Georgia Redistricting Order

Case 1:21-cv-05337-SCJ Document 134 Filed 02/28/22 Page 1 of 238
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
ALPHA PHI ALPHA FRATERNITY CIVIL ACTION FILE

INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs, No. 1:21-CV-5337-SCJ
v.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his

official capacity as Secretary of State of
Georgia,
Defendant.
____________________________________ CIVIL ACTION FILE
COAKLEY PENDERGRASS, et al.,
v.
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.,

Defendants.
____________________________________ CIVIL ACTION FILE
ANNIE LOIS GRANT, et al.,
v.
ORDER FOLLOWING
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al., COORDINATED HEARING ON
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY
Defendants.
INJUNCTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................11
A. What Is Redistricting and Why Is It Necessary? ................................12
B. Factual History ........................................................................................14
C. The Purpose of the Voting Rights Act and the Conduct It
Prohibits ...................................................................................................16
D. Timeline ....................................................................................................19
II. LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................21
A. Preliminary Injunction ...........................................................................21
1. Eleventh Circuit ................................................................................21
2. Recent Supreme Court Authority ..................................................23
B. The Voting Rights Act ............................................................................27
1. The Gingles Preconditions ..............................................................28
2. The Senate Factors............................................................................29
C. Evidentiary Considerations...................................................................32
D. Motions to Dismiss .................................................................................33
III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ..........................34
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.....................................................34
1. The First Gingles Precondition: Numerosity and

Compactness .....................................................................................35
a) Credibility Determinations ......................................................35
(1) Mr. Cooper ...........................................................................35
(2) Mr. Esselstyn........................................................................38

2
(3) Mr. Morgan ..........................................................................42
(4) Ms. Wright ...........................................................................46
b) First Gingles Precondition Legal Standard .............................51
(1) Numerosity ..........................................................................52
(2) Compactness ........................................................................54
c) Pendergrass ................................................................................55
(1) Numerosity ..........................................................................58
(a) Demographic developments in Georgia ...................59
(b) Georgia’s 2021 congressional plan ............................63
(c) The Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ illustrative

congressional plan........................................................66
(2) Geographic Compactness ..................................................69
(a) Population equality ......................................................71
(b) Compactness .................................................................71
(c) Contiguity......................................................................76
(d) Preservation of political subdivisions .......................76
(e) Preservation of communities of interest ...................79
(f) Core Retention ..............................................................85
(g) Racial considerations ...................................................87
(3) Conclusions of Law ............................................................92
d) Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha .....................................................93
(1) The Grant Plaintiffs are substantially likely to

establish a Section 2 violation .........................................101
3
(a) Senate Districts ...........................................................101
i) Numerosity ...........................................................101
ii) Geographic compactness ....................................107
(a) Population equality ......................................108
(b) Compactness ..................................................110
(c) Contiguity ......................................................115
(d) Preservation of political

subdivisions ...................................................115
(e) Preservation of communities of

interest ............................................................118
(f) Incumbent protection ...................................123
(g) Core retention ................................................123
(h) Racial considerations ....................................125
(b) Esselstyn House Districts ..........................................129
i) Numerosity ...........................................................129
ii) Geographic Compactness...................................133
(b) Compactness ..................................................135
(c) Contiguity ......................................................139

subdivisions ...................................................139

interest ............................................................143
4
(g) Core retention ................................................148
(2) The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs are

substantially likely to establish a Section 2
violation..............................................................................153
(a) Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 .................153
i) Numerosity ...........................................................153
ii) Geographic compactness ....................................155
(b) Compactness ..................................................157
(c) Contiguity ......................................................159

subdivisions ...................................................159

interest ............................................................164
(g) Core retention ................................................168
(3) Conclusions of Law ..........................................................171
2. The Second Gingles Precondition: Political Cohesion ..............172
a) The parties’ arguments ...........................................................172
(1) Defendants .........................................................................172
5
(2) Plaintiffs .............................................................................173
(3) Conclusions of law............................................................174
b) The existence of political cohesion ........................................176
(1) Pendergrass........................................................................176
(a) Plaintiffs’ Expert: Dr. Maxwell Palmer ...................176
i) Qualification .........................................................177
ii) Analysis .................................................................178
(b) Defendants’ Expert: Dr. John Alford .......................180
i) Qualification .........................................................180
ii) Analysis .................................................................182
(c) Conclusions of Law....................................................185
(2) Grant ...................................................................................186
(a) Dr. Palmer’s analysis .................................................186
(3) Alpha Phi Alpha ...............................................................187
(a) Plaintiffs’ Expert: Dr. Lisa Handley .......................188
i) Qualification .........................................................188
ii) Analysis .................................................................190
(a) Statewide general elections .........................191
(b) State legislative elections .............................192
(c) Primaries ........................................................193
(b) Defendants’ Expert: Dr. Alford ...............................195
(c) Conclusions of Law....................................................197

6
3. The Third Gingles Precondition: Bloc Voting ............................197
a) Pendergrass ..............................................................................198
b) Grant ..........................................................................................200
c) Alpha Phi Alpha ......................................................................202
4. The Senate Factors..........................................................................205
a) Senate Factor One: Georgia has a history of

official, voting-related discrimination. .................................205
b) Senate Factor Two: Georgia voters are racially

polarized. ..................................................................................209
c) Senate Factor Three: Georgia’s voting practices

enhance the opportunity for discrimination. ......................210
d) Senate Factor Four: Georgia has no history of

candidate slating for legislative elections. ...........................211
e) Senate Factor Five: Georgia’s discrimination has

produced significant socioeconomic disparities
that impair Black Georgians’ participation in the
political process. ......................................................................211
f) Senate Factor Six: Both overt and subtle racial

appeals are prevalent in Georgia’s political
campaigns. ................................................................................215
g) Senate Factor Seven: Black candidates in Georgia

are underrepresented in office and rarely succeed
outside of majority-minority districts. .................................217
h) Senate Factor Eight: Georgia is not responsive to

its Black residents. ...................................................................218
i) Senate Factor Nine: The justifications for the

enacted redistricting maps are tenuous. ..............................219
7
5. Conclusions of Law........................................................................220
B. Irreparable Injury ..................................................................................220
C. Balancing of the Equities and Public Interest ...................................221
1. Findings of Fact ..............................................................................222
2. Conclusions of Law........................................................................230
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................237
8
ORDER1
This matter appears before the Court on the pending Motions for
Preliminary Injunction filed in the above-stated cases concerning the legality of
the State of Georgia’s newly adopted redistricting plans. APA Doc. No. [39],
1 In the interest of judicial economy, the Court issues a single order that will be filed
by the Clerk in each of the above-stated cases. The Court’s issuance of this single order
does not imply or reflect any intention of the court to consolidate these cases under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 or otherwise.
For reference, the following citations are used for support for each of the findings
below:
Citation Document Type
APA Doc. No. [ ] Docket entry from Alpha Phi Alpha
Grant Doc. No. [ ] Docket entry from Grant
Pendergrass Doc. [ ] Docket entry from Pendergrass
Tr. Transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing held

February 7–14, 2022 in all three cases and filed at APA
Doc. Nos. [106–117]; Grant Doc. Nos. [68–79];
Pendergrass Doc. Nos. [73–75, 77–85].
DX Defendants’ Exhibits
APAX Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
GPX Grant/Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
APA Stip. Alpha Phi Alpha joint stipulated facts filed at APA
Doc. No. [94]
Grant Stip. Grant joint stipulated facts filed at Grant Doc. No. [56]
Pendergrass Stip. Pendergrass joint stipulated facts filed at Pendergrass

Doc. No. [63]
9
Grant Doc. No. [19], Pendergrass Doc. No. [32]. In considering this important
matter, the Court has had the benefit of thousands of pages of briefing and
evidence, as well as the testimony of numerous fact and expert witnesses the
Court observed over a six-day hearing on this matter. After careful review and
consideration, the Court finds that while the plaintiffs have shown that they
are likely to ultimately prove that certain aspects of the State’s redistricting
plans are unlawful, preliminary injunctive relief is not in the public’s interest
because changes to the redistricting maps at this point in the 2022 election
schedule are likely to substantially disrupt the election process. As a result, the
Court will not grant the requests for preliminary injunctive relief.
The Court’s analysis proceeds as follows. First, the Court discusses
redistricting, voting rights law, and the factual and procedural backgrounds of
the above-stated actions. Second, the Court provides the relevant legal
standard and discusses the voting rights legislation and case law that guides
this Court’s analysis. Finally, the Court provides its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, which includes the Court’s credibility determinations of
expert witnesses as well as the Court’s analysis under the pertinent law.
10
I. BACKGROUND
Long ago, the United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886). described the “political franchise of voting” as “a
fundamental political right, [] preservative of all rights.” Our sister court in the
Northern District of Alabama therefore aptly expanded: “Voting is an
inviolable right, occupying a sacred place in the lives of those who fought to
secure the right and in our democracy, because it is ‘preservative of all rights.’”
People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1091 (N.D. Ala. 2020)
(quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370), appeal dismissed sub nom. People First of
Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., No. 20-13695-GG, 2020 WL 7038817 (11th Cir.
Nov. 13, 2020), and appeal dismissed, No. 20-13695-GG, 2020 WL 7028611
(11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2020).
In the three cases before the Court, each set of Plaintiffs argues that their
voting rights have been violated by the redistricting plans recently adopted by
the State of Georgia in the wake of the 2020 Census. The Court thus approaches
this case “with caution, bearing in mind that these circumstances involve ‘one
of the most fundamental rights of . . . citizens: the right to vote.’” Ga. State Conf.
of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citations omitted).
11
A. What Is Redistricting and Why Is It Necessary?
The country’s system of elections is based on the principle of “one
person, one vote” espoused by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962). As a result, and because our federal system of government is
representative when people are drawn into electoral districts, those districts
must have equal populations. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983)
(“Article I, § 2 establishes a ‘high standard of justice and common sense’ for the
apportionment of congressional districts: ‘equal representation for equal
numbers of people.’” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964))).
Otherwise, the voting strength of people who live in districts with large
populations will be diluted compared to those who live in districts with smaller
populations. The Supreme Court has therefore held that in elections for
members of the United States House of Representatives, “the command of Art.
I, § 2 [of the Constitution], that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People of the
several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” Wesberry, 376 U.S.
at 7–8 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). This principle has also been
extended to state legislative bodies: “[A]s a basic constitutional standard, the
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral
12
state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.” Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
The number of people who must be in a particular electoral district
depends on which legislative office the district is designed to cover. For
instance, the U.S. Constitution prescribes that for the House of Representatives,
“[t]he Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3. When district populations are not equal, the districts are
malapportioned. Because populations naturally shift and change over time,
district boundaries must be adjusted periodically to correct any
malapportionment. This “[r]ealignment of a legislative district’s boundaries to
reflect changes in population and ensure proportionate representation by
elected officials” is known as reapportionment or redistricting.
Reapportionment, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (citing U.S. Const. art.
I, § 2, cl. 3); redistricting, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The U.S.
Constitution requires that reapportionment for members of the U.S. House of
Representatives occur every ten years, based on the Decennial Census. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id., amend XIV, § 2. Likewise, the Georgia Constitution
13
requires that the Senate and House districts of the General Assembly be
reapportioned after each Decennial Census. Ga. Const. art. III, § 2, ¶ II.
B. Factual History
All of this explains why it was necessary, after the results of the 2020
Census became available, for the Georgia General Assembly to pass laws
reapportioning districts for the U.S. House of Representatives (SB 2EX), the
Georgia Senate (SB 1EX), and the Georgia House (HB 1EX). Each of these
provisions was signed into law by Governor Brian Kemp on December 30, 2021.
Plaintiffs’ claims all stem from that redistricting process, but they do not claim
that the districts are malapportioned. Rather, their claims are based on the
alleged improper dilution of their votes tied to race.
Within hours of Governor Kemp signing SB 2EX, SB 1EX, and HB 1EX
into law, Plaintiffs in Alpha Phi Alpha v. Raffensperger, No. 1:21-cv-05337-SCJ
(Alpha Phi Alpha) and Pendergrass v. Raffensperger, No. 1:21-cv-05339-SCJ
(Pendergrass), filed suit. Ultimately, between December 30, 2021, and January
11, 2022, the three cases at issue here were filed against State of Georgia
officials, alleging these redistricting plans (collectively, the “Enacted Plans”)
violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
14
The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs challenge certain State Senate and State
House districts in the Enacted Plans. Specifically, they challenge Senate
Districts 16, 17, and 23 in the Enacted State Senate Plan (SB 1EX), and House
Districts 74, 114, 117, 118, 124, 133, 137, 140, 141, 149, 150, 153, 154, and 155, in
the Enacted State House Plan (HB 1EX). APA Doc. No. [1], ¶¶ 64–66, 70–74. The
Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs contend that the Enacted State Senate and House
Plans fail to include additional majority-minority districts (i.e., districts in
which the majority of the voting-age population is Black) that would give Black
voters the opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. Instead, they assert
Black voters have been heavily “packed” into certain districts and split up into
predominantly white districts (i.e., “cracked”) in other areas. See generally
APA Doc. No. [1].
The Grant v. Raffensperger, No. 1:22-cv-00122-SCJ (Grant) Plaintiffs,
likewise challenge the Enacted State Senate and House Plans. Specifically, the
Grant Plaintiffs challenge Senate Districts 10, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 34, 35 in
the Enacted State Senate Plan, and House Districts 61, 64, 69, 74, 75, 78, 117, 133,
142, 143, 144, 145, 147, and 149 in the Enacted State House Plan. Grant Doc.
No. [1], ¶¶ 41–44. They argue the General Assembly should have drawn three
15
additional majority-minority State Senate districts and five State House
districts. See generally Grant Doc. No. [1].
Finally, the Pendergrass Plaintiffs, challenges certain congressional
districts in the Congressional Enacted Plan. Specifically, the Pendergrass
Plaintiffs challenge congressional Districts 3, 6, 11, 13, and 14. Pendergrass Doc.
No. [1], ¶ 35. The Pendergrass Plaintiffs allege that SB 2EX should have
included an additional majority-minority district in the western Atlanta
metropolitan area.
Each set of Plaintiffs contends these failures to draw additional majority-
minority districts violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
C. The Purpose of the Voting Rights Act and the Conduct It

Prohibits
“The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, in the wake of the Civil
War. It provides that ‘[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude,’ and it gives Congress the ‘power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.’” Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder,
570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013). Even after the adoption of this amendment, however,
many discriminatory systems—including violence—were used to deprive
Blacks (among others) of their right to vote.
16
One particularly extreme use of such violence took place on Sunday,
March 7, 1965 (“Bloody Sunday”). On that day, civil rights proponents began
marching from Selma, Alabama to Montgomery, Alabama for, among other
things, the right to vote. After crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge, the marchers
were attacked by state troopers and civilians, an event that was televised across
America. The Bloody Sunday attack caused public outrage. See James D.
Wascher, Recognizing the 50th Anniversary of the Voting Rights Act, Fed.
Law., May 2015, at 41 (hereinafter, “Wascher”) (citing Richard H. Pildes,
Introduction, in The Future of the Voting Rights Act xi, (David L. Epstein, et al.,
eds., 2006)). Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(“VRA”). It was signed into law on August 6 of that year. Pub. L. No. 89-110,
79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10702). The VRA
was adopted specifically “[t]o enforce the fifteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.” Id. Many commentators have “rightly called
[it] the most effective civil rights legislation ever adopted.” Wascher at 38; see
also Terrye Conroy, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: A Selected Annotated
Bibliography, 98 Law Libr. J. 663, 663 (2006) (stating that the VRA “is widely
considered one of the most important and successful civil rights laws ever
enacted”).
17
While the VRA has been amended several times, as originally adopted,
Section 2 prohibited practices that denied or abridged the right to vote “on
account of” race or color. Section 4 contained an automatic trigger for the
review of new voting laws or practices adopted in certain locations that had a
history of using discriminatory voting tests or devices (such as poll taxes or
literacy requirements) (the “coverage formula”). The entire State of Georgia
was among these “covered jurisdictions.” Under Section 5, covered
jurisdictions were required to submit new voting procedures or practices for
prior approval (“preclearance”) by the Department of Justice or a district court
panel of three judges. See Wascher at 41. The VRA thus “employed
extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem.” Shelby Cnty.,
570 U.S. at 534.
In 2013, the Supreme Court held that the coverage formula was no longer
constitutional because it had not been reformulated since 1975. Shelby Cnty.,
570 U.S. at 538, 556–57. As a result, the State of Georgia is no longer a covered
jurisdiction. The current round of redistricting is the first to be done as a result
of a Decennial Census after the Shelby County ruling. Thus, this is the first time
in over fifty years in which Georgia has redistricted following the Decennial
Census without having to seek preclearance. But Shelby County “in no way
18
affect[ed] the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting
found in § 2.” Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 557. And it is Section 2 on which the
Plaintiffs in these three cases predicate their claims.
D. Timeline
Due to the serious time exigencies surrounding the fair and timely
resolution of these cases, including the provisions of Georgia’s election law that
set various deadlines applicable to the upcoming 2022 elections, the Court
moved expeditiously to hold a Rule 16 Status Conference on January 12, 2022.
APA Doc. No. [8]; Pendergrass Doc. No. [15].
Following the Status Conference, the Court set the following schedule
for briefing on motions to dismiss in all three matters: Motions to Dismiss were
due by 5:00 PM EST on January 14, 2022; Responses were due by 5:00 PM on
January 18; Replies were due by 5:00 PM on January 20. APA Doc. No. [37];
Grant Doc. No. [14]; Pendergrass Doc. No. [33].
The Court also set an expedited schedule for briefing on any motions for
preliminary injunction in all three matters: Motions for preliminary injunction
were due by 5:00 PM EST on January 13, 2022; Responses were due by 5:00 PM
EST on January 18; Replies were due by 5:00 PM EST on January 20. APA Doc.
No. [36]; Grant Doc. No. [15]; Pendergrass Doc. No. [35].
19
The Court then scheduled a six-day preliminary injunction hearing with
deadlines for exchange of witnesses and exhibits, objections to witnesses and
exhibits, and stipulated facts to streamline the hearing process. APA Doc. No.
[55]; Grant Doc. No. [44]; Pendergrass Doc. No. [41]. The Court thereafter
entered expedited rulings, denying Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss on January
28, 2022. APA Doc. No. [65]; Grant Doc. No. [44]; Pendergrass Doc. No. [43].
The coordinated hearing on the preliminary injunctions in all three cases
was held from February 7 through February 14, 2022. APA Doc. Nos. [106]–
[117]; Grant Doc. Nos. [68]–[79]; Pendergrass Doc. Nos. [73]–[75], [77]–[85].2
Related to the coordinated hearing and in accordance with the Court’s
orders setting deadlines, the parties filed stipulations, requests for judicial
notice, supplemental authority (and responses), and proposed findings and
conclusions of law,3 which the Court has reviewed in conjunction with the
issuance of this Order. 4 APA Doc. Nos. [61], [73], [94], [95], [98], [101], [119],
2 On February 8, 2022, the Court verbally granted the Motion for Leave to File Brief
as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs filed by Fair Districts Ga and the Election Law
Clinic at Harvard. APA Doc. No. [90]. The Amici Curiae brief has been fully
considered by the Court in rendering its decision.
3 In the interest of judicial economy, portions of the proposed findings of
fact/conclusions of law have been adopted and incorporated into this Order.
4 In addition, non-party, Fair Districts Ga and the Election Law Clinic at Harvard filed
a Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs. APA Doc.
20
[120], [121], [123], [124]; Grant Doc. Nos. [39], [47], [56], [60], [61], [80], [81], [82];
Pendergrass Doc. Nos. [47], 54], [63], [66], [67], [69], [86], [87], [88].
The Court has also reviewed the entire record of each of the three cases
at issue, inclusive of the exhibits and evidence admitted during the coordinated
hearing. The pending preliminary injunction motions are now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Preliminary Injunction
1. Eleventh Circuit
To obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must demonstrate:
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) that irreparable injury will be suffered unless the
injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the
movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if
issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the
public interest.
Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320 F.3d 1205, 1210
(11th Cir. 2003); see also Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 275 F.3d
1032, 1034–35 (11th Cir. 2001). Injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy and should not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the
No. [90]. On February 8, 2022, the Court verbally granted the Motion. The Amici
Curiae brief has been fully considered by the Court in rendering its decision.
21
burden of persuasion as to each of these four factors. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F. 3d
1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306
(11th Cir. 1998). Moreover, when a party seeks to affirmatively enjoin a state
governmental agency, requiring it to perform a certain action, the “case must
contend with the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally
been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own affairs.” Martin v.
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976)). This rule “bars federal
courts from interfering with non-federal government operations in the absence
of facts showing an immediate threat of substantial injury.” Id. (quoting
Midgett v. Tri–Cnty. Metro. Dist. of Or., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (D. Or. 1999);
citing Brown v. Bd. of Trs. of LaGrange Ind. Sch. Dist., 187 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
1951)).5 The decision to grant preliminary injunctive relief is within the broad
discretion of the district court. Majd–Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724
F.2d 901, 902 (11th Cir. 1984).
5 All decisions of the former Fifth Circuit entered prior to October 1, 1981, are binding
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206,
1209–10 (11th Cir. 1981).
22
2. Recent Supreme Court Authority
Added to this mix is the recent Supreme Court order in Merrill v.
Milligan, 595 U.S. ---, 142 S. Ct. 879 (Feb. 7, 2022). Milligan involves challenges
under the United States Constitution and the VRA to Alabama’s recently
redrawn congressional electoral maps. See generally Milligan v. Merrill, Case
No. 2:21-cv-1530-AMM (N.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), consolidated with
Singleton v. Merrill, Case No. 2:21-cv-1291-AMM (N.D. Ala.) (three-judge
court). After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the three-judge court entered
preliminary injunctions enjoining the Alabama Secretary of State from
conducting congressional elections using those maps. Id. Doc. No. [107]. The
Alabama defendants applied to the United States Supreme Court for a stay of
the injunctive relief from those orders. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. at 879.6 The Supreme
Court granted the request and stayed, without opinion, the injunctions that
were issued by the three-judge court. See id. Chief Justice Roberts, as well as
Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissented. Id. at 882–89.
6 Because the orders were issued by a three-judge court, all appellate review is by the
United States Supreme Court. 52 U.S.C. § 10306(c) (“The district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction of such actions which shall be heard and determined by
a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28
and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.”).
23
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately to concur
with the stay of the injunctions. See id. at 879–82. Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurrence first emphasized that the stay was not a ruling on the merits but
followed precedent—the Purcell principle7—which dictates that federal courts
generally “should not enjoin state election laws in the period close to an
election.” Id. at 879. This is important because
[l]ate judicial tinkering with election laws can lead to

disruption and to unanticipated and unfair
consequences for candidates, political parties, and
voters, among others. It is one thing for a State on its
own to toy with its election laws close to a State’s
elections. But it is quite another thing for a federal
court to swoop in and re-do a State’s election laws in
the period close to an election.
Id. at 881 (footnote omitted). Because “practical considerations sometimes
require courts to allow elections to proceed despite pending legal challenges,”
7 The Purcell principle derives from Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per
curiam). There, the Supreme Court noted that “[c]ourt orders affecting elections,
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent
incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will
increase.” Id. at 4–5. Accordingly, the Court vacated an appellate court order that
enjoined enforcement of a voter-identification law about a month before an election.
Id. at 3. Based on Purcell, both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
applied the principle that “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election
rules on the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,
140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (citations omitted).
24
id. at 882 (quoting Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 426 (2008)), Justice
Kavanaugh concluded that the Purcell principle should be applied to modify
the traditional preliminary injunction standard when elections are close at
hand:
I would think that the Purcell principle thus might be

overcome even with respect to an injunction issued
close to an election if a plaintiff establishes at least the
following: (i) the underlying merits are entirely
clearcut in favor of the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff would
suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (iii) the
plaintiff has not unduly delayed bringing the
complaint to court; and (iv) the changes in question
are at least feasible before the election without
significant cost, confusion, or hardship.
Id. at 881 (citations omitted).
Although Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence is not controlling, this Court
would be remiss if it ignored its conclusions. First, even dicta from the Supreme
Court carries strong persuasive value. The Eleventh Circuit has made this clear.
In rejecting another appellate court’s dismissal of Supreme Court dicta, the
Eleventh Circuit emphasized the following:
We disagree with the [] opinion’s dismissal of the

Supreme Court’s specific pronouncements []. A lot.
We will start with the most fundamental reason. We
have always believed that when the Founders penned
Article III’s reference to the judicial power being
vested “in one supreme Court and in such inferior
25
Courts” as Congress may establish, they used

“supreme” and “inferior” as contrasting adjectives,
with us being on the short end of the contrast. See U.S.
Const. Art. III § 1. . . .
It is true that the Supreme Court’s analysis . . . and its

conclusion that the issue remains an open question in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, is dicta. However,
there is dicta and then there is dicta, and then there is
Supreme Court dicta. . . .
We have previously recognized that “dicta from the

Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast
aside.”
Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Peterson v. BMI
Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Second, although the Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in Milligan
explaining its reasoning for staying the three-judge court’s injunction orders,
five justices agreed that the stay should issue. That is, a majority of the Supreme
Court necessarily concluded that there was a “fair prospect” it would reverse
the injunction on the merits, the Alabama defendants would suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction were not lifted, the equities weighed in the defendants’
favor, and the injunction was not in the public interest. 142 S. Ct. at 880
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Taken in this light, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion
carries even more weight than typical Supreme Court dicta.
26
Accordingly, although this Court applies the traditional test employed
by the Eleventh Circuit for determining whether a preliminary injunction
should issue, it is cognizant of the proposed standard set forth by Justice
Kavanaugh and that the State of Georgia has already begun the process of
preparing for elections to take place under the Enacted Plans.
B. The Voting Rights Act
Subsection (a) of Section 2 of the VRA prohibits standards, practices, and
procedures that deny or abridge the right to vote of any United States citizen
based on race or color. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Such a violation is established
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown

that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.
Id. at § 10301(b). The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that Section 2 is “a
constitutional exercise of congressional enforcement power under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.” United States v. Marengo Cnty.
Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1984).
27
1. The Gingles Preconditions
In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Supreme Court first
interpreted Section 2 after Congress amended it in 1982. The statute, as
amended, focuses on the results of the challenged standards, practices, and
procedures; it is not concerned with whether those processes were adopted
because of discriminatory intent. Id. at 35–36. “Under the results test, the
inquiry is more direct: past discrimination can severely impair the present-day
ability of minorities to participate on an equal footing in the political process.
Past discrimination may cause [B]lacks to register or vote in lower numbers
than whites. Past discrimination may also lead to present socioeconomic
disadvantages, which in turn can reduce participation and influence in political
affairs.” Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1567 (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
Under Gingles, plaintiffs must show that they have satisfied three
prerequisites to make out a Section 2 vote dilution claim:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate

that it is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district. If it is not, as would be the case in a
substantially integrated district, the multi-member form
of the district cannot be responsible for minority
voters’ inability to elect its candidates. Second, the
28
minority group must be able to show that it is

politically cohesive. If the minority group is not
politically cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection
of a multimember electoral structure thwarts
distinctive minority group interests. Third, the
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in
the absence of special circumstances, such as the
minority candidate running unopposed—usually to
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.
478 U.S. at 50–51 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). Despite Gingles’s
focus on multi-member districts, in Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153
(1993), the Supreme Court made clear that single-member districts can also
dilute minority voting strength and thereby violate Section 2. The Gingles
requirements “present mixed questions of law and fact.” Solomon v. Liberty
Cnty., Fla., 899 F.2d 1012, 1017 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990) (Kravitch, J., specially
concurring).
2. The Senate Factors
In addition to applying the Gingles factors, courts must also consider
several factors that may be relevant to Section 2 claims, which were identified
in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 VRA amendment. Gingles, 478
U.S. at 44–45. The Court notes, “it will be only the very unusual case in which
the plaintiffs can establish the . . . Gingles [threshold] factors but still have
failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of the circumstances.”
29
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1514 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Jenkins v. Red Clay
Consol. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1116 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also Clark v.
Calhoun Cnty., 88 F.3d 1393, 1402 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). However, Gingles
instructs Courts to evaluate the Senate Factors to determine, under the totality
of the circumstances, if there was a Section 2 violation. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at
48, n.15. As later explained by the Eleventh Circuit, the Senate Report factors
(the “Senate Factors”) that will “typically establish” a violation of Section 2 are:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination

in the state or political subdivision that touched the
right of the members of the minority group to register,
to vote or otherwise to participate in the democratic
process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the

state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision

has used unusually large election districts, majority
vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions,8 or
other voting practices or procedures that may
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
the minority group;
8 Single-shot or bullet voting “enables a minority group to win some at-large seats if
it concentrates its vote behind a limited number of candidates and if the vote of the
majority is divided among a number of candidates.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 38 n.5
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
30
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the

members of the minority group have been denied
access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group

in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education,
employment[,] and health, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been

characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group

have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1015–16. Two additional circumstances may also be
probative of a Section 2 violation:
8. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness

on the part of elected officials to the particularized
needs of the members of the minority group;
9. whether the policy underlying the state or political

subdivision’s use of such voting qualification,
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.
Id. at 1016.
In Gingles, the Supreme Court concluded that the Senate Factors “will
often be pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations, particularly to vote dilution
claims.” 478 U.S. at 45 (footnote omitted). In conjunction, the Gingles
31
preconditions and Senate Factors require the consideration of race to some
extent when evaluating electoral districts so that the voting rights of minorities
are not denied or abridged. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a); see also, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S.
30; Voinovich, 507 U.S. 146; Solomon, 899 F.2d 1012; Marengo Cnty. Comm’n,
731 F.2d at 1561 (“Section 2 is not meant to create race-conscious voting but to
attack the discriminatory results of such voting where it is present.”). Satisfying
the Gingles preconditions and the Senate Factors proves the injury of vote
dilution. Such harms must, however, be evaluated on a district-by-district
basis. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
Chief Justice Roberts recently noted that “it is fair to say that Gingles and
its progeny have engendered considerable disagreement and uncertainty
regarding the nature and contours of a vote dilution claim.” Milligan, 142 S. Ct.
at 882–83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Despite the
disagreement and apparent uncertainty, this Court applies the relevant
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent as they currently exist.
C. Evidentiary Considerations
At the preliminary injunction stage, “a district court may rely on
affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a
permanent injunction, if the evidence is ‘appropriate given the character and
32
objectives of the injunctive proceeding.’” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l
Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995). A substantial amount of evidence
was presented by the parties during the hearing, and much of it has been
considered by the Court for purposes of this Order, even if such evidence may
not ultimately be admissible at trial. When discussing the evidence, this Order
addresses to the extent necessary any objections raised by the parties.9
D. Motions to Dismiss
The Court has already ruled on the motions to dismiss filed by
Defendants in each of these three cases and denied their requests to certify the
Court’s rulings for interlocutory appeal. APA Doc. No. [65]; Pendergrass Doc.
No. [50]; Grant Doc. No. [43]. No party has sought reconsideration of those
Orders. See generally APA Docket; Pendergrass Docket; Grant Docket.
Accordingly, the Court does not further address Defendants’ argument that
there is no private right of action under Section 2.10
9 The Court entered a separate order addressing evidentiary rulings.

