions, glass, skylights, artwork, stairways, storage racks, shafts, shelves, atrium
spaces, furnishing, etc.
5.5 AIRFIELD EMERGENCY REPAIRS

The AERT will coordinate airfield emergency repairs. The team shall mobilize
emergency repair kits for the restoration of airport operations.
Based on the extent of the damage, the following techniques may be used for the
repair of the pavement:
1. Sealing: This technique is used to repair small cracks in the pavement caused
by light damage in the subgrade and/or basement. Cold asphalt material can
be used for sealing.
2. Patching: This technique is used for severe cracks in the pavement. Cold mix
polymer material is used for the repair.
3. Rehabilitation or Overlay: If the damage is extensive, with faults and potholes
over a large area, hot mix asphalt with pulverised material is used for the
repair. If the overlay is used to cover a large area, then cracks need to be
sealed first.
A typical example of rapid repair of airfield pavement is presented in Appendix VIII
adopted from Air Force Runway Repair Instruction (FPAM10-219V4, 2004).
5.6 PROVISION OF AVIATION FUEL

Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC) shall report the status of aviation fuel provisions to the
Operation Commander every four hours. NOC shall request Operation Commander
for resource to make quick repair of fuel farm. The AERT shall provide necessary
technical support to NOC for the quick restoration of facilities.
In the case when earthquake damages the fuel farm significantly and fuel supply from
TIA fuel farm is not possible for several days, ECC shall coordinate with NEOC and UN
Logistic cluster for arrangement of alternate provision of supply as per section 6.3.2.
5.7 SEISMIC VULNERABILITY OF AIRPORT STRUCTURES

The result of preliminary seismic vulnerability assessment of infrastructures at the
airport system can be found in Nepal Civil Military Emergency preparedness – Seismic
Vulnerability Procedures Workshop, Final Recommendation Report, 2011. The report
provides lists the seismic vulnerabilities of airport structures and components, along
with retrofit priorities and recommended actions for mitigating the risk. The table
also provides general guidance to the AERT on expected damage to the airport
facilities.
5.8 ASSESSMENT OF LIQUEFACTION POTENTIAL
The results of assessment of Liquefaction Potential of TIA airfield infrastructures can
be found in Final report on Geotechnical Investigation Works of Tribhuvan
International Airport at Kathmandu Nepal, 2012. The report provides results of
liquefaction susceptibility analysis of 12 sites in and around the airfield of TIA for a
major earthquake scenario. The reports lists the locations and liquefaction potential
for a major earthquake that generates a MMI IX intensity in Kathmandu
Figure below shows the surface liquefaction potential map of the airport as estimated
from the investigation.
SECTION-6 LOGISTICS (EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO DISASTER RELIEF
OPERATIONS AND INTERNAL AIRPORT LOGISTICS)
6.1 PURPOSE
This section describes both internal logistics for Airport Emergency Operations and
the external logistics support that will be provided by the Airport to the Disaster
Relief Operation. The Disaster Relief operations will include Air Operations for
Rescue, Relief, and Evacuation and UN Logistics Cluster operation of the
Humanitarian Staging Area(s) which will be located at the Airport. The plan also
addresses support for alternate Fuel Re-Supply operations.
6.2 BACKGROUND: DISASTER RELIEF / HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

The overall management of Disaster Relief / Humanitarian Assistance response to the
earthquake will be led by MoHA utilizing the Nepal Disaster Response Framework
(NDRF). The NDRF provides the coordinating framework for the myriad of
responding organizations: Nepal Government agencies, the UN and the International
community, NGOs and the private sector. The NDRF separates functional response
areas into “Clusters” and assigns Lead and Coordinating Agencies to each Cluster.
The National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) which is managed by MoHA, is

the focal point of command and control with the Nepal Government. The decision
making body is the Central Natural Disaster Relief Committee (CNDRC) of which
MoHA is a member and serves as secretariat. CAAN and the TIA Civil Aviation
Organization (CAO) are also members.
The UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) heads the International Disaster Relief

Operation supported by the IASC and UNOCHA.
MoHA has designated the Logistics Cluster run by the World Food Program (WFP) as
the lead UN cluster that will operate at TIA; all other clusters and international
support that goes through the airport will be managed by /coordinated through, the
Log Cluster, including Urban Search and Rescue and Medical Teams (UN response is
dependent on funding). One or two Humanitarian Staging Area(s) (HSA) will be
established at the Airport by the Log Cluster to support the relief operation. The UN
Log Cluster has done extensive pre-planning for an earthquake response. UN
Contingency Plans may be found at:
http://www.un.org.np/resources/contingencyplanning
Section 6.3 provides the requirements for the HSA. Section 6.4 provides coordination
mechanisms between TIA Airport and the Log Cluster that will be required to support
Disaster Relief flights.
If required, the Government of Nepal may request to the UN Humanitarian

Coordinator, national and international governments; regional organizations; donor
communities; I/NGOs; political parties; different professionals; resident and non-
resident Nepalese citizen; foreign citizen; and other sources for international
assistance in terms of cash or kind to respond to disaster and jointly respond to
disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional co-
operation.
The Government of Nepal shall establish the provision of visa fees and custom duty
exemptions at entry points to IHC along with relief goods, search and rescue
equipment. Based on this provision, the immediate visa granting to International
Humanitarian Communities along with relief goods, search and rescue equipment
customs duty exemptions shall be facilitated at the entry points (land or airport)
during the disaster. Nepal Customs and Immigration Offices maintain emergency
plans to support this requirement at the airport.
The normal supply chain for Nepal will be severely impacted in the scenario
earthquake used for this plan. Blocked roads and collapsed bridges will seriously
hinder movement of persons, relief goods, and equipment. TIA will likely be
impacted with shortened runway lengths limiting aircraft size. TIA will become the
focal point for the incoming personnel, equipment and relief supplies and for
evacuations. Integration of TIA airport operations with the overall national strategic
response will be critical to an effective disaster response. CAAN and TIA will support
the Log Cluster through rapid repair of the airport, maximization of aircraft
throughput and helicopter operations, and support to the HSA.
6.3 SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

6.3.1. SUPPORT TO UN LOGISTICS CLUSTER, HUMANITARIAN STAGING AREA(S) (HSA)
The UN Log Cluster has the lead for planning for the large scale Disaster Relief logistics
operation. The Log Cluster Contingency Plan addresses all aspects of the air and road
transport based logistics operation. Their plan includes alternate airports for refueling
and interim stopover relief supply staging and refueling points within Nepal, India and
China.
HSA Space Requirements:

One HSA requires 8 acres, 4 acres for the tent storage area and 4 acres for the housing of
Humanitarian Assistance workers (roughly estimated at 1,000 persons). The Log Cluster
has identified that two HSAs will be required on TIA airport grounds.
UN Logistics Cluster is working to pre-position food and other emergency relief supplies
at the airport and other warehouses throughout Nepal. Currently, 5 ea. 20’x 8’ storage
containers have been placed at the airport containing 30m x 20m storage tents which
would be set up post incident as the Storage Area for the HSA, storing relief supplies,
generators, water bladders, office kits, water purification, etc. Section 6.5 provides the
TIA Airport Land Use Plan
HSA Site Selection:
The provision of space for the Log Cluster HAS(s) is a complex issue. Major
construction to implement the airport improvement plan will be underway for the next
four years. Construction work and contractor mobilization areas will be shifted to
numerous locations throughout the 4 years, impacting potential HAS sites. The Director
of Civil Maintenance will identify space for the HAS(s) during the different phases of the
construction period. The Airport Improvement Plan will integrate the requirement for
pre-selected HSA sites through the phases of the project (especially at the north end
where the runway will be extended).
The potential area identified for the main HAS is an undeveloped area that runs along the
SW side of south end of RWY 02, just south/adjacent to the Cargo bldg. However, this
area will likely be used for contractor mobilization for construction of the runway and
taxiway extensions. If the area was required for an HAS now, they could do emergency
work to grade and compact the area and provide an access road. They asked that this
work be one of the recommendations for work to be done now. The area south of RWY
02, across the highway where the VOR is located would make an ideal location if there
were a tunnel connecting it to the main airport grounds. Other space potential is the
domestic apron and vacant land near Buddha Air.
The Log Cluster Contingency Plan identifies that the Golf Course adjacent to the Airport
will be used for Individually Displace Persons camps (IDP) and will not be available for
an HSA.
Other TIA Support Requirements for Log Cluster HSA:
 Airport Security Police will need to provide security for the HSA and
provide an access badge system for disaster relief workers.
 Both the Nepal Customs and Nepal Immigration will execute plans to
support expeditious entry of relief personnel and cargo.
 TIA Civil Maintenance Division support for the HSA will be required for
site preparation, access roads, provision of utilities.
6.3.2. SUPPORT TO RESCUE, RELIEF AND EVACUATION EMERGENCY AIR OPERATIONS
Disaster Relief Air Operations:
Air operations following the earthquake are expected to increase greatly from normal
operations. Operations will involve both fixed wing and helicopter involved with rescue,
relief supplies air lift, evacuations, and other emergency response work.
Numerous organizations will be involved with air operations. The Nepal Army operates
maintains helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. The Log Cluster has standby agreements in
place with the Nepal Airline Operators Association (AOA) for airlift support and the
Airlines within the AOA have contingency plans to shift from commercial operations to
rescue/relief operations. The UN Humanitarian Air Service may supply helicopter
service for passengers and cargo if requested. If commercial operators are not available,
a regional air service may be set arranged by WFP. The Nepal Government may also
make appeals to the International Community for fixed wing airlift and helicopter
support including foreign military airlift and helicopters. The Chief of the NEOC (MoHA)
will be the Point of Contact for setting the priority of disaster relief flights. UN support is
dependent on funding.
CAAN and TIA support to rescue and disaster relief air operations:
 Expeditious repair of runway, taxiways, ramp areas, navigation equipment and