10 The Court is aware of the recent decision in Arkansas State Conference NAACP v.
Arkansas Board of Apportionment, Case No. 4:21-cv-01239-LPR, 2022 WL 496908, at
*1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 17, 2022) (APA Doc. No. [119]), in which the district court concluded
there is no implied private right of action under Section 2. Given the extent and weight
of the authority holding otherwise (see APA Doc. No. [65], 32–33), including from the
Supreme Court, this Court finds no basis to alter the analysis in its Order denying
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
33
III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, evidence, and other filings, and
having listened to and considered the testimony and arguments presented
during the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court now provides the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court first discusses
Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, analyzing the Section 2 claims
under the framework established by Gingles and its progeny. The Court then
discusses whether Plaintiffs have shown that they will suffer irreparable injury
absent the requested injunctions, whether Plaintiffs’ threatened injury
outweighs whatever the damage the proposed injunction may cause
Defendants and if issued, whether the injunction is adverse to the public
interest.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Court’s analysis begins with the first Gingles precondition and a
credibility review of the expert witnesses who testified in relation to this prong.
34
1. The First Gingles Precondition: Numerosity and

Compactness
a) Credibility Determinations
(1) Mr. Cooper
The Alpha Phi Alpha and Pendergrass Plaintiffs qualified Mr. William S.
Cooper as an expert in redistricting and with reference to census data. Feb. 7,
2022, Morning Tr. 38:16–18; Feb. 7; 2022, Afternoon Tr. 112:16–19. Mr. Cooper
earned a bachelor’s degree in economics from Davidson College and has
earned his living for the last thirty years by drawing maps, both for electoral
purposes and for demographic analysis. APAX 1, ¶¶ 1–2. He has extensive
experience testifying in federal courts about redistricting issues and has been
qualified in forty-five voting rights cases in nineteen states. Id. ¶ 2.
Over twenty-five of these cases led to changes in local election district
plans. Id. And five of the cases resulted in changes to statewide legislative
boundaries: Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council, Inc. v.
McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Old Person v. Brown, 182 F.
Supp. 2d 1002 (D. Mont. 2002); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976
(D.S.D. 2004); Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F. Supp. 3d
1026 (M.D. Ala. 2017); and Thomas v. Reeves, 2:18-CV-441-CWR-FKB, 2021 WL
517038 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 11, 2021).
35
Mr. Cooper has served as an expert in two post-2010 local level Section 2
cases in Georgia (Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2015) and Ga. State Conf. of the
NAACP v. Emanuel Cnty., 6:16-CV-00021, (S.D. Ga. 2016)) both of which
resulted in settlements and implementation of the maps that Mr. Cooper
created. Mr. Cooper has worked on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendants in
redistricting cases. Caster v. Merrill, No. 2:21-cv-1536-AMM, 2022 WL 264819,
at *35 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022); APAX 1, 67–72.
The Court finds Mr. Cooper’s testimony highly credible. Mr. Cooper has
spent the majority of his career drawing maps for redistricting and
demographic purposes, and he has accumulated extensive expertise (more so
than any other expert in the first Gingles precondition in the case) in
redistricting litigation, particularly in Georgia. Indeed, his command of
districting issues in Georgia is sufficiently strong that he was able to draw a
draft remedial plan for Pendergrass’s counsel “in a couple of hours in late
November.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 69:6–9.
Throughout Mr. Cooper’s reports and his live testimony, his opinions
were clear and consistent, and he had no difficulty articulating his bases for
them. See APAX 1, Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 39–104; Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
36
113–241. But he was not dogmatic: he took Mr. Tyson’s and the Court’s
criticism of the compactness of his Illustrative State Senate District 18 seriously
and stated, “I think the Plaintiffs – the Defendant are going to complain about
[Senate District 18]. I think they sort of have a valid argument that you don’t
need to have a district that long, so . . . if I had that opportunity, will fix that
problem.” Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 149:14–23.
The Court particularly credits Mr. Cooper’s testimony that he “tried to
balance” all traditional redistricting principles. Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 50:24.
Mr. Cooper also testified that he “was aware of [all the traditional redistricting
principles] and [he] tried to achieve plans that were fair and balanced.” Feb. 7,
2022, Afternoon Tr. 140:6–7. He was candid that he prioritized race only to the
extent necessary to answer the essential question asked of him as an expert on
the first Gingles precondition (“Is it possible to draw an additional, reasonably
compact majority-Black district?”), and clearly explained that he did not
prioritize it to any greater extent. See Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 51:4–5 (“I was
aware of the racial demographics for most parts of the state, but certainly [race]
did not predominate”); Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 135:17–19 (“I was aware of
race as traditional redistrict principles suggest one should be. I mean, it’s
Voting Rights Act[]. It’s Federal Law.”). Mr. Cooper acknowledged that [the]
37
tradeoffs between traditional districting criteria are necessary, and he did not
ignore any criteria. See Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 230:22–25 (“I have attempted
to balance [traditional redistricting principles] together and I think overall, the
Plan does comply with traditional redistricting principles, but I’m certainly
willing to accept criticism and would make adjustments upon receiving that
criticism.”).
During Mr. Cooper’s live testimony, the Court carefully observed his
demeanor, particularly as he was cross-examined for the first time about his
work on this case. He consistently defended his work with careful and
deliberate explanations of the cases for his opinions. The Court observed no
internal inconsistencies in his testimony, no appropriate question that he could
not or would not answer, and no reason to question the veracity of his
testimony. The Court finds that his methods and conclusions are highly
reliable, and ultimately that his work as an expert on the first Gingles
precondition is helpful to the Court.
(2) Mr. Esselstyn
The Grant Plaintiffs qualified Mr. Blakeman B. Esselstyn as an expert in
redistricting and census data. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 111:18–112:1.
Mr. Esselstyn earned his bachelor’s in Geology & Geophysics and International
38
Studies from Yale University and a Master’s in Computer and Information
Technology from the University of Pennsylvania, School of Engineering. GPX
3, 26. Mr. Esselstyn testified that he has “more than 20 years in experience in
looking at maps and demographics and recognizing patterns and things like
that.” Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 168:10–12. Since 2017, Mr. Esselstyn has
taught two one-semester-graduate-level courses in Geographic Information
Systems. GPX 3, at 27. Mr. Esselstyn has designed redistricting plans that were
accepted by various local governments in North Carolina. Id. at 27–28.
Mr. Esselstyn was a testifying expert witness in Jensen v. City of Asheville,
Buncombe County, North Carolina, Superior Court (2009); Hall v. City of
Asheville, Buncombe County, North Carolina, Superior Court (2009); and
Arnold v. City of Ashville, Buncombe County, North Carolina, Superior Court
(2005). On voir dire, Mr. Esselstyn acknowledged that he has never drawn a
statewide map that was used in an election and that he has never drawn a map
for any jurisdiction in Georgia. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 112:13–18. The Court
finds Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony highly credible. Mr. Esselstyn has spent the
majority of his professional life drawing maps for redistricting and
demographic purposes.
39
Throughout Mr. Esselstyn’s reports and his live testimony, his opinions
were clear and consistent, and he had no difficulty articulating his bases for
them. See GPX 3; Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 107–128; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 148–276. Mr. Esselstyn acknowledged that his Illustrative State and House
Plans had higher population deviations, more precinct splits, and more county
splits than the Enacted State House and Senate Plans. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 203:18–21, 205:8–14, 23–25. Mr. Esselstyn also stated that if he was asked to
try to reduce these changes, he “could probably accommodate.” Id. at 204:23–
25.
The Court particularly credits Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony that he tried “to
sort of find the best balance that [he] can” for all the traditional redistricting
principles. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 157:14–25. Mr. Cooper also testified the
traditional redistricting principles are “sort of the multi-layered puzzle” and
it’s a balancing act” because “there are often criteria that will be [in tension]
with each other.” Id. at 157:24–25. He was candid that he prioritized race only
to the extent necessary to answer the essential question asked of him as an
expert on the first Gingles precondition (“Is it possible to draw an additional,
reasonably compact majority-Black district?”), and clearly explained that he
did not prioritize it to any greater extent. See id. at 155:20–156:2 (“[M]y
40
understanding of Section 2 in the Gingles criteria is that the key metric is
whether a district has a majority of Any Part Black population. . . . And that
means . . . [y]ou have to look at the numbers that measure the percentage of the
population is Black.”). Mr. Esselstyn acknowledged that tradeoffs between
traditional districting criteria are necessary, and he did not ignore any criteria.
See id. at 157:14–21
[O]ften the criteria will be [in tension] with each other.

It may be that you are trying to just follow precinct
lines and not split . . . precincts, but the precincts have
funny shapes. So that means you either are going to
end up with a less compact shape that doesn’t split
precincts or you could split a precinct and end up
with a more compact shape.
During Mr. Esselstyn’s live testimony, the Court carefully observed his
deliberate explanations of the cases for his opinions. The Court observed no
internal inconsistencies in his testimony, no appropriate question that he could
not or would not answer, and no reason to question the veracity of his
testimony. The Court finds that his methods and conclusions are highly
reliable, and ultimately that his work as an expert on the first Gingles
precondition is helpful to the Court.
41
(3) Mr. Morgan
The Defendants qualified Mr. John B. Morgan as an expert in
redistricting and the analysis of demographic data. Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr.
121:8–10. Mr. Morgan has a bachelor’s in History from the University of
Chicago and has earned his living for the last thirty years by drawing maps,
both for electoral purposes and for demographic analysis. DX 2, ¶ 2; Feb. 11,
2022, Morning Tr. 119:13–18. Prior to this case, Mr. Morgan has served as a
testifying expert in five cases. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 244:12–15. He has
performed redistricting work for 20 states and performed demographics and
election analysis in 40 states for both statewide and legislative candidates. DX
2, at 17–18.
Despite Mr. Morgan’s extensive experience, the Court assigns very little
weight to Mr. Morgan’s testimony. Mr. Morgan’s previous redistricting work
includes drawing maps that were ultimately struck down as unconstitutional
racial gerrymanders (Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 183:9–17, 183:24–184:6), as
well as serving as an expert for the defense in a case in Georgia where the map
was ultimately found to have violated the Voting Rights Act (Feb. 14, 2022,
Morning Tr. 9:21–10:6).
42
In Georgia State Conference of NAACP v. Fayette County Board of
Commissioners, Mr. Morgan testified as an expert for the defense opposite
Mr. Cooper, who testified as an expert for the plaintiffs. 950 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1310–11 (N.D. Ga. 2013). In granting the motion for summary judgment, that
court found that the plaintiffs successfully asserted a vote dilution claim. Id. at
1326. At the preliminary injunction hearing for the cases sub judice,
Mr. Morgan admitted that he worked on the 2011–2012 North Carolina State
Senate Maps. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr.182:22–183:13. Ultimately, twenty-
eight districts in North Carolina’s 2011 state House and Senate redistricting
plans were struck down as racial gerrymanders. Id. at 183:14–19; see also
Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d North
Carolina v. Covington, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
Additionally, two federal courts have determined that Mr. Morgan’s
testimony was not credible. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 245:19–246:15, 246:17–
19, 247:25–248:21. The Court gives great weight to the credibility
determinations of its sister courts.
At the hearing for this matter, Mr. Morgan testified that he had helped
draw the 2011 Virginia House of Delegates Maps. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
183:20–25. In that case, “Mr. Morgan testified . . . that he played a substantial
43
role in constructing the 2011 plan, which role included his use of the Maptitude
software to draw district lines.” Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 151 (E.D. Va. 2018). Ultimately, a three-judge court found
that 11 of the House of Delegates districts were racial gerrymanders. Feb. 11,
2022, Afternoon Tr. 184:1–6; see also Bethune-Hill, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
Mr. Morgan served as both a fact and expert witness in Bethune-Hill.
That court ultimately found that Mr. Morgan’s testimony was not credible.
That court found that “Morgan’s testimony was wholly lacking in credibility.
Th[is] adverse credibility finding[] [is] not limited to particular assertions of
[this] witness[], but instead wholly undermine[s] the content of . . . Morgan’s
testimony.” Bethune-Hill, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 174; Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
246:17–19, 247:25–248:4. Specifically, “Morgan testified in considerable detail
about his reasons for drawing dozens of lines covering all 11 challenged
districts, including purportedly race-neutral explanations for several
boundaries that appeared facially suspicious.” Bethune-Hill, 326 F. Supp.3d at
151. “In our view, Morgan’s contention, that the precision with which these
splits divided white and black areas was mere happenstance, simply is not
credible.” Id. “[W]e conclude that Morgan did not present credible testimony,
and we decline to consider it in our predominance analysis.” Id. at 152.
44
Mr. Morgan also served as a testifying expert in Page v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 WL 3604029 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015). Feb.
11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 245:2–5. When counsel for the Pendergrass and Grant
Plaintiffs asked Mr. Morgan if he recalled that court’s opinions about his
testimony, he stated: “not specifically.” Id. at 245:9–11. That court found
“Mr. Morgan, contends that the majority-white populations excluded . . . were
predominately Republican. . . . The evidence at trial, however, revealed that
Mr. Morgan’s analysis was based upon several pieces of mistaken data, a
critical error. . . . Mr. Morgan’s coding mistakes were significant to the outcome
of his analysis.” Page, 2015 WL 3604029, at *15 n.25; Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon T.
245:19–3. Mr. Morgan explained that his error was caused because the
attorneys asked him to produce an additional exhibit on the day of trial. Feb.
11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 246:8–14.
During Mr. Morgan’s live testimony, the Court carefully observed his
work on this case. The Court found that Mr. Morgan declined to answer
counsel’s and the Court’s questions about the definition for “packing.” Feb. 11,
2022, Afternoon Tr. 192:24–196:25. The Court specifically asked Mr. Morgan for
his definition of packing (Id. at 194:4), to which Mr. Morgan responded,
45
“Honestly, I have seen so many different places —” Id. at 194:4–6. The Court
then stated, “I understand that. You said you have been doing this for four
decades. You have more experience than just about everybody. What is your
definition of it?” Id. at 194:7–9. Despite the Court and counsel’s questioning,
Mr. Morgan never gave a clear definition for the term “packing.” Id. at 194:7–
196:25. The Court also observed that Mr. Morgan consistently could not recall
that his credibility was undermined in previous redistricting cases. As such, the
Court finds that Mr. Morgan’s testimony lacks credibility, and the Court
assigns little weight to his testimony.
(4) Ms. Wright
Over objection from the Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs, Defendants
offered Ms. Regina Harbin Wright as an expert on redistricting in Georgia and
the analysis of demographic data in Georgia.11 Ms. Wright is an experienced
map drawer and a busy public servant. Ms. Wright serves as the Executive
Director of the Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment Officer
(LCRO), a joint office of the Georgia General Assembly. DX 41, ¶ 2. Ms. Wright
11 In 2012, Ms. Wright served as a technical advisor and consultant to this Court in
the redrawing the Cobb County, Georgia electoral commission districts. See Crumly
v. Cobb Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Voter Registration, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (N.D. Ga.
2012); Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 9:2–4.
46
has worked for LRCO for just over twenty-one years and has been the director
for almost ten years. Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 6:20–24. LRCO assists the
General Assembly in drawing the Georgia State House and Senate Districts, the
Public Service Commission, as well as the fourteen (14) United States
Congressional Districts. Id. LRCO provides an array of maps and data reports
to both legislators and the public at large. Id.
Ms. Wright has served as an expert or technical advisor for redistricting
by federal courts in eight federal cases since the 2010 redistricting cycle. See
DX 41, ¶ 6 (Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 996
F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (appointed as the court’s “independent
technical advisor”); Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1340
(appointed to be the court’s “expert or technical advisor”); Crumly v. Cobb
Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Voter Registration, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1344 (N.D. Ga
2012) (appointed as the court’s “technical advisor and consultant”) Martin v.
Augusta-Richmond Cnty., No. CV 112-058, 2012 WL 2339499, at *1 (S.D. Ga.
June 19, 2012) (appointed by the court as “advisor and consultant”); Walker v.
Cunningham, No. CV 112-058, 2012 WL 2339499, at *5 (S.D. Ga. June 19, 2012)
(three-judge court) (appointed by the court “as its independent technical
advisor”); Bird v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Educ., CA No. 1:12cv76-WLS (M.D. Ga.
47
2013) Doc. No. [70], 5 (appointed as the court’s “independent technical
advisor”); Adamson v. Clayton Cnty. Elections & Reg. Bd., CA No. 1:12cv1665-
CAP (N.D. Ga. 2012), Doc. No. [23], 2 (appointed as the court’s “independent
technical advisor.”); Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Kemp, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1357,
1360–62 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (three-judge court) (testified at preliminary judgment
hearing by deposition)).
Counsel for Defendants offered Ms. Wright as an expert on redistricting
in Georgia and the analysis of demographic data in Georgia. Feb. 11, 2022,
Morning Tr. 10:1–3. Counsel for the Grant and Pendergrass Plaintiffs objected
to Ms. Wright’s certification as an expert because
Her credibility has been specifically questioned by the

Court in connection with the 2015 redistricting where
she moved many [B]lack voters from districts where
their votes would have made an impact to districts
where they would not. And [her] report[, in this case,]
is little more than a running commentary untethered
to data, much less any sort of scientific or technical
analysis that would lend to credibility before this
Court . . . . [A]lthough [Ms. Wright] has practical
experience relating generally to redistricting, she
doesn’t apply that technical or specialized knowledge
here in any way which might be helpful to this Court
. . . . her testimony is not based on sufficient facts or
data which are notably absent from the report . . . .
[Ms. Wright] has not and cannot show that her
analysis or conclusions to the product are reliable
48
principles or methods at 702(C), and it too, is wholly

absent from her report.
Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 20:10–17, 21:8–11, 18–20. The Court overruled
counsel’s objection and admitted Ms. Wright as an expert on redistricting in
Georgia and the analysis of demographic data in Georgia. Id. at 24:1–5.
Although the Court finds that Ms. Wright is a credible expert witness
with over twenty-one years of experience in redistricting and demographics in
Georgia, the Court assigns little weight to her testimony regarding
compactness and demographics; however, the Court assigns a greater amount
of weight to Ms. Wright’s testimony about communities of interest and political
subdivisions in Georgia.
The Court finds that Ms. Wright did not provide any statistical metric by
which to measure the compactness of any of the illustrative maps. Ms. Wright’s
report does not explain how she determined whether a particular district was
more or less compact and thus was not permitted to explain her methodology
at the hearing. DX 41; Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 47:18–48:6. Thus, the Court
assigns very little weight to Ms. Wright’s testimony regarding a district’s
compactness. The Court does recognize that Ms. Wright was given one day to
49
prepare and submit her expert report to the Court. See APA Doc. No. [85];
Pendergrass Doc. No. [58]; Grant Doc. No. [51].
Ms. Wright also testified about the demographics of the enacted
Congressional, State House, and State Senate districts in comparison to the
Illustrative Congressional, State House, and State Senate districts. Ms. Wright
testified that the Secretary of State’s Office used the Non-Hispanic Black metric
as opposed to the Any Part Black metric that was used by Mr. Cooper and
Mr. Esselstyn. Id. at 79:4–80:1. In particular, Ms. Wright testified when
evaluating the percentage of Black registered voters, Ms. Wright’s analysis is
based on non-Hispanic Black metric and not Any Part Black metric. Id. at 79:18–
21. Because the Court uses the Any Part Black metric to determine if the Black
population is sufficiently numerous to create an additional majority-minority
district—“it is proper to look at all individuals who identify themselves as
[B]lack” in their census responses, even if they “self-identify as both [B]lack and
a member of another minority group,” because the case involved “an
examination of only one minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.” Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 473 n.1 (2003)—the Court assigns
little weight to Ms. Wright’s demographic analysis.
50
The Court assigns greater weight to Ms. Wright’s testimony about
communities of interest and political subdivisions in Georgia. Ms. Wright has
twenty-one years of experience in drawing statewide Congressional, State
House, and State Senate districts. DX 41, ¶ 2. Ms. Wright also assists in drawing
maps for local County Commissions, Boards of Education, and City Councils
throughout the state of Georgia. Id. Ms. Wright oversees a staff that draws
maps in Georgia for statewide legislative districts, local redistricting plans, city
creation boundaries, annexations and de-annexations, and precinct boundary
changes. Id. ¶ 3. Finally, Ms. Wright has been appointed as an expert and
technical advisor to the Court in seven federal redistricting cases between 2012
and 2015. Id. at 6. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Wright has extensive
knowledge about communities of interest and political subdivisions in Georgia.
Thus, Ms. Wright’s testimony regarding communities of interest and political
subdivisions in Georgia is highly credible.
Having discussed the expert witnesses relevant to the analysis of the first
Gingles precondition in these cases.
b) First Gingles Precondition Legal Standard
To satisfy the first Gingles precondition, the plaintiffs must establish that
Black voters as a group are “sufficiently large and geographically compact to
51
constitute a majority in some reasonably configured legislative district.”
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1470 (internal quotation marks omitted). “When applied
to a claim that single-member districts dilute minority votes, the first Gingles
[pre]condition requires the possibility of creating more than the existing
number of reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority
population to elect candidates of its choice.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1008 (1994). Although “[p]laintiffs typically attempt to satisfy [the first
Gingles precondition] by drawing hypothetical majority-minority districts,”
Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406, such illustrative plans are “not cast in stone” and are
offered only “to demonstrate that a majority-[B]lack district is feasible,” Clark
v. Calhoun Cnty., 21 F.3d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine,
461 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1018 n.7
(Kravitch, J., specially concurring) (“So long as the potential exists that a
minority group could elect its own representative in spite of racially polarized
voting, that group has standing to raise a vote dilution challenge under the
Voting Rights Act.” (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17)).
(1) Numerosity
The plaintiffs must show that the Black population is sufficiently
numerous to create an additional majority-minority district. “In majority-
52
minority districts, a minority group composes a numerical, working majority
of the voting-age population. Under present doctrine, [Section] 2 can require
the creation of these districts.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009)
(plurality op.). “[A] party asserting [Section] 2 liability must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the minority population in the potential
election district is greater than 50 percent.” Id. at 19–20. When a voting rights
“case involves an examination of only one minority group’s effective exercise
of the electoral franchise[,] . . . it is proper to look at all individuals who identify
themselves as black” when determining a district’s Black Voting Age
Population (“BVAP”). Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 474 n.1 (2003); see also Fayette
Cnty., 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1343 n.8 (“[T]he Court is not willing to exclude Black
voters who also identify with another race when there is no evidence that these
voters do not form part of the politically cohesive group of Black voters in
Fayette County.”).
In determining whether a district is sufficiently numerous, Courts use
the Any Part Black Voting Age Population (“AP BVAP”) demographics, not
single-race black demographics. The Supreme Court concluded that “it is
proper to look at all individuals” even if they “self-identify as both [B]lack and
a member of another minority group,” because the case involved “an
53
examination of only one minority group’s effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.” Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 473 n.1 (2003). Because this Court must decide
a case that involves claims about Georgia’s Black population’s effective exercise
of the electoral franchise, this Court relies on the AP BVAP metric.
(2) Compactness
The plaintiffs must show that Georgia’s Black population can form
additional reasonably compact Congressional, State Senate, and State House
districts. Under the compactness requirement of the first Gingles precondition,
Plaintiffs must show that it is “possible to design an electoral district[]
consistent with traditional redistricting principles.” Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d
1414, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998). Compliance with this criterion does not require that
the illustrative plans be equally or more compact than the enacted plans;
instead, this criterion requires only that the illustrative plans contain
reasonably compact districts. An illustrative plan can be “far from perfect” in
terms of compactness yet satisfy the first Gingles precondition. Wright v.
Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Elections & Registration, 301 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1326
(M.D. Ga. 2018), aff’d, 979 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2020). “While no precise rule has
emerged governing § 2 compactness,” League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 433 (2006), plaintiffs satisfy the first
54
Gingles precondition when their proposed majority-minority district is
“consistent with traditional districting principles,” Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425.
These traditional districting principles include “maintaining
communities of interest and traditional boundaries,” “geographical
compactness, contiguity, and protection of incumbents. Thus, while Plaintiffs’
evidence regarding the geographical compactness of their proposed district
does not alone establish compactness under § 2, that evidence, combined with
their evidence that the district complies with other traditional redistricting
principles, is directly relevant to determining whether the district is compact
under § 2.” Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 950
F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citations omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 775 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plans must comply with the one person one vote
requirement under the Equal Protection Clause. Fayette Cnty., 996 F. Supp. 2d
at 1368.
c) Pendergrass
The Court finds that the Pendergrass Plaintiffs have established that they
are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of showing that it is possible to
create an additional majority-minority congressional district in the western
55
Atlanta metropolitan area that complies with the relevant considerations under
Gingles.
The Pendergrass Plaintiffs move for an order preliminarily enjoining
Defendants from enforcing the boundaries of the congressional districts as
drawn in the Georgia Congressional Redistricting Act of 2021, which they claim
violates Section 2 by failing to include an additional congressional district in
the western Atlanta metropolitan area in which Black voters would have the
opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. Pendergrass Doc. No. [32], 2. In
particular, the Pendergrass Plaintiffs contend that the new congressional map
packs Black voters into the Thirteenth Congressional District—which has a
BVAP over 66% and includes south Fulton, north Fayette, Douglas, and Cobb
Counties—and cracks other Black voters among the more rural and
predominately white Third, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Congressional Districts.
Pendergrass Doc. No. [32-1], 4, 6–7. The Pendergrass Plaintiffs argue that
increases in Georgia’s Black population over the last decade, along with
concurrent decreases in the state’s white population, create an opportunity for
an additional majority-minority congressional district that the State did not
draw. See id. at 5, 9–10. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that they can satisfy the
first Gingles precondition by showing that an additional, compact majority-
56
minority district can be drawn in the western Atlanta metropolitan area. Id. at
9–10. Plaintiffs rely on the following illustrative plan by expert demographer
William S. Cooper to demonstrate how such a district could be drawn.
GPX 1, at 65–66. With Mr. Cooper’s illustrative congressional plan, the
Pendergrass Plaintiffs contend that they have drawn an illustrative
Congressional District 6—which includes parts of Cobb, Douglas, Fulton, and
Fayette Counties—that is majority AP Black and thus would allow Black voters
to elect their preferred candidates. Pendergrass Doc. No. [32-1], 10; GPX 1,
57
¶¶ 47–48 & fig.8. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Cooper’s illustrative
congressional district is sufficiently compact and complies with other
traditional redistricting principles such as population equality, contiguity,
maintaining political boundaries and communities of interest, and avoiding
pairing of incumbents. Pendergrass Doc. No. [32-1], 10.
Because the first Gingles precondition requires showings that the
relevant minority population is “sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425
(quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1006–07), the Court now turns to discussion of
whether the Pendergrass Plaintiffs have made those showings with their
proposed congressional plan.
(1) Numerosity
The first Gingles precondition requires a “numerosity” showing that
“minorities make up more than 50 percent of the voting-age population in the
relevant geographic area.” Bartlett v, 556 U.S. at 18. The Court finds that the
Pendergrass Plaintiffs have established that the AP BVAP in the western
Atlanta metropolitan area is sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority of
the voting-age population in a new congressional district in the western Atlanta
metropolitan area. Below, the Court will discuss relevant demographic
58
developments in Georgia and then turn to how those developments inform
review of the enacted and illustrative congressional maps.
(a) Demographic developments in

Georgia
The U.S. Census Bureau releases population and demographic data to
the states after each census for use in redistricting. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 24. The
Census Bureau provided initial redistricting data to Georgia on August 12,
2021. Id. ¶ 25. This data shows that from 2010 to 2020, Georgia’s population
grew by over 1 million people to 10.71 million, up 10.6% from 2010. Id. ¶ 26;
GPX 1, ¶ 13. Based upon Georgia’s population, it maintained its fourteen seats
in the U.S. House of Representatives. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 27.
Georgia’s population growth since 2010 can be attributed to increases in
the state’s overall minority population. GPX 1, ¶ 14 & fig.1. For example, from
2010 to 2020, Georgia’s Black population increased by almost half a million
people, up nearly 16% in that time. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 28; GPX 1, ¶ 15. During
that decade, 47.26% of the state’s population gain was attributable to Black
population growth. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 29; GPX 1, ¶ 14 & fig.1. Indeed,
Georgia’s Black population, as a share of the overall statewide population,
increased from 31.53% in 2010 to 33.03% in 2020. GPX 1, ¶ 16 & fig.1. And as a
59
matter of total population, AP Black Georgians comprise the largest minority
population in the state (at 33.03%). Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 32.
Georgia’s white population, however, decreased by 51,764 persons, or
approximately 1%, from 2010 to 2020. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 30; GPX 1, ¶ 15 &
fig.1. As a result, while non-Hispanic white Georgians remain a majority of the
state’s population, it is by a slim margin—50.06%. GPX 1, ¶ 17.
Georgia’s Black population has increased in absolute and percentage
terms since 1990, from about 27% in 1990 to 33% in 2020. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 31.
In that time, the Black population has more than doubled: from 1.75 million to
3.54 million, an increase that is the equivalent of the populations of more than
two congressional districts. GPX 1, ¶ 22 & fig.3. Over the same period, the non-
Hispanic white population also increased, but at a slower rate: from 4.54
million to 5.36 million, amounting to an increase of about 18% over the three-
decade period. GPX 1, ¶ 22 & fig.3. And the percentage of Georgia’s population
identifying as non-Hispanic white has dropped from about 70% to just over
50%. See Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 31; GPX 1, ¶ 21 & fig.3.
As of the 2020 census, Georgia has a total voting-age population of
8,220,274, of whom 2,607,986 (31.73%) are AP Black. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 33;
60
GPX 1, ¶ 18 & fig.2. The total estimated citizen voting-age population in
Georgia in 2019 was 33.8% AP Black. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 34; GPX 1, ¶ 20.
The Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (the “Atlanta MSA”) consists
of the following twenty-nine counties: Barrow, Bartow, Butts, Carroll,
Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, Dawson, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth,
Fulton, Gwinnett, Haralson, Heard, Henry, Jasper, Lamar, Meriwether,
Morgan, Newton, Paulding, Pickens, Pike, Rockdale, Spalding, and Walton.
Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 35; GPX 1, ¶ 12 n.3. The Atlanta MSA has driven Georgia’s
population growth in recent decades, due in part to a large increase in the
region’s Black population. See GPX 1, ¶ 24 & fig.4. Between 2010 and 2020, the
overall population in the Atlanta MSA grew by 803,087 persons—greater than
the population of a Georgia congressional district. See GPX 1, ¶ 29 & fig.5.12
About half of that increase was attributable to the Atlanta MSA’s Black
population growing by 409,927 persons (or 23.07%). GPX 1, ¶ 29 & fig.5.13 And
looking at the period from 2000 to 2020, the Black population in the Atlanta
12 According to the 2020 Census, the Atlanta MSA now has a total voting-age
population of 4,654,322 persons. GPX 1, ¶ 30 & fig.6.
13 According to the 2020 Census, the Atlanta MSA’s voting-age population now
includes 1,622,469 (34.86%) AP Black persons and 4,342,333 (52.1%) non-Hispanic
white persons. GPX 1, ¶ 30 & fig.6.
61
MSA grew from 1,248,809 to 2,186,815 in 2020—or 938,006 persons.
Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 36.14
This increase in the Atlanta MSA’s Black population contrasts with the
comparative decrease in the non-Hispanic white population in the same area.
Under the 2000 Census, the population in the Atlanta MSA was 60.42% non-
Hispanic white. GPX 1, ¶ 24 & fig.4. That share decreased to 50.78% in 2010 and
then further to 43.71% in 2020. Id. In fact, between 2010 and 2020, the non-
Hispanic white population in the Atlanta MSA decreased by 22,736 persons.
Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 37; GPX 1, ¶ 24 & fig.4.
Demographic trends in another sub-group of counties provide further
insight. The eleven core counties of the Atlanta Regional Commission (“ARC”)
service area are Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth,
Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and Rockdale. Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 96:3–10.
According to the 2020 Census, these ARC counties account for more than half
(54.7%) of Georgia’s Black population. GPX 1, ¶ 27. When considering the
14 Charting the percentage share growth over the last two decades also illustrates the
increases in the AP Black population in the Atlanta MSA: The AP Black population in
the Atlanta MSA was 29.29% in 2000, which increased to 33.61% in 2010 and then
further to 35.91% in 2020. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 36.
62
entire Atlanta MSA (including the ARC counties), the Atlanta metropolitan
area encompasses 61.81% of Georgia’s Black population. Id.
And focusing more particularly on the area in which the illustrative
District 6 is located, the 2020 Census shows that the combined Black population
in Cobb, Fulton, Douglas, and Fayette Counties is 807,076 persons, which is
more than necessary to constitute either an entire congressional district or a
majority in two congressional districts. GPX 1, ¶ 40 & fig.7. More than half
(53.27%) of the total population increase in these four counties since 2010 can
be attributed to the increase in the counties’ Black population. Id. ¶ 41.
(b) Georgia’s 2021 congressional plan
Georgia’s Enacted 2021 Congressional Plan contains two majority-
minority districts using the AP BVAP metric—Districts 4 and 13. See
Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 48. The Enacted Congressional Plan places Districts 3, 6, 11,
13, and 14 in the northwestern part of the state, including areas in the western
portions of the Atlanta MSA.
63
64
GPX 1, at 55–56. The Enacted Congressional Plan reduces Congressional
District 6’s15 AP BVAP from 14.6% under the prior congressional plan to 9.9%.
Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 49; GPX 1, ¶ 38. Under the 2021 plan, Congressional District
13 has an AP BVAP of over 66%. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 50. Under the Enacted
Congressional Plan, Congressional Districts 3, 11, and 14 border Congressional
District 13. Id. ¶ 51.
Mr. Cooper observed that “District 13 is packed with African-American
voters. Under the 2021 plan it’s almost 65 percent, a little bit over 65 percent
black voting age.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 45:4–6. Mr. Cooper concluded that
“it would be very easy to unpack that population so that there are fewer African
Americans living in the district but still a clear majority black voting age
population district. And in so doing create an additional majority black district
in western metro Atlanta that would include a little part of Fayette County and
south Fulton County, . . . eastern Douglas County and central Southern Cobb
County.” Id. at 45:7–14. Mr. Cooper further observed that “the fragmentation
of the black population . . . is most evident in Cobb County. Cobb County has
15The Court takes judicial notice that Congresswoman Lucy McBath, a Black woman,
was elected to represent Congressional District 6 in 2018 and won reelection in 2020,
even though the AP BVAP for the district was 14.6%.
65
been split four ways under the enacted plan . . . . As it now stands, the enacted
plan takes population that is just a few minutes away from downtown Atlanta
in western Cobb County and puts it in District 14, which goes all the way to the
suburbs of Chattanooga.” Id. at 46:19–47:4.
(c) The Pendergrass Plaintiffs’

illustrative congressional plan
Analyzing the demographic trends discussed above, as well as the
enacted congressional map, Mr. Cooper concludes that “[t]he Black population
in metropolitan Atlanta is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact
to allow for the creation of an additional compact majority-Black congressional
district anchored in Cobb and Fulton Counties (District 6 in the Illustrative
Plan).” GPX 1, ¶¶ 10, 42, 59. Mr. Cooper opines that this “additional
congressional district can be merged into the enacted 2021 Plan without making
changes to six of the 14 districts: CD 1, CD 2, CD 5, CD 7, CD 8, and CD 12 are
unaffected.” Id. ¶ 11; see also id. ¶ 46 (“The result leaves intact six
congressional districts in the enacted plan, modifying eight districts in the 2021
Plan to create an additional majority-Black district in and around Cobb and
Fulton Counties.”); Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 51:6–20 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony
about the unchanged districts).
66
Mr. Cooper drew an illustrative congressional plan that includes an
additional majority-minority congressional district—illustrative Congressional
District 6—in the western Atlanta metropolitan area. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 52;
GPX 1, ¶¶ 47–48 & fig.8. Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Congressional District 6 has
an AP BVAP of 50.23% and a non-Hispanic Black citizen voting-age population
(“BCVAP”) of 50.69%. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 53; GPX 1, ¶ 47.16 Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Congressional Plan includes three total majority-minority districts
using the any part BVAP metric and five total majority-minority districts using
the non-Hispanic BCVAP metric. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 55.17
Neither Mr. Morgan nor Ms. Wright disputes that Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Congressional District 6 is a majority-minority district under both
the AP BVAP and non-Hispanic BCVAP metrics. See DX 3, ¶ 9 (Mr. Morgan’s
expert report noting that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Congressional District 6 has
a “50.2% any-part Black voting age population”); DX 41, ¶ 29 (Ms. Wright’s
expert report acknowledging that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Congressional
16 District 6 is below 50% on other racial metrics, including single-race BVAP and the
percentage of registered voters who are Black. See DX 43. As stated above, however,
this Court is relying on the AP Black metric.
17 As a result of the adjustments in the illustrative map, District 13 went from having
a 66.75% BVAP to having a 51.40% BVAP, and District 4 went from having a 54.42%
BVAP to a 52.40% BVAP. See GPX 2, ¶ 5 & fig.1.
67
District 6 is “over the 50% threshold on any part Black”).18 Both Mr. Morgan
and Ms. Wright admitted during the hearing that Mr. Cooper’s illustrative
Congressional District 6 has an AP BVAP of 50.23%. See Feb. 11, 2022, Morning
Tr. 82:21–83:7 (Ms. Wright); Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 233:19–234:1
(Mr. Morgan). Although Ms. Wright claimed that Mr. Cooper’s illustrative
Congressional District 6 “is below 50% Black on voter registration” (DX 41,
¶ 29), she admitted during the hearing that more than 8% of registered voters
are of unknown race and that this qualifying information was not included in
her expert report.19 See Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 71:10–78:12.
Notably, Mr. Cooper’s illustrative plan does not reduce the number of
preexisting majority-minority districts in the enacted congressional plan. See
GPX 1, ¶ 51; GPX 2, ¶ 5 & fig.1. Mr. Cooper testified that creating an additional
majority-minority congressional district in the western Atlanta metropolitan
18 While Mr. Morgan notes that District 6 is “a barely majority Black district at 50.2%”
AP BVAP (DX 3, ¶ 9 (emphasis added)), the question is whether the illustrative
district is majority Black. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 18. Because 50.2% is a majority, the Court
finds that the numerosity requirement is met.
19 Ms. Wright’s report and testimony at trial referenced demographic statistics used
by the Secretary of State’s Office. See DX 41, ¶¶ 10–12, 21, 27–29; Feb. 11, 2022,
Morning Tr. 71:10–78:12. Because this information was not attached to Ms. Wright’s
expert report, or submitted as an exhibit at trial, the Court requested that counsel for
Defendants provide said statistics to the Court for review. Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr.
80:15–18. The Court reviewed the demographic statistics when preparing this Order.
68
area with the Black communities in Cobb, Douglas, Fulton, and Fayette
Counties “was extremely easy to do” and “not a complicated plan drawing
project.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 53:6–8. Mr. Cooper emphasized this point
throughout the hearing. E.g., id. at 69:6–9 (stating that “it was extraordinarily
easy to draw this additional majority black district in the western part of metro
Atlanta” and that “[i]t basically just draws it[self]”); id. at 75:11–12
(Mr. Cooper’s testimony: “There are no complexities here like there might be
in other states. This is just drop-dead obvious.”).
Based on the expert reports and testimony provided in this case, the
Court concludes that Mr. Cooper’s illustrative congressional plan contains an
additional majority-minority congressional district.
Court concludes that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Congressional Plan contains an
additional majority-Black congressional district. Thus, the Court finds that the
Pendergrass Plaintiffs have satisfied the numerosity component of the first
Gingles precondition.
(2) Geographic Compactness
To satisfy the first Gingles precondition, the Pendergrass Plaintiffs must
also show that their proposed majority-Black congressional district is
69
sufficiently compact. This compactness requirement under Gingles requires a
showing that it is “possible to design an electoral district[] consistent with
traditional redistricting principles.” Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425.
The redistricting guidelines adopted by the Georgia General Assembly
provide that those drawing new districts should account for or consider
population equality, compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivision
boundaries and communities of interest, and compliance with Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. See GPX 40. Mr. Cooper testified that his Illustrative Map
adheres to these and other neutral districting criteria. See Feb. 7, 2022, Morning
Tr. 48:16–50:21 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony describing traditional districting
principles employed during his map-drawing process). Mr. Cooper explained
that none of the traditional districting principles predominated when he drew
his Illustrative Congressional Plan; instead, he “tried to balance them all” and
“did not prioritize anything other than specifically meeting the one-person,
one-vote zero population ideal district size.” Id. 50:22–51:2.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the Pendergrass
Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan comports with traditional redistricting principles—
including those enumerated in the General Assembly’s redistricting guidelines.
70
Thus, the Court finds that the Pendergrass Plaintiffs satisfy the remainder of
the first Gingles precondition analysis.
(a) Population equality
First, an illustrative plan must comply with the one-person, one-vote
principle. See Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1325–26; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 577 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and
good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly
of equal population as practicable.”).
Mr. Cooper’s expert report demonstrates that his Illustrative Plan
contains minimal population deviation. See GPX 1 at 67–68; Feb. 7, 2022,
Morning Tr. 55:12–18 (Mr. Cooper’s testifying that population equality is
“reflected with perfection [in his illustrative map] because the districts are plus
or minus one person”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Congressional Map complies with the one-person, one-vote
principle.
(b) Compactness
Second, as discussed in greater detail above, an illustrative plan must
contain “reasonably compact” districts. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979
(1996). Mr. Cooper testified that “there is no bright line rule” for compactness,
71
“nor should there be” given that “so many factors [] enter into the equation”—
including, in Georgia, the fact that “municipal boundaries in many [c]ounties
[] are not exactly compact.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 60:14–24.
The parties’ experts evaluated the Enacted Congressional Plan and
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan using the Reock and Polsby-Popper analyses,
two commonly used measures of a district’s compactness. See GPX 1, ¶ 54 &
nn.11–12 & fig.10; DX 1, ¶ 17 & chart 2; see also Comm. for a Fair & Balanced
Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 835 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(referring to “the Polsby–Popper measure and the Reock indicator” as “two
widely acceptable tests to determine compactness scores”). The Reock test is an
area-based measure that compares each district to a circle, which is considered
to be the most compact shape possible. GPX 1, ¶ 54 & n.11. For each district, the
Reock test computes the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the
minimum enclosing circle for the district. Id. The measure is always between
0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact. Id.; see also Feb. 7, 2022, Morning
Tr. 59:21–60:4 (Mr. Cooper describing the Reock score as “just creating a
number between zero and one to compare the area of a district with a circle
drawn around the district, and so the higher you are towards one, the more
compact the district would be under that measure”). The Polsby-Popper test,
72
on the other hand, computes the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle
with the same perimeter. GPX 1, ¶ 54 n.12. The measure is always between 0
and 1, with 1 being the most compact. Id.; see also Feb. 7, 2022, Morning
Tr. 60:5–13 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony describing the Polsby-Popper measure). In
discussing these methods of measuring compactness scores, Defendants’
mapping expert Mr. Morgan stated that while he would not assert that a certain
score would be a universally applicable threshold for compactness, the
compactness scores generally “are usually useful in comparing one plan to
another” and that “when you do a lot of comparisons, you can see some cases
where things are considerably less compact than others.” Feb. 11, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 226:2–11.
Mr. Cooper reported that the mean Reock score for his Illustrative Plan
is 0.40, compared to a mean score of 0.43 for the Enacted Plan, and that the
mean Polsby-Popper score for this Illustrative Plan is 0.23, compared to 0.25 for
the Enacted Plan. GPX 1, ¶ 54 & fig.10; see also id. at 78–83. Mr. Morgan
confirmed these figures in his report. See DX 3, ¶ 17; see also Feb. 11, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 243:3–9. The following table included in Mr. Morgan’s report
compares, on a district-by-district level for the eight congressional districts
73
changed in Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan, the compactness measures of
Mr. Cooper’s illustrative districts to those of the districts in the Enacted Map:
DX 1, ¶ 17 & chart 2. Mr. Cooper testified that, “practically speaking, there is
no difference” between compactness measures for the Illustrative and Enacted
Congressional Plans. Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 61:4–15. Mr. Cooper also
testified that the compactness measures for his Illustrative Congressional Plan
are “[i]n the usual range. There is no problem with the compactness per se in
either” the Enacted or Illustrative Congressional Plans. Id. at 61:16–20. Further,
while Mr. Morgan stated that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Congressional Plan is
“less compact overall” than the Enacted Plan (DX 3, ¶ 17), he did not opine that
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan is not reasonably compact. Feb. 11, 2022,
74
Afternoon Tr. 243:19–244:1; see also id. at 228:3–16 (Mr. Morgan conceding that
there is no minimum compactness threshold for districts under Georgia law).
Given the evidence discussed above, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Congressional Map has comparable compactness scores to
Georgia’s enacted 2021 congressional plan. More specifically, after reviewing
the compactness measures supplied by the expert reports in this case and
listening to the expert testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing, the
Court concludes that the districts in Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan are
reasonably compact for purposes of the first Gingles precondition analysis.
And beyond recognizing that the numerical compactness measures indicate
that the affected districts in the Illustrative Plan are sufficiently compact, the
Court finds that the districts in the Illustrative Plan pass the “eyeball test” in
that they appear from a visual review to be compact. See Ala. State Conf. of
NAACP v. Alabama, No. 2:16-CV-731-WKW, 2020 WL 583803, at *20 (M.D. Ala.
Feb. 5, 2020) (“District 1 is contiguous and also passes the eyeball test for
geographical compactness.”); Comm. for a Fair & Balanced Map, 835
F. Supp. 2d at 571 (noting a district’s Polsby-Popper and Reock scores but also
stating that the district “passe[d] muster under the ‘eyeball’ test for
compactness”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
75
Congressional Plan is consistent with the traditional districting principle of
compactness.
(c) Contiguity
Third, an illustrative plan’s district must be contiguous. See Davis, 139
F.3d at 1425. The parties do not dispute that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
Congressional Map contains contiguous districts. See Feb. 7, 2022, Morning
Tr. 62:4–14 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony confirming that his illustrative districts are
contiguous).

subdivisions
Fourth, an illustrative plan should consider the “preservation of
significant political and geographic subdivisions.” See Adamson, 876 F. Supp.
2d at 1353.
Mr. Cooper testified that he “attempted to avoid splitting counties where
unnecessary and avoid splitting towns and municipalities.” Feb. 7, 2022,
Morning Tr. 55:19–56:22. However, he also noted that “to meet one-person,
one-vote in the congressional plan, it is absolutely necessary to split some
counties.” Id. at 56:3–5. In those cases, Mr. Cooper “would try to split the
county by precinct,” though splitting precincts was also sometimes necessary
to achieve population equality. Id. at 56:6–10. If splitting a precinct was
76
necessary, Mr. Cooper “would follow, if possible, a municipal boundary or an
observable boundary like a road or waterway. And in some cases, [Mr. Cooper]
generally follow[ed] observable boundaries, but also rel[ied] on a census
bureau boundary that is established, known as a block group.” Id. at 56:11–19.
As Mr. Morgan notes, Mr. Cooper’s plan splits more political
subdivisions than the Enacted Plan does. DX 3, ¶ 15. Overall, however, the
Court finds that county, voting district (“VTD”),20 and municipal splits are
comparable between the Enacted Congressional Plan and Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Plan. Although thirteen counties are split in Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Plan (compared to twelve in the Enacted Plan), Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Plan includes fewer unique county-district combinations than the
Enacted Plan—fourteen compared to nineteen—indicating fewer splits overall.
See GPX 1, ¶ 55 & fig.11; id. at 84–91; Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 56:20–57:21
(Mr. Cooper’s testimony distinguishing between number of counties that are
split as opposed to number of splits total). Further, Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
20 The term “voting district” is “a generic term adopted by the Bureau of the Census
to include the wide variety of small polling areas, such as election districts, precincts,
or wards, that State and local governments create for the purpose of administering
elections.” U.S. Census Bureau, https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/reference
/GARM/Ch14GARM.pdf (last visited February 27, 2022).
77
Congressional Plan splits fewer municipalities than the Enacted Plan:
seventy-nine compared to ninety. See GPX 1, ¶ 55 & fig.11; id. at 92–97; Feb. 7,
2022, Morning Tr. 57:22–58:4 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony describing municipality
splits). Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Congressional Plan splits only five more VTDs
than the Enacted Plan. See GPX 1, at 84–91; Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 58:5–59:3
(Mr. Cooper’s testimony describing VTD splits). And as compared to the
Enacted Congressional Plan, in which Cobb County is divided among four
congressional districts, Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan divides Cobb County
between only two congressional districts. Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 46:23–47:1,
53:9–22.
Based on the record, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
Congressional Plan sufficiently respects political subdivision boundaries for
purposes of the first Gingles precondition. While Mr. Cooper’s plan splits more
political subdivisions than the Enacted Plan splits, the difference is small and
not material. Further, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper provided convincing and
permissible reasons for why he opted to split many of the political subdivisions
he did split. E.g., Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 55:21–59:3, 83:2–20 (explaining that
he had to split certain counties in order to comply with the one-person, one-
78
vote requirement). On balance, the Court finds that the Illustrative Plan
adequately respects political subdivision boundaries.

interest
Fifth, an illustrative map should seek to keep communities of interest
together in the same districts. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432–33. The Supreme
Court has indicated that communities of interest may form by commonalities
in “socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and other
characteristics.” See id. at 432 (citation omitted); see also Perez v. Abbott, No.
SA-11-CV-360, 2017 WL 1406379, at *60 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2017) (recognizing
communities of interest that shared “socioeconomic issues, poverty, lack of
good jobs, and lack of access to health services and public hospitals”). “The
recognition of nonracial communities of interest reflects the principle that a
State may not assume from a group of voters’ race that they think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 432–33 (cleaned up). But the Supreme Court has also noted
“evidence that in many cases, race correlates strongly with manifestations of
community of interest (for example, shared broadcast and print media, public
79
transport infrastructure, and institutions such as schools and churches).” Bush,
517 U.S. at 964.21
With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to discuss whether
the Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Map respects communities of interest.
Because the relevant portions of the Enacted Map and the Pendergrass
Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Map are in the western portion of the state, the Court
focuses its discussion on those districts.
Referring to the Enacted Congressional District 14, Mr. Cooper testified,
“I think you would be hard-pressed to find anything with relation to south
Cobb County that would connect that part of District 14 to the remainder,
particularly since District 14 extends way to the north. So it’s really— it’s really
getting into an Appalachian Regional commission territory. It’s just not the
same.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 47:5–15. When asked by the Court how he
would describe southwest Cobb County, Mr. Cooper responded, “Suburban.”
Id. at 47:16–18.
21 While Georgia’s redistricting guidelines provide that communities of interest