facilities to support maximum air operations/throughput
 Provision of emergency air traffic control
 Set up of temporary heli-pads
 Provision of aircraft parking space for Emergency Fuel Operations: 3 x
Refueling Aircraft or bladders (3 x 60M x 60M) with direct access to the
runway
 Aircraft parking – large jet (70M x 70M), C-130 (~35M x 40M),
 Space for Ground handling equipment
 Coordination and support to the Nepal Oil, UN Log Cluster for temporary fuel
storage if required (each 50K liter bladder occupies 12m x 9m)
Emergency Fuel Operations:
Nepal Oil Corporation’s (NOC) tank farm at the airport has a 7.640 Kilo Liters (KL)
capacity. They maintain approximately 4,000 of Jet fuel in their tank farm for normal
airport operations; International, and Domestic airlines including helicopter operators.
Normal operations consume approximately 300KL/day (20% is domestic fixed and
Helicopter operation) and this will supply will last approximately 7 days. Nepal Oil
Corporation has 13 ea. fuel tenders (tanker trucks) used to transfer fuel from the tanker
farm to aircraft.
Following an earthquake, if roads/bridges to India are open, Nepal Oil will increase their
normal re-supply operation to accommodate emergency relief operations. If additional
storage capacity or fuel tenders are needed, a request will be made through MoHA and
the UN Logistic Cluster for this required bladders and trucks.
However, it is likely that following a large earthquake, access roads and bridges to India
will be damaged, disrupting re-supply of fuel to TIA for an extended period of time.
There is currently no written plan for Emergency Fuel Operations in this scenario and
there is no lead agency; the agencies noted below will join in a coordinated operation.
The organizations involved with emergency fuel operations are: Nepal Oil, the UN Log
Cluster, TIA Airport, and the Airline Operators Association (AOA) (Domestic Airlines)
and the Airline Operators Committee (AOC) (International carriers). Aircraft tankers will
be required and will be coordinated by TIA Operations through the ECC to the NEOC for
appeals to the international community for Military or Commercial aircraft tankers.
If the NOC fuel farm is damaged and non-operable, a fuel bladder storage system will
need to be established at TIA. The UN Log Cluster will coordinate procurement of the
bladders and TIA operations will facilitate the site preparation at the airport. A pre-
designated site at the airport has been established, see Section 6.5
Airlines and military air operations will need to plan accordingly for limited fuel supplies
at TIA with alternate fuel stops enroute and landing with adequate fuel for departure.
Roles and responsibilities:
Nepal Oil:
- Increase fuel supply to meet emergency operations requirement - via

road if open
- Requires ~ 500k liters/day
- Conduct rapid repairs of fuel facility
- Augment alternate refueling airports within Nepal
UN Log Cluster:
- Procure fuel bladders if required to augment Nepal Oil fuel operation or

if Nepal Oil tanks damaged
TIA Operations
- Provide space on airport for bladders including site prep/grading, etc.

- Issue NOTAM on status of fuel at TIA/guidance to aircraft on alternate
fueling points to be coordinated post disaster with UN Cluster/ MoHA.
- Request through NEOC additional flight entry points for emergency
relief flights including fuel through India and east and west
- Operations Commander provides guidance to Nepal Oil on which
aircraft to provide fuel to be based on information received on priority
relief flights from MoHA
- Coordinate requests for additional tanker trucks and for aircraft
tankers – military and commercial to through ECC (CAAN) to NEOC
augment Nepal Oil/provide supply for Emergency relief operations if
Nepal Oil Tank Farm is inoperable.
Airlines
- Plan flights accordingly for fuel shortages, i.e. extra fuel, alternate fuels
stops
- Provide contract aircraft fuel tankers – both to support their own
operation and/or general support via a UN procured contract
The Logistic Cluster Contingency Plan provides additional information on Fuel
Management and alternate airports for fueling stopovers in Nepal, India and China,
including Bagdogra Airport in India.
6.3.3. COORDINATION OF DISASTER RELIEF FLIGHTS

The Chief of the NEOC will be the Point of Contact for setting the priority of disaster relief
flights. He will communicate directly with the Airport Incident Commander to provide
the prioritized flights for the Airport to assign to fill available flight slot allocations.
The Airport Incident Commander or designated section in the ECC, i.e. Air Traffic
Operation Contingency unit, will inform the NEOC of available flight slots based on the
throughput capability/Maximum (aircraft allowable) On-Ground (MOG). The MOG takes
into account the airport operating status, refueling capabilities, parking and relief supply
storage space available, off-loading/loading capability, etc. A key function of the Airport
ECC will be a constant recalculation of the throughput/MOG and slot availability (see
Appendix IV).
The On Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) set up by OCHA nearby the NEOC
will be the link between the Nepal Government and the International Disaster Relief
community. The OSOCC will communicate the priority of flights with the International
Community and coordinate with the Log Cluster. The World Food Program which leads
the Log Clusters has been given direct communications with the NEOC.
The Chief of the NEOC will set the priorities, OSOCC will communicate them to the
International Community and the Airport Incident Commander will assign the flights to
the available slot allocations.
6.3.4. THE CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION CENTER (CMCC)

In the event that the Gov’t of Nepal emergency operations capability is severely
impacted, direct coordination to the OSOCC may be temporarily required while the Gov’t
of Nepal reconstitutes.
6.4 INTERNAL AIRPORT LOGISTICS FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

During the emergency response and early recovery phases of the disaster response, TIA
will not be able to fill requirements for emergency equipment and supplies through the
normal supply chain. In additional equipment and supplies will be needed on emergency
basis. Emergency procurement may be used and requests may be made for support from
the International Community through MoHA.
During a large scale disaster response where transportation is limited, all delivery of
emergency equipment will be coordinated through MoHA at the NEOC where the relief
supplies and equipment priorities will be prioritized for the limited relief flights.
6.5 TIA AIRPORT EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY LAND USE PLAN

The following Airport Land Use Plan provides the current designated sites for the Log
Cluster HSA, Aircraft Parking, temporary helicopter pads, fuel tanker parking, Red Cross,
and Nepal Police.
APPENDIX I: TIADRP DISTRIBUTION LIST
Organization Custodian Copies
Issued
Office of Attorney General Attorney General 1
Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Secretary 1
Army Head Quarters Chief of General Staff 1
Ministry of Home Affairs Secretary 1
Ministry of Defense Secretary 1
Ministry of Finance Secretary 1
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Secretary 1
Police Head Quarters IGP 1
National Bureau of Investigation Chief Officer 1
Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Director General 15
Tribhuvan International Airport Civil Aviation General Manager 20
Office
Civil Aviation Academy Chief, C.A. Academy 5
No.11 Brigade Chief 1
VVIP Wing Chief 1
TIA Security Police Guard Office Chief 1
TIA Vigilance Office Chief 1
Engineer Directorate, Gauchar Barrack, Royal Director 1
Nepal Army
Kalibaksa Gana, Royal Nepal Army Chief 1
APPENDIX II: AIRPORT GRID MAP
APPENDIX III: TIA EMERGENCY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
1. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEPAL (CAAN) HEAD OFFICE
Office Direct DCA Res.

Exchange
* Director General 4-262387 4-
262416
4262518
4262326
4262988
Ext. 150
* Dy. Director General 4-261602 Ext.119
(Air Transportation)
* Dy. Director General 4262532 Ext.120
(Airport Operation) 4266139
2. TRIBHUVAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CIVIL AVIATION OFFICE
Office Direct TIA Ext. Res.

* General Manager 4-411161 4-411933 4781842
4016
* Director, Airport Operation & 4113196 4024
Facilitation
* Manager, Security Division 4113074 4015 4770610
* Director Flight Operation Division 4113155 4008 4350304
* ATS Supervisor
* Shift In charge
* AEROCOM, Shift In charge
* Director, Technical Service Dept. 4014
* Manager, Com & Nav Aid Division 4113185 4010
* Manager, Civil Maintenance Division 4113160 2504
4113259
* Control Tower
* Area Control Centre
* AIS
* Fire Chief 4-470275 4018
* Fire Watch Tower
* ADO ( International) 4477163 2419
3. TIA SECURITY POLICE GUARD

* Chief 4468670 4007
* Dy. Chief
* Duty Room
4. NEPAL ARMY

* Engineer Directorate, Gauchar 4-473949
Barrack
* Sri Kali Baksh Gana, Gauchar 4471706
* No. 11 Brigade TIA 4-470240
4-472290
5. OTHER AGENCIES AT TIA

* Custom 4470382
* Immigration 4476445 2410
* National Bureau of Investigation 4470175
RNAC
* STN Manager (International) 4484410
* Load Control 4473774
* STN Manager (Domestic) 4470668
* President, BARN 4224562
* Indian Airlines 4472647
* Bangladesh Airlines 4113147/9851026159
* Thai Airways 4113293/9801021404
* Druk Air 4471712
* Pakistan International Airlines 4113134/9851110432
* China South/West Airlines 4440650/9851026147
6. HOSPITALS/AMBULANCES

* Kathmandu Medical College 4469062/063
* Birandra Military Hospital 4-271965
* Bir Hospital and Other Hospitals 4228656
4221119
4221988
* Teaching Hospital 4412707
4412404
4412505
4420976
4412404
4412984
* Patan Hospital 5-610798
5-610676
* Bhaktapur Hospital 6-412630
* Dipendra Police Hospital 4002601/4002599
* Red Cross Ambulance 4270650/4272760
2.7 MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS

* Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Civil 4-225579/4211635
Aviation
Minister 4-211870
Secretary 4-225870
* Ministry of Home Affairs
Minister 4-4211203
4-4211233
Secretary 4-228024
4-224849
NEOC 4200105/4200203
* Ministry of Defense
Secretary 4-4211290/4211289
* Police Head Quarters
IGP 4-412737
4-411210
AIG OPN 4-411569
4-411210
4-225771
* Armed Police Head Quarters 4-4287368/4672645
4-275681
* Royal Nepal Army Head Quarters 4-424000/4230823
4-231524
4-226020
4-240915
* National Bureau of Investigation 4-4211888
Chief Officer 4-4211893
APPENDIX IV: AIRPORT CAPACITY FOR TIA
Airport capacity drives incident command. However, it is complex, with multiple factors that interrelate and
influence each other and the total capacity. The first factor is the ability to move aircraft from the runway to
an offloading and servicing location, and then return to the runway for takeoff. Current efforts are in place to
evaluate and strengthen the AOA, which includes the runway, turn‐off, taxiways and ramps. We will assume
adequate runway, turn‐off, taxiways, and ramps are available to support Boeing C‐130 operations for this
report. This assumption, of course, must be verified prior to dispatching aircraft for relief operations.
TIA does not have enough ramp space to support the calculated requirements. Ramp space utilization should
be pre‐planned and designed with additional parking, cargo management, and aircraft servicing (fuel, engine
starters, tugs to push back, etc.). Furthermore, ground control (movement of any and all vehicles within the
AOA) should be designed and documented, and local airport personnel and relief workers should be trained.
There appears to be adequate space to provide aircraft parking and servicing, cargo storage, movement
areas (helipads, truck loading areas, etc.), and other critical relief operations within the current TIA
perimeter fence. However, any and all operations that can be supported outside of the airport perimeter
fence should be considered to decrease the potential incursion of actions in the AOA. This includes the use of
the golf course adjacent to the existing TIA facility. This will also reduce the number of potential airport
safety issues that may arise, as facilities will be more spread out allowing increased safe passage from the
various operating areas outlined in the draft emergency operations land‐use plan.
Airport capacity is summarized by the ability to offload aircraft, move the cargo from the AOA, and distribute
it away from the airfield property. It is clearly understood that aircraft may play a role in multiple
operations, such as delivery to the airport (ex. C‐130 Hercules cargo airplanes), and then pickup and delivery
off the airport property (ex. CH‐47 Chinook cargo helicopters). Each AOA requires the same factors to assure
safety and then capacity. In this instance, capacity is specifically tied to the movement of cargo from the
delivery aircraft, to an area that is clear of the delivery AOA, and then to the pickup point. The links between
these operations are usually ground vehicles of various types.
The layout of an AOA for each purpose must be addressed in the airfield emergency response plan with
pre‐designated roads, storage yards, and other mobility and egress issues identified. Storage must be more
than 200 ft. (61 m) from the centerline of the runway (max height is 8 ft. [2.4 m]), outside of jet intake or
engine blast ranges, and at least 1,000 yards (914 m) away from the ASR and Very High Frequency
Omni‐Directional Radio Range (VOR) to prevent operational and/or safety issues .
The impact of not having these issues addressed before an emergency occurs can lead to significant
inefficiency, such as what was seen at the recent Haiti earthquake response. Transportation and logistical
issues will dominate the ability to manage cargo and will usually determine the airport capacity.
The requirements for the various relief operations must be identified and verified with the potential
organizations expecting to support the disaster operations (ex. World Food Programme or U.S. Government).
These requirements are used to evaluate the ability of TIA, CAAN, and the Nepal Army to meet these needs
and determine if the current plan is effective. Without reasonable requirements, we can never determine if
the airport capacity represents an adequate and reliable source. TIA, CAAN, and the Nepal Army need to
collaboratively engage these potential aid organizations and partner nations as soon as possible so that their
requirements can be included in a final emergency operation land‐use plan for TIA.
Capacity could also be increased by adding integrated voice switches and installing a standalone Remote
Transmitter and Receiver (RTR) in the International Terminal. The RTR needs climate control (HVAC), so its
facilities could be used to store other critical response equipment (ex. portable transmitters and receivers
[PET 2000 radios], spare electronic parts, etc.). Additionally, high value recovery supplies would include
chain link fence parts, cold mix asphalt (emulsion or cut back), and high strength quick setting cement. These
recovery supplies need to be stored near the airfield where they can be expeditiously accessed and used in
an emergency situation.
The following factors influence the total airport capacity at TIA.
A. Runway:
Minimum runway length for the design aircraft (C‐130) at the altitude of TIA is 6,200ft (1,900 meters).
For a C‐130 Hercules and CH‐47 Chinook, TIA can currently support an average of 40 operations per hour on
their runway in most weather conditions.
The critical limitation of the TIA runway is the taxiway not extending to the end of the runway. Aircraft have
to enter the runway, taxi to the end, turn around and then take off which requires a significant amount of
additional time on the runway. This could be a limiting factor based on the turn‐around (ability to unload,
service and return aircraft to the runway for departure) rate of the aircraft.
B. Taxiways:
Taxiways and turn offs allow the aircraft to depart the runway and proceed to the ramps where they park
and are serviced. If no turn offs or taxiways are available, then only one aircraft at a time can land, be
serviced (off loaded), and then take off.
C. Ramps:
Ramps are areas for aircraft to park and be serviced. Services include off‐loading, fueling, engine starting,
push back (tugs), reloading, etc.
D. Approach Control:
High Altitude Area Control (En Route in U.S.) manages aircraft between airports, and Terminal Approach
Control (TRACON in U.S.) controls the transition from high altitude to/from the airport. In a large‐scale
earthquake, both control systems will be lost, since they are located in the International Terminal and rely
on remote locations to communicate with the pilots. With advanced planning agreements, these services can
be backed up and provided regionally until they are recovered locally.
E. Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR):
The TIA ASR is critical to optimizing runway operations at all times and will significantly decrease capacity if
it is damaged or destroyed. Plans must be created to rapidly repair or replace the ASR. The structural
retrofitting measures outlined in Section 3 should be followed.
F. Aerodrome Traffic Control:
The Aerodrome Traffic Control, or Air Traffic Control, manages landing/takeoff clearances, ground control of
the runway, taxiways, and ramp.
G. Weather Conditions:
TIA has a Category I (one) Instrument Landing Capability (ILC) when Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) are
required, which indicates minimal adverse effects from weather. When Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) are not
required, then Visual Flight Rules (VFR) apply. Helicopters can approach and depart from the airport
without using the runway. This allows operations in conjunction with fixed wing aircraft using the runway.
It would be possible to have dual helicopter approaches (each side of the runway), with fixed wing aircraft
using the runway (Figure 17). Under VFR rules, this could allow up to 120 operations an hour (40 per
approach and departure route) during an emergency in Nepal.
When ILS conditions exist, every aircraft has to use the runway approach and departure. Therefore, the total
operations would drop to 40 per hour. This doesn’t appear to be a significant threat, but must be taken into
account in the detailed design.
H. Security:
The Airport Operating Area (AOA), which is everything inside the airport perimeter fence, must be secure
from animals and personnel. This is to prevent accidents, which will severely restrict and hamper
operations. The first security priority will be to repair the airport fence, and then remove all non‐ essential
personnel from the AOA. Passenger and cargo screening will not be necessary until outbound flights are
resumed.
I. Cargo:
If all of TIA’s current cargo capacity was available, then they may be able (under normal conditions) to meet
the food supply requirements. The earthquake will eliminate almost all normal conditions (ex. no road
transportation to/ from the airport, damaged equipment, etc.). Therefore, there is a reduced chance that TIA
would be able to support relief operations without significant preparation and outside support.
Based on the field assessments that took place at the CMEP Seismic Vulnerability Procedures Workshop, the
following risk categories have been generated for airport capacity at TIA.
Table 1 – Airport Capacity Risk Assessment
Expected impact to Capacity

Probability Severity Risk
Runway L H M
Taxiways L H M
Ramps L H M
Approach/Departure Control H H H
Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) L H M
Aerodrome Traffic Control M H H
Weather Conditions/ILS L M L
Security H H H
Cargo H H H
To summarize, aircraft parking and cargo management will be the limiting factors to airport capacity. This
includes ground‐based vehicles to move and manage cargo, with a goal of four (4) hours from airplane
touchdown (C‐130 Hercules) to take‐off for the delivery of emergency relief supplies.
Airport Throughput
A 2007 World Health Organization (WHO) newsletter1 indicated that, “approximately 40,000 deaths,
95,000 injures, and 600,000‐900,000 homeless could be expected” if a catastrophic earthquake were to
occur in the Kathmandu Valley. Using these numbers as an approximate estimate, we can derive throughput
estimates for TIA during an emergency situation.
• Roughly 4,000 metric tons (MT) of food and water, or 1,000 MT of just food, would be required per
day. The airport currently supports about 533 MT per day, and can support about 860 MT per day at
its maximum capacity.
In order to determine the throughput estimates above, the C‐130 Hercules, C‐47 Chinook helicopter,
semi‐truck, and 200‐bed hospital were used for all design calculations. The load capacity of these resources
is:
• Semi‐truck: 40,000 pounds or 20 tons (18.2 MT)

• Chinook C‐47 Helicopter: 24,000 pounds or 12 tons (11 MT)
• C‐130 Airplane: 35,000 pounds or 17.5 tons (16 MT)
• A 200 bed hospital requires a minimum of 3,000 square feet. An area of 4,225 square feet has been
established for all “relief” camps and operations (65 ft x 65 ft or 19.8 m x 19.8 m)
The TIA emergency responses throughout calculations are outlined below in Table 2. These approximations
were derived using the best possible information provided by TIA, CAAN, and the Nepal Army. These values
are subject to change depending on the current status of the airfield, and they should be verified by the
Government of Nepal before official planning commences.
Table 2 – TIA Throughput Calculations
Cargo required per day to support food only:

o 900,000 persons * 2 pounds per person per day = 1.8 million pounds per day or
900 tons per day.
o 900 tons / 17.5 tons per C‐130 = 51 C‐130 missions per day.
One C‐130 may fly multiple missions per day.
Cargo required per day to support water only:
o 900,000 persons * 8 pounds per person per day = 7.2 million pounds per day or
3,600 tons per day.
o 3,600 tons / 17.5 tons per C‐130 = 206 C‐130 missions per day.
Cargo to support 200 bed hospitals:
o Assume 5 days to construct one hospital and cargo is needed evenly over the
5 day period: 40 Missions per 200 bed Hospital = 40/5 = 8 Missions per day
per Hospital.
o Assume 10 total hospitals
o There will be no Medical Evacuations (MEDIVAC) to other locations for this
scenario.
o Assume two are being built, starting at Day 3 to completion of all 10.
o So 16 Missions per day for 25 days.
Cargo per day:
o With a 4‐hour turn around, each parking slot can be used six (6) times per day.
o Each C‐130 carries 22.5 tons, so each parking slot can support 135 tons per day.
o Currently, TIA has nine (9) slots available for large aircraft.
o 9 * 6 = 54 C‐130 missions per day or 1,215 tons per day.
o Assume an aircraft (airplane or helicopter) must take off to create a parking slot
for the next aircraft.
Air Operations per hour:
o When Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions exist:
 The runway can support approximately 40 operations per hour. That
would be 20 take offs and 20 landings or any combination that totals 40.
 Helicopters will not require use of the runway and can run
concurrently.
 Assume 40 per hour as a design number, it will probably exceed that.
 Using and east and west helicopter approach and departure
system, TIA can nominally support 40 Helicopter Operations
on the East Approach, 40 on the West Approach and 40 Fixed
Wing in the Runway for a total of 120 operation an hour
(about 60 take offs and landings)
o When Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) exist:
 All Aircraft must use the runway exclusively.
 The runway can still support about 40 operations an hour.
 Total operations drop from 120 to 40 per hour.
Example of methodology for airfield capacity
(throughput) calculations
The following document only addresses objective planning computations. It is designed to help service, joint,
and combined planners make gross estimates about mobility requirements in the early stages of the
planning process. It covers strategic airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 10-1403 12 DECEMBER 2011
Operations
AIR MOBILITY PLANNING FACTORS
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
ACCESSIBILITY:
This publication is available by downloading from the e-Publishing website at www.e-Publishing.af.mil
RELEASABILITY:
There are no releasability restrictions on this publication
OPR: HQ AMC/A3XP
Supersedes: AFPAM 10-1403,