should be considered when districts are being drawn, the guidelines do not define
what constitutes a community of interest. See GPX 40, at 2.
80
Jason Carter, a former member of the State Senate and candidate for
Governor of Georgia during the 2014 election, agreed that the treatment of
Cobb County in the enacted congressional map does not serve a clear
community of interest, noting that it “looks like . . . you are taking bits and
pieces of Cobb County and you are sticking them in these districts that are very,
very different from Cobb County.” Feb. 10, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 127:8–20.
Mr. Carter explained that this “part of Cobb [County] is essentially Metro
Atlanta. It’s a suburban part . . . . And if you look at [Chattooga] County or
some of these others, we are talking about rural, mountain counties in essence
that are not part of the Metro Atlanta area at all and [confront] very different
sets of issue[s], it would seem to me.” Id. at 127:21–128:8. He further explained
the difficulties that Cobb County residents would have in securing
representation due to being included in more rural-reaching congressional
districts: “[I]f you are in a part of that district that is, again, buried as an
appendage, in a district that has a significant number of other interests, then
you are not going to have the amount of responsiveness that you would
otherwise have.” Id. at 132:1–15.
Ms. Wright described southwest Cobb County as “municipalized” and
“developed.” Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 33:19–34:3. She also confirmed that this
81
area is “part of metro Atlanta.” Id. at 34:4–5. By contrast, she described Polk
and Bartow Counties in northwest Georgia—which are connected with
southwest Cobb County in the Enacted Congressional Plan—as “more rural
counties.” Id. at 34:6–11.
Mr. Cooper explained that he looked at maps of Georgia’s regional
commissions and metropolitan statistical areas to guide his preservation of
communities of interest. Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 62:15–63:17; see also Feb. 11,
2022, Morning Tr. 90:3–91:12 (Ms. Wright’s testimony agreeing that a
“community of interest is anything that unites people in an area and brings
them together” and broadly defining communities of interest to include regions
with shared commercial and economic interests). Mr. Cooper testified that he
used these sources to derive communities with shared economic and
transportation interests. Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 62:23–63:4. As depicted in his
expert report, Mr. Cooper’s illustrative Congressional District 6 is comprised of
pieces of four counties—Cobb, Douglas, Fulton, and Fayette—that are among
the 11 core ARC counties:
82
GPX 1, ¶ 47 & fig.8. As Mr. Cooper testified, “these [c]ounties are all part of
core Atlanta,” and the distances between them “are fairly small.” Feb. 7, 2022,
Morning Tr. 92:23–25; see also id. at 96:22–25 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony
characterizing 11 ARC counties as core Atlanta area). Mr. Cooper also testified
that he was aware of the creation of at least four majority-Black Georgia State
Senate districts in the western Atlanta metropolitan area under the newly
enacted legislative maps. See GPX 2, ¶ 3; Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 103:4–14. He
explained that “four Senate districts is one congressional, 14 times four is 56.
83
So that’s why I was so confident at the outset that it was going to be likely that
I could draw the additional majority black district in that part of the state.” Feb.
7, 2022, Morning Tr. 103:15–22.
Commenting on Mr. Cooper’s illustrative Congressional District 6,
Mr. Carter testified, that it was “clearly” a “suburban district” in a “fast-
growing” area of suburban Atlanta. Feb. 10, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 133:8–14.
Mr. Carter noted that illustrative Congressional District 6 is an area within
forty-five minutes of downtown Atlanta that confronts similar issues. See id. at
133:8–18. Mr. Carter described the interests that residents of the western
Atlanta metropolitan area share, such as similar suburban school districts,
transportation concerns (“the Atlanta traffic reports affect everybody’s life in
that part of West Cobb and it affects basically nobody’s life in Gordon
County”), and healthcare concerns. Id. at 128:9–129:11. Applying these shared
concerns to Mr. Cooper’s illustrative Congressional District 6, Mr. Carter
testified that residents of these areas would have similar transportation,
housing, and healthcare issues. Id. at 133:19–23. He further testified that Fulton,
Cobb, and Douglas Counties are growing quickly “from a school district
standpoint” and will “be in the kind of environments that are going to look
familiar to each other.” Id. at 133:23–134:2. Asked about shared infrastructure
84
concerns, Mr. Carter responded, “I think from an infrastructure standpoint,
there is no doubt that the infrastructure needs here are really cohesive because
you’ve got the traffic issues that are there . . . . And that also includes [] land
use management . . . . [T]he Chattahoochee River runs through here and you
are talking about drainage and land use and as these things are growing fast,
the connectedness of this area is really real. So that infrastructure piece is
another thing that links it together.” Id. at 134:3–18.
Based on the record, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
Congressional Plan sufficiently respects communities of interest in the western
Atlanta metropolitan area for purposes of the first Gingles precondition.
Several witnesses testified that the areas constituting illustrative Congressional
District 6 are developed and suburban in nature and generally face the same
infrastructure, medical care, educational, and other critical needs. The Court
finds that these needs, along with the relative geographic proximity given the
compactness of the proposed district, combine to create a community of interest
for Gingles purposes.
(f) Core Retention
Next, the Court discusses the preservation of existing district cores,
which is not an enumerated districting principle adopted by the Georgia
85
General Assembly. See GPX 40. Mr. Morgan opined that while the 2021 Enacted
Congressional Plan “largely maintains existing district cores” from the prior
congressional plan, Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan “makes drastic changes” to
many of the districts from the prior plan. DX 3, ¶ 12 & chart 1. Mr. Cooper
responds, however, that he could not avoid drawing illustrative districts with
lower core retention scores than the districts in the Enacted Congressional Plan
in light of his objective of satisfying the first Gingles precondition. See GPX 2,
¶ 4. As he explained in his expert report, “[c]ore retention is largely irrelevant
when an election plan is challenged on the grounds that it violates Section 2[]
of the VRA. The very nature of the challenge means that districts adjacent to
the demonstrative majority-minority district must change, while adhering to
traditional redistricting principles.” Id.
During his testimony at the hearing, Mr. Morgan conceded that
illustrative plans are necessarily different from enacted plans. Feb. 11, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 214:1–3. The Court also notes that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Plan
does not alter six of Georgia’s fourteen congressional districts. See GPX 1,
¶¶ 11, 46; Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 51:6–20 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony describing
unchanged districts). As such, the Court finds that not only does Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative Congressional Plan comply with the traditional districting
86
principles and the General Assembly’s guidelines, his plan also does not alter
existing district cores in a manner that counsels against finding that it satisfies
the first Gingles precondition.
(g) Racial considerations
Finally, the Court addresses whether Mr. Cooper subordinated
traditional districting principles in favor of race-conscious considerations. A
state cannot use race as the predominant factor motivating the decision to place
a significant number of voters within or without a particular district, and the
state is not allowed to subordinate other factors, such as compactness or respect
for political subdivisions, to racial considerations. Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at
1325 (citations omitted). Thus, an illustrative plan should not subordinate
traditional redistricting principles to racial considerations substantially more
than is reasonably necessary to avoid liability under Section 2. See Davis, 139
F.3d at 1424.
Mr. Cooper was asked “to determine whether the African American
population in Georgia is ‘sufficiently large and geographically compact’ to
allow for the creation of an additional majority-Black congressional district in
the Atlanta metropolitan area.” GPX 1, ¶ 8 (footnotes omitted); see also Feb. 7,
2022, Morning Tr. 98:8–16. He testified that he was not asked to either “draw
87
as many majority black districts as possible” or “draw every conceivable way
of drawing an additional majority black district.” Id. at 98:17–24. And
Mr. Cooper testified that if he had found that a majority-Black district could
not have been drawn, he would have reported that to counsel, as he has “done
[] in other cases.” Id. at 98:25–99:24. Mr. Cooper testified that race “is something
that one does consider as part of traditional redistricting principles” because
“you have to be cognizant of race in order to develop a plan that respects
communities of interest, as well as complying with the Voting Rights Act[,]
because one of the key tenets of traditional redistricting principles is the
importance of not diluting the minority vote.” Id. at 48:4–15. Mr. Cooper
emphasized that he accounted for other considerations when he drew his
illustrative map, including the traditional districting principles described
above. See id. at 48:16–51:5. Although he “was aware of the racial
demographics for most parts of the state,” race “certainly did not
predominate.” Id. at 51:3–5; see also id. at 50:22–51:2 (testifying that no factor
was a predominant factor in drawing the Illustrative Plan); 99:25–100:9
(Mr. Cooper’s testimony: “I looked at all of the factors that are part of the
traditional redistricting principles and tried to balance them. So I tried to draw
a compact district, a district that didn’t split very many political subdivisions,
88
and we [have] already seen that the plan that I’ve drawn splits fewer
municipalities than the adopted [] plan. And I looked at other factors, . . . the
various traditional redistricting factors. The idea was to balance those factors
and show that a district could be created if it could be created.”); id. at 101:25–
102:13 (similar).
Although Ms. Wright opined that she “cannot explain the decision to
take District 6 into Fayette County” in Mr. Cooper’s illustrative map (DX 41,
¶ 29), Mr. Cooper explained that “[t]o meet one-person one-vote requirements,
one has to split Fayette County between District 13 and District 6 because if you
put all of Fayette County in District 13, it would be overpopulated by . . .
several thousand people.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 64:22–65:8. Mr. Cooper
noted that “the northern part of Fayette County” is “a racially diverse area.
That is not overwhelmingly black. It’s balanced to some part[s] of Cobb County
where there is no racial majority.” Id. at 82:6–18.
Similarly, Ms. Wright suggested that “District 13 reaches into Newton
County in an unusual way that cannot be explained by normal redistricting
principles” (DX 41, ¶ 29), but Mr. Cooper again explained that this was done
“to balance populations out” because including all of Newton County in
Congressional District 4 would have made that district overpopulated. Feb. 7,
89
2022, Morning Tr. 66:11–67:1. Ms. Wright also stated that “District 6 specifically
grabs Black voters near Acworth and Kennesaw State University to connect
them with other Black voters in South Cobb, Douglas, and Fulton Counties”
(DX 41, ¶ 29), but Mr. Cooper explained that this decision was also made “to
ensure that District 6 met population equality.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 65:14–
21. Mr. Cooper noted that the northern arm of his illustrative Congressional
District 6 is not in “an area that is predominately black. It is a racially diverse
area[.]” Id. at 65:21–66:2; see also id. at 84:4–7 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony: “I was
not trying to maximize the black voting age population of District 6 by going
into . . . Kennesaw and Acworth.”); id. at 85:18–86:4 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony:
“I had to go in some direction and pick up fairly heavily populated areas, and
I knew Kennesaw and Acworth were racially diverse so from a community of
interest standpoint it made sense to include that with central Cobb County,
which is also racially diverse, and southern Cobb County, which is more
predominantly black.”); id. at 97:5–10 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony: “That was an
area with relative racial diversity. I thought it would fit into a majority black
district. But I was not trying to identify majority black blocks to put into District
6 from that area.”).
90
Indeed, when asked if “there [were] densely populated black areas in
those [c]ounties that you didn’t include in your illustrative map,” Mr. Cooper
confirmed that “there would be ways to enhance the black voting age
population, not just in District 6 but elsewhere, by changing lines and perhaps
splitting some additional [c]ounties.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 66:3–10; see also
id. at 97:11–19 (Mr. Cooper’s testimony agreeing that he could have “done
further changes to the plan that was adopted, perhaps, splitting an additional
[c]ounty or something to find other areas to draw a majority black district”). In
response to Ms. Wright’s suggestion that “[t]he divisions of Cobb, Fayette, and
Newton Counties do not make sense as part of normal redistricting principles”
and were made “in service of some kind of specific goal” (DX 41, ¶ 29),
Mr. Cooper confirmed that he did not have a single specific goal in mind when
drawing his Illustrative Congressional Map, explaining that he was asked “to
determine whether or not an additional majority black district could be created,
but that was not the goal per se. I had to also follow traditional redistricting
principles and then make an assessment as to whether that one additional black
district could be determined. I determined that it could be, but that was not my
goal per se.” Feb. 7, 2022, Morning Tr. 68:5–20.
91
Given the record and the evidence discussed above, the Court finds that
race did not predominate in the drawing of Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
Congressional Plan. Specifically, the Court finds that Ms. Wright’s criticisms of
the Illustrative Plan are conclusory and lack analysis. For every unsupported
conclusion she made that certain illustrative districts did not comply with
traditional redistricting principles, Mr. Cooper offered detailed and readily
understandable explanations for why he drew districts in the way he did and
how his plan complies with traditional redistricting principles. Moreover, the
Court finds that while Mr. Cooper was conscious of race when drawing the
congressional districts, other redistricting principles were not subordinated.
(3) Conclusions of Law
Thus, based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that the
Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan demonstrates that the Black population
in the western Atlanta metropolitan area is sufficiently geographically compact
to constitute a voting-age majority in an additional congressional district.
Moreover, the Court finds that the Illustrative Plan is consistent with
traditional redistricting principles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
Pendergrass Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood to succeed on the
merits of the first Gingles precondition.
92
d) Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha
The Court finds that the Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have
sufficiently established that they are substantially likely to succeed on the
merits in showing that it is possible to create two additional State Senate
Districts and two State House Districts in the Atlanta Metropolitan area and
one additional State House District in southwestern Georgia under relevant
Gingles considerations.
In addition, as indicated above, Plaintiffs in both the Grant and Alpha
Phi Alpha cases allege that the State maps passed in SB 2EX and HB 1EX violate
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Both the Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha
Plaintiffs allege that the Georgia legislature should have drawn two additional
Senate Districts in the southern metropolitan Atlanta area and one additional
Senate District in the Eastern Black belt area. Grant Doc. No. [1], ¶¶ 41–42; APA
Doc. No. [1], ¶¶ 64–66. While the Illustrative Maps (drawn by redistricting
experts, Mr. Esselstyn and Mr. Cooper) presented by the Grant and Alpha Phi
Alpha Plaintiffs are not exact replicas, they largely overlap.22 Compare GPX 3,
22 The Court recognizes that “there is more than one way to draw a district so that it
can reasonably be described as meaningfully adhering to traditional principles, even
if not to the same extent or degree as some other hypothetical district.” Chen v. City
of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 519 (5th Cir. 2000). And the remedial plan that the Court
eventually implements if it finds Section 2 liability need not be one of the maps
93
¶ 26 & fig.6, with APAX 1, ¶ 79 & fig.17; compare GPX 3, ¶ 27 & fig.7, with
APAX 1, ¶ 76 & fig.15; compare GPX 3, ¶ 41 & fig.12 with APAX 1, ¶ 112 &
fig.28. The Court finds that both plans concern areas of Henry, Clayton, and
Fayette Counties. Accordingly, because the Court found that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative Senate District 25 and 28 have a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits as to the first Gingles precondition, the Court does not rule on the
substantial likelihood of success of Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative Senate Districts 17
and 28.
Compare GPX 3, ¶ 24 & fig.4
proposed by Plaintiffs. See Clark, 21 F.3d at 95–96 & n.2 (“[P]laintiffs’ proposed
district is not cast in stone. It was simply presented to demonstrate that a majority-
black district is feasible in [the jurisdiction] . . . . [T]he district court, of course, retains
supervision over the final configuration of the districting plan.”).
94
with, APAX 1, ¶ 71 & fig.14.
95
Additionally, both the Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs allege that
the Georgia legislature should have drawn five additional House Districts. The
Grant Plaintiffs allege that two additional House Districts could be drawn in
the southern Atlanta metropolitan area (Grant Doc. No. [1], ¶ 43), and the
Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs allege that three additional House Districts could be
drawn in the southern Atlanta metropolitan area (APA Doc. No. [1], ¶¶ 70–72.).
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House Districts 74, 110, and 111 concern areas of
96
Henry, Fayette, and Clayton Counties. Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House
Districts 74 and 117 also concern Henry, Fayette, Clayton, and Cowetta
Counties. Accordingly, because the Court found that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative House District 74 and 117 have a substantial likelihood of success
on the first Gingles precondition, the Court does not rule on the substantial
likelihood of success of Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House Districts 73, 110, and
111.
GPX 3, ¶ 39 & fig.10.
97
APAX 1, ¶ 111 & fig.28.
The Grant Plaintiffs’ redistricting expert drew one additional House
District in the western metropolitan Atlanta area and two additional House
Districts in central Georgia, that are anchored in Bibb County. See GPX 3, ¶ 39
& fig.10. The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ redistricting expert drew one
additional House District in the Eastern Black Belt and one additional House
District in Southwestern Georgia.
98
Id. ¶ 116 & fig.32.
99
Id. ¶ 118 & fig.34.
To recap the prior ruling, at this stage, the Court finds that the Grant and
Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of
succeeding on the merits of their claim that SB 2EX and HB 1EX violate
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because the Black population is sufficiently
large and compact to create two additional Black-majority Senate Districts in
the southern Atlanta metropolitan area, two additional House Districts in the
100
southern Atlanta metropolitan area, one additional House District in
southwestern Georgia.23
(1) The Grant Plaintiffs are substantially

likely to establish a Section 2 violation
This Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have shown that they have a
substantial likelihood of satisfying the first Gingles precondition with respect
to two additional State Senate Districts and two additional State House Districts
in the Atlanta metropolitan area.
(a) Senate Districts
i) Numerosity
As indicated above, on December 30, 2021, Governor Kemp signed into
law State Senate Maps. The Georgia State Senate map consists of 56 districts.
GPX 3, ¶ 20; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 169:13–14. The 2014 Georgia State
Senate plan contained 13 majority-Black districts using the AP BVAP metric
23 At this stage and without further discovery, the Court does not find that the Grant
and Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have established that they have a substantial
likelihood of succeeding on the merits of their claims that a third State Senate District
should have been drawn in the Eastern Black Belt or that additional House Districts
should have been drawn in the western Atlanta metropolitan area, central Georgia, or
in the Eastern Black Belt. Because the burden of proving substantial likelihood of
success for a preliminary injunction is a “high threshold,” this in no way
predetermines whether Plaintiffs can prove that Section 2 requires the creation of an
additional Senate District in the Eastern Black Belt, or additional House Districts in
central Georgia and in the Eastern Black Belt. See Louisiana v. Envir. Soc., Inc. v.
Coleman, 524 F.2d 930, 931 (5th Cir. 1975).
101
when the 2020 Census data was applied. Grant Stip. ¶ 30. The Enacted State
Senate Map contains 14 majority-Black districts using the AP BVAP metric.
Grant Stip. ¶ 56; GPX 3, ¶ 21; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 169:8–12. Ten of those
districts are in the Atlanta metropolitan area and four are in the Black Belt.
GPX 3, ¶ 21 & fig.3.
Redistricting expert, Mr. Esselstyn, drew two illustrative Senate Districts
in the Atlanta metropolitan area, which are labeled Esselstyn Illustrative State
Senate District 25 and Illustrative State Senate District 28. Just about half of
Georgia’s Black population lives in six counties in the Atlanta MSA. GPX 3,
¶ 17. Those six counties, listed in order of Black population, are Fulton, DeKalb,
Gwinnett, Cobb, Clayton, and Henry. Id. Under the 2000 Census, the
population in the 29-county Atlanta MSA was 29.29% AP Black, increasing to
33.61% in 2010, and increasing further to 35.91% in 2020. Since 2000, the Black
population in the Atlanta MSA has grown from 1,248,809 to 2,186,815 in 2020.
Grant Stip. ¶ 44.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 is an additional
majority-Black State Senate district in the southeastern Atlanta metropolitan
area and is composed of portions of Clayton and Henry Counties. Grant Stip.
¶ 64; GPX 3, ¶ 26 & fig.6; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 171:17–23, 228:10–13.
102
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 has an AP BVAP over 50%.
Grant Stip. ¶ 65; GPX 3, ¶ 24 & tbl.1; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 171:24–172:8.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 28 is an additional
majority-Black State Senate district in the southwestern Atlanta metropolitan
area and is composed of portions of Clayton, Coweta, Fayette, and Fulton
Counties. Grant Stip. ¶ 66; GPX 3, ¶ 27 & fig.7; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
172:11–17. Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 28 has an AP BVAP
over 50%. Grant Stip. ¶ 67; GPX 3, ¶ 24 & tbl.1; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
172:18–20.
Grant Stip. ¶ 60; GPX 3, ¶ 24 & tbl.1; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 169:20–22.
103
Mr. Morgan and Ms. Wright do not dispute that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State Senate District 25 and Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate
District 28 both have AP BVAPs over 50%. See DX 2, ¶ 11 (Mr. Morgan’s expert
report confirming that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative State Senate plan contains 17
majority-Black districts); Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 191:21–25 (Mr. Morgan’s
testimony agreeing that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative State Senate plan includes
three additional majority-Black districts); DX 41, ¶ 20 (Ms. Wright’s expert
report noting that “[t]he Esselstyn Senate plan also adds majority-Black
districts above the adopted Senate plan when using the any-part Black voting
age population Census metric”); Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 78:13–22, 80:23–
81:24 (Ms. Wright’s testimony acknowledging that AP BVAPs of
Mr. Esselstyn’s additional majority-Black State Senate districts exceed 50%).
Mr. Morgan’s expert report included a chart demonstrating that
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative State Senate plan contains three fewer districts with
AP BVAPs above 65% compared to the Enacted Plan.
104
DX 2, ¶ 10 & chart 1.
As Mr. Esselstyn explained in his supplemental expert report, “[o]ne
reason that the Enacted Plans have fewer majority-Black districts than the
Illustrative Plans is that more Black voters were unnecessarily concentrated
into certain Metro Atlanta districts in the Enacted Plans. By unpacking these
districts, the Illustrative Plans contain fewer packed districts—and,
consequently, additional majority-Black districts.” GPX 4, ¶ 4.
Defendants argue that Senate District 25 is not sufficiently numerous to
form an additional majority-Black district. Defendants point out that in
105
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25, the district is 56.51%
single-race Black voting age population and only 52.71% Black voter
registration. DX 46. However, this argument fails. First, courts use the AP Black
demographics, not single-race black demographics to determine whether the
Black community is sufficiently numerous. Because this Court must decide a
case that involves claims about Georgia’s Black population’s effective exercise
of the electoral franchise, this Court relies on the AP Black metric.
Second, the Supreme Court held that “a party asserting [Section] 2
liability must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the minority
population in the potential election district is greater than 50 percent.” Bartlett,
556 U.S. at 19–20. As stated above, the single-race Black population exceeds
50% of the voting age population of Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate
District 25. Additionally, the percentage of Black registered voters exceeds 50%.
Accordingly, the Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 is
sufficiently numerous for an additional majority-minority district.
Court concludes that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate plan contains two
additional majority-Black districts in the metropolitan Atlanta area.
106
ii) Geographic compactness
Mr. Esselstyn states that his Illustrative State Senate Plan “was drawn to
comply with and balance” the principles enumerated in the 2021-2022 Senate
Reapportionment Committee Guidelines. GPX 3, ¶ 29. The guidelines are as
follows:
1. Each legislative district of the General Assembly

should be drawn to achieve a total population that
is substantially equal as practicable, considering
the principles listed below.
2. All plans adopted by the committee will comply

with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended.
3. All plans adopted by the Committee will comply

with the United States and Georgia Constitutions.
4. Districts shall be composed of contiguous

geography. Districts that connect on a single point
are not contiguous
5. No multi-member districts shall be drawn on any

legislative redistricting plan.
6. The Committee should consider:
a. The boundaries of counties and precincts;
b. Compactness; and
c. Communities of interest.
7. Efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary

pairing of incumbents.
107
8. The identifying of these criteria is not intended to

limit the consideration of other principles or
factors that the Committee deems appropriate.
GPX 39, at 3.
Mr. Esselstyn explained in his supplemental expert report and during his
testimony at the hearing, applying these traditional districting principles often
required balancing. See GPX 4, ¶ 14. As he described the process,
It’s a balancing act. So . . . often the criteria will be [in

tension] with each other. It may be that you are trying
to just follow precinct lines and not split . . . precincts,
but the precincts have funny shapes. So that means
you either are going to end up with a less compact
shape that doesn’t split precincts or you could split a
precinct and end up with a more compact shape. And
some of the county shapes are highly irregular as
well. So sometime[s] you can have a decision about
splitting counties as well. So that’s the example of
where there’s no one clear right answer and I’m trying
to sort of find the best balance that I can.
Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 157:14–25.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Maps are not malapportioned
and comply with the one-person, one-vote principle. See Wright, 301 F. Supp.
3d at 1325–26; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he Equal Protection
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
108
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as
practicable.”).
Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report demonstrates that his Illustrative State
Senate Plan contains minimal population deviation. In both the Enacted and
Illustrative State Senate Plans, most district populations are within ±1% of the
ideal, and a small minority are between ±1 and 2%. None has a deviation of
more than 2%. For the Enacted Plan, the relative average deviation is 0.53%,
and for the Illustrative Plan, the relative average deviation is 0.68%. GPX 3,
¶ 30; see also id. at 49–52, 54–55 (Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report listing
population statistics for enacted and illustrative State Senate maps); id. at 66
(similar); Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 158:4–22, 176:20–177:5, 188:4–12
(Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony describing compliance with population equality).
Mr. Esselstyn conceded that his illustrative Senate Plan had higher population
deviations than the Enacted State Senate Map. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
205:8-14. Mr. Esselstyn’s population deviations are within the limits allowed by
the Equal Protection Clause.
[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality

among state legislative districts are insufficient to
make out a prima facie case . . . under the Fourteenth
Amendments. . . . Our decisions have established, as
a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a
109
maximum population deviation under 10% falls

within this category of minor deviations.
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 825, 842 (1983) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 745)
(quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative Senate Plan complies with population equality.
(b) Compactness
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Plan has comparable
compactness scores to the Enacted State Senate Map. Mr. Esselstyn reported the
average compactness scores for both the Enacted Plans and his illustrative
legislative plans using five measures—Reock,24 Schwartzberg,25 Polsby-
24 The Court discussed Reock and Polsby-Popper in the Pendergrass section of this
Order; however, considering the Order’s length, the Court deems it proper to
readdress these measures for the reader. The Reock test is an area-based measure that
compares each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape
possible. For each district, the Reock test computes the ratio of the area of the district
to the area of the minimum enclosing circle for the district. The measure is always
between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact. GPX 3, at 63.
25 The Schwartzberg test is a perimeter-based measure that compares a simplified
version of each district to a circle, which is considered to be the most compact shape
possible. For each district, the Schwartzberg test computes the ratio of the perimeter
of the simplified version of the district to the perimeter of a circle with the same area
as the original district. This measure is usually greater than or equal to 1, with 1 being
the most compact. GPX 3, at 63.
110
Popper,26 Area/Convex Hull,27 and Number of Cut Edges.28 GPX 3, ¶¶ 31, 46 &
tbls. 2, 5; see also Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 158:23–160:1 (Mr. Esselstyn’s
testimony describing common measures of compactness).
Mr. Esselstyn concluded that the average compactness measures for the
Enacted State Senate Map and his Illustrative Plan “are almost identical, if not
identical.” GPX 3, ¶ 31 & tbl.2; see also id. at 66–79 (Mr. Esselstyn’s expert
report providing detailed compactness measures for enacted and illustrative
State Senate maps); Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:2–10, 177:6–19, 188:13–17
(Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony describing compliance with compactness principle);
Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 223:23–224:3 (Mr. Morgan’s testimony confirming
26 The Polsby-Popper test computes the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle
with the same perimeter: 4πArea/(Perimeter2). The measure is always between 0 and
1, with 1 being the most compact. GPX 3, at 63.
27 The Area/Convex Hull test computes the ratio the district area to the area of the
convex hull of the district (minimum convex polygon which completely contains the
district). The measure is always between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most compact. GPX
3, at 63.
28The Cut Edges test counts the number of edges removed (“cut”) from the adjacency
(dual) graph of the base layer to define the districting plan. The adjacency graph is
defined by creating a node for each base layer area. An edge is added between two
nodes if the two corresponding base layer areas are adjacent—which is to say, they
share a common linear boundary. If such a boundary forms part of the district
boundary, then its corresponding edge is cut by the plan. The measure is a single
number for the plan. A smaller number implies a more compact plan. GPX 3, at 63–64;
see also Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 236:2–16 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony describing Cut
Edges measurement).
111
that overall compactness scores of Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative State Senate map
and enacted map are similar).
Mr. Esselstyn reported those measures as follows:
GPX 3, ¶ 31 & tbl.2.
In his expert report, Mr. Morgan, confirmed the accuracy of
Mr. Esselstyn’s compactness statistics without suggesting that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative Maps fail to comply with this districting principle. See DX 2,
¶¶ 23–24 & chart 5. Moreover, his report demonstrated that most of the
additional majority-Black districts in Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Plans
outperform their precursors in the Enacted Plans according to the
Polsby-Popper compactness measure, with Senate District 25 performing better
according to that measure and the Reock measure:
112
Id.
Defendants maintained a line of questioning at the preliminary
injunction hearing in an effort to show that the Reock and Schwartzberg scores
of the 2021 adopted state Senate plan are more compact on average than
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative state Senate plan. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 235:10–25. The evidence showed that several districts on the Esselstyn
remedial Senate plan are far less compact than the 2021 adopted state Senate
plan. DX 2, ¶ 24. However, the Enacted State Senate Map and Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative Senate Map have identical Polsby-Popper scores (0.29) and
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate Map has seven fewer cut edges than the
Enacted State Senate Map. Second, under the Reock, Schwartzberg and
Area/Convex Hull tests the Illustrative Plan is one-one-hundredth of a point
113
less compact than the enacted State Plan. Accordingly, the Court does not find
that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative legislative maps are not sufficiently compact.
Looking at the challenged districts specifically, the Court finds
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 is more compact than the
Enacted State Plan. Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 has a
Reock score of 0.57 and Polsby-Popper score of 0.34 and the Enacted State
Senate District 25 has a Reock score of 0.39 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.24.
See DX 2, ¶¶ 23–24 & chart 5. The Enacted State Senate District 28 is slightly
more compact than Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 28.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 28 has a Reock score of 0.38 and
a Polsby-Popper score of 0.19 and the Enacted State Senate District 28 has a
Reock score of 0.45 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.19. Id. The Court finds that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 is sufficiently compact and
more compact than Enacted State Senate District 25.
The Court also finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District
28 is sufficiently compact. The Court does not find that the difference of
six-hundredths of a point in the Polsby-Popper score and seven-hundredths of
a point difference in the Reock scores makes Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State
Senate District 28 not compact. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s
114
Illustrative State Senate District 25 and Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate
District 28 are sufficiently compact and satisfy the first Gingles precondition.
(c) Contiguity
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate Districts are contiguous. There is no
factual dispute on this issue. See Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:11–13
(Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony confirming that his illustrative districts are
contiguous).

subdivisions
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate Plan preserves political subdivisions.
Mr. Esselstyn testified that it was “not always possible” to preserve political
subdivisions because, for example, “a typical precinct size is in the
neighborhood typically around a few thousand people,” and “[s]o often to get
the best shape . . . , it’s often practical to divide precincts.” Feb. 9, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 160:20–161:1–8. Mr. Esselstyn concluded that “[w]hile the
creation of three additional majority-Black State Senate districts involved the
division of additional counties and VTDs, the differences are marginal.” GPX
3, ¶¶ 32–33 & tbl.3; see also id. at 80–91 (Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report providing
political subdivision splits for enacted and illustrative State Senate maps); Feb.
9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 161:9–11 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony stating that “the
115
numbers of divided counties and precincts in the Illustrative Plans are similar,
slightly higher than those for the Enacted Plans”); id. at 177:20–25, 188:18–24
(Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony describing preservation of political subdivisions).
He reported the splits in the enacted and illustrative State Senate maps as
follows:
GPX 3, ¶¶ 32–33 & tbl.3.
Out of 2,698 VTDs statewide, only 49 are split in Mr. Esselstyn’s
illustrative State Senate plan, and in only 18 of Georgia’s 159 counties. Grant
Doc. No. [61-1], ¶ 3 & fig.1; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 163:17–20, 166:5–9. The
2021 Enacted State Senate Map divides fewer precincts than Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State Senate Maps. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 205:23–25,
236:25–237:1. However, some of the VTD splits in Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
State Senate Maps are inherited from the Enacted State Senate map because
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative map leaves a majority of districts untouched. Id.
at 164:23–165:4. Mr. Esselstyn’s second supplemental report included a
116
histogram depicting the VTD splits in his illustrative State Senate plan by
county.
Grant Doc. No. [61-1], ¶ 3 & fig.1. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State Senate Map complies with the traditional redistricting
principle of keeping political subdivisions together; even though,
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Maps has two more split VTDs than the
Enacted State Senate Map.
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative Senate plan splits thirty-four counties, which
is five more than the 2021 adopted state Senate plan. Grant Stip. ¶¶ 58, 75;
Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 203:18–21; DX 2, ¶ 21. However, the number of
county splits in Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Map is lower than the
117
number of such splits in the legislative plans used in the most recent elections
(which is to say, Georgia’s 2014 State Senate plans).
GPX 4, ¶ 11 & tbl.1; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 178:1–5, 188:25–189:4.
Defendants’ expert Mr. Morgan’s report confirmed Mr. Esselstyn’s statistics for
political subdivision splits without opining that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative
maps fail to comply with this districting principle. See DX 2, ¶¶ 20–22; see also
Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 220:15–221:20 (Mr. Morgan’s testimony confirming
Mr. Esselstyn’s reported figures and conceding that his expert report offers no
opinion on issue of split geographies). Thus, the Court finds that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Maps comply with the traditional
redistricting principle of maintaining existing political subdivisions.
(e) Preservation of
communities of interest
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Maps
preserve communities of interest. Mr. Esselstyn testified regarding his
definition of a community of interest:
118
[C]ommunity of interest could be something as large

as the Black Belt. As large as Metro Atlanta. Can span
multiple counties. And . . . it could also be as small as
a neighborhood. So it can be an area that is large or
larger geographically but the basic idea is you are
looking at areas that have a shared characteristics or
where the people have a shared interest.
Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 167:1–11. Although sometimes such communities
“can be delineated on [a] map”—such as municipalities, college campuses, or
military bases—at other times “they don’t have clearly defined boundaries.”
Id. at 167:18–168:9; see also Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 90:5–91:12 (Ms. Wright’s
testimony broadly defining communities of interest). Mr. Esselstyn testified
that in drawing his illustrative maps, he sought to preserve communities of
interest where possible. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 168:13–16. This does not
necessarily mean that each illustrative district is homogenous; as Mr. Esselstyn
explained, “I don’t believe that the communities of interest principle[] requires
every two communities in a given district to have commonalities. I don’t think
that’s what the principle stands for. . . . [M]y focus on communities of interest
is trying to keep them intact, when possible.” Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 221:1–
222:11. Accordingly, the absence of “some shared characteristic” does not
necessarily indicate “a failure to meet the communities of interest criteria or
any other [] traditional redistricting principle.” Id. at 222:12–17.
119
With respect to Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25,
Defendants’ expert Ms. Wright conceded that “District 25 is at least more
compact,” but concluded that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District
25 has the effect of dividing communities of interest in Mr. Esselstyn’s Senate
District 10. DX 41, ¶ 23; Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 48:20–49:4. Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative Senate District 10 stretches from Stonecrest in DeKalb County to
Butts County. Id. The Court finds that even if Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate
District 10 divides communities of interest, that does not necessarily mean that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 does not respect traditional
redistricting principles. See Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1326 (finding that
plaintiffs successfully proved violation of Section 2 of the VRA, even though
the “illustrative plan [was] [] far from perfect”). Given that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative Senate District 10 does not represent a challenged district, and
Ms. Wright testified that Mr. Esselstyn’s Senate District 25 is “at least more
compact,” (Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 48:20–49:4), the Court finds that Mr.
Esselstyn’s Senate District 25 respects communities of interest.
Jason Carter, a former member of the State Senate and candidate for
Governor of Georgia during the 2014 election, testified that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State Senate District 25
120
includes virtually all of Henry County in a single