18 December 2003
Certified by: Deputy AF/A5R (Col Michael W. Hafer)
This pamphlet supersedes AFPAM 10-1403 dated 18 December 2003 Air Mobility Planning Factors. It
provides broad air mobility planning factors for peacetime and wartime operations. It is designed to help
service, joint, and combined planners make gross estimates about mobility requirements in the early stages
of the planning process. It covers strategic airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation (AE). For greater
detail, or in-depth mobility analysis call HQ AMC/A3XP at DSN 779-4363/3382 or 618 TACC/XOP at DSN
779-1930. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary
Responsibility (OPR) via AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Form 847s
from the field through the appropriate functional‘s chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a
result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 33-
363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records
Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm
Section A—Mobility Planning
1. How To Use This Pamphlet
1.1. There are four basic parts to this pamphlet: terms and definitions, formulas, planning factors, and
examples. Although each of these parts can be individually used, we recommend you review the entire
contents to get a full understanding of the planning process.
1.2. Due to the number of variables involved in every air mobility operation, the planning factors presented
are not universally applicable. Instead, they provide ―order of magnitude‖ approximations in the context of
a generic scenario. The use of detailed computer simulation models is encouraged for extensive calculations.
1.3. This pamphlet only addresses objective planning computations. It does not provide guidance
concerning other factors such as environmental and tactical considerations which can impact the mobility
operation.
Section B—Airlift Formulas
2. Number of Cargo Missions Required
3. Number of Passenger (PAX) Missions Required
NOTE: PAX on Cargo Missions = Number of PAX seats available on each cargo mission x
Number of Cargo Missions.
4. Total Missions Required
= Cargo missions + PAX missions
5. Time to Arrival
= active route flying time (ARFT) + active route ground time (ARGT)
6. Cycle Time
= round trip flying time (RTFT) + round trip ground time (RTGT)
7. Closure
NOTE: For major wartime operations, we recommend planners use the wartime objective surge UTE rates
published in Table 6. For non-mobilized contingencies, we recommend the contingency UTE rates published
in Table 6. The computations involved in determining actual UTE rates are quite involved and not necessary
for initial gross planning estimates.
8. Fleet Capability
Short tons delivered to the theater per day
NOTE: This formula is preferred for contingency planning because it accurately relates the variables
affecting the deployment of requirements.
9. Fleet Capacity
Million ton-miles per day
NOTE: Although planners do not commonly use this formula, occasionally we need to convert short ton
figures into million ton-miles per day (MTM/D). AMC force structure programmers use MTM/D when
funding out-year aircraft purchases and many civilian agencies are accustomed to visualizing our fleet
capability in terms of MTM/D. Fleet Capacity is generally more optimistic than actual Fleet Capability for a
particular contingency.
10. Airfield Throughput Capability (station capability)

NOTE: Use the lower of the working, parking, or fuel MOG.
Section C—Air Refueling Formulas
11. Air Refueling Overview
Refer to Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12 for determining the approximate number of tankers required to
meet the air refueling requirements for various size fighter/airlift deployments. These tables were
constructed using average/historical data and will provide a gross estimate of the size and duration of an air
refueling operation. If actual mission specifics and data are known, such as aircraft model, configuration, air
refueling altitude, airspeed, tanker basing, etc, using the formulas below will provide more accurate planning
estimates. However, this formula does not consider specific air refueling abort reserves and the impact on
destination fuel. As stated in the introduction we recommend using computer simulation models whenever
feasible.
11.1. Offload Required (per receiver)
Distance = total distance from takeoff to landing
TAS = average airspeed of receiver leg (use Table 4 Aircraft Block Speeds or applicable flight manual
airspeeds for other aircraft.)
Fuel Flow = fuel burn rate in lbs/hr
Total Fuel = total fuel on board at takeoff
Destination Reserve = required fuel reserves at destination
11.2. Offload Available (per tanker)
11.3. Tankers Required
Section D—Aeromedical Evacuation Formulas

12. Aeromedical Evacuation Overview Refer to AFI 11-2AE V3 Addenda A for detailed aircraft specific
configuration and mission planning. Use the following formulas and data in Table 14 to determine the AE
force and capabilities. In the near term, AE will be primarily accomplished using, C-21, C-130, KC-135, or C-
17 aircraft. Opportune airlift may be used, keeping the best interest of the patient and crew in mind. When
the aeromedical segment (Stage II or Stage III) of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is activated, the B-767
will be the primary means of inter-theater AE, with augmentation by military aircraft such as KC-135 and C-
17, as necessary. An AE crew consists of two (2) flight nurses and three (3) medical technicians.
12.1. AE Missions (# required per day)
Aircraft Load Planning Factor = standard number of patients loaded per aircraft for aeromedical evacuation
(see Table 14).
12.2. AE Crew (# required for missions flown, does not include stage)
Crews per Aircraft: Refer to Table 14
Crew Cycle Time:

Intra-theater (Within Theater) = 2 days
Inter-theater (Theater to CONUS) = 4 days
Section E—Examples
13. Airlift Example. As an example of how to use the formulas and planning factors in this pamphlet, assume
the following scenario. The 10th Mountain Div. out of Ft. Drum, NY, is to deploy to Kathmandu, Nepal, at the
foot of the Himalayas, to assist in earthquake relief. The requirement is to move 700 personnel and 800
short tons of cargo.
NOTE: The following examples use International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) codes, which are four-
character alphanumeric code designating each airport around the world and commonly used in flight
planning.
13.1. Suitable Airfield
13.1.1. Referring to the Aircraft Airfield Restrictions (Table 1), we see that the B-767 requires a minimum of
6,000 feet of runway and the C-17 requires a minimum of 3,500 feet. Since the airfield at Ft. Drum, Wheeler-
Sack AAF, has a runway length of 10,000 feet, it meets the requirements for both aircraft (this assumes
adequate runway width).
NOTE: Refer to the HQ AMC Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report (ASRR) or the airfield database (AFD)
in AMC‘s Global Decision Support System (GDSS) to determine suitability for mobility aircraft (C-5, C-17, C-
21, C-130, KC-10, KC-135). If the airfield does not appear in the ASRR/AFD, contact AMC/A3AS and request
the airfield be evaluated and added to the database (Airfield.Helpdesk@amc.af.mil). AMC/A3AS will
provide prompt feedback and include suitability information in future editions of the ASRR.
13.1.2. Looking in the Kathmandu area, we find Tribhuvan International airport in Kathmandu to have
10,121 feet of runway which, along with the associated taxiways and ramp, is stressed for B-767 aircraft.
Therefore, we make our initial plans based on using Wheeler Sack AAF as the onload and Tribhuvan
International as the offload.
13.2. Missions Required. Our examples will address only the cargo requirements, however passenger
movement would be handled in a similar manner. For all examples to follow, assume we have 15 C-17s
apportioned for our use and we will use crew staging where necessary.
13.3. Time to Arrival. The time required for cargo/PAX to arrive at the offload location including all en route
ground times. For this example, the C-17‘s will depart McGuire (KWRI), fly to Wheeler Sack AAF (KGTB) for
onload, then en route stop at Rota (LERT), Dhahran (OEDR), Delhi, (VIDP), and then offload at Tribhuvan
(VNKT). Refer to definitions and tables as needed.
= active route flying time (ARFT) + active route ground time (ARGT)
NOTE: First leg from McGuire to Wheeler is inactive as it‘s a positioning leg. Block speeds were interpolated
from Table 4.
(refer to Table 5.)
= 26.55 hours
13.4. Cycle Time. For this example, we calculated round trip flying time (RTFT) and round trip ground time
(RTGT) using reverse routing except the last leg will be from Rota (LERT) to McGuire (KWRI). Refer to
definitions for RTFT and RTGT.
Cycle Time = round trip flying time (RTFT) + round trip ground time (RTGT)
= 20 hours
13.5. Closure
= 3.8 days
13.6. Fleet Capability (short tons delivered to the theater)
= 208.8 Stons/day
13.7. Airfield Throughput Capability It is necessary to look at the throughput capability of all airfields
associated with a deployment, to determine whether any one airfield limits a planned operation. However,
for initial planning, the en route locations may be assumed to have a higher throughput capability than the
onload and offload locations. For this example, we have used Tribhuvan International and a working MOG of
one narrow body (NB) aircraft.
Airfield Throughput Capability (e.g.., Tribhuvan)
= 282.5 Stons/day (Refer to Table 8.)
NOTE: Since the arrival airfield can handle the estimated fleet capability that will be delivered, this
calculation is complete. If the fleet capability had exceeded the airfield‘s throughput, either the flow would
need to be slowed to compensate or the airfield‘s resources increased to handle the airflow.
14. Air Refueling Example. For this example, assume you need to deploy 6 F-15C‘s from
Langley (KLFI) to Spangdahlem (ETAD). How much fuel and how many tankers (KC-135R) are required?
Note: For this example average/historical figures were used. Actual numbers would vary according to
aircraft model, configuration, altitude, airspeed, etc.
14.1. Onload Required (per receiver)
Distance = total distance from takeoff to landing
TAS = average airspeed of receiver leg (use Table 4. for mobility aircraft or applicable flight manual
airspeeds for other aircraft.)
Fuel Flow = fuel burn rate in lbs/hr
Total Fuel = total fuel on board at takeoff
Destination Reserves = required fuel reserves at destination
= (3500/480 x 10,822) - 23,000 + 7500
= 63,410 lbs (per receiver) x 6 = 380,462 lbs

14.2. Offload Available (per tanker)
= 71,848 lbs per tanker
14.3. Tankers required
= 380,462 (rounded up)

71,848
= 6 KC-135Rs required
15. Aeromedical Evacuation Example. For this example, C-130s will be used to evacuate 500 patients per
day.
15.1. AE Missions (# required)
= 10 AE Missions required
Table 1. Aircraft Airfield Restrictions
NOTES:
1. HQ AMC/A3 retains runway criteria waiver authority for AMC organic aircraft.
2. Refer to DOD Flight Information Handbook for an airfield‘s specific Pavement Classification Number (PCN)
and subgrade as well as additional aircraft Aircraft Classification Number (ACN). Table 1 reflects values for
the aircraft‘s empty weight and the aircraft‘s maximum take-off/taxi weight.
3. Refer to the weight bearing information in the Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report (ASRR) or
Global Decision Support System (GDSS) for an airfield‘s specific PCN and subgrade. The GDSS also provides
weight bearing capacity (WBC) information when pavement strength is reported in terms other than ACN or
PCN, and translates raw WBC into aircraft gross weight limits. Planners can contact the AMC Airfield Help
Desk (Airfield.Helpdesk@amc.af.mil) for assistance regarding weight bearing capacity information in the
ASRR or GDSS/AFD. Mobility aircraft planners will use only the weight bearing information figures
published in the ASRR and GDSS.
4. For Non-Tactical Assault Operations, minimum runway width is 80 ft; minimum runway length is 5000 ft.
5. Values listed are maximum values for the Aircraft Type.
Table 2. Aircraft Size
NOTES:
1. Wingtip clearance: 10 ft on each side with wing walker, 25 ft each side without wing walker.
(Does not apply to CRAF aircraft)
2. Refer to DOD Flight Information Publication (Enroute Supplement) for an airfield‘s maximum runway load
bearing capability expressed as a maximum aircraft weight for a particular landing gear type. Additionally,
the ASRR and GDSS/AFD provide maximum runway/taxiway/parking apron load bearing capability
information for AMC aircraft by landing gear type.
3. Width required is for landing gear only and does not include the wingspan footprint required for a 180
degree turn.
4. C-17 Parking spot equivalent calculation
= Aircraft Length x Aircraft Width
C-17 length x C-17 width
5. The C-17 minimum width for a Star Turn is 90 ft (can be done in 80 feet, but 90 feet is the minimum
runway width for landing).
6. Values listed are maximum values for the Aircraft Type.
7. Based on full asymmetric thrust and initial differential braking.
Table 3. Aircraft Payloads.
NOTES:
1. Cargo and passenger payloads (except for the C-5) are exclusive of one another.
2. Organic (except C-130) calculated as the maximum ACL for a 3200 nm leg, CRAF calculated for a 3500nm
leg. C-130 calculated based on a 2000 nm leg.
3. CRAF based on mixed service averages (B-747-100 Equivalent = 78 Stons).
4. CRAF MAX and AVG passengers are the same because PAX are loaded to the max allowable by weight.
5. Lower NEO number reflects life raft capacity.
6. Weights are based on 400 lbs per passenger, which includes passenger, baggage, and combat gear. Take
total passenger weight into account as part of total cargo weight when requirements dictate movement of
cargo and passengers on the same aircraft.
Table 4. Aircraft Block Speeds
NOTE: Organic aircraft block speeds obtained from computer flight plan data. Civil aircraft
figures are a composite average of various configurations and series participating in CRAF. For Civil aircraft
whose passenger and cargo configuration speeds differed, the lower speed was used. All airspeeds are TAS.
Table 5. Ground Times
NOTES:
1. Onload or offload operations only. Does not include refuel or reconfiguration operations.
2. KC-135 times apply to roller-equipped aircraft.
3. For Commercial Contract and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), add 1 hour to onload times if concurrent
loading and servicing are prohibited.
4. Stations where loading, servicing to include catering, and/or unloading will occur.
5. Assumes aircraft configured to accommodate 463L pallets.
6. No aircraft servicing, to include catering, is planned.
7. Currently the only commercial aircraft supporting AE is the 767 from CRAF AE.
Table 6. Aircraft Utilization
NOTES:
1. Surge UTE rates apply for the first 45 days, (C-130‘s surge for 30 days).
2. Reflects active/ARC aircraft inventory, not apportionment. See JSCP, Enclosure 11.
3. KC-10 and KC-135 UTE rates apply in the airlift role.
4. CRAF CARGO/PASSENGER aircraft is updated quarterly. For the latest CRAF capability,
go into the Air Force Portal, select AMC/A3B, click on the CRAF Capability link. CAC and AF Portal access
required.
Table 7. Productivity Factors
Table 8. Maximum Airfield Throughput
NOTES:
1. Use the lower of working MOG, parking MOG, or fuel MOG.
2. Passenger throughput based on B-767-400 equivalents (average payload 216 passengers, ground time
3+00).
3. Cargo throughput based on C-17 equivalents (average payload 45 Stons, ground time 3+15).
4. Queuing efficiency of 85% applied.
5. Daylight operations in summer months.
6. Daylight operations in winter months.
Table 9. Fuel Burn Rates
NOTE: Fuel burn rates extracted from AFPAM 23-221, Fuels Logistics Planning, 22 December
2006 (converted to lbs/hr using 6.7 lbs/gal conversion rate). Fuel burn rates are for planning purposes
only. Actual rate varies according to mission profile, AC model, configuration, altitude, airspeed etc.
Table 10. Tanker Offload Capabilities
NOTES:
1. This table was extracted from AFTTP 3.1.KC-10/KC-135 2 November 2008
2. Based on Sea level, standard day, 10,000-ft dry runway.
3. Offload data based on 1-hour orbit.
4. Cargo carried will reduce fuel load on a 1:1 basis.
5. All KC-10 and a limited number of KC-135 aircraft are air refuelable, providing increased range, off-load,
and loiter capabilities.
Table 11. KC-135 Tanker Aircraft Required.1,2,3
NOTES:
1. Due to the multitude of Air Refueling variables, this table reflects an ―order of magnitude‖
only.
2. Table assumes multiple tanker launch bases would be used for AR distances greater than
3000nm.
3. Fighter/tanker ratio can be limited by boom cycle time.
4. For the airlift aircraft, assume average payloads, maximum takeoff gross weight, optimum located air
refueling tracks and divert bases, and a minimum tanker off-load capability of 90,000 lbs.
Table 12. KC-10 Tanker Aircraft Required.1,2,3
NOTES:
1. Due to the multitude of Air Refueling variables, this table reflects an ―order of magnitude‖
only.
2. Table assumes multiple tanker launch bases would be used for AR distances greater than
3000nm.
3. Fighter/tanker ratio can be limited by boom cycle time.
4. For the airlift aircraft, assume average payloads, maximum takeoff gross weight, optimum located air
refueling tracks and divert bases, and a minimum tanker off-load capability of 90,000 lbs.
Table 13. Aeromedical Evacuation Capabilities Matrix
NOTES:
1. Comm augmentation UTC applies to any AE UTC requiring additional communication spt.
2. Weights: PSP-L: .4 Stons; PSP-W: .4. Stons; PSP-S: .4 Stons
Table 14. Aeromedical Evacuation Capabilities
NOTES: Maximum litter patients on 3 Patient Support Pallets (PSP) would be 18; however, PSPs near cargo
door cannot be configured with stanchions resulting in the loss of 3 litter positions.
1. Basic crew only (2 Flight Nurses and 3 AE Technicians). B-767s require 1 additional Flight Nurse for basic
crew to act as overall mission MCD.
2. Total positions. Data reflects the subtraction of litter positions and seat requirements for a basic AE crew
with medical equipment. Addition of one CCATT would subtract an additional 3 seats and 2 litter positions.
3. Various litter and ambulatory patient combinations are available based on requirement.
4. Limited to 80 seats including crew for overwater flights.
5. No integral litter capability. PSP required to increase number of positions.
6. Capacity increases to 36 litter positions with LSAS Litter Stanchion Kit installed, or by redistributing
assets from other airframes.
7. Only configuration possible due to number of ship sets available.
8. Not used for contingency planning at this time.
HERBERT J. CARLISLE, LT GEN, USAF DCS/ Operations, Plans and Requirements

Attachment 1
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
References
HQ AMC/A3AS, Airfield Suitability Branch, DSN 779-3112, Comm (618) 229-3112
HQ AMC/A3XP, Regional Plans Branch, DSN 779-4363/3382, Comm (618) 229-4363/3382
HQ AMC/A3B, Commercial Airlift Division DSN 779-1751, Comm (618) 229-1751
HQ AMC/A3XP, Aeromedical Evacuation Plans Branch, DSN 779-3382, Comm (618) 229-
3382
618 TACC/XOP, Contingency Operations & Exercise Division, DSN 779-1930, Comm (618)
229-1930
The Joint Staff Officer‘s Guide 2000, JFSC Pub 1
AF Pamphlet 23-221, Fuels Logistics Planning, 22 December 2006
AMC Instruction 11-208, Tanker/Airlift Operations, 1 June 2000
AMC Omnibus OPLAN, 21 Feb 2003 (Unclassified data only)
AMC Pamphlet 24-2 Volume 1, Civil Reserve Air Fleet Load Planning Guide, 1 December 2001
AMC Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report, published quarterly by AMC/A3
Adopted Forms
AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AC—Aircraft
ACL—Allowable Cabin Load
ACN—Aircraft Classification Number
AE—Aeromedical Evacuation
AFD—Airfield Database contained in
GDSS AMC—Air Mobility Command
AR EXIT PT—Air Refueling Exit Point
AR—Air Refueling
ARC—Air Reserve Component
ARCP—Air Refueling Control Point
ARCT—Air Refueling Control Time
ARFT—Active Route Flying Time
ARGT—Active Route Ground Time
ARIP—Air Refueling Initial Point
ASRR—Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report
AVG—Average
AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System
C2—Command and Control
CCATT—Critical Care Air Transport Team
CONUS—Continental United States
CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRC—Control and Reporting Center
DEST—Destination
DIST—Distance
DOD—Department of Defense
FL—Flight Level
FT—Feet
GCI—Ground Control Intercept
GDSS—Global Decision Support System
HR—Hour
ICAO—— International Civil Aviation Organization
JSCP—Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
LBS—Pounds
LSAS—Litter Station Augmentation Set
MAX—Maximum
MOG—Maximum (Aircraft) on Ground
MSNS—Missions
MTM/D—Million Ton-Miles per Day
NEO—Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NM—Nautical Miles
OPLAN—Operational Plan
PAI—Primary Authorized Inventory
PAX—Passengers
PCN—Pavement Classification Number
PMAI—Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory
PSP—Patient Support Pallet
RTFT—Round Trip Flying Time
RTGT—Round Trip Ground Time

RZ—Rendezvous
SAAM—Special Assignment Airlift Mission
STON—Short Ton
TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation
TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center
TAS—True Airspeed
UTE—Utilization
VORTAC—Very High Frequency Omni directional Range and Tactical Air Navigation
Terms
ACN— See Pavement/Aircraft Classification System.
Active route flying time (ARFT)— The flying time from onload to the offload location including all
intermediate locations en route. This does not include ground time.
Active route ground time (ARGT) — The cumulative ground time of all intermediate stops from the onload
location to the offload location. This does not include flying time.
Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Patients— Litter = Patient who needs to be carried during both enplaning
and deplaning. Patient requires assistance to enplane and deplane. Ambulatory = Patient capable of walking
who may not require assistance to enplane and deplane.
Air cargo— Stores, equipment or vehicles, which do not form part of the aircraft, and are part or all of its
payload. Note: There are different classifications of military cargo, categorized as follows:
Bulk Air Cargo, including the 463L pallet itself, which is within the usable dimensions of a 463L pallet (104‖
x 84‖ x 96‖) and within the height and width requirements established by the cargo envelope of the
particular model of aircraft.
Oversize Cargo exceeding the usable dimensions of a 463L pallet loaded to the design height of
96‖ but is equal to or less than 1,090‖ in length, 117‖ in width, and 105‖ in height. This cargo is
transportable on the C—5, C-17, C-130, and to a limited extent the KC-10.
Outsize Cargo which exceeds the dimension of oversize (1,090‖ x 117‖ x 105‖) and requires use of a C—5 or
C-17.
Rolling Stock Equipment that can be driven or rolled directly into the cargo compartment.
Special Items requiring specialized preparation and handling procedures, such as space satellites or nuclear
weapons.
Aircraft block speed— True airspeed in knots under zero wind conditions adjusted in relation to length of
sortie to compensate for takeoff, climb out, descent, instrument approach, and landing.
Aircraft parking size— The ramp space a particular aircraft occupies, usually expressed in C-
17 equivalents (See Table 2.).
Airfield database (AFD)— The airfield database is contained in the AMC Global Decision Support System
(GDSS) and establishes suitability and restrictions for AMC and AMC-gained C-5, KC-10, C-17, C-130, and KC-
135 aircraft operations.
Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report (ASRR) — AMC/A3 quarterly publication available on line
that contains AMC policy and guidance regarding airfield suitability and a synopsis of suitability for airfields
AMC operates at globally.
Airfield throughput capability— The amount of passengers or cargo which can be moved through the
airfield per day via strategic airlift based on the limitations of the airfield (such as parking spots).
Air refueling track— A track designated for air refueling reserved by the receiver unit/planner. If possible,
the track from the ARIP to the ARCP should be along a TACAN/VORTAC radial and within 100 NM of the
station.
Air refueling initial point (ARIP) — A point located upstream from the ARCP at which the receiver aircraft
initiates a rendezvous with the tanker.
Air refueling control point (ARCP) — The planned geographic point over which the receiver(s)
arrive in the observation/pre-contact position with respect to the assigned tanker.
Air refueling control time (ARCT) — The planned time that the receiver and tanker will arrive over the air
refueling control point (ARCP).
Air refueling exit point (AR EXIT PT) — The designated geographic point at which the refueling track
terminates. In a refueling anchor it is a designated point where the tanker and receiver may depart the
anchor area after refueling is completed.
Allowable cabin load (ACL) — The maximum payload that can be carried on a mission. Note: The ACL may
be limited by the maximum takeoff gross weight, maximum landing gross weight, or by the maximum zero
fuel weight.
Anchor point— A designated geographical point on the downstream end of the inbound course of the
Anchor Refueling Pattern.
Anchor refueling— Air refueling performed as the tankers maintain a prescribed pattern which is anchored
to a geographical point or fix.
Anchor rendezvous (Anchor Rendezvous) — The procedures normally employed by radar