district . . . [which] helps in some context for sure . . . .
[I]f there were really differing aspects in Henry
County that needed to be divided, up that would be
one thing but . . . Henry County is a fast-growing,
multi-racial community that . . . would seem like []
the kind of place that can be kept together . . . if you
can make it coherent, it would seem that that would
be great.
Feb. 10, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 138:9–139:6. Thus, the Court finds that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate District 25 respects communities of
interest.
With respect to Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate District 28, Defendants
argued it connects pieces of the following counties to create a district that is
majority-Black: Clayton, Coweta, Fayette, and Fulton. See Feb. 9, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 229:4–7. To create this district, Mr. Esselstyn has to double the
traditional number of Senate districts in Clayton County from two to four and
cut into Coweta County to reach a sizeable Black population in Newnan. DX
41, ¶ 22; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 229:23–230:16. Unlike the Democratic
Senate plan and 2021 adopted state Senate plan that kept Coweta County
whole, Mr. Esselstyn’s Senate District 28 splits Coweta County three ways. DX
13; DX 10; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 231:8–17. Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
Senate District 28 from his report is reproduced below.
121
GPX 3, ¶ 27 & fig.7.
Mr. Carter described the communities of interest contained in
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate District 28 as follows: “[T]hat is . . . to me, a
cohesive community and . . . Newnan certainly has more in common with that
part of South Fulton than it does with . . . Franklin, Georgia, because of the
issues that it confronts from an infrastructure standpoint and [] other issues[.]”
Feb. 10, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 139:18–140:19. Despite the additional county splits,
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate District 28 “goes right around the Airport,
122
285. 85 corridors that are . . . those suburban south side areas.” Id. at 140:10–12.
Thus, Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate District 28 respects communities of
interest.
(f) Incumbent protection
Defendants point out that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Map
pairs incumbents Marty Harbin (R) and Valencia Seay (D) into one district;
while, the Enacted State Senate Map pairs no incumbents who are running for
reelection. DX 1, ¶ 15. During the hearing, Mr. Esselstyn testified that “I was
not able to find a publicly-available authoritative source . . . for incumbent
address data . . . [s]o, as a result I did not have that data and so I did not take it
into account.” Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 223:16–18. Despite not having this
information, Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Maps only create one
incumbent pairing. The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State
Senate Map complies with the traditional redistricting principle of protecting
incumbents.
(g) Core retention
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Map retains
the core of the Enacted State Senate Map. As an initial note, preservation of
existing district cores was not an enumerated districting principle adopted by
123
the General Assembly. See GPX 39; 40. However, in terms of implementing a
remedial map, the Court takes core retention into consideration.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Plan changes 22 of the 56
2021 Enacted State Senate districts in the process of creating three additional
majority-Black districts. DX 2, ¶ 19. Mr. Esselstyn explained in his
supplemental expert report, “One of the guiding principles in the creation of
my Illustrative Plans was to keep changes to a minimum while adhering to
other neutral criteria . . . . [W]hile the illustrative plans are—intentionally—a
departure from the enacted plans, most of the plans’ districts remain intact.”
GPX 4, ¶ 9; see Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 267:20–268:4 (Mr. Esselstyn’s
testimony: “One of the other considerations for me was not trying to make
more changes that I have to.”).
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Maps do not
change over 60% of the Enacted State Senate Map. The Court notes that
“[m]odifying one district necessarily requires changes to districts adjacent to
the original modification, and harmonizing those changes with traditional
redistricting criteria (such as population equality and intactness of counties)
often inescapably results in cascading changes to other surrounding districts.”
124
GPX 4, ¶ 9. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State
Senate Map respects the principle of core retention.
(h) Racial considerations
Defendants argued that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate Maps must
fail because they were predominately drawn for racial considerations. The
Court is not persuaded by this argument. Both the Supreme Court’s and
Eleventh Circuit’s “precedents require [Section 2] plaintiffs to show that it
would be possible to design an electoral district, consistent with traditional
districting principles, in which minority voters could successfully elect a
minority candidate.” Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425. “[I]ntentional creation of a
majority-minority district necessarily requires consideration of race.” Fayette
Cnty., 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1345. Therefore, “[t]o penalize [plaintiffs] . . . for
attempting to make the very showing that Gingles [and its progeny] demand
would be to make it impossible, as a matter of law, for any plaintiff to bring a
successful Section [2] action.” Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425. Consideration of race
accordingly does not mean that an illustrative plan must be subjected to strict
scrutiny or any other heightened bar beyond the question of whether
traditional districting principles were employed. Consistent with this
understanding, the Eleventh Circuit, and every other circuit to address this
125
issue, has rejected attempts to graft the constitutional standard that applies to
racial gerrymandering by the State onto the first Gingles precondition vote
dilution analysis. See Davis, 139 F.3d at 1417–18; see also, e.g., Bone Shirt, 461
F.3d at 1019; Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406–07; Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1327
(10th Cir. 1996); Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 926 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994);
Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 278
(2d Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds sub nom. City of Bridgeport v.
Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994).
Mr. Esselstyn explained that he was asked “to determine whether there
are areas in the State of Georgia where the Black population is ‘sufficiently large
and geographically compact’ to enable the creation of additional majority-Black
legislative districts relative to the number of such districts provided in the
enacted State Senate and State House of Representatives redistricting plans
from 2021.” GPX 3, ¶ 8 (footnote omitted); see also Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 150:11–19, 202:15–29 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony confirming what he was
asked to do in this case). Mr. Esselstyn testified that he was not asked to
maximize the number of majority-Black districts in the State Senate or House
map. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 150:23–25. Mr. Esselstyn also testified that it
126
was necessary for him to consider race as part of his analysis because, under
Section 2,
the key metric is whether a district has a majority of

the Any Part Black population. So that means it has to
be over 50 percent. And that means looking at a
column of numbers in order to determine, to assess
whether a district has that characteristic. You have to
look at the numbers that measure the percentage of
the population is Black.
Id. at 155:15–156:2. When asked by the Court whether race was the controlling
issue when drawing his illustrative House District 149, Mr. Esselstyn
responded, “There’s not one predominant consideration . . . . I’m trying to see
if something can be satisfied while considering all the other traditional
principles and the principles adopted by the General Assembly.” Feb. 9, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 254:1–255:18. Mr. Esselstyn emphasized that he took other
considerations into account as well when drawing his Illustrative Plans,
including population equality, compliance with the federal and state
constitutions, contiguity, and other traditional districting principles. Id. at
156:10–157:9; see also id. at 275:2–11 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony explaining that,
when drawing illustrative districts, “I’m not looking at any one race of
voters . . . . I’m always looking [at] a multitude of considerations”).
127
Defendants’ expert, Ms. Wright, opined that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
Senate District 25 and 28 were drawn predominately with racial considerations,
“District 25 . . . strategically connects pieces of south Clayton with Henry
apparently in service of a racial goal” (DX 41, ¶ 23) and “District 28 . . . splits
Clayton County into four districts in a manner that make [sic] no geographical
sense apart from a racial goal.” Id. ¶ 22. Without more, the Court is unable to
uphold Ms. Wright’s assessment. Mr. Esselstyn testified that he used various
metrics including but not limited to population size, communities of interest,
and political subdivisions, in addition to race when he drew his Illustrative
State Senate Maps. Accordingly, the Court does not find that race
predominated the drawing of Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Districts
25 and 28.
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State Senate Districts 25
and 28 contain Black population that are sufficiently numerous and compact,
as to create two additional districts that comply with traditional redistricting
principles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have a
substantial likelihood of success in proving that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
State Senate Districts 25 and 28 satisfy the first Gingles precondition.
128
(b) Esselstyn House Districts
i) Numerosity
As stated above, on December 30, 2021, Governor Kemp signed the
Enacted State House Map into law. The Georgia House of Representatives map
consists of 180 districts. GPX 3, ¶ 35; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 178:10–12. The
2015 Georgia House of Representatives plan contained 47 majority-Black
districts using the AP BVAP metric when the 2020 Census data was applied.
Grant Stip. ¶ 31. The enacted House plan contains 49 majority-Black districts
using the AP BVAP metric. Grant Stip. ¶ 57; GPX 3, ¶ 36; Feb. 9, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 178:17–19. Thirty-four of those districts are in the Atlanta
metropolitan area, 13 are in the Black Belt, and two small districts are within
Chatham County (anchored in Savannah) and Lowndes County (anchored in
Valdosta) in the southeastern part of the state. GPX 3, ¶ 36 & fig.9.
Mr. Esselstyn also drew two additional majority-Black House Districts in
the metropolitan Atlanta area: Illustrative State House District 74 and
Illustrative State House District 117. As stated above, the AP Black population
in the Atlanta MSA increased from 29.29% in 2000 to 33.61% in 2010 and to
35.91% in 2020. Grant Stip. ¶ 44. And half of Georgia’s Black population live in
Fulton, DeKalb, Gwinnett, Cobb, Clayton, and Henry counties. GPX 3, ¶ 17.
129
Mr. Esselstyn drew two additional majority-Black House districts in the
southern Atlanta metropolitan area (Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House
District 74 and Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House District 117) are
composed of portions of Clayton, Fayette, and Henry Counties. Grant Stip.
¶ 70; GPX 3, ¶ 41 & fig.12; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 185:12–18. Mr. Esselstyn’s
illustrative House Districts 74 and 117 have AP BVAPs over 50%. Grant
Stip. ¶ 71; GPX 3, ¶ 39 & tbl.4; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 185:23–186:5.
Grant Stip. ¶ 61; GPX 3, ¶ 39 & tbl.4.
Mr. Morgan and Ms. Wright do not dispute that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State House District 74 and Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House
130
District 117 have AP BVAPs over 50%. See DX 2, ¶ 13 (confirming that
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative House plain contains 54 majority-Black districts);
DX 41, ¶ 24 (Ms. Wright’s expert report noting that “[t]he Esselstyn House plan
adds majority-Black districts above the adopted House plan when using the
any-part Black voting age population Census metric”); Feb. 11, 2022, Morning
Tr. 81:25–82:16 (Ms. Wright’s testimony acknowledging that AP BVAPs of
Mr. Esselstyn’s additional majority-Black House districts exceed 50%).
Mr. Morgan’s expert report includes a chart demonstrating that
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative House plan contains three fewer districts with AP
BVAPs above 65% compared to the Enacted Plan.
131
DX 2, ¶ 12 & chart 2. As Mr. Esselstyn explained in his supplemental expert
report, “[o]ne reason that the enacted plans have fewer majority-Black districts
than the illustrative plans is that more Black voters were unnecessarily
concentrated into certain Metro Atlanta districts in the enacted plans. By
unpacking these districts, the illustrative plans contain fewer packed districts—
and, consequently, additional majority-Black districts.” GPX 4, ¶ 4.
Although Ms. Wright asserts that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative House
Districts 64, 74, and 117 are “below 50% Black on voter registration” (DX 41,
¶¶ 27–28), she admitted during the hearing that more than 8% of registered
132
voters are of unknown race and that this qualifying information was not
included in her expert report. Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 71:10–78:12.29
Court concludes that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative House plan contains two
additional majority-Black districts.
ii) Geographic Compactness
Mr. Esselstyn states that his illustrative State House Map “was drawn to
comply with and balance” the principles enumerated in the 2021-2022 House
Reapportionment Committee Guidelines, discussed supra. GPX 3, ¶ 44; 40, 3.
As stated above, Mr. Esselstyn explained in his supplemental expert
report and during his testimony at the hearing, applying these traditional
districting principles often required balancing. See GPX 4, ¶ 14. As he described
the process,
It’s a balancing act. So . . . often the criteria will be [in

tension] with each other. It may be that you are trying
to just follow precinct lines and not split . . . precincts,
but the precincts have funny shapes. So that means
you either are going to end up with a less compact
shape that doesn’t split precincts or you could split a
precinct and end up with a more compact shape. And
some of the county shapes are highly irregular as
well. So sometime[s] you can have a decision about
29 See supra n.19.
133
splitting counties as well. So that’s the example of

where there’s no one clear right answer and I’m trying
to sort of find the best balance that I can.
Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 157:14–25.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Districts 74 and 117 are consistent with
traditional redistricting principles of compactness.
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Map is not malapportioned and
complies with the one-person, one-vote principle. See Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d
at 1325–26; see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause
requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts,
in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as practicable.”).
Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report demonstrates that his Illustrative State House
Map contains minimal population deviation.
In both the Enacted and Illustrative House plans, most district
populations are within ±1% of the ideal, and a small minority are between ±1
and 2%. None has a deviation of more than 2%. For the Enacted Plan, the
relative average deviation is 0.61%, and for the Illustrative Plan, the relative
average deviation is 0.64%. GPX 3, ¶ 45; see also id. at 97–106, 108–13
(Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report listing population statistics for enacted and
134
illustrative House maps); id. at 121 (similar); Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
158:4–22, 176:20–177:5, 188:4–12 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony describing
compliance with population equality).
Mr. Esselstyn conceded that his illustrative House plan has higher
deviations than the 2021 adopted House plan. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 205:8-14. Mr. Esselstyn’s population deviations are within the limits
allowed by the Equal Protection Clause. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (quoting
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 745). Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
Senate Plan complies with population equality.
(b) Compactness
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Plan has comparable
compactness scores to HB 1EX. Using the same compactness measures as for
the Illustrative Senate plans, Mr. Esselstyn concluded that the average
compactness measures for the enacted House plan and his illustrative plan “are
almost identical, if not identical.” GPX 3, ¶ 46 & tbl.5; see also id. at 121–52
(Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report providing detailed compactness measures for
enacted and illustrative House maps); Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:2–10
(Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony describing compliance with compactness principle);
Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 224:4–7 (Mr. Morgan’s testimony confirming that
135
overall compactness scores of Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative House map and
enacted map are similar). Mr. Esselstyn reported those measures as follows:
GPX 3, ¶ 46 & tbl.5.
Looking at average compactness scores, Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
House plan has identical Reock, Polsby-Popper and Area/Convex Hull scores
as the State’s enacted plan, and it is two-hundredths of a point less compact
under the Schwartzberg method. GPX 3, ¶ 46 & tbl.5. In his expert report,
Mr. Morgan confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Esselstyn’s compactness statistics
without suggesting that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative maps are not sufficiently
compact. See DX 2, ¶¶ 23–24 & chart 5.
136
Looking at the Schwartzberg and Cut Edges scores, the 2021 adopted
state House plan is more compact on average than Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative
state House plan. See Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 264:24–265:7. Of the twenty-
six districts changed on Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative state House plan, sixteen
are less compact on the Reock measurement and fifteen are less compact on the
Polsby-Popper measurement. DX 2, ¶ 24. This evidence, however, does not
persuade the Court that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Map is not
sufficiently compact. First, the Enacted State House Map and Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative House Map have identical compactness scores in three out of the
five compactness measures. See GPX 3, ¶ 46 & tbl.5. Second, the Enacted State
House Map is only two-hundredths of a point more compact than
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Map and has only 455 fewer cut edges. Id. The Court
137
does not find that these minor deviations render Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
House Map non-compact. Accordingly, the Court does not find that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Map is not sufficiently compact.
Looking at the challenged districts specifically, the Court finds
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House District 74 is less compact than the
Enacted State House District 74. Whereas Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State
House District 74 has a Reock score of 0.30 and Polsby-Popper score of 0.19, the
Enacted State House District 74 has a Reock score of 0.50 and a Polsby-Popper
score of 0.25. See DX 2, chart 5. Also, although Enacted State House District 117
is slightly more compact than Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House District
117 under the Reock measure, it is less compact under the Polsby-Popper
measure. Id. Specifically, Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House District 117
has a Reock score of 0.40 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.33 and the Enacted
State Senate District 28 has a Reock score of 0.41 and a Polsby-Popper score of
0.28. Id.
After reviewing the data above, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State House Districts 74 and 117 are sufficiently compact. The Court
does not find that the difference of one-hundredths of a point in the Reock score
makes Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House District 117 not compact,
138
especially given that the Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House District 117
Polsby-Popper score is five-hundredths of a point higher than the Enacted State
House District 117. The Court also finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State
House District 74 is sufficiently compact. Although Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
State House District 74 has a Reock score that is a twentieth of a point less
compact than the Enacted State House District 74 and six-hundredths of a point
less compact under Polsby-Popper, Mr. Morgan acknowledged that there is no
minimum compactness threshold for districts under Georgia law. See Feb. 11,
2022, Afternoon Tr. 228:3–16. Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State House Districts 74 and 117 are sufficiently compact and satisfy
the first Gingles precondition.
(c) Contiguity
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Districts 74 and 117 are contiguous.
There is no factual dispute on this issue. See Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:11–
13 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony confirming that his illustrative districts are
contiguous).

subdivisions
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Plan preserves political subdivisions.
Mr. Esselstyn testified that it was “not always possible” to preserve political
139
subdivisions because, for example, “the ideal population for a House district is
around 60,000 people, and there are going to be counties that have way more
than 60,000 people. So you are going to have to divide that county up into
multiple districts.” Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:14–25. Similarly, “a typical
precinct size is in the neighborhood typically around a few thousand people,”
and “[s]o often to get the best shape . . . it’s often practical to divide precincts.”
Id. at 161:1–8. Mr. Esselstyn concluded that “[w]hile the creation of five
additional majority-Black House districts involved the division of one
additional county and a handful of VTDs, the differences are marginal.” GPX
3, ¶¶ 47–48 & tbl.6; see also id. at 153–85 (Mr. Esselstyn’s expert report
providing political subdivision splits for enacted and illustrative House maps);
Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 161:9–11 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony stating that “the
numbers of divided counties and precincts in the illustrative plans are similar,
slightly higher than those for the enacted plans”). He reported the splits in the
enacted and illustrative House maps as follows:
GPX 3, ¶¶ 47–48 & tbl.6.
140
Out of 2,698 VTDs statewide, only 192 are split in Mr. Esselstyn’s
illustrative House plan, and in only 45 of Georgia’s 159 counties. Grant Doc.
No. [61-1], ¶ 4 & fig.2; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 164:13–17, 166:4–11. Some of
these VTD splits are inherited from the enacted House map because
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative map leaves a vast majority of districts untouched.
Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 164:22–165:6. Mr. Esselstyn’s second supplemental
report included a histogram depicting the VTD splits in his illustrative House
plan by county:
Grant Doc. No. [61-1], ¶ 4 & fig.2.
After reviewing this data, the Court finds that although Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State House Maps has seven more split VTDs than the Enacted State
141
Senate Map, it still complies with the traditional redistricting principle of
keeping political subdivisions together. Thus, the Court finds fact that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Maps satisfy this factor.
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative House plan splits 70 counties, which is one
more than the 2021 enacted state House plan. Grant Stip. ¶¶ 59, 76; Feb. 9, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 267:4–7; DX 2, ¶ 22. However, the number of county splits in
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative State Senate and House plans are lower than the
number of such splits in the legislative plans used in the most recent elections
(namely, Georgia’s 2014 State Senate and 2015 House plans). GPX 4, ¶ 11 &
tbl.1; Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 178:1–5, 188:25–189:4.
Mr. Morgan confirmed Mr. Esselstyn’s statistics for political subdivision
splits without opining that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative maps fail to comply with
this districting principle. See DX 2, ¶¶ 20–22; see also Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 220:15–221:20 (Mr. Morgan’s testimony confirming Mr. Esselstyn’s reported
figures and conceding that his expert report offers no opinion on issue of split
geographies). After reviewing the data above, the Court finds that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Maps comply with the traditional
redistricting principle of maintaining existing political subdivisions.
142
(e) Preservation of
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Maps
preserve communities of interest. Mr. Esselstyn testified regarding his
definition of a community of interest: “[C]ommunity of interest could be
something as large as the Black Belt. As large as Metro Atlanta. Can span
multiple counties. And . . . it could also be as small as a neighborhood. So it can
be an area that is large or larger geographically but the basic idea is you are
looking at areas that have a shared characteristic[] or where the people have a
shared interest.” Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 167:1–11. Although sometimes
such communities “can be delineated on a map”—such as municipalities,
college campuses, or military bases—at other times “they don’t have clearly
defined boundaries.” Id. at 167:18–168:9; see also Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr.
90:3–91:12 (Ms. Wright’s testimony broadly defining communities of interest).
Mr. Esselstyn testified that in drawing his illustrative maps, he sought to
preserve communities of interest where possible. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
168:13–16. This does not necessarily mean that each illustrative district is
homogenous; as Mr. Esselstyn explained, “I don’t believe that the communities
of interest principle[] requires every two communities in a given district to have
commonalities. I don’t think that’s what the principle stands for. . . . [M]y focus
143
on communities of interest is trying to keep them intact, when possible.” Id. at
221:1–222:11. Accordingly, the absence of “some shared characteristic” does not
necessarily indicate “a failure to meet the communities of interest criteria or
any other [] traditional redistricting principle.” Id. at 222:12–17.
Defendants’ expert Ms. Wright did not testify or provide any expert
opinion about whether Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Districts 74 and 117
respected communities of interest.30 When asked by Defendants’ counsel
whether the composition of his illustrative House District 74 was “to achieve
the goal of majority status in [that] district,” Mr. Esselstyn responded, “No. . . .
[T]here are always multiple goals,” such as preserving the community of
Irondale, ensuring that Fayetteville was kept intact in the illustrative map, and
being “relatively consistent with what it is in the enacted plan” in terms of
preexisting district boundaries. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 246:16–247:5.
Ms. Wright, in rebuttal testified that Irondale was not an incorporated city in
30 Ms. Wright’s expert report states that “Districts 74 and 117 suffer from the same
problems I outlined above regarding Cooper House District 73 and 110” (DX 41, ¶ 27);
however, the Court is unable to determine exactly what problems Mr. Esselstyn’s
House Districts 74 and 117 suffer from. While Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House
Districts 74 and 117 overlaps with Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House Districts 73 and
110, the districts are not identical and have boundaries that affect different
communities. Thus, the Court will not apply Ms. Wright’s opinions about
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 73 and 110 to Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
House Districts 74 and 117.
144
Georgia. Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 51:18–52:2. Even though Irondale is not an
incorporated municipality, it does not mean that it is not a community of
interest. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House
Districts 74 and 117 adhere to the traditional redistricting principle of
maintaining communities of interest.
Mr. Morgan states in his report that Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative state
House plan pairs eight sets of incumbents (16 total) who are running for
reelection, whereas the Enacted State House map pairs only four sets of
incumbents (eight total) who are running for reelection. DX 2, ¶¶ 17–18 &
chart 4.
145
DX 2, ¶ 18 & chart 4.
During the hearing, Mr. Esselstyn testified that “I was not able to find a
publicly-available authoritative source . . . for incumbent address data . . . [s]o,
as a result, I did not have that data and so I did not take it into account.” Feb.
9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 223:16–22. Indeed, the Court finds it notable that
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Map creates only eight incumbent
pairings even though Mr. Esselstyn had no address information regarding
146
incumbents. Further, three of the incumbent pairings are unchanged from the
Enacted State House Map (Rebecca Mitchell and Shelly Hutchinson; Gerald
Green and Winifred Dukes; James Burchett and Dominic LaRiccia). DX 2, ¶ 18
& chart 4. Additionally, while Robert Pruitt is paired against Danny Mathis in
the enacted plan, Robert Pruitt is paired against Noel Williams in
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Maps—in both pairings, both incumbents
are Republicans. Id.
With respect to Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Districts 74 and 117,
six-incumbents are paired against one another, two more than the Enacted
House Plan. Two of the incumbent pairings (Miriam Paris and Dale Washburn;
and Shaw Blackmon and Robert Dickey) are not impacted by Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative House Districts 74 and 117. Rep. Paris currently represents House
District 142 in Bibb County and Rep. Washburn represents House District 141
in Bibb and Monroe Counties. Rep. Blackmon represents House District 146 in
Houston County and Rep. Dickey represents House District 140 in Houston,
Bibb, Monroe and Peach Counties. Georgia General Assembly House of
Representatives, https://www.legis.ga.gov/members/ house (last visited Feb.
147
28, 2022).31 Thus, Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Districts 74 and 117 creates
six incumbent pairings, two more than the Enacted State House Map. The
Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Map complies with the
traditional redistricting principle of protecting incumbents.
(g) Core retention
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Map retains
the core of the Enacted State House Map. As an initial note, preservation of
existing district cores was not an enumerated districting principle adopted by
the General Assembly. See GPX 40. However, if the Court were to implement a
remedial map, the Court would consider core retention. Thus, the Court has
considered this issue and finds as follows:
Mr. Esselstyn’s illustrative state House plan changes 26 of the 180 2021
adopted House districts in the process of creating five additional majority-
minority districts. DX 2, ¶ 19. Mr. Esselstyn explained in his supplemental
expert report that “[o]ne of the guiding principles in the creation of my
illustrative plans was to keep changes to a minimum while adhering to other
neutral criteria . . . . While the illustrative plans are—intentionally—a
31 The Court takes judicial notice of the names of the members of the House of
Representative for the Georgia General Assembly and the districts that those
members serve. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
148
departure from the enacted plans, most of the plans’ districts remain intact.”
GPX 4, ¶ 9; see also Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 267:20–268:4 (Mr. Esselstyn’s
testimony: “One of the other considerations for me was not trying to make
more changes [than] I have to.”).
The Court finds that in Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Map, “86% of
the districts are unchanged from the enacted House plan.” GPX 4, ¶ 9. The
Court notes that “[m]odifying one district necessarily requires changes to
districts adjacent to the original modification, and harmonizing those changes
with traditional redistricting criteria (such as population equality and
intactness of counties) often inescapably results in cascading changes to other
surrounding districts.” Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s
Illustrative State House Map respects the principle of core retention.
Defendants argue that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative House Maps still must
fail because they were drawn predominately for racial considerations. The
Court is not persuaded by this argument. Both the U.S. Supreme Court’s and
Eleventh Circuit’s “precedents require [Section 2] plaintiffs to show that it
149
attempting to make the very showing that Gingles, Nipper, 39 F.3d 1494, and
[Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir.
1995),] demand would be to make it impossible, as a matter of law, for any
plaintiff to bring a successful Section Two action.” Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425.
Mr. Esselstyn explained that he was asked “to determine whether there
are areas in the State of Georgia where the Black population is ‘sufficiently large
and geographically compact’ to enable the creation of additional majority-Black
legislative districts relative to the number of such districts provided in the
enacted State Senate and State House of Representatives redistricting plans
from 2021.” GPX 3, ¶ 8 (footnote omitted); see also Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
150:11–19 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony confirming what he was asked to do in
this case). Mr. Esselstyn testified that he was not asked to maximize the number
of majority-Black districts in the State Senate or House map. Feb. 9, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 150:23–25. Mr. Esselstyn also testified that it was necessary for
him to consider race as part of his analysis because, under Section 2, “the key
metric is whether a district has a majority of the Any Part Black population. So
150
that means it has to be over 50 percent. And that means looking at a column of
numbers in order to determine, to assess whether a district has that
characteristic. You have to look at the numbers that measure the percentage of
the population is Black.” Id. at 155:15–156:2.
When asked by the Court whether race was the “controlling question”
when drawing his illustrative House District 149, Mr. Esselstyn responded that
he did not have “one predominant consideration. . . . [he was] trying to see if
something can be satisfied while considering all the other traditional principles
and the principles adopted by the General Assembly.” Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 254:1–255:18. Mr. Esselstyn emphasized that he took other considerations
into account as well when drawing his illustrative plans, including population
equality, compliance with the federal and state constitutions, contiguity, and
other traditional districting principles. Id. at 156:10–157:9; see also id. at
275:2–11 (Mr. Esselstyn’s testimony explaining that, when drawing illustrative
districts, “I’m not looking at any one race of voters. . . . I’m always looking [at]
a multitude of considerations”).
Defendants’ expert Ms. Wright opined that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
House District 117 was drawn predominately with racial considerations: “It is
also unusual that District 116 follows the interstate except to take a single
151
precinct across the interstate that likely has racial implications for District 117.”
DX 41, ¶ 27. The Court does not agree with Ms. Wright’s assessment. As stated
above, Mr. Esselstyn testified that he used various metrics including but not
limited to population size, communities of interest, and political subdivisions,
in addition to race, when he drew his Illustrative State House Maps.
Accordingly, the Court does not find that race predominated the drawing of
Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Districts 74 and 117.
The Court finds that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House Districts 74
and 117 contain Black populations that are sufficiently numerous and compact
to create two districts that comply with traditional redistricting principles.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have a substantial
likelihood of success in proving that Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative State House
Districts 74 and 117 satisfy the first Gingles precondition.
152
(2) The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs are

substantially likely to establish a Section
2 violation.32
(a) Cooper’s Illustrative House District