(CRC/GCI/AWACS) to vector the tanker(s) and receiver(s) for a visual join-up for refueling.
Base air refueling altitude— A reference altitude at which lead aircraft of a tanker formation
(or single aircraft for individual air refueling) will fly at initial contact.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) — A program in which the Department of Defense (DOD) uses FAA Part
121-certificated, US-flagged aircraft. These aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation (DOT)
to augment the military airlift capability of the DOD. These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD
requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as International, Domestic, and Aeromedical
segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the DOD and the DOT. The CRAF can be incrementally
activated by the DOD in three stages in response to defense-oriented situations, up to and including a
declared national emergency or war, to satisfy DOD airlift requirements. Note: The International segment is
further divided into long-range and short-range sections; and the Domestic segment is further divided into
National and Alaskan sections.
Closure— In transportation, the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first
element arrives at a designated location, e.g. port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final
destination, and ends when the last element does likewise, For the purposes of studies and command post
exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for
personnel and equipment are completed.
Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATT) — CCATTs provide critical care augmentation to
aeromedically evacuated injured, ill and/or burn patients requiring advanced care during transportation.
They are available to assist the AE crews if a patient‘s condition dictates. A CCATT is comprised of three
personnel: a physician who may be an intensivist (cardiopulmonary), a critical care nurse, and a respiratory
technician.
Cycle time— Total elapsed time for an aircraft to depart home station, fly a complete mission and be back to
start a second time.
Dual role mission— A mission where both air refueling and airlift are provided to the user. The primary
mission role is normally air refueling. Missions where cargo movement is primary require a dedicated
funded special assignment airlift mission (SAAM).
Enroute rendezvous— A rendezvous procedure whereby the tanker and receiver arrive at a common
rendezvous (RZ) point at the same time with 1,000 feet altitude separation.
Fleet capability— The amount of cargo or passengers which can be moved into or out of a location or
theater expressed in short tons or PAX per day. Limitations include the number of aircraft in the operation,
their UTE rate, and the distance between onload and offload locations.
Fuel MOG— See Maximum on Ground.
Global Decision Support System (GDSS)— GDSS is AMC's force level command and control (C2) system
supporting 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center (618 TACC) execution authority for effective airlift mission
management. It provides AMC accurate, near real-time data required for making decisions concerning the
deployment and employment of AMC resources. New accounts may be obtained by following the "GDSS2
Accounts" guidance on the support web site: https://gdss2ams.c2.amc.af.mil/gdss2web/
Ground time— The planned ground time for the type of aircraft used.
Maximum on ground (MOG) — It is most commonly expressed in C-17 equivalents.
Parking MOG— The number of aircraft that can fit, or be parked, on the ground.
Working MOG— The number of parked aircraft can be worked simultaneously based on available
personnel, materials handling equipment (MHE), and ramp space.
Missions required— The number of strategic airlift missions (by aircraft type) required to move a
requirement from the onload to the offload location.
Non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) — Operations conducted to relocate threatened non-

combatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve US citizens whose lives
are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Note: NEO planning factors (refer to Table 3.)
should be used when planning NEO operations. Emergency NEO capabilities represent the most extreme of
circumstances.
Number of aircraft— The specific number of aircraft apportioned to any peacetime operation, contingency,
or exercise, or the number apportioned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Enclosure 11 for tasked
OPLANs.
Pavement/Aircraft classification system— The ICAO standard method of reporting pavement strengths.
The Pavement Classification Number (PCN) is established by an engineering assessment of the runway. The
PCN is for use in conjunction with an Aircraft Classification Number (ACN). ACN values (provided in Table
1.) relate aircraft characteristics to a runway‘s load bearing capability, expressed as a PCN. An aircraft with
an ACN equal or less than the reported PCN can operate on the pavement subject to any limitations on the
tire pressure. Refer to DOD Flight Information Publication (Enroute Supplement) for an airfield‘s specific
PCN.
Payload— The sum of the weight of passengers and cargo that an aircraft can carry. Note: Cargo weight is
normally expressed in short tons.
Planning payload— The payload (expressed in short tons of cargo or number of passengers) expected on a
fleet-wide basis, and used by planners to make initial gross planning estimates. The size, shape, and density
of most payloads, as well as passenger constraints (i.e., oxygen or life preservers available), rarely permit
loading to 100 percent capacity. Planning payload data, not maximum payload data, should be used for
operations/transportation planning.
Point parallel rendezvous— A rendezvous accomplished with the tanker maintaining an appropriate
offset, the receiver flying the ARIP to ARCP track, and the tanker turning in front of the receiver at a
computed range.
Primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI) — Aircraft authorized to a unit for performance of its
operational mission. The Primary authorization forms the basis for the allocation of operating resources to
include manpower, support equipment, and flying hours funds.
Productivity factor— Gross measure of an aircraft‘s expected useful ability to move cargo and passengers
to a user, expressed as a percentage. Positioning, de-positioning, and other non- productive legs all diminish
the overall productivity. For example, on a strategic airlift mission involving an outbound and a return leg,
the return leg is normally considered non-productive. The productivity factor, in this case would be 50
percent. However, this assumes cargo has already been positioned at the aircraft‘s departure point. In most
situations, airlift aircraft must fly one or more positioning legs to an onload location. Since productive cargo
is usually not moved at this time, these positioning legs reduce the overall productivity factor to a value less
than 50 percent.
For planning purposes use the productivity, factors found in Table 7, or calculate your own by dividing
productive leg distance (onload to offload) by round trip cycle distance.
Queuing efficiency— A factor used by planners and applied in formulas (i.e., throughput capability) to
account for the physical impossibility of using limited airfield facilities with perfect efficiency. For example,
when a parking spot is vacated, it is never instantly re-occupied. Historically, planners have applied a
queuing efficiency of 85 percent.
Requirement—
Airlift-The force to be moved in number of passengers or short tons of cargo.

Tanker-The number and type of receivers, fuel desired, time to loiter, and AR track.
Round trip flying time (RTFT)— The accumulated flying time from the aircraft‘s starting point, to the
onload location, through the en route structure, to the offload location, back through the en route system, to
starting point of origin or other final destination.
Round trip ground time (RTGT) — The accumulated ground time from the aircraft‘s starting point, to the
onload location, through the en route structure, to the offload location, back to the final destination.
Short Ton (Ston) — 2,000 pounds.
Time to arrival— The time required for cargo/PAX to arrive at the offload location including all en route
ground times.
USE rate— The capability of a subset of PMAI aircraft to generate flying hours expressed in average flying
hours per aircraft per day. Computed only for those aircraft applied to a specific mission. For example,
consider an operation using 2 C-17 aircraft. If 1 aircraft flies 10 hours while the other is in maintenance, then
one aircraft has 10 hours of USE rate and the other has 0 hours of USE rate. Collectively, these two aircraft
generate 5.0 hrs/day of ―USE‖.
Utilization rate (UTE rate) — The capability of a fleet of aircraft to generate flying hours in a day,
expressed in terms of per Primary Authorized Inventory (PAI). Applies only to long-term, large scale
operations such as OPLANs. For small operations involving less than the entire fleet, UTE rates are not
normally a factor.
Wartime Objective “Surge” UTE Rate— A command established flying hour goal for planning and
programming to meet JCS directed wartime objectives in the first 45 days of the most demanding wartime
operations. AMC sets this rate as a target for planning and programming aircrews, maintenance, and
aerial port manpower, active and reserve force mixes, and spare parts. This early 45 day surge period
assumes the deferral of scheduled maintenance, support people working overtime, and the full mobilization
of both active and reserve forces with fully funded and fully stocked spares in supply.
Wartime Objective “Sustained” UTE Rate— Sustained UTE rates represent another command goal for
planning purposes. After a 45 day surge operation in wartime, the immediate demand for airlift decreases
somewhat and a greater percentage of needed equipment arrives by sealift/surface. AMC plans to fly at a
lower operational tempo known as a sustained UTE rate. This reduced rate is based upon normal duty days,
100% active and reserve participation, and the accomplishment of maintenance activities deferred in the
surge period.
Contingency Non—Mobilized UTE Rate = Sustained rate of flying hour activity based upon full active duty
participation and 25% reserve volunteerism. (e.g. JUST CAUSE, RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE COMFORT).
94
APPENDIX V: EXAMPLES OF EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE OF AIRFIELD

This appendix provides basic guidance on airfield damage assessment procedures. Earthquake
damages are usually obvious, and simple engineering judgement can suffice to estimate the
operational loss and recovery of airfield assets.
The following graphics provide visual examples of expected damage to an airfield after an
earthquake event. The damage could impact the runway, taxiway, aprons, roads or open areas.
Airfield damages are most commonly caused by liquefaction, shaking and displacement of the
ground.
1. SAND BOIL
During liquefaction, sand will be ejected out from the liquefied layer of the soil,
deposit to the surface, and often create a hole or crater. Sand boils can deposit sand
on pavement, cause local settlement and generate damage throughout an airfield.
Figure 1: Sand boiling in the pavement1

95
Figure 2: Sand boiling in the open field2

96
Figure 3: Tramway filed with extruded sand3
2. DIFFERENTIAL SETTLEMENT
During an earthquake, the ground may experience differential settlement due to
liquefaction or soil failure due to shaking. Differential settlement will create uneven
surfaces, prohibiting flight operations.
Figure 4: Differential settlement with open fissures in the pavement4

97
Figure 5: Fissure in pavement caused by settlement5
Figure 6: Settlement of asphalt pavement6
3. LATERAL SPREADING
98
Lateral spreading occurs in conjunction with liquefaction when the ground or the soil
has some slope or the cut slope is retained by some means. Lateral spreading causes
open fissures to the pavement or sometimes, large displacement of the ground with
trenches. At the edge of the slope, lateral spreading may case landslides.
Figure 7: Lateral spreading of runway end7
4. DAMAGE TO PAVEMENT BY SHAKING AND FAILURE OF SOIL UNDERNEATH

Ground shaking may cause severe damage to a pavement system by breaking the
pavement slab, buckling it, upheaval or soil failure.
99
Figure 8: Depression in the pavement8
Figure 9: Upheaval of pavement9

10
0
Figure 10: Local depression10
Figure 11: Buckled pavement11

10
1
Figure 12: pavement breaks due to soil failure12
Figure 13: shattered pavement slab13

10
2
Figure 14: Upheaval of pavement
5. DAMAGE TO PIPELINES , CABLES AND DRAINAGE SYSTEM

Ground shaking can break water pipes, sewer drains and cable buried under the
surface. Liquefaction and lateral spreading are often the cause of the damage. Light
structures, like manholes, may float during liquefaction and permanently extrude
from the surface.
10
3
Figure 15: Uplift of Manholes due to liqufaction14
6. GROUND DEFORMATION
The ground may move laterally or vertically due to a strong earthquake near a fault
region. The permanent displacement of the ground can cause severe damage to the
pavement and create stepping in the surface.
Figure 16: Severe ground deformation in the port pavement due to liquefaction
10
4
APPENDIX VI: RAPID VISUAL ASSESSMENT OF MASONRY AND

CONCRETE BUILDING COMPONENTS
This appendix provides basic guidance on procedures for rapid visual damage assessments of
structures at the airport. Unlike the ground, damage to structures may not be explicit and require
careful observation to identify and estimate the severity and consequence caused by an
earthquake event.
Major determination factors for damage severity are related to the type and extent of structural
components. Airport structural damage caused by earthquakes can be broadly classified into
three groups.
1. Insignificant Damage - Minor damage, building may be temporarily closed for

cleaning and could be reopened in less than a week. Damage does not significantly
affect the structural properties in spite of minor loss in stiffness. No significant repair
is needed except minor patch-up.
2. Damage requiring structural restoration– Although some cracks and other damage
might not have an obvious visual indication, the damage is significant in terms of
strength, stiffness and survival of future shaking. The structure requires a detailed
inspection.
3. Major damage or near collapse – Damage is severe and explicit. There will be total
functional loss and the structure may not be repairable.
This appendix provides simple graphic sketches 15 of the first two types of damages described
above. This will provide guidance in identifying the severity of damages. “Major damage” or “near
collapse” are obvious, and can be clearly identified from simple engineering judgement.
10
5
1. DAMAGE TO MASONRY SOLID WALL

Flexural cracking /bed joint sliding
Insignificant damage Damage requiring

1. Horizontal hairline crack in the bedjoint at the

heel of the wall
2. Diagonally oriented hairline cracks and minor 1. Horizontal crack at bedjoint at the heel
spalling at toe of the wall of the wall with in-plane offset
2. Diagonally oriented extended up to
several course and spalling at toe of the
wall
3. Diagonal cracks at the upper portion of
the wall
Flexural cracking /toe crushing
Insignificant damage Damage requiring structural restoration
1. Horizontal hairline crack in the bedjoint

at the heel of the wall 1. Horizontal crack at bedjoint at the heel of the wall
2. 1-3Horizontal cracks at the centre of the 2. Horizontal crack the centre with offset
wall with no offset in the cracks. No 3. Diagonal cracks at the toe of the wall
cracks across the wall. No cracks in the
masonry units.
Out of plane
10
6
1. Hairline cracks at floor/roof line and 1. cracks at floor/roof line and midheights with mortar
midheights spalling
2. No out-of-plane offsets and spalling 2. Spalling and rounding of units along crack plane
3. Out of plane offsets
2. DAMAGE TO PIERS
Rocking
Insignificant damage Damage requiring structural

restoration
1. Hairline cracks/ spalled mortar in bed

joints at top and bottom of pier
1. Cracks/ spalled mortar in bed joints at top and bottom
of pier
2. Cracking/ spalled mortar in bed joints within pier
Bed joint sliding
10
7
Insignificant damage Damage requiring

1. Hairline cracks in head and bed joints either

on horizontal plane or in stair stepped
fashion. No offset is occurred and cracking 1. In-plane offset in crack plane or gap in
is not continuous. No cracks in masonry head joints.
units. 2. Cracks in masonry units.
Diagonal tension

restoration
1. Hairline cracks in masonry units in fewer

than 5 units 1. Diagonal Cracks reach up to corners.
3. DAMAGE TO LINTEL/ SPANDREL

Spandrel joint sliding
10
8

restoration
1. Staggered Hairline cracks/ spalled

mortar in head and bed joints up to 3 1. Staggered Hairline cracks/ spalled mortar in
courses at the end of lintel/ spandrel. head and bed joints at the end of lintel/
No cracks in masonry units. spandrel with in-plane offset and opening in
head joints.
Spandrel unit cracking
1. Predominantly vertical cracks /spalled

mortar through no more than one at 1. Predominantly vertical cracks /spalled mortar across full
the end of lintel/ spandrel. depth of lintel/ spandrel. Cracks go through some of
masonry units.
4. DAMAGE TO CONCRETE FRAME WITH MASONRY INFILL

Concrete block infill
10
9
1. Separation of mortar around 1. Crushing of mortar, cracking of blocks including lateral

perimeter of panel and some movement of face shells.
crushing or mortar near corners of
infill panels.
Clay brick infill

restoration
1. Diagonal Hairline cracking mostly

concentrating in the centre region of 1. Cracks fully extend along the diagonals in stair-
infill. stepped fashion. Crushing out of mortar.
11
0
Out of plane in brick infill
1. Flexural cracking in the mortar beds

around the perimeter with hairline 1. Cracks fully extend along the diagonals in stair-stepped
cracking in the mortar bed at the mid fashion. Crushing out of mortar.
height of the infill panel.
Lap splices failure in concrete column

restoration
1. Flexure crack at floor level. Slight hairline

vertical cracks.
1. Flexure cracks at slab level with evidence of toe
crushing. Longitudinal splitting.
11
1
Shear failure in concrete column

restoration
1. Flexure cracks in columns near top corner

of infill 1. Flexure cracks change into shear X-cracks
over 2 column widths length at column end.
11
2
APPENDIX VII: LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES AT TIA

Tribhuvan International airport Civil engineering office (TIACAO) possesses equipment and
facilities as listed below. These are the resources at TIA that can be mobilised in the emergency
situation, if they remain functional. The list also serves as the checklist for rapid damage
assessment and repair of functional components at TIA.
1. RESCUE & FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT

i. List of Vehicles in Fire Mechanical Unit
S. Call Sign Function Water Qty. Agents Qty Remarks
No. (Ltr.)
1 New Rosenbauer Foaming 12500 a. DCP: 225 kg
(Large Foam Tender) b. Foam: 1500 kg
2 LFT – 2 Foaming 9000 a. Foam: 1500 ltr.
(Large Foam Tender)
3 MFT – 5 Foaming 9000
(Large Foam Tender) a. Foam: 1500 ltr.
4 MFT – 3 Foaming 6000 a. DCP: 1000 kg.
(Medium Foam b. Foam: 1000 ltr.
Tender)
5 MFT – 7 Foaming 6000 a. DCP: 250 kg
(Medium Foam b. Foam: 1500 ltr.
Tender)
6 RESCUE TENDER Rescue - a. DCP: 225 kg
7 WATER TENDER Water 15000 -

8 AMB – 3 Patient - Stretcher - 2
(Ambulance) Carry
9 AMB – 4 Patient - Stretcher - 2
(Ambulance) Carry
10 RFF Command - -
(Chief Car) Car
11 Compressor – 2 Pneumatic - -
Supply
12 Compressor – 3 Pneumatic - -
Supply
11
3
ii. List of Fire Vehicles and Ambulance in Fire Mechanical Unit not in operation
S. No. NAME OF THE VEHICLE REMARKS

1 RIV, Sides U/S
2 Medium Foam Tender 4 , Yellow, Sides U/S
3 CHUBB U/S
4 Small Foam Tender, 11, Sides U/S
5 Ambulance (Toyota) U/S
6 Ambulance (Renault, Sides) U/S
2. ELECTROMETRICAL EQUIPMENT
i. List of Electrical Pump
S. No. Type Location Qty Capacity (HP) Remarks
1 Booster Pump CMD 2 12.5
2 Submersible Pump CMD 1 12.5
3 Submersible Pump CMD 1 25
4 Submersible Pump Transport 1 12.5
5 Submersible Pump Radar Antenna 1 30
ii. List of Air Field Light (AFL)

S. No. Type Qty Power (W) Remarks
1 Runway edge light elevated 63 200
2 Runway edge light inset 5 2x100
3 Edge marking of turn-around areas 16 45
4 Low intensity runway end light inset 6 100
5 PAPI unit 8 2x200
6 Low intensity taxiway light elevated 230 45
8 High intensity approach light elevated 161 200
9 Flashing Light 29 -
10 High intensity threshold light inset type 16 3x100
11 Taxi-ing guidance sign single face 13 45/light
12 Taxi-ing guidance sign double 7 45/light
13 Low intensity taxiway light elevated inset 18 45
15 Runway edge light inset 1 2x100
16 REILS light elevated 2 -
17 High intensity threshold light elevated 10 200
18 Low intensity taxiway light elevated 3 45
19 High intensity runway end light inset 6 3x100
20 Lightning Arrestor Device 15 6kV/5 kA
11
4
iii. List of Electrical Equipment
S. No. Name Capacity Qty Location Remarks
1 Vacuum Circuit 630 Amp 4 Main Substation
Breaker 11 kVA (P0)
2 Transformer 1 MVA 2 Main Substation
11/0.4 kVA (P0)
3 Low Voltage Panels - - Main Substation
(P0)
4 Medium High 5.5 kV 9 P0, P1, P2
Voltage Switch
Gears
5 Constant Current 7.5 kVA 4 P0
Regulator (CCR)
6 Constant Current 25 kVA 4 P1
Regulator (CCR) 3 kVa 4
7 Constant Current 25 kVA 2 P2
Regulator (CCR) 3 kVA 4
8 Transformer 150 kVA 1 Radar Antenna
9 Transformer 300 kVA 1 Radar Building
iv. List of Generators
S.N. Generator Location Generator Capacity Remarks

Make/Model
1. East Locator, Nalinchok Lister 5 KVA
2. East Locator, Nalinchok Perkins 5 KVA New
3. South Locator, Thecho Lister 5 KVA
4. South Locator, Thecho Perkins 5 KVA New
5. Transmitting Station, Sinamangal Perkins 5 KVA New
7. VOR/DME, Koteshwor Kirloskar 15 KVA New
8. VOR/DME, Koteshwor Leroy Somer 7.5 KVA
(Mobile)
9. Radar Site Mitshubishi 150 KVA Company
Recommended
10. New Boring Cummins 30 KVA
11. Phulchoki Mitshubishi 37.5 KVA
12. Phulchoki Perkins 60 KVA
13. Overhead Tank Atalanta 50 KVA U/S
14. Overhead Tank Lister 15 KVA
15. Civil Maintenance Division kirloskar 20 KVA
16. Radar Operation Mitshubishi 250 KVA
17. TIA Power House Caterpillar 450 KVA
18. TIA Power House Cummins 625 KVA
19. Domestic TIA Cummins 100 KVA
11
5
v. List Air Conditions Units
S. No. Name A/C Details Capacity (BTU/hr) Remarks