153
This Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have shown that they
have a substantial likelihood of satisfying the first Gingles precondition with
respect to an additional majority-minority district in southwest Georgia.
i) Numerosity
Mr. Cooper drew one illustrative House District in southeastern Georgia.
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 is in the area South of Albany,
including Dougherty, Mitchell, and Thomas Counties. APAX 1, ¶ 118 & fig.34.
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House District 153 includes all of Mitchell
County, and parts of Dougherty and Thomas Counties. Id.
32 In closing arguments, the court asked counsel for Alpha Phi Alpha whether the
Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs would be “upset if [the Court] just totally disregarded
Mr. Cooper[‘s] maps on the Senate?” Feb. 14, 2022, Morning Tr. 81:25–82:1. In
response, counsel stated “[n]ot at all, your Honor. They draw districts in exactly—
pretty much the same areas of the State and at the end of the day, remedy the same
violation based on the exact same population growth, based on the exact same
concentration of Black voting strengths in different parts of the Black Belt.” Id. 82:2–
7. Accordingly, the Court formally incorporates its findings for the Grant Plaintiffs
into its findings for the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs.
153
APAX 1, ¶ 117 & fig.34.
In 1990, Non-Hispanic whites constituted about half of the overall
population in the Senate District 12 region. See APAX 1, ¶ 55 & fig.9. By 2020,
Non-Hispanic whites comprised only about one-third of the population. See id.
Over the same period, the Black population grew in absolute terms from
102,728 to 115,621, representing just under half the population in 1990, but
60.6% of the population by 2020. See id. From 2000 to 2020, the proportion of
154
the AP Black population in the southwest Georgia counties comprising Senate
District 12 grew, representing just over half the population in 2000 at 55.33%,
but 60.6% of the population by 2020. APA Stip. ¶ 109. In the area where Enacted
Senate District 12 was drawn with a majority-Black population, only two of the
three House districts in the Enacted House Plan are majority Black. See id.
¶ 110. This fact, combined with the increase in the proportion of the Black
population in that area over the last decade, indicates that an additional Black-
majority House district can very likely be drawn in the area of Southwest
Georgia covered by Enacted Senate District 12. Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
123:6–19, 124:8–16; see also APAX 1, ¶ 117 & fig.34; id. ¶ 118 & fig.35.
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 has an AP BVAP of 57.96%. APAX
1, at 293. Neither of Defendants’ experts disputes that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
House District 153 has an AP BVAP greater than 50%. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the Black population in Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House District
153 is sufficiently numerous to constitute an additional Black-majority house
district.
ii) Geographic compactness
Mr. Cooper reported that his plans “comply with traditional redistricting
principles, including population equality, compactness, contiguity, respect for
155
communities of interest, and the non-dilution of minority voting strength.”
APAX 1, ¶ 8. Mr. Cooper testified that he attempted to balance all these
principles and that no one principle predominated over the others. See Feb. 7,
2022, Afternoon Tr. 140:2–7 (“I tried to balance [all the traditional redistricting
principles]. I was aware of them all and I tried to achieve plans that were fair
and balanced.”).
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 is not malapportioned, and
it complies with the one-person, one-vote principle. “[T]he Equal Protection
Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as
practicable.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. Mr. Cooper’s report states that the
population deviation for his Illustrative House District 153 is 1.35% (APAX 1,
at 293) and the enacted House District 153 has a population deviation of 0.36%
(id. at 282). Mr. Cooper also testified that his Illustrative House Map overall
had a deviation of ± 1.5%. Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 169:1–2. Mr. Cooper’s
population deviations are within the limits allowed by the Equal Protection
Clause.
156
[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality

among state legislative districts are insufficient to
make out a prima facie case . . . under the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . . Our decisions have established, as a
general matter, that an apportionment plan with a
maximum population deviation under 10% falls
within this category of minor deviations.
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (quotations and citations omitted).
Thus, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 complies
with population equality.
(b) Compactness
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 has a comparable
compactness score to the Enacted State House Map. Mr. Cooper reported that
his Illustrative House Map has an average Reock score of 0.39 and an average
Polsby-Popper score of 0.27. APAX 1, ¶¶ 122–123 & fig.36. In comparison, the
Enacted State House Map has an average Reock score of 0.39 and an average
Polsby-Popper score of 0.28. Id. In other words, Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House
Map has an identical Reock score as the enacted House Map and is one one-
hundredth of a point less compact under Polsby-Popper. Id.
157
Id.
Defendants’ expert Mr. Morgan reports that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative
House District 153 has a Reock score of 0.28 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.19.
DX 1, ¶ 24 & chart 5. In comparison, the Enacted State House District 153 has a
Reock score of 0.30 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.30. Id.
158
Id.
The Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 is
sufficiently compact. Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 has a Reock
score only two-hundredths of a point less compact than the Enacted State
House District 153. Additionally, the Court does not find that the difference in
nine-hundredths of a point difference in the Polsby-Popper scores makes
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 not compact. Thus, the Court finds
that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 is sufficiently compact to
satisfy the first Gingles precondition.
(c) Contiguity
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153 is contiguous. There is no
factual dispute on this issue. See Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 133:8–13
(Mr. Cooper testimony confirming that he used Maptitude when drawing to
alert him to whether his districts were contiguous).

subdivisions
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House District 153 preserves political
subdivisions. Mr. Cooper reported that “[t]he illustrative plans are drawn to
follow, to the extent possible, county and VTD boundaries. Where counties are
split to comply with one-person one-vote requirements or to avoid pairing
159
incumbents, [he] ha[s] generally used whole 2020 Census VTDs as sub-county
components.” APAX 1, ¶ 9 (footnote omitted). Mr. Cooper also stated that
“[w]here VTDs are split, [he] ha[s] followed census block boundaries that are
aligned with roads, natural features, census block groups, or municipal
boundaries.” Id.
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House Plan as a whole, splits four more
counties than the Enacted State House Map and splits 83 more VTDs than the
Enacted House Plan. APAX 1, ¶ 124 & fig.37. The Court notes that Mr. Cooper
based his Illustrative House Plan on the 2015 Benchmark House Plan, not the
Enacted State House Map, because Mr. Cooper began drawing his maps before
the Georgia Assembly passed the Enacted State House Map. See Feb. 7, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 239:25–240:5.
APAX 1, ¶ 124 & fig.37.
160
With respect to Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153, Mr. Cooper
testifies that his Illustrative House District 153 includes “part of Dougherty
County, Albany, [] all of Mitchell and part of Thomas into Thomasville,
following the main route there from Albany to Thomasville.” Feb. 7, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 159:10–14. Defendants noted that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State
House District 153 has the effect that no district is wholly within Dougherty
County on the illustrative plan. See id. at 217:2–10. Upon review, however, the
Court notes that Dougherty County is split four ways in the Enacted State Plan
and only three ways Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Plan. Compare
APAX 1, at ¶ 117 & fig.34,
161
with id. at ¶ 118 & fig.35.
162
In Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Plan, Dougherty County is split
among Illustrative Districts 151, 153, and 154. Id. at 60 fig.34. In the Enacted
State House Map, on the other hand, Dougherty County is split between
Districts 153, 154, 155 and 171. Id. at 61 fig.35. Although District 153 is wholly
within Dougherty County in the Enacted State House Map, Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative State House Map splits Dougherty County three not four times.
Accordingly, the Court does not find that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House
163
District 153 does not respect political boundaries simply because there is not
one district that is wholly within Dougherty County. The Court finds that
Mr. Cooper adhered to respecting political subdivisions when he drew his
Illustrative House District 153.
(e) Preservation of
The Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153
preserves communities of interest. Mr. Cooper testified that “there is a clear
transportation route along the Highway 19.” Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:19–
23. Additionally, Mr. Cooper stated that “the Southwest Georgia Regional
Commission includes Thomas, and extends all the way out to the Albany area.
So it’s in the same Regional Commission and it’s connected by a major highway
that’s featured in the Georgia tourist volume I think that you can get at rest
stops.” Id. at 161:3–8. Thus, Mr. Cooper opined, “[t]here are clear connections
between Albany and Thomasville.” Id. at 161:8–9. Defendants’ expert
Ms. Wright, however, testified that Albany and Thomasville are “communities
that would not typically be combined together . . . . Albany is very – is a very
unique, defined identity in that region, as is Thomasville further south, but they
don’t share a common interest.” Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 44:22–45:2. The
Court is not convinced by this assessment. After all, Ms. Wright also testified
164
that a community of interest is “kind of in the eye of the beholder.” Id. at 91:11–
12. The Court finds that there is a major roadway that connects the two towns,
and the regional commission lists Albany and Thomasville as part of the same
region. Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:19–23; 161:3–8. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House District 153 contains
communities of common interest.
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House District 153 does not pair any
incumbents. Mr. Morgan criticized Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Plan
because it paired 26 total incumbents as opposed to the Enacted State House
Map, which paired eight incumbents. DX 1, ¶ 18. Mr. Cooper responded
explaining that he used a publicly available database when he drew his
Illustrative State House Plan, which had different information than the
“incumbent databases used by the Georgia General Assembly during the
redistricting process” that Mr. Morgan used. APAX 2, ¶¶ 3–4. Mr. Cooper
testified that after he received the information that Mr. Morgan had access to,
he was able to sharply reduce the number of incumbent pairings in three or
four hours. Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 138:14–140:1. Mr. Cooper was ultimately
165
able to reduce the number of incumbent pairings significantly. See APAX 2,
¶¶ 3–14.
Of the incumbent pairings that Mr. Morgan identified, only incumbents
Winifred Dukes and Gerald Greene currently represent a district that is
impacted by Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153.
166
DX 1, ¶ 17 & chart 4.; See Georgia General Assembly House of Representatives,
https://www.legis.ga.gov/members/ house (last visited Feb. 28, 2022). Rep.
Dukes represents House District 154, which includes part of Albany. Id. This
167
pairing, however, exists in both the Enacted State House Plan and Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative State House Plan. DX 1, ¶ 17 & chart 4. The Court thus finds that
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House District 153 protects incumbents because
no incumbents are paired in this district.
(g) Core retention
Defendants argue that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House Plan does not
retain the core of the Enacted State House Map. As an initial note, preservation
of existing district cores was not an enumerated districting principle adopted
by the General Assembly. See GPX 40. However, if the Court were to
implement a remedial map, the Court would consider core retention. Thus, the
Court has considered this issue and finds as follows:
The Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Maps and the
enacted House Maps overlap by 61.4%. Although, Mr. Morgan found that only
enacted House District 003 was unchanged in Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House
Plan (DX 1, ¶ 19), Mr. Cooper found that there is a total 61.4% overlap between
Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Plan and the Enacted State House Map
(APAX 2, ¶ 16). Mr. Morgan testified that he only opined on whether the
districts between Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Plan and the Enacted
State House Map were exactly the same. Feb. 14, 2022, Morning Tr. 13:23–14:1.
168
However, Mr. Morgan did not contest that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State
House Plan and the Enacted State House Map overlapped by 61.4%. Id. at
14:13–20. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House
Plan maintains more than half of the Enacted State House Map.
Defendants also argue that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House Maps
still must fail because they were drawn predominately for racial considerations.
The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Both the U.S. Supreme Court’s
and Eleventh Circuit’s “precedents require [Section 2] plaintiffs to show that it
attempting to make the very showing that Gingles [and its progeny] demand
would be to make it impossible, as a matter of law, for any plaintiff to bring a
successful Section Two action.” Davis, 139 F.3d at 1425.
Mr. Cooper explained that he was “aware of race as traditional
redistricting principles suggest one should be.” Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
169
135:17–18. Mr. Cooper explained that considering race was required to comply
with the Voting Rights Act, which is federal law. Id. at 135:17–21. Mr. Cooper
testified that he did not aim to draw any minimum number of Black-majority
districts in his analysis. Id. at 135:22–136:3. When asked by the State whether
his goal “really was to create an additional majority Black district in the creation
of [his] House and Senate Plans,” he answered that his goal “was to determine
whether or not additional majority Black districts could be created. So there
was no goal per se.” Id. at 164:16–21. Mr. Cooper repeatedly testified that he
balanced all redistricting principles and stated that no one principle
predominated. E.g., id. at 140:3–7, 230:17–25.
Ms. Wright testified that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153
contained “communities that would not typically be combined together. So
[she is] not sure what the reason would be unless there was another particular
goal in mind to draw that.” Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 44:22–25. The Court does
not agree with Ms. Wright’s assessment. Mr. Cooper testified that his
Illustrative House District 153 is connected by “a clear transportation route
along Highway 19” (Feb. 7, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:22–23) and is in within the
same regional commission (id. at 161:3–8). Mr. Cooper also testified that he
took into account a district’s population size, political subdivisions and
170
incumbent pairings, in addition to race. Accordingly, the Court does not find
that race predominated the drawing of Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative State House
District 153.
The Court finds that Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153
contains Black population that is sufficiently numerous and compact, as to
create an additional district that complies with traditional redistricting
principles. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs
have a substantial likelihood of success in proving that Mr. Cooper’s
Illustrative House District 153 satisfies the first Gingles precondition.
(3) Conclusions of Law
Thus, based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Grant
and Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they are
substantially likely to succeed on the merits of satisfying the first Gingles
precondition because it is possible to create two additional State Senate
Districts (Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative Senate Districts 25 and 28) and two State
House Districts in the Atlanta Metropolitan area (Mr. Esselstyn’s Illustrative
House Districts 74 and 117) and one additional State House District in
southwestern Georgia (Mr. Cooper’s Illustrative House District 153).
171
2. The Second Gingles Precondition: Political Cohesion
The second Gingles element is that “the minority group . . . show that it
is politically cohesive.” 478 U.S. at 50. This involves an assessment of the extent
to which elections in the jurisdiction are affected by racial polarization:
[T]he question whether a given district experiences

legally significant racially polarized voting requires
discrete inquiries into minority and white voting
practices. A showing that a significant number of
minority group members usually vote for the same
candidates is one way of proving the political
cohesiveness necessary to a vote dilution claim, and,
consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within
the context of § 2.
Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
All the parties agree that there is an extremely large degree of racial
polarization in Georgia elections. However, they starkly disagree about the
causes of that polarization and whether those causes are relevant to the second
Gingles precondition.
a) The parties’ arguments
(1) Defendants
Defendants contend, in short, that the polarization is caused by partisan
factors rather than “the race of the candidate” Black voters vote for. APA Doc.
No. [120], ¶ 285. Because white voters cohesively support Republican
172
candidates and Black voters cohesively support Democratic candidates without
regard to whether the candidate is Black or white, Defendants attribute the
polarization to partisanship. Id. ¶¶ 286–287. In doing so, Defendants assert that
the extreme level of polarization is really partisan rather than racial. Id. Because
the vote dilution must be “on account of race or color” to violate Section 2,
Defendants argue that the Court must determine whether some other factor is
the cause. See id. ¶ 430. As a result, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot
show that “electoral losses are ‘on account of race or color’ and not partisan
voting patterns.” Id. 430 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a); Solomon, 221 F. 3d at 1225
(en banc); LULAC, 999 F. 2d at 854 (en banc)).
(2) Plaintiffs
In contrast, all three sets of Plaintiffs contend that the reasons why Black
Georgia voters and white Georgia voters overwhelmingly support opposing
candidates is irrelevant to Section 2’s effects-based inquiry. The evidence
compellingly demonstrates acute polarization by race and, Plaintiffs assert,
what causes Georgia voters to vote that way is not relevant to the second
Gingles Precondition or the second Senate Factor. They argue they are not
required “to prove [that] racism determines the voting choices of the white
electorate in order to succeed in a voting rights case.” Pendergrass Doc. No.
173
[87], ¶ 351 (citing Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1382 (11th Cir. 1997);
Fayette Cnty., 950 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 n.29); see also APA Doc. No. 121, ¶ 665
(similar); Grant Doc. No. [82], ¶ 381 (same).
(3) Conclusions of law
The Court concludes as a matter of law that, to satisfy the second Gingles
precondition, Plaintiffs need not prove the causes of racial polarization, just its
existence. The plurality opinion in Gingles concluded that, “[f]or purposes of
§ 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation
nor intent. It means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a
certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different
races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different candidates.”
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). Thus, four Supreme Court justices
concluded that the existence of political polarization does not negate Plaintiffs’
ability to establish the second Gingles precondition by showing the extent of
racial-bloc voting. Id.; see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991)
(emphasizing that “Congress made clear that a violation of § 2 could be
established by proof of discriminatory results alone”).
The weight that should be placed on the extent of such polarization—
and any link to partisanship—must necessarily be part of the totality-of-the-
174
circumstances analysis under the second Senate Factor. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37
(identifying extent of racial polarization in elections under second Senate
Factor); Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1015 (Kravitch, J., specially concurring) (same).
However, such evidence must again be considered in light of the admonition
in Gingles’s plurality opinion that
[i]t is the difference between the choices made by

blacks and whites—not the reasons for that
difference—that results in blacks having less
opportunity than whites to elect their preferred
representatives. Consequently, we conclude that
under the “results test” of § 2, only the correlation
between race of voter and selection of certain
candidates, not the causes of the correlation, matters.
....
[W]e would hold that the legal concept of racially

polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote
dilution, refers only to the existence of a correlation
between the race of voters and the selection of certain
candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove causation or
intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial
bloc voting and defendants may not rebut that case
with evidence of causation or intent.
478 U.S. at 63, 74 (emphasis in original).
As discussed above, applying the standard advocated by Defendants
would undermine the congressional intent behind the 1982 amendments to the
VRA—namely, to focus on the results of the challenged practices. Id. at 35–36;
175
see also Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1567. Congress wanted to avoid
“unnecessarily divisive [litigation] involv[ing] charges of racism on the part of
individual officials or entire communities.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, pt. 1, at 36
(1982); see also Solomon, 899 F.2d at 1016 n.3 (Kravitch, J., specially concurring)
(explaining that this theory “would involve litigating the issue of whether or
not the community as a whole was motivated by racism, a divisive inquiry that
Congress sought to avoid by instituting the results test”). As the Eleventh
Circuit long ago made clear, “[t]he surest indication of race-conscious politics
is a pattern of racially polarized voting.” Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at
1567.
Here, each set of Plaintiffs has more than satisfied its burden to show
political cohesion among Black voters in the relevant regions and districts.
b) The existence of political cohesion
(1) Pendergrass
(a) Plaintiffs’ Expert: Dr. Maxwell

Palmer33
The Pendergrass Plaintiffs proffered Dr. Maxwell Palmer as their racially
polarized voting expert. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 44:17–20, 47:8–19.
33 To the extent Dr. Palmer provided evidence related to other issues or Plaintiffs, the
following discussion is necessarily applicable to those matters as well.
176
i) Qualification
Dr. Palmer received his undergraduate degree in mathematics, and
government and legal study from Bowdoin College in Maine; he holds a Ph.D.
in political science from Harvard University. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 45:14–
18. He is currently a tenured associate professor of political science at Boston
University. Id. at 45:21–25. He teaches classes on American politics and political
methodology, including data science and formal theory. Id. at 46:1–5. Among
his principle areas of research are voting rights. Id. at 46:6–8.
Dr. Palmer has previously served as an expert witness in numerous
redistricting cases, conducting racially polarization analyses in each; he has
never been rejected as such an expert. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 46:9–24; GPX
5, ¶ 3 & 22–31. He has also served as an expert for the Virginia Independent
Redistricting Commission. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 47:3–7; GPX 5, at 29.
Defendants did not object to Dr. Palmer being qualified as an expert in
redistricting and data analysis, and the Court so qualified him. Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 47:15–19. The Court found Dr. Palmer’s testimony to be credible
and his analyses to be methodologically sound. The Court notes that
Dr. Palmer’s findings are consistent with the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ expert
177
Dr. Handley. See infra (III.A.2.(b)(3)(a)(ii)). It credits that testimony and the
reliability of Dr. Palmer’s conclusions.
During Dr. Palmer’s live testimony, the Court carefully observed his
deliberate explanations of the cases for his opinions. When Defense counsel
questioned his methodology, and particularly the reason behind not using
primary data, Dr. Palmer provided measured and thoughtful responses. The
Court observed no internal inconsistencies in his testimony, no appropriate
question that he could not or would not answer, and no reason to question the
veracity of his testimony. The Court finds that his methods and conclusions are
highly reliable, and ultimately that his work as an expert on the second and
third Gingles preconditions is helpful to the Court.
ii) Analysis
Dr. Palmer was tasked with offering an expert opinion on the extent to
which voting is racially polarized in each of the Congressional Districts 3, 11,
13, and 14 of the Enacted Maps, as well as the region covered by those districts.
Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 56; GPX 5, ¶ 9; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 52:5–16.
Dr. Palmer found strong evidence of such voting in every area he examined.
178
Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 48:3–6. In other words, Dr. Palmer found that Black
and white voters consistently support different candidates. GPX 5, ¶ 6.
To assess polarization, Dr. Palmer employed a statistical method called
Ecological Inference (“EI”) to derive estimates of the percentages of Black and
white voters in elections conducted in the relevant Congressional Districts in
31 statewide elections held between 2012 and 2021. GPX 5, ¶¶ 10, 12; Feb. 10,
2022, Morning Tr. 49:19–50:1, 51:16–19. He described EI as a “statistical
procedure . . . that estimates group-level preferences based on aggregate data.”
GPX 5, ¶ 12. His EI analysis relied on precinct-level election results and voter
turnout by race, as compiled by the State of Georgia. GPX 5, ¶ 10; Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 51:20–52:3.
First, Dr. Palmer examined each racial group’s support for each
candidate to determine if members of the group voted cohesively in support of
a single candidate in each election. GPX 5, ¶ 13. If a significant majority of the
group supported a single candidate, he then identified that candidate as the
group’s candidate of choice. Id. Dr. Palmer next compared the preferences of
white voters to the preferences of Black voters. Id. In every election he
examined, across the relevant region and in each Congressional District from
the Enacted Maps, Dr. Palmer found that Black voters had clearly identifiable
179
candidates of choice. GPX 5, ¶¶ 15, 17–18, & figs. 2–4, 6; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning
Tr. 52:17–54:19. For elections from 2012 through 2021, Black voters on average
supported their preferred candidates with an estimated vote share of 98.5%.
GPX 5, ¶¶ 6, 14–15 & figs. 2–3, tbl.1.
(b) Defendants’ Expert: Dr. John

Alford34
Defendants proffered Dr. John Alford as their expert on the issue of racial
polarization. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 140:17–22. Plaintiffs did not object to
Dr. Alford being so qualified, and the Court so qualified him. Id. at 140:23–
141:4.
i) Qualification
Dr. Alford is a tenured professor of Political Science at Rice University.
DX 42, Ex. 1, at 1; Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 140:1–4. He holds a Master’s in
Public Administration from the University of Houston and a Ph.D. in Political
Science from the University of Iowa. DX 42, Ex. 1, at 1; Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 139:18–25. He has taught graduate and undergraduate level courses on
various subjects, including redistricting, elections, and political representation.
DX 42, 2. Dr. Alford has authored numerous scholarly articles and presented
34 Since Dr. Alford was Defendants’ expert in each of the three cases on multiple
issues, the following discussion applies to those matters as well.
180
papers at various conferences and consortia. DX 42, Ex. 1, at 1–8. He has
previously been qualified as an expert witness on racial polarization in cases
involving Section 2 claims. Id. at 140:13–18. However, Dr. Alford has never
published a paper on racially polarized voting or any peer-reviewed articles
using EI; and, he has never written about Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
an academic publication. See Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 160:8–16.
While the Court found Dr. Alford to be credible, his conclusions were
not reached through methodologically sound means and were therefore
speculative and unreliable. Other courts have come to similar conclusions. See
Lopez v. Abbott, 339 F. Supp. 3d 589, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (crediting
Dr. Handley’s testimony over Dr. Alford’s because “Dr. Alford’s testimony . . .
focused on issues other than the ethnicity of the voters and their preferred
candidates—which are the issues relevant to bloc voting”); Texas v. U.S., 887 F.
Supp. 2d 133, 146–47 (D.D.C. 2012) (critiquing Dr. Alford’s approach because
he used an analysis that “lies outside accepted academic norms among
redistricting experts,” and instead relying heavily on Dr. Handley’s testimony),
vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. 928 (2013).
181
ii) Analysis
Dr. Alford was tasked with responding to Dr. Palmer’s expert report and
providing expert opinions about the nature of the polarized voting in Georgia.
DX 42; Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 140:5–12. Dr. Alford assumed that
Dr. Palmer’s EI analysis of existence of racially polarized voting was sound
because he knows from his own past work that Dr. Palmer is competent at
performing such analyses. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 143:14–21. However, he
raised concerns that Dr. Palmer’s results were more attributable to partisanship
than race. See DX 42, at 6.
The Court cannot credit this testimony. Dr. Alford admitted on cross-
examination that he did not identify any errors that would affect Dr. Palmer’s
analysis or conclusions. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 153:3–7. The basis for his
testimony was only Dr. Alford’s conclusion that Black voters overwhelmingly
prefer Democratic candidates and white voters overwhelmingly support
Republican candidates. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 171:8–16; DX 42, at 5. But
Dr. Alford did not perform his own analyses of voter behavior, and he testified
that it is not possible to separate partisan polarization from racial polarization
based on Dr. Palmer’s analysis. DX 42; Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 143:4–10. In
fact, there is no evidentiary support in the record for Dr. Alford’s treatment of
182
race and partisanship as separate and distinct factors affecting voter behavior.
Nor is there any evidence—aside from Dr. Alford’s speculation—that
partisanship is the cause of the racial polarization identified by Dr. Palmer. DX
42, at 3–4. Dr. Alford himself acknowledged that polarization can reflect both
race and partisanship, and that “it’s possible for political affiliation to be
motivated by race.” Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 171:8–16. All this undermines
Dr. Alford’s insistence that partisanship rather than race is the cause of the
polarization. In any event, and as discussed above, the cause of the polarization
is not relevant to the second Gingles precondition.
Other courts have discounted Dr. Alford’s testimony for similar reasons.
See, e.g., NAACP, Spring Valley Branch v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 462 F.
Supp. 3d 368, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[Dr. Alford’s] testimony, while sincere, did
not reflect current established scholarship and methods of analysis of racially
polarized voting and voting estimates.”), aff’d sub nom. Clerveaux v. E.
Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 984 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2021); Flores v. Town of Islip, 382
F. Supp. 3d 197, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Dr. Alford maintains that at least 80% of
the white majority in Islip must vote against the Hispanic-preferred candidate
for the white bloc vote to be sufficient. . . . This theory has no foundation in the
applicable caselaw.”); Lopez v. Abbott, 339 F. Supp. 3d 589, 610 (S.D. Tex. 2018)
183
(“At this juncture, the Court is only concerned with whether there is a pattern
of white bloc voting that consistently defeats minority-preferred candidates.
That analysis requires a determination that the different groups prefer different
candidates, as they do. It does not require a determination of why particular
candidates are preferred by the two groups.”); Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230
F. Supp. 3d 667, 709–13 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding in favor of the plaintiffs as to
Gingles’ second and third prongs, contrary to Dr. Alford’s testimony on behalf
of the defendant jurisdiction), stay denied pending appeal, 667 F. App’x 950
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Montes v. City of Yakima, 40 F. Supp. 3d 1377,
1401–07 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (finding the same and stating that Dr. Alford’s
testimony did “not defeat a finding of Latino voter cohesion”); Benavidez v.
Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:13–CV–0087–D, 2014 WL 4055366, at *11–13 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 15, 2014) (same); Fabela v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3:10–CV–
1425–D, 2012 WL 3135545, at *8–13 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2012) (same); Texas v.
United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 181 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he fact that a number
of Anglo voters share the same political party as minority voters does not
remove those minority voters from the protections of the VRA. The statute
makes clear that this Court must focus on whether minorities are able to elect
the candidate of their choice, no matter the political party that may benefit.”),
184
vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. 928 (2013); Benavidez v. City of Irving, 638
F. Supp. 2d 709, 722–25, 731–32 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding in favor of the
plaintiffs as to Gingles’ second and third prongs, contrary to Dr. Alford’s
testimony on behalf of the defendant jurisdiction); see also Feb. 11, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 172:17–20 (agreeing that other courts have rejected his testimony
before “[i]n the sense of deciding to go in a different direction than what I
thought the facts of the case suggested”).
(c) Conclusions of Law
The Court concludes that the Pendergrass Plaintiffs have satisfied their
burden to establish that Black voters in Georgia (at least for those regions
examined) are politically cohesive. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49. “Bloc voting by
blacks tends to prove that the black community is politically cohesive, that is,
it shows that blacks prefer certain candidates whom they could elect in a single-
member, black majority district.” Id. at 68. Dr. Palmer’s analysis clearly
demonstrate high levels of such cohesiveness, both across the congressional
focus area and in the individual districts that comprise it. Neither Dr. Alford’s
testimony nor his expert report undermines this conclusion.
This finding is also consistent with previous findings of political
cohesion among Black Georgians. See, e.g., Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1313
185
(noting that, in ten elections for Sumter County Board of Education with Black
candidates, “the overwhelming majority of African Americans voted for the
same candidate”); Wright, 979 F.3d at 1306 (noting “the high levels of racially
polarized voting” in Sumter County).
(2) Grant
The Grant Plaintiffs also proffered Dr. Palmer as their racially polarized
voting expert. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 44:17–20, 47:8–11. Defendants again
proffered Dr. Alford. Except with regard to the specific areas and districts
analyzed by Dr. Palmer for the Grant case, (which are discussed further below),
the discussion concerning the existence of political cohesion in Pendergrass
applies equally here. The Court likewise finds that the Grant Plaintiffs have met
their burden to establish the second Gingles precondition.
(a) Dr. Palmer’s analysis
In Grant, Dr. Palmer was tasked with offering an expert opinion on the
extent to which voting is racially polarized in five different “focus areas” based
on the Georgia General Assembly House and Senate Enacted Maps. Grant Stip.
¶ 77; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 60:1–13; GPX 6, ¶ 9. The focus areas cover those
regions where Plaintiffs’ illustrative majority-minority districts are located.
GPX 6, ¶ 9. For the Georgia House, Dr. Palmer examined regions he described
186
as the Black Belt (covering Enacted Map House Districts 133, 142, 143, 145, 147,
and 149), Southern Atlanta (Enacted Map House Districts 69, 74, 75, 78, 115,
and 117), and Western Atlanta (Enacted Map House Districts 61 and 64). GPX
6, ¶ 10. For the Georgia Senate, Dr. Palmer looked at the Black Belt (Enacted
Map Senate Districts 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26) and Southern Atlanta (Enacted Map
Senate Districts 10, 16, 17, 25, 28, 34, 35, 39, and 44). GPX 6, ¶ 11.
The analysis Dr. Palmer performed was the same type of EI as that in
Pendergrass (GPX 6, ¶¶ 14–16; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 59:12–25, 60:18–21),
and the results were similar: Black voters in the relevant regions supported
their preferred candidate with at least 95.2% of the vote. GPX 6, ¶ 17 & fig.2,
tbl.1. Each of the House districts Dr. Palmer examined also exhibited a high
degree of polarization. Id. ¶ 18 & fig.3. For the Senate districts, 12 of the 14
showed racial polarization. Id.35
(3) Alpha Phi Alpha
The Alpha Plaintiffs proffered Dr. Lisa Handley as an expert in racial
polarization analysis and the analysis of minority vote dilution and
35 For the two districts where Dr. Palmer concluded there was not consistent evidence
of racially polarized voting, he noted the following: “Voting is generally not polarized
in Senate District 39. In Senate District 44, White voters do not have a clear candidate
of choice in 18 of the 31 elections, and majorities of White voters opposed the Black-
preferred candidate in 13 elections.” GPX 6, ¶ 18 & fig.3.
187
redistricting. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 76:13, 81:8–10. Defendants proffered
Dr. Alford. Accordingly, except with regard to the specific areas and districts
analyzed by Dr. Handley for the Alpha Phi Alpha case, the discussion
concerning the existence of political cohesion in Pendergrass applies here, too.
(a) Plaintiffs’ Expert:

Dr. Lisa Handley
i) Qualification
Dr. Handley holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from The George
Washington University. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 78:22–79:4; APAX 3, at 47.
She has over thirty years of experience in the areas of redistricting and voting
rights, and has provided election assistance to numerous countries including
to various post-conflict countries through the United Nations. Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 79:5–18; APAX 3, at 47. She has taught political science courses at
both the graduate and undergraduate level at several universities. APAX 3, at
47. She has authored numerous scholarly works concerning redistricting and
minority vote dilution, including her dissertation. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr.
79:22–80:4; APAX 3, at 50–52.
Dr. Handley has served as an expert in “scores” of redistricting and
voting rights cases, including on behalf of jurisdictions defending against
Section 2 cases. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 80:5–12, 102:23–103:6; APAX 3, at 46.
188
In those cases, she generally analyzes voting patterns by race and ethnicity. Feb.
10, 2022, Morning Tr. 80:13–19. As an expert, she has also numerous times
performed analyses of racial-bloc voting and evaluations of whether proposed
districts provide minorities with the opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 80:20–81:7. She has routinely been qualified
as an expert in cases where she used the same methodology she employed here.
Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 84:25–85:4; APA Doc. No. [118-2], ¶ 4.
Defendants did not object to Dr. Handley being qualified as an expert in
the analysis of racial polarization and minority vote dilution and redistricting,
and the Court so qualified her. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 81:14–17. The Court
found Dr. Handley’s testimony to be credible and her analyses to be sound. At
the live hearing, the Court carefully observed Dr. Handley’s demeanor,
particularly as she was cross-examined for the first time about his work on this
case. She consistently defended his work with careful and deliberate
explanations of the cases for his opinions. When Defense counsel questioned
her about her methodology particularly the reason behind not using confidence
intervals, Dr. Palmer provided measured and thoughtful responses. The Court
observed no internal inconsistencies in her testimony, no appropriate question
that he could not or would not answer, and no reason to question the veracity
189
of her testimony. Thus, the Court credits that testimony and the reliability of
Dr. Handley’s conclusions.
ii) Analysis
Dr. Handley was tasked with conducting an analysis of voting patterns
by race in several regions of Georgia to determine whether there is racially
polarized voting there. APAX 3, at 2. She concluded that an election was
racially polarized where, according to her EI analysis, “the outcome would be
different if the election were held only among black voters compared to only
among white voters.” Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 83:13–14. In all six regions that
Dr. Handley examined, Black voters were cohesive in supporting their
preferred candidates. APAX 3, at 23.
Dr. Handley analyzed voting patterns by race in the six regions that are
the focus of the Alpha Phi Alpha case, specifically: the Eastern Atlanta Metro
Region, the Southern Atlanta Metro Region, East Central Georgia with
Augusta, the Southeastern Atlanta Metro Region, Central Georgia, and
Southwest Georgia. APAX 3, at 2; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 83:7–8.
Dr. Handley’s analysis employed three commonly used statistical methods that
have been widely accepted by courts in voting rights cases: homogeneous
precinct analysis, ecological regression, and “King’s EI.” Feb. 10, 2022, Morning
190
Tr. 83:21–23, 84:3–24, 85:12–25; APAX 3, at 3–5; APA Doc. No. [118-2], ¶ 4.
Dr. Handley has employed King’s EI in numerous cases, and courts have
routinely accepted her use of that methodology to assess racially polarized
voting. APA Doc. No. [118-2], ¶ 4; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 84:20–85:4. She
uses homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological regression to check the
estimates produced by EI. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 84:2–19. She has used all
three techniques in previous cases. Id. at 83:19–85:4.
Although Dr. Alford claimed that Dr. Handley should have used a
version of EI called “RxC,” Dr. Handley credibly explained why her use of
King’s EI here was appropriate. Dr. Handley testified that she uses EI RxC
analysis in only two situations: (1) when “estimating the voting patterns of
more than two racial/ethnic groups”; or (2) when she lacks data showing
“turnout by race,” and she “instead must rely on voting age population by race
to estimate voting patterns.” APA Doc. No. [118-2], ¶¶ 1–2. Because neither
was present here, she concluded that King’s EI was an appropriate
methodology. Id.
(a) Statewide general

elections
Dr. Handley estimated of the percentage of Black and white voters in the
six regions in statewide general elections for U.S. Senate, Governor,
191
Commissioner of Insurance, and School Superintendent. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning
Tr. 86:1–7; APAX 3, at 5–6; APA Doc. No. [118-1]. All but two of those elections
involved Black and white candidates—i.e., they were biracial elections. APAX
3, at 6, 8–11; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 91:8–17. According to Dr. Handley,
biracial elections are the most probative for measuring racial polarization. Feb.
10, 2022, Morning Tr. 86:16–20. Courts generally have agreed. See Feb. 11, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 170:25–171:7. Dr. Handley also analyzed the 2020 U.S. Senate
general election and 2021 U.S. Senate runoff election with Jon Ossoff, in part
because Black candidates ran in the primary. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 86:23–
87:3.
The racial polarization was stark in every statewide general election that
Dr. Handley analyzed, with the vast majority of Black voters supporting one
candidate and the vast majority of white voters supporting the other candidate.
Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 90:18–20, 91:6–25, 101:20–23; APA Doc. No. [118-1].
The Black-voter preferred candidates in these races typically received more
than 98% of Black voters’ support. APA Doc. No. [118-1].
(b) State legislative

elections
Dr. Handley also looked at 26 State legislative elections in the relevant
regions. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 86:1–7, 91:12–17; APAX 4, at 5, 7–10. She
192
found starkly racially polarized voting here, too. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr.
91:8–25; APAX 4, at 5, 7–10. She analyzed recent biracial elections in General
Assembly districts wholly contained within or overlapping with the additional
majority-Black districts drawn by Plaintiffs’ expert demographer. Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 91:8–17; APAX 3, at 8–11. There were eight such State senate
contests, and 18 such State house contests. APAX 3, at 8–11. All these elections
were racially polarized, with Black candidates receiving a minuscule share of
the white vote and the overwhelming support of Black voters. Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 91:8–25; APAX 4, at 5, 7–10. Indeed, in all but one of the 26 contests,
over 95% of Black voters supported the same candidate. APAX 4, at 5, 7–10.
(c) Primaries
In addition to analyzing statewide elections, Dr. Handley applied her EI
analysis to statewide Democratic primaries for Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Commissioner of Insurance, School Superintendent, and
Commissioner of Labor. APAX 3, at 5–6; APA Doc. No. [118-1]; Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 86:3–4. Although Dr. Handley acknowledged that polarized
voting is “somewhat less stark in the primaries” and in a few instances the
support of Black and white voters for the same candidate is close (Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 101:3–23), the majority of primaries she analyzed across all six
193
regions still demonstrated evidence of racially polarized voting (Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 100:13–16; APAX 4, at 2–3). The only regular exceptions were the
two recent Democratic primaries in which Black voters supported white
candidates (Jon Ossoff in the 2020 primary for U.S. Senate and Jim Barksdale in
his bid for the Democratic nomination for U.S. Senate in 2016). APAX 3, at 8,
23.
Specifically, Dr. Handley found that in all six regions, at least 62.5% of
the eight primaries she analyzed showed evidence of racial polarization. APAX
4, at 2–3. For example, in the 2018 Democratic primary for Lieutenant Governor,
the white candidate received an average of more than 83% of the white vote in
these areas, and the Black candidate received an average of nearly 60% of the
Black vote. See APA Doc. No. [118-1], 3–13. Similarly, in the 2018 Democratic
primary for the Commissioner of Insurance, the white candidate received on
average more than 60% of the white vote, and the Black candidate received on
average more than 78% of the Black vote. See APA Doc. No. [118-1], 3–13.
This evidence of racial polarization in primary elections is particularly
compelling here because it undermines Defendants’ contention that the
polarization is the result of partisan factors. By definition, partisan affiliation
194
cannot explain polarized election outcomes in primary contests, where
Democrats are necessarily running against other Democrats.
(b) Defendants’ Expert:

Dr. Alford
As an expert witness, Dr. Alford has used all three statistical methods
employed by Dr. Handley here. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 168:21–24. He
agrees that King’s EI is “the gold standard for experts in this field doing a
racially-polarized voting analysis.” Id. at 163:20–23. Dr. Alford did, however,
voice some concern that the type of ecological inference analysis Dr. Handley
employed was not really “King’s EI” but instead an “iterative version of it” that
lacks “an appropriate test of statistical significance.” Id. at 165:13–15.
Dr. Handley later clarified that she did use King’s EI to produce her results,
and she ran the analysis more than once (i.e., “iteratively”). APA Doc. No. [118-
2], ¶ 1. Dr. Handley has used, and courts have accepted and relied on, this exact
method of EI in numerous prior minority vote dilution cases. Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 84:25–85:4; APA Doc. No. [118-2], ¶ 4.
Dr. Alford did agree with Dr. Handley’s assessment that statewide
general elections involving Black and white candidates are the most probative
for measuring racial polarization. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 170:25–171:7.
And he did not dispute Dr. Handley’s conclusions there is a high degree of
195
racial polarization in the election contests she analyzed, testifying that in
general elections in Georgia, Black voters are “very cohesive.” Id. at 154:15–17;
DX 42, at 6. He concluded the same of white voters. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 154:18–19; DX 42, at 6. Dr. Alford also found Dr. Handley’s conclusions and
those of Dr. Palmer were “entirely compatible with each other,” and that both
showed polarized voting. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 142:9–13, 145:21.
Dr. Alford said that “[i]t would be hard to get a difference more stark” than the
voting patterns of Black and white voters reflected in the analyses of Drs.
Handley and Palmer. Id. at 154:20–22.
Moreover, Dr. Alford did not testify to anything contradicting
Dr. Handley’s assessment that there was evidence of racially polarized voting
in Democratic primaries in the six regions she evaluated. In fact, in a previous
case in which he was an expert witness, “Dr. Alford testified that an analysis of
primary elections is preferable to general elections because primary elections
are nonpartisan and cannot be influenced by the partisanship factor.” Perez v.
Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1196, 1225 (S.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d, 165
F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999); accord Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 171:17–172:16
(Dr. Alford testifying that partisanship cannot explain racial polarization in
196
nonpartisan elections such as primaries). This undermines Dr. Alford’s
speculation that partisanship explains the polarization better than race.
(c) Conclusions of Law
As with Dr. Alford’s critiques of Dr. Palmer’s analyses, the Court finds
the criticisms of Dr. Handley’s work unpersuasive. For the same reasons as
stated with regard to the Pendergrass Plaintiffs, the Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs
have satisfied their burden to establish that, for the regions and elections
Dr. Handley examined, Black voters in Georgia are politically cohesive.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 49.
3. The Third Gingles Precondition: Bloc Voting
The third Gingles precondition requires that the minority group be able
to demonstrate that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate
running unopposed—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 (citations omitted). In Gingles, the Supreme Court
treated the terms “racial bloc” and “racial polarization” as interchangeable. Id.
at 53 n.21. Thus, the third precondition involves the same evaluation as to the
voting preferences of the majority group as that the second precondition does
for the minority group: “[I]n general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat
197
the combined strength of minority support plus white ‘crossover’ votes rises to
the level of legally significant white bloc voting.” Id. at 56 (citations omitted).
a) Pendergrass
In addition to his work concerning political cohesion, Dr. Palmer also
testified about racial-bloc voting. He employed the same methods described
above, and the Court incorporates that discussion here by reference.36
Dr. Palmer’s analysis shows that white voters in the regions he examined vote
sufficiently as a bloc to defeat Black voters’ candidates of choice except in
majority-Black districts. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 48:9–13; GPX 5, ¶ 7.
Overall, Dr. Palmer found “strong evidence of racially polarized voting”
as a whole and in each individual congressional district he examined. Feb. 10,
2022, Morning Tr. 48:3–8; GPX 5, ¶¶ 6, 18. White voters had clearly identifiable
candidates of choice in each election. GPX 5, ¶¶ 16–17 & figs. 2–4. From 2012 to
2021, white voters were highly cohesive in opposing the Black candidate of
choice in every election. On average, Dr. Palmer found that white voters
supported Black-preferred candidates with an average of just 11.5% of the vote.
36 See supra Sections III(A)(2)(b)(1)(a), (2)(a).
198
See id. ¶ 16. White voters, however, on average supported their preferred
candidates with an estimated vote-share of 88.5%. See id.
As a result of this racially polarized voting in the regions Dr. Palmer
examined, candidates preferred by Black voters have generally been unable to
win elections outside of majority-Black districts. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr.
48:9–13. Excluding the existing majority-Black Congressional District 13, Black-
preferred candidates were defeated by white-bloc voting in all 31 elections
Dr. Palmer examined. GPX 5, ¶ 21. Dr. Alford did not dispute Dr. Palmer’s
conclusions about racial-bloc voting. Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 159:7–11.
Dr. Palmer also assessed the anticipated performance of Plaintiffs’
Illustrative Congressional District 6. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 47:21–48:2.
Dr. Palmer concluded that this proposed district would permit the Black voters
there to elect candidates of their choice with an average of 66.7% of the vote. Id.
at 48:5–8, 58:13–59:1; GPX 5, ¶¶ 8, 22–23. Dr. Alford did not contest this
conclusion. Dr. Palmer’s analysis of the illustrative district also weighs in favor
of the feasibility of the Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ proposed remedy.
199
For these reasons and those explained above,37 the Court credits
Dr. Palmer’s analysis and testimony, and concludes that the Pendergrass
Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden under the third Gingles precondition.
b) Grant
Dr. Palmer testified similarly concerning the regions he examined in
Grant. In the areas as a whole and in each legislative district, Dr. Palmer
concluded that white voters had clearly identifiable candidates of choice for
every election he analyzed. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 60:22–25; GPX 6, ¶ 17 &
figs. 2–3, tbl.1. In elections from 2012 to 2021, white voters were highly cohesive
in voting in opposition to the Black voters’ candidate of choice. On average,
Dr. Palmer found that white voters supported Black-preferred candidates with
a maximum of just 17.7% of the vote. GPX 6, ¶ 17. That is, white voters on
average supported their preferred candidates with an estimated vote share of
82.3%. Id.
Dr. Palmer also concluded that, as a result of this racially polarized
voting, candidates preferred by Black voters in the regions he examined have
generally been unable to win elections outside of majority-Black districts. GPX
200
6, ¶ 20. He testified that “Black-preferred candidates win almost every election
in the Black-majority districts, but lose almost every election in the non Black-
majority districts.” Id.
Using returns from 31 statewide elections, Dr. Palmer analyzed the
illustrative State House and Senate districts drawn by Esselstyn. GPX 6, ¶ 22 &
fig.5, tbl.10. He found that in “Senate Districts 23, 25, and 28, the Black-
preferred candidate won a larger share of the vote in all 31 statewide elections.
In House District 117, the Black-preferred candidate won all 19 elections since
2018.” Id. ¶ 22. He also confirmed that that changes Esselstyn made to the
majority-Black districts in the Enacted Maps would not change the ability of
candidates preferred by Black voters to win there. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr.
65:1–4.
For these reasons and those explained above,38 the Court credits
Dr. Palmer’s analysis and testimony, and concludes that the Grant Plaintiffs
have satisfied their burden under the third Gingles precondition.
201
c) Alpha Phi Alpha
The Alpha Phi Alpha Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Handley, also provided
evidence about racial-bloc voting. She performed the same type of analysis for
racial-bloc voting as she did for political cohesion, looking at voting patterns
by race in the six identified regions. APAX 3, at 2. For every general election
she analyzed, Dr. Handley found that white voters voted as a bloc against the
preferred candidates of Black voters. Id. at 8; APAX 4, at 5, 7–10; APA Doc. No.
[118-1]; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 90:18–20, 91:22–25, 101:20–23. She concluded
that, as a result of the stark racial polarization, candidates preferred by Black
voters were consistently unable to win elections and will likely continue to be
unable to win elections outside of majority-Black districts. Feb. 10, 2022,
Morning Tr. 95:24–96:3; APAX 3, at 8–9.
Specifically, Dr. Handley found that the candidate of choice for Black
voters on average secured the support of less than 5% of white voters in State
Senate races and less than 9.5% of white voters in State House races. APAX 3,
at 8; APAX 4, at 5, 7–10. As a result, blocs of white voters in the regions
Dr. Handley examined were able to consistently defeat the candidates
preferred by Black voters in state legislative general elections, except where the
districts were majority Black. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 95:21–96:3; APA Doc.
202
No. [118-1]. Based on this “starkly” racially polarized voting, Dr. Handley
concluded that the ability of Black voters to elect candidates of their choice to
the Georgia General Assembly is substantially impeded unless majority-
minority districts are drawn to provide Black voters with such opportunities.
Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 82:16–83:4, 95:9–96:3, 99:12–18; APAX 3, at 12.
Dr. Handley also evaluated whether Black voters had the opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice under the illustrative districts drawn by Cooper
compared with the Enacted Maps. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 81:21–25; APAX
3, at 7–8. She used recompiled election results with official data from 2016, 2018,
and 2020 statewide election contests and 2020 Census data, to determine
whether Black voters have an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.
Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 92:18–93:3, 93:7–9; APAX 3, at 2–4. Recompiled
elections analysis has been accepted by courts and used by special masters
specifically for the purpose of evaluating whether a proposed majority-
minority district will provide Black voters with the opportunity to elect their
candidates of choice. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 92:1–93:17.
To do so, Dr. Handley calculated a “General Election” effectiveness score
(“GE Score”), which averaged the vote-share of candidates of choice for Black
voters in five prior statewide elections in each of the districts in the illustrative
203
maps and the Enacted Maps for the regions of focus. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr.
92:18–93:3, 93:7–9; APAX 3, at 12. The GE Scores show that, on average, the
candidates preferred by Black voters receive less than 50% of the vote outside
of districts that are majority-Black and were thus likely to be defeated. Feb. 10,
2022, Morning Tr. 97:4–99:11; APAX 3, at 12–23. Based on her analysis,
Dr. Handley concluded that the illustrative maps provide “at least one
additional black opportunity district compared to the enacted plan” in the
regions she analyzed. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 83:2–4; APAX 3, at 12–20. This
means that, for each of the proposed majority-Black districts, candidates of
choice for Black voters would have received more than 50% of the total vote,
providing Black voters with an opportunity they would not otherwise have had
to elect those candidates. APAX 3, at 22–23.
For example, in and around Illustrative House District 153, white voters
consistently joined together to defeat Black voters’ candidates of choice. Feb.
10, 2022, Morning Tr. 95:21–96:3; APA Doc. No. [118-1]. As House District 173
was constituted before the Enacted Maps were adopted, its area overlapped
with illustrative House District 153. In elections in District 173 in 2016 and 2020,
candidates preferred by Black voters garnered more than 96% of Black votes
but were defeated because of white racial-bloc voting, with white voters’
204
candidates of choice securing more than 90% of the white vote. APAX 4, at 8,
10.
Accordingly, and for the reasons explained above,39 the Court credits
Dr. Handley’s analysis and testimony and concludes that the Alpha Phi Alpha
Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden under the third Gingles precondition.
4. The Senate Factors
As indicated above, to determine whether vote dilution is occurring, “a
court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority
electoral opportunities on the basis of objective factors. The Senate Report [from
the 1982 Amendments to the VRA] specifies factors which typically may be
relevant to a § 2 claim[.]” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44. The Court now reviews the
relevant Senate factors.
a) Senate Factor One: Georgia has a history of

official, voting-related discrimination.
It cannot be disputed that Black Georgians have experienced franchise-
related discrimination. “African-Americans have in the past been subject to
legal and cultural segregation in Georgia[.]” Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969
F. Supp. 749, 767 (N.D. Ga. 1997). “Black residents did not enjoy the right to
39 See supra Section III(A)(2)(b)(3)(a).
205
vote until Reconstruction.” Id. “Moreover, early in this century, Georgia passed
a constitutional amendment establishing a literacy test, poll tax, property
ownership requirement, and a good-character test for voting.” Id. “This act was
accurately called the ‘Disfranchisement Act.’ Such devices that limited black
participation in elections continued into the 1950s.” Id.
This Court recently took judicial notice of the fact that “prior to the 1990s,
Georgia had a long sad history of racist policies in a number of areas including
voting.” Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, No. 1:18-CV-5391-SCJ, slip op.
at 41 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2021) (hereinafter, “Fair Fight”) (order denying
defendants’ motion for summary judgment). As this Court has described,
“Georgia has a history chocked full of racial discrimination at all levels. This
discrimination was ratified into state constitutions, enacted into state statutes,
and promulgated in state policy. Racism and race discrimination were apparent
and conspicuous realities, the norm rather than the exception.” Fayette Cnty.,
950 F. Supp. 2d at 1314; see also Wright, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 (“Georgia’s
history of discrimination has been rehashed so many times that the Court can
all but take judicial notice thereof.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
206
The Pendergrass and Grant Plaintiffs detailed this sad history through
the report and testimony of their expert witness, Dr. Orville Vernon Burton. See
GPX 7; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 4:11–43:22. Dr. Burton is a professor of
history at Clemson University who earned his undergraduate degree from
Furman University and Ph.D. in American History from Princeton University.
GPX 7, at 4. He was retained “to analyze the history of voting-related
discrimination in Georgia and to contextualize and put in historical perspective
such discrimination.” Id. at 2. His report describes the many decades of efforts
to minimize the influence of minority—and specifically Black—voters. See id.
at 2–3; 7–54. This historical review spans from the Reconstruction era to the
present day. Id. at 9–54. Most of his analysis relates to discrimination that
occurred prior to the 1980s. See id. at 9–38. Dr. Burton expounded on his report
when he testified remotely by videoconference at the hearing, where he was
qualified as an expert on the history of race discrimination and voting. Feb. 10,
2022, Morning Tr. 7:6–11. The Court has reviewed Dr. Burton’s report and
closely observed his testimony. The Court finds Dr. Burton to be highly
credible. His historical analysis was thorough and methodologically sound.
Further, the Court finds Dr. Burton’s conclusions to be reliable.
207
Dr. Burton opined on the extensive history of discrimination against
Black voters in Georgia and concluded that throughout the State’s history,
“voting rights have followed a pattern where after periods of increased
nonwhite voter registration and turnout, the state has passed legislation, and
often used extralegal means, to disenfranchise minority voters.” GPX 7, at 8.
This discrimination included years of physical violence and intimidation (id. at
12–15, 22), as well as official barriers such as poll taxes and legislation that had
the effect of disenfranchising most Black voters (e.g., id. at 15–20). The Court
need not belabor this issue—as stated above, this history is well-documented
in the relevant caselaw. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that Black
Georgians have historically experienced franchise-related discrimination.
During the hearing, Defendants seemingly attempted to cast aside this
history as long past and therefore less relevant. See, e.g., Feb. 10, 2022, Morning
Tr. 25:16–26:13 (emphasizing how much of Dr. Burton’s report concerns pre-
1980 matters). Of course, whether some of the history Dr. Burton discussed is
decades or centuries old does not diminish the importance of those events and
trends under this Senate Factor, which specifically requires the Court to
consider the history of official discrimination in Georgia. And it is not a novel
concept that a history of discrimination can have present-day ramifications. See
208
Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1567; Wright, 301 F. Supp. at 1319 (quoting
Marengo Cnty. Comm’n).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated the
history of voting-related discrimination in Georgia. The first Senate Factor thus
weighs decisively in Plaintiffs’ favor.
b) Senate Factor Two: Georgia voters are racially

polarized.
“The second Senate Factor focuses on ‘the extent to which voting in the
elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized.’” Wright, 979
F.3d at 1305 (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426). “This ‘factor will ordinarily be
the keystone of a dilution case.’” Id. (quoting Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d
at 1566).
Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Palmer and Dr. Handley, provided clear evidence
through their reports and hearing testimony that Black and white Georgians
consistently support different candidates. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alford, did
not contest this point—in fact, he agreed with it. See Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 153:15–154:22. Moreover, Dr. Alford’s observations about the relationship
between race and partisanship—namely, that Black voters overwhelmingly
support Democratic candidates and that white voters overwhelmingly support
Republican candidates (see Feb. 11, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 171:8–16)—are
209
irrelevant because the fact remains that voters are racially polarized, as
Plaintiffs have shown. In short, the Court’s analysis on the second and third
Gingles preconditions controls here.40 The second Senate Factor thus weighs in
Plaintiffs’ favor.
c) Senate Factor Three: Georgia’s voting practices

enhance the opportunity for discrimination.
Senate Factor Three “considers ‘the extent to which the State or political
subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against
bullet voting.’” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–45).
For this Senate Factor, the Court returns to Dr. Burton’s expert report and
testimony. Dr. Burton opined that throughout much of the twentieth century,
Georgia deliberately malapportioned its legislative and congressional districts
to dilute the votes of Black Georgians, citing as examples past congressional
districts in and near Atlanta that were severely malapportioned. See GPX 7, at
29–30; Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 12:7–18. Dr. Burton also opined that Georgia’s
history is marked by electoral schemes that have enhanced the opportunity for
40 See supra Sections III.A.2. and III.A.3.
210
discrimination against Black voters, such as shifts from voting by district to at-
large voting and staggered voting. See GPX 7, at 34–36. Dr. Burton also opined
that similar efforts have persisted to today. See id. at 44–53. Because Plaintiffs
have shown there has been a history of voting practices or procedures in
Georgia that have enhanced the opportunity for discrimination against Black
voters, the Court finds that this factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
d) Senate Factor Four: Georgia has no history of

candidate slating for legislative elections.
It is undisputed that Georgia uses no slating process for its legislative or
congressional elections. As a result, this factor is irrelevant to these cases.
e) Senate Factor Five: Georgia’s discrimination has