1 AC-1 3rd Floor ITB North 304000
2 AC-2 3rd Floor ITB North 599000
3 AC N-1 3rd Floor ITB North 599000
4 AC N-2 3rd Floor ITB North 364120
5 AC-9 2nd Floor ITB North 290000
6 AC-10 2nd Floor ITB North 248000
7 AC-3 3rd Floor ITB South 599000
8 AC-3A 3rd Floor ITB South 398000
9 AC-S1 3rd Floor ITB South 599000
10 AC-S2 3rd Floor ITB South 502000
11 AC-8 2nd Floor ITB South 248000
12 AC-4 Roof Operation/Airlines 244000
Complex
13 AC-5 Roof Operation/Airlines 244000
Complex
14 AC-6 Tower 107000
15 AC-7 Tower 107000
16 Sterile 1 Old Sterile Hall 52300 kCal/hr
19 Sterile New New Sterile Hall 80 Tons
20 Unitary AC 20 Tons Splitted over TIA
building
vi. List of Facilities
S. No. Name Qty. Location Remarks
1 Baggage Handling 6 3 – Arrival

System 3 – Departure
2 Elevator 6 4 – ITB
2 – Operation
Building
3 Escalator 2 1- Departure
1- Arrival
vii. List of Vehicles in Transport Unit of Mechanical Section
S. Vehicle No. Qty. Type Function Remarks

No.
1 1543, 1544, 1635 3 Mahindra Bolero Pick Up
2 592, 593 2 Toyota Hiace Passenger Vehicle
3 1-0-15, 10-0-40 2 Air Side
11
6
4 1567 1 ISUZU Follow Me
5 3886 1 Holden Civil Maintenance
6 1646 1 Pajero GM car
7 1761, 1762, 1763 3 Santro Chief Car
3. VEHICLES AND CIVIL WORK EQUIPMENT

S. No. Vehicle Name Function Remarks
1 Mahindra Tractor (Large) Grass Mower
2 Mahindra Tractor (Small) Grass Mower
3 HMT Tractor Grass Mower
4 Kubota Tractor Trailer
5 Crane mounted Truck Lifting and Carry
6 Water Tanker Water Carry
7 Sweeprite (Husky) Clean Runway
8 Small Roller Compaction
9 Jumper Compaction
10 Trailer Carry
4. GROUND HANDLING EQUIPMENT OF NEPAL AIRLINES

Loading Others
Equipment Type Fork Conveyor Catering PC high
Belts Trucks loader
AHM 991 925 927 930
GE Series 200 600 500 1500
Capacity 10 tons 06 200Lbs/Ft2 5.5 Mtrs 3.5Mtrs
tons -7 Tons
Applicabili Heavy load Medium load All A/C Conven
ty cargo CGO tional
A/C
Loading
transportati Type pc baggage container pallet dummy
on transporter cart/trolly dolly dolly dolly
equipment AHM 936 963 965 966
GE Series 1700 900 2000 1800 1900
Capacity 7 tons 2.5 tons 1.6 tons 7 tons 7 tons
Applicabili transporting transporting baggage contain Pallet
ty ULDs ULDs transport er loads of
transpo different
rt pallet
sizes
Towing
equipment Type conventional Towbarless Ramp others Remarks
aircraft a/c tractor equipment
tractor tractors
(Baggage
tractors)
11
7
AHM 955 957 968
GE Series 1100 1100 300
Capacity 20000 Lbs TE 5000 Lbs DBP
44000 Lbs TE 5000 Lbs DBP
27000 Lbs TE 5000 Lbs DBP
Applicabili conventional all wide tow of

ty A/C up to bodied a/c equip. and
B757,A320,B7 trailed mass baggage
37 300T trolley/PC
Passenger
Handling Type pax steps passenger ambu lift others Remarks
equipment ramp bus
AHM 920 950 921
GE Series 400 2100 2400
Capacity 04 mtrs,5.5 20standes,90s
mtrs tandes,110
standes
Applicabili Narrow transport of lifting/lowe
ty bodied a/c domestic pax ring
incapacitat
ed pax to
from a/c
cabin
Aircraft
Servicing Type water truck lav service a/c a/c a/c air
Equipment truck airconditio ground starter
n unit power unit
AHM 970 971 974 972 976
GE Series 1600 1000 2300 100 700
Capacity 900 gallons 900 gallons 60tons of 115v/9 300 ppm
ref. 0 kva
Applicabili all a/c all a/c a/c up to a/c for for n/b a/c
ty the load mediu
m load
require
ment
Maintenance ramp movement
platforms vehicles
1400 1200
42 feet commercial
maintenance of w/b surface transport
and n/b aircrafts
11
8
APPENDIX VIII: EXAMPLE OF RAPID REPAIR OF AIRFIELD

PAVEMENT
1. DETERMINING REPAIR METHOD
The pavement repair method must be determined and the damaged pavement area
must be cleared of debris to permit upheaval identification. One of four pavement
repair methods can be utilized:
i. Debris backfill
ii. Choke ballast over debris
iii. Choke ballast
iv. Sand grid
The sand-grid repair method must have foreign object damage (FOD) cover and is
only suitable for C-130 operations. Foreign object damage covers are not currently
approved for C-17 Globe master, C-5 Galaxy, For airfields with a mix of aircraft that
includes those not approved for FOD covers and ones that require FOD covers,
multiple MOS' should be selected, if possible, to allow for a MOS with FOD covers and
one without. This will prevent the time consuming and maintenance intensive
removal and replacement of FOD covers between operations of different aircraft. It is
critical in either case to ensure the AERT teams understand which type mission has
higher priority and repair that one first.
2. INITIAL UPHEAVAL DETERMINATION
The determination of how much upheaved pavement must be removed at the start of
a pavement repair is accomplished by profile measurement. The same process is used
after repairs are complete to see if repairs have been performed within the tolerances
specified. Profile measurement will also be employed at various times following
aircraft trafficking in order to determine if crater maintenance is necessary due to
11
9
base course compression. It is of paramount importance that AERT know the exact
extent of the upheaval damage as well as the quality of a completed repair effort.
3. REMOVING UPHEAVAL, EXCAVATING AND FILLING CRATER
With the extent of upheaval determined, the next step in the rapid repair process is
the removal of unsound and upheaved pavement. Unsound pavement is pavement
that has been damaged to the point where there is a reasonable possibility that it
might break apart under traffic and present a FOD problem. Based on the repair
method chosen, the crater must be excavated or filled with useable debris. Removing
more pavement than necessary will increase the time to complete the repair and
could enlarge the crater to the extent where additional FOD cover sections are
required.
4. INTERMEDIATE PROFILE CHECK
As upheaval is being removed, intermediate upheaval measurements are required to

ensure all upheaval has been identified and removed. Use the same method as used
when performing initial upheaval determination. Check multiple points as upheaval is
being removed.
5. DAMAGED PAVEMENT EDGE CLEANING, LEVELING FILL MATERIAL, AND OVERFILLING
Clean edges of the crater by making the top 18 inches of the sidewalls as vertical as
possible. Then, level the top layers of fill material. Use shovels to level areas near the
crater’s edge. Next, fill and compact the crater with crushed stone material using six-
inch lifts. Overfill the crater by approximately three inches above the original
pavement surface height.
6. ROUGH LEVELING AND COMPACTING THE FILLED PAVEMENT

12
0
When the crater has been filled with the top layer of crushed stone, it requires
leveling and compacting to achieve its greatest load bearing capacity.
7. FINAL GRADE AND COMPACTION
To ensure the final crater surface is flush and not below the original pavement height,
final grade and compaction procedures must be performed.

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Final

Tribhuvan International Airport

Dr. Punya Raj Shakya

1. Dr. Punya Raj Shakya, Tribhuvan International Airport, Officiating Director,

University of British Columbia

4. Mr. Bishnu Pandey, Project Engineer & Coordinator

7. Mr. Pablo Riofrio, Technical Director

8. Mr. Sean Dowling, Emergency Planning Advisor

Emergency preparedness is commonly defined as the process of ensuring that an

The main objectives are:

Recent earthquakes in developing countries, particularly those not prepared enough to

Tribhuvan International Airport is expected to be the only means of transportation for

 Seismic vulnerability assessment of the airport system.

The approach for undertaking the tasks is characterized by the following:

The following methodology has been implemented:

Collection and Review of Pertinent Data and Information

Interaction with Key Persons of the Concerned Authorities

Development of Emergency Response and Recovery Strategy for Airport

Development of Strategy for Emergency Aid Handling

 Airport Earthquake Emergency Response Plan for Tribhuvan International Airport.

Disaster Response Plan (TIADRP)

This document deals with the specific disaster scenario of an earthquake.

Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

1.1 USE OF AIRPORT DISASTER RESPONSE PLAN (TIADRP) .................................................................................................... 1

1.1.1. PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1.2. AUTHORITY ......................................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1.3. ACTIVATION OF TIADRP ................................................................................................................................................. 1

1.1.5. DISTRIBUTION OF PLAN ................................................................................................................................................... 2

1.1.6. AMENDMENT ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3

1.1.7. REQUIREMENT OF CHANGE .............................................................................................................................................. 3

1.1.8. DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................................................................................................................................................... 3

1.2 BASIS OF TIADRP ....................................................................................................................................................................... 4

1.2.1. SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

1.2.2. APPLICABILITY ................................................................................................................................................................... 4

1.2.3. EARTHQUAKE SCENARIOS CONSIDERED FOR THE PLAN ............................................................................................ 4

1.2.4. ASSUMPTIONS .................................................................................................................................................................... 5

1.2.5. EMERGENCY RESTORATION GOALS ................................................................................................................................ 6

1.2.6. EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE ACTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 6

1.3 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY INFORMATION FLOW CHART.................................................................................................... 8

1.4 MATRIX OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................................................. 9

SECTION-2 COMMAND & CONTROL ..................................................................................................................................................... 10

2.1 PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 10

2.2 COMMAND & CONTROL AND LINE OF SUCCESSION ............................................................................................................. 10

2.3 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC) .................................................................................................................................. 10

2.3.1. ACTIVATION ...................................................................................................................................................................... 10

2.3.3. OFFICIALS .......................................................................................................................................................................... 11

2.4 AIRPORT EMERGENCY OPERATION POST (AEOP) ............................................................................................................ 12

2.4.1. ACTIVATION ...................................................................................................................................................................... 12

2.4.2. OPERATION COMMANDER .............................................................................................................................................. 12

2.5 COMMAND & CONTROL CHAIN................................................................................................................................................ 13

2.6 EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY OPERATION ASSIGNMENTS (GENERAL) ............................................................................... 13

2.6.1. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEPAL (CAAN) ..................................................................................................... 13

2.6.3. FLIGHT OPERATION DEPARTMENT, TIACAO ............................................................................................................ 14

2.6.4. AIRPORT RESCUE AND FIREFIGHTING DIVISION , TIACAO..................................................................................... 14

2.6.5. AIRPORT TECHNICAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT .......................................................................................................... 15

2.6.6. AIRPORT OPERATION DEPARTMENT ........................................................................................................................... 15

2.6.7. AIRPORT CIVIL ENGINEERING DIVISION .................................................................................................................... 16

2.6.8. METROPOLITAN POLICE TIA SECURITY GUARD OFFICE .......................................................................................... 16