produced significant socioeconomic disparities
that impair Black Georgians’ participation in the
political process.
The Eleventh Circuit has “recognized in binding precedent that
‘disproportionate educational, employment, income level, and living
conditions arising from past discrimination tend to depress minority political
participation.’” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731
F.2d at 1568). “Where these conditions are shown, and where the level of black
participation is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further causal nexus
between their disparate socio-economic status and the depressed level of
211
political participation.” Id. (quoting Marengo Cnty., 731 F.2d at 1568–69);
United States v. Dallas Cnty. Comm’n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984)
(“Once lower socio-economic status of [B]lacks has been shown, there is no
need to show the causal link of this lower status on political participation.”)).
Here, Plaintiffs have offered unrebutted evidence that Black Georgians
suffer socioeconomic hardships stemming from centuries-long racial
discrimination, and that those hardships impede their ability to fully
participate in the political process. To that end, the Court accepts the analysis
and conclusions of Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Loren Collingwood. Dr. Collingwood,
a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico, has published
extensively on matters of election administration and racially polarized voting.
See GPX 11, at 2. Dr. Collingwood analyzed data from the American
Community Survey (“ACS”), as well as voter-turnout data from the Georgia
Secretary of State’s office. Id. at 3. From this data, he concluded that Black
Georgians are disadvantaged socioeconomically relative to non-Hispanic white
Georgians by several measures. Id. at 3–6.
For example, the unemployment rate among Black Georgians (8.7%) is
nearly double that of white Georgians (4.4%). Id. at 4; Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 58.
White households in Georgia are twice as likely as Black households to
212
(1) report an annual income above $100,000 and (2) not to live below the
poverty line. GPX 11, at 4; Pendergrass Stip. ¶¶ 59–60. Black Georgians are less
likely than white Georgians to have received a high school diploma or a
bachelor’s degree or higher. GPX 11, at 4; Pendergrass Stip. ¶¶ 62–63. And
statistics indicate that Black Georgians also experience disparities in medical
care. See, e.g., GPX 11, at 4 (stating that Black Georgians are more likely than
white Georgians to lack health insurance).41
These disparities have extended to the political arena. Historically and
today, the number of Black legislators serving in the Georgia General Assembly
has trailed the number of white legislators, and Georgia has never had a Black
governor. See Pendergrass Stip. ¶¶ 64–65. Generally, Black Georgians have
voted at significantly lower rates than white Georgians, and there is evidence
that Black Georgians have been less engaged in political activities such as
attending political meetings and donating to political campaigns. See GPX 11,
at 6–23.
41 This Court recently credited similar evidence that “twice as many Black Georgians
as white Georgians live below the poverty line; the unemployment rate for Black
Georgians is double that of white Georgians; Black Georgians are less likely to attain
a high school or college degree; and Black Georgians die of cancer, heart disease and
diabetes at a higher rate than white Georgians.” Fair Fight, slip op. at 44 (citations
omitted).
213
After careful review of Dr. Collingwood’s report, the Court accepts
Dr. Collingwood as qualified to opine as an expert on demographics and
political science. The Court finds Dr. Collingwood to be credible, his analysis
methodologically sound, and his conclusions reliable. The Court credits
Dr. Collingwood’s opinions and conclusions, which support a finding that
Black Georgians bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in
the political process. Specifically, the Court is persuaded by Dr. Collingwood’s
opinion that many of the socioeconomic disparities discussed above have been
a cause of lower political participation among Black Georgians. See id. at 6.
To be sure, Senator Raphael Warnock was recently elected as the first
Black Georgian to serve Georgia in the U.S. Senate. Pendergrass Stip. ¶ 66. And
while Defendants have highlighted the record-breaking turnout of Black voters
in the 2020 election as an indication that Blacks are no longer hindered from
participating in the political process (see Feb. 10, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 198:18–
24), the Court finds that it is still important to consider the pre-2020 level of
Black political participation for purposes of this Senate Factor. Put another way,
the Court finds that one recent example of increased Black voter turnout does
214
not erase the evidence that Black individuals have for years participated less in
the political process in Georgia.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ evidence on this factor
weighs in favor of a finding of vote dilution.
f) Senate Factor Six: Both overt and subtle racial

appeals are prevalent in Georgia’s political
campaigns.
This factor “asks whether political campaigns in the area are
characterized by subtle or overt racial appeals.” Wright, 979 F.3d at 1296
(quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45).
This Court recently credited evidence of racial appeals in recent Georgia
elections. Fair Fight, slip op. at 44–46. In addition, Plaintiffs have submitted
substantial evidence that overt and subtle racial appeals remain common in
Georgia politics. To start, Dr. Burton’s report provides a historical backdrop for
this issue, discussing early, post-Civil War racial appeals in Georgia politics.
GPX 7, at 9–20. And at the hearing, Dr. Burton related this history to the
modern era, testifying that contemporary racial appeals in Georgia stem from
the political realignment that followed Democrats’ support for civil rights
legislation in the 1960s and that saw white Georgians overwhelmingly switch
to the Republican Party. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 20:13–22:8. Dr. Burton
215
explained that during this transition, Republican politicians courted
conservative constituents with race-based appeals, including what Dr. Burton
deemed to be implicitly racist language and terms such as the “Welfare queen”
and “strapping young buck.” Id.; GPX 8, at 3–6. Dr. Burton further opined that
such coded racial appeals have continued to this day, with conservative
political discourse constantly focused on matters such as poverty, “criminal
corruption,” and immigration. Feb. 10, 2022, Morning Tr. 21:25–22:8, 30:20–
32:13.
For this Senate Factor, Plaintiffs also relied on the report and testimony
of Dr. Adrienne Jones, a political science professor at Morehouse College in
Atlanta, who has expertise in the history of racial discrimination in voting. See
APAX 5, at 3. The Court has reviewed Dr. Jones’s report and listened to her
testify during the hearing. The Court finds her to be credible, and the Court
accepts her as qualified to opine as an expert on political science. Feb. 10, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 172:3–10. In her report and in her testimony, Dr. Jones opined
that explicit and subtle racial appeals have been used in political campaign
strategies in Georgia. E.g., APAX 5, at 25–29; see also Feb. 10, 2022, Afternoon
Tr. 176:2–183:4 (discussing what Dr. Jones determines to be racial appeals in
recent campaigns, which has included the darkening of Black candidates’ skin
216
color in advertisements to create what Dr. Jones opines to be a “dark menacing”
image). Dr. Jones concludes that these and similar instances of race-based
messaging in recent Georgia campaigns and election cycles show that racial
appeals continue to play an important role in Georgia political campaigns.
APAX 5, at 25–29.
After careful review and consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have presented sufficient evidence for this factor to weigh in their favor. The
Court is unable to uphold Defendants’ suggestion that appeals to racism by
“unsuccessful candidates” do not weigh toward this Senate Factor or the
totality of the circumstances. As this Court has previously explained, “this
factor does not require that racially polarized statements be made by successful
candidates. The factor simply asks whether campaigns include racial appeals.”
Fair Fight, slip op. at 45–46 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37).
g) Senate Factor Seven: Black candidates in Georgia

are underrepresented in office and rarely succeed
outside of majority-minority districts.
This factor “focuses on ‘the extent to which members of the minority
group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.’” Wright, 979 F.3d
at 1295 (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 426). “If members of the minority group
have not been elected to public office, it is of course evidence of vote dilution.”
217
Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1571. As discussed above under Senate
Factor Five, Plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that Black Georgians have been
and continue to be underrepresented in statewide elected offices and rarely
succeed in local elections outside of majority-minority districts. Further, the
Court notes that Dr. Burton discussed how Black Georgians historically have
been underrepresented politically—comparatively few Black individuals have
held statewide positions, and Black candidates tend to have struggled even at
the county level unless they were in majority-minority districts. See GPX 7, at
32–38, 53–54. Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that this factor
thus weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
h) Senate Factor Eight: Georgia is not responsive to

its Black residents.
“The authors of the Senate Report apparently contemplated that
unresponsiveness would be relevant only if the plaintiff chose to make it so,
and that although a showing of unresponsiveness might have some probative
value a showing of responsiveness would have very little.” Marengo Cnty.
Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1572 (footnote omitted). As discussed above,
Dr. Collingwood’s expert report shows significant socioeconomic disparities
between Black and white Georgians, which Dr. Collingwood opines contribute
to the lower rates at which Black Georgians engage in the political process and
218
elect their preferred candidates. See GPX 11, at 16–19. Moreover, political
science professor Dr. Traci Burch was offered as an expert in political behavior,
barriers to voting, and political participation. See APAX 6, at 3. She explained
that disparities, such as the ones Dr. Collingwood identified, are often caused
by public policies and demonstrate a lack of responsiveness by public officials
to the needs of Black Georgians, which in turn leaves those Black Georgians
dissatisfied with their elected representatives and the quality of the local
services they receive. See id. at 28. While the Court does not find that this
evidence causes this factor to weigh heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor, it still weighs
in their favor.
i) Senate Factor Nine: The justifications for the

enacted redistricting maps are tenuous.
Defendants have offered no justification for the General Assembly’s
failure to draw additional majority-Black legislative districts in the areas at
issue in the pending cases. And Mr. Esselstyn’s and Mr. Cooper’s illustrative
maps demonstrate that it is possible to create such maps while respecting
traditional redistricting principles—just as the Voting Rights Act requires.
This factor thus weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
219
5. Conclusions of Law
As is clear from this discussion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
satisfied each of the Gingles preconditions for at least some of the Illustrative
Districts at issue. Further, all the applicable Senate Factors weigh in Plaintiffs’
favor. The Court therefore concludes that the Pendergrass Plaintiffs have
satisfied their burden to show a substantial likelihood of success as to
Illustrative Congressional District 6. The Grant Plaintiffs have shown a
substantial likelihood of success as to Illustrative State Senate Districts 25 and
28, and Illustrative State House Districts 74 and 177. The Alpha Phi Alpha
Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success as to Illustrative State House
District 153. This does not mean that the other proposed districts cannot
ultimately succeed, only that Plaintiffs have not met their burden as to those
districts at this preliminary injunction stage.
B. Irreparable Injury
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that an injury is irreparable “if it
cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Cunningham v. Adams, 808
F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). It has also been held that
“[a]bridgement or dilution of a right so fundamental as the right to vote
constitutes irreparable injury.” Cardona v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 785
220
F. Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v.
North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Courts routinely deem
restrictions on fundamental voting rights irreparable injury.”) (citations
omitted).
In view of this Court’s finding, supra, that there is a substantial
likelihood the Enacted Plans violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,42 this
Court further finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of persuasion of
establishing that the resulting threatened injury of having to vote under those
plans cannot be undone through any form of monetary or post-election relief
as to the 2022 election cycle only. See League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 247
(“[O]nce the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress.”).
C. Balancing of the Equities and Public Interest
“The last two requirements for a preliminary injunction involve a
balancing of the equities between the parties and the public.” Florida v. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 19 F.4th 1271, 1293 (11th Cir. 2021). “Where the
government is the party opposing the preliminary injunction, its interest and
harm—the third and fourth elements—merge with the public interest.” Id.
42 See generally supra Section III.A.
221
(citation omitted). All Defendants in each of the cases at issue were named in
their official capacities as governmental actors and oppose the preliminary
injunction. Therefore, the Court will address the third and fourth preliminary
injunction factors together in a merged format in accordance with applicable
authority. See Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020) (indicating
that the balance of the equities and public interest factors “‘merge’ when, as
here, ‘the Government is the opposing party’”) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).
Thus, the Court proceeds with its findings of fact and conclusions of law
as to the issue of whether the threatened injuries to Plaintiffs outweigh the
harm that the preliminary injunction would cause Defendants and the public.
1. Findings of Fact
At the preliminary injunction hearing, this Court heard extensive
evidence about Georgia’s election timelines and machinery, as well as evidence
on the potential effects of issuing a preliminary injunction related to the
upcoming 2022 election cycle. The Court heard from multiple witnesses in this
regard. The Court found the expert witness testimony of Lynn Bailey, the
former director of the Richmond County Board of Elections, who has decades
of experience as a county election official, particularly credible.
222
More specifically, the evidence at the hearing showed that the election
timeline is tight in a normal year, but it is even more challenging this year
because of the delayed release of the 2020 Census data and an earlier-than-
usual general primary, currently scheduled for May 24, 2022. DX 38, ¶ 8; Feb.
9, 2022, Morning Tr. 8:21–9:2. The General Election is scheduled to be held on
November 8, 2022. DX 4, Ex. 1, at 1.
In addition, the election calendar generally works backwards from the
date for an election. DX 38, ¶ 12. The earliest day a candidate could circulate a
nominating petition for the 2022 General Election was January 13, 2022. See
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-170(e). The deadline for calling special elections to be held in
conjunction with the May 2022 primary and the deadline for setting polling
places outside the boundaries of a precinct was February 23, 2022. DX 38,
¶¶ 13–14; Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr. 118:6–12. Qualifying for the May 2022
primary is set to begin on March 7, 2022. DX 4, ¶ 6; see also O.C.G.A. § 21-2-
153(c)(1)(A). County registrars can begin mailing absentee ballots on April 5,
2022. DX 4, ¶14. Absentee ballots for overseas voters must be mailed by April
9, 2022. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 88:4–8; see also O.C.G.A. § 21-2-384(a)(2).
The early voting period for the May 2022 primary election begins on May 2,
2022. DX 4, Ex. 1, at 2. The primary election is scheduled to be held on May 24,
223
2022. Id. at 1.43 The primary election runoff is scheduled for June 21, 2022. Id.
The General Election is scheduled to be held on November 8, 2022. Id.
Before the Georgia Secretary of State’s office can create ballots for use in
the primary election, county elections officials must allocate voters to their
correct districts by updating street segments in Georgia’s voter registration
database—the 2022 process has already begun as of the date of this Order. DX 4,
¶¶ 6–7; Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr. 41:24–42:10. More specifically, county election
officials have to update each individual street segment manually to update
district numbers for voters on that street segment. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr.
17:5–18:9, 32:1–25. During this process, county election officials engage in a
manual review of maps to identify where each street segment is located on the
new district plans. Id. at 20:14–21:9, 81:7–20; DX 38, ¶ 9. Once a county has
entered the data-entry/redistricting module, the county registrar is prevented
from engaging in normal activity in the voter registration system, such as
adding new voters. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr. 20:4–11; DX 7, at 31.
43 A number of Georgia election officials requested a change in the primary election

schedule in the summer of 2021; however, the General Assembly did not make that
change during the special session, as had been requested. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr.
54:1–23. Without the schedule change, election officials proceeded to plan for the
election by contacting polling places and taking other steps based on the established
election calendar. Id. at 57:6–25.
224
Defendants’ representative witness from the Secretary of State’s office,
Michael Barnes, stated in his declaration that “[c]ounty registrars generally
need several weeks to complete the reallocation process for voters in their
particular counties.” DX 4, ¶ 16.44 There was also evidence that it took Fulton
County four weeks to update its street segments. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr.
83:12–19.45
After counties complete updating their street segments, the next step is
to request precinct cards from the voter-registration system to notify voters
about their new districts. DX 7, at 49. Also, after county registrars complete the
process of updating all the street segments in a county with new district
numbers, the Center for Election Systems of the Office of the Secretary of State
begins the manual process of creating ballot combinations for use in the
44 The Secretary of State set a February 18, 2022, non-statutory deadline for all county
registrars to complete their updates to the voter-registration database with new
district information. DX 4, ¶ 15; DX 38, ¶ 12; Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 73:20–74:1.
45 Plaintiffs’ demographer/map expert, Mr. Esselstyn also provided testimony about
the feasibility of implementing his maps/plans. However, that testimony was based
on his belief that Georgia’s voter-registration system allowed the mass assignment of
all voters in a single precinct to a particular district. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 123:15–
124:16. Mr. Esselstyn was mistaken on that point, as several county election officials
attested, and thus his testimony on the feasibility of relief does not assist the Court.
225
election. DX 4, ¶¶ 8–9, 11; DX 38, ¶ 12; Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 68:3–23.46
Ballot combinations account for every possible combination of political districts
in the State and include all races from United States Congress down to county
commission and school board. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 67:11–68:2; Feb. 9,
2022, Morning Tr. 105:4–24. There is at least one ballot combination per
precinct, so the total is more than 2,000 ballot combinations or styles in the state
of Georgia. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 67:24–68:2; DX 4, ¶ 9. According to
Elections Director Michael Barnes, the Center for Election Systems has already
started building election projects for use in the 2022 primary election for
counties that already know their districts. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 70:4–7.
Once qualifying occurs, the Center for Election Systems adds candidate
names to the relevant contests and begins preparing proofing packages to send
to counties. DX 4, ¶ 12; Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 70:8–71:2. County election
officials then proof those drafts, identify errors, and return the drafts to the
Center for Election Systems to make corrections to the databases. Feb. 8, 2022,
Afternoon Tr. 71:3–6; DX 38, ¶¶ 15, 16. The Center for Election Systems then
46 State officials cannot build ballot combinations until after county registrars have
entered all updated information into the voter-registration database. Feb. 9, 2022,
Morning Tr. 92:16–19.
226
makes those corrections, generates a revised proofing package, and creates
print files for absentee ballots and final project files for programming the voting
machines. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 71:7–23. This entire process occurs for all
159 counties between the close of qualifying on March 11 and the deadline for
sending ballots for overseas voters on April 9. Id. at 71:24–72:4, 86:23–88:8.
The upcoming primary is the first time the State of Georgia has built
ballot combinations for the Dominion ballot-marking voting system after
redistricting. Id. at 72:8–20. In addition, extra election projects have to be built
this year because of the addition of ranked-choice voting for overseas and
military voters. Id. If all the ballot combinations are not ready by qualifying,
then no ballot proofing can occur because the Center for Elections Systems
cannot generate a proofing package without both the ballot combinations and
candidate information. Id. at 72:21–73:19.
There was also evidence presented at the hearing about various
remedial/injunctive relief options, such as changing the qualifying date
without changing the election date, and changing both the qualifying and
election dates. The evidence revealed that if the qualifying dates for the primary
elections are moved without moving the May 24, 2022, election date, the work
of the Center for Election Systems and counties becomes incredibly
227
compressed, risking the accuracy of the election. Id. 74:13–75:16. In essence,
delaying qualifying without delaying the primary would limit the time election
officials have to engage in the quality-assurance checks necessary to ensure the
election is accurate. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr. 8:13–9:15. In addition, without
candidate names after qualifying, no ballot proofs can be completed, meaning
that the Center for Election Systems cannot send proofing packages and
counties cannot begin proofing ballots. Feb. 8, 2022, Afternoon Tr. 75:17–76:7.
There was also testimony that reduced time for proofing ballots can lead to
errors in information that could result in less voter confidence in the election
system. Id. at 102:8–103:15.
The evidence also showed that delaying qualifying without delaying the
primary while also imposing new district lines would require election officials
to simultaneously input new district information while conducting other tasks
related to elections, reducing the opportunity to check for errors. DX 38, ¶ 21.
The evidence from Ms. Bailey concerning changing the election date was
clear: there could be “massive upheaval.” DX 38, ¶ 19. She testified that there
could be problems with the polling places as some counties have already
secured their polling locations for the May 2022 primary. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning
Tr. 94:15–19, 111:20–25, 119:3–5. In addition, election officials have already
228
scheduled poll workers and poll-worker training around the existing election
calendar for the May primary. Id. at 121:7–10. And voters are already being
notified of their districts and polling locations for the May primary election. Id.
at 10:13–11:11.
The testimony also showed that facilities used as polling locations have
other events on their calendars this year. Id. at 9:16–24, 27:15–23; DX 38, ¶¶ 19–
20. For example, churches have often scheduled Vacation Bible School around
the planned election dates and may not be available as polling locations if the
date of the election were to change. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr. 68:5–19, 119:3–18.
In addition, finding new polling facilities is challenging not only because of
scheduling but also because of the electrical power needs of Georgia’s voting
machines. Id. at 73:17–74:5, 75:15–20.47
Furthermore, when the 2020 primary elections were delayed during the
pandemic, county officials in Fulton County lost access to polling locations. Id.
at 95:10–24. The resulting loss of access meant voters were combined in voting
47The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs’ witness, Bishop Reginald Johnson, offered 520
African Methodist Episcopal churches as polling places. Feb. 9, 2022, Afternoon Tr.
131:24–132:21. However, it was not clearly established that all 520 of these churches
would meet the power requirements for the Dominion voting machines and other
polling location requirements.
229
locations. Id. at 95:1–96:17. Voters in Fulton County (a number of whom were
of color) waited in line for hours during the June 9, 2020, primary at locations
where polling places had to be combined. Id. at 96:18–97:22. There was also
testimony that voter confidence can be adversely affected by long lines and that
moving polling locations causes confusion for voters. Id. at 98:9–23; Feb. 9,
2022, Afternoon Tr. 144:21–23.48
Additionally, there was testimony of the “whiplash” effect that could
occur if the primary election date were changed by this Court and then that
order were stayed by an appellate court. On this, the testimony from Ms. Bailey
was clear that there would be chaos and confusion for local election officials
and voters. Feb. 9, 2022, Morning Tr. 12:22–13:3; DX 38, ¶ 19.
2. Conclusions of Law
This Court must weigh the threatened injury to Plaintiffs (discussed
above) and the public interests of the State of Georgia.
48 Another potential concern with awarding remedial relief in these cases is the fact
that the recent change in Georgia law from nine-week runoffs to four-week runoffs is
currently being challenged in three of the consolidated cases challenging provisions
of SB 202, which regulates various election processes and activities. New Georgia
Project v. Raffensperger, Sixth District AME v. Raffensperger, and Concerned Black
Clergy v. Raffensperger, Consolidated Case No. 1:21-mi-55555-JPB (N.D. Ga.).
230
The State of Georgia has significant interests “in conducting an efficient
election [and] maintaining order,” because “‘[c]onfidence in the integrity of our
electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory
democracy.’” New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4).
The Court finds that the public interest of the State of Georgia would be
significantly undermined by altering the election calendar and unwinding the
electoral process at this point.
More specifically, the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing
showed that elections are complex and election calendars are finely calibrated
processes, and significant upheaval and voter confusion can result if changes
are made late in the process. With candidate qualifying for the State of Georgia
set to begin in six days, any change now would be considered late in the
process. Applying the Purcell principle, the United States Supreme Court “has
also repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not
alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (citing, inter alia, Purcell,
549 U.S. at 1).
231
And while “it would be the unusual case in which a court would be
justified in not taking appropriate action to [e]nsure that no further elections
are conducted under the invalid plan,” the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that “under certain circumstances, such as where an impending
election is imminent and a State’s election machinery is already in progress,
equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding the granting of
immediately effective relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though
the existing apportionment scheme was found invalid.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
585. Here, in considering the “proximity of a forthcoming election and the
mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and . . . general equitable
principles,” the Court is of the opinion that it would not be proper to enjoin the
2022 election cycle for which the election machinery is already in progress. Id.
More specifically, the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing
showed that moving the date for qualifying without moving the date of the
primary election risks the accuracy of the primary because of the required
timelines for building ballot combinations, proofing draft ballots, and
preparing ballots for printing by the deadline for overseas and military voters.
Likewise, moving the primary election date would upend months of planning
by local election officials. Multiple county election officials testified that they
232
already selected polling places for all election dates in 2022 and changing those
dates could entail having to locate new polling places on short notice. Fulton
County’s experience in June 2020 showed that consolidating polling places at
the last minute can lead to long lines for voters (including voters of color). And
several witnesses testified to the voter confusion that would occur if last-
minute changes were required. There is also the potential for “whiplash” if
orders of this Court and subsequent rulings of appellate courts resulted in
different conclusions. Such events could create even more voter confusion and
loss of confidence in the election system. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5 (“Court
orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result
in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”).
In essence, the sum of the testimony of the election officials presented at the
preliminary injunction hearing was that changes in the 2022 election calendar
at this point would result in significant cost, confusion, and hardship.
Further, under applicable law, this Court would be required to first give
the Georgia General Assembly the opportunity to draw new district plans
based on this Court’s findings. Cf. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)
(“When a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme
unconstitutional, it is therefore, appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a
233
reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements
by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and
order into effect its own plan.”).49 Even if this election process were to continue
through a court-drawn redistricting plan, at least one former special master
recommends “[a]llowing one month for the drawing of a plan and an
additional month for hearings and potential modifications to it [in order to]
build in enough of a cushion so that all concerned can proceed in a nonfrenzied
fashion.” Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on
Court-Drawn Redistricting Plans, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1131, 1148 (2005). This
is because “[a] quick plan . . . is not necessarily a good plan.” Id. at 1147.50
Ultimately, voters are not well served “by a chaotic, last–minute
reordering of [] districts. It is best for candidates and voters to know
significantly in advance of the [qualifying] period who may run where.” Favors
49 While constitutionality of the apportionment scheme is not at issue in these three

cases, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wise is still analogous.
50 The Court notes that the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing showed
that the General Assembly’s process of drawing redistricting maps for 2021 took “a
couple of months” even though the legislation for the maps was introduced,
considered, and passed in a matter of days. Feb. 11, 2022, Morning Tr. 59:3–17; 114:9–
15.
234
v. Cuomo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 356, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (three-judge court) (citing
Diaz v. Silver, 932 F. Supp. 462, 466–68 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (three-judge court)).
While not precedential, as indicated above, the Court is also aware of the
Supreme Court’s ruling on Alabama’s motion to stay the three-judge court’s
injunction in Merrill v. Milligan. APA Doc. No. [97]; Grant Doc. No. [59];
Pendergrass Doc. No. [65].51 Given the similarity of the claims in these three
cases on the one hand and the Alabama cases on the other hand (i.e., they are
Section 2 cases seeking at least one additional majority-minority district), and
the timeline (i.e., both sets of cases involve a May 24 primary election), it would
be unwise, irresponsible, and against common sense for this Court not to take
note of Milligan, which essentially allowed Alabama’s May 24, 2022, primary
election to go forward despite a three-judge court’s preliminary injunction
ruling that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on the merits of their
Section 2 claims. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982) (noting that the
Supreme Court has “authorized District Courts to order or to permit elections
51The Court also recognizes that the stay issued by the Supreme Court did not change
the law in this Circuit. Cf. Schwab v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1297, 1298
(11th Cir. 2007) (“The district court’s action in granting the stay is contrary to the
unequivocal law of this circuit that . . . grants of certiorari do not themselves change
the law . . . .”).
235
to be held pursuant to apportionment plans that do not in all respects measure
up to the legal requirements, even constitutional requirements”).
Numerous other lower courts have also permitted elections to proceed
when the state’s election machinery was already in progress, even after a
finding that the districts were unlawful. See Wright v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of
Elections & Registration, No. 1:14-CV-42 (WLS), 2018 WL 7365178, at *3 (Mar.
30, 2018), objections overruled, 2018 WL 7365179 (Apr. 11, 2018), and modified,
2018 WL 7366461 (M.D. Ga. June 21, 2018); see also Covington, 316 F.R.D. 117.
While this Court proceeded with these three important cases as quickly
as practicable in light of the complicated issues involved, the “greatest public
interest must attach to adjudicating these claims fairly—and correctly.” Favors,
881 F. Supp. 2d at 371. Given the massively complex factual issues combined
with the timeline of candidate qualifying set to begin in days, it would not serve
the public interest or the candidates, poll workers, and voters to enjoin use of
the Enacted Plans and begin the process of putting new plans in their place for
the 2022 election cycle.
After review of the evidence and briefing submitted by the parties, this
Court concludes that due to the mechanics of State election requirements, there
is insufficient time to effectuate remedial relief for purposes of the 2022 election
236
cycle. The Court is unable to disregard the Purcell principle given the progress
of Georgia’s election machinery toward the 2022 election. The merged
balancing of the harms and public interest factors weigh against injunctive
relief at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the pending Motions for
Preliminary Injunctions in each of the above-stated cases. Doc. Nos. [26], [39],
1:21-cv-5337; Doc. No. [32], 1:21-cv-5339; Doc. No. [19], 1:22-cv-122.52 Having
determined that a preliminary injunction should not issue, the Court cautions
that this is an interim, non-final ruling that should not be viewed as an
indication of how the Court will ultimately rule on the merits at trial.
Under the specific circumstances of this case, the Court finds that
proceeding with the Enacted Maps for the 2022 election cycle is the right
decision. But it is a difficult decision. And it is a decision the Court did not
make lightly.
52 While the option of halting all proceedings to await a future ruling by the United
States Supreme Court was briefly mentioned at the preliminary injunction hearing, in
the absence of a formal motion and full briefing, the Court declines to halt these
proceedings. To this regard, each of the above-stated cases shall proceed on the same
discovery tracks previously set for the three-judge court redistricting cases pending
in the Northern District of Georgia. The Court will issue formal scheduling orders at
a later date.
237
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of February, 2022.
HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
238

Georgia Redistricting Order

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Georgia Redistricting Order

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Georgia Redistricting Order

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 1:21-cv-05337-SCJ Document 134 Filed 02/28/22 Page 1 of 238

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ALPHA PHI ALPHA FRATERNITY CIVIL ACTION FILE

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, et al.,

I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................11

A. What Is Redistricting and Why Is It Necessary? ................................12

B. Factual History ........................................................................................14

D. Timeline ....................................................................................................19

II. LEGAL STANDARD ....................................................................................21

A. Preliminary Injunction ...........................................................................21

1. Eleventh Circuit ................................................................................21

2. Recent Supreme Court Authority ..................................................23

B. The Voting Rights Act ............................................................................27

1. The Gingles Preconditions ..............................................................28

2. The Senate Factors............................................................................29

C. Evidentiary Considerations...................................................................32

D. Motions to Dismiss .................................................................................33

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ..........................34

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.....................................................34

1. The First Gingles Precondition: Numerosity and

a) Credibility Determinations ......................................................35

(1) Mr. Cooper ...........................................................................35

(2) Mr. Esselstyn........................................................................38

(3) Mr. Morgan ..........................................................................42

(4) Ms. Wright ...........................................................................46

b) First Gingles Precondition Legal Standard .............................51

(1) Numerosity ..........................................................................52

(2) Compactness ........................................................................54

c) Pendergrass ................................................................................55

(1) Numerosity ..........................................................................58

(a) Demographic developments in Georgia ...................59

(b) Georgia’s 2021 congressional plan ............................63

(c) The Pendergrass Plaintiffs’ illustrative

(2) Geographic Compactness ..................................................69

(a) Population equality ......................................................71

(b) Compactness .................................................................71

(d) Preservation of political subdivisions .......................76

(e) Preservation of communities of interest ...................79

(f) Core Retention ..............................................................85

(g) Racial considerations ...................................................87

(3) Conclusions of Law ............................................................92

d) Grant and Alpha Phi Alpha .....................................................93

(1) The Grant Plaintiffs are substantially likely to

(a) Senate Districts ...........................................................101

i) Numerosity ...........................................................101

ii) Geographic compactness ....................................107

(a) Population equality ......................................108

(b) Compactness ..................................................110

(c) Contiguity ......................................................115

(d) Preservation of political

(e) Preservation of communities of

(f) Incumbent protection ...................................123

(g) Core retention ................................................123

(h) Racial considerations ....................................125

(b) Esselstyn House Districts ..........................................129

i) Numerosity ...........................................................129

ii) Geographic Compactness...................................133

(a) Population equality ......................................